DAVID - Alice in Wonderland Meets Frankenstein

Contemporary Security Policy
ISSN: 1352-3260 (Print) 1743-8764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20
Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein:

Constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in
Bosnia
Charles-Philippe David
To cite this article: Charles-Philippe David (2001) Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein:
Constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary Security Policy, 22:1, 1-30,
DOI: 10.1080/13523260512331391046
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260512331391046
Published online: 06 Sep 2010.
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Alice in Wonderland Meets Frankenstein:

Constructivism, Realism
and Peacebuilding in Bosnia
C H A R L E S -PH IL IPPE DAVI D
Studies in peacebuilding generally adopt either a conceptual or an empirical

approach, but rarely both at the same time. However, there is much to be
gained from combining theory with case studies. In presenting an overview
and an assessment of peacebuilding in Bosnia, this article seeks to bring
theoretical understanding to bear on empirical analysis. We believe that to
gain a better understanding of this peacebuilding mission, which has been
under way for more than four years, we should examine the different visions
underpinning the efforts to bring the conflict to a definite end and assist in
rebuilding the country. Those visions and the way they shape peacebuilding
missions have a significant impact on the prospects for success and on the
decisions of a variety of actors who have committed considerable human
and financial resources to building peace in Bosnia. They provide a useful
guide for gauging the ability to bring about lasting peace in a region
devastated, as Bosnia is, by an armed conflict with grave implications.
This article seeks to come to grips with the following questions: is it
possible to rebuild Bosnia and create conditions conducive to lasting peace?
Can Bosnia ever return to a state of stability, interethnic harmony and
economic progress? And if so, by what means: the integration or separation
of ethnic groups? Can Bosnia survive without ongoing foreign intervention
(military and civil)? Are the international community’s laudable efforts
likely to succeed in building peace or are they doomed to failure and a
resumption of hostilities? To these difficult questions there are no simple
answers. However, two analytical frameworks, constructivist and realist, are
useful for examining the appropriateness of the peacebuilding mission in
Bosnia and its likelihood of success. Depending on the set of lenses through
which we examine the peacebuilding efforts on the ground, Bosnia after
Dayton may appear to be on the right track (this is the ‘Alice in Wonderland’
Charles-Philippe David is Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of

Québec, Montréal (UQAM), email: david.charles-philippe@uqam.ca. He wishes to thank his
colleagues of the Chair for their assistance in gathering the documentation used in the
preparation of this article.
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.22, No.1 (April 2001), pp.1–30

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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2 CONT E MP O R A RY S E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y
view) or the wrong one (what can be called ‘Frankenstein’s monster’). Our
assessment of the results of the peacebuilding efforts will seek to determine
which approach, constructivist or realist, is more applicable to Bosnia, and
which outcome, promising or disappointing, is more probable.
To begin, the article draws on a number of basic constructivist and realist
concepts to clarify the nature of conflicts and the appropriateness of
peacebuilding missions. These two theoretical approaches are then applied to
the analysis and interpretation of the conflict in Bosnia. The article also looks
briefly at some of the critical commentary on the Dayton Accords. Lastly, it
examines the process of peacebuilding in Bosnia in terms of security
outcomes, political implications and social and economic impact by applying
and comparing constructivist and realist theses. It concludes with remarks
about Bosnia’s future and the explanatory value of our conceptual framework.
Constructivist and Realist Views of Conflict and Peacebuilding

The constructivist thesis is very popular among scholars as an explanatory
scheme for the origins of conflict, as well as the norms that influence states
and the international system. Roland Paris sums it up well.1 Constructivists
maintain that norms largely define the conduct, interests and basic character
(identity) of states. Norms shape the nature of states by transforming their
identities; conversely, states can contribute to redefining norms through
changes in their conduct, in other words, through identity changes. Norms
and identity thus assume a co-determining role in the explanation of
conflicts as well as peace missions.2
a) Conflicts result from identity crises. When they occur, norms of conduct
are cast into question and are subject to attacks that can drastically alter
them. The construction of threats serves, in particular, to redefine identities
and ultimately modify norms by force in order to satisfy individuals, leaders
or groups who seek to use shifts in identity for the purposes of group
legitimization, asserting authority or national chauvinism.
b) Peace missions entail the dissemination (read construction) of new

norms. Peacebuilding is exemplary of constructivist logic to the extent that
its goal is to rebuild shattered states in accordance with the norms embraced
by the actors. Since norms are constitutive of states, it is theoretically
possible to change a state’s identity to bring it into line with the peace
mission’s goals. This ‘artificial’ intervention thus renders the new identity
more compatible with prevailing norms and makes it possible to construct
peace on the basis of liberal norms such as negotiated agreements, the
peaceful arbitration of differences, the institutionalization of democratic
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CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 3

processes, the institution of a free-market economy and security for
individuals (in other words, ‘human security’).
The constructivist approach is eloquently articulated by partisans of the
democratic model (the democratizers), who stress the following norms: justice,
respect for human rights, democratization and international involvement in
rebuilding states and reshaping their identities.3 The reform is undertaken at all
levels by an army of peacebuilders from a wide variety of organizations
(especially IGOs) which claim those norms, regardless of the motivations and
interests expressed by the states themselves. Peacebuilding is thus a concrete
example of constructivism in action, a strategy designed to establish (impose?)
norms of conduct in the countries that are being rebuilt in order to minimize if
not eliminate the risk of a resumption of hostilities. Extending this vision to all
peacebuilding missions sustains a hope that Alice may one day enter the land
of perpetual peace. We shall see whether there are grounds for such optimism
in the case of Bosnia and whether it may also be justified elsewhere.
Contrary to the constructivist perspective, the realist thesis asserts that
conflicts are intrinsic rather than ‘constructed’. Objective and historical
factors contribute to polarizing societies and pitting states against each
other, leading inexorably to militarization and confrontation. In addition,
one recent ‘ethno-realist’ interpretation marshals the traditional explanation
of interstate conflict to explain intrastate conflict. In particular, the concept
of the ‘security dilemma’ is used to illuminate the dynamic of ethnic
rivalries; this concept refers to the lack of trust between states, which must
arm themselves to maximize security (resulting in generalized insecurity for
all states).4 This thesis is highly relevant to analysis of peacebuilding in
Bosnia.
a) The realist begins with a rational and non-subjective interpretation of the

causes and factors underlying conflicts, such as the existence of an
expansionist state, processes of fragmentation and polarization, the pursuit of
contradictory interests by societies or states, the desire to protect or gain
territory, and assistance to allies. Just as naturally as a forest fire results in
destruction and regrowth, conflict is an age-old natural phenomenon. Ethnic
confrontation is a form of conflict that is nevertheless governed by the same
logic as conflict between states. Fearful of being weakened, marginalized or
destroyed, an ethnic group, spurred by leaders seeking to conserve or
enhance their power, attacks one or more other groups. The lack of a central
authority (national or international) capable of maintaining order or internal
political equilibrium tends to produce a state of anarchy among ethnic
groups, which ultimately can only be remedied by force. In this respect, the
anarchic intra-state and inter-ethnic situation is similar to that which prevails
among nation-states. This is the origin of the security dilemma, which also
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arises in internal conflicts.5 The cycle of conflict between ethnic groups

seems to exhibit the same pattern as that between states: fragmentation of
interests and polarization of power lead to non-violent confrontation and
then to armed conflict, which is resolved and followed by a transition period
(marked by victories and defeats), which itself gives rise to subsequent
conflicts. As Penelope Safioleas remarks, ‘it is quite easy for these societies
to be led down the same paths over and over again. In this way, the cycle of
ethnic conflict seemingly dominates history’.6 Which is to say that the
spectre of Frankenstein will be haunting us for a long time to come.
b) Peace missions are seen by most realists as temporary band-aid solutions

that stifle conflict temporarily without ever succeeding in resolving it. By
itself, the mere presence of Blue Helmets or a civilian intervention force is
never enough. Conflicts are settled through the exhaustion of the combatants,
through the victory of one of the parties, or through the intervention of a
great power. In the view of Edward Luttwak, a member of the realist camp,
‘armistices remove the greatest incentive to negotiate peace settlements. In
fact they intensify and prolong warfare’.7 According to Luttwak,
humanitarian intervention and initiatives such as peacebuilding missions are
counterproductive insofar as they prevent wars from running their course, the
only way in which the means for continuing the hostilities can be eliminated.
The efforts of NGOs and the UN fuel the will to wage war and ultimately
work against the interests of peace. In this macabre logic, ‘war is the origin
of peace’. A virtual peace or one imposed from outside prolongs the state of
war and actually prevents a genuine peace from being achieved. With
Luttwak’s cynical argument, the realists certainly earn their name.
Realists see the goal of conflict management (and, if possible, resolution) as

valid and useful, but view peacebuilding operations as superfluous.8
Conflict management does not mean reconstruction; it means negotiation
with a view to suspending or putting an end to hostilities rather than
resolving conflicts. Peace is achieved not by bringing the parties responsible
for the war to justice, but rather by negotiating security compromises with
them that let them keep their grip on power. Territorial and political
concessions take precedence over reconstituting a unitary and democratic
state. In short, peace is not won through democratization and peacebuilding,
but through the only approach the realists consider viable: conflict
management, which allows for the (temporary) containment of the security
threats attendant upon ethnic confrontation.
Which of these two approaches, constructivist or realist, is most useful
for looking at the peacebuilding process in Bosnia? How can we use the
basic concepts associated with these two contrasting visions to assess and
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analyze the efforts made in that country? To answer these questions, we
must first examine their respective interpretations of the conflict.
Realist and Constructivist Approaches to the Conflict in Bosnia

Without rehearsing the entire history of the Bosnian conflict, we can
distinguish two principal interpretations of its disintegration and subsequent
developments. These interpretations derive from the realist and
constructivist theories and are useful for understanding the subsequent
peacebuilding mission. Let us turn, first, to the realist analysis.
1) The realist approach is clearly the dominant paradigm for explaining the
Bosnian conflict. We shall present a brief survey of this analytical
framework, drawing on the work of scholars who have studied the causes
and consequences of the conflict and noting the various types of explanation
it offers – rational, objective and historic – as well as the impact of
traditional factors.
a) Dusko Doder maintains that the crisis resulted from internal causes
specific to the former Yugoslavia: ‘until its collapse in 1991, Yugoslavia
was in essence the unhappy union of its two largest nationalities’.9 Tito was
able to impose peace, but after his death ancestral antagonisms resurfaced
and nationalist crises proliferated. This analysis of the conflict is
characterized by a degree of fatalism: international influence could not have
altered the course of events in any significant way. Once Serb nationalist
expansion manifested itself, the process of disintegration was inevitable.10
b) According to Adam Roberts, ideas about ancient communal hatred and

aggression must be balanced by an understanding of the quest for power by
‘machinations of corrupt politicians who have exploited ethnic rivalries to
further their own political ambitions’.11 Albrecht Schnabel and Nika
Strazisar add, ‘a great deal of responsibility for the break-up can be
attributed to nationalist leaders that seized the opportunity of the weakness
of the country in order to come to power, maintain and/or expand it. In the
service of their goals, they appealed to ethnonationalist sentiments and
emphasized historical inter-ethnic antagonisms’.12 During the 1980s,
moreover, these leaders took advantage of a disastrous economic situation
marked by growing inequality, a decline in the standard of living, an
unemployment rate fluctuating between 25 and 30 per cent, a large public
debt, and galloping hyperinflation. In Susan Woodward’s view, these
conditions contributed to the rejection of the Tito regime’s erstwhile
institutions and policies by anxious populations.13
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c) US General Charles Boyd, Deputy SACEUR in charge of Bosnia from

1992 to 1995, rejects the thesis of an inevitable war caused by centuries of
ethnic rivalry. However, he fully embraces the realist perspective and the
security dilemma thesis when he maintains that the conflict was the result of
‘ambition, fear, and incompetence – local and international’.14 He believes that
American (and we might add European) policy up until the Dayton Accords
needlessly prolonged the conflict. Contradictory policies of military restraint
towards the Serbs and humanitarian support for the Muslims ultimately
hindered resolution of the conflict (a number of scholars have drawn attention
to this counterproductive alternation between active and passive conduct).
Only Bosnia itself, Boyd concludes, could and still can heal its own wounds.
d) The major powers’ attempts to avert the conflict were hamstrung by

traditional conflicts of interest. Realpolitik was employed without
consistency or credibility, save the desire to keep the conflict from
spreading beyond Bosnia’s borders. Yet information on the preparations for
the conflict and the terrible consequences which were likely to ensue was
readily available. It was foreseeable that armed confrontation would follow
upon the eruption of interethnic rivalries. Schnabel and Strazisar (cited
earlier) and Saadia Touval concur in this view. Touval claims that the West’s
desire to preserve Yugoslavian unity at any cost and to propel the country
along the path toward democracy was a tremendous error, a view shared by
Warren Zimmermann15 (the former American ambassador to Belgrade):
‘western policies promoting economic reforms, democratization, and
respect for human rights did not bring about the expected results. Ironically,
they may have even contributed to the aggravation of the country’s
problems’.16 Like Adam Roberts, Touval believes that it is extremely
difficult for a third party to mediate or manage a conflict in a context of
interethnic hostilities. This has been borne out by, among other things, the
United Nations’ disastrous experience in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.
e) Troy McGrath, Director of European Studies at the University of Central

Europe, agrees with the ethno-realist approach outlined above; in his view,
the liberal-institutional and democratic model could not apply to a
disintegrating Yugoslavia under conditions in which a small elite was
seeking to entrench its domination by preying on ethnic fears and prejudice.
The norms of justice, democracy and the free market can have no meaning
in circumstances of scapegoating and demagoguery by dictators who take
advantage of crises to further their own ends. ‘The paradox is that
“democratizing” regimes can, with western support (either tacit or explicit),
enact harsh or even repressive economic and social policies with as much
impunity as authoritarian regimes, under the guise of “democratization”.’17
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The new leaders in the former Yugoslavia fed this paradox, using the pretext
of sovereignty and democracy to fan the flames of belligerent territorial
nationalism. Their conduct weakened the hold of genuine democratic norms
and forces. Finally, in McGrath’s view, we must ask whether the western
democratic model is applicable to States emerging from the communist era.
Most realists believe that, in the final analysis, there can be no permanent
resolution to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia.
In Penelope Safioleas’ terms, an ‘objective’ cycle of ethnic conflict will
continue indefinitely. A number of constructivist analyses of the conflict
take issue with this deterministic and empirical argument.
2) The constructivist approach looks to subjective, normative and identity-

based explanations. On the issue of Bosnia, the contributions of Beverly
Crawford, Ronnie Lipschutz, Kenneth Bush and Fuat Keyman are
particularly instructive.
According to Crawford and Lipschutz18 (two writers who have made

extensive contributions to the critical study of security issues), the decisions
made by elites during the conflict were ‘constructed’ on the basis of a
particular and highly subjective understanding of identity differences. Those
decisions resulted in bellicose rhetoric aimed at stirring up the populace and
prodding it towards a new identity. In contrast to the dominant realist thesis,
the constructivist view holds that this strategy made use of history rather than
being dictated by history. In other words, the leaders were not moved by their
sense of identity, as the realists would have it; on the contrary, they exploited
it. Identity does not drive individuals; individuals drive identity. This is not a
static view, like the conception of the state in the realist approach, but a
dynamic and contingent one. ‘Identities are politically constructed during
periods of upheaval by certain members of political and economic elites, who
we can call “political entrepreneurs”.’19 Leaders manipulate the language of
identity to win popular support, particularly in circumstances where identity
is the last rampart of identity left standing by the instability or breakdown of
institutions. ‘The construction of threat may also consolidate identity.’20 In this
respect, identity contributes to the very definition of the group and, in extreme
cases such as Bosnia, encourages the development of a chauvinist,
xenophobic and exclusivist identity pitted against others. (The journalist
Michael Ignatieff arrived at a similar conclusion following his trip to
Bosnia.21)
Thus, constructivist scholars completely reject ‘biological’ theses that
find age-old enmities at the root of a variety of phenomena such as civil war
among ethnic groups, the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serb aggression (the
conquering state), and the interethnic security dilemma. In their view, none
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of these arguments really explains the conflict. They view it rather as a

social war waged over local, familial, national and civic claims to identity
based on ethnic belonging. For Crawford and Lipschutz, ‘The referent
object of war in the former Yugoslavia thus has been not the state, not
competitors for state power, not even the tribe, but society and the
individuals who make it up’. History occupies a relatively minor place in
their cultural and sociological approach, which casts the conflict as a recent
rather than an ancient phenomenon. ‘Reading Yugoslavia “out of history”
is, so to speak, a strategy of denial’,22 for it denies that it is possible to do
anything, in Bosnia or elsewhere, to affect, contain or prevent identity-
based conflicts. The implications of their analysis lead Crawford and
Lipschutz to recommend more not less international intervention in order to
‘restructure state institutions in areas threatened with similar conflicts in
ways that might lead to peace and more security for individuals’.23 In other
words, they support peacebuilding efforts.
The constructivist perspective is clearly at odds with the realist approach
insofar as it considers peacebuilding missions such as the one in Bosnia to be
very important. But what has been the real impact of the Dayton Accords on
the ground? Is a new identity conducive to lasting peace being forged or will
the historical realities always make peace uncertain? Is it possible to
reconcile conflict management (the separation of ethnic groups) and
democratization (the integration of ethnic groups)? Can Alice and
Frankenstein be wed?
Assessing the Dayton Accords: Success or Failure?

Signed in Paris in December 1995, the Dayton Accords are certainly among
the most impressive examples of conflict resolution. To reach the
agreement, force had to be brought to bear against the Bosnian Serbs and
sustained negotiations had to be conducted by American and European
diplomats.24 The Dayton Peace Accords comprise four main dimensions:25
1. The cessation of hostilities between the Bosnian and Serb forces and the
de facto (not de jure) division of Bosnian territory into two autonomous but
federated entities separated by an inter-entity boundary line. Sarajevo
remains a unified city, while the status of the city of Brcko remains to be
determined. A NATO international implementation force (first IFOR, then
SFOR) enforces the military provisions, namely, maintaining the cease-fire,
the redeployment and demilitarization of the armed forces, ongoing
measures to create a safe environment and, lastly, arms control under the
aegis of the OSCE. NATO has the authority to use force, if necessary, to
implement all the measures set out in the Dayton Accords.
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2. The constitutional structure of the Federal State of Bosnia remains intact. In
other words, Bosnia remains, in principle, a unitary state, with its 1992 borders,
its democratic and interethnic institutions, as well as a federal regime
embracing the two entities. It is based on a tripartite presidency (Serb, Croat
and Muslim) with a rotating leadership; a constitutional court; a bicameral pan-
national legislature consisting of a lower house (28 Muslim and Croat
representatives, 14 Serb representatives) and an upper chamber (five delegates
for each ethnic group). The federal government is responsible for foreign
affairs, international trade, citizenship, immigration and monetary policy (a
central bank was established). In addition, the two entities each have their own
independent institutions, including a president and a legislative assembly.
3. Civil reconstruction, under the direction of a High Representative

(currently Wolfgang Petritsch from Austria), entails regular elections at
both the national and municipal levels, under the auspices of the OSCE, to
promote interethnic reconciliation; a UN International Police Task Force; a
vast programmeme of technical and economic assistance provided by donor
states, the European Union and international institutions such as the IMF
and the World Bank.
4. Lastly, guarantees of personal security including the free return of

refugees to their place of origin or requested relocation under the
supervision of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; a ban on
participation of war criminals in political life and the prosecution of war
crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY); full respect for human rights and a functioning judicial system.
Four years later, what had the Dayton Accords accomplished on the ground?
The general view is fairly negative and sceptical. We shall examine the
security dimension, as well as the political and socio-economic aspects of
peacebuilding in Bosnia in greater detail. The summary that follows
provides an overview based on the assessments of specialists in the field.
The Clinton administration saw ‘progress’ after Dayton: greater military
stability, better public security, democracy and the rule of law, the existence
of an independent media, the right of refugees to circulate freely, the arrest
and prosecution of war criminals, economic reconstruction. All of these
benchmarks point to the success of the Dayton Accords.26 Most observers
agree that Dayton brought the war to an end and that the cease-fire is
gradually evolving into a sustainable peace. ‘No one in Bosnia-Herzegovina
believes that hostilities will break out again’, writes Thomas Hofnung.27 ‘By
anyone’s measure, Bosnia is much better off now than it was in 1995’,
concludes Ruth Wedgwood and her colleagues.28 James Schear also offers a
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positive assessment: ‘thanks to the Dayton accord…struggles are now

largely non-violent’, despite persistent differences among the protagonists
‘certainly Bosnia would have been in far worse shape without Dayton’.29
With regard to other civilian goals, however, Dayton has proved
disappointing in many respects.
According to the 1999 report of the International Crisis Group, ethnic
cleansers are winning the battle to shape Bosnia after the war, and major parts
of the Dayton accord remain unimplemented. The ICG recommends the
establishment of a full international protectorate in Bosnia.30 David Chandler
estimates that ‘after more than four years of democratisation, Bosnia is further
away from democracy than at any point since the war’.31 William Hyland also
concludes that ‘the Dayton agreement is not working politically’.32 Ivo
Daalder refers to Dayton as an ‘incomplete peace’.33 Svebor Dizdarevic
believes that ‘the dream of a multiethnic, multicultural and democratic Bosnia
in the short or medium term seems to be evaporating in the face of the alliance
between the political realism of the world powers and the communal hysteria
of the actors in the Balkans’.34 Xavier Bougarel believes the institutional
edifice of Dayton is tottering; in his view the military provisions have been
executed quite well, but the civilian provisions have been ‘very imperfectly’
implemented.35 He points to significant delays and dysfunctions (particularly
flawed elections and difficulties setting up institutions). In his view, the
Dayton Accords sanction Bosnia’s ‘de facto partition’ – an observation that,
for Hofnung, conjures up a ‘Cyprus-like scenario’. In this respect, the real
Bosnia is fragmented and bears little resemblance to the virtual Bosnia,
conceived as a unitary state within which the various ethnic groups are
gradually reintegrated. Ironically, the partition is being reinforced by the
electoral processes and the economic aid programmes which, although
intended to iron out the divisions and disparities among ethnic groups, are
actually exacerbating them. At times, Dayton appears to be a continuation of
the conflict by other means. Warren Bass argues that recourse to international
institutions is proving to be a ‘disaster’; he decries the timidity of the
European Union and the uneven performance of the ICTY; he regards
multiethnic democracy and the nominal unity of the Bosnian State as a ‘house
of cards’.36 In his view, the liberal aspects of Dayton, such as a central
government, the prosecution of war criminals, the return of refugees and the
values of civic culture, will remain a dead letter unless there is real
determination to make them a reality at any cost. As Susan Woodward
concludes, ‘Whether one looks at the settlement of refugees and displaced
persons, or political power, the goal of a multiethnic, unified Bosnia was
further from realization than at the time of the Dayton signing’.37
Without the presence of NATO forces and the international community,
Bosnia would not be an experiment in peacebuilding but a dangerous
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powder-keg for many years to come. As General Boyd maintains, ‘virtually
no one familiar with Bosnia believes that peace will endure…if the coalition
force is withdrawn’.38 This is borne out by the substantial investment in
weapons and the arms race by the three parties. In the words of Pedrac
Simic, Bosnia resembles ‘a European Gaza Strip’, and it will be ‘just about
impossible for this former Yugoslav republic to function as a single State
once the peace forces leave for good’.39 Gideon Rose shares that fear. He
criticizes the illusion of an ‘exit strategy’ for the United States and NATO;
in his view, they cannot consider setting a deadline for withdrawal (however
much Clinton and the American Congress may desire it40), for the SFOR
mission is likely to be a protracted one. At the same time, he acknowledges
that ‘re-creating a unified Bosnia is beyond U.S. capabilities in the near
future’.41 The strategic dilemma remains unresolved, especially if we accept
Safioleas’ argument that ‘the stage is definitely set for yet another
fragmentation and polarization phase’.42
According to Jane Sharp, the great powers have had a tendency to
appease aggressors at the expense of the victims of war and if this is not
reversed ‘the current fragile peace could be shattered’.43 Indeed, General
Boyd argues that to continue implementing the Dayton Accords as
conceived may lead to a renewal of hostilities and ‘that war will not be in
spite of our efforts, but because of them’.44 Susan Woodward warns: ‘the
Dayton accords only reproduce the institutional causes of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration that led to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina’.45 Thus, the Dayton
Accords leave the very same nationalist leaders who dream of one day
redrawing the Dayton map in power. The return of the refugees is
proceeding very slowly and may take as long as 50 years. The collegial
tripartite presidency is functioning badly or not at all, while each of the
ethnic leaders is developing ‘more and more intransigent positions further
and further removed from the ideal of a multiethnic, multidenominational
Bosnia’.46 According to Bougarel, reconciliation will remain a distant goal
if it presupposes the emergence of a form of peacebuilding that breaks with
‘visions that reduce the transition to a process of institutional
transplantation and financial transfusion, or a simple policing operation’.47
In light of this assessment, we are compelled to ask whether Bosnia is a
fiction, whether it represents a wonderful but unattainable ideal. Is it
possible, in the long term, to transform the fictitious Bosnia into a real
Bosnia? This is indeed the aim of the ‘constructivist’ peacebuilders who
think it possible for Alice to turn Frankenstein into a creature at peace with
himself. Nothing is less clear for the realists who, by contrast, fear the
sleeping monster of interethnic rivalry.
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 12
Peacebuilding and the Future of Bosnia

As New York Times editorialist Thomas Friedman writes, ‘the Dayton accord
is based on the notion [of] a civil war that ends with elections, a new
constitution, a military balance, the trial of war criminals and power-
sharing’.48 Surely, no better portrait could be painted of the marriage of Alice
and Frankenstein! This vision corresponds to the notion of peacebuilding
missions that was articulated in 1992 by then-Secretary General of the United
Nations Boutros-Boutros Ghali, which conceived peacebuilding as an effort
to help societies devastated by conflict and war recover and put peace on a
firm footing.49 Since that time peacebuilding activities have been developed,
in one guise or another, by various parties, particularly by IGOs such as the
UN, by NGOs and by several states – notably Canada – that made it the
cornerstone of their foreign policy.50 The goals of peacebuilding are
reconstruction, reconciliation and peace education. It is based on a security
transition, on democratic process, and on the restoration of a capitalist
economy. It promotes a liberal vision, which corresponds to the democratic,
free market model that certain actors wish to export to conflict zones in order
to institute peace. The motives of the various parties involved vary: some are
driven by constructivist aims, others by realist ends. These contradictory
positions reflect the uncertainty about how to achieve peace and the prospects
for doing so. This contradiction is nowhere more evident than in Bosnia, in
the realm of security as much as in the political and socio-economic spheres.
The Security Transition

It was Churchill who said that the Balkan region has a tendency to produce
more history than it can consume. In Bosnia, this dictum is exemplified in
the domain of security. Through the presence of NATO forces, the
peacebuilding mission seeks to rein in the parties and encourage them to live
together (although separately for the time being) without reviving disputes
over territory and the domination of one ethnic group over another. The
twofold challenge is an ambitious one: first, to speed up the process of
integration in a context of mutual distrust and intolerance among ethnic
groups and, second, to resolve the traditional security dilemmas by imposing
new peace norms through the active intervention first of IFOR and then of
SFOR. Has the challenge been met? What hope does the future hold?
By accepting the principle of a de facto partition of Bosnia, Dayton
sanctioned the territorial division of two ethnic groups. As a result of this
division, the politicians (and policies) responsible for the confrontations
remained in place. Thus, not only is Bosnia a fiction, but the fiction is being
maintained by the presence of NATO troops. In this respect, the country is
comparable to a vassal or client state of the West. Dayton’s aim was to
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initiate a process of ethnic integration but its ambiguities are such that, on
the one hand, integration is being effected by force and, on the other, it is
entrenching ethnic barriers. The partition is currently being supervised by
SFOR’s 20,000 soldiers (of whom 6,900 are American); in terms of
security, they behave far more like peacekeepers than peacebuilders.51 Their
approach is reminiscent of that of the Ottoman Empire: keep competing
nationalisms in a state of torpor, maintain a balance of power, and, when
necessary, redress military inequalities. This is precisely the realist
approach to conflict management. The American authors of Dayton have
always recognized this; they have instituted a sugar-coated version of
realpolitik under the guise (or at least not at variance with) the liberal ideals
of the Clinton administration, namely, policies promoting the
reestablishment of a multiethnic Bosnian state. As Warren Bass remarks,
‘Dayton is an act of realism rather than idealism’.52 The desire to construct
new liberal norms so often articulated by Western diplomacy was
abandoned during and after Dayton. This is reflected in the decision to keep
the SFOR mission in Bosnia for purely military reasons. All the parties fear
the withdrawal of the troops, at least at times, anticipating that it would have
catastrophic consequences for peace. SFOR is therefore playing an
increasingly strong and significant role in the application of the civilian
elements of Dayton, since, as Thierry Tardy affirms ‘one of the main
lessons…is precisely that the military and civilian dimensions of the peace
accords are indissociable’.53 It is unlikely that the norms of conduct of the
Muslim, Croat and Serbian entities will change on their own and it is
possible that the tenuous stability achieved by IFOR and then SFOR is only
temporary. Peace cannot be nurtured unless the parties in question have an
unconditional desire for it. Few observers are confident that this will
develop.54 Barring radical changes in sense of identity, there appears to be
little likelihood of ethnic coexistence.
The security dilemma has not vanished – however much SFOR hopes
that the parties will renounce the pursuit of territorial gains through the use
of force. An exit strategy for NATO troops is inconceivable as long as the
dilemma continues to be perceived as significant and dangerous. Professor
Zlato Isakovic observes: ‘Croat and part of Serb political leaderships in
Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatened by Bosniacs’ intentions to establish
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a real federation, single, state;
Bosniacs’ leadership is, in return, threatened by Serbs’ and Croats’ intentions
to join (as much as it is possible) neighbouring Former Yugoslavia and
Croatia… The Dayton Accords stopped the war, but it seems that did not
eliminate actors, conditions and causes that started it’.55 In Jane Sharp’s view,
rather than encouraging reconciliation, the many announcements of SFOR
imminent withdrawal have ‘encouraged former enemies to prepare for the
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next battle’.56 Evidently, none of the ethnic leaders is satisfied with Dayton –
especially the Serbs who did not accept the Accords – and they are pursuing
divergent aims. The Serbs and Croats want to exclude the Muslims from
their territories, while the Muslims want to be able to return to zones
controlled by other ethnic groups. Warren Bass speaks of a ‘marriage of
interests’ and of ‘partners on paper only’, pointing out that ‘most Bosnian
Serbs have no interest in sharing power with Muslims and Croats… Muslims
and Croats will cooperate only as long as it suits both sides’ interests.
Otherwise they eagerly exploit each other.’57 Ethnic paranoia persists, fuelled
by nervous leaders seeking to control and preserve intact the areas where
their ethnic groups form a majority.58 Referring explicitly to the security
dilemma, Susan Woodward notes that, ‘the fear of becoming a minority in
someone else’s nation-state was exactly what was (and still is) motivating
each community to fight, from Croatia to Macedonia’. She concludes: ‘there
appears to have been no change in the incentives, interests, ambitions, or
identities of the political leaderships or their political parties, no reduction in
the insecurity felt by citizens about their future, and no shift of power and
responsibility to others who have different interests and goals’.59 Although it
remains politically possible, a change in the leading elites and their appeals
to ethnic identity is thus doubtful at best. And as long as those conditions
prevail, the security dilemma cannot be abolished.
3) While the norms of peaceful conflict resolution must prevail in principle,

the extension of military assistance to the Bosnian Muslims is contradictory
to say the least. How can progress be made on the security front when one of
the basic elements of the security equation, approved at the time of the
Dayton Accords, is the rearmament of one of the factions, which will
recreate a military imbalance and undermine the prospects for peace? The
train and equip programme for the Muslim forces follows a realist logic. At
the insistence of President Izetbegovic, this assistance became a requisite
condition for signing the Accords. Moreover, the United States and NATO
believed that the programme would make it possible for them to disengage
their troops from Bosnia more quickly. In cooperation with allies such as
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the Pentagon thus provided more than
$400 million in equipment to the army of the Muslim-Croat Federation. The
Federation also received training from the private US firm Military
Professional Resources (MRI). In addition, the Muslims stepped up their
efforts to obtain arms secretly from countries such as Iran.60 Nor did the Serbs
remain idle. Some observers see benefits in Western training for the
Federation’s troops, since it inculcates values of discipline and respect for
human rights. Jane Sharp disagrees, arguing that ‘train and equip’
undermines trust-building between the two Bosnian entities, as well as the
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parallel disarmament negotiations. All members of the contact group, which
supported the Dayton diplomatic effort, opposed this programme. General
Boyd explains: ‘ironically, after supposedly arming the Muslims so they
could defend themselves in our absence, we may now have to stay, if only to
prevent them from restarting the war’.61 A comprehensive study by the US
Institute of Peace also finds that ‘Train and Equip radically alters the
balance-of-power and increases the likelihood of a Federation-directed
offensive…Some believe that by mid-1999 the Bosniacs will have the ability
to inflict a decisive defeat over the Serbs. According to this assessment,
parity will simply cease to exist.’62 That view was shared by the former High
Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt.63 This situation does very little to
mitigate the security dilemma. Nor does it promote the development of new
norms based less on defence and more on development and reconstruction.
4) Certain territorial disputes have been worrisome, especially those which

were at the core of ethnic cleansing during the war.64 In particular, the Serbs
lost control of the city of Brcko, which forms a corridor between the two main
sections of their entity. This happened in March 1999 when a judgement by
international arbitrator Robert Owens (the legal father of Dayton) ruled that
the city should be reunified, demilitarized, and accorded neutral status under
the authority of the Bosnian Federal State. This (reasoned) ruling was bitterly
resented by the Serbs, who felt that the Dayton peace had robbed them of a
city of great strategic importance to them, one that they believe they won in
the war. Moreover, the city of Mostar is still disputed by Muslims and Croats,
and only the presence of SFOR and the EU seems to be preventing an
outbreak of hostilities. Brcko and Mostar are thus two examples of territorial
disputes, which illustrate the hazards of the security transition.
5) What are the implications of this situation for the security transition in
Bosnia? Can the Dayton Accords be maintained in their current form, and can
SFOR stay indefinitely? Some ethno-realist scholars respond in the negative
and consider the peacebuilding efforts aimed at creating a unified Bosnia to
be futile. In their view, there was good reason for the Dayton accords to create
a de facto partition of Bosnian territory: forcing the reintegration of the
combatants against their will is riskier than separating them and endorsing the
separation. For the ethno-realists, the solution does not lie in transforming and
reconciling incompatible identities, but in accepting those identities and
putting distance between them. Thus, a legal partition of the Bosnian state
would be the simplest solution, even though such a course of action represents
an abandonment of Dayton and of liberal values. Separation of the ethnic
groups is viewed as a more promising route. Recognizing that Dayton was full
of ambiguities concerning the precise nature of Bosnian identity, Ivo Daalder
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(coordinator of American policy on Bosnia at the NSC between 1995 and

1997) proposes to resolve the fragmentation-reintegration dilemma with a
Dayton II accord to ratify the partition. The Serbs could be granted their
own republic (with minor territorial adjustments) and the Muslim-Croat
Federation could preserve its territory intact. A NATO transition force
would be redeployed to guarantee the new security agreements; this force
could be withdrawn sooner than the continuation of present conditions
would allow. For Daalder, ‘the renegotiation of the Dayton framework
could resolve the underlying differences among the parties and thereby
provide the basis for a lasting peace’.65 Chaim Kaufmann, John
Mearsheimer, Stephen Van Evera, Michael O’Hanlon and Fareed Zakaria
all argue along the same lines and support the partition option, on the
grounds that the various factions will never accept the concept of a
multiethnic Bosnia, as envisioned by Dayton.66 Robert Pape remarks,
‘history records no instance where ethnic groups have successfully shared
power in a democracy after a large-scale ethnic war’.67 However, the
examples of Ireland, India, Palestine and Cyprus bear witness to the grave
consequences and considerable violence associated with partition strategies
(deliberate or not).68 The peacebuilders are opposed to a renegotiation of
Dayton for just this reason. For Carlos Westendorp (the former High
Representative), ‘Dayton remains the only solution to the problem, since
everything that falls outside that framework is tantamount to creating the
same conditions that led to war in the first place’.69 Former NATO Secretary
General Javier Solana believes partitioning Bosnia into mini-states would
be catastrophic and dangerous.70 Carl Bildt (previously cited) considers the
idea naïve and potentially disastrous – a recipe for heightened instability –
and sees no chance for what would be left of Bosnia to survive.71 The
Tindemans report predicts that in this case Bosnia would split into three
entities; it deems the divorce ‘no recipe for stability’.72 According to Pauline
Neville-Jones, former British representative at Dayton, it would be risky to
reopen the Accords; she remarks that: ‘the enemy of success is not so much
the development of a “dependency culture” on the part of Bosnians as the
insecurity about their personal future’.73 In sum, the dismemberment of
Bosnia does not appear to represent a miracle solution; the scenario is the
object of lively arguments between US experts, who favour partition, and
the Europeans, who oppose it.
By opting for ‘soft’ partition, constructivists and realists have managed
to have it both ways. However, it is not clear for how much longer this will
be possible. A conflict management approach to the security situation is
called for, in the hope that democratization will transform the political and
socio-economic situation and, in the long run, render the security dilemma
obsolete, making the supportive presence of the West unnecessary. If not,
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Alice and Frankenstein agree: there can be no entry into the wonderland of
peace as long as the monsters of war are lurking in the shadows.
The Democratic Transition

The democratic transition is conceived along constructivist lines.
Democratization can be achieved by inculcating new norms, which will serve
to construct new identities based on the liberal model, conceived as the source
of political compromises and peace. This reconstruction can be accomplished
without taking history into account because it can transform history. On this
view, all that is required is perseverance, and Alice will be able to convince
Frankenstein to change, through the catharsis of elections. As the weekly The
Economist correctly observes, ‘Westerners in Bosnia believe that people do not
kill people, politicians kill people. Change the politicians and the institutions
they control, and you change the culture of fear and intolerance that make it
impossible for Muslims, Croats and Serbs to live together.’74 For some
commentators, such as Alain Joxe, this vision stems from ‘a purely American
cultural standpoint’.75 For others, it is the only way forward. The West can
artificially rebuild Bosnia, institution by institution. It can ensure that elections,
the media, the justice system and all kinds of civilian activities (such as police
work and traffic regulation) conform to liberal and democratic principles,
under the supervision of a ‘proconsul’ responsible for implementing Dayton.
What have been the results of these attempts to reconfigure identity?
a) For constructivist peacebuilders, elections are critical. They are a measure

of the success of peacebuilding efforts. Elections bring about two changes:
they promote a climate of debate and political compromise (rather than
military conflict) and they allow the eventual rise of a political class convinced
of the virtues of democracy.76 Federal elections were held in the fall of 1996,
1998 and 2000, as provided in the Dayton Accords. National and municipal
elections took place in November 1997 and April 2000. Although the electoral
process unfolded in a fairly exemplary fashion (under the auspices of the
OSCE), as a rule, the outcome registered victories for nationalist candidates
within the three ethnic communities. Political fractures have thus remained
mostly intact and, in the case of the Serbs, have even been exacerbated.
The 1997 elections in the Serb entity gave reason for hope that the more
moderate tendency of President Biljana Plavsic would eventually prevail
over the radical current of former President Radovan Karadzic, who was
responsible for the Serbian genocide in Bosnia. For nearly two years, in
1998–99, SFOR tried by every means to help Plavsic lay her hands on the
mechanisms of political control in the Serbian republic. Its efforts were in
vain. Karadzic partisans, assembled in the southern part of Bosnia,
undermined all of Plavsic’s efforts to encourage the moderates, such as
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Prime Minister Mirolad Dodik, to carry out significant political reforms. As

James Schear recalls, ‘one measure of the elections’ success will be whether
they can establish a legitimate niche for nonethnic opposition parties’,77 in
other words those who favour a multiethnic and non-nationalist political
community. According to David Rieff, ‘lack of commitment to pluralism is
revealed by the absence of any candidates who are not members of the
dominant group the party in question claims to represent’. This is the reason
why nationalists fear elections much less than is generally thought. Rieff
acknowledges, that voting ‘suits their interests’.78 In this respect, the
September 1998 election results were disappointing. The radical Nikola
Poplasen was elected the new President of the Serbian entity, marking a
defeat for Plavsic’s party and for the democratization efforts of the Serb
political leadership. Thus, the pragmatists could not withstand the electoral
test and, after two sets of elections, it must be said that a functioning
multiparty system seems more elusive than ever.
Not only has the democratic route suffered a setback, but the very idea
of using the electoral process as a means to unify Bosnia has been cast in
doubt. Following a trip to Bosnia, journalist Thomas Friedman had this to
say about the 1996 elections: ‘I believe elections will not unify Bosnia.
There is no example of a partitioned country unified by an election process.
Elections tend to expose divisions, not heal them.’79 Canadian observer John
Graham agrees: ‘these [in Bosnia] were governments with no tradition of
democracy and little interest in democratic norms except insofar as elections
served to reinforce control’.80 If elections don’t produce moderates, why
bother? They only paralyze the ethnic gameboard. The question is actually
subtler and also bears on political change at the grassroots level. Many
peacebuilders feel that change is more evident in the business of daily life.
In all areas, Bosnians are learning to live together again – at least if the
reports of reconciliation efforts at the local level are reliable.81 The
municipal elections offered a few rays of hope, with breakthroughs by
candidates clearly opposed to nationalist positions.82 The OSCE can certify
that 125 of 136 Bosnian municipalities are following the rules for selecting
their mayors and municipal councils.83 Pessimism remains the order of the
day, though. As one elections monitor notes, ‘Bosnia’s political institutions
offer few incentives for multiethnic behavior…in a country like Bosnia,
with no history of political accommodation, a system of proportional
representation is a disaster’.84 And an editorial in The Economist maintains,
‘after three years of keeping Bosnia under intensive international care, it is
getting harder to sustain the argument that its people will opt for
reconciliation once freed from the grips of the demagogues’.85 Ironically, the
elections are serving to strengthen the nationalist parties and are thereby
hindering efforts to bring democracy to Bosnia. In December 1999, a report
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of the US Institute of Peace concluded: ‘Thus far, initial assumptions about
elections have not been supported. Elections do not necessarily bring
moderates to power.’86
Only time will tell whether the constructivist vision of democracy can
take root in Bosnia. For the time being, in spite of Alice’s appeal to the
virtues of democracy, Frankenstein refuses to change.
b) One key factor in building a democratic civic culture that gives dissenting
voices a hearing is the existence of an independent press which can freely
broadcast news and opinions in the most objective manner possible.
Conversely, media that serve as platforms for one ruling group or faction,
spreading messages of hatred and aggression, can play an important role in
breeding civic violence, political tensions and armed conflict (as was the case
throughout the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995).87 These
considerations led SFOR to take action in the summer of 1997 and seize the
four transmitters of the Serb television station in Pale, which was
broadcasting the Karadzic faction’s xenophobic appeals to revolt against
Plavsic and the Bosnians. The thinking was that with NATO playing a novel
role in peacebuilding, only SFOR control over the media could sway the
Serbs to a more favourable attitude towards Plavsic and improve the odds of
inter-ethnic reconciliation.88 The loss of their transmitters, however, does not
seem to have greatly affected the general radicalism of the Serbs.
Nevertheless, such actions are necessary, not only to counter the messages of
fear and revenge, but also to make people less receptive to interethnic rivalries
and more inclined toward tolerance and pluralism. Frankenstein must not
speak louder than Alice; otherwise Alice will have little chance to be heard.
c) The arrest and prosecution of war criminals was one of the most
important components of the peacebuilding mission and one of the major
successes of the joint efforts of SFOR and the ICTY. It was not clear at first
that IFOR troops could or would make arrests, and for more than two years
the ICTY was frequently frustrated.89 Without the cooperation of the
military, how could criminals be arrested in zones where they had support
(due to ethnic ties), without putting the hard-won Dayton peace agreement
in peril? Of the 74 indictments issued by the tribunal in October 1997, only
19 individuals were in custody. Two years after Dayton, a number of local
police forces remained under the control of some of these criminals. The
tribunal’s chief judge, South African Richard Goldstone, admitted ‘the lack
of credibility and enforcement of the ICTY’, while affirming that it could
‘further international humanitarian law’.90 His successor, Canadian Louise
Arbour, decried the lack of cooperation, especially on the part of the French
authorities, in pursuing war criminals, and charged France with wanting to
discredit and sabotage the ICTY.91 Simply put, the problem was that, in the
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absence of political pressure, NATO had little reason to step up arrests, since
its primary objective was a security transition, and that meant dealing with
some of those criminals to ensure their cooperation in implementing Dayton.
When the British and American governments became convinced that
stepping up the arrests would actually enhance the prospects for a lasting
peace and a more rapid withdrawal of SFOR, NATO received the green light
to provide substantial support for the ICTY’s efforts. In December 1997,
SFOR arrested three Bosno-Croats accused of massacring Muslim civilians in
1993. In January 1998, it apprehended a Serb described as the ‘Adolf Hitler’
of ethnic cleansing. Then, in March 1999, another notorious Serb was
arrested for crimes against humanity, and in January 2000, the Tribunal
sentenced five Bosnian Croats for attacks of ethnic cleansing.92 As Hofnung
notes, ‘the total impunity that the perpetrators of these crimes had benefited
from, until then, was finally ended’.93 Since that time, SFOR operations of
this kind have increased and the new ICTY chief judge, French Claude Jorda,
now has 40 indicted individuals in custody (of whom 15 have been sentenced)
and hopes to indict another 150 suspects by the time investigations are
completed in 2004. While this constitutes substantial progress, it cannot solve
the basic problem as long as ethnic divisions remain entrenched and the
process of reconciliation remains blocked. A report from the US Institute of
Peace notes: ‘arresting war criminals will not bring social reconciliation to the
former Yugoslavia unless it is perceived by all parties as the means to a just
end, and not simply as a way to expedite Dayton implementation’.94 In this
connection, when war criminals like Karadzic remain free, justice cannot be
seen to be done and undermines the prospects for reconciliation. While
Karadzic has been made a scapegoat for all the difficulties with pushing the
peace process forward in the Serb entity, it is virtually impossible to arrest him
(the possibility was contemplated and then rejected95) without seriously
imperilling Dayton. The alternative between a realist peace with a guilty party
and the justice of the peacebuilders may be a Hobson’s choice; it is one on
which Alice and Frankenstein have differing opinions.
d) Bosnia is under a form of ‘disguised protectorate’ and, in June 1997,

Carlos Westendorp was named High Representative responsible for full
implementation of the civilian provisions of the Dayton Accords.96 Like
General MacArthur in Japan and General Clay in Germany after the Second
World War, Westendorp resorted to increasingly drastic measures (even
more than his predecessor Bildt) to rebuild Bosnia. The effectiveness of his
approach, which has been compared by some to that of a viceroy,97 was
enhanced by the increasingly firm support he received from the SFOR
troops. The following are just a few random examples, which illustrate the
range of areas in which Westendorp’s successor, Wolfgang Petritsch, and his
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212 international bureaucrats are forcing the hand of the Bosnians:
a. appointing Bosnian ambassadors
b. re-establishing civilian control of Bosnia’s airspace
c. helping refugees return to Sarajevo by restoring their property rights
d. instituting a single system of car registration throughout the country
e. rapidly restoring telephone service
f. choosing a new flag and national anthem for Bosnia
g. adopting a common passport, as well as new citizenship laws
h. curbing media activities that violate the spirit of Dayton
i. creating a new currency, the ‘marka’, to replace the dinar.
This list could be extended considerably. The High Representative is taking

every opportunity to give substance to the (re)construction of the state. An
exemplar of constructivism, he is defining and choosing the norms that can
make Bosnia less of a virtual country and endow it with a common ‘identity’.
This mission is sometimes difficult inasmuch as coordinating military and
civilian personnel is a complicated matter. Moreover, some of the decisions are
proving to be very unpopular, especially the removal of certain politicians who
oppose the peace process – the latest being none other than Nicola Poplasen.98
Other unpopular measures include the unilateral appointment of administrators
for some towns that have been placed under trusteeship, forbidding certain
candidates from running for office due to their refusal to implement the Dayton
Accords, and threatening to impose sanctions on and withdraw economic aid
from Serb authorities who impede the return of refugees.99 The moral of the
story is that peacebuilding succeeds best when peace is imposed and soldiers
support the efforts of the civilians, who are ultimately responsible for
reconciliation strategies. When it comes to subduing a recalcitrant
Frankenstein, Alice is clearly more effective dressed in khakis.
The democratic transition is an ambitious and feasible (realist)
endeavour only insofar as it has the long-term support of an international
community prepared to use brute force as a means to foster the rise of new
leaders and a new culture imbued with peaceful values. It remains to be seen
whether this support will suffice to carry the democratization to completion.
Socio-economic Reconstruction
After Dayton, Nebojsa Vukadinovic recalls, it was expected that there would
be a five-year period of reconstruction in Bosnia, but ‘two years later, the
time estimate has doubled or tripled’.100 A tremendous effort has been made
and it has resulted in significant achievements. Bosnia has been a unique
exercise in peacebuilding: an army of peacebuilders has been placed at the
disposal of the Bosnian state in order to rebuild an efficient capitalist
economy which could serve as an example for other peacebuilding missions.
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The stakes are high. As Richard Holbrooke foresaw, ‘a huge economic

reconstruction programme was essential to any Bosnia settlement’.101 But is
socio-economic reconstruction sufficient to complement and gradually
replace SFOR’s military mission? Can economic norms designed to promote
capitalism eliminate insecurity? Can constructivists keep the realist bugbears
at bay through their intervention in the economy and the society? There are
significant disconnects between liberal dreams and the concrete realities on
the ground. These have to do with economic conditions, with the strategies
of the ‘builders’ and donors, and with the return of refugees.
The most recent economic assessments of the Bosnian federal state show
that while progress has been made, the performance is still well below
expectations.102 There is no longer famine and lack of adequate heating; the
road system is functional again, the $45 million debt to the IMF has been
forgiven, and Bosnia is receiving considerable international aid to cover the
$445 million in financial arrears owed to the World Bank. Several economic
summit meetings have been held by donor countries. They have resulted in
an aid package of nearly $5 billion over five years. Finally, in partnership
with the private sector, the US Department of Commerce generated over $5
billion worth of contracts for US firms (between 1,000 and 3,000 American
businesses are benefiting from the joint plan). On the other hand, ‘the
Bosnian economy is scarcely more viable than it was when the Dayton
Accord was signed in 1995’.103 Indeed, the overall performance in 1998–99
offers a more sombre portrait of Bosnia’s economic transformation. GDP
remains at only half its pre-war level (in spite of $5 billion in aid since 1996
to help Bosnia close the gap). People, goods and products cannot easily
cross interethnic boundaries; Bosnia has only nominal control over its
borders. Sometimes customs posts are unmanned, and contraband, as well
as the flow of illegal migrants from Asia and Africa, is allowed to freely
cross the border. The Central Bank, headed by New Zealander Peter
Nicholl, is not receiving consistent cooperation from its affiliates and the
monitoring system is inadequate. Corruption within the Bosnian
government is still a serious problem. And, finally, private foreign
investment has been slow in coming (only $160 million in 1997 and 1998).
All things considered, the situation is far from catastrophic – a positive
note in and of itself – but much remains to be done, especially in light of a
number of key factors: the production and redistribution of goods remains
sluggish and unemployment is high (30 per cent). In the Serb republic, which
is receiving 2 per cent of the international aid, compared with 98 per cent for
the federation, unemployment is running at 50 per cent.104 Taxes remain
unpaid, corruption is rampant and the mafia is ubiquitous. Further, there are
increasingly deep disparities between Bosnia’s two territorial entities. In these
circumstances, Vukadinovic fears the development of a two-tier process of
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reconstruction in the two entities, which would have the unintended
consequence of underscoring the advantages for the Bosnians of a strategy of
separation as opposed to a policy of integration. He warns: ‘the difficulty of
pursuing reconstruction at the same time as the transition stems from the
political logjam and the intractable institutional problems. If the logic of neo-
liberalism governs both reconstruction and the transition, there is a danger
that, in time, the underlying disparities of the Bosnian economy will
resurface.’105 From this vantage point, the socio-economic transition depends
on the results achieved in the realm of security and in the political sphere,
rather than the reverse. Before he can prosper, Frankenstein must first feel
happy and secure.
a) It is no exaggeration to speak of an ‘army’ of peacebuilders deployed in

Bosnia. The force includes 10,000 people from foreign governments
(primarily the donor states), various UN and EU agencies, and, above all,
200 NGOs from 24 countries (in addition to the 77 Bosnian NGOs) that are
investing more than $1.5 billion annually to help Bosnia get back on its feet.
Together, they are carrying out a ‘mini Marshall plan’. It is a fine example
of constructivism in action, an effort to reshape the norms of conduct and
refashion Bosnia’s identity.106 Alice is stepping up her efforts on the ground
to conquer hearts and minds, from rebuilding homes and restoring nursing
care to clearing mines, from bolstering the judicial system and assisting
widows and orphans to organizing elections and schools. The NGOs believe
that peacebuilding is carried out from the bottom up and not the other way
around. The populace can be won over faster and more completely than
politicians, and successful projects can bring ethnic groups together by
empowering them to conceive and implement solutions to their own
problems.107 As one aid worker observed, ‘This place is healing, not dying.
But we are the life-support system.’108 For their part, the donors have agreed
to give Bosnia an enormous amount of aid, $1.25 billion in 1998 alone. This
assistance is often dispensed in a scattered way. There is little coordination
between the United States and Europe, which is acting primarily through the
ECHO and PHARE programmes (one component of which aims at
rebuilding the city of Mostar). To this can be added the actions of
governments such as those of Canada and Japan, and of the World Bank and
the IMF, as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other
IGOs and NGOs.109 The lack of coordination among the parties involved in
the reconstruction efforts is impeding progress. As Jane Sharp writes, all
these players ‘tended to work in a bilateral framework with recipients, not as
part of a coordinated plan…Most of the money directed to Bosnia had been
squandered with so little effect.’110 This has prompted many observers to call
for the creation of a civilian chief-of-staff, comparable to the military
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authority, and for a central coordinator to organize the activities of the

civilian players in Bosnia and elsewhere (the High Representative does not
have formal control over the work of the NGOs and IGOs because he
represents only the UN and the EU).111 The ‘constructivist’ strategy of the
peacebuilders and donors is certainly laudable, but Alice must speak in a
unified voice if she wants to prevail.
b) One of the basic points in the Dayton Accords was the return of the three
million refugees who had been dislocated or had fled Bosnia during the
1992–95 war (the largest exodus since the Second World War). Of Bosnia’s
total population of 4.4 million, one-third were dislocated and one-third fled;
67 per cent of the Croats, 63 per cent of the Muslims and 39 per cent of the
Serbs were displaced within or outside Bosnia’s territory.112 Although 1998
was supposed to be the ‘year of return’, UNHCR statistics show that 1.2
million have no prospects of repatriation or relocation in Bosnia; they are
‘awaiting a solution’ to use the standard phrase.113 As of December 1998,
475,000 refugees and displaced persons had returned since the end of the
war. Of that number, only some 60,000 settled outside the entity controlled
by their own community (Serb or Muslim-Croat). In most cases, the
refugees are not returning to their former lands and homes but to a region,
a city or a village where their ethnic group forms the majority. It would
appear that the return is not being conducted on a harmonious and
multiethnic basis; rather it is entrenching the divisions between the peoples.
In fact, 90 per cent of the Serbs who lived in the territory of the Muslim-
Croat federation are now residing in the Serb entity. Evidence provided by
NATO, in December 1999, shows that Bosnian Croats have shored up their
ethnic presence in Western Herzegovina to prevent the return of Muslim
refugees. The promise of return contained in Dayton remains largely
unfulfilled, although there were strict provisions in the Accords concerning
the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their former homes.
The powers of the Office of the High Representative, Daalder irreverently
observes, ‘are like those of the pope: it can issue an encyclical, but unless
people believe, there is very little it can do about their behavior’.114 In
principle, this right of return was supposed to promote reunification, not the
segregation of Bosnia. Sophie Albert remarks, ‘by adding the word
“homes” to the provisions on return, the negotiators at Dayton appeared to
express an almost mystical belief in human goodness’.115 The reality is quite
different, however: it is not safe to return to one’s home and many houses
were destroyed or damaged;116 indeed, 40 per cent of them are uninhabitable.
There are not enough homes to accommodate the refugees who are
returning to Bosnia; there is still a dearth of potable water; and landmines
are scattered everywhere.
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 25

It is vital that the peacebuilding mission halt the current (re)division of
Bosnia’s population and promote ethnic coexistence. Accordingly, a UNHCR
programme aims to create a dozen ‘open cities’, intended to encourage the
multiethnic reintegration of refugees in exchange for significant economic
aid. The UNHCR is also supporting measures such as trust building among
refugees who wish to return to a region where they will be a part of an ethnic
minority; setting up a bus service to transport Bosnians across the interethnic
border; and a large-scale home building project in cooperation with USAID.117
It would appear, though, that the ethno-realist thesis is being borne out. The
people of Bosnia are turning their backs on coexistence; rather, they want to
maintain and even reinforce the ethnic divide. Short of a permanent military
occupation by SFOR and a forced repatriation of the refugees within a
completely ‘open’ Bosnia, it is hard to see how the return of the refugees can
contribute to reconciliation. In spite of much effort and encouragement,
Frankenstein does not seem to want to set up house with Alice.
Conclusion: NATO or TITO, That Is the Question!

Our analysis of peacebuilding in Bosnia shows that scepticism is warranted
in assessing the prospects for successful implementation of the Dayton
Accords and reconciliation. Given a choice between (re)constructing and
instituting new security, democratic and economic norms, on the one hand,
and maintaining ethnic cleavages, on the other, Bosnia seems to be taking the
second road, in spite of the imposing civilian and military presence of the
international community. As the former commander in chief of the Bosnian
army has remarked: ‘the multiethnic bosnian state is a fairytale made up for
foreigners’.118 Either Frankenstein will need extensive therapy to agree to
change and learn to appreciate the benefits of Alice’s liberalism or Alice
must reluctantly swallow a healthy dose of realism. In Bosnia’s case, realism
means continuing conflict management, not embracing false hopes of
peacebuilding. Conflict management must be conducted with a firm hand by
NATO over an extended period of time. NATO has no choice but to assume
the role of Tito, to borrow Thomas Friedman’s analogy: ‘Sarajevo residents
are hoping that president Clinton will be their new Tito – the iron-fisted
Yugoslav strongman who used his army and secret police to maintain peace
among the different communities. That’s worth thinking about: We’re telling
them that the solution to their problem is a new constitution and they are
telling us that the solution to their problem is a new Tito.’119
Experts who have pondered the future of Bosnia fear the consequences
of maintaining the de facto divisions between ethnic communities. Policies
favouring partition will breed future conflicts between ethnic groups over
land, resources, political power and military superiority in Bosnia.120 The
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 26
international community may well weary of Bosnia and the peacebuilders

may lose interest in an interminable mission with an uncertain outcome.
Certainly, it would be a shame if the ‘Frankies’ (ironically, the name given
to the Serb para-military force that practised ethnic cleansing in Kosovo121)
were to prevail against the heroic efforts of Alice the Constructivist to
change the course of history by altering human consciousness and identity.
The facts strongly suggest, however, that Bosnia, like the rest of the
Balkans, is not amenable to the North American ideal of a multiethnic and
multicultural society. At the end of the day, as one prominent realist
unhappily (and probably correctly) concludes: ‘the ethnic groups have lived
together peacefully only when that coexistence was imposed, as under
foreign empires or the Tito dictatorship’.122 Our case study of peacebuilding
in Bosnia does not appear to gainsay this assertion. NATO must play Tito to
avoid an irreparable break between Alice and Frankenstein.
NOTES
This study was made possible by multi-year grants from the Canadian Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada (SSHRC).
1. Roland Paris, ‘Constructing Liberal States: I.R. Theory and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding’,
paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington,
Feb. 1999.
2. See Peter Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in
Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.1–32.
3. Nika Strazisar, ‘Rethinking the Concept of Peacebuilding: The Case of Bosnia and
Hercegovina’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,
Minneapolis March 1998.
4. Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, in Michael Brown (ed), Ethnic
Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.103–24.
5. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic
Conflict’, in Lake and Rothchild (eds), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear,
Diffusion and Escalation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp.3–32; Rajat
Ganguly and Raymond Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict. The International Dimension,
(New York: Longman, 1998), pp.3–40; Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions
to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security, 20, (Spring 1996), pp.136–75; Stephen Van
Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, International Security, 18, (Spring 1994),
pp.3–32.
6. Penelope Safioleas, ‘The Cycle of Conflict and the Necessity of International Policy
Convergence: Ethnic Conflict (Mis)Management and the Former Yugoslavia’, paper presented
at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, Feb. 1999, p.11.
7. Edward Luttwak, ‘The End of War and the Future of Political Violence’, text presented at the
Ivan Bloch conference on ‘The Future of War’, organized by the Foundation for War Studies
of the Netherlands, Saint Petersburg, 24–27 February 1999, p.4; see also Luttwak, ‘Give War
a Chance’, Foreign Affairs, 78, (July–Aug. 1999), pp.36–44.
8. Pauline Baker, ‘Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 27

Peace?’, in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Managing Global Chaos:
Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press,
1996), pp.564–8.
9. Dusko Doder, ‘Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds’, Foreign Policy, 91, (Summer 1993), p.9.
10. William Hagen, ‘The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms’, Foreign Affairs, 78, (July–August 1999),
pp.52–64; Cvijeto Job, ‘Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Furies’, Foreign Policy, 92, (Fall 1993), pp.52–74.
11. Adam Roberts, ‘Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case of
Former Yugoslavia’, in Olra Otunnu and Michael Doyle (eds), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
For the New Century, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p.35.
12. Albrecht Schnabel and Nika Strazisar, ‘Conflict Prevention in the Former Yugoslavia: Missed
Opportunities and Lessons for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding’, paper presented at the annual
meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, March 1998, p.4.
13. Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, (Washington,
Brookings Institution, 1995).
14. Charles G. Boyd, ‘Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia’, Foreign Affairs, 74,
(Sep.–Oct. 1995), p.26.
15. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, (New York: Random House, 1996); and ‘The
Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia’, Foreign Affairs, 74,
(March–April 1995), pp.2–8.
16. Saadia Touval, ‘Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia’, in Chester Crocker, Fen
Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to
International Conflict, (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p.405.
17. Troy McGrath, ‘The Break-Up of Bosnia: You Can’t Go Back to Holding Hands’, paper
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, March
1998, p.4.
18. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie Lipschutz, ‘Discourses of War: Security and the Case of
Yugoslavia’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p.185.
19. Ibid., p.168.
20. Kenneth Bush and Fuat Keyman, ‘Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold
War World’, Global Governance, 3, (1997), p.313.
21. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour. Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, (Toronto:
Viking, 1998), pp.34–71.
22. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie Lipschutz, op cit., p.167, 178.
23. Ibid., p.151.
24. For an historical account of the period preceding Dayton and a discussion of the Accords, see
Lenard J. Cohen, ‘Bosnia and Hercegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State’, Current
History, 95, (March 1996), pp.103–12; Jane M.O. Sharp, ‘Dayton Report Card’, International
Security, 22, (Winter 1997–98), pp. 103–13; and Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton, (Washington:
Brookings, 1998).
25. A good analysis of the Dayton Accords can be found in the special editions of The Economist,
Balkans supplement, 24 Jan. 1998; and the special section edited by Sophia Clément and
Thierry Tardy, ‘Les Balkans deux ans après les accords de Dayton’, Relations internationales
et stratégiques, 28, (Winter 1997). See also Saïd Hamdouni, ‘Les accords de Dayton et le statut
de la Bosnie-Herzégovine’, Études internationales, 29, (March 1998), pp.55–69.
26. Speech by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, ‘Making Progress Toward a Lasting Peace
in Bosnia’, US Department of State Dispatch, April 1998, pp.6–11.
27. Thomas Hofnung, ‘La paix américaine en panne en Bosnie’, Manière de voir, 43, (Jan.–Feb.
1999), p.34 [article reprinted from the Monde Diplomatique, Sept. 1998 – my translation].
28. Ruth Wedgwood (ed), After Dayton: Lessons of the Bosnian Peace Process, (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p.22.
29. James Schear, Bosnia’s Post-Dayton Traumas’, Foreign Policy, 104, (Fall 1996), pp.87, 89. See
also Fouad Ajami, ‘Under Western Eyes: The Fate of Bosnia’, Survival, 41, (Summer 1999),
pp. 35–42.
30. International Crisis Group, Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement,
(Brussels: ICG, 1999).
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 28
31. David Chandler, Bosnia. Faking Democracy After Dayton, (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p.204.
32. William Hyland, ‘The Solution: A Pan-European Peace Conference for the Balkans’,
International Herald Tribune, 1 April 1999, p.4.
33. Ivo Daalder, ‘Dayton’s Incomplete Peace’, Foreign Affairs, 78, (Nov.–Dec. 1999), pp.106–13.
34. Svebor Dizdarevic, ‘Bosnie, la fin du rêve multiethnique’, Manière de voir, 45, (May–June
1999), p.44 [article reprinted from the Monde Diplomatique, Jan. 1996 – my translation].
35. Xavier Bougarel, ‘Quel bilan critique des accords de Dayton?’ Relations internationales et
stratégiques, 28, (Winter 1997), pp.29–35.
36. Warren Bass, ‘The Triage of Dayton’, Foreign Affairs, 77, (Sept.–Oct. 1998), p.106.
37. Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two’, Current History, 96, (March 1997), p.98.
38. Charles G. Boyd, ‘Making Bosnia Work’, Foreign Affairs, 77, (Jan.–Feb. 1998), p.43.
39. Pedrac Simic, ‘La Bosnie, deux ans après Dayton’, Relations internationales et stratégiques,
28, (Winter 1997), p.46 [my translation].
40. Charles-Philippe David, ‘At Least 2001: US Security Policy and Exit Strategy in Bosnia’,
European Security, 9, (Spring 2000), p.1–21.
41. Gideon Rose, ‘The Exit Strategy Delusion’, Foreign Affairs, 77, (Jan.–Feb. 1998), p.66.
42. Penelope Safioleas, op cit., p.23.
43. Jane Sharp, op cit., p.101.
44. Charles G. Boyd, ‘Making Bosnia Work’, op cit., p.55.
45. Susan Woodward, quoted in the report of the International Peace Academy and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Healing the Wounds: Refugees, Reconstruction and
Reconciliation, New York, July 1996, p.14.
46. Edited by Pascal Boniface, L’année stratégique 1997, (Paris: Institut de relations
internationales et stratégiques, 1998), p.46 [my translation].
47. Xavier Bougarel, op cit., p.35 [my translation].
48. Thomas Friedman, ‘NATO or Tito’, The New York Times, 17 Jan. 1996, p.A19.
49. For a comprehensive examination of the concept of peacebuilding, see Charles-Philippe David,
‘Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process’, Security Dialogue,
30, (March 1999), pp.25–42.
50. See, for example, Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane Roussel, ‘Middle Power Blues:
Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War’, The American Review of
Canadian Studies, 28, (Spring 1998), pp.131–56.
51. SFOR’s mission extends beyond the military aspect to encompass the civilian side of
peacebuilding. See Albert Legault and Manon Tessier, ‘L’IFOR et la SFOR’, Le maintien de la
paix, 34, (April 1998); David Carment and Frank Harvey, ‘Why SFOR Must Stay and Go’,
Peacekeeping and International Relations, (May–June 1998), pp.3–4; in the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1997–98, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998), pp.123–32; and Bruce Pirnie, ‘Peace Operations in Bosnia-Hercegovina’, in Marin
Sopta, (ed), Bosnia-Hercegovina: Beyond Dayton, (Zagreb: Croatian Center of Strategic
Studies, 1997), pp.130–42.
52. Warren Bass, op cit., p.105.
53. Thierry Tardy, ‘Les forces de l’OTAN en Bosnie-Herzégovine: paix retrouvée et avenir
incertain’, Relations internationales et stratégiques, 28, (Winter 1997), p.131 [my translation].
54. Among the first are the members of the International Commission on the Balkans. See their
report, edited by Leo Tindemans, Unfinished Peace, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1996), pp.87–8.
55. Zlato Isakovic, ‘The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords – Failure or Success’, paper presented at the
annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, March 1998, pp.8, 14.
56. Jane Sharp, op cit., p.114.
57. Warren Bass, op cit., pp.102, 104.
58. Leo Tindemans, op cit., pp.158–9.
59. Susan Woodward, ‘Resolving the Security Dilemma in Bosnia and Hercegovina: Regional and
Local Tasks After Dayton’, in Marin Sopta, op cit., pp.63, 65.
60. Chris Hedges, ‘Bosnian Muslims Said to Intensify Their Efforts to Rearm in Secret’, The New
York Times, 3 Oct. 1997, pp.A1, A8.
61. Charles G. Boyd, ‘Making Bosnia Work’, op cit., p.49
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 29

62. ‘Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program’, Special Report, (Washington: US
Institute of Peace, 1997), pp.4–5.
63. Tom Walker, ‘US Policy in Bosnia Dangerous, Envoy Warns’, The Globe and Mail, 7 June 1997,
pp.A1, A11.
64. James Gow, ‘Strategic Questions and Security Policy: Knowing What We Want’, and Christian
Clages, ‘Implementation of the Peace Agreement in the Consolidation Period’, in Marin Sopta,
op cit., pp.48–60 and 165–71 respectively.
65. Ivo Daalder, ‘Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement’, Survival, 39, (Winter
1997–1998), p.14.
66. Chaim Kaufmann, ‘When All Else Fails. Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the
Twentieth Century’, International Security, 23, (Fall 1998), pp.120–56; John Mearsheimer, ‘The
Only Exit from Bosnia’, The New York Times, 7 Oct. 1997, p.A13; John Mearsheimer and Robert
Pape, ‘The Answer: A Three Way Partition Plan for Bosnia and How the US Can Enforce It’, The
New Republic, 14 June 1993, pp.22–8; Stephen Van Evera, ‘When Peace Means War’, The New
Republic, 18 Dec. 1995, pp.16–21; Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Turning the Cease-fire into Peace’,
Brookings Review, 16, (Winter 1998), pp.41–4; and Fareed Zakaria, ‘Fighting a Losing Battle’,
Newsweek, 6 Oct. 1997, p.13.
67. Robert Pape, ‘Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia’, Survival, 39, (Winter 1997–98), p.26.
68. See the studies by Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, (London:
Verso, 1998), p.207; and ‘The Troubled History of Partition’, Foreign Affairs, 76, (Jan.–Feb.
1997), pp.22–34.
69. ‘Les accords de Dayton doivent être respectés’, Le Devoir, 6 Aug. 1997, p.A5 [my translation].
70. Cited by Jocelyn Coulon, ‘L’OTAN s’oppose à la partition de la Bosnie’, Le Devoir, 30 Oct. 1997,
pp.A1, A8.
71. Carl Bildt, ‘There Is No Alternative to Dayton’, Survival, 39, (Winter 1997–98), pp.19–21.
72. Leo Tindemans, op cit., p.86.
73. Pauline Neville-Jones, ‘Washington Has a Responsibility Too’, Survival, 39, (Winter 1997–98),
p.23.
74. ‘A Precarious Peace’, special feature on the Balkans, The Economist, 24 Jan. 1998, pp.6–7.
75. Alain Joxe, ‘Dayton: chronique de l’impasse’, Le débat stratégique, 40, (Sept. 1998), p.4 [my
translation].
76. Ulrich Albrecht, ‘Using Electoral Monitoring and the International War Crimes Tribunal as Tools
for Conflict Resolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina’, in Marin Sopta, op cit., pp.101–7.
77. James Schear, op cit., p.97.
78. David Rieff, ‘In Bosnia, A Prelude to Partition’, The New York Times, 14 Aug. 1996, p.A21.
79. Thomas Friedman, ‘Bosnia Election Blues’, The New York Times, 12 June 1996, p.A23.
80. John Graham, ‘Black Past, Grey Future?’ International Journal, 53, (Spring 1998), p.211.
81. Mike O’Connor, ‘On Local Level, at Least, Bosnians Try to Get Along’, The New York Times, 4
May 1998, p.A7.
82. ‘A Sporting Chance of Success’, The Economist, 6 Dec. 1997, p.55.
83. ‘Councils of Despair’, The Economist, 11 April 1998, p.40.
84. Ben Reilly, ‘With No Melting Pot, a Recipe for Failure in Bosnia’, International Herald Tribune,
12 Sept. 1998, p.8.
85. ‘A Fresh Vote in Bosnia’, The Economist, 5 Sept. 1998, p.15.
86. Steven Riskin, (ed), ‘Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia’, Peaceworks, (Washington:,
US Institute of Peace, 1999), p.7.
87. Leo Tindemans, op cit., pp.92–5, 148–57.
88. Anthony Lewis, ‘For Bosnia, Cautious Optimism and Newly Rising Hopes’, The New York
Times, 18 Oct. 1997, p.A13; “War of the Airwaves,” The Economist, 30 Aug. 1997, p.37.
89. Alex Kuo, ‘Forging Peace: International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia’, Harvard
International Review, Winter 1997–98, pp. 34–7; ‘The Bosnia Beat’, Peace Watch, 5, (Feb.
1999), pp.6–7; Leo Tindemans, op cit., pp.90–1.
90. Richard Goldstone, ‘No Justice in Bosnia’, The New York Times, 3 March 1997, p.A17.
91. Jocelyn Coulon, ‘Le combat de Louise Arbour’, Le Devoir, 17 Dec. 1997, p.A1.
92. ‘UN Indicts Serbian Paramilitary Leader’, International Herald Tribune, 1 April 1999, p.10.
93. Thomas Hofnung, op cit., p.34 [my translation].
221csp01.qxd 27/06/01 10:14 Page 30
94. ‘Dayton Implementation: The Apprehension and Prosecution of Indicted War Criminals’,
Special Report, (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1997), p.5.
95. Bernard Kaplan, ‘There’s a Reason No Top Bosnian War Criminals Have Been Caught’, The
Globe and Mail, 2 Jan. 1998, p.A12.
96. ‘The Protectorate’, The Economist, 14 Feb. 1998, pp.50–1.
97. Carlos Westendorp, ‘Bosnia’s Euro-Spanish Viceroy’, The Economist, 5 Sept. 1998, p.52.
98. Carlos Westendorp, ‘Bosnian Serbs Can Help to Guarantee the Peace’, International Herald
Tribune, 15 March 15 1999, p.10.
99. Chris Hedges, ‘Diplomat Rules Bosnia With a Strong Hand’, The New York Times, 10 April
1998, p.A3.
100. Nebojsa Vukadinovic, ‘Économies d’après-guerre entre reconstruction et transition’,
Relations internationales et stratégiques, 28, (Winter 1997), p.47 [my translation].
101. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, (New York: Random, 1998), p.86.
102. Geoffrey Pigman, ‘Public-Private Partnership in Post-Cold War Political Risk Management:
Clinton Administration Bosnia Policy, 1993–1998’, paper presented at the annual meeting of
the International Studies Association, Washington, Feb. 1999; ‘Bosnia in the Balkans’, Peace
Watch, 4, (April 1998), pp.3–4; Leo Tindemans, op cit., pp.95–6; the International Institute
of Strategic Studies Annual Reports, Strategic Survey, 1997/98.
103. Benn Steil and Susan Woodward, ‘A European ‘New Deal’ for the Balkans’, Foreign Affairs,
78, (Nov.–Dec. 1999), p.96.
104. An important point raised by a number of observers including Anthony Lewis, ‘Inching
Forward in Postwar Republika Srpska’, The New York Times, 21 Oct. 1997, p.A13; Mike
O’Connor, ‘West Fears Money for Bosnia Is Help to Hard-Line Serbs’, The New York Times,
16 Feb. 1998, p.A1, A7; ‘Building Bosnia on Banknotes’, The Economist, 1 May 1999, p.66;
Charles G. Boyd, op cit., pp.46–7, compares the Bosnian Serbs to the Germans after
Versailles and their determination to avenge themselves for Western retribution.
105. Nebojsa Vukadinovic, op cit., p.56 [my translation].
106. Elizabeth Becker, ‘Aid Groups Are Hands That Help in Bosnia’, The New York Times, 12
April 1998, p.A5.
107. Julia Demichelis, ‘NGOs and Peacebuilding in Bosnia’s Ethnically Divided Cities’, Special
Report, (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1998).
108. Neil King, ‘Nation-Builders Hard at Work in Bosnia’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 Sept. 1998,
p.9.
109. Nebojsa Vukadinovic, op cit., pp.49–56.
110. Jane M.O. Sharp, op cit., p.129.
111. James Kitfield, ‘Waging Peace’, National Journal, 5 Oct. 1996, p.2115.
112. David Bosco, ‘Reintegrating Bosnia: A Progress Report’, The Washington Quarterly, 21,
(Spring 1998), pp.65–81; Jonas Widgren, ‘How to Ensure that the Return of Refugees to
Bosnia-Hercegovina Will Contribute to Security and Stability?’, in Marin Sopta, op cit.,
pp.172–8.
113. Roland De Courson, ‘Priorité aux réfugiés bosniaques’, Le Devoir, 17 Dec. 1998, p.A5.
114. Ivo Daalder, ‘Dayton Incomplete Peace…’, op cit., p.111.
115. Sophie Albert, ‘The Return of Refugees to Bosnia and Hercegovina; Peacebuilding with
People’, International Peacekeeping, 4, (Fall 1997), p.12.
116. Barbara McDougall, ‘It’s Still Dangerous to Go Home in Bosnia’, The Globe and Mail, 22
May 1998, p.A9.
117. ‘Dayton Implementation: The Return of Refugees’, Special Report, (Washington: US
Institute of Peace, 1998).
118. Gojko Beric, ‘L’État bosniaque multiethnique: une jolie fable à l’intention des étrangers’,
Courrier international,20–26 Nov. 1997, p.20 [my translation].
119. Thomas Friedman, ‘NATO or Tito’, op cit., p.A19.
120. Janusz Bugajski, ‘Bosnia-Hercegovina: Future Political Scenarios’, in Marin Sopta, op cit.,
pp.201–7.
121. Charles Sennott, ‘Town of Pec Suffers the Worst Atrocities, International Herald Tribune, 31
March 1999, p.1, 7.
122. Henry Kissinger, ‘NATO Has to Prevail’, International Herald Tribune, 2 April 1999, p.8.

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Contemporary Security Policy

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Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein:

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Alice in Wonderland Meets Frankenstein:

C H A R L E S -PH IL IPPE DAVI D

Studies in peacebuilding generally adopt either a conceptual or an empirical

Charles-Philippe David is Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of

Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.22, No.1 (April 2001), pp.1–30

Constructivist and Realist Views of Conflict and Peacebuilding

b) Peace missions entail the dissemination (read construction) of new

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 3

a) The realist begins with a rational and non-subjective interpretation of the

arises in internal conflicts.5 The cycle of conflict between ethnic groups

b) Peace missions are seen by most realists as temporary band-aid solutions

Realists see the goal of conflict management (and, if possible, resolution) as

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 5

Realist and Constructivist Approaches to the Conflict in Bosnia

b) According to Adam Roberts, ideas about ancient communal hatred and

c) US General Charles Boyd, Deputy SACEUR in charge of Bosnia from

d) The major powers’ attempts to avert the conflict were hamstrung by

e) Troy McGrath, Director of European Studies at the University of Central

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 7

2) The constructivist approach looks to subjective, normative and identity-

According to Crawford and Lipschutz18 (two writers who have made

of these arguments really explains the conflict. They view it rather as a

Assessing the Dayton Accords: Success or Failure?

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 9

3. Civil reconstruction, under the direction of a High Representative

4. Lastly, guarantees of personal security including the free return of

positive assessment: ‘thanks to the Dayton accord…struggles are now

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 11

Peacebuilding and the Future of Bosnia

The Security Transition

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 13

3) While the norms of peaceful conflict resolution must prevail in principle,

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 15

4) Certain territorial disputes have been worrisome, especially those which

(coordinator of American policy on Bosnia at the NSC between 1995 and

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 17

The Democratic Transition

a) For constructivist peacebuilders, elections are critical. They are a measure

Prime Minister Mirolad Dodik, to carry out significant political reforms. As

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 19

d) Bosnia is under a form of ‘disguised protectorate’ and, in June 1997,

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 21

This list could be extended considerably. The High Representative is taking

The stakes are high. As Richard Holbrooke foresaw, ‘a huge economic

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 23

a) It is no exaggeration to speak of an ‘army’ of peacebuilders deployed in

authority, and for a central coordinator to organize the activities of the

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 25

Conclusion: NATO or TITO, That Is the Question!

international community may well weary of Bosnia and the peacebuilders

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 27

CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA 29

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