AQUINAS ON INTELLECTUAL REPRESENTATION Cxaupe Panaccro (Université du Québec a Trois-Rivieres) Many recent commentators on Thomas Aquinas have insisted that his theory of intellectual cognition should not be seen as a brand of representationalism, Father Edouard Wéber, for example, has it that although Aquinas “Sometimes uses the traditional term of Similar. ity'—‘simititudo"”, he nevertheless “excludes the idea of an interme- diate representation” in intellectual knowledge.' Alain de Libera, in a similar vein, assures us that in using the term similitudo, “Thomas does not equate the mental concept with a representation of the thing”.* And, of course, several scholars have labelled Aquinas as a “direct realist’ in epistemology.® My point here will be that such char- acterizations are in need of important qualifications: there is, as I will endeavour to show by reviewing a number of relevant texts in Aquinas’s work, a perfectly acceptable sense in which his theory of intellectual intentionality is basically representationalist. By representationalism, I will mean, in this context, any theory of cognition which attributes a crucial and indispensable role to some sort of mental representation. And by mental representation, [ will mean laa symbolic token existing in some individual mind and endowed ‘within this mind with a semantic content. A mental representation, in this vocabulary, is a mental token referring to something else, something extramental in most cases. What I would like to say, then, is that Aquinas’s thcory does attribute a crucial and indispensable role to such intermediate mental entities in the very process of under- standing, First, I will briefly recall both the prima facie case for seeing Aqui- nas’s theory of intellectual cognition as a brand of direct realism, and the prima facie case for seeing it as a brand of representational- ism as well, And second, I will explore ways of reconciling these two opposite trends in Aquinas's thought. My main point, then, will be | Wéber [1990], 2709 (my translation); see also Wéber [1970], 246. ® Libera {1996}, 275 (my translation). ¥ See, for example, Kretamann [1993], 138186 CLAUDE PANACCIO: that the representationalist aspect of the theory must prevail in the last analysis. 1. Intentional identity and-menta! representations LL. Intentional identity . Why so many commentators see Aquinas’s theory of intellectual cog- nition as a brand of direct realism, is straightforward. Scott MacDonald, for example, formulates the point in’ a paradigmatic way: “a cog- nizer”, he writes, “is assimilated to an object of cognition when the / form that is particularized in that object—such as a stone—comes to exist in the cognizer’s soul”.! The idea is that intellectual cogni- tion is reached when the cognizer somehow becomes the object itsel! by taking on its very form, its intelligible form that is. Many of Aquinas’s texts can be quoted in support of this read- | ing. The Summa contra Gentiles, for example, is quite explicit that “any intelligible thing is understood insofar as it is one in act with the intellectual cognizer”.’ And so is the Summa Theologiae: “cognition takes place insofar as what is cognized is within the cognizer”.® Aquinas even explains in this respect that “non cognizers have only their own forms, while cognizers are apt to have in addition to their own form the form of the other thing as well”.’ Thus the thomistic doctrine does posit that some sort of identity--which we can call intentional identity is reached through the act of knowledge between the cognizer and whatever it is that is cognized Such intentional identifications are thought to be possible because, as Aquinas makes it clear in his commentary on the De anima, the very nature of the thing, its essence—human nature, for example, or feline nature~“can have two different modes of being: material being insofar as it is in natural matter; and immaterial being inso- ' MacDonald (1993), 160. Sic Gait. l, 47; “Orne intelligibile intelligitur secundum quod est unum actu cum imelligente”s see also 1, 444 “Formze autem intellectae in acty funt unum cum intellect actu intelligente”, The English translations of Aquinas's quotes in the body of the text are usual © S, Theol 1, 16, 1: “f. «J cognitie est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente”, 8. Tel. L141 “[...} nom cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tan- tuum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rel slterius [...}°.AQUINAS ON INTELLECTUAL REPRESENTATION 187 far as it is in the intellect”. The upshot would seem to be that when cognition takes place, it is the very same nature, the very same essence which is in the cognized thing on the one hand, and in the cog- nizer on the other hand, except that in the latter this nature is abstracted from the individualizing conditions which singularize it within the material cognized objects.’ Intentional identity between the cognizer and the cognized thing is possible precisely because of this special ubiquity of intelligible natures, which also accounts for the objectivity of knowledge. What more direct form of realism could one hope for than such a doctrine which says that the very nature of the extemal thing—its essence—-comes to exist in some way within the cognizing subject?!” 1.2, Intellectual representations ‘This, however, is only one side of the coin, as we are about to dis- cover. What exactly does it mean to say that the nature of a stone, for example, comes to exist within the mind of the cognizer in some way? The striking thing here is that when Aquinas wants to tackle the question, he inevitably resorts to the idea of mental similarity (similitudo) as being explicative in such matters. His oft-repeated prin- ciple is that “a cognition takes place only insofar as a similitude of the cognized thing is in the cognizer”;! or in the wording of the Sumama Thevlogice: “[, ..] it is required for cognition to take place that a similitude of the cognized thing be in the cognizer somewhat as I, 12: “Ipsa autem natura cui advenit intentio universalitatis, puta habet duplex esse: unum quidem materiale secundum quod est in materia naturali, aliud autem immateriale secundum quod est in intelleetu”. "See De Ente ot Essent UH, 5: “Ipsa enim natura humana in intellecw habet ‘esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus”. ® As many have remarked, this approach (o intentional identity seems to pre- suppose something like the avicennian doctrine of the threc ‘statuses’ a given essence can have, according to whether it is considered in itself, in the individuals which exemplify it, or in the minds which are thinking it, ‘This connection is aptly worked out, for example, by Libera and Michon [1993], 22-26 and by Libera [1996], 227-283. For a directly relevant passage, see Quodi. VIII, 1, 1: “Respondco dicen. dum quod secundum Avicennam in sua Mctaphysica, triplex est alicujus naturae consideratio [...”, 1S 6, Gent. I, 77: “Omnis enim cognitio fit secundum cognoscente”, litudinem cogniti in188 CLAUDE PANAUGIO a form of himself”."" This cannot be seen as the mere result of ocea- sional slips on Aquinas’s part, or of an uncommitted concession to traditional ways of speaking. Accounting for imentionality on die basis of similarity is, quite to the contrary, Aquinas's considered strategy from the carly time of the disputed questions De Vivitate in the 1250s to the very end of his career in the 1270s.!° Mental samilitudo, more- over, is sometimes explicitly associated with some form of representa- ion, ax in the following passage, for example: “Something is cognized insofar as it is represented in the cognizer, and not insofar as it is exist- ing in the cognizer”. We must be careful, of course. It has sometimes been suggested that similitudo should not be translated by ‘similarity’ in such con- texts, and that refraeseitae should ot be translated by ‘to represent? either, What is needed, here, is a closer look at the thomistic doc- trine of mental sduilitudo. ‘A somewhat surprising, but quite distinetive, feature of this doc- urine that soon emerges under such scrutiny is that intellectual cog- nition according to Aquinas requires not one mental simifiiudo, but two: the intelligible sfecies, on the one hand, and the concep! mental word»on the other hand. Let us examine cach one of them in turn, 1.21. dulelligible species The intelligible species is what is deposited within the possible intel- leet as a result of the action of the agent intellect." The process is roughly the following: first, the cognizer gets in touch with external objects through his senses (sight, hearing, and so on) and forms sen- sible images of these external things; and then ihe agent intellect © S. Thol 1, 88, 1: |...) requirinur ad cognoscenduny ut sit similitude rei cog- nitae in cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius”. [take iChere that “ipsius” refers Back to the cognizer (cagrascens); what Aquias means is that the sinilitude of the cognized (hing must exist within the cognizer prety much as a qualitative form would, "More of this in section 2.3 below. 1 Quast Dis, de Tor, Uy 3: “|...J aliquid cognoscitur secunduin quod est in cognescente rpraeseatatart, et non secundum quod est in cognescente existens” (talies are mine) © For this doctrine of the speci intelégibiis, vee, most notably, 8. Theat 1, 84-89. ‘Vhis pant of Aquinas's epistemology has been extensively studied. For recent pre- ations ane more bibliographical references: sce in particular: Kenny [1993}, Krevinann [1993], Spruit [L994}, Stamp [1998]AQUINAS ON INTELLECTUAL REPRESENTATION 189 takes over and abstracts intelligible forms from these sensible images These intelligible forms are the intelligible species 1 am now talking about. They are deposited in the possible intellect and stored there for future use. Aquinas’s view is that these intelligible species are necessary for intel- lectual cognition to take place, and prima jacie they seem to be exactly the sort of things that is usually meant by ‘mental representation mental tokens endowed with Semantic content. Look at the follow- ing passage, for example: . The soul is not the thing itself as some say, because it is not the stone which is in the soul, but the species of the stone, and what is meant when we say that the intellect in act is the intellected thing itself is that the species of the intellected thing is a species of the intellect in act.!® Intentional identity here is quite clearly accounted for by the presence of intermediate intelligible species within the mind. And the Summa contra Gentiles is also quite explicit that such is the order of explanation: It is to be taken into consideration that the external things intellected by us do not exist in our intellect according to their own nature, but what has to be in our intellect is their species, in virtue of which the intellect comes to be in act. [...] intellection itself stays within the cognizing subject and has with the thing which is intellected a rela- tion, which depends on the fact that this aforesaid species [...] is a similitude of the thing.” Gognition takes place not because the cognized thing is in the mind according to its proper nature, but in virtue of a similitudo relation between the mental species and the external thing. This, undeniably, sounds very much like some strong sort of representationalism. "Ty De én IM, 7: “Non autem anima est ipse res, sicut ili posuerunt, quia lapis non est in anima, set species lapidis; et per hunc modum dieitur intellectus in actu. exe ipsum intellectam in actu, in quantum species intellect! est species intellectus in actu”, "8. G Gait. 1, 53: “Considerandum est quod res exterior intelleeta a nobis, in intellectw nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam; sed oportet quod species jus sit in intellect nostro, per quam fit intellectus in acta, [..] ipsum intelligere [/..] manet in ipso intelligente, et habet relationcm ad rem quac intelligirur, cx €o quod species praedicta [...] est similitudo ilius”,190 CLAUDE, PANACGIO: 1.2.2. Gancepls ‘The process | have just deseribed is that by which the intelligible species is: originally acquired. Aquinas, however, has it that when we actively think about something of which we already have an intelli- gible species, we then form in ourselves something uew, a concep (con- feptus) or conception (conceptio) or mental’ word (verbim meutis), which also turns out to be indispensable in order for intellection to take place."* Tnspied mainly by Augustine’s De Tritate, this docuine of the mental word is frequently expounded by Aquinas, notably in the disputed questions De Varilale, in the Summa conoa Gentiles and in the disputed questions De Poientia."® Here is, from the Summa Theologiae, a cameo presentation of it s, achieves n himself which is a conception of the intellected thing, springing out of the intellectual power and coming from its cognition And this conception is what the spoken ward signifies, and it is called the “word of the heart? (eerbum caidis) signified by the spoken word." WiDSSeertRiIN ROR Ae aR Tae WIRE Se something w ‘This concept or mental word is said to differ from the intelligible species, the latter being the starting point of the intellectual operation while the mental word is the result of this very operation, its femainus ad quem so 10 say In the disputed questions De Potentia, Aquinas states that the intellectual cognizer can, as cognizer, be related to four distinct items: the thing itself which is intellected, the intelligible sficies, the act of iniellection (the ‘auelliger’), and finally the conception of the intellect, the mental word, “which conception”, he insists, “differs from the other three items” ‘The thomistic concept is defi- On Aquinas’s theory of the menial word, Paissac [L051] iy still a must. For recent reviews of the theme, with additional references, sce my [1992] and [1999], ch. 6. See Quart. Dixy. de Vivi hy Sc Gents Ly 38 eOIN, IL; Queenie Di, de Pot 89, ~S Therd We 27, Us “Quicumaue enim intellgit, ex hoe ipso quod intelligit, pro- ceait aliquid intra ipsum, quar est conceptio rei intellectac, ex vi intelleetia prove- niietis, cL es clus aotitia procedemis. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat: ¢t diciwue satin canis, significa verbo vocis” "See Gueed. V nde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quac est prin= Gipium pperstionis inellectualis, dflerat a verbo cordis, quod per operasionem intel Jectus formats”, Quaest, Disp. de Pit. BL: “lacelligens autem in intelligence ad quatuor potest haber ovdinem: scilicet adn clligitur, ad speciem intelizibilem, qua fi intellectus in_cetu. ac suum intelhgere, et ad concepuonem intellectuss Que qui- dent couceptio a wibus praedictis diAQUINAS ON INTELLECTUAL REPRESENTATION 191 nitely not to be identified with either the external thing, the intelligible species, or the act of intellection; it is simply something else. Although they differ, however, both the intelligible species and the concept (or mental word) are described by Aquinas as similitudines of external things.’ Each intellectual cognition, in this theory, thus seems to require no less than two distinct intellectual representations .. . The Summa contra Gentiles is explicit indeed about the representa- tional character of the mental word. “The internally conceived word”, Aquinas writes, “is some sort of ratio and similitudo of the intellected thing”. And he dren goes on to explain what he means by simili- tudo in this context: A similitude of something existing in some other thing can have the significance of an exemplar if it is like a model for the other thing: or it has the significance of an image (imago) if what it is a similitude of is its model. ‘The latter clearly applies in the case of the toncepts. So one has no choice but to conclude that the concept--or mental word —is here said by Aquinas to be a similitude of something in the sense of being an image—an imago—of that thing. The De Veritale, morcover, neatly described the concept as being intermediate between the intel- lect and the intellected thing. And Aquinas sometimes goes as far as (0 raise it to the status of primary object of intellection.”” It seems difficult, in view of such texts (and many others), to maintain that the thomistic concept is no mental intermediate representation at all Especially since the mental word is plainly said by Aquinas to ‘rep- resent whatever it is that is intellected by it: “For the word conceived ® See S. ¢ Gewt. 1, 53: “Haec autem intentio intellecta fie. the mental word or conteept], cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelli gibili quae facie imtellectum in actu [...] feet atrumque sit rei inelectee sumilituds” (italics are mine). % $6 Gent IV, 1: “Verbum autem interius conceptum est quacdam ratio et similitudo rei intellectae”. ® Ibid: “Similimdo autem alicuius in aliero existens vel habet rationem eu: Plaris, si se habeat ut principium; vel habet potins rationem imaginis, si se habeat ad id cuius est similitudo sicut ad principium”, * Quaesi Disp. de Verit, 4, 2 “{...] concep tum et rem intellectam’ ‘italics are mine), * See Ques. Dap. de Pot, 9, 5: “Hoc engo est primo et per se intellectum quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enunciatia LP. The opuscule De Natexa Verbi Iniellecus~of slightly doubtlal authenticity even compares the mental word to “a mirror in which the thing is apprehended” (Est cnim tamquamn speculum in quo res cemnitur”). intellectus est media inter intellec-ig GLAUDE PANACCIO ch is in the mind is representative (epracsentatioun) of everything, whit imtellected in act”. We now seem to have @ very strong prima facie case for labelling Aquinas's theory of intellectual cognition as a brand of rupresenta- tionalism in the sense given earlier. And even ay double representa tionalism: intellectual cognition, according’to Aquinas, involves both tho imelligible species and the mental word, and both are regularly described by him ay similitudes~ even images~ of the external things within the mind. But, remember, we also had in the previous sec- tion a rather strong case for labelling Aquinas as a direct realist. So the question which is now before us is how to reconcile these two apparently opposite ways of speaking we find in Aquinas: one accord- ing w which the very nature of the cognized (hing finds some sort of ofistence within the cognizer’s mind, and the other according to which only: similitudes of the external things—-representations—are present within the cognizer’s mind. 2. Quiddities, spectes and concepts ‘The question can be put in the following terms: what could the rela- tion be between the nature which is said to exist in the mind in an intentional or immaterial mode, and the two sorts of mental repre- sentations called for by the thomistic doctrine, the intelligible species and the concepts? Once this question is raised, the most tempting possibility at first sight would be that this relation simply is identity. ‘This approach then subdivides in two, according to whether the quiddities in the mind are equated with intelligible species or with mental words. So let us consider cach hora in turn. 2.1. Quidditios and intelligible. species Could the quiddity in the mind=-the feline nature, for example, inso- far as I am thinking it~ be identical with some intelligible species? Aquinas sometimes scems to suggest as much: The intellect, however, eognizes the very mature and substance of the thing; and hence the intelligible speries is a similitude of the very essence of the thing and i i a some way toe very quiddity ond nature of the thing © Theol, 1, $4, 3: °Verbum autem in mente conceplum, est repracsentativur omnis eius quod actu intelligitur”,AQUINAS ON INTELLECTUAL REPRESENTATION 193 according to intelligible being as it is in the things themselves; and therefore everything which falls not under the senses or the imagina- tion but solely under the intellect, is known in virtue of this that its essence or quiddity is in some way in the intellect.” Upon reflection, though, this identification can hardly be sustained, and we must give great weight to Aquinas’s own qualification, in this passage, to the effect that the intelligible species is only ix some way (quodam mode) the very quiddity of the thing. There are indeed, within the thomistic doctrine, irreducible differences between the quiddities of things 6n the one hand and the intelligible species on the other hand. First and foremost, the quiddities of things are frequently said by Aquinas to be the proper objects of the intellect.” The intelligible species, however, are normally not in his view the objects of the intel- leet, they are not the id quod of intellection, but that in virtue of which intellection takes place, the qua of intellection.®! Secondly, the intel- ligible species are mental tokens and they are multiplied according to the plurality of singular minds, while the essences are not so multi- plied. Thus having once more recalled, in the Compendium Theologiae, that “the object of the intellect is not the intelligible species, but the quiddity of the thing”, Aquinas justifies this distinction between men- tal species and quiddities by stating that, even when you and I are thinking about the same quiddity, the intelligible species we use for that are “numerically distinct in me and in you”.? And finally, the intelligible species has the being of an accident of the cognizer.® How could an essence ever have the being of an accident? ® Queal, VILL, 2, 2: “Set intellectus cognoscit ipsam naturam et substantiam rei, unde species intelligibilis est similitudo ipsius essencie vei et est quodem modo ipsa quid- ihitas ef natura rei secundum esse intelligibile, non sccundum esse naturale prout est in rebus; et ideo omnia que non cacunt sub sensu et iinaginatione, set sub. solo intellect, cognoscuntur per hoc quod essencic vel quidditates corum sunt aliquo modo in intellectu” (italics are mine} See eg. S. Test {, 17, $: “Obicctum autem proprium intellectus est quid tas rei", 5" A Typical passage on this would be the following one, from dr De dn IL, 2 “Manifestum cst etiam quod species intelligibiles quibus intellectus possibilis Bt in actu, non sunt obiectum intellectus. Non enim se habent ad intellectum sicut quod intelligitur, set sicut quo intellectus inteliigit |. ..”. ® Corp. Theol, 85: "[. ..] obiectum autem intellects non est species inteligiblis, sed quidditas rei’[...] unde et species intelligibiles [sunt] aliae numero in me et in te [..). ® See eg. S. Gent I, 46: “Species intclligibilis in intellectu practer essentiam ius existens esse accidentale habet”.194 GLAUDE PANACCIO 2.2. Quiddities end cancepls Tt seems clear, then, that the intelligible species cannot literally be identified with the quiddity of the external thing. What about the mental word, the concepi? Here again, there is something to be said in favor of simply identifying it with the quiddity as it exists in the mind. Look at the following passage, for example, from the disputed questions De Veritate, The word of our intellect is that which the operation of our intellect ferminates at, that which is intellected and which is called the con- ception of the intellect: whether it is a conception which can be signified by a simple spoken word, as it happens ahen the intellect fonns the quid- dies of things, ov by a complex phrase, as it happens when the intel- lect composes and divides." The mental word, here~ which is cither a concept or a combina- tion of concepts “is said 1@ be the intellected itself (Gas intellect), and it is wempting, therefore, to identily it with what is repeatedly accepted by Aquinas as the proper object of imellection, namely the quiddity. Mereaxer, we do read in this same passage that “the intel lect forms the quidditics of things"; since the concept or mental word frequently described as what the intellect forms through the intele leewal act, the conclusion seems inviting that concepis just are the quicidities of things insofar as they have intentional being within the mind. All the more so, since the mental word is sometimes explic- ily attributed a purely intentional mode of existence within the mind (by contrast, in particular, with the accidental mode of existence of the intelligible species). Cam afraid, though, that this identification will not do either: mental words have peculiarities of their own which do not fit quid- ities very well. First, they are produced by the intellectual act, engen- dered by it. In what sense could an essence, a quiddity be produced by the mind? ‘The concept, Aquin; is the effect of the act of 7 Quarst. Disp. de Vert IW. % |...) verbum intellects nosis... est id ad quod operatic intellects noste} terminatur, quiod est ipsum intellectum, quod dicitur con Stump [1998], 305.200 CLAUDE PANACCIO again within the mind that is thinking them. And it is quite true, as we have seen, that Aquinas sometimes expresses himself in a closely related way.’ What comes out of the texts | have reviewed, however, is that intentional identity is explained, in Aquinas’s most considered formulations, in terms of similarity, rather than the reverse. We have to conclude, then, that Aquinas’s thcory of intellectual cognition is basically represencationalist, in the quite standard sense of that term 1 have adopted here: it attributes a crucial and indis- pensable role to certain mental tokens which it considers endowed with semantic content, It even recognizes, actually, two such sorts of mental tokens: the intelligible species and the concepts (or mental words}, neither of which is in any strong sense seen as identical with the quiddities it represents. Intentional identity, in Aquinas's most considered ways of speaking, is analyzed as a sinilitude-rclation rather than as a real identity-relation. What exactly this simiditudo-relation should be has been left open here, as in Aquinas himself, The ques- tion, as far as TE can see, is still in need of further elucidation. *Similitudo’, as Aquinas understood it on the basis of common use in philosophy and theology, might have included, in some way or other, a causal component which we would not normally associate, today, with ‘similarity’. But the core of it would still have to be some sort of isomorphism. Does that preclude direct realism? Well, Elizabeth Karger, at the Basel conlerence fom which this book is stemming, proposed an appropriately concise and standard characterization of direct realism as the docirine that an external object can be apprehended without a mental object being apprehended. But precisely this, as we have seen, is something Aquinas does reject in his theory of concepts (if not of intelligible species}: no external thing, for him, can be intel- ‘or mental word——being formed ay an inlermediate object of intellection.” Aquinas's representation- alism thus turns out to be incompatible with direct realism after all. Iectually cognized without a mental concept Sec above. notes 89, and 10. » Several commentators have insistently underlined this causal dimension of nas’ cognitive simillitucle, Sec, for a classical instance, Hayen [1954], 210-226; and, for a recent one, Jacobs and Zeis [1997]. © See section 12.2 above and, in particular, dhe representative texts quoted above fit notes 6 and 27. Other testimonies to the same include Quaest. Disp. de Vari, 4, 17.) eum verbum interius sit id- quod intellectum ot [2 P, and: Conf. 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Weber, E.-H., L'Homme en discussion a UUniversité de Paris en 1270, Paris: Vrio 1970. —, Le Christ selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris: Desclée 1988. ~, “Verbum”, in: Encyclopédie philosophigue universelle, vol, I: Notions philasophiques, Paris: PUF 1990, 1. 2, 2709-2711 =~, La personne lounaine aa XUN" sitele, Pasis: Vrin 1991.