The affiliation of the majority of Bulgarian citizens with Orthodoxy determines the

significance of this denomination for the religious peace in the country. Therefore
the Orthodox Church’s legal status has become a major issue in all analyses of
religion since 1989. According to them, the state tends to favor this Church at the
expense of the other confessions. In most cases, however, this attitude is not aimed
at suppressing the religious minorities, but at protecting the Orthodox Church as a
source of indigenous national identity. The latter is inspired by the nineteenth
century concept of nationhood and the post-communist “vacuum of values” in
society. At the same time, such an overemphasis on Orthodoxy contradicts the
principles of democracy and pluralism and could impede the European integration
of Bulgaria.
The special treatment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church could not be understood
without an analysis of its origins that root in the 1992 developments. This year
marked the beginning of the restitution of religious institutions’ properties taken by
the communist regime.19 The process was blocked by the Director of Religious
Affairs, who declared the 1971 election of Maxim as Bulgarian Patriarch null and
void on 9 March 1992.20 This act threw the Orthodox Church into a crisis. Her
hierarchy split into two synods. The Synod, chaired by Patriarch Maxim, was
supported by socialists, while the alternative one was backed by democrats. As a
result, the restitution of church possessions interwove with the political struggle
between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces
(UDF). By the same time, the communist Law on Religious Denominations was
changed and its most totalitarian texts were nullified.21 The amendment did not
provide adequate solutions to the religious problems. (Kohen, 1999) On the con-
trary it doomed to failure the following attempts to heal the division by administra-
tive measures, court decisions and ecclesiastical councils. (Kalkandjieva, 2004)
The new Denominations Act (20 December 2002) did not met the hopes for
reconciliation in the religious sphere.22 The ex lege recognition granted solely to
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Art. 10 § 2) left the other religious denominations
in inferior positions had a negative effect on the religious peace in Bulgaria and its
accession to Europe. This text was objected by the Council of Europe23, but was
supported by the majority of the Bulgarian National Assembly. The latter referred
to Art.13, § 3 of the 1991 Constitution that reads: “The traditional religion in
Republic of Bulgaria is the Eastern Orthodox denomination.” The special recogni-
tion of the Orthodox Church was also justified by the 1998 Constitutional Court’s
statement that “the traditional nature of Eastern Orthodoxy expresses its cultural
and historical role for the Bulgarian state as well as its present significance for the
state life, especially its impact on the system of official holidays.” (Nenovski,
2002) Finally, the defenders of the ex lege recognition omitted the different
meaning given by the new bill to Art. 13 of the Constitution. It is no more Eastern
Orthodoxy that is defined as “traditional religion” in accordance with the 1991
Constitution, but the Orthodox Church, i.e. a particular religious institution.

This metamorphosis was realized by the means of the term veroizpovedanie

[denomination].24 According to § 1 of the “Additional Instructions” of the bill,
“denomination” means “a totality, embracing a religious community with its
religious beliefs and principles as well as its institution,” while the term “religious
institution” is “a registered, in accordance with the Denominations Act, religious
community, that has the quality of judicial entity with the corresponding ruling
organs and statutes.” In this way, the traditional character of Orthodoxy as a
religion/denomination (Constitution, Art.13 § 3) is transferred to the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church as an institution, representing the same denomination
(Denominations Act, Art. 10 § 1). According to the latter, the traditional
denomination in Republic of Bulgaria is Eastern Orthodoxy. It has played
historical role for the Bulgarian State and has actual significance for its state life.
Its voice and representative is the autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church that
under the name ‘Patriarchate’ is the [legitimate] successor of the Bulgarian
Exarchate and is a member of the United, Holy, Ecumenical and Apostolic Church.
It is governed by the Holy Synod and represented by the Bulgarian Patriarch, who
also is the Metropolitan of Sofia.

The transformation was also facilitated by the law preamble that speaks about “the
specific and traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of
Bulgaria for the creation and development of its spirituality and culture” instead of
Eastern Orthodoxy.

The Orthodox Church’s ex lege recognition also implies the possibility that some
legal regulations do not concern her activity. This Church is de facto exempted
from the regulations of Art. 8 which imposes restrictions on religious rights when
the freedom of religion is used against “the national security, public order, people’s
health and the morals or against the rights and freedoms of other persons” as well
as when religious organizations are used for political ends (Art. 7 (1) and (2)). The
constitutional principle of equality without regard of religion (1991 Constitution,
Art. 6 § 2) is not strictly observed as well. Only the candle industry and the church
plate production of Patriarch Maxim’s Church have been exempted from the
WAT-taxation by the Ministry of Finances.25 Most religious programs in the
national electronic media are limited to Eastern Orthodoxy, while the other
confessions are underrepresented. Still there are some positive developments in the
field of religious pluralism. Non-Orthodox clerics have been allowed to work with
prisoners in some Bulgarian prisons since 1998.
The compatibility between the secular and the religious in post-communist
Bulgaria is another question raised by the Denominations Act. In 2003, the Con-
stitutional Court was requested to pronounce several of its texts “as incompatible
with the Constitution and inconsistent with the European Convention for Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) and with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant).”26 One of
them was the formula linking the Patriarch’s office with that of the Metropolitan of
Sofia (Art. 10, § 1). This case involved the constitutional judges in a discussion on
canons, a sphere where they have no competence. Five of them argued that the
Patriarchal office had to be bound with that of the Metropolitan of Sofia as
Bulgaria’s capital on the basis of the 34th Apostle Canon, approved by the First
Ecumenical Council (325). Six judges disagreed because a civil bill should not
incorporate religious principles engaging the secular state with religion. According
to them, this was against the constitutional separation of church and state.
Nevertheless their number was not sufficient and the challenge of the text of Art.
10 was dismissed.27 As a result, the mixture of secular and religious elements has
been preserved in Bulgarian legislation and is a hidden source of conflicts.

The Denominations Act endangers the religious peace by enhancing the tendency
of reducing of Christianity to Eastern Orthodoxy, while excluding Catholics and
Protestants from the same religion.28 It also nurtures confrontations between the
Orthodox majority and non-Christian minorities. In this respect, the address of
Patriarch Maxim’s Synod to the Bulgarian people, pronounced four days before the
adoption of the Denominations Act, is symptomatic. It defines the new bill as
recognition of the “natural rights29 of the Orthodox majority of Bulgarians.” The
Synod highly appraised the clarification and further development of the
Constitutional formula for “traditional religion” and concluded that the vote “for”
and “contra” the texts, recognizing the Bulgarian Orthodox Church … will be a
clear and undeniable sign [revealing] who takes the side of the forces that have
been working against our kinfolk Church for years and who respects the freedom
of our religious convictions, the unity and authority of the Republic of Bulgaria.30

At the same time, some applications of the Denominations Act caused not only
national but international concerns. One of them is the confiscation of 250
churches and premises of the Alternative Synod (21 July 2004). On the basis of
Art. 10, they were occupied by the police and transferred to Patriarch Maxim.31
On this occasion, the Alternative Synod filed a series of complaints with the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which decision is expected in
2006. Meanwhile, the PACE recommended measures ensuring “that the special
recognition given to Eastern Orthodoxy does not lead to the discrimination of other
religions for practical purposes.” It also advised either to delete the provision for
the ex lege recognition of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church or to make clear that her
leadership is legitimate according to Orthodox canonical law.32 The Bulgarian
authorities, however, keep silence about them.

There is one more international dimension of the Denominations Act that is

shadowed by domestic problems. It again relates to the text of Art. 10. According
to it, the present Bulgarian Patriarchate is “the legitimate successor of the [former]
Bulgarian Exarchate.”33 This formula does not make clear which areas of
succession are concerned. It could provoke conflicts with the neighbor Orthodox
churches, because from 1870 to 1918 as well as during World War II the territory
of the Bulgarian Exarchate has included some of their present eparchies. This text
could complicate the conflict between the so-called Autocephalous Macedonian
Orthodox Church and the Serbian Patriarchate. Both have approached the Bulgar-
ian Patriarchate on the issue of Macedonian autocephality several times.