ARTICLE

Why Do Professional Soldiers

Commit Acts of Personal Violence
that Contravene the Law of Armed
Conflict?
W I NG C O MM ANDE R S AR A MACKMIN, RAF

Wg
Defence
10.1080/14702430601135610
1470-2436
Original
Taylor
7102007
00000March
Cdr&SaraMackmin
Studies
Article
Francis
FDEF_A_213492.sgm
and(print)/1743-9698
2007 Ltd
Francis (online)

People get killed and often in large numbers. War is hell.1

Michael Walzer, 2000
While it is generally accepted that war is hell and people get killed in
combat, the world was horrified by the reports of atrocities at Abu Ghraib
and Camp Breadbasket in Iraq. There are those who believe that such inci-
dents are a reality of war and that they should be accepted as an inevitable
aspect of armed conflict. However, the furore over the pictures and stories
from Abu Ghraib and Camp Breadbasket demonstrate that the public does
not understand the realities of war and is not prepared to look further than
the initial pictorial evidence published by the media. This article initially set
out to prove that such incidents happen in all conflicts and that their occur-
rence should not come as a shock. A brief literature review confirmed that
evidence of large-scale atrocities happening in conflicts throughout history
is readily available. As a colonel in World War I stated, ‘you can’t stimulate
and let loose the animal in man and then expect to be able to cage it up again
at a moment’s notice’.2
The review also indicated that it is mainly the major, strategic level
atrocities that have been investigated, for example, the Holocaust and
Rwanda, and that very little research has been done on incidents
committed at an individual level. Research into combat stress and histor-
ical analyses of conflicts since World War I have unearthed accounts of
soldiers using force unnecessarily but these acts have often not been

Wg Cdr Sara Mackmin, RAF, Advanced Command and Staff Course No. 9 JSCSC, Shrivenham,
Sept. 2005 – July 2006.

Defence Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 65–89

ISSN 1470-2436
DOI: 10.1080/14702430601135610 © 2007 Taylor & Francis
66 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

reported and have historically been accepted as being simply a

consequence of war. However, the Western public’s attitude to war is
changing.
The British public has always expected its soldiers to behave with abso-
lute honour at all times but in the past has turned a blind eye to some of the
less savoury aspects of war. Today’s public and media are less lenient and
are quick to condemn when evidence of any apparently unnecessary
violence comes to light. Cicero’s ‘inter arma silent leges’ of 52 BC [in war, the
law is silent], the unwritten rule of ‘combat immunity’, is no longer suffi-
cient defence as soldiers are being called to account for many acts of aggres-
sion. By February 2005, the British Military Police were investigating
137 incidents of alleged war crimes by British soldiers in Iraq3 and several
soldiers have subsequently been convicted. The Secretary of State for
Defence recently called on the British people to ‘be slower to condemn and
quicker to understand’4 yet there have been few concerted efforts to try to
determine why individual soldiers might use force illegally. Therefore, the
purpose of this article is to try to understand why professional soldiers
commit these acts of ‘personal violence’5 even though they have been
trained to control the application of force and are fully aware of the Laws of
Armed Conflict.
The author has not experienced frontline combat face-to-face with an
enemy and could be criticised for judging without having seen ‘buddies
mangled or been shot at’.6 Although it is possible to become too clinical
without personal experience, one can also see more clearly without being
influenced by prejudice or the desire to either condemn or excuse.
Accurate breadth and depth of evidence is the key to forming an objective
conclusion. This kind of evidence is not easy to gather when it comes to
atrocities. Few people experience combat and fewer still are prepared to
talk about their experiences. Those who do are unlikely to discuss events
that they know were wrong, especially if there is risk of repercussions.
Those who are prepared to talk about their combat experiences find it diffi-
cult to find the right words to explain events without seeming to either
glorify or underplay the realities of war. In addition, personal accounts
naturally come from a singular perspective, which changes over time. It is
only by examining a collection of accounts that a true overview of events
can be drawn. It has not been possible to arrange primary research to
support this study within the allocated time due to the sensitivity of this
subject and the classification of some associated aspects. Instead, the analy-
sis is underpinned by first and second hand accounts of acts of personal
violence that have been extracted from studies of conflicts over the last
century. Examples have been restricted to the period from World War I to
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D I E R S 67

the present because this falls within the context of the current International
Laws of Armed Conflict.
This article is limited to breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict at a
personal level within the jus in bello concept and to consideration of acts by
Western ground troops only. Therefore, the paper starts by explaining what
is meant by an illegal ‘act of personal violence’ in International Law before
looking at the normal causes of aggression in humans. Analysis of the key
factors peculiar to an armed conflict environment leads to the conclusion
that there are four main areas where the risk of atrocities being committed
at the personal level is highest. These are: high individual disposition
towards violence; the period between the cessation of fighting and soldiers’
emotional levels normalising; poor command discipline; and novel situa-
tions. The analysis has not explored factors such as the typical background
and intellect of the average soldier or specific military training techniques.
These factors will only modify the risks of unnecessary violence occurring
and are unlikely to change this paper’s conclusions.

The Illegal ‘Act of Personal Violence’

The idea that the conduct of armed hostilities is governed by rules appears to have
been found in almost all societies, without geographical limitation.7
There have been written and unwritten laws of war throughout history.
These laws have reflected the morals and ethics peculiar to each historical
period and each society as well as having practical application. They origi-
nated from the fundamental religious beliefs that the taking of another’s life
should not be done lightly and that one should ‘do unto others as one
would have done to oneself’. These laws are not purely altruistic; they
prevent violence continuing once the political objectives have been
achieved and thus protect one’s own forces from unnecessary losses.8 These
underpinning concepts are relevant to all societies and laws across the world
and have developed along broadly similar lines. A key theme is the preven-
tion of war escalating to levels abhorrent to the society of the time. These
laws were drawn together at the turn of the last century to form the ‘Just
War’ theory of our time; this comprises the just reasons to go to war (jus ad
bellum) and the use of just means within war (jus in bello).
It is those aspects of the Just War theory that apply to the individual
soldier that are the most important for this article. Therefore, it is jus in bello
and not jus ad bellum that is at stake. The legal articulation of the jus in bello
criteria for our times started with the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907),
which were further developed by the Nuremberg Principles in 1946 and
68 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

the Geneva Convention in 1949. These are collectively known as the Laws
of Armed Conflict or International Humanitarian Law. The detail within
these laws is complex but they basically adopt the principles of discrimina-
tion, necessity and proportionality when using military force in armed
conflicts.9
There is uncertainty regarding the application of international law
during Peace Enforcement or Post-Conflict Reconstruction operations,
which are generally internal and not inter-state conflicts.10 These operations
are technically not armed conflict scenarios and thus the Laws of Armed
Conflict should not apply. They are also not times of peace or internal
disturbances within a nation state and thus fall outside the jurisdiction of
human rights legislation and domestic law. This grey area is being explored
in the courts today as soldiers are being investigated for alleged crimes in
Iraq during the post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction periods. For
the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the Laws of Armed Conflict
apply whenever soldiers are armed on operations.
In armed conflict the laws can be summarised as follows: non-
combatants must be protected and treated humanely without adverse
distinction; it is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or is
in a non-combatant role; wounded and sick personnel, medical personnel
and medical establishments must not be harmed and must be protected;
captured combatants and civilians must be protected against all acts of
violence and reprisal; no one shall be held responsible for an act he has
not committed and no one shall be subjected to physical or mental
torture, corporal punishment or cruel or degrading treatment; the use of
weapons or methods of warfare that cause unnecessary losses or excessive
suffering is forbidden; and attacks shall be directed solely against military
objectives, neither civilian persons nor civilian property shall be the object
of attack.11
The Nuremberg Principles decree that ‘any person who commits an
act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible there-
after and liable to punishment’ and that following the orders of a superior
does not ‘relieve him of responsibility… provided a moral choice was in
fact possible to him’.12 This does not take away a soldier’s basic right to
self-defence but, to legally use military force, he must at the time of the attack
be satisfied that: the target is a military objective/has military value; the
attack is not indiscriminate; and the expected casualties are not excessive in
relationship to the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained. In
addition, the attack must be stopped if there is no military purpose or the
effects caused are unlikely to be proportional.13 A commander normally
has responsibility for the decision to attack or ceasefire but this does not
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D I E R S 69

absolve each soldier from understanding the legal application of force.

Commanders are also responsible for breaches of the Law of Armed
Conflict by one or more of their men if they know or have information
which should have enabled them to conclude that a crime had been or was
about to be committed and they do not take all feasible measures to
prevent the breach.14
Soldiers in a disciplined military are taught to control the application of
violence and are taught the fundamental basics of the Law of Armed
Conflict. In addition they are taught and issued Rules of Engagement,
specific to each theatre of operation, prior to going into combat. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that professional soldiers understand the legal
application of force and do not set out ‘to violate an article of the ICC
statute or the Geneva Conventions’ but will only ‘commit an act [of
violence] that seems to them necessary’.15 Acts of violence to achieve
objectives may appear uncontrolled when in the heat of combat but if they
are in the prosecution of a justified military goal using proportional force
and discriminating against non-combatants then they comply with jus in
bello and are thus legal. Conversely, regardless of whether an act is planned,
perpetrated because it is perceived to be useful or is a spur of the moment
decision, it is illegal if it uses unnecessary force which breaches propor-
tionality or does not have a justified military purpose or targets non-
combatants which make it indiscriminate. Arguably, any professional
soldier should be able to recognise this and decide not to act. If he does act,
he is liable to be charged and prosecuted by courts martial under The
Army Act 1955.16
The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court of Justice were
established on 1 July 2002 with the specific aim of addressing: the crime of
genocide; war crimes; crimes against humanity; and the crime of aggres-
sion.17 The crime of aggression has yet to be defined. The international
community has focused on atrocities committed by states or men as part of
a wider strategic or operational policy, such as the Holocaust, Rwanda or
Cambodia. Consequently, the terms ‘war crime’ and ‘crimes against
humanity’ have become associated with these kinds of atrocities. Acts of
violence by individual soldiers or units that contravene the Laws of Armed
Conflict normally include offences that fall within the definitions of ‘war
crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ but they are not always committed as
part of a widespread plan or policy. In order to differentiate these acts at the
individual level from operational or strategic level atrocities, the term
‘personal’ or ‘unnecessary’ violence is used here. The first step in under-
standing why soldiers commit these acts of unnecessary violence is to
understand the causes of aggression.
70 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

Aggression
The most basic of questions concerning man’s approach to battle, that of whether
or not he is innately aggressive, admits of no easy answers.18
Aggression is a complex subject, which has been studied by numerous
eminent biologists, psychologists, psychiatrists and physiologists. They
each have their own opinions or variances on themes but all generally agree
that the cause of aggression is rarely singular but involves a combination of
contributory factors. The intention is not to discuss the relative merits of all
the variant viewpoints but to explain the main themes that could be present
when breaches of law occur and that are broadly accepted by experts in this
field. Therefore, the focus of this section is on the normal causes of human
aggression together with the natural control, or inhibiting, mechanisms.
Aggression is not just about destruction as the desired end-state; it needs
only to have the credible potential for destruction in order to achieve domi-
nation of a situation.19 Aggression is defined as ‘any and every activity of an
animal that is directed toward another animal and that inflicts partial or
complete destruction upon that animal or that is associated with a high
probability of doing so’.20 According to Buss it also has three dimensions,
the means, mode and form, with the means being physical or verbal, the
mode active or passive and the form direct or indirect.21 Acts of personal
violence in armed conflict thus far recorded have involved rape, torture,
physical and verbal abuse of prisoners and unnecessary killing. This means
that they have been physical or verbal, active and direct acts of aggression.
The military is currently investigating commanders for failing to prevent an
offence, which would be a passive-indirect act of aggression.22
There are two main schools of thought regarding man’s disposition to
act aggressively.
The naturists, supported by Sigmund Freud, Konrad Lorenz and Robert
Ardrey, argue that humans are innately aggressive.23 Biologists have proven
that aggression is a normal part of animal behaviour as an established ‘fight
or flight’ survival mechanism and that man is ‘relatively combative’; this
means that a slight stimulus can be enough to cause aggressive behaviour.24
Studies have also demonstrated that some people are more disposed to act
violently from an early age, even without any influencing factors such as
violent parents or siblings, and thus ‘combativity has a strictly biological
root’.25
The ‘realists’ argue that violent behaviour is not innate but is learned and
modified by experiences.26 The concept of learning through reinforcement
is well documented and no one seems to disagree with the fact that ‘learning
is critically involved in the acquisition and maintenance of hostile and
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D I E R S 71

aggressive modes of behaviour’.27 This learning starts in childhood but

continues throughout life. Social approval or positive examples of aggres-
sion achieving the desired outcome will reinforce aggressive tendencies.
Conversely, if aggression does not achieve the desired goals and/or results
in repercussive punishment, the motivation to fight will reduce on subse-
quent occasions. It is thus fair to say that we are born with a certain dispo-
sition, weak or strong, towards aggression, which is then tempered or
strengthened by experiences.28
Aside from personal disposition, many people believe that violence is
simply an outlet for frustration or suppressed anger. While it is true that
aggression is one of the possible responses to frustration, frustration is not
the only cause of aggression.29 Zillman suggested that there are two prime
motivating factors for aggression in man: annoyance and incentive.30 Other
theorists agree with Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes that ideology, or
doctrine, is a third reason for violence.31 This is certainly true for large-scale
activities such as the Holocaust or perhaps Churchill’s strategic bombing
campaign. However, while ideology is an important motivating factor for
violence at the individual level, as argued by Luedicke32 and discussed later
in this paper, it is not a fundamental or prime cause.
Annoyance-motivated aggression seeks to release obnoxious internal
emotions (anger or frustration) or to counter obnoxious external conditions
(threat).33 When someone feels stressful emotions, such as fear or anger, this
upsets their natural balance of emotions and they will automatically seek to
re-establish their internal equilibrium. They have three ways of doing this,
called coping mechanisms; they may act on, abstain from or withdraw from
the situation.34 The aim of any of these actions is to change, maintain or
adapt to a situation and by doing so remove the feelings of stress associated
with it. While all nine permutations of these strategies are available to any
individual, one of them is likely to be a preferred option as a result of past
experience or innate disposition and perception of the situation. The
picture each person forms of a given situation is based on their past experi-
ences, state of mind at the time and personality. Therefore, while any situ-
ation can be described objectively in terms of its physical parameters, it is
likely that each person involved will perceive it, and thus react, differently.35
Of particular interest for this paper is that different people find different
situations threatening or stressful.
The second motivation for aggression proposed by Zillman, incentive-
motivated aggression, is about gain. This can be a conscious or sub-conscious
decision-making process and normally occurs in the absence of acute annoy-
ance. The aim is to attain intrinsic (feelings of power or superiority) or
extrinsic (territory or financial) goals.36 As with annoyance-motivated
72 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

aggression, an individual’s perception and coping mechanisms are funda-

mental to how they will react to a given situation. Any aggressive response
or action will be further modified to achieve maximum gratification for
minimum repercussions.37 Man’s cognitive abilities mean that he may elect
to delay his aggressive response until such time as more favourable condi-
tions exist if either the risk of repercussion or lack of success is too great.
When any such delay separates causal factors from action, this will be seen
as unprovoked or unnecessary violence.
The decision to react aggressively and the level of aggression are influ-
enced by too many other factors for them all to be discussed in this paper.
Two that do need to be considered when evaluating acts of personal
violence are emotional arousal states and the external stimuli provided by
the opponent.
Someone with a normal pre-disposition to violence is able to keep their
aggressive instincts under control using normal coping and inhibiting
mechanisms at intermediate levels of emotional excitement. However, a
person’s cognitive functions are increasingly impaired as their emotional
arousal state rises to the point at which they become oblivious to the
outcome of their actions. When an individual’s excitement levels reach a
certain level, specific to them, they will become pre-occupied with taking
action to alleviate the feelings of annoyance and will become more likely to
react aggressively.38 This can result in apparently irrational or unnecessary
aggression although the perpetrator may believe their actions to be perfectly
rational and necessary.
The strength of any violent act is also influenced by the external stimuli.
Humans are prone to act more aggressively to someone they dislike, believe
to have committed an offence, associate with causing feelings of annoyance
or who threatens their feelings of superiority than an innocent opponent.
The level of violence will be tempered by the target’s response.39 Once an
aggressor perceives that he has hit back sufficiently at his frustrater and is in
a position of authority, with his opponent suitably subjugated, he will
reduce or cease acting aggressively.40
Humans are naturally inhibited from violent acts by acceptable stan-
dards of societal behaviour and a feeling of moral responsibility that is
particularly strong within a society linked by values, culture or family ties.41
Even if sufficiently motivated to act aggressively, people are generally inhib-
ited from killing by strong feelings of anxiety and guilt.42 This means that
they will seek to justify any acts of aggression to allay any associated feelings
of guilt. However, the restraining effects of their moral societal values will
be weakened by other factors, especially the ‘strangeness’ of an opponent.43
If the opponent is seen as being a stranger or as a transgressor of acceptable
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D I E R S 73

behaviour, then this can be sufficient to free the aggressor from moral
restraint or feelings of guilt. Therefore, laws have been established that
reflect the values of society in order to reinforce any moral instincts with a
credible, and highly undesirable threat, of punishment. Consequently, a
soldier needs some sort of justification to avoid feelings of guilt about fight-
ing and killing and to legitimise his actions.44 Grossman states that:
the soldier who does kill must overcome that part of him that says he
is a murderer of women and children, a foul beast who has done the
unforgivable. He must deny the guilt within him, and he must assure
himself that the world is not mad, that his victims are… evil vermin
and that what… his leaders have told him to do is right.45
The next step is thus to take the theory of aggression and place it into a real
world context which for our purposes is the armed conflict environment.

Armed Conflict Factors

Warfare makes fierce onslaughts on an instinct or group of instincts which is rarely
touched by the ordinary life of the member of a modern civilised community.46
British anthropologist W. H. R. Rivers (1864–1922)
The military needs to ‘convert civilians into effective combatants’47 to over-
come their inhibitions in order that they will fight, and kill if required; this
is called combat motivation. Overly aggressive troops are prone to overrun-
ning objectives and to losing their orientation and focus on the task in
hand.48 Therefore, soldiers are also trained to control the application of
force. There is obviously a line between motivation to fight and maintain-
ing control to ensure that soldiers do not breach the Law of Armed Conflict.
Yager concluded that ‘personal violence in combat results from an interac-
tion of individual, group and situational factors’,49 which provides a useful
framework for analysis of motivational and control influences on soldiers’
aggression in armed conflict.

Situational
When soldiers deploy to an area of conflict they are often in a new environ-
ment away from their families. Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison experiment in
1971 led to the conclusion that when someone is placed in a novel situation
or is uncertain about their role, they have no familiar path of action to
follow.50 Consequently, they will draw on what experience seems most
applicable. Iraqi looters at Camp Breadbasket were neither combatants nor
prisoners of war and thus did not fit into a known scenario. The Royal
74 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

Fusiliers were not given any clear direction on how to handle these looters
and the methods they chose proved to be unacceptable. Deployed living
conditions are also often fairly basic and cramped with few home comforts
and soldiers live with the knowledge that ‘while there are strict controls on
what may be legally done in war, it inevitably entails violence and suffer-
ing’.51 When the fighting starts, the noises, sights and smells are worse than
anything that can be experienced outside combat. These factors all conspire
to cause feelings of confusion, fear and frustration that lead to increased
stress levels, which can ‘produce physiological, psychological and social
symptoms’.52
These symptoms can manifest as ‘changes in mental processes, moods,
attitudes and motivation’ or a ‘loss of working efficiency’.53 Soldiers are
expected to react to and carry out orders automatically. They need to be able
to act without receiving direct orders for every action and be able to ‘exer-
cise independent judgement’.54 If that discipline or independent judgement
is impaired, they may act irrationally, some men may freeze instead of fight-
ing, while others may overreact. This naturally concerns the military
because of the potential loss of performance and the increased risk of
making poor decisions, which could result in an undesirable tactical
outcome or a war crime.
Battle inoculation and drills help soldiers to overcome any harmful
impact of the combat environment. This training helps soldiers to function
in this most sensory overwhelming of circumstances and not to be
distracted by the realities of battle or emotions such as rage or fear. A third
of veterans from the World War II North African campaign asked for more
realism training using live ammunition in order to help reduce the shock of
battle and over 80 per cent of the infantry in Italy believed that realism train-
ing had been a very important part of preparing them for combat.55 Realism
training has three main benefits: it gives a soldier confidence in himself, his
equipment, his peers and his commanders; ‘well rehearsed drills are least
prone to the negative side effects of stress’; and he is better prepared and
able to cope with anxiety in times of stress.56 A ‘lowered level of anxiety’
enables people to see situations more objectively57 and thus soldiers are
better able to make rational decisions when their emotional arousal levels
are stabilised.
Notwithstanding the benefits of battle inoculation, over time, men and
units become battle fatigued, stressed or numbed, which causes them to act
abnormally. After World War II, military psychiatrists concluded that battle
fatigue was a ‘normal and natural consequence of extended combat’ and not
an aberration caused by an individual’s weakness and a particularly stressful
incident.58 Research into battle fatigue as a result of exposure to combat is
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D I E R S 75

limited and the most significant study was carried out on combat infantry
and flying personnel in 1944 in the European theatre. This showed that
combat efficiency reached a peak and then dropped off after men had been
in combat for some time and that feelings of anxiety and chronic tension
increased with the number of missions flown.59 Even more telling is that
this performance peak occurred for both frontline infantrymen and for
non-combatants;60 this proved it was the environment and not simply the
face-to-face combat exposure that takes its toll. However, the peak did
occur later for the non-combatants.61 Units are now normally rotated out of
combat theatres after 4–6 months, which takes account of World War II
research data. Commanders and soldiers are taught to recognise the signs of
stress and fatigue, to enable them to do something about them before an
individual or unit’s decision-making process is harmed. However, combat
methods and technology have changed since World War II and a soldier
may become fatigued earlier or later than his 1940s counterpart.
In the Falklands War (1982), breaches of discipline occurred before and
after, but not during, the fighting.62 This may reflect the fact that before
fighting starts and after fighting ends, soldiers have higher than normal
arousal levels but few outlets for their emotions and once fighting starts a
soldier has an outlet but also has clear military objectives. Breaches that
occur before fighting starts tend to be internal military disciplinary matters
that do not infringe the Laws of Armed Conflict because soldiers have not
yet had the opportunity to interact with the enemy. However, there is
evidence that acts of personal violence do occur during fighting; soldiers
who served in World War II and the Falklands tell accounts of enemy
soldiers being killed as they tried to surrender in the midst of ongoing fight-
ing.63 This is technically illegal but, as World War I stormtrooper Ernst
Junger pointed out, a soldier ‘cannot change his feelings again during the
last rush with a veil of blood before his eyes. He does not want to take pris-
oners but to kill.’64 David Cooper, a padre in the Falklands said that ‘civili-
sation is one of the first things to go in war, in the mind of the individual.
To be effective as a soldier you have to break free of the normal civilised
constraints.’65 Soldiers’ rational cognitive abilities are impaired in combat
due to high arousal states and the knowledge that they risk being killed if
they do not kill first. Therefore, it is more likely that the lack of prosecuted
breaches during the Falklands fighting is because it is difficult to prove indi-
vidual breaches of law in the midst of fighting when a soldier has the basic
right to self-defence.
David Cooper also stated that ‘you have to be brought back’ after the
fighting ends and that this is ‘a transition that has to be imposed from with-
out’.66 This is to re-establish soldiers’ arousal states at normal levels in order
76 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

to reinstate cognitive, rational thought processes.67 A World War II II infan-

try officer agrees with Cooper, saying that ‘if you start a man killing, you
can’t turn him off again like an engine’ and went on to describe a ‘good man’
who had shot a surrendering German after fighting had ceased as probably
being ‘half off his head’ and thus only able to see the German as the enemy
to be killed.68 This means that the period directly after fighting is a particu-
larly dangerous time when soldiers may commit aggressive acts while their
arousal states are still high but the clear military objectives have been
achieved.
In many conflicts looting and rape are seen as ways to allow soldiers to
wind down and release internal emotions following a period of intense
fighting. These are also ways of further proving superiority and control over
the defeated enemy and were seen historically as the ‘spoils of war’; for
example, when soldiers helped topple Saddam’s statue in Baghdad. This
action was not condemned but raping most certainly would have been.
Control of soldiers during the period immediately after fighting is thus
essential in order to prevent illegal acts of violence occurring and this is the
responsibility of commanders. As General George Patton instructed his
corps and divisional commanders in 1944, ‘there is only one sort of disci-
pline – perfect discipline. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you
are potential murderers.’69 For example, after the ceasefire in The Falklands,
soldiers started looting in Port Stanley. Major General Thompson, 3
Commando Brigade’s Commander in the Falklands, was well aware of the
potential for these relatively harmless breaches of discipline to develop
into something far more serious and banned everyone from the streets of
Port Stanley.70 Following the Iraq War major operations in 2003, the Royal
Military Police found themselves investigating numerous incidents of
alleged abuse, including murder, of Iraqis by British soldiers.71 The
frequency of reported incidents reduced once the trials began of the Royal
Fusiliers for their actions at Camp Breadbasket. This reinforces the need to
enforce the Laws of Armed Conflict to make the threat of punishment
credible in order to encourage soldiers to use force only when it is neces-
sary, proportionate and discriminate.
Unfortunately, not all commanders are willing to curb aggression in
their men because they need them to be motivated to fight. An army lawyer
in a Vietnam case said that ‘no commander in his right mind is going to
impair the efficiency of his combat unit by trying people who think they’re
doing the right thing’.72 Taken to extremes, this attitude can result in
violence escalating to uncontrollable limits as it did in Vietnam when
soldiers knew they would not be punished for using unnecessary violence
that included widespread killing and rape of non-combatants. The key is a
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 77

commander knowing when to call a halt to fighting and being prepared to

enforce discipline on one’s own men, as Major General Thompson did in
the Falklands; this is a legal as well as a moral responsibility. On 13 April
1919, Brigadier General Reginald Dyer ordered his Gurkhas to open fire on
those gathered at a peaceful, but banned, public gathering in Amritsar, and
to continue to fire on those trying to hide or escape; his men obeyed and
did so until they ran out of ammunition.73
The Indian Army later relieved General Dyer of his command after an
official inquiry found him guilty of ‘a grave error of judgement which
exceeded the reasonable requirements of the case’.74 Even at the start of the
nineteenth century, commanders were expected to take responsibility for
the actions of their troops and their own orders and it is not just the officers
that have command responsibilities in the military. Junior and senior non-
commissioned officers are responsible for commanding at the level appro-
priate to their rank; for example, patrols of four are normally commanded
by a lance-corporal.
As well as controlling their men, commanders have a key role in moti-
vating their men to fight. One of the ways they achieve this is through rally-
ing speeches. Yet some commanders go too far in these speeches and either
explicitly or tacitly condone over-aggressive action. Lieutenant Colonel
Colin Mitchell encouraged his Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to be
dominant in Aden in 1967 and said: ‘if anybody starts any trouble they’ll get
their heads blown off’.75 Following filming of British troops smashing heads
in, UK troops were investigated for brutality. Colonel Mitchell may have
intended to just motivate his troops or he might have known exactly what
the result of his statement would be. It could even have been part of his
strategy to achieve control of the region through a credible threat of force.
Even Patton did not always get it right; in 1943 American infantrymen
massacred around 70 prisoners of war in Sicily after his pre-battle speech
had urged his men to show the enemy no mercy saying that he had ‘killed
thousands of your comrades and he must die’.76
There is also a deliberate effort by leaders, military and political, to
dehumanise the enemy because this helps to allay feelings of guilt about
killing.77 It is much easier to fight and ultimately kill if you believe your
enemy to be evil and that your purpose is to prevent him committing evil;
‘decent people can not be expected to kill other decent people against whom
they have feelings of neither personal malice nor personal indignation’.78
Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George Bush Junior used the
threat of weapons of mass destruction as the reason for going to war against
Iraq. However, they also said that the Iraq regime perpetrated injustices
against its own population. Thus the US-led coalition was a ‘force for good’
78 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

that would rescue Saddam’s victims. Societies differentiate between killing

an insider and killing an outsider or stranger,79 which means it is easier
to dehumanise the enemy if they are different racially or ideologically.
Ideological and racial differences resulted in the strong feelings of animosity
in Vietnam and the barbaric aspects of World War II.80 The worst atrocities
carried out by allied troops in World War II were, across three theatres,
where the enemy was considered to be racially different. In Aden, Arabs
were called ‘gollys’ while soldiers in Vietnam did not consider the enemy to
be human, ‘they were a gook or a commie and it was okay’ to shoot them.81
Dehumanisation is reinforced by reports of an enemy’s willingness to
commit atrocities. This can weaken soldiers’ belief that an enemy deserves
to be treated fairly. In Burma, an Indian unit, serving in the Allied 14th
Army, murdered all the Japanese prisoner of war patients. One of the
Border Regiment soldiers, George MacDonald Fraser, later said that he
knew the killings were ‘well beyond the civilized borderline’ but this was a
particularly vicious war against an enemy who ‘wouldn’t have known the
Geneva Convention if it fell on him’.82 He went on to explain that while he
could have reported the incident as a war crime, it would have been ‘obnox-
ious, dishonourable even’ to have denounced fellow comrades. This can
contribute to escalatory levels of unnecessary violence as observed in the
Pacific theatre against the Japanese in World War II and again in Vietnam.
Once again it falls to commanders to be prepared to enforce the law but it
is also the responsibility of each soldier, who may be under the influence of
other individual factors.

Individual
The first, and simplest, combat motivator in an individual soldier is a natu-
ral disposition for violence. At the extremity of natural disposition lies the
psychopath who positively enjoys and seeks to hurt or kill others. As
Private Mark Northfield said after the Falklands War, ‘some people act
over the top, even in the context of war, with unnecessary waste of life…it
was in some people anyway’.83 If a man with a very strong pre-disposition
to violence is placed in a position to kill without control measures being in
place, the results can be horrendous. This was seen when the Bosnian Serb
Goran Jelisic was put in command of a concentration camp at Luka in
Yugoslavia. Goran enjoyed killing and took great pride in shooting 20 to 30
non-Serbs before breakfast; he was ultimately moved elsewhere as his
behaviour got out of control.84 The military does not want psychopaths,
they are unlikely to conform to ‘normal’ behaviour conventions, and thus
discipline, and are deliberately not recruited.85 However, it is also natural
that people with a strong disposition for violence will gravitate towards a
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 79

career in the military in search of action. Once in the military they are
likely to volunteer for riskier missions or specialist units where the chance
of action is greatest.86 This not only gives them the opportunity to kill but
also puts them into higher stress situations making them more prone to
acting aggressively.87 While one might assume that good killers are
welcome in the military, those soldiers who actively seek out violence for
no justified reason are not popular. There is a fine line between being a
good soldier who others can trust and one who potentially endangers
others through his own self-gratification or loss of focus on the true objec-
tive. When commanders identify the latter they will move them away from
positions of responsibility.88
While the psychopath is, hopefully, a minority in a professional army,
combat can become a ‘strong motivation and source of pleasure’ in its own
right for any soldier.89 In the Falklands, Sergeant McCullum noticed that
‘you get individuals who are maniacs in their own little paradise, blowing
prisoners away and enjoying it’.90 This may be because of the individual’s
natural predilection for violence but it can also be a consequence of combat
experience. In 1984 a former US Marine, William Broyles, said that if men
who had been to war were honest they would admit that a part of them
actually loved the experience.91 He argued that ‘the thrill of destruction was
irresistible’ and that ‘war was a turn on’. Many other combat veterans also
tell of the orgasmic pleasure of killing or inflicting violence on one’s enemy;
according to Richard Holmes they ‘compare it to the closely linked guilt
and satisfaction which accompany masturbation’.92 It can become addictive
and thus men will seek that feeling of intense satisfaction through further
acts, even though such acts may not actually be necessary. This could be
considered an extension of Zillman’s concept of incentive-motivated
aggression to gain the feeling of pleasure or as a coping mechanism for
annoyance-motivated aggression whereby a soldier seeks to replace feelings
of fear or anger with feelings of pleasure.
The converse of pleasure is hatred, which can lead to annoyance-
motivated aggression and thus the military has tended to encourage hatred
as a form of combat motivation. Unfortunately, hatred also reduces the
sense of rightness in a cause and any civilising sense of morality in acknowl-
edging the humanity of the enemy.93 If hatred is deliberately combined with
dehumanisation of the enemy and any associated absolution of feelings of
guilt, soldiers lose some of their violence-inhibiting mechanism. Philip
Caputo said he ‘burned with a hatred for the Viet Cong and …with a desire
for retribution’; he did not hate the enemy for their politics but for
‘murdering Simpson [a comrade]’ and he wanted the chance to kill some-
one in revenge.94
80 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

Prisoners provide a captive audience on which men can take out their
frustrations. In World War II, the most powerful motive for killing prison-
ers of war was revenge.95 One soldier wrote that while an officer was angry
with him for shooting at fleeing soldiers during one attack ‘the scores owed
washed out anything else’.96 One Vietnam non-combatant ‘confessed that
he considered lashing out at prisoners after seeing the way booby traps
dismembered his comrades’ and that prisoners were routinely slaughtered
after his unit had encountered booby traps because ‘the guys were frustrated
and angry… there was no one else to take it out on, so they just killed
people’.97 There are those who do not hate the enemy, even when they
would have the justification of wanting revenge for the loss of friends. The
difference between those in danger of committing acts of unnecessary
violence as a result of uncontrolled hatred and those who just want to ‘do
their job’ boils down to the individual’s personality, coping mechanisms,
moral values and their overall attitude to the enemy. Corporal Siddall, a
Royal Marine, in the Falklands said ‘I felt neither hatred nor friendliness
towards the Argentinians… I simply thought about the job in hand and they
happened to be in the way.’98
There is evidence that support troops have significantly greater hate for
the enemy and commit more cases of unjustified violence than combat
troops.99 There are several reasons for this. Frontline troops have the chance
to let off steam and release any frustration that has built up waiting to fight
or anger over the loss of friends. Whether they win by killing or by the
enemy surrendering, they have still proven their superiority. Their proxim-
ity to the enemy can also result in admiration for a worthy foe or pity for his
ineptitude. Those soldiers who come face to face with their opponents will
often discover that the enemy is actually just a man like themselves and a
mutual respect will then often build up. Ultimately, both incentive and
annoyance motivated aggression are effectively neutralised and frontline
troops will only do what is necessary to achieve the objective and will stop
at anything unethical. This is especially true in a professional army.
Support troops have many of the same fears and frustrations associated
with being in an unfamiliar and dangerous environment. Unlike their
frontline counterparts they are unlikely to meet or see the enemy during the
fighting and thus are less likely to humanise him. They are also unlikely to
have the opportunity to release inner emotional tensions through fighting.
If they are brought forward to conduct patrols or guard prisoners once the
fighting is over, they have the opportunity to release tensions. To prove
their superiority and authority they are likely to resort to overly aggressive
methods such as humiliation. Zimbardo’s experiment also demonstrated
that ‘young men chosen for their mental health and positive values eased
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 81

into the character of sadistic guards inflicting suffering on their fellow

students without moral compunction’.100 One third of the experimental
group became brutal with no external stimuli other than boredom and
being in a position of authority over a captive audience. At Abu Ghraib,
when combat troops were placed in charge of prisoners with very few exter-
nal control measures, it was hardly surprising that they sought to exert their
authority through humiliating acts of violence based on what collective
knowledge they possessed or the orders they believe they had been given.
Soldiers are conditioned to be obedient and taught that disobeying a
legal order is punishable by court martial.101 Obedience is an essential
element of military discipline to ensure split-second decisions can be made
and implemented without a delay that might result in failure to achieve an
objective. Following orders also helps soldiers to overcome any inhibitions
they may have about killing. Someone who feels directly responsible for
their actions, for which there is a credible and unwelcome punishment, is
more reticent about making an illegal decision than someone who is distant
from their actions or can feel absolved in some way or for which there is no
viable threat of repercussion. Milgram conducted an experiment into
obedience to authority in 1963.102 He proved that 68 per cent of people
would continue to act aggressively provided they think that they will not be
held responsible. In his briefing to his US troops prior to entering My Lai,
Colonel Oran K. Henderson, the brigade commander, ‘taunted the officers
for their poor performance in earlier attacks and their lack of aggression’.103
This made his men feel resentful and angry and they believed they had been
given clear direction to ‘kill everyone in the village’.104 Lieutenant William
Calley was not a particularly violent man and when he was court-martialled
for his role in the My Lai massacre, he said that he felt no remorse because
he believed what they did was justified and that they had ‘followed the rules
of warfare’.105 Following orders is one way that soldiers justify killing to
absolve themselves from any feelings of guilt but they also know that
following orders does not legally relieve them of responsibility.106 This
knowledge is all very well in theory but a soldier has to cope with group
pressures in addition to his own emotions, aggressive disposition and ability
to cope.

Group
The importance of unit cohesion for effective military performance is well
understood; it has been and is a core principle by which armies have prac-
tised their trade for over 2,500 years.107 French infantry Colonel Charles
Ardant du Picq said that unit cohesion was that ‘which makes a soldier
capable of obedience and direction in action includes…confidence in his
82 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them

in danger…his desire to go where others do without trembling more than
they’.108 Military psychologists treating the 929,000 psychiatric casualties of
World War II agreed with the American historian S. L. A. Marshall that
group solidarity was ‘the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep
going’.109 The military develops unit cohesion through several techniques
but key is linking a unit’s reputation to the achievement of high perfor-
mance output and thus an individual’s self-esteem to pride in his unit.110
Understandably, a soldier is extremely unwilling to act in a way that might
undermine either his position within his unit or the reputation of his unit.
He will also wish to prove his value to the unit.
In a group, an individual’s identity, and thus reactions, are ‘submerged
in group acts in which he has little real investment’.111 Psychologists
consider humans to be herd animals and thus in a group such as the Army,
the ‘group mind’ will take over ‘endowing the individual with a sense of
almost limitless power and immortality’.112 This has positive and negative
consequences for the individual. Statistical evidence shows that in conflict
the fear of letting down one’s comrades, by other ranks, or dependents, by
officers/senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), outweighs fears of
personal injury, capture or making the wrong decision and that fear of seri-
ous injury or death are the next highest factors.113 In the Pacific in World
War II, 61 per cent of men ‘kept going because they did not want to let their
comrades down’.114 This means that an individual soldier is focused on his
unit’s interests and not on his own interests. He is thus distracted from his
own fears and will focus on controlling his emotions to ensure that he is an
effective member of his team. It can be argued that unit cohesion is less
about altruism and more about a soldier’s ‘own survival’ depending ‘upon
his ability to make others willing to help him in his own time of need’ and
that soldiers are well aware of this interdependence.115
When someone is part of a tight-knit group, group sanction also
excludes individual guilt.116 Bourne’s study of specialist units in Vietnam led
to his conclusions that ‘externally directed aggressive behaviour, which
enjoyed a maximum of group condonence, tended to relieve the individual
of any feelings of vulnerability’.117 This feeling can go as far as even provid-
ing ‘deep group satisfaction’118 when an enemy is killed. Thus while an indi-
vidual soldier may not actively seek to commit an atrocity, he may well
commit acts of unnecessary violence when following a strong unit
commander or when part of a particularly aggressive unit. Such strong
group dynamics were evident at Abu Ghraib.
In summary, a soldier feels protected and ‘supported by the formidable-
ness of the group’119 and this helps him to control his fear and thus maintain
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 83

his cognitive thought processes. However, individuals are also fearful of

losing the protection of the group and may react to a particular situation in
a way that they would not contemplate doing if they were alone. It takes
great strength of character to resist the group intent and personal inhibiting
mechanisms will be reinforced if the threat of punishment is credible.

Conclusion
Issues raised by the notion of war crimes are complex, relative and murky.120
The complexity of factors involved in any act of aggression makes it difficult
to accurately attribute either one single or multiple linked causes to violent
acts.121 Studies into aggressive behaviour in humans have proved that man
is born with a disposition to violence that is stronger in some than others
and that this disposition will be modified by experience. It has also been
identified that people act aggressively for gain or as a reaction to obnoxious
emotions such as fear or frustration. The decision to react aggressively and
the level of violence depend on the strength of stimulus, personal perception
of the situation and the individual’s coping ability. The prime inhibiting
mechanisms for aggression are moral guilt and fear of punishment but high
emotional arousal states impair cognitive thought processes. Therefore,
someone is less likely to be able to make a rational decision and more likely
to act on impulse when they are in situation that they find particularly stress-
ful or when their excitement levels are high. It is the instinctive spontaneity
of aggression that makes it particularly dangerous and can result in the
unnecessary use of force.122
Determining why soldiers act aggressively is complicated by the fact
that armed conflict is violent by nature. Chuter concludes that ‘war
crimes tend to occur in circumstances of tension and crisis’. He goes on
to say that this could be because crises provide individuals with the
opportunity to do ‘strange and violent things’ or because individuals do
these things when in a crisis or a combination of the two.123 His conclu-
sions are drawn from analysis of deliberate and often premeditated atroci-
ties perpetrated by nations or authorities. However, they are equally true
for acts committed at individual or unit level. Armed conflict provides the
opportunity for people who enjoy or like violence to act aggressively. In
addition, the stressful nature of the conflict environment causes other
soldiers to act violently in reaction to fear or anger. It is evident that those
men with a strong pre-disposition towards violence or who are less able
to cope with the stress of the combat environment are more likely to
commit acts of unnecessary violence.
84 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

In armed conflict, soldiers need to overcome any moral inhibitions in

order to fight and kill when necessary but they need to act within the Laws
of Armed Conflict. Soldiers are motivated to fight by their commanders
and dehumanisation of the enemy helps overcome their moral inhibitions.
Group cohesion, discipline and battle inoculation all help soldiers to
control any obnoxious emotions such as fear and frustration and command-
ers endeavour to ensure that soldiers with a particular penchant for aggres-
sion are not placed in positions of responsibility. However, strong group
cohesion and hatred of the enemy can remove or over-ride any guilt-inhib-
iting mechanisms. Poor leadership and strong group dynamics that
condone, or even order, unnecessary use of force can also reduce or remove
a soldier’s sense of responsibility. Novel situations, particularly guarding
prisoners, will increase the risk of force being used unnecessarily. If such
situations involve support troops, who have a higher statistical probability
of acting violently without just cause, this will merely exacerbate the situa-
tion. Group and individual factors can be contained by effective command
and discipline but the hardest soldiers to control will still be those who
actively seek out opportunities to be violent and unfamiliar situations carry
the greatest risk of soldiers using unjustified force. The most dangerous
period is immediately after fighting has ceased, when soldiers’ arousal states
are still high, and acts of personal violence that tend to occur on impulse are
more likely to happen.124
The laws governing the application of force in conflict reinforce
soldiers’ natural moral values to persuade them to use violence only when
it is necessary and to adhere to the principles of proportionality and
discrimination. Unfortunately, these laws have not always been robustly
enforced. Had commanders at all levels maintained discipline and enforced
the Laws of Armed Conflict throughout Vietnam, the massacre at My Lai
and other acts of personal violence in that conflict could have been avoided.
The Peers Commission concluded that
if, on the day before the Son My operation, only one of the leaders at
platoon company, task force or brigade level had foreseen and voiced
an objection to the prospect of killing non-combatants, or had
mentioned the problem of non-combatants in their preoperational
orders and instructions… the Son My tragedy might have been
averted altogether, or at least substantially limited and the operation
brought under control.125
Some men do have the courage to speak up but unless their command-
ers accept responsibility for enforcing the laws of armed conflict, their
objections will have little effect other than to ostracise them from their peer
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 85

group. Command responsibility does not devolve an individual soldier

from taking responsibility for his actions but should complement it. The
lack of discipline in Vietnam led to escalating and uncontrolled illegal use
of force while the threat of credible punishment has contributed to a tight-
ening of military practices in Iraq. Therefore, it is not only a legal require-
ment to prosecute soldiers who break the law but prosecution is
fundamental to reinforce the credibility of the Laws of Armed Conflict in
order to deter soldiers from acting illegally.
The circumstances leading to one atrocity are rarely if ever identical to
those that lead to another atrocity but there is sufficient historical evidence
to show that there are key areas when acts of personal violence by soldiers
are most likely to occur. These are: high individual disposition towards
violence; poor command discipline (including illegal orders and lack of
enforcement of control measures); the period after fighting ceases before
soldiers’ emotional arousal levels normalise; and novel situations such as
troops, especially support, guarding prisoners. Essentially, a soldier is at
most risk of using force illegally when he is only thinking about personal
gain, when his cognitive abilities are impaired, when he is in an unfamiliar
situation and is guided by limited knowledge or strong group dynamics and
when he thinks he can get away with it.
This article does not seek to absolve a soldier from taking responsibility
for his actions and none of the conclusions are particularly surprising; they
appear to be basic common sense. What is surprising is that there is only one
recorded dedicated study into acts of personal violence, by Yager in 1975.
The investigations and prosecutions of alleged cases of abuse in Iraq prove
that an increasingly litigious society and a legally astute military are not
content to overlook breaches of law, whatever the mitigating circum-
stances. At the same time there is a duty of care to ensure that soldiers, who
risk their lives for ‘Queen and Country’ and who have to live with what
they have done, are fully prepared for combat. Although the examples used
here prove that acts of personal violence do occur in all conflicts and that
there are some key areas of risk, data from recent conflicts in the Balkans,
Afghanistan and the Gulf were not available.
The nature of war is changing, current conflicts are wars of choice and
not wars of national survival, and techniques and technology are constantly
evolving. The current conflicts do not even sit neatly within the Laws of
Armed Conflict. Therefore, further studies into the causes of personal
violence, based on personal accounts from more recent conflicts, should be
conducted to verify the findings of this paper. These findings are needed
to ensure that British soldiers understand when they are most likely to
commit acts of personal violence and they can also be used to inform the
86 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

‘greater level of understanding in the British public debate of the realities of

modern conflict’.126

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DISCLAIMER

The author thanks Teri McConville for her advice on the social science
aspects of this paper and those members of ACSC9 who were willing to
discuss the realities of frontline combat.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent those of the UK Ministry of Defence or any
other department of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government of the United
Kingdom. Furthermore, such views should not be considered as constitut-
ing an official endorsement of factual accuracy, opinion, conclusion or
recommendation of the UK Ministry of Defence or any other department
of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom.

NOTES
1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New
York: Basic Books 2000) p.22.
2 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare
(London: Granta Books 1999) p.187.
3 Sean Rayment, ‘Revealed: as many as 50 British soldiers face trial for murder and
other crimes in Iraq’, news.telegraph, 27 Feb. 2005, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news> accessed
14 March 2006.
4 John Reid, ‘Be slower to condemn and quicker to understand the best fighting force in the
world’, speech by the UK Secretary of State for Defence to King’s College London, 20
Feb.2006, p.1 <www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness
/WeMustBeslowerToCondemnQuickerToUnderstandTheForcesJohnReid.htm>.
5 J. Yager, ‘Personal Violence in Infantry Combat’, Archives of General Psychiatry 32 (Feb.
1975) p.257. ‘[A]cts against persons at close range judged to be unnecessary from a military
point of view.’
6 Bourke (note 2) p.187. From a 1946 Australian training memorandum.
7 Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War (New York: OUP
2000) p.3.
8 Ibid.
9 A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (Manchester: Juris, 2004) p.3.
10 Ibid. pp.215–16.
11 Army Code 71130, A Soldier’s Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, Issue 4.0 (Dec. 2003)
pp.4–1&2.
12 Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal (1950) 〈http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-nurem.htm〉 accessed
14 March 2006, Principles I and IV.
13 Army Code 71130 (note 11) pp.4–3&4.
14 Roberts and Guelff (note 7) p.472. Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 – Additional Protocol
I, Article 86, Summary for Members of the Armed Forces and the General Public (Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross 1970).
15 David Chuter, War Crimes – Confronting Atrocity in the Modern World (London: Lynne
Rienner 2003) p.7.
16 Army Code 71130, p.1–4.
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 87

17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1 July 2002, pp.1–9 <www.loc.gov/law/
public> accessed 14 March 2006.
18 Richard Holmes, Acts of War: the Behaviour of Men in Battle (London: Weidenfeld 2003)
p.19.
19 Dolf Zillman, Hostility and Aggression (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1979)
p.14.
20 Ibid. p.16.
21 Ben Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat (New York: Praeger 1988) p.42.
22 Thomas Harding, ‘Army wanted an officer on trial over Iraq. They picked my husband’
and ‘Army Under Fire’, Daily Telegraph, 14 Nov. 2005, p.2.
23 Shalit (note 21) pp.57–69.
24 Raymond Aron in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994)
p.77.
25 Ibid. p.78.
26 Ibid.
27 Zillman (note 19) p.171.
28 Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
1973) p.26.
29 Aron in Freedman (note 24) pp.79–81.
30 Shalit (note 21) p.43.
31 Wight in Freedman (note 24) pp.90–2.
32 Major D.G. Luedicke, Motivation in War: Soldiers, Ideology and the Barbarisation of Warfare. To
what extent was ideology the primary motivating factor that resulted in the barbarisation of warfare in
World War 2? (Watchfield, UK: Joint Services Command and Staff College Advanced Staff
and Command Course No.7, 2004).
33 Shalit (note 21) p.43.
34 Ibid. pp.16–17.
35 Ibid. p.10.
36 Ibid. p.43.
37 Zillman (note 19) pp.258–61.
38 Ibid. p.275.
39 Leonard Berkowitz and R.G. Green, ‘Stimulus Qualities of the Target of Aggres-
sion: A Further Study’, in Norman S. Endler and David Magnusson (eds.), Interac-
tional Psychology and Personality (Washington DC: Hemisphere Publishing 1976)
pp.299–307.
40 Shalit (note 24) pp.57–62.
41 Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression [1966] (London: Routledge 1996) pp.206–36.
42 Bourke (note 2) p.100.
43 Salzen in Lorenz (note 41) pp.xix–xx.
44 Frederick J. Manning, ‘Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps’, in Reuven Gal and David
A. Mangelsdorff (eds.), Handbook of Military Psychology (Chichester, UK: John Wiley 1991)
p.457.
45 Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, On Killing – The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and
Society (Boston: Little, Brown 1995) p.209.
46 Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale–Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York: Penguin 1997)
p.63.
47 Bourke (note 2) p.72.
48 Ibid. pp.168–70.
49 Yager (note 5) p.257.
50 Teri McConville, ‘Abu Ghraib and Camp Breadbasket: Understanding Social Atrocities’,
Research Seminar, 23 Feb. 2005 (RMCS: Cranfield University) p.7.
51 Chuter (note 15) p.5.
52 A.J.W. Taylor, ‘Individual and Group Behaviour in Extreme Situations and Environments’,
in Gal and Mangelsdorff (note 44) p.496.
53 Ibid.
88 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

54 Bourke (note 2) p.85. Also known as ‘Mission Command’.

55 Samuel A Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, Vol.2 (Princeton UP
1949) pp.228–9 and 231.
56 Stasiu Labuc, ‘Cultural and Societal Factors in Military Organisations’ in Gal and
Mangelsdorff (note 44) p.487.
57 Ibid.
58 Manning in Gal and Mangelsdorff (note 44) p.456.
59 Stouffer (note 55) pp.288 and 362–3.
60 Described as those in theatre and under threat from attack but displaced from direct
contact with the enemy. Ibid. pp.62–4.
61 After 4–5 months for combatants and 6–8 months for non-combatants. Ibid. p.288.
62 Hugh McManners, The Scars of War (London: HarperCollins 1993) p.94.
63 John Keegan, The Face of Battle [1976] (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin 1984) pp.47–9;
McManners (note 62) pp.176 and 347.
64 Grossman (note 45) p.200.
65 McManners (note 62) p.312.
66 Ibid.
67 Zillman (note 19) pp.359–71.
68 Keegan (note 63) p.49–50.
69 Robert A. Fitton (ed.), Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition (Oxford: Westview
Press 1990) p.83.
70 McManners (note 62) pp.94–5.
71 Rayment (note 3).
72 Bourke (note 2) p.207.
73 Brian Bailey, Massacres – An Account of Crimes Against Humanity (London: Orion 1994)
p.102.
74 Ibid.
75 Empire Warriors, Part 1 of 4: ‘Mad Mitch’ and his Tribal Law, shown 8 Nov. 2004 (United
Kingdom: BBC documentary).
76 Bourke (note 2) p.183.
77 Ibid. p.101, from Coleman, ‘The Group Factor in Military Psychiatry’, American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry 16 (1946) pp.222 and 224–5.
78 Ibid. pp.152–4.
79 Robert Ardrey, The Social Contract: A Personal Inquiry into the Evolutionary Sources of Order and
Disorder (London: Collins 1970) p.276.
80 Luedicke (note 32).
81 Camil, Sergeant Scott, quoted by Bourke (note 2) p.205.
82 Bourke (note 2) pp.185–6.
83 McManners (note 62) p.187.
84 Chuter (note 15) pp.13–14.
85 McManners (note 62) p.35.
86 Peter Watson, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (London:
Hutchinson 1978) pp.243–6.
87 Vietnam statistics show that more atrocities were committed by volunteers than by
conscripts. ibid., p245.
88 Theodore Nadelson, Trained to Kill: Soldiers at War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 2005)
p.55.
89 Shalit (note 21) p.3.
90 McManners (note 62) p.308.
91 Bourke (note 2) pp.13–15.
92 Holmes (note 18) p.380.
93 Bourke (note 2) pp.168–70.
94 Ibid. p.156.
95 Ibid. pp.182–3.
96 Ibid. p.183.
P E RSON AL VIO LEN CE BY P R OF ES S I ON A L S OL D IE R S 89

97 Ibid. p.204. quoting David E. Wilson in Gerald R. Gioglio, Days of Decision: An Oral History
of Conscientious Objectors in the Military During the Vietnam War (Lavallette, NJ: Broken Rifle
Press 1989).
98 Holmes (note 18) p.371.
99 Shalit (note 21) pp.46–8.
100 P.G. Zimbardo, ‘The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulated Study of the Psychology
of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University’, 19 Jan. 2005 <www.prisonexp.org>
accessed 14 Nov. 2005.
101 Army Code 71130 (note 11) p.9–1.
102 McConville (note 50) pp.12–17.
103 Bourke (note 2) p.174.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. p.452 from Robert L. Garrard, North Carolina Medical Journal (Sept. 1949).
106 Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, I and IV (note 12).
107 Manning in Gal and Mangelsdorff (note 44) p.456.
108 Ibid. ‘Unit cohesion’ is also called ‘moral cohesion’.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. p.458.
111 P.G. Bourne, ‘Altered Adrenal Function in Two Combat Situations in Viet Nam’, in Basil
E. Eleftheriou and John Paul Scott (eds.), The Physiology of Aggression and Defeat (New York:
Plenum Press 1971) p.288.
112 Bourke (note 2) p.98 from the work of Gustave le Bon and Wilfred Trotter.
113 Shalit (note 21) pp.10–12.
114 Bourke (note 2) p.158.
115 Manning in Gal and Mangelsdorff (note 44) pp.463–4.
116 Bourke (note 2) p.101, from Coleman (note 77).
117 Bourne (note 2) p.283.
118 Ibid. p.101, from Coleman (note 77).
119 Ibid. p.98 from G. Stanley Hall, Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct (1920)
pp.36–7.
120 Chuter (note 15) p.5.
121 Yager (note 5) p.257.
122 Lorenz (note 41) p.40.
123 Chuter (note 15) p.274.
124 Watson (note 86) pp.242–6.
125 Bourke (note 2) p.197.
126 Reid (note 4) p.10.