SPOUSES VICENTE AND LOURDES PINGOL V HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

AND HEIRS OF FRANCISCO DONASCO

G.R. NO. 102909 SEPTEMBER 6, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan
described in TCT No. 7435. Later, he executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-
HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of
Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public. Pursuant to the contract,
Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed
a house and started paying monthly installments up to 1972. On 1984, Donasco died and had
paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00. On Oct
1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for "Specific Performance and Damages,
with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against the spouses Vicent. They averred that
after the death of their father, they offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00 plus the stipulated
legal rate of interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but the latter rebuffed their offer. defendants
admitted the execution of the aforementioned deed of sale, the segregation of the portion sold
and the preparation and approval of the subdivision plan, but set up the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed; (2) the deed of sale
embodied a conditional contract of sale"; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the
assumption that Francisco Donasco would be able to comply with his obligation; (4) when
Francisco died, he had not fully paid the total consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the
breach by Francisco the sale was deemed to have been cancelled and the continuous occupancy
of Francisco after 1976 and by his heirs thereafter was by mere tolerance of Vicente Pingol.

ISSUE:
Whether the action of quieting title has prescribed.

RULING:
No. The Court held that prescription cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is
aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. The
contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the
buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject
lot was made upon the execution of the deed of sale 18 while the actual delivery was effected
when the private respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A.
Although Vicente Pingol asserts that he had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was
cancelling the contract, he did not prove that his demand for rescission was made either
judicially or by a notarial act. That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is
indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the
deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to
accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly insisted that their
obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective. The rationale for this rule has been aptly
stated thus: The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his
possession is invaded or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person
claiming title to real property, but not in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and within the
time provided by the statute. Possession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such
possession. So it has been determined that an owner of real property in possession has a
continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a continuing menace to his
title. Such a menace is compared to a continuing nuisance or trespass which is treated as
successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until continued without interruption for
a length of time sufficient to affect a change of title as a matter of law.

CORONEL V HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ELIAS MERLAN,

BRIGIDO MERLAN, TEODORICO NOSTRATIS, SEVERO JECIEL SANTIAGO FERNAN
AND FORTUNATO OCAMPO
G.R. NO. 70191 October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel
Santiago Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before the CFI of Cavite. Coronel alleged
that at the time he purchased the subject parcel of land, the defendants were
already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will" and despite demands to
vacate, the defendants failed and refused to move out. The defendants denied that
Coronel was the owner of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots they
occupied is part of the 1/3 undivided share inherited from their deceased father and
that the plaintiff's claim of ownership of the whole parcel of land, if ever it has
basis, is fraudulent, void, and without effect. Third-Party Defendant denied that
they had something to do with the fraudulent acts or illegal machinations which
deprived the defendants of their share in the subject parcel of land, and that what
they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel. The RTC ruled in
favor of defendants and on appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. The records show
that Coronel bought Lot No. 1950-Aof the Naic Estate from Mariano Manalo
without any mention of the 1/3 share of the private respondents land.
Consequently, there was a mistake when TCT was issued to Manalo covering the
whole area of Lot No. 1950-A. Coronel contends that the claim of the private
respondents over their 1/3 undivided portion of Lot No. 1950-A 25 years after the
registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio Manalo in 1950 and more than
five (5) years after the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Mariano Manalo
is barred by prescription or laches.

ISSUE:

Whether there is undue delay on the part of the private respondents to claim their
1/3 portion.

RULING:

NO. The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in effect a

reconveyance to them of their 1/3 undivided share over lot No. 1950-A has not
prescribed.As lawful possessors and owners of the lot their cause of action falls
within the settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property-in one's
possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession of more than 25 years
gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect of his own title. If at all,
the private respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to annul TCT
accrued only in 1975 when they were made aware of a claim adverse to their own.
It was only at that time that, the statutory period of prescription may be said to
have commenced to run against them. In the same manner, there is no bar based on
laches to assert their right over 1/3 of the disputed property. It is shown that the
private respondents is in possession of the 1/3 portion, exercising ownership
thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only in 1975 when the petitioner tried to
remove them by virtue of his torrens title covering the entire Lot. It was only at this
point that private respondents knew about the supposed sale of their 1/3 portion of
Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they immediately resisted. The Registrar of
Deeds of Cavite is ordered to segregate the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the
Naic Estate (4,063 square meters) from the entire portion embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-75543 and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the
heirs of Gabriel Merlan over the disputed one-third portion and another new
certificate of title over the remaining two-thirds portion of the land in favor of
petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.
SPOUSES HADJI ALI MAMDSUAL AND HADJI SALIKA MAMADSUL V
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, SPOUSE KAGUI ABDULA MACARAPAN
AND KAGUI RAKMA MACARAPAN AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
COTABATO
G.R. NO. 92557 SEPTEMBER 27, 1990

FACTS:

On Nov 14, 1988, Spouses Hadji filed a complaint against Spouses Kagui for
"Quieting of Title To Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-
122 and P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" with the Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District at Cotabato City.
Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city was impleaded as a nominal
party. on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as
"Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of
Complaint On the Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction." The trial court issued an order
dismissing the complaint that in order that an action for quieting of title shall
prosper, it is necessary that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the
property which is the subject-matter of the action. In the case at bar, plaintiffs have
no legal or equitable title to the land.

ISSUE:

Does the Spouses Hadji has legal or equitable title to the land in question and may
file an action to quiet title.

RULING

YES. The Spouses Hadji has legal or equitable title to the land. In reading of the
complaint, it is alleged that petitioners are in "actual, continuous, and adverse
possession" of the land in question "since time immemorial" in the concept of
owners. The complaint shows that it is an action for quieting title. An action to
quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. It is
not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner
of the property in question. In Chacon, this Court considered the action to be one
for quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession
since time immemorial of the property in question by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, while defendants secured a certificate of title over said
property through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit. Thus, "title" to property does
not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote
acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Indeed,
one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to
quiet title under the law. Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to
property whereby petitioners claim to have acquired title to the same by
prescription, the property was thereby effectively withdrawn from the public
domain and became property of private ownership. Thus, the ruling of the trial
court that the action being one for reversion only the Solicitor General can institute
the same has no cogent basis. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The
questioned orders of the trial court dated November 7, 1989 and January 23, 1990
are hereby reversed and set aside, and the records of the case are remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.
SPOUSES FLORENTINO L. FERNANDEZ AND VIVENCIA FERNANDEZ V HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND ZENAIDA ANGELES FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. 83141 SEPTEMBER 21, 1990

FACTS:
On Nov 28, 1966, petitioners-spouses Florentino and Vivencia Fernandez and
private respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez and the latter's husband Justiniano
Fernandez purchased in common a parcel of land with an area of 310 square
meters. The vendors Torres executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses
Zenaida only. When Spouses Florentino they were not included as vendees they
confronted Zenaida who then executed an affidavit acknowledging the sale to
Spouses Florentino of a portion of the land consisting of 110 square meters and the
receipt of the consideration therefor in the amount of P5,500.00. A duplex building
was constructed occupied by Spouses Florentino and the other unit occupied by
spouses Zenaida. On Jan 26, 1970, Spouse Zenaida caused the issuance of TCT
only in their name. On Feb 26, 1976, Zenaida and Justiniano filed a petition for
voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. The couple prayed for judicial approval of their
compromise agreement wherein Justiniano waived all his rights to the conjugal
properties including the subject parcel of land. Court awarded the parcel of land to
Zenaida. Later she demanded that petitioners vacate the the lot awarded to her.
Spouses Florentino filed an action to quiet title and damages against Zenaida only.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review contending that CA erred in not
declaring them part owners of the lot in question despitethe fact that it is not
disputed that they and Zenaida and Justiniano entered into an agreementwith the
vendors-spouses Santos and Matilde de Torres that the subject land would be
purchased by them in common.

ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Florentino and Vivencia is entitled to a share of the land in
question.

RULING:
YES. The affidavit executed by Justiniano and Zenaida acknowledged the sale of
one-third (1/3) portion of the land to spouses Florentino and the receipt by the
former of the amount of P5,500.00 as consideration thereof. The issuance of a
certificate of title in the name of Zenaida does not preclude Spouses Florentino
from asserting their right of ownership over the land in question. Time and again it
has been ruled that the Torrens system should not be used as a shield to protect
fraud. Moreover, prescription cannot be considered against petitioners who had
been in possession of subject premises from the time it was purchased from the de
Torres spouses in 1967 and continue to possess the same under claim of
ownership. Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that
the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud
(Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442. As far as private respondent Zenaida Angeles
and her husband Justiniano are concerned, the non-registration of the affidavit
admitting their sale of a portion of 110 square meters of the subject land to
petitioners cannot be invoked as a defense because knowledge of an unregistered
sale is equivalent to registration.