PESIGAN V.

ANGELES - Crim Digest

(carabaos confiscated, EO was in 08/25/1980 but
published in June 14 1982)

129 SCRA 174

April 30, 1984
Facts:
Before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, Presidential Executive Order
No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing to the confiscation and forfeiture by the
government of carabaos transported from one province to another. Anselmo L. Pesigan
and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in
the evening of April 2, 1982 with twenty-six (26) carabaos and a calf from Sipocot,
Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas as the destination. In spite of having all the
needed permit to transport and certificates, the carabaos , while passing at Basud,
Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town’s
police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian,
based on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A. Doctor Miranda distributed
the carabaos among 25 farmers of Basud and to a farmer from Vinzons municipal
nursing. The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for
recovery of the carabaos.

Issue:
(1)  Whether the Pesigans may have the recovery of the carabaos.
(2)  Whether the said Executive Order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April
2, 1982.

Ruling:
(1)  Yes. The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos of the value of each
carabao which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a
reasonable rental for each carabao from the 26 farmers who used them. The farmers
should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.
(2)  No. The Executive Order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later
in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only 15 days thereafter
as provided Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
People v. Veridiano Digest
(BP 22 has not yet Taken effect, Must be circulated for 15 days not printed)

Civil Law, When laws take effect, Publication of laws

Issue: w/n BP 22 which was circulated a month after private respondent issued the
dishonored check is applicable

Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting
to P200,000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and despite repreated
demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment hence the filing of charges against
him for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check law.

Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offense on ground that
BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into
effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the
dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense, hence BP
22 is applicable.

The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and
hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said
publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued about
the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet
released for circulation at the time.

Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed

HELD: NO. It is proved that the penal statute in question was made public or circulated only on June
14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the
public can be apprised of the contents and or penalties of a penal statute before it can be bound by
it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no
such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. When the
alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it.

The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning -- or to make known
to the people in general. Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the
Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a
special effectivity provision.
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

Tañada vs. Tuvera

Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, lettersof instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementationand administrative orders.
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have thiscase dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality orstanding to bring the instant petition and that it is not
required for a law to be publishedwhen the date of its effectivity are expressly mentioned in said
laws. Petitioners thencontended that the publication of said Presidential Issuances is a public right
and thatcompelling the respondent to publish it is a public duty that does not need any otherspecific
interest from the petitioner to be given due course.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary
before its enforcement.

RULING:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.
MRCA v. CA Digest
Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private respondents spouses (who were
defendants in said civil case). Said case was dismissed by the trial court due to the non-payment of
proper filing fees when petitioner failed to include include in the complain the amount of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the petitioner comes to SC by petition for
review. Petitioner contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply to the case since said court
decision was not published in the Official Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed said
complaint ten months after the promulgation of the Manchester ruling.

Issue: w/n court rulings need to be published in the Official Gazette order to be effective

HELD: NO.

Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays
down a new rule or procedure. It is a well-established doctrine that the procedure of the court may
be changed at any time and become effective at once so long as it does not affect or change vested
rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of Lands)

As such, the court granted the petition and held that the Manchester ruling should apply to the case
of the petitioner though it was modified by the Sun Insurance case where the court allowed the
payment of docket fees within a reasonable period but not beyond the reglamentary period.
Petitioner was allowed to amend the complaint and specify therein the amount of damages it seeks
from defendant and pay the proper filing fees
Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest
GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989

Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner
Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the
custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the
release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988.
The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where
the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of
automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these
were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published
in the Official Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect

NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative
order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said
issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed
only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general
applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on the assumption that it has
been circularized to all concerned.”

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress,
executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no
general applicability.
Kasilag versus Rodriguez Case Digest/ Brief 69
Phil 217
(ignorance of the law, Good faith may be basis
for excusable ignorance, contract mortgage,
turned antichresis)

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of

improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the
indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio
was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in such case, mortgage
would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute
a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the
tax on the land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax.

Hence, they entered a verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on the condition that they would not collect the interest of
the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits
of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.

These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the
mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the
land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid

ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land,

based upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states “Ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith,” the P’s lack of knowledge of the contract of
antichresis.

HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is

valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void.

REASONING: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every

person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor
of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith
maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith
in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent
acquisition thereof.
Puzon v Abellera Digest
G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989
Retroactivity

Facts:

The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by Domondon) was the
owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land which was previously
part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another case Republic v Pio Marcos,
the Supreme Court declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act
was applicable only to places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which
was covered by a townsite reservation.

This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying
decrees of registration and certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
pursuant to RA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid certain
titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes.
Hence, the lot in question was reverted to the public domain.

The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of taxes.\Petitioner took
interest and subsequently won the bid. A year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this
connection, the petitioner filed a case to consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile,
Domondon found out about the auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for consolidation
filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the
assessments were illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition
with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative
effect.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively

YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless expressly
provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions.
The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the time they were issued. This
implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of ownership done
in good faith by persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date
stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such would be possible
only by validating all the said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their respective dates of
issue. However, the validity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the
conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.
Acosta v Plan
(ROC needed record of appeal, BP 129 changed that
during pendency of this case and was given retroactive
effect being procedural)
Facts:
Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela.
Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited for the
trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court).

On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal,
hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed required
to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not have to be printed.

Issue: Whether or not a  timely submission of a record on appeal is required  for the
perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant

NO.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on appeal is
no longer required for the perfection of an appeal.  This law was given retroactive effect.

As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied
retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
BPI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L-66826, August
19, 1988
CORTES, J:

Facts: 

Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account
and a peso current account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by
Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In
the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dolar savings
account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of
the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When
Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from
the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was
given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with
COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation
payable to Ernesto. 

Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?

Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that
the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it
to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on
May 10, 1976, or over five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging
to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is
no deposit but some other contract.
[CASE DIGEST] Guingona v. Carague (G.R. No. 94571)

April 22, 1991 | 196 SCRA 221

(Laws, including the Marcos-era PD’s remain operative until they are revoke, amended or
repealed, budget for debt exceeded the budget fir education which was contended to be
contrary to Constitution, which was not)

FACTS:

For the fiscal year of 1990, Congress passed RA 6831, otherwise known as the GAA Act of 1990. The said
budget contained an automatic appropriation of P98.4 billion, of which P86.8 billion was for debt
service. This automatic appropriation was made pursuant to three Marcos-era issuances: PDs 81, 1177,
and 1967.

The said Act set the appropriation for education at P29.7 billion -- significantly lower than the
appropriation for debt service. This was contrary to Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that "the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not greater budget allocation for debt servicing as opposed to education violates Section
5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative despite having been issued during the
Marcos era.

3. Whether or not automatic appropriation is violative of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

1. No, the constitutional provision that the highest appropriation should go to education does not mean
that the hands of Congress are so humstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of
the national interest and the attainment of other state policies/objectives. One of these policies is to
ensure that the President can take advantage of favorable economic conditions, such as situations
where interest rates are low.

2. Yes, said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically revoked upon the ouster of Marcos.
The Court held that these laws remain operative until they are amended, repealed, or revoked, and so
long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. In addition, the Court dismissed petitioners'
argument that the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Art. VI pertaining to "all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills," mainly because the PDs in question are considered enacted laws
and not bills.
3. No, the Court held there was no undue delegation of legislative power because the assailed PDs are
complete -- they set out a policy and are complete in their terms, such that the President doesn't have
any choice but to implement them.
CASE DIGEST: ARTICLE 12 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES BY GERALDINE PUGUON
Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

(Cochero Incident, Leaving horses in the manner has been deemed a custom and
not inherently injurious)
FACTS:

 On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata

on Calle Real, Ermita, Manila, Philippines, when a delivery wagon belonging to
William Van Buskirk, came along the street in the opposite direction at a great
speed, and run over to carromata severely wounding Carmen Ong with a serious
cut upon her head.
 Van Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant
and was considered a safe and reliable cochero;
 That upon the delivery of some forage, the defendant’s cochero tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went
back inside the wagon to unload the forage.
 While unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which
cracked a whip and made some other noise, which frightened the horses attached
to the delivery wagon and they ran away. The driver was thrown out from the
wagon and was unable to stop the horses resulting to a collision with the
carromata.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is
before us on an appeal from that judgment.

ISSUE

 Whether or Not the defendant be liable for the negligence of his cochero?
HOLDING

 No. The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. This is because the
occurrence that transpired therein was an accident resulted from an ordinary acts
of life. The prima facie case was already destroyed from the start when the
defendant presented his evidence to the court by employing all the diligence of
 his cochero proving that the latter was not a negligent. Hence, it proves that the
defendant is not liable for any accusations.
RULINGS

 It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the
horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. The act of
defendant’s driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts that the performance of which has not proved
destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by
society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held
to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent. In fact, the very reason why they
have been permitted by society is that they are beneficial rather than prejudicial.
 It is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. Those conditions showing of themselves
that the defendant’s cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse.
Armigos v CA (G.R. No. L-50654, November 6, 1989)

Facts:
Private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against petitioner with the Municipal Court – Davao
del Sur for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor
of the private respondent and against the herein petitioner. 

A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June
1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed the
other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the
payment of the appellate court docket fee. 

However, when the case was elevated to the CFI-Davao del Sur for the consideration of the appeal,
the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period;
consequently, he dismissed the appeal.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the CA,
claiming that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to
24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. 

The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the
hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is
from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.

The Court of Appeals, however, rejected his interpretation as it would result in many confusing
situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or pleading is
received. It held that when a law was to be effective upon approval by the President and the President
signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact
hour when the President signed the same on 16 June 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said
day of 16 June 1950.

MR was denied, hence, this petition.    

Issue: W/N the court should take into consideration the exact hour when a pleading, order or
decision is received by a party for the computation of the period to appeal.     
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No. The Court found no merit in the petition.

Ratio:

The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day
shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within   which an
act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last;
and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules
of Court which stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of
Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default
after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the
period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time
shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this
rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date.

Petitioner's suggestion, however, may find application in appeals in habeas corpus cases where the law
requires that such appeals should be made within 48 hours from notice of judgment.

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no
jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. In the instant case, the petitioner
failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.
NAMARCO (national marketing corporation) v Tecson
G.R. No. L-29131             August 27, 1969
CONCEPCION, C.J.
(NAMARCO forgot the Leap years in computing Prescription of 10 years to
appeal)

Facts:

Before a judgement was already served in the Civil Case No. 20520 Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co.
Inc.

On December 21, 1965, Miguel D. Tecson appealed to moved to dismiss the

previously judged Civil Case No. 20520 because it was upon lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The National Marketing
Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and chooses in action of
the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor
therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701
thereof, against Mr. Tecson, for the revival of the judgment rendered the previous
Case No. 20520. Acting upon the motion and plaintiff’s opposition thereto, said Court
issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:

“Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is
less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by
this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription.
Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This
case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed
a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were
both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.”

Issue:
Whether or not  the present action for the revival of a judgement is barred by the
statute of limitation

Ruling:
The ordered appealed from as it is hereby AFFIRMED, without costs. Although some
members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for
failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-
appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our
Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby
engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative
Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 (1933)
Facts – Plaintiff and defendant both Filipinos and presently residing in Manila. Married in Manila in 1919
and lived together as husband and wife until 1926 when they voluntarily separated. Couple have 4
children. In their settlement they agree that plaintiff wife will receive for their children’s support five
hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of
certain properties to be put in her name. After settlement husband left for the US where he secured an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion in November 1927 and consequently got married to another
Filipina with whom he has 3 children at present. Husband defendant came back to the Philippines in 1928
where he since remained.

Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for
the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce
as alimony.

Case before the Court of First Instance – Wife requested the Court to confirm and ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the State of Nevada. She prayed that 1) the community existing between plaintiff and
defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to
the plaintiff her share of the community property; 2) that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff
alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month; 3) that the defendant be ordered to pay the
plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and; 4) that the defendant be ordered
to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons.

Court Decision – Court decided in favour of the plaintiff except that it reduced counsel fees to 3000 and
granted costs of action against defendant.

Appeal of Defendant - From this judgment defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of
errors:

I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine Divorce Law, is
unconstitutional, null and void.

II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law) applies to the Nevada
decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C. Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to
confirmation and recognition.

III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of cause of action against
appellant and appellee.

IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors to be null and void.

V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the support not
only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not entitled to support
from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed by the divorce decree in
Exhibit A.

VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-appellee P3,000
attorney's fees.
VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.

Issue – whether or not the divorce decree issued by the State of Nevada can be ratified by Philippine
Court

Ruling – The Divorce Decree cannot be ratified in the Philippines. Invoking Article 9 of the Civil Code,
“The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.” And Article 11 of the Civil Code
“the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote
public order and good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by
anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country”

StatCon – despite the lower court’s ruling granting relief stated that the securing of the divorce, the
contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a
condition that the court must grant relief. HOWEVER “The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation
what he personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to
say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.”

“The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and
defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action. This, however, without prejudice
to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have against defendant. No special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.”
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO

Civil Law | Divorce | Legal Separation

( Tenchavez didn’t get to enjoy marriage, Escano filed for divorce in Nevada and lived with an
American, Tenchavez won but reward was reduced from 1million to P25,000 and is unable to remarry)

FACTS:

Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain. Upon discovery of their
daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and Mena sought priestly advice where it was suggested that
the marriage be recelebrated. However, the recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds
eventually became estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States. There, she
filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty, and an absolute divorce was
granted by the Court of Nevada. She later sought for the annulment of her marriage from the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta eventually married an American in Nevada and acquired American
citizenship.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta and her parents whom
he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged their daughter from joining him and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church for having decreed the annulment of the marriage.
He asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.

Vicenta claims a valid divorce from Tenchavez and an equally valid marriage to her American husband;
while her parents filed a counterclaim for moral damages, denying that they had in any way influenced
their daughter’s acts.

The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to her exclusion. It granted the counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Tenchavez, to the extent of P45,000.00. Thus, he filed a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the Philippines;

2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral damages.

RULING:
1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between Tenchavez and Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which was already in force
at the time expressly provided that “Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.” Here, at the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then still subject to Philippine law, which does not admit absolute divorce. Thus, under
Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.

2.) Yes. The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and considerations that Tenchavez is
entitled to a decree of legal separation on the basis of adultery as provided under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since our jurisdiction does not recognize Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as
valid, her marriage and cohabitation with the American is technically “intercourse with a person not her
husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband also constitute in law a wrong for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Thus, the latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law.

As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a million pesos as unreasonable, taking
into account some considerations. First, the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on his part. Second, the parties never lived together.
Third, there is evidence that Tenchavez had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage,
although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy. Fourth, the fact that Tenchavez
is unable to remarry under our law is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he
entered into voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
Van Dorn v Romillo

(Sps VanDorn and Upton married and divorced, the divorce was valid in Nevada
therefore valid here, VanDorn remarried but Upton sued to gain right to manage
their conjugal property, but he had no legal standing as they were no longer
married)

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van
Dorn be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Pilapil v Ibay-Somera et al
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

(ex-Husband has no legal standin even if wife cheated on him before divorce)

REGALADO, J.:
Facts:

Sometime in 1979, the petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling were married in the Federal Republic of Germany and establish residence in
Malate, Manila.

The marriage was troubled and Geiling filed for divorce in Germany while the petitioner Pilapil
filed for legal separation and support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, on 1983.

In January of 1986, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce.  Five

months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints of
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while they are married Imelda “had an
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983”.  The said cases were filed and docketed.

In 1987, Pilapil filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent qualifies as an offended spouse after having obtained a final
divorce.

Held:

After a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dorn Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business
concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that
the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. It is true that
owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case at hand as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets.

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.
People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690

(The criminal liability was not proved but civil liability can still be claimed, Ritter was not black
although Rosario said a Negro put something in her vagina)

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room
in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to
the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that
Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has
already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul
smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to
remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the
object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty
of rape with homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with
Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received
300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said
to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a
Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.

However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s
heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
 SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND
ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001

(A TRO was issued to prevent Amonoy from destroying respondent’s house

which were on a lot he foreclosed and bought, Amonoy ignored the TRO and
proceeded resulting in an abuse of his rights, Damnum Absque Injuria is
NOT appreciated)

Facts:

Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the
settlement of the latter’s estate. On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and Formilda executed
a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them, in favor of
Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969, after the
taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate was
declared closed and terminated. When Pasamba and Formilda passed away, Formilda
was succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the
closure of the two lots alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein
respondents denied the allegation, but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.

Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able
to buy the lots by auction where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated. On
Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders were implemented for the demolition of
structures in the said lot, including herein respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985,
David Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the suspension of the
demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already been demolished. A
complaint for damages was filed by respondents, which was denied by RTC but granted
by CA, thus this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to
respondents.

Ruling:

Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from the
legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria
— for which the law gives no remedy, saying he is not liable for damages. The precept of
Damnum Absque Injuria has no application is this case. Petitioner did not heed the TRO
suspending the demolition of structures. Although the acts of petitioner may have
been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with
bad faith.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. This
must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner,
despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of
such right. The petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.
TANJANCO v CA

(Santos filed for damages against Tanjanco for seducing her with promise to marry, no
merit because Santos was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations
with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse for a year).

FACTS:

From December of 1957, petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted the respondent, Araceli Santos,
both of them are of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection
for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. Due to Tanjanco’s promise of marriage,
Santos agreed to his desire for carnal knowledge in July of 1958. For a year, Tanjanco had
carnal access to Santos which resulted to pregnancy. Santos had resigned from her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. to avoid embarrassment. In her state of unemployment Santos
became unable to support herself and her baby. Tanjanco not being able to fulfill his promise of
marriage had caused Santos to suffer mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be
compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for support and
damages. Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of
action. Santos then appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, the
decision stated that there is no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn
child nor for its support, but there was a cause of action for damages, in accordance to Article
21 of the Civil Code which states that “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages”. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading that
actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his
promise to marry.

RULING: Tanjaco cannot be compelled since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse.

Article 21 cannot be invoked for the fact that even though Tanjaco was not able to comply with
the promise of marriage to Santos, the latter still allowed Tanjaco to have carnal knowledge for
a significant duration of one year. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion between
the two parties. She would have cut all relationship upon finding that the defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promises. In this case, the petitioner, Tanjaco cannot be held liable for a
breach of promise to marry. Court of Appeals relied upon the example set forth in a
memorandum by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of
the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who
has been seduced the when the Art. 21 of the Civil Code was applied. Seduction connotes the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not in the position of Santos, who
was of legal age and who have granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with
him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to
Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction.
Pe vs Pe
TITLE: Pe vs. Pe

CITATION: 5 SCRA 200

(Alfonso Pe, A MARRIED MAN, abused the trust of Cecilio Pe to have carnal knowledge with his
daughter in the pretext of teaching her the rosary)

FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in
Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners.  Cecilio
introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of
Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio.  The defendant frequented the house of Lolita
sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. 
Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in
bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection.  The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom
and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code.  The defendant took advantage of the
trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita.  The
wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. 

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
Gashem Shookat Baksh, vs.
Court of Appeals and
Marilou T. Gonzales
 (Iranian student used promise to marry Filipina to have carnal
knowledge of her, he is liable not because of breach of promise but
for fraud and deceit, he was also already married to a girl in
Bacolod)

Facts:

Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of good moral

character and reputation, duly respected in her community filed a
complaint on October 27, 1987, against Gashem Shookat Baksh, an
Iranian citizen, and an exchange student taking up a medical course at
the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.  The complaint for
damages is due to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.

Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou and proposed to

marry her.  She accepted his love on the condition that they will get
married.  They agreed to get married at the end of the semester, which
was October of that year.  They also visited Marilou’s parents in
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.

Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live with him in Guilig,
Dagupan City.  It should be noted that she was a virgin before she lived
with him and not a woman of loose morals.  A few weeks after she
begun living with him, Gashem started to maltreat her, which result to
injuries.  A confrontation with the barangay captain of Guilig ensued and
Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and said that he is already
married to a girl in Bacolod City.
On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article 21 of the New Civil
Code in its decision favoring Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem
Baksh to pay PhP 20,000 moral damges, PhP 3,000.00 in attorney’s
fees and PhP 2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.

Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court seeking for the
review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Pangasinan and to
set aside the said decision which was also affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to

marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Held:

The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. However, the Court rules that no foreigner should
make a mockery of our laws.  It was evident from the facts presented to
the Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to marry Marilou
Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment.”

In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by good faith
and honest motive when he proposed his love and promised to marry
Marilou Gonzales.  He was merely motivated by lust and “clearly
violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.”

The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Aticle 21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the
breach of promise to marry, but due the fraud and deceit employed by
herein petitioner that wilfully caused injury to the honor and reputation of
the herein private respondent, which committed contrary to the morals,
good customs or public policy.
WASSMER v VELEZ
(Velez promised to Marry Wassmer, a wedding was set up and planned, Velez
did not attend and disappeared, despite no law against breach of marriage
promise, what he did was still contrary to morals and good customs under Art.
21)
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided
to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for
the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not
be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her
that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not
appear and was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default.
On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because
of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for
breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which
such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and
moral damages against him.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further,
the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case
show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.
ROE v WADE

Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an
abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the
enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to
save the life of the mother.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when

medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe
sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and
an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the
statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was
unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to
travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and
sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?

Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage,
deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century.
At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement
of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was
ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion
laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither
courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However,
modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in
protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and
may not be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s
interest in promoting the health of the mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon
the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.

Geluz v CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

J. J. B.L. Reyes
Facts:

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Lazo’s cuase of action
was the third and last abortion of his wife to the said doctor.

The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had herself aborted again by
the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and was
aborted when the husband was campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.

The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. The
doctor appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus

Held: No. Petition granted.

Ratio:

Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality.

Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born
later with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that
he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee
does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

11 FEB

34 SCRA 132 | July 31, 1970 | J. J.B.L. Reyes

 
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from
the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request
for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations
with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact
that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to
allege fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and
an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child,
which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused”
per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages
for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the
decision; with costs against Icao. 
De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110
November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza,
Cesar Syquia’s brother-in-law. Cesar then courted Antonia, and the latter
became pregnant with a baby boy who was born on June 17, 1931. During
Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar was always visiting her. On February 1931, he
wrote a letter to the priest who was to christen the baby boy, saying

Rev. Father,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While
he was abroad, Cesar wrote several letters to Antonia Loanco, showing
paternal interest in the situation and cautioning her to keep in good condition
in order that junior might be strong. The baby boy, however, was not named
Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After giving birth, Cesar took Antonia to
a house in Manila, and they lived together for about a year in regular family
style. Cesar paid for all the household expenses during their living together.
Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got
married to another woman.

The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from
Cesar Php30,000 as damages for the breach of promise to marry, to compel
Syquia to recognize Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s second child) as natural
children, and to make him pay for the maintenance of the children worth
Php500 per month.
Issues:
1. Is the note to the priest a proof of acknowledgment of paternity within the
meaning of Article 135 (1) of the (Old) Civil Code?

2. Does the acknowledgment referred to in Article 135 of the Old Civil Code
need to be made in a single document?

3. Can Antonia be granted payment for damages because of breach of

promise to marry?

Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 135 (1) states

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in
the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his

paternity, is in existence

A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable
of being dealt with as a living person. The problem of the recognition of the
child even before he was born is no different from that when he is already
born. The words used by Syquia in his letter are not capable of two
constructions, and the identity of the baby was clear.

2. No. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to
one or any particular individual. The only requirement is that the writing should
be indubitable. Thus, the many letters Cesar Syquia wrote may be made proof
to his acknowledgment of Ismael Loanco.

3. No. Such promise to marry was not satisfactorily proved and the action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise.
 Limjoco v. FRAGRANTE

G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948

Pedro O. Fragante, A Filipino citizen, applied for certificate of public convenience to

maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half
(2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant.
However, he died prior to the approval of his application. Since his
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service, the
commission, ordered certificate of public convenience be issued to the
Intestate Estate of the authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half
(2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant
in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
in Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a

“citizen of the Philippines” within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act,
as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the
power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of
public convenience and necessity “only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United
States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-
stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines”, and the
further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities
must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Yes. Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death.
His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received
from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist
here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is
the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Dumlao vs Quality Plastics

TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics

CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976

FACTS:

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum
of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or
else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the
amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff
at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not
aware on Oria’s death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June
24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own
behalf and his co-defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment
of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in
his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the
ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:

Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead
prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality
Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-
defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent
nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity
which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria
does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorney’s fees against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case
No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of
Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void
Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

(A case for the custody of the body of Vitaliana. Eugenio claims to be a common law
husband, but it is not recognized as he already has a subsisting marriage before
Vitaliana)

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging
that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the
herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The
court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body
to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings.
Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s
residence. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy
but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides: “Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil
Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman
not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. In
addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

FACTS:

Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela
Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German
Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three
daughters who fell.  Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left
with his son, his son’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was
hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club
collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and
Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10,
1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela
were hit and killed.

Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that
son outlived his mother.

ISSUE:

Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.

HELD:

Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of
the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges
prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption
shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the
other shall take place.

In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died
before his mother.  The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence.  Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.

Evidence of survivorship may be

(1) direct
(2) indirect
(3) circumstantial or
(4) inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed
each other as to which of them died first.  In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights
from one to another.  In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of
survivorship.
SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.) vs NATIVIDADG.R. No. 15574September 17, 1919

Facts:

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine
Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel
known as the Batobuilt for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross
The Batowas brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the
vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused
to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands.

The instant action is the result.On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No.
2761. The first section of this law amended section 1172 of theAdministrative Code to read as
follows:SEC.1172. Certificate of Philippine register.—Upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued
for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner."Domestic ownership," as used
in this section, means ownership vested in some one or more of the following classes of
persons:

(a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands;

(b) citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands;

(c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the
United States or of both, created under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or
of thereof, or the managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands Any
vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a
vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the ownership thereof
nor any transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel to person not
included under the last preceding paragraph.

The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth in the Jones Law, provides "That no law
shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws."Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of
the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of
law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial
attribute of ownership in the Batoand left with the naked title to a boat it could not use
Issue/Held:

WON the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry
of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.

-YES, this is a valid exercise of police power. Common carriers which in the Philippines as in
the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with a public interest,"
can only be permitted to use these public waters as a privilege and under such conditions as to
the representatives of the people may seem wise.

Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co.
Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that
vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend
against the constitutional provision.

Ratio:The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person"
includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the
guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. Classification with the end in view of
providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based
upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection. Examples of laws
held unconstitutional because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be cited.
Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to
engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living.
BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] –

F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on
7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having
been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent,
and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def.,
by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in
conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his
representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman
Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other
prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render
an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-
Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.

HELD: (4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the
Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a
thousand years any other personality in Europe, and which existed "when Grecian eloquence still
flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca," does not require
serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by
Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October 1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, he

"Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to the time of Galieno,
who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it among the juridical entities protected by the laws of
the Empire, it existed until then by the mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence upon
pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the year
313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter
gradually entered upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and
transmission of property the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary
of Spanish Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the 4th of December, 1890, 3
Alcubilla, 189.)"
Standard Oil v. Arenas, G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, 1911

FACTS: Standard Oil sued 5 debtors for payment, including appellant Vicente Villanueva who
acted as surety to the loan. CFI Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente,
appealed and alleged that her husband was declared insane.

ISSUE: W/N suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the
person does not have capacity to act

HELD: Villanueva possess the capacity to act. No evidence that a person suffering from a
monomania of wealth is really insane and incapable of binding himself in a contract. Capacity to
act must be presumed to attach to every person who has not been previously declared to be
incapable, and to continue until the contrary is proven
 Mercado VS. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215
September 3, 2017sheyiligan

(Minors pretended to be legal age to sign contract, they cannot void the contract for they
entered it willingly)

FACTS:

The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the
defendant) and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha
Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their consent into the contract of sale
of the land they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis
Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of contract asserting
that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that
they were of legal age.

HELD:

The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and
entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court stated that they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted
by them, or to have them annulled.

The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123,
Section 6 paragraph A which states that “whenever a party has, by its own declaration,
act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a particular
thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA
(unlike in Mercado v Espiritu, the minors here were forced into the contract)

FACTS:

Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura
died leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba
forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell their land as payment for the
loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were threatening his
mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalan’s first cedula to
acknowledge the document.

ISSUE:

Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.

RATIO:

The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The
Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case,
because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a
minor.

Important Statutes:

Civil Code, Article 38.

Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.

Civil code, Art. 1327.

The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

Civil code, Art. 1390.

The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been
no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
SIA SUAN & GAW CHIAO V. Alcantara

FACTS

A deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons, one of them is a minor,
conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Thereafter, the attorney of Alcantara
informed the husband of Sia that Ramon Alcantara is a minor and accordingly
disavowed the contract. Ramon, however, executed an affidavit in the office of the
attorney of the husband of Sia, ratifying the sale and receiving P500 as payment. In the
meantime, Sia sold one of the lots to Azorez.

Ramon instituted an action for the annulment of the deed of sale at the CFI of Laguna,
to which the court granted, and thereby required Sia to pay Ramon the sum of P1,750
with legal interest and the reconveyance of the property. Sia appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid.

HELD

Yes. Under the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs Espiritu (37 Phil 215) to
bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his
vendee to actually part with a cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid
consideration. Preexisting indebtedness is a valid consideration which produces its full
force and effect, in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the sale.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, Ramon
informed Sia and her husband of his minority, is of no moment, because Ramon’s
previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract.
 DE BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE
(the boys were not similarly liable for fraud, but still liable
for unjust enrichment)
FACTS:

Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per
annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war.
Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first
instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they
signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were
ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for
consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract.
ISSUE:

Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of
loan they have signed.
RATIO:

The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because
the minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of
P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them
similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous
sources in Jurisprudence – “in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual
and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as
to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of
deceit.”
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the
actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written
contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the
extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00,
which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to
P1,166.67.
Abella v COMELEC

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari challenging the resolutions of respondent COMELEC.

 Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition for disqualification against Larrazabal for alleged
false statements in COC regarding her residence.
 TRO was issued by SC against Larrazabal from being proclaimed governor in the event
that she obtains the winning margin of votes. (Since COMELEC was not yet fully constituted
that time)
 Abella filed objections to COMELEC charging Larrazabal with falsification and
misrepresentation in her residency.
 COMELEC lifted TRO upon motion of Larrazabal.
 Feb 14, 1991, Comelec 2nd Division, disqualified L. (Held: Affirmed)
 July 18, 1991, Comelec en banc denied L’s petition declaring decision void. – STILL
DISQUALIFIED. (Held: Affirmed)
 COMELEC, in the same decision disallowed Abella’s proclamation as governor.
 Hence, the petitions.
 August 1, 1991 On petition by Larrazabal for the issuance of TRO to COMELEC, SC:
CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing decision. (Held: Lifted, disqualification enforced)
 Vice Gov took oath as governor thru COMELEC resolution, Court further resolved that
Petilla (Vice Gov) should DESIST from assuming position.
 Position of petitioners against L: respondent is neither a resident nor a registered voter of
Kananga, Leyte as she claimed, but a resident of Ormoc City, a component city but
independent of the province.
 L: she is a resident of Kananga, Leyte. She had intent to return (animus revertendi) to
Kananga even if she physically transferred to Ormoc.
 SC: There is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in
Kananga, Leyte to pursue any calling, profession or business. COMELEC relied on
provisions of the Family Code.
ISSUE:

Who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte?

 1. Petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes (declared
winner but subsequently disqualified by COMELEC)
 2. Petitioner Benjamin Abella (2nd highest but not proclaimed as gov after
disqualification of Larrazabal)
 3. Leopoldo E. Petilla, Vice Gov of Leyte.
HELD:

 Article X of the Constitution is explicit that aside from highly-urbanized cities,

component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials are independent of the province.
 connotes 2 prohibitions. One, from running for, and the second, for voting for any
provincial elective official.
 Resolution of COMELEC AFFIRMED. TRO issued against it was lifted. Costs
against petitioners.
 With regard to Abella, Larrazabal was voted for, and election proceeded. Net
effect was that Abella lost, and repudiated by the electorate.
 In the Firvaldo (governorship of Sorsogon) and Labo(mayor in Baguio) cases,
this is exactly the reason why the candidates obtaining second highest number of
votes were not allowed to assume the positions.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Cabague Cabague v. v. Auxillo Auxillo

11/26/195211/26/1952:

Facts: There was an agreement to marry betweetween Cabagues’s son and Auxillo’s
daughter . The consideration of which is for Cabague to improve the house of Auxillo
and spend for the wedding feastthe wedding and the needs of the bride. When Auxillo’s
daughter refused to carry out the agreement, Cabague filede action for damages.

Whether or not the agreement may be proved incourt.court.

Held: The rules of court applicable at the at the time provides that, “any agreement made
upon the consideration of marriage, other than mutual promise to marry, should be in
writing, or in any notes s or memorandum and subscribed by parties, otherwise it shall
be it shall be unenforceable.I n this case, the action for damages breach of promise to
marry may prosper and evidence of such mutual promise is such mutual promise is
admissibladmissible. But thee. But theagreement between Cabague and Auxillo may
notagreement between Cabague and Auxillo may notprosper , since such agreement is
oral and may notprosper , since such agreement is oral and may notbe proven in
court.be proven in court