Millares v Subido

Facts:
Billy Millares, a lawyer employed in the office of the City of Manila, was appointed to "Technical
Assistant on Fiscal Matters" with compensation at P6,600.00 per annum from being a part of office of
City treasurer, Manila, as Field Supervisor at P3120.00. Acting Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo
Subido issued an order terminating the services of Billy Millares because of several reasons like: How
the newly appointed position of Millares does not require knowledge of law, did not pursue any course in
economics, the approval of transfer was not complete because it was signed by the Chief of the
Personnel Transactions Division and that Millares's transfer was irregular.
The City treasurer stopped providing the salary of Millares which prompted the latter to file an action
for mandamus against appellants in the CFI alleging that the Civil service commissioner had no
authority to terminate his services and that withholding his salary was made in violation of Section 4,
Article 12 of the Constitution and Section 32 of RA 2260. Civil Service Commissioner contended that the
action complained of was within the general powers conferred on him "to enforce, execute and carry
out the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system" and "to have exclusive jurisdiction
over the approval under the Civil Service law and rules of all appointments including promotions to
positions in the competitive service."
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. According to the same, petitioner may be considered a first-
grader, that the petitioner’s appointment was both a transfer and promotion and as such, not governed
by the rule on transfers and that the summary termination of petitioner's services without observance
of due process makes his removal illegal.
Issues:
1. WON the appointment of petitioner appellee was made in pursuance of the Civil Service rules
on transfer;
2. WON there was valid approval of appellee's appointment by the Civil Service Commission;
Ruling:
1. A vacant position (be it new or created by the cessation of an incumbent in office) shall be filled by
promotion of the ranking officer or employee, who is competent and qualified to hold the same. And
only where, for special reason or reasons of which the affected officer or employee will be notified,
this mode of recruitment or selection cannot be observed, that the position may be filled either by
transfer, or re-employment, or by getting from the certified list of appropriate eligibles, in that
order. In the case at bar, however, no evidence was presented that there were ranking employees in
the office of the City Mayor affected by the appointment of appellee to the position involved herein.
We have to rule, therefore, that the appointment in question did not violate the next-in-rank or
seniority rule of the Civil Service Act.
2. Under the Civil Service rules, promotion and transfer connote two different personnel movements
which cannot take place, in a single instance, at the same time. Appellee's latest appointment, insofar
as it involves an immediate increase of compensation, is violative of Civil Service rules and,
therefore, invalid. To comply strictly with the Civil Service policy regulations in force at the time of
petitioner’s appellee's transfer, the same should not have included any immediate increase in
salary, but without prejudice to a subsequent promotional appointment after a minimum
service of three months in the new position. We are of the opinion that petitioner should be
considered entitled to full compensation after three months from his original transfer from the City
Treasurer's office to that of the City Mayor.
PT&T and Co. v CA
Facts:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing telegraph and
communication services thru its branches all over the country. The petitioner came up with a Relocation
and Restructuring Program. designed to (a) sustain its (PT&T’s) retail operations; (b) decongest
surplus workforce in some branches, to promote efficiency and productivity; (c) lower expenses
incidental to hiring and training new personnel; and (d) avoid retrenchment of employees occupying
redundant positions. The private respondents and other petitioner’s employees were directed to “relocate”
to their new PT&T Branches. The petitioner offered benefits/allowances to those employees who
would agree to be transferred under its new program. Moreover, the employees who would agree to
the transfers would be considered promoted. The private respondents rejected the petitioner’s offer. The
private respondents explained that the transfers imposed by the management would cause enormous
difficulties on the individual complainants. Dissatisfied with this explanation, the petitioner considered
the private respondents’ refusal as insubordination and willful disobedience to a lawful order; hence,
the private respondents were dismissed from work. They forthwith filed their respective complaints
against the petitioner before the appropriate sub-regional branches of the NLRC.
Subsequently, the private respondents’ bargaining agent, PT&T Workers Union-NAFLUKMU, filed a
complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice for and in behalf of the
private respondents, including Ignacio Dela Cerna, before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. For its
part, the petitioner (respondent therein) alleged that the private respondents’ transfers were made in the
lawful exercise of its management prerogative and were done in good faith. The labor arbiter ruled in
favor of the petitioner, finding that the aforesaid transfers indeed resulted in the private respondents’
promotion, and that the complaint for unfair labor practice was not fully substantiated and supported by
evidence. Aggrieved, the private respondents appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. The NLRC
issued a Resolution which reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. The NLRC ruled that
the petitioner illegally dismissed the private respondents, The petitioner raised that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled against private
respondents’ dismissal on the ground of insubordination for refusing to heed to the transfer order
of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, affirming the resolution of the NLRC.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed its petition for review assailing the decision and resolution of the CA.
Issue:
WON public respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it issued the orders dated June 15, 2001 and February 6, 2002 affirming the order dated May 31,
1999 of the third division of the national labor relations commission?
Ruling:
The CA is not supposed to decide on cases regarding questions of facts but questions of law. For this
reason alone, this case should be dismissed. An employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result
of a transfer, without his consent. A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or
reduction or a transfer that aims to ‘lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done
without the employees’ consent. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for
the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to
refuse. Hence, the exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as
insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid
cause for the private respondents’ dismissal.
Erasmo v Home Insurance
Facts:
Petitioner started working with respondent Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1982 as a
consultant on the Project Evaluation Department and held various positions therein until finally, she
was promoted to Vice-President. The nature of her appointment was “promotion” and her employment
status was “temporary,” since the position is a Career Executive Service Office (CESO) and petitioner
lacks the required CES eligibility. Petitioner was administratively charged with, among others:
neglect of duty. Respondent, through its President, Fernando M. Miranda, Jr., wrote petitioner, informing
her that “by operation of law, your appointment shall be deemed terminated. She was also advised that
the pendency of the administrative case against her precludes any renewal of her appointment. Petitioner
wrote respondent seeking reinstatement to her previous position with back wages, but her request was
denied. She was also informed that the position that she vacated has already been filled up and approved
by the CSC on a permanent basis.
When the investigating committee of the HIGC recommended the dismissal of the charges against
petitioner on June 29, 1995, the latter again wrote respondent asking that she be allowed to continue to
discharge her duties and responsibilities as VP for TS/GCIG. Again, respondent denied her demands.
One (1) year after, petitioner wrote the Chairperson of the CSC, appealing her case. The CSC dismissed
her appeal on February 3, 1998 per Resolution No. 980182. According to the CSC: (1) petitioner is not
protected by the security of tenure clause under the Constitution because she was holding her position
of Vice-President under a temporary status. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CSC’s resolution and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issues:
WON petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG of respondent
HIGC?
Ruling:
No. The facts of this case indubitably show that petitioner’s promotional appointment as Vice-
President of TS/GCIG is merely temporary in nature. Her appointment papers dated June 11, 1992
clearly indicate it. This is because petitioner does not possess a career executive service eligibility
which is necessary for the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG, it being a career service executive
office. Her new appointment, being temporary in character, was terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing power with or without a cause, and petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure. As held in
Achacoso v. Macaraig: ‘It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed.” Petitioner maintains that we apply the ruling in Palmera v. Civil Service
Commission instead of Achacoso v. Macaraig. This, however, is not possible in the Palmera case, having
worked in the government for 34 years, it was held that by signing the contract. Palmera couldn’t be
reasonably supposed to have knowingly relinquished his permanent post and all its concomitant rights
and benefits. Palmera was led to believe that the contract he signed was merely a subterfuge to provide
legal basis for the payment of his salary for the period of January 1 to December 31, 1987, and he was
not informed of the real objective of the contract. It was also ruled that the contract was void and cannot
be the basis for the claim that Palmera abandoned his post. The foregoing circumstances are not present in
petitioner’s case.
Echo v Obrero

Facts:
Echo is a provider of warehousing management and delivery services. Somido is Warehouse
Checker, while Cortes is a Forklift Operator. Echo received information about shortages in peso
value arising from the movement of products to and from its warehouse. After an immediate audit, Echo
suspected that there was a conspiracy among the employees in the warehouse. Echo, in the exercise of its
management prerogative, decided to reassign the staff. The respondents were among those affected.
Enriquez issued a memorandum informing the respondents of their transfer to the Delivery Section. The
transfer would entail no change in ranks, status and salaries. They both declined the offer. Enriquez,
without consent of the respondents, informed the latter of their assignments/designations as Delivery
Supervisors.
Echo alleged that the respondents did not perform the new duties assigned to them. Successive
memoranda were issued by Echo to the respondents, who refused to acknowledge receipt and comply
with the directives therein. The Memoranda dated August 8, 2009 informed them of their termination
from employment by reason of their repeated refusal to acknowledge receipt of Echo’s memoranda
and flagrant defiance to assume the duties of Delivery Coordinators. LA Hernandez dismissed the
respondents’ complaint. In sustaining the respondents’ arguments, the NLRC explained that at the time of
the former’s dismissal, they had been employed by Echo for several years since 2002 and 2004,
respectively. Things changed when the Union was formed. When the two did not agree to be transferred,
they were terminated for insubordination, a mere ploy to lend a semblance of legality to a preconceived
management strategy. The CA affirmed in toto the NLRC’s ruling: The dismissal of the respondents was
tainted with bad faith as they were dismissed by ECHO for refusing to accept their promotion as Delivery
Supervisor/Coordinator.
Issues: WON (1) the respondents were illegally suspended and terminated, hence, entitled to payment of
their money claims, damages and attorney’s fees; (2) Echo and its officers are guilty of unfair labor
practice?
Rulings: The instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
1. Such refusal cannot be the basis for the respondents’ dismissal from service. An employee is not bound
to accept a promotion, which is in the nature of a gift or reward. Refusal to be promoted is a valid
exercise of a right. Such exercise cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful
disobedience of a lawful order of the employer, hence, it cannot be the basis of an employee’s
dismissal from service. In the case at bench, a Warehouse Checker and a Forklift Operator are rank-and-
file employees. On the other hand, the job of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator requires the exercise of
discretion and judgment from time to time.
2. The finding of unfair labor practice and the award of moral and exemplary damages do not however
follow solely by reason of the dismissal. The Court finds no sufficient basis to award moral and
exemplary damages. A dismissal may be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad
faith to entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages
cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without just or
authorized cause. In the instant case, the right not to accept an offered promotion pertained to each of the
respondents. However, they exhibited disrespectful behavior by their repeated refusal to receive the
memoranda issued by Echo and by their continued presence in their respective areas without any
work output. Echo expectedly imposed disciplinary penalties upon the respondents for the latter’s
intransigence.