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MIMESIS -LUKACS' UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE

STEFAN MORAWSKI*

cameto Marxismin a verycomplexway.In 1933he


wrotethathe arrivedat Marxthrough Kantand Hegel;but
we could add thattherewas undoubtedly also a strongin-
fluenceofLebensphilosophie yof Simmelin particular, and unques-
tionablya strongintellectual dependenceupon Max Weber. This
admixture, stillincompletely showsthedilemmaof Lukacs
defined,
verysharply. He mighthavebrokenabruptly withall this;he did
not.He cameto Marxismthrough an evolutionand whenhe finally
emerged a Marxist, he consciouslyadaptedall his priorknowledge
and attitudesto his Marxistoutlook.It would not make sense,
therefore,to studythe aestheticsof Lukacs in 1963 withouta
knowledgeof his Die Seele rinddie Formenof 1914. His first
Marxistworkson aestheticswere publishedin the 1930s; their
basicideas date fromearlier.Lukacswas thennot yeta Marxist,
but he had alreadyread muchin Marx. During 1915-25his in-
terpretationsof artisticformand contentbecame increasingly
historicized.
Even earlier,he was extremely sensitiveto alienation
in contemporary dramaand thenovel,and soughtto balancethe
idea of Totalität-takenfrom Hegel and Simmel-with it. His
readingin Marx graduallygave a definitesocialistcharacterto
the conceptTotalität.Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923),
that turning point in Lukacs' work which demonstrated
thereificationprocessand distinguished actualfrompotentialcon-
leads
sciousness, him to definiteconclusionsin aesthetics.Art,or
moreprecisely, itsgenesisand function,had to be regardedin the
lightofclassconflict and in termsof theperspective of thevictory
* Stefan Morawski holds the Chair of Aesthetics at Warsaw
University,and taught
last summer at the Universityof California in Berkeley.This article was translated
by Malgorzata Munk and Lee Baxandall.
26
LUKACS' UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE 27

of socialism.Lukacs' essaysfromthe time of his activityon Die


Linkskurvewere writtenin this spirit;at this time he formedhis
notionof the equivalence of partisanshipin art with an authentic
realism,that is, the capturingof true social process; and at this
timehe also proposedthatrealismbe chosenas the means of look-
ing at realityin its typicality(subject-objectrelationship),as op-
posed to naturalism,which providesonly the artisticrenderingof
reportage.In all thesewritingsLukacs opposed sectarianeffortsto
cut socialist creative works off from the best creative effortsof
criticalbourgeoisauthors.He viewed the work of Thomas Mann
in particularas an importantbridge between the old and new
culturalworlds.There are, accordingto Lukacs, historicalepochs
in whicheven the best artistsfindthemselvesunable to make un-
equivocal statements of theirclassallegiance.Such timesare usual!',
of
epochs revolutionary change,when,like gods livingin the empty
spacesbetweenparticlesof matter,the artistsworkin an Epicurean
Intermundium.
If one wereto sayonlythisof Lukacs,the readermightconclude
thathis scientifictalentlies mainlyin his great eruditionand his
extremelyclever adaptation of older philosophical ideas to the
language of Marxism.Such a presentationwould thereforefalsify
the value of his work,the most importantelementof which is his
own creativephilosophy.It is here thathis aestheticachievements
are the greatest.
We come now to an extremelydifficult subject: the historyof
Marxistaesthetics.
One of Lukacs' greatmeritsis thathe showedthereis a Marxist
aesthetics.At the same time, he undertook several analyses of
changeswithinthe Marxistdoctrine (e.g., Mehring,Lenin) . There
is no doubt that no Marxistscientisthas broadened the circle of
aestheticquestions or analyzed and systemizedthem more deeply
thanLukacs. Those who say that Lukacs providesthe firstMarxist
systemof aestheticsare not mistaken.There is no problemwhich
he has not placed in a new light;no aestheticquestionon whichhe
has not shown that Marxism has its roots in the best European
tradition.Always extremelysensitive to our cultural heritage,
Lukacs stillneverfailsto point out the revolutionary philosophical
and aestheticchangeswroughtby Marx.
When I reflecton the novum Lukacs has created in Marxist
28 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

aestheticscience,I thinkin the firstinstanceof his researchmethod.


The study of the historyof literaturein the light of historical
change does not seem particularlynew; what is new, however,is
his view of the philosophicalinterpretationof artisticcreation.The
analysisof the relationof contentto form in an artisticwork and
the spiritualstructureenclosingit, which iconology-arisingfrom
Geistesgeschichte- carrieson today,was undertakenby Lukacs but
with a rather differentpoint of view. He regarded the creative
work'sexistencefromthe viewpointof the historyof philosophy;
he looked for the relationof an artistto the encompassingsocial
processesthroughthe prism of the alienation phenomenon.He
went deeply into the artist'sspecificphilosophyas presentedin a
given artisticcreation,examininghow that philosophyconfronts
otherexistentphilosophies.
Lukacs, known for this kind of interpretation, also introduced
anothernovumrelated closelyto it: the historicalinterpretation of
formand genre.From his firstpublicationsthisproblem interested
him. However, the terminologyand interpretationhe used in
1910-11 were suggestivebut murky; he wrote of ready-to-hand
spiritualforms,waiting for an artistto put them into his work.
But, even then, one could see his social interestin the subject.
His attitudewas changedrapidlyand in the followingyears,Lukacs
began to explain the failuresof novels and dramas as an aspect of
the failureof bourgeoisculture.A fullydeveloped Marxist inter-
pretationof thisproblemdid not come until he wrote The Histori-
cal Novel in the 1950s, but I do not know any major work by
Lukacs which did not emphasizethe relation of changingartistic
formsto social changes. This sociologyof formshas yet to be
presentedin a systematic way; perhapsLukacs will do so in further
volumes of his aesthetics.In any case, his analysesdo approach
problemswhich are usually untouchedor hardlytouched,and do
so in the lightof total Marxistdoctrine.Only the art theoretician,
Max Raphael (who spent his last yearsin the United States,and
is hardlyknown either there or in Poland), has achieved some
comparablesuccessin thisdirection.
The third novum is Lukacs' analysis of realism. Despite the
factthat on this point Marxistanalysisis extremelyrich, no one
has equaled his deep philosophicalanalysisof this concept,nor
have othersbroughtsuch broad literary-historical studies to bear
LUKACS' UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE 29
in provingtheirthesis.The problemof realism-in Lukacs' inter-
pretation-isconnectedwith the questionsof genesisand function
in art; its relationto religionand science; and to beautyin nature
and aestheticemotion.Each of these questionsLukacs puts in his
own untraditionalway,and each one of his answerserectsan im-
pressiveedifice,which togetheroffera fundamentalnovum. And
here we come to our principal theme.

In 1963, Luchterhand,a West German house, published the


firsttwo volumes of Lukacs' aesthetics (Die Eigenart des Aesthe-
tischen). Altogethertheycontainover 1700 pagesand are, in a way,
the sum-totalof all Lukacs' analysesconcernedwith the specificity
of artisticcreation.A selectivediscussionis necessary,for despite
the sustained quality of the work, many detailed problems are
touchedupon whichwould require separatecomment.Because the
chief subject is mimesis,or to be more exact, a theoryof the
universalityof the reflection of realityin art,I shall analyze,along
with Lukacs and in the light of this premise,the problem of the
genesisof art and of its specificity.
Beforeundertakingthis,it is necessaryto say a fewwordsabout
aspectsof Lukacs' work that reveal a hithertounknown Lukacs»
Most strikingly, this work goes outside of literature,which has
previously been the main fieldof his studies.The book is of much
interestto art historians;Lukacs provesnot only amazinglyerudite
in this field,but shows himselfto be an independentand fertile
researcher.He broadens the circle of problems from another
aspect,inasmuchas his work: (a) gives a deeper Marxistanalysis
of how the world is known; (b) takes the analysisof art's genesis
-as I have soughtto demonstrate- fromthe viewpointof a histor-
ical processthat moves towardthe independenceof artisticforms,
rather than from the traditional,well-understood(class-condi-
tioned) point of view; (c) analyzes the futurefor art, especially
in the lightof an evolutionaryrelease fromthe chains of religion;
(d) analyzesPavlov's conceptof signal-systems fromthe viewpoint
of the specificity of artisticand aestheticcognition;and (e) ana-
lyzes especially the anthropomorphiccharacterof art from the
aspect of art'svarious functionsand its role in the moraland polit-
ical developmentof man. Yet we should realize that this is only,
as Lukacs says,a preparationfor analysis.The interpretation pro-
30 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
vided in thesetwo volumesis drawn fromthe dialecticalmaterial-
ist perspectiveon art. From the viewpointof historicalmaterialism
a short,summaryaccount of artisticand aestheticconsciousness,
based on the historyof the various arts,has still to be presented.

The problemof genesis-as presentedby Lukacs- has been little


analyzed within the Marxist framework.The remarksof Ernst
Fischer,in The Necessityof Art,do not providea clear answeras
to how artisticactivitydiffersfromotherformsof social conscious-
ness. I have analyzedthe question in my lecturesat the University
of Warsaw during 1963-64 in a detailed way; this analysisis not
yet published. In Lukacs' view, froma single material world of
social praxis three fundamentalformsof consciousnessemerge:
artistic,scientific,and everyday.Artistic consciousnessis much
closerto everydayconsciousnessthanis scientific consciousness.This
is because it is based on practical-sensuous, direct relation with
reality.The object, which gives birth to the artisticconsciousness
and to which artisticconsciousnessreturns,never is treated im-
personally.Lukacs believes this strikingdifference is explained by
the genesisof the phenomenon.In the genesisof art, he looks as
well for the deeper determinantof artisticconsciousness,which
dependson concretecreation,i.e., the creationof worksof art. Art
develops slowly,against a backgroundof the practical-technical
conquest of realitywhich moves away from the magical-religious
attitudes of primitiveman. With Marx, Lukacs speaks of the
objectificationof the sensesand of the release of man fromdirect
dependenceon reality.Zur-Kunstw erden as a processis not com-
pletelyconscious,but goes forwardin connectionwith a reality
increasingly accessibleand tangibleto man. The more man focuses
on sensually perceptibleaspects of phenomena,the more deeply
he penetratesreal existence,the less is he dependenton the pressure
of the magical-religious point of view, of which transcendentalism
is characteristic.But how can such changes occur in the process
of cognition?Accordingto Lukacs, the cause lies as much in the
biophysiologicalnatureof the human being as in his social charac-
ter,specificallyin the human mimeticrelationto reality.
If we go back to the beginningsof humancivilization,not much
remainsaside fromthe plasticarts; even the remainsof thesearts
require a difficultreconstruction. We should regardall such com-
LUKACS'UNIVERSALPRINCIPLE 31

pleted processesin the alreadyassimilatedperspectiveon the


sequencesof art and culture,lookingnot only at this or that
sequencebutat theentirecontextof thecivilization. Lukacsthinks
thatthereconstruction of primitive conditions provesrhythm the
mostprobablesource,in the firstinstance,of artisticsensation.
Rhythm- biologicallytaken-undergoes socialmodification through
thelaborprocess.Rhythm alone is not,however, an aesthetic ele-
ment;afterall, it is associated with definite contents and these
contents are derivedfrommimesis. There is repetitionof outside
rhythms, in a
participation magicceremony, evocationof similar
rhythm wtih others. to
According Lukacs,onlybyunderstanding it
in thiswaydoesrhythm havean anthropomorphic character, which
meansit answersto the needsof the man and allowshim to ex-
presshimself;in itselfrhythm is something verymysterious and
frightening, servingreligious rather than aesthetic dispositions.
Identicalarguments applyto symmetry and proportion. It is not
an aestheticinstinctwhichis crucialbut ratherthe reflection of
real spatial structure and real human experience, in relation to
the real humanbiologicalconstitution. Lukacs explains the ap-
of
pearance asymmetry- as does Weyl (Symmetry, 1952)- by ref-
erenceto thepositionof theheart.The basic meaninghas again,
however- togetherwiththe two above elements- a social praxis:
Tools requirea moreexactsymmetry and proportion to achievea
moreeffective production and a developingeconomy.The circle
is closed. Mimesis manifests itselfin definite production processes;
and theresultsof theseprocesses lead once again to an increased
strength of the mimeticphenomenon.
In a similarwayLukacsexplainsthe originof ornament;he
seesin it a tendencylinkedto thecopyingof natureand especially
tospecific production (baskets,pottery) , thusdiscarding thehypoth-
esis of an instinctfor decorationsupposed to be shared with
animals.The consequence ofthisargument is a polemicwithWor-
ringer(Abstraction und Einfühlung, 1908), who held thatorna-
mentshada specialrolein shapingprimitive aesthetic attitudes and
saw theirgenesisin a fearof mysterious powers.Lukacsdoes not
doubtthetranscendental experiences of the caveman;however, he
ornament is firsta reflection of geometry en-
saysthatlikerhythm,
countered in nature;second,it expresses among other things man's
32 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

adaptationto nature; and third,it is connectedwith many of the


practicalproductivefunctionsof man.
Art-in the light of the premisesto this point-is always dies-
seitig,thatis, sensuous-material,object-derived, and alwaysmimetic.
Its developmentmoves from the reflectionof abstractstructure
toward the reflectionof concretestructure.If art fails to see the
direct contact of man with reality,if it for instance absolutizes
abstractforms,accordingto Lukacs it ceases to be art. What occurs
is the de-anthropomorphization ofart; art,in otherwords,is not yet
freedfrommagicand religion,or is returningtowardthem (a case
is modern art), or it subordinatesitselfto the rigor of scientific
consciousness.Primitiveart was not yet completelyfreed; despite
the mimetictendency,it was rooted deeply in magic or religion,
having in view practical-socialand transcendentalpurposes.How-
ever, the processof autonomizationcame about through the ar-
ticulatedusage of mimesis;forthe act of copyingsensuous,object-
derivedrealityleads towardthe breakwithmagic.Mimesispresumes
the relationshipof fiction;the copy differsfromwhat has been
copied. Mimesisestablishesa distancebetweenthe copyand reality;
a distancenot knownin magical ceremony.Magic includes the ob-
ject withinthe ceremonialsphere.
Mimesis tends, on the other hand, to see the structureof the
given object, that is, the creativework,as a specificportionof the
whole. An eigene Welt is created-a microcosm,a self-contained
worldof art. It is true thatthe self-contained world containssuch
elementsas materialand specificways of expression (homogenes
Medium) , but in mimesistheseare dependent. Copyingis not a
concept which Lukacs associates with photo-copying;in fact he
declares the opposite.Accordingto him, the crux is a knowledge-
able masteringof the reality,a directcapturingof its basic charac-
teristics,an expressionof the completehuman relation to nature
and social lifein givenconcretehistoricalconditions.Art,therefore,
is an expressionand evocationof the experienceof a man seeing
himselfin relation to the total world as he findsit (the idea of
Totalität). Materialsand expressivemeans-based on the sensuous
apparatus-may be most varied instrumentsof the mimetic-evoca-
tional attitude.It is in this way that art is shaped as a productof
the independentformof consciousness.
Let us recapitulate the characteristicstages of that process.
LUKACS'UNIVERSALPRINCIPLE 33
Choiceof whatis closeto man; objectification of the sensuously-
givenobject;shaping of the self
-enclosed structure, whichis none-
thelessin directrelationto theartist'semotionand to theconcrete
socialrealitythatdetermines hisviewof natureand sensuously de-
lineatesitstypicalcharacteristics (Besonderheit) . Lukacs concludes
fromthisset of considerations thatshapedstructure is indeeda
form,but alwaysa content-form. Contentafterall constitutes the
form, humancontent- derivedfromboththeworldwithinand the
worldwithout. The birthoftheprocess heresketched is reconstruct-
ed by Lukacson themodelof dance,pantomime, and songas the
mostprimitive artisticmanifestations, and fromthe exampleof
the plasticarts;he emphasizes thatthe aestheticsensesare visual
and auditory, and a distancefromouterrealityis here implied.
Lukacsdoes notexactlydefinetheperiodin whichthisprocessof
the autonomization of art occurred,but suggests, with Gordon
Childe (ManMakesHimself,1936), thatthemomentcamefollow-
ing theneolithicrevolution, in the era of thedecadenceof prim-
itivecommunism.
Two obviousconclusions flowfromtheforegoing:(a) mimesis
is a universal principleofart,and (b) artcreatesitsownrelatively
autonomous world.To thesecondconclusion, Lukacslinksfurther
considerations about theFür-sich-sein of art. In thecase of every
social phenomenon, one can noticeand deducethatits existence
alwaysis ofa subject-object nature.The worldalwaysexistsforus.
Nevertheless theaccentin variousformsof consciousness is always
changing; in sciencethe world of objects(An sich) is the decisive
element,whilein religionthe worldof the subject (Für uns) is
decisive,even consideringthe fact that religiousconsciousness
mystificates a godas a superhuman absolute.Arthas to constitute a
particular field- wherein man most fullyexpresses himself (vollen-
dete intensiveTotalität), whereinin a wayhe intensifies reality,
affirming his situation in the world. The Für-sich-sein of art, then,
is an expression of man'sconsciousness given in closed subjective
structures, providing a fullstatement of the characteristic features
of reality.Thus the Für-sich-sein is alwaysthe same existential
category of art,whileat thesametimeit alwaystakeshistorically
different shape.
To thefirst conclusion Lukacsbringsa consideration of border-
line cases,suchas music,architecture, applied arts,and landscape
34 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

gardening.If everyauthenticart must be realistic,if its Für-sich-


sein must be tangiblethroughthe capturingof typicalcharacteris-
ticsof theworld,thenall the artsshould be open to analysisunder-
takenwiththe aid of the identicalresearchtools.This is the essence
of Lukacs' position,but he introducesan additional proviso. In
the differentarts or genres typicalityis differently shape-giving
(Besonderheit) , that is, in the epic it adheres more closelyto sin-
gularity{Einzelheit) and in drama to the general {Allgemeinheit) .
Thereforethe creationof art is "a systemof tensions,"a dynamic
structurewhose oppositionsdepend in the same way on the mate-
rials and on a set of expressivemeans as theydo on the historical
moment.This reservationdoes not yet, however,reach down to
the fundamentsof the variousmimeses.To it Lukacs adds a state-
ment that thereis direct,indirect,and double {gedoppelte) mim-
esis.
Thus in music,the reflectionis concernedwithemotionswhich
reflectreal social attitudes.The inner world {Innerlichkeit,des
Seelische) manifests- in an indirectlydescribed manner-events
fromthe objectiveworld.Should one fetishizethe subjectivesensa-
tion, or musical formonly, then music loses meaning.But if one
accepts the idea that music must have a catharticeffectas an ex-
pression of life attitudes,then one arrives at its essence. Thus
understood,music is a realisticart. Architecture similarlydoes not
present reality, but is nonetheless realistic.It not just pro-
reflects
portions and but
antique symmetries, through theseexpresseshuman
needs. Man lives in a coordinatesystem:back-front, right-left,
up-
down. He adapts space to his ends, and within the limits of the
adaptation he transmitshis social-historicalattitude. Here, then,
we are concerned with the expressionand evocation of feelings
{Empfindungskomplex) ; and here also there is danger of the de-
anthropomorphization of art, if one allots a superioror exclusive
role to technical-constructive elements.In landscapegardeningmat-
tersare similar,inasmuchas mimesisconcernsthe relationof man
to nature,a relationwhich is of coursesocial and concretelyhistor-
ical {Stoffwechsel der Gesellschaftmit der Natur) . If the art of
gardening is treated as nature itself (in a wild state), or as a pro-
jection of taste (patheticfallacy)-one eliminatesits meaning. It
then becomes either the realityitselfor an exclusivelysubjective
reality.The art closestto architecture, accordingto Lukacs, is film.
LUKACS' UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE 35

In both cases the mimesisis preciselya double copyingo£ reality.


In architecture- let us repeat-one finds a reflectionof the pro-
portionand symmetry and throughthese of
of spatial structures,
social attitudesas well. In filmone findsa photographicreflection
of the world,and with thisand throughthis,a typicalstructuring
of the social reality.In both cases mimesisalone is the constitutive
aestheticelement.Natureitselfis not beautiful,nor has themechan-
ical reflectionof naturean aestheticvalue. To createart man must
choose and providea typicalization.An art in which man locates
himselfis alwaysrealistic.
The purpose of this article has been to presentsome of the
ideas whichappear in Lukacs' latestwork.Due to thelimitationsof
space, I have not been able to presenteverythingadequately. Of
necessityI have not gone into Lukacs' many-sidedpolemicsagainst
other basic aesthetictheoriesof art's genesis and specificity. Nor
have I reconstructed the progressof his argumentsfromone thesis
to the next,wherehe oftendoes not offera solutionbut onlyshows
the possibilityof overcomingan impasse.Since an argumentwith
Lukacs' work would require a large separate study,I would like
to conclude by presentingthe reader with a few questions which
I feel mustbe asked in regardto certainof his theses.

Lukacs employsthe method of researchderived from Marx's


formulationthatman's anatomyexplains the anatomyof the mon-
key,and that to determinestructurewithouta geneticanalysisis
impossible. (Capital is the best example of this.) Accepting the
method,which I use in similarresearch,I would add that Lukacs
has not strivensufficiently for the maximum objectivitypossible
today about past historicalprocess.He begins with the probably-
normativepremisethat the only art is a realisticart as he himself
understandsit, and tracesits originsin lightof thispremise.From
his rich materials,then,he draws out only as much as he puts in.
Provingin thiswaythatmimesisis a universalprinciple,he justifies
his polemicaljousts againstmodernart, that is, the so-calledavant-
garde, which in its entiretyhe treatsas a fetishized,de-anthropo-
morphizedcreation. One can see very clearly here that Lukacs'
deductionsdo not help correctthe circulusvitiosusshown within
them.
The premisethat mimesisis the source of the developmentof
36 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

a relativelyautonomousartisticstructureis correct,and Lukacs'


argumentshere are fullyconvincing.When he sets out to prove,
on the otherhand, that mimesisis generaland all-embracing(i.e.,
fromit flowall the othermotifsin the processof the autonomiza-
tion of art), then his deductionsappear arbitrary.In primitive
conditionsthe compositionof sensuously-given quantities,properly
organized,always expressed some content, but it was not always
concernedwiththe representation of real relations,even abstractly,
i.e., geometricspace. Apparently,Lukacs fails to appreciate the
significanceof transcendencein the artisticconsciousnessof primi-
tive man, and wrongly makes the post-neolithicrevolution the
period of the full independenceof art understoodas mimesis.The
historyof art shows ratherthat mimesis,while accompanyingart
from the beginning,in subsequent phases of developmentgives
priorityto formal structure,and this becomes the fundamental
artisticprinciple.Of coursemimesisneverdisappears;later records
of art are filledwith the unwaningtensionbetweenthe artisticre-
creationor reproductionof reality,and a retentionof artisticstruc-
turewithinthe limitsof the formitself.At the same time,nothing
showsthatformsalone, givensensuousnessand possessingexpressive
power,must always and everywhereact in a de-anthropomorphic
way. Afterall, these also expressthe Diesseitigkeitof a man and
in themhis whole relationto the given social world is oftenpro-
jected.
I do not thinkthatthe principleof mimesisis as universalas
Lukacs states.I base myjudgmenton his own considerations, among
otherthings.When Lukacs set out forinstanceto provethatgarden-
ing,architecture, or music are mimeticarts,he was forcedto bring
in supplementaltheses conflicting,to my mind, with his initial
thesis. Mimesis is supposed to concern the relation of art to a
directlygiven outside reality.In the argumentsfocusingon music
and architecture,however,the accent moves to psychologicalor
psycho-social attitudes.If one were to posit the expressionof def-
inite psychicor psycho-socialstates as a constitutiveelement of
mimesis,then the conceptwould be so altered that Lukacs' entire
thesis would become a truism.It would become an elastic state-
ment-suchas thatart is alwaysdependenton reality,by whichone
would understandthe world of subject and the world of object in
LUKACS' UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE 37

the same way.Even should the "reflection"be verifiedin a limited


sense,yetin a broadersense (as an expressionof psychicstates) it
is so vague that Lukacs himselfcarefullyavoids any strongstate-
ment about the relation betweenthe emotional burden of music
and architecture and theirequivalenthuman psycho-social attitudes
in this or that historicalmoment.
Even were we to assume the universalityof the mimesisprin-
ciple, the thesisof realismas applicable to all the arts would still
be verydoubtful.Lukacs' analysisof realismseems to me the best
yet renderedin twentieth-century aesthetics,and not merelythe
best of the Marxistattempts.Agreeingwith his conceptof realism,
I am the more surprisedthat he looks for typicalityeverywhere.
One mightassume that nonrepresentational painting,architecture,
or music, for instance,reconstructsome elements of the outer
reality;but in such arts one should not speak of Besonderheit.
One would have to formulatethe idea of typicalitydifferently, and
relate it to expressivevalues as well. Such surgeryas this seems
extremelyriskyto me and hardlyuseful,because even in the rep-
resentationalarts, where typicalityis more firmlyverifiable,the
researcherhas no easyjob.
Lukacs looks to socialistrealism,as to other realism,not for
ready answers,but for a basis in answeringthe questions posed
to the world by its particularviewpoint (Fortschrittperspektive) .
I find this view more convincingthan any other interpretation of
thatartisticmethod.Even acceptingthis approach,however,I do
not understandwhy Lukacs makes such a sharp demarcationbe-
tween avant-gardeand socialist art. Afterall, while their social
perspectivemay often be far from socialism, these avant-garde
artists(the best ones) frequentlyask the same questionsand they
oftengive dramaticevidenceof the social truthsof our days.Thus
I thinkthat Lukacs' conception of Totalität as the artisticideal
allows fora far more subtle analysisof modern art than is found
in RealismIn Our Time (1958) or in manypartsof Die Eigenart
des Aesthetischen.
The factthatI have offeredthese criticalnotes in a briefform
mightmislead the reader. For this reason I should emphasizethat
despite the deceptivelyassailable appearance of Lukacs' work, it
offersverydifficultproblemsto a polemicist.He avoidsall simplifica-
38 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

tion; he always takes note of counter-arguments at the suitable


moment;he drawshis conclusionsaftercollectingempirical argu-
ments.Because of some of Lukacs' formulations, he sometimesis
lumped with certain Soviet researcherswho reduce all problemsof
Marxistaestheticsto the question: realismor socialistrealism.Not
long ago a book by V. Razumnyappeared (Problemsof Socialist
Realism, 1963). The authordid not go beyondslogans,and- what
is worse-he analyzedall aestheticquestions (form,style,taste,judg-
ment,etc.) fromthe viewpointof a verypoorlyunderstoodrealism.
One need only compare that book- unfortunately, one of a large
family- with Lukacs' work to become aware of the depth,richness,
and in a scientificsense, the nobilityof the conclusions in Die
Eigenartdes Aesthetischen.If thereis any Marxistwho can com-
pletely demolish the repeated attacks on realism as an artistic
categoryor as a categoryof an ideologicalcharacter(see, forexam-
ple, the introductionby G. J. Becker to Documents of Modern
LiteraryRealism, Princeton,1963), then it is Lukacs. But, from
Razumny'sslogans,one would gatherthat it is his opponentswho
are right.This comparisonwithwhichI close my articlemay seem
shocking.Afterall, manySoviet aestheticiansand researchersfrom
other socialist countries move the discipline forward-rightly.
However,it still is an unquestionablefactthatLukacs remainsthe
greatestindividualscientistin the field.Marxistaestheticscan only
be developed by incorporatinghis achievementsand by learning
fromhis mistakes.Only in this way will it be able to attain new
horizons. Recognition of this fact implies social consequences-
that is, it calls for the translationof Lukacs' work.

WarsawUniversity
Warsaw,Poland

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