BACHRACH Motors v.

Talisay-Silay SC affirmed the judgment.

Milling Bonus is not a civil fruit; not an

G.R. No. 35223. September 17, 1931
income of the land. The amount of the
_________________________________
bonus, according to the resolution, is not
based upon the value, importance or any
FACTS other circumstance of the mortgaged
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was property, but upon the total value of the
indebted to PNB. To secure the payment debt secured, which is something quite
of its debt, it induced its planters, among distinct from and independent of the
whom was Mariano Ledesma, to mort- property referred to. As the bonus is not
gage their land to the bank. To compen- obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits
sate the planters for the risk, Talisay-Silay of that land. It is neither rent of buildings,
Milling, by a resolution, undertook to cred- proceeds from lease of lands, or income
it the planters every year with a sum equal under Article 355 of the Civil Code.

to 2% of the debt secured.

Bachrach filed a complaint against

the Talisay for the delivery of the amount
of P13,850 or promissory notes or other
instruments of credit, as bonus in favor of CALTEX vs. FELISA FELIAS
Ledesma. The complaint further prays that G.R. No. L-14309         June 30, 1960

the sugar central be ordered to render an ____________________________________

accounting of the amounts it owes

Ledesma, and to pay Bachrach Motors a
sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment
mentioned in the complaint, and that the
sale made by Ledesma be declared null
and void.
ed there by Felisa and husband Sawamo-
PNB filed a third party claim alleg-
ing a preferential right to receive any
amount which Ledesma might be entitled
from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay
FACTS
The Lot No. 107 was originally
owned by the spouses Felias (parents of
Felisa). In 1927, a building was construct-
to. In 1928, spouses Felias donated it to
their daughter, Felisa, as a result OCT was
cancelled and TCT was issued making it
her paraphernal property.

answered the complaint that Ledesma’s In 1941, CFI rendered judgment in a

credit belonged to Cesar Ledesma be- civil case involving Sawamoto, ordering
cause the latter had purchased it. Cesar him to pay for damages. A writ of execu-
Ledesma claimed to be an owner by pur- tion was levied upon Lot No. 107, together
chase in good faith.
with the improvements. It was sold in auc-
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the tion to Caltex.

court held that Bachrach Motor had a pre- Felisa filed the present action to
ferred right to receive Ledesma’s bonus, declare herself exclusive owner of the Lot.
and it ordered the central to deliver said Trial Court declared Dysecko as owner,
sum to Bachrach Motors.
and the sale at auction null and void.

PNB appealed.
CA modified trial court by declaring
Felisa Felias exclusive owner of Lot, in-
ISSUE stead of Dysekco.

Whether or not the bonus in question is

civil fruits.
ISSUE
Whether or not a paraphernal lot
becomes conjugal ipso facto upon con-
struction of a conjugal house thereon.

HELD

HELD
ART. 158. … Buildings constructed
at the expense of partnership during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses, also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reim-
bursed to the spouse who owns the same.
croached on the land of the plaintiffs.
Trial Court ruled that the rights of a
builder in good faith under Article 448
cannot apply to a case where one co-
owner has built, planted or sown on the
land owned in common. Defendants have
no other alternative except to remove and
demolish part of their house that has en-

However, when the building was

constructed, the land was not yet owned ISSUE
by Felisa. Applicable was "the familiar rule Whether or not Art 448 cannot ap-
of accessory following the principal". In ply in this case.

other words, when the lot was donated to

Felisa, the lot became her paraphernal HELD
property as well as the building thereon. The court a quo correctly held that
The donation transmitted to her the rights Article 448 cannot apply. The co-owner is
of a landowner over a building construct- not a 3rd person under the circumstances,
ed on it.
and the situation is governed by the rules
Therefore at the time of the levy of co-ownership.

and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107 was However, the co-ownership is
paraphernal property of Felisa. As such, it terminated by the partition, then the
was not answerable for the obligations of provisions of Article 448 should apply.

her husband. The building constructed on The plaintiffs have the right to appropriate
Lot was destroyed during the last war, so said portion of the house of defendants
that "at the time the Sheriff executed the upon payment of indemnity to defendants
final deed of sale in favor of Caltex, that as provided for in Article 546. Otherwise,
house was no longer in existence.”
the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to
CA is affirmed.
pay the price of the land occupied by their
house. However, if the price asked for is
considerably much more, then the latter
SPOUSES (1) FERNANDEZ DEL CAMPO cannot be obliged to buy the land. The de-
and (2) DEL CANTO vs. (3) FERNANDEZ fendants shall then pay the reasonable
ABESIA rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and
G.R. No. L-49219 April 15, 1988
conditions that they may agree. In case of
___________________________________
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the
terms thereof. Of course, defendants may
FACTS demolish or remove the said portion of
Sole issue is the applicability of the their house, at their own expense, if they
provisions of Article 448 relating to a so decide.

builder in good faith when the property

involved is owned in common.

Plaintiffs (1 and 2) and defendants FELICES vs. IRIOLA

(3) are co-owners pro indiviso of a Lot (45 G.R. No. L-11269           February 28, 1958

sq m) in the proportion of and 1/3 share _____________________________________

each, respectively, so 30 sqm for plaintiffs

and 15 sqm for defendant. But the house FACTS
of defendant occupied a 5 sqm area ex- It appears that Felices was the
tending on plaintiffs’ lot. The parties asked grantee of a homestead, by virtue of
the trial court to adjudicate who among which he was issued OCT. A month after
the parties should take possession of the patent, he conveyed in conditional sale to
5 sq.m land in question.
Iriola a portion of his homestead with an
express stipulation subject to Sec. 119 of
Act 141 (PLA), that after the lapse of 5
years or as soon as may be allowed by
law, the vendor or his successors would
execute in vendee's favor a deed of abso-
lute sale over the land in question.
It was found out that the excess
2 years after sale, Felices tried to
recover the land, but the latter refused un-
less he was paid P2,000 as the value of
improvements. Felices deposited the re-
ceived price in court and filed this action.
Defendant filed her answer invoking
good faith in subdividing the lot; that the
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant may re-
cover or be reimbursed the value of his
improvements on the land in question.
was entitled under the law to claim, as she
HELD
While recognizing Felices' right to
"redeem", Iriola insisted that he must first
be reimbursed. But investigation found
that improvements were made after the
complaint had been filed; some of the im-
provements were even introduced after a
commissioner had already been appoint-
ed. "He who builds, plants or sows in bad
faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted, or sown without right to in-
demnity" (Art. 449, New Civil Code).
The sale in question was executed
by the parties within the 5-year prohibitive
period (Sec 118 of PLA), the same is ab-
solutely null and void and ineffective from
its inception. Consequently, Felices never
lost his title or ownership over the land in
question, and there was no need either for
him to repurchase the same.
REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS of LUISA ABRILLE
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976
_________________________________
FACTS
The Heirs of Luisa Abrille is the
owner of a 525,652 sqm land. She subdi-
vided it into two lots approved by LRC: a
30,100 portion and a 577,679 sq.m por-
tion. But the total of the 2 lots is 82,127
sq.m more than its area in TCT. Abrille was
able to secure an order from the CFI, di-
recting the Register of Deeds to correct
the area of CT, cancel the same and issue
TCTs. There was no
notice and publication.
area was formerly a portion of the Davao
River; hence a land belonging to the pub-
lic domain; thus TCT is null and void ab
initio.
subject increase of area was made in ac-
cordance with law and existing jurispru-
dence; and that Abrille, as riparian owner
did, the increase or excess in area of her
original land as her own.
The trial court rendered judgment
cancelling TCTs and directing the Reg-
ister of Deeds to issue new certificates
of title in lieu thereof after the portions
consisting of 82,127 square meters, the
land involved, shall have been segre-
gated therefrom in accordance with
law.
On appeal, CA certified the case to
the SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not a Court approval on
the land in question is enough to deem the
land registered.
HELD
Lower Court is upheld.
The step taken by defendant-appel-
lant in petitioning the court for the ap-
proval of their Subdivision Plan with the
increased area is unwarranted and irregu-
lar. The land in question is so big as to
give allowance for a mere mistake in area.
Proceedings in registrations of land title
should have been filed instead of an ordi-
nary approval of subdivision plan.
The recourse under Section 44 of
Act 496 is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands. In the instant
case, the area of 82,127 sq.m, has not yet
been brought under the operation of the
Torrens System. Worse, the approval of
Subdivision Plans was without notice, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,
more particularly the Director of Lands. which has been in its possession since
For an applicant to have his imperfect or time immemorial by means of its tenants
incomplete title or claim to a land to be or lessees and farmers.

originally registered under Act 496, the fol- In contrast, Government contends
lowing requisites should all be satisfied:
that the said parcels belong to public do-
1. Survey by the Bureau of Lands or a main, as they have always been known as
duly licensed private surveyor;
the shores of Laguna de Bay.

2. Filing of application for registration;

The CFI rendered a decision in fa-
3. Setting of the date for initial hearing of vor of Colegio ordering the registration of
the application by the Court;
the 2 parcels in accordance with law. Both
4. Transmittal of the application with all admitted that the strip was formerly cov-
the documents attached thereto by the ered by water but since the Bay receded,
Clerk of Court to the LRC;
it was now uncovered. The government
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of applied Art. 458 which states the adjoin
the application and date and place of estate (Colegio) does

the hearing in the Official Gazette;

not acquire the land left dry by the natural
6. Service of notice upon owners, occu- decrease of the waters.

pants and those known to have inter-

ests in the property by the sheriff;
ISSUES
7. Filing of answer to the application by Whether or not the property in
any person;
question belongs to the public domain as
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
a part of the bed of Laguna de Bay.

9. Judgment by the Court;

10. Declaration by the Court and instruct- HELD

ing the LRC to issue a decree of con- Article 367 (now Art.458) provides
firmation and registration;
that “the owners of estates bordering on
11. Entry of the decree of registration in ponds or lagoons, do not acquire the land
the Land Registration Commission;
left dry by the natural decrease of the wa-
12. Sending of copy of the decree of regis- ters, nor lose those inundated by them in
tration to the corresponding Register extraordinary floods.”

of Deeds, and
The provision refers to ponds and
13. Transcription of the decree in the regis- lagoons, and has therefore no application
tration book and the issuance of the to the present case, which refers to a lake,
owner's duplicate OCT to the applicant a lagoon being legally distinct in character
by the Register of Deeds, upon pay- from a lake. Instead, Art.77 of the Spanish
ment of the prescribed fees.
Law of Waters should apply, which pro-
vides: “Lands accidentally inundated by
the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers or
GOVERNMENT vs. COLEGIO DE SAN other streams shall continue to be the
JOSE property of their respective owners.”
G.R. No. L-30829             August 28, 1929
Therefore, they must belong to
_____________________________________
Colegio de San Jose as part of Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan, which was origi-
FACTS nally owned by it.

During the months of September to

November every year, the waters of Lagu-

na de Bay cover a long strip of land along
the eastern border of the 2 parcels of land
in question. Colegio de San Jose con-
tends that the parcels of land are a part of
TAYAG vs YUSECO ings, giving the plaintiffs opportunity to
G.R. No. L-14043. April 16, 1959
rebut.

__________________________________
Plaintiffs: 2 buildings cannot be
more than P40,000. Defendants: chalet is
FACTS from P45,000 to P50,000; garage and
In 1920’s, Maria Lim offered to dwelling house, from P5,000 to P6,000.
Yuseco and his wife, defendant Rosario, Trial court fixed them at P50,000. This is
for them to build a house on 2 lots owned the order appealed from.

by Lim (Hacienda de San Lazaro). The

Yusecos accepted the offer and built a ISSUE
dwelling house and an annex for garage Whether or not a litigant who has
and servant quarters. To legalize, Lim and made a choice to sell his property appeal
the Yusecos executed a contract of lease the price amount fixed by the court.

covering them, to run for a period of 5

years, with a yearly rental of P120.
HELD
Before death, Lim sold the 2 lots to
her married daughter, Tayag. In 1946, the
Tayags asked the Yusecos to remove their
house, or else pay them monthly rent. The
latter refused. Because of this, the Tayags
brought an action of ejection for the resti-
tution of the lots and the recovery of a
monthly rental. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the Tayags. The defendants ap-
pealed.
to make the purchase? How would this
The court rendered judgment adju-
NO. If petitioners were allowed to
change their mind, repudiate their choice
made in court not to sell the land but to
buy the buildings, and then compel the
owners of the houses, respondents herein,
instead to buy land, then what if respon-
dent also claimed inability to pay the price
of the land, claiming that it is also a good
and valid reason for not compelling them
litigation end, if it ever would end?

dicating to Tayag the possession of the 2 Once a party, in conformity with a

lots, with right to appropriate the 2 build- court decision, has made his choice, and
ings thereon upon payment to Yusecos of has duly informed the court of said choice,
their value, and providing that should the and is accordingly ordered to comply with
plaintiffs fail to pay within 90 days, the de- the same by buying the building erected
fendants shall have the right to purchase on his land and pay the value thereof fixed
said lots. The plaintiffs appealed.
by the courts, that duty is converted into
CA, finding the defendants as pos- a money obligation which can be en-
sessors in good faith, affirmed the lower forced by execution, regardless of the un-
court. The plaintiffs appealed to SC.
willingness and alleged inability of the par-
SC affirmed the decision of CA to ty concerned to pay the amount.

remand the case to lower court to require As to the alleged absence in the
plaintiffs to make a choice: "whether they order of execution for the houseowners to
would purchase the buildings erected on make the transfer of the houses, that is to
the lots, or allow the defendants to buy be understood, that upon full payment of
said lots.”
the price, the respondents will execute the
Tayag’s choice: “NOT to sell the lot, corresponding deed of transfer.

but to appropriate the building if its valua-

tion is as it should be and is properly and
fairly determined.”

Trial court ordered the next step to

adduce evidence in connection with the
value of the buildings. Since the defen-
dants will be the sellers, they have the
burden of proving the value of the build-
DEPRA vs. DUMLAO
provements after payment of the proper
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or
___________________________________
planter to pay for the land and the sower
to pay for the proper rent.

FACTS It is the owner of the land who is

Depra, is the owner of Lot in Iloilo. authorized to exercise the option, because
In 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his his right is older, and because, by the
house, the kitchen encroached on DE- principle of accession, he is entitled to the
PRA's property. DEPRA’s mother filed an ownership of the accessory thing.

action for Unlawful Detainer vs DUMLAO. Judgment of trial Court is set aside,
MTC found DUMLAO in good faith, and and case is remanded to RTC for further
applying Article 448, ordered a forced proceedings consistent with Articles 448
lease on the encroachment between the and 546 as follows:

parties. But DEPRA did not accept pay- 1. The trial Court shall determine:

ment of rentals so that DUMLAO deposit- a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34
ed them with MTC.
sqm land; b) the amount of the expenses
In 1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint spent by DUMLAO for the kitchen; c) the
for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO at increase in value which encroachment
CFI involving the same encroachment. may have acquired, and d) whether the
Rebutting the argument of res judicata re- value of said area of land is considerably
lied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that more than that of the kitchen built thereon.

the Decision of MTC was null and void ab 2. After said amounts shall have been de-
initio since such is jurisdiction of CFI. In termined, RTC shall judge, as follows:

the MTC, the cause of action was the de-
privation of possession, while in the action
to quiet title, the cause of action was
based on ownership. CFI upheld DEPRA.
DUMLAO to pay the price of said area;
a) grant DEPRA to exercise his option un-
der Article 448, whether to appropriate the
kitchen by paying DUMLAO, or to oblige

b) order that if DEPRA exercises the op-

ISSUE tion to oblige DUMLAO to pay the land but
Whether or not Article 448 applies.
the latter rejects because the value of the
land is considerably more than that of the
HELD kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice
Within the context of their mutual of DEPRA’s option to sell the land. If no
concession and stipulation, the parties agreement is reached, the Court shall fix
have chosen a legal formula to resolve the terms of the lease;

their dispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO the c) DUMLAO shall pay reasonable com-
rights of a "builder in good faith" and to pensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's
DEPRA those of a "landowner in good land from 1952;

faith" as prescribed in Article 448.

d) The periods shall be inextendible, and
The fairness of the rules in Article upon failure of the party obliged to tender
448 has been explained as follows:
to the trial Court the amount due to the
Where the builder, planter or sower obligee, the party entitled to such pay-
has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights ment shall be entitled to an order of exe-
arises between the owners, and it be- cution for the enforcement of payment.

comes necessary to protect the owner of

the improvements without causing injus-
tice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provid-
ed a just solution by giving the owner of
the land the option to acquire the im-
MACASAET vs. MACASAET
HELD
GR 154391-92 September 30, 2004
SC rules out possession by mere
_____________________________________
tolerance. Petitioners were invited by re-
spondents to occupy the lots so that they
FACTS
could resolve family problems. By occupy-
The children (petitioners - Ismael/ ing, petitioners demonstrated their accep-
Teresita) were invited by the parents (re- tance of the invitation. Hence, there was a
spondents - Vicente/Rosario) to occupy meeting of minds.

the latters' 2 lots. Unfortunately, an unre-
solved conflict terminated this situation.
Out of pique, the parents asked them to
vacate the premises losing their right to
remain on the property. They have the
That petitioners had a right to oc-
cupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue
is the duration of possession. In the ab-
sence of a stipulation, Article 1197 allows
the courts to fix the period.

right, however, to be indemnified for the However, Article 1197 applies to a

useful improvements in good faith and situation in which the parties intended a
with the consent of the parents. In short, period. Here, no period was intended by
Article 448 applies.
the parties. Their mere failure to fix the du-
MTCC ruled in favor of respondents ration of their agreement does not neces-
and ordered petitioners to vacate the sarily justify or authorize the courts to do
premises opining that petitioners had oc- so. It can be safely concluded that the
cupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal agreement subsisted as long as the par-
lease agreement, but by tolerance of re- ents and the children mutually benefited
spondents. MTCC dismissed petitioner’s from the arrangement. Effectively, there is
contention that it was an advance inheri- a resolutory condition here. Having been
tance, on the ground that successional based on parental love, the agreement
rights were inchoate.
would end upon the dissipation of the af-
On appeal, RTC upheld MTCC. fection. Thus, petitioners no longer had any
However, it allowed respondents to ap- cause for continued possession of lots.

propriate the building and improvements, As applied to this case, accession

after payment of the indemnity provided refers to the right of the owner to every-
for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 thing that is incorporated or attached to
and 548.
the property. Accession industrial -- build-
CA upheld the 2 lower courts ruling ing, planting and sowing on an immovable
that petitioners status was analogous to -- is governed by Articles 445 to 456.

that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of Article 447 is not applicable, be-
lease had expired, but whose occupancy cause it relates to the rules that apply
continued by tolerance of the owner. But when the owner of the property uses the
CA said that Article 448 was inapplicable. materials of another.

But under Article 1678, petitioners had the HOWEVER, Art 448 is applicable.
right to be reimbursed for one half of the The respondents consented to the im-
value of the improvements made.
provements. In fact, because the children
Hence, this appeal.
occupied the lots, the parents certainly
approved of the improvements. Thus, peti-
ISSUE tioners have been in good faith when they
Whether or not Article 1678 should built the structures.

apply to the case on the matters of im- Therefore, CA is AFFIRMED with

provements, or is it Article 447 in relation the following MODIFICATIONS:

to Articles 453 and 454.

1. The portion requiring respondents
to reimburse one half the value of im-
provements, and the right of petitioners to
remove those improvements (if the former
refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.

2. The case is REMANDED to the

court of origin to determine the facts ap-
plying Articles 448 and 546:

a) Respondents’ option to appropriate the

improvements, after paying the indemnity,
under Article 546 in relation to Article 448;
or Petitioners to pay the value of lots, un-
less it is considerably more than that of
the improvements, in which case petition-
ers shall pay reasonable rent ;

b) The value of expenses incurred in the

improvements;

c. The increase in value of improvements;

d. Respondents’ choice of type of indem-

nity to be paid (whether b or c)

e. Whether the value of the lots is consid-

erably more than that of the improvements
built thereon.