Estipona vs Lobrigo

Facts:
This case challenges the constitutionality of Section 23 of RA 9165 (AKA the dangerous
drugs act of 2002) which provides that any person under any provision of this act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.

Petitioner Estipona is the accused in a criminal case charging him with possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu). Subsequently, Estipona filed a Motion to allow
the accused to enter into a plea bargaining agreement where he prayed to withdraw his
"not guilty" plea and instead enter a plea of guilty for violation of RA 9165 due to the fact
that he was a first time offender and had minimal quantity of the drug at the time of seizure
and thus, the penalty is merely rehabilitation.

He argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 violates the rule making authority of the SC and the
principle of separation of powers of the Government's branches.

The prosecution moved to have the motion denied and that Section 23 of the Act is justified
by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. The
motion was then denied by the lower court on the ground that while lower courts are not
precluded from resolving constitutional questions, they must observe a becoming modesty
in examining such. Thus "it is not for this court to declare Section 23 of RA 9165
unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the
prosecution of illegal drug cases".

Issue: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroaches on the

Supreme Courts' power to promulgate procedural rules?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court did not resolve the constitutionality of Section 23 of RA 9165 in order
not to preempt a future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind such.
Thus, it was merely declared invalid until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an Administrative Circular issued for that purpose.

The SC reiterated in this case that the power to promulgate procedural rules is in the
exclusive domain of the Court and is no longer shared by the Executive and Legislative
departments.
 o Note that there is a lengthy discussion in this case regarding the evolution of the power
to enact procedural rules from the 1935 constitution to present however, the conclusion
is that presently, the Court has been given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. However, most important is the
fact that the Congress' power to repeal, alter, supplement the rules of procedure was
taken away.
o The other branches of government trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders amending rules of procedure promulgated by the Court.

The SC also discussed the fact that Plea Bargaining in Criminal Cases as a rule and practice
has existed in our Jurisdiction as early as the 1940 Rules of procedure. Currently, the
present rules (at the time of the case the effective rule was the 2000 Rules of Procedure)
allow plea bargaining under Rule 116 and Rule 118.

Rule 116, Section 2 provides that

“At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor may be allowed
by the Trial Court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.”

Plea bargaining is a rule of Procedure. Note that the SC's sole prerogative regarding
procedural rules is limited only to the preservation of substantive rights. In other words,
the SC has the sole prerogative to issue procedural rules and not substantive rules. Note
that:
o A rule is substantive it if takes away a vested right or creates a right
o A rule is procedural if it operates as a means of implementing an existing
right

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining is defined as a process whereby the accused and
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It is encouraged because it benefits the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.  Considering this mutuality of advantage, plea bargaining does
not create nor take away a vested right. It is merely a means to implement an existing right
by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

Furthermore, it is not a demandable right since it banks on the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor. Furthermore, the plea is also subject to the sound discretion of
the court which MAY allow the accused to exercise such.