FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in
their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio
R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica
Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995
and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did
not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge
Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable
cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide. NO.

2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them. NO.

HELD:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause
against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons ...against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature ..." An
arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of
persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque
concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of
reasonable caution or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. The terms are legally synonymous
and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the
average man on the street. It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have an abundance.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there
must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional
Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before
issuing warrants of arrest against them.

FACTS:

Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for
two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati against private respondent George
I. Lagos. He alleged that LAGOS, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles
entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc.

Public prosecutor Alex G. Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private respondent, and on the
same day, respondent was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315.

LAGOS filed a motion to recuse praying that Presiding Judge Reinato G. Quilala inhibit himself from
hearing the case based on the following grounds:

a) the presiding judge summarily denied respondent's motion: 1) to defer issuance of the warrant of
arrest; and 2) to order reinvestigation.
b) the presiding judge and Atty. Alex Y. Tan, SAAG Philippines, Inc.'s Ad Interim President, were seen
together.

LAGOS filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a
pending petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.

The trial court denied respondent's motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse.

CA rendered its challenged decision. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a prejudicial question exists
which calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the resolution of the intra-corporate controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.

RULING:

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

Here, the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now pending before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution is based.

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner before the RTC of
Makati.

Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the
demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such a
demand on the company's behalf. LAGOS is challenging petitioner's authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc.
in the corporate case pending before the RTC. Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of petitioner
is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot
prosper. Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the same or
deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the
crime of estafa. This is because the crime is committed by misappropriating or converting money or
goods received by the offender under a lawful transaction.

The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure to return the things received for sale on commission,
or to deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is defined by law, by misappropriating or converting
the money or goods received on commission. Delay in the fulfillment of a commission or in the delivery
of the sum on such account received only involves civil liability. So long as the money that a person is
under obligation to deliver is not demanded of him, and he fails to deliver it for having wrongfully
disposed of it, there is no estafa, whatever be the cause of the debt.