You are on page 1of 17

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

2020, VOL. 160, NO. 6, 751–767


https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2020.1755217

Support for rejection and reception policies toward asylum


seekers in Italy: The role of conservative ideologies and
legitimizing myths
a a b b
Tiziana Mancini , Luca Caricati , Gian Antonio di Bernardo , and Loris Vezzali
a
University of Parma; bUniversity of Modena and Reggio Emilia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY


Based on Social Dominance Theory (SDT), this study investigates the relation- Received 20 September
ships between ideologically conservative attitudes (social dominance orienta- 2019
tion, SDO; right-wing authoritarianism, RWA), legitimizing myths (false belief in Accepted 29 March 2020
asylum seekers as bogus; perception of in-group threats), and citizens’ support KEYWORDS
for restricted reception and rejection of asylum policies. A sample of 539 Asylum seekers; SDO; RWA;
people living in Italy filled in an anonymous questionnaire administered false beliefs; migration
using a cross-sectional design. The results support the expectations, showing policies
that people high in SDO and RWA were more likely to hold the belief that
asylum seekers are making false claims and to perceive that the latter pose
a threat to the in-group, which in turn increased support for both of restrictive
policies. Findings suggest that conservative ideologies can positively affect
citizens’ support for restrictive asylum seeker policies based on both rejection
and restricted reception by supplying ideological justification for not accom-
modating them in the host society.

Introduction
The issue of migration, and in particular migration consequent to war, conflict, persecution, and
climatic change, has been receiving growing attention in public and political debates all around the
world. Also as a result of the increasing number of migrants arriving in European countries over the
last few years, one of the most debated questions in the media and in political discourses is whether
European countries should accept or reject asylum claimants. Either choice is linked to international
agreements that often depend on the economic and socio-political configuration of the nations, as
well as on the opinions of citizens in each country. In fact, it is well known that, in the last decade,
the large amount of news, and specifically alarmist news on the issue of migration in Europe, has
been observed coinciding with the electoral campaigns for the administrative, political or European
elections. Therefore, citizens’ opinions on the reception or rejection of asylum seekers are an issue
that addresses the political and cultural agendas of the potential host countries. Nevertheless, the
scientific study of the psychosocial processes involved in citizens’ opinions about migration policies
has not yet been given sufficient attention, especially in European countries. The present study aims
to provide a contribution in this direction. Starting from Social Dominance Theory (SDT, Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999), we have analyzed the extent to which ideologically conservative attitudes and legit-
imizing myths, i.e., false belief in asylum seekers as bogus and the perception of threats to the in-
group, shape citizens’ support for restrictive asylum policies among majority Italian members. To the
best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to focus on the legitimizing role of false beliefs and
the perception of threats considering them as mediators of the relationship between conservative
ideologies and support for two different types of restrictive asylum seeker policies: i.e. reducing

CONTACT Tiziana Mancini tiziana.mancini@unipr.it Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Industries,
University of Parma, Parma, Italy
© 2020 Taylor & Francis
752 T. MANCINI ET AL.

accommodation measures and rejecting asylum seekers. Moreover, it is one of the few studies (e.g.,
Mancini et al., 2018) that focuses on the humanitarian crisis affecting European countries since 2011.
Specifically, this study directly addresses the mechanisms supporting both restricted reception and
rejection policies toward asylum seekers at the time when the center-left government was in office in
Italy.

Conservative ideologies and support for migration policies toward Asylum Seekers
Ideological attitudes, such as social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto et al., 1994) and right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981), are relevant predictors of generalized prejudice and
ethnocentrism (Sibley & Duckitt, 2013). SDO and RWA incorporate social worldview beliefs and
people’s desires about the way in which society should be organized (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).
SDO is rooted in the belief that societies are inherently competitive and characterized by the
powerful who win over the subordinates, and it captures people’s desire that social groups should
be hierarchically organized, with some groups in powerful and others in powerless positions (Pratto
et al., 1994). RWA, instead, is rooted in the belief that the social world is inherently dangerous,
unstable and menacing and captures people’s desire for social order and protection of the in-group’s
worldview. RWA, therefore, encourages people to defend the values, norms, and culture of the in-
group (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).
Several studies have found that SDO and RWA, albeit related, are independent predictors of
prejudice against disadvantaged outgroups (e.g., Caricati et al., 2017; Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Duckitt &
Sibley, 2010), including asylum seekers. These effects have been found in samples from different
nations such as Australia (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015; Nickerson & Louis, 2008), Canada (e.g.,
V. M. Esses et al., 2008), the Netherlands (e.g., Onraet et al., 2019), and Italy (e.g., Mancini et al.,
2018) with SDO and RWA predicting different anti-asylum seeker sentiments such as prejudice
(Mancini et al., 2018), dehumanization (V. M. Esses et al., 2008; Trounson et al., 2015), and negative
attitudes (Anderson, 2018a; Anderson et al., 2015). Other works have shown that RWA and SDO
differently predicted social distance from Syrian refugees in Turkey (Koc & Anderson, 2018, Study,
p. 1), modern and classic forms of prejudice in Australia (Anderson, 2018b, Study 2), the level of the
economic and security threat posed by asylum seekers in two Croatian counties (Gregurović et al.,
2016), and the perception of asylum seekers as legitimate or as economic in the Netherlands (Onraet
et al., 2019). Furthermore, Anderson and Ferguson (2018) meta-analysis combined effect sizes from
published and unpublished Australian studies and confirmed that SDO and RWA strongly corre-
lated (rs = .49, .56; ps < .05 respectively) with anti-asylum seeker sentiments. Extending the work of
Anderson and Ferguson (2018), Cowling et al.’s (2019) meta-analysis aggregated globally available
data of prejudice-relevant correlates of attitudes toward refugees, confirming that the effects of RWA
and SDO were strong (Fisher’s zs = 0.50 and 0.50, respectively).
While the link between ideologically conservative attitudes and prejudice against asylum-seekers
is well documented, less is known about the role of SDO and RWA on citizens’ support for the
asylum seeker policies adopted by their countries (Hartley & Pedersen, 2015). In this regard,
Nickerson and Louis (2008) cross-sectional study showed that Australians with higher levels of
SDO and RWA were likelier to support exclusionary policies, and hold more negative attitudes,
toward asylum seekers. However, Louis et al. (2007), in a longitudinal Australian study, found only
a small effect of SDO on behavioral support for the restrictive treatment of asylum seekers measured
at time 2. Mancini et al. (2018) found in a sample of Italian adults that SDO and RWA predicted
prejudice against asylum seekers but did not have significant direct effects on intentions to help
asylum seekers.
Hence, the literature offers limited and partially discordant evidence about the role of SDO and
RWA on people’s support for migration policies toward asylum seekers. It may be that the relation-
ship is indirect, that is, that it can occur indirectly whether or not a direct effect exists. If this is the
case, then identifying the underlying processes becomes a priority. Sidanius and Pratto (1999)
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 753

offered a valuable theoretical support in this regard: According to SDT, ideological variables are
basic orientations that drive individuals to adhere to the so-called legitimizing myths, that is to say,
shared beliefs that make fair and legitimate the unequal treatment or condition of outgroups, thus
providing moral and intellectual support for the maintenance of social hierarchies. Accordingly,
SDO (and RWA) has proven to be robustly linked to racism and sexism (Pratto et al., 1994), which
according to SDT work as legitimizing myths. As the study on the Indian caste system by Cotterill
et al. (2014) showed, generalized prejudice, as well as the endorsement of Karma, functioned as
legitimizing ideologies that mediated the relationship between SDO and RWA and support for anti-
egalitarian social policies and conventions. Since legitimizing myths drive the effects of ideological
orientations on support for social policies, they are good candidates also to drive the effects of both
SDO and RWA on policies targeting a specific group such as asylum seekers (Pratto et al., 2006).
Moreover, as studies have consistently shown that false beliefs, such as the perception of asylum
seekers as “cheaters” of the system (Anderson et al., 2015; Hartley et al., 2018) and the perception of
threats (Cowling et al., 2019; Mancini et al., 2018; Onraet et al., 2019) were closely associated with
prejudicial attitudes vis-à-vis asylum seekers, it is conceivable that both operate as legitimizing myths
driving the effects of both SDO and RWA on support for asylum policies.

False beliefs about Asylum Seekers as legitimizing myths


Several studies have shown that the strong rhetoric against migrants that accompanies the debates on
migrants illegally arriving in European countries has generated or consolidated some false beliefs
(e.g., Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; O’Doherty & Lecouteur, 2007). Pedersen and collaborators
(Hartley et al., 2018; Pedersen et al., 2005, 2006; Suhnan et al., 2012) defined the construct of
“negative false beliefs” as the “acceptance of certain incorrect facts; false beliefs can serve as currency
for everyday people and conversations” (Pedersen et al., 2005, p. 151). A list of false beliefs of asylum
seekers in Australia included, for instance, the belief that “Most asylum seekers arrive by boat” or
that “Asylum seekers are more likely to be terrorists compared with refugees that come through
official channels” (Croston & Pedersen, 2013). A negative false belief about asylum seekers is also
that that they are profiteers of the asylum channel (e.g., Lynn & Lea, 2003). Italian newspapers/media
have often conveyed this false belief, as shown by the headlines of some articles: “The refugee scam:
one in two is a false claimant” (Biloslavo, 2014), “The mystery of the false Pakistani refugees”
(Giurovich, 2017), “Migrants, the eight false myths to be debunked” (Polchi, 2016).
The perception of being cheated by asylum seekers, i.e., viewing asylum seekers as “bogus
refugees” or “voluntary migrants” (e.g., Lynn & Lea, 2003; Verkuyten, 2014) has been associated
with negative attitudes (Pedersen et al., 2005, 2006; Suhnan et al., 2012) and negative reactions
(Onraet et al., 2019) toward asylum seekers, proving that false beliefs about asylum seekers can
operate as legitimate myths. In Europe, for example, discursive and rhetorical analysis of the letters
written to British national newspapers by readers has shown that the term bogus was used as
a rhetorical device to reinforce the false belief that among asylum seekers there were criminals or
people “cheating the system” by misappropriating resources and living off the government’s gener-
osity (Lynn & Lea, 2003). Significant associations between negative attitudes toward asylum seekers
and negative ideas invoked through political rhetoric have been found by Pedersen et al. (2005),
(2006)) who at the time wrote about an Australian rhetoric closely related to false beliefs, such as the
belief that asylum seekers must be “cashed up” to pay back the people smugglers. More recent
studies have confirmed that this rhetorical device was powerful in spreading false beliefs about
asylum seekers (Suhnan et al., 2012).
Few studies have analyzed the association between the way in which asylum seekers have been
defined and citizens’ support for asylum seekers. In Europe, for example, Verkuyten (2004) found
that, when asylum seekers were perceived as genuine, feelings of sympathy predicted citizens’
behavioral intentions in support of migrants’ plight, whereas when asylum seekers were perceived
as bogus, feelings of anger increased citizens’ behavioral intentions against migrants. In two
754 T. MANCINI ET AL.

subsequent experimental studies, Verkuyten et al. (2018) showed that the personal importance that
participants attributed to the issues of migration moderated the relationships between perceiving
migrants as involuntary (i.e., as genuine asylum seekers) compared to voluntary, societal and
humanitarian considerations (as mediator variables), and support for accommodation of migrants
within Dutch society. Both studies showed that for the participants who find migration a personally
important topic, migrants described as being involuntary (compared to voluntary) made societal
concerns (e.g., societal costs and cohesion) as well as humanitarian considerations less relevant in
predicting support for their accommodation. In a community survey of 164 Australians, Hartley
et al. (2018) showed that false beliefs about asylum seekers were strongly related to prejudice, and
that although political ideology and prejudice were significant predictors of policy support, false
beliefs were the strongest predictors. Specifically, this study showed that false beliefs were the
strongest predictor of both the offshore detention policy and the boat turnback policy, while less
endorsement of false beliefs predicted support for humanitarian policies.

Perception of the in-group threat as a legitimizing myth


To believe that asylum seekers pose a threat to national security or the economy may be another
rhetorical device used to reinforce or justify the exclusion of asylum seekers. That asylum seekers are
a threat to both the country security and national resources is a recurrent issue both in the literature
and in popular debates (e.g., Goodman & Burke, 2010). In Italy, for example, the perception of
insecurity instilled by migrants has reached its highest rate in 10 years since 2017 (Demos & Pi,
2017). Feelings of being invaded and threatened by migrants are therefore greater than feelings of
solidarity, an effect also fueled by the media (Barretta, 2015; Barretta & Milazzo, 2017). As the meta-
analysis by Cowling et al. (2019) demonstrated, perception of refugees as symbolic and realistic
threats were the strongest correlates of negative attitudes toward them (Fisher’s zs = 0.98 and 1.11,
respectively).
Psychosocial studies have consistently shown that perception of being threatened by asylum
claimants shapes people’s support for restrictive migration policies worldwide. For example, using
data collected in 2013 by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, ISSP Research Group,
2015), the results by Caricati (2018) revealed that, across 33 nations, the perception of threat
increased the likelihood of people supporting illegal migrant exclusion policies. Coherently, the
perceptions of threatening socio-structural relations between Australian citizens and asylum seekers
predicted Australians’ intention to support the harsh treatment of asylum seekers, as well as
exclusionary attitudes and actions (Louis et al., 2007). On the contrary, perceiving the Australian
community as stable and the Australian government’s policy as illegitimate predicted support for
a lenient policy orientation in a survey conducted among citizens of the Perth metropolitan area by
Hartley and Pedersen (2007). Religious grounds and the associated threat of terrorism, alongside
economic reasons and the notion that asylum seekers lack integration in British society, were the
three arguments that undergraduate students participating in focus groups used to oppose asylum
seekers in the study by Goodman and Burke (2011). An overtly hostile response to asylum seekers
also emerged from the study by Klocker (2004), in which residents of Port Augusta (Australia)
described asylum seekers as “burdensome”, “threatening” and “illegal.” In this study, the citizens’
opposition to asylum seekers was consistent with the overwhelming support for the Federal
Government’s asylum policies based on rejection (e.g., Turning back people smuggling vessels)
and measures of deterrence (e.g., Mandatory detention, detention of women and children).
Moreover, Hartley and Pedersen (2015) found that fear and perceived threat were independent
predictors of more restrictive social policy against resettled refugees in an Australian sample. More
recently, Landmann et al. (2019) have identified different types of threat that majority group
members in Germany experience as a result of refugee migration; all these types of threat elicited
negative emotions and were associated with support for restrictive migration policies.
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 755

Furthermore, perceived threat also appears to have a mediator role. For example, Pereira et al. (2010)
found perception of threat mediated the relationship between prejudice and both opposition to migra-
tion and opposition to naturalization of migrants. More specifically, Canetti et al. (2016) showed that
perceived threat mediated the relationship between political preferences and support for exclusionary
asylum policies in Israel and Australia. In this case, the more people were right wing-oriented, the more
they perceived asylum seekers as a threat and the more they supported exclusionary asylum policies.
Similarly, in the Netherlands, Onraet et al. (2019) found that feelings of an in-group threat mediated the
relationship between the perception of asylum seekers as illegitimate, i.e. as being economic asylum
seekers, and support for tougher policies. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2015) showed that when asylum
seekers were seen as being in a disadvantaged position and needing resources (i.e., not threatening) the
negative effects of conservative ideological beliefs on prejudicial attitudes is reduced.
In short, the literature suggests that the more the host population shares negative false beliefs such as
viewing asylum seekers as bogus refugees and the more people feel asylum seekers as a source of threat
for the host society, the more they support restrictive and tough policies against asylum seekers.
According to SDT, both the beliefs that asylum seekers are bogus or false refugees and the feeling that
they pose a threat to nations might act as legitimizing myths supplying justifications for restrictive
policies toward asylum seekers. In this paper, we propose that ideologically conservative attitudes (SDO
and RWA) are linked with greater support for restrictive policies via increases in the belief in false asylum
seekers and in feelings of an ingroup threat both considered as legitimizing myths.

Aim of present study


This study aimed to analyze the role of ideologically conservative attitudes in shaping Italian citizens’
support for restrictive asylum seeker policies. Specifically, it aimed to test the SDT expectation that
claims that asylum seekers are false and threatening would act as a legitimizing myth by mediating
the relations between SDO and RWA and support for restrictive policies for asylum seekers.
Although the literature has already demonstrated the predictive role of SDO and RWA in supporting
restrictive migration policies, to the best of our knowledge, the mediational role of false beliefs and feelings
of an in-group threat as legitimizing myths have not yet been investigated. Importantly, these relations have
not yet been tested with respect to support for both restricted reception and rejection asylum policies. The
literature has rarely distinguished between different types of restriction policies, focusing mainly on the
comparison between border rejection and the offshore detention policy (e.g., Hartley et al., 2018). These
policies are not common in European countries and do not take into account policies that accommodate
immigrants but set some limitations on migrants’ rights and freedom. Thus, we considered two kinds of
restrictive policies against migrants, that is to say rejection policies (e.g., border rejection) and restricted
reception policies (e.g., accommodation and integration with restrictions on some rights and freedoms).
This novel distinction is supported by the evidence that there are different motivations that encourage
people to support rejection or restricted reception policies, for instance, personal importance attributed to
the topic of migration (Verkuyten et al., 2018), type of threat that people use to justify discrimination
(Pereira et al., 2010), and level of false belief endorsement (Hartley et al., 2018). However, no study has
analyzed whether ideological orientations (SDO and RWA) and the false myths that people use to justify
the treatment of minorities can support rejection and restricted reception asylum seeker policies. Thus, this
study aimed to explore whether SDO and RWA come to two different albeit related outcomes (i.e., support
for rejection and support for restrict reception policies), via two different albeit related legitimizing myths
(i.e., viewing asylum seekers as “false refugees” and feeling that they pose a threat to the country).
In addition, this study was one of the few studies (e.g., Landmann et al., 2019; Mancini et al.,
2018; Onraet et al., 2019) that focused on the humanitarian crisis that has affected European
countries since the Arab Spring uprisings. Most of the studies about the hosting community’s
support for policies against or in favor of asylum seekers have been conducted in Australia,
a continent that is very different from Europe for many reasons. For the sake of example, the
resettled refugees – i.e., refugees who arrive via an official refugee resettlement program – are
756 T. MANCINI ET AL.

widespread in Australia while this aspect is fueling heated debates in the European Union, and it is
actually quite rare in Italy (1.4% in 2016, Report on International Protection in Italy, 2017), where
since 2011 most asylum seekers have arrived by illegal means. In regard to the kinds of policies
directed to asylum seekers, it is also important to underline that this study was conducted in Italy at
the time of the center-left government headed by Matteo Renzi in 2016, a year that saw the biggest
number of landings since 2012. Therefore, it refers to a social and political context that is a slightly
different from the current one, which is characterized by more explicit restrictive policies both in
regard to the access and the accommodation of asylum seekers and in regard to rejection of these
migrants (see Law no. 132, December 1, 2018 commonly known as the “Salvini decree”).
To reach the goal of analyzing the psychosocial processes involved in forming the citizens’ opinion
about asylum seeker migration policies, this study was based on SDT. Consistently with SDT, we
expected that SDO and RWA would be positively linked to holding legitimizing myths about asylum
seekers, i.e. beliefs that asylum seekers are bogus refugees and pose a threat. Thus, the more people are
SDO and RWA oriented, the more they should believe that asylum seekers are profiteers of the asylum
channel and are threatening to the country (hypothesis 1). Moreover, as myths that legitimate the unfair
treatment of disadvantaged groups, we expected that the more people held beliefs in bogus refugees and
felt threatened by them the more they were likely to support both restrictive policies (hypothesis 2). The
last expectation concerns the mediating role of legitimizing myths on the relations between ideological
attitudes and support for rejection and restrict reception policies. Specifically, we expected that both
beliefs that asylum seekers are bogus refugees and the feeling of an in-group threat would explain the
relation of SDO and RWA with support for rejection and restricted reception policies (hypothesis 3).
Figure 1 shows the hypothesized model.

Method
Procedure
Using the Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) platform, an online survey design was proposed to
a sample of Italian adults recruited via mailing lists and advertisements posted on websites, forums,
and social network pages (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) or groups dedicated to specific care-giving

R2 =.24
Bogus refugee
Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5

SDO4 .14*
.33 ** .23* .13**
SDO3
SDO .27** Restricted
SDO2 Reception

SDO1 R2 =.67
.52** .11ns
RWA1 -.07ns R2 =.87
.11ns
RWA2
RWA .29 ** Rejection
RWA3
.64 ** .32 ** 44** .67**
RWA4

R2 =.73 Rej1 Rej2 Rej3 Rej4


Threat

Th1 Th2 Th3 Th4 Th5 Th6 Th7 Th8

Figure 1. Results from path analysis on the tested model.


N = 539.* p =.001. ** p <.001. ns = not significant. Standardized coefficients are reported.
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 757

professions (e.g., psychologists, social workers, social health assistants), to voluntary associations,
and to social cooperatives operating in the national territory.
A simple message invited people to participate voluntarily in a survey on the topic of migration,
with the request to fill out an anonymous online questionnaire. It was specified that participation
was voluntary, unpaid, and that the participants could leave the research at any moment. Considered
variables were presented in the order in which they are described below. Data were collected from
January to April 2016.

Power analysis and participants


We used the approach suggested by MacCallum et al. (1996) as implemented by Preacher and
Coffman (2006) in order to detect a minimum sample size based on the RMSEA of our tested model.
More precisely, we considered 286 degrees of freedom, a = .05, b = .80, a null RMSEA equal to .05
and an alternative RMSEA equal to .04. With these criteria, the minimum sample size was 366.
Moreover, given the difficulty in predicting each pattern in the tested model, we performed the
Monte Carlo simulation (1000 resampling) on our results. Simulation revealed that indirect effects
had a power greater than .90 (i.e., they were significant in more than 90% of simulated samples),
except for the indirect effect of RWA on reception via fake refugees that had a power = .78.
Altogether, 1,060 participants gave their consent to participate and started the survey, 521
(49.15%) of whom were excluded because they completed less than 30% of the items. In the final
sample considered for the data analysis (N = 539), 71.2% (384) of the participants completed (100%)
the questionnaire. In the final sample, less than 1% of the total responses (i.e., 0.56%) was missing
(ranging from 17% to 0% at a variable level). Thus, we replaced them by using multiple imputation
with the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, a method proven to be generally effective in
managing missing data (see e.g., Graham, 2009).
One hundred and sixty-two participants (30.1%) were male and 377 (69.9%) were female, with
a mean age of 43.05 (SD = 12.56. range = 19–74 years). Almost all the participants (528, 98.0%) were
born in Italy and they all declared they had Italian citizenship. The majority (335, 62.2%) were
Catholic and 176 (32.7%) were atheist. More than three-quarters of the sample (426, 79.0%) were in
employment; 32 (5.9%) were students. Concerning the education level, 409 participants (75.9%) had
attained a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree. One hundred and sixty-seven participants (31.0%) declared
that they were working for or had worked in the last 5 years in associations, services or organizations
dealing with asylum seekers and 127 (23.6%) that they were part of or registered with some
association or group that dealt with activities assisting asylum seekers.

Measures
Ideological conservative predictors
Social dominance orientation (SDO) was measured with the Italian version of the short form of the SDO6
scale (Pratto et al., 2013), which is made up of four items (e.g., “Superior groups should dominate inferior
groups”). Items were rated on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree).
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) was measured with four items (e.g., “Obedience and respect for
authority are the most important values children should learn”) taken from the authoritarian submission
and aggression dimension of the Italian version of the RWA scale (Manganelli et al., 2007). Items were
rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree).

Legitimizing-myth mediators
Perception of asylum seekers as bogus refugees was measured with a single item in which, considering
the total number of asylum seekers who arrived in Italy in 2015, participants had to indicate the
758 T. MANCINI ET AL.

percentage of those they believed were not indeed “forced” migrants (i.e., those that were not “real”
asylum seekers).
In-group threat was measured with a short version of the zero-sum beliefs scale (V.M. Esses et al.,
2001) applied by Mancini et al. (2018) to the perceived threat from asylum seekers. The scale is
composed of eight items rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree).
Four items asked the participants to express their agreement with some statements referring to
a realistic threat (e.g., “Money spent on social services for asylum seekers means less money for services
for Italians already living here”) and four items referred to a symbolic threat from asylum seekers (i.e.,
“When asylum seekers are encouraged to preserve their cultural practices, Italian culture is weakened”).
We checked for the dimensionality of the scale comparing one-dimension solution confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) with a two-dimension solution. CFAs were performed with maximum likelihood
estimation and robust standard error. One-dimension structure had acceptable fit, χ2(20) = 75.30,
p < .001, CFI = .967, TLI = .954, RMSEA = .070, p = .004, 95%CI [.058, .085], SRMR = .028,
AIC = 11352.40, BIC = 11455.36 which did not improve (Δχ2(1) = 2.14, p = .144; Vuong’s (1989) test
for non-nested models: w2 = 0.012, p = .146) when a two-dimension structure was considered, χ2
(19) = 73.22, p < .001, CFI = .968, TLI = .952, RMSEA = .073, p = .003, 95%CI [.059, .087], SRMR = .028,
AIC = 11350.74, BIC = 11457.99. Thus, we considered threat as a one-dimensional construct1.

Support for policy outcomes


Support to asylum seekers policies was measured with 9 items adapted from previous studies (e.g.,
Cottrell et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2004). All items were on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = totally
disagree, 5 = totally agree). Four items measured support for rejection policies for asylum seekers (e.g.,
“The Italian government should limit the entry of asylum seekers in Italy as much as possible,”
“Repatriation of asylum seekers who do not come from countries at war should be one of the priorities
of the Italian government”) and five measured support for the restricted reception policies (e.g., “Board
and lodging should be guaranteed to all asylum seekers arriving in Italy”, reversed, “The Italian
government should guarantee all asylum seekers access to health and social services”, reversed).
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that two-dimension structure had good (χ2(25) = 62.71,
p < .001, CFI = .977, TLI = .967, RMSEA = .053, p = .356, 95%CI [.038, .068], SRMR = .031,
AIC = 14361.16, BIC = 14485.57; Hu & Bentler, 1999) and better fit than the one-dimension structure
(χ2(26) = 213.37, p < .001, CFI = .884, TLI = .899, RMSEA = .116, p < .001, 95%CI [.102, .129],
SRMR = .061, AIC = 14534.15, BIC = 14654.26; Δχ2(1) = 99.37, p < .001; Vuong’s (1989) test for non-
nested models: w2 = 0.792, p < .001, Z = 4.23, p < .001) confirmed the existence of two dimensions:
support to rejection policies and support to restricted reception policies (all ps < .001).
Measures used in this study are provided in https://osf.io/927wd.

Analysis plan
First of all, we investigated descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between considered
variables. We then used structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood and robust (Huber-
White) standard error estimation in order to test the model. Model testing was done in two steps.
First, we assessed measurement model in order to verify that latent traits significantly measured the
intended items. Afterward, we tested the full model in order to investigate regression paths among
variables as indicated in Figure 1. Evaluation of model fit was based on the comparative fit index
(CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).
Values greater than 0.90 and 0.95 are considered adequate and good for both CFI and TLI, while
values smaller than 0.08 and 0.06 indicate adequate and excellent RMSEA (e.g., Browne & Cudeck,
1993). The R software package (R Core Team, 2018) was used to perform the analyses. Database used
in this study is provided in https://osf.io/927wd.
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 759

Results
Descriptive analyses
For all measures, the intended items were averaged to create a composite score in which higher scores
indicated higher levels of the measured constructs. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations
between considered variables are presented in Table 1 (zero-order correlations with demographics are
supplied in https://osf.io/927wd). Reliability of scales was satisfactory except for SDO which had a slightly
lower reliability (see Table 1). The value of SDO reliability, however, was comparable with that reported
in other studies (Pratto et al., 2013, Table 2). On average, participants declared their partial disagreement
with statements measuring SDO, RWA and perception of in-group threats, they were close to the
theoretical median of the scale on the support for rejection policies, while they partially disagreed with
support for restricted reception policies. Nevertheless, they thought that about 43% of the asylum seekers
who arrived in Italy in 2015 were bogus refugees. As expected, all measures were significantly correlated
in the expected direction. It is worth noting that, in line with the broader literature, SDO and RWA were
moderately correlated, suggesting that they refer to distinct albeit related facets of ideological orientation
toward diversity and social hierarchies.

Testing the model


Before running analysis, the raw score of percentage of bogus asylum seekers was rescaled to range
from 1 to 10 in order to make estimated coefficients comparable with other measures.
Firstly, measurement model results indicated adequate goodness of fit, χ2 (265) = 553.07, p < .001,
CFI = .953, TLI = .947, RMSEA = .045, p = .956, 95%CI [.040, .050], SRMR = .038, with all the items
significantly contributing to the measurement of intended latent dimensions (all ps < .001). Thus, no
measurement concerns appeared.
The full model2 revealed good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), χ2 (286) = 593.69, p < .001, CFI = .951,
TLI = .945, RMSEA = .045, p = .968, 95%CI [.040, .049], SRMR = .039, AIC = 39496.85, BIC = 39887.22.
Figure 1 depicts the tested model; a full account of estimates is presented in Table 2.
As predicted, in line with hypothesis 1, both SDO and RWA were significantly and positively
linked to false beliefs of in-group threats and bogus refugees so that the more people were SDO- and
RWA-oriented, the more they were likely to believe that asylum seekers are actually bogus refugees
and that they pose a threat for the host nation. According to hypothesis 2, perceived asylum seekers
as bogus refugees and threatening were in turn positively linked to both restricted reception and
rejection of asylum seekers. In line with the expected mediational role for legitimizing myths
(hypothesis 3), in-group threats and perception of refugees as being bogus claimants mediated the
relations between SDO and RWA and support for both restricted reception and rejection policies, as
all the indirect effects were significant (see Table 2). More precisely, SDO maintained a significant
direct effect on support for restricted reception policies, while its direct effect on support for
rejection policies turned out to be non-significant. RWA, instead, maintained a significant direct
effect on support for rejection policies while the direct effect on support for restricted reception
became non-significant.

Table 1. Mean and standard deviation and zero-order correlations of considered measures (N = 539).
M SD α SDO RWA Bogus Threat Rejection
SDO 1.82 0.74 .59 1
RWA 2.47 1.07 .82 .38** 1
Bogus refugee 42.90 23.98 - .32** .33** 1
In-group threat 2.04 1.02 .93 .48** .69** .46** 1
Support for Rejection 2.87 1.10 .81 .38** .67** .46** .79** 1
Support for restricted Reception 2.26 1.02 .85 .48** .54** .47** .68** .61**
** p <.001
The response scale for all measures ranged from 1 to 5, with the exception of the Bogus refugee measure, ranging from 0 to 100.
760 T. MANCINI ET AL.

Table 2. Estimate of direct and indirect effects from the structural part of the tested model.
B SE Z 95%CI
Restricted reception
SDO .510 .140 3.650*** [.236,.784]
RWA .126 .089 1.407 [−.049,.301]
Bogus refugee .056 .016 3.439*** [.024,.089]
Threat .582 .121 4.013*** [.345,.819]
Rejection
SDO −.140 .121 −1.159 [−.377,.097]
RWA .350 .084 4.170*** [.186,.515]
Bogus refugee .058 .015 3.894*** [.029,.088]
Threat .965 .134 7.174*** [.701, 1.228]
Bogus refugee
SDO 1.508 .415 3.632*** [.694, 2.321]
RWA .638 .196 3.219*** [.249, 1.026]
Threat
SDO .452 .109 4.131 *** [.238,.666]
RWA .545 .061 8.895*** [.425,.665]
Indirect effects
SDO->Threat->Restricted reception .263 .074 3.554** [.118,.408]
SDO->Threat->Rejection .436 .117 3.739*** [.207,.664]
RWA->Threat->Restricted reception .317 .072 4.377*** [.175,.459]
RWA->Threat->Rejection .526 .071 7.434*** [.387,.664]
SDO->Bogus refugee->Restricted reception .085 .030 2.881** [.027,.143]
SDO-> Bogus refugee ->Rejection .088 .035 2.488* [.019,.157]
RWA-> Bogus refugee ->Restricted reception .036 .016 2.213* [.004,.068]
RWA-> Bogus refugee ->Rejection .037 .013 2.778** [.011,.063]
* p <.05; ** p <.01. *** p <.001
all standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust (White-Huber) standard errors. N = 539

Discussion and conclusions


Our study aims to analyze the psychosocial processes that influence citizens’ opinions toward
migration policies in a European context. It is well-known that, as a consequence of the increasing
number of migrants reaching European countries in the last few years, political debates as to whether
European nations should accept or reject asylum claimants has influenced, and has been influenced
by, citizens’ opinions on migration issues (Demos & Pi, 2017). Nevertheless, the analysis of
psychosocial factors influencing citizens’ opinions about migration policies adopted by various
States remains largely unexplored. This study has focused on the Italian case at the time of the
center-left government led by Matteo Renzi in 2016, a year that recorded the highest number of
arrivals since 2012, and adopted both rejection and reception policies toward asylum seekers.
Specifically, starting from SDT (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), this study examined the effects of
ideologically conservative attitudes (i.e., SDO and RWA) and legitimizing myths about asylum
seekers (i.e., perception of asylum seekers as a threat for the country and profiteering from the
asylum pathway) in terms of support for both restricted reception and rejection policies in a sample
of the general Italian adult population.
Results supported our hypotheses showing that people high in SDO and RWA were likelier to
hold beliefs that asylum seekers are bogus refugees and to perceive that they are a threat for the in-
group. This is consistent with the SDT expectation that ideological attitudes push people to embrace
beliefs that justify negative treatment toward disadvantaged groups. Results also revealed that, as
expected, both the belief in asylum seekers as bogus refugees and the perception of asylum seekers as
an in-group threat (i.e., legitimizing myths) were associated with increased support for restrictive
policies that either limited the freedom of the accepted asylum seekers or rejected them. In other
words, the more people believed that asylum seekers were actually false claimants and/or the more
they perceived that asylum seekers threatened the country, the more they were likely to support
rejection and restricted reception policies for asylum seekers. These results confirm previous studies
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 761

showing that beliefs in illegitimate refugees (e.g., Hartley et al., 2018; Verkuyten et al., 2018) and the
feeling of threat (e.g., Canetti et al., 2016; Hartley & Pedersen, 2007; Landmann et al., 2019; Louis
et al., 2007) increase support for tough policies toward asylum seekers. Our results extend this
evidence to the support for policies that do not directly reject claimants but pose some curbs on their
rights and freedom, and confirm that beliefs about asylum seekers as either bogus or threatening,
fueled by ideological orientations, operate as justifications for their non-accommodation in the host
society by increasing citizens’ support for restrictive policies that reject or debunk refugees’ claims by
reducing or denying their rights.
Our results also indicated that both legitimizing myths mediated the relations between ideological
attitudes and support for both rejection and restricted reception policies. This means that people
high in SDO or RWA support policies against asylum seekers because this group is perceived as
competing with the ingroup (e.g., threat to the ingroup integrity and exploitation of ingroup’s
resources). These results are congruent with the idea that SDO and RWA, as ideological conservative
beliefs, have similar and independent positive effects on generalized prejudice and exclusion of
outgroups (e.g., McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Pratto et al., 2006). Along with this similarity, however,
mediation analysis revealed that SDO and RWA also have slightly different relations with legitimiz-
ing myths and support for policies. More precisely, SDO had no significant direct effect on support
for rejection policies when controlled for legitimizing myths, while its direct effect on restricted
reception policies remained significant. Opposite patterns were observed or RWA that had no
significant direct effect on support for restricted reception policies but had a significant direct
relationship with support for rejection policies. This unexpected result might be congruent with
the idea that SDO and RWA could lead to similar outcomes but for different reasons (e.g., Thomsen
et al., 2008) because they serve different motivations. According to the Dual-Process Model (DPM;
Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), SDO serves the desire to preserve intergroup hierarchy and RWA serves the
desire to defend the ingroup’s integrity. In this case, the direct relationship between SDO and
support for restricted reception policies seems to directly reflect intergroup dominance (i.e. to make
sure that asylum seekers do not undermine the privileged status of the host population), while the
direct effect between RWA and rejection policies seems to directly reflect concerns about defending
the ingroup. In any case, the effect of ideologically conservative attitudes on support for restrictive
policies against asylum seekers seems to be boosted by the perception that asylum seekers pose
a threat to the ingroup or else are profiting from ingroup’s resources which, in turn, helps people to
make the exclusion of asylum seekers’ justified.
Thus, in line with the literature on negative attitudes toward asylum seekers and refugees
(Anderson, 2018a, Study1; Louis et al., 2007; Gregurović et al., 2016; Koc & Anderson, 2018,
Study 1; Onraet et al., 2019) the present results suggest that RWA and SDO related differently
with the support for restricted reception and rejection asylum seeker policies, but this only happens
when these ideological attitudes are not associated with legitimizing myths.
In conclusion, by supplying ideological justifications for not accommodating asylum seekers in
the host society, false beliefs in bogus refugees and the perception of asylum seekers as posing
a threat seem to have greater strength in shaping the citizens’ support not only for policies that reject
claimants but also for policies that welcome asylum seekers yet impose curbs on their rights and
freedom.

Limitations and Future Directions


The correlational nature of the research design calls for caution when inferring causal relationships
among the considered variables. Moreover, the strong correlations among variables suggest that
results can be affected by common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). These shortcomings may
limit the generalizability of the findings. However, the fact that a relatively large sample of common
people (and not only students) was examined increases the robustness and the generalizability of
present results. However, other factors arouse concerns about the internal validity of our study. First
762 T. MANCINI ET AL.

of all, it is well-known (J.R. Anderson, 2019) that prejudice toward asylum seekers is a very sensitive
topic and for this reason it could be affected by socially desirable response tendencies. Moreover, the
fact that a portion of our sample had a proxy for contact with asylum seekers and refugees could
have affected the results, as contact with asylum seekers has proved to reduce negative attitudes
against asylum seekers (e.g., Barlow et al., 2012). Also, some methodological concerns may have
affected the results: the low reliability of SDO, the use of the authoritarian submission and the
aggression dimension of RWA alone, and the use of a single item to measure beliefs in bogus
refugees, could represent shortcomings for the robustness of our findings. Further research using
more reliable measures and assessing the role of other type of legitimizing myths or other types of
threat (e.g., Landmann et al., 2019) is required. For example, experimental studies might manipulate
in-group threats and beliefs about bogus refugees in order to establish a causal link between
legitimizing myths and support for asylum policies. Other studies might explore moderating vari-
ables such as people’s political commitment, or their proximity with asylum seekers. Furthermore,
future studies could take into consideration the role of other predictors such as people’s willingness
to comply with the humanitarian norm of helping a person in need. Also, it would be interesting to
analyze the political or media rhetoric concerning the role of NGOs in the actual migration crisis,
especially whether or not this rhetoric increases aversion toward migrants as well as the consensus
for right-wing leaning policies in the European Union.

Political and societal implications


This research has some implications not only for laypeople, but also for politicians who are called upon to
propose measures to deal with migration flows. We have found that, on average, our participants believe
that about 43% of asylum seekers who arrived in Italy in 2015 were actually bogus claimants. This means
that, for our sample, a little less than half the number of asylum seekers are bogus refugees who abuse the
asylum pathway. We believe that similar percentages mark the success of several “appeals to fear and
invasion” which are so often used by many Parties. The role of the rhetoric of asylum seekers as “abusers
and unfair competitors” in justifying government policies is easily observable worldwide (e.g., O’Doherty
& Augoustinos, 2008). For example, in 2016 the Italian Government, justified their exclusionary
migration schemes by leveraging the perception of asylum seekers and migrants as a posing a threat to
citizens (e.g., Demos & Pi, 2017), which the media often encourage (Barretta, 2015; Barretta & Milazzo,
2017). Similar justifications seem to support the prevailing restrictive policies of the current Italian
government, where colloquialisms such as “pacchia” (the easy life), cruise holiday, clandestine, and
invasion are paving the way for the unprecedented refusal of the Italian authorities to rescue shipwrecked
people in Italian ports (Cataldi, 2018). Lynn and Lea (2003) and Pedersen et al. (2005, 2006) referred to
the “bogus” refugees as a false belief that is invoked through political rhetoric and, accordingly, research
demonstrated that this false belief powerfully increased perceptions of threats and negative attitudes
toward asylum seekers in Australia (Suhnan et al., 2012; Croston & Pedersen, 2013; see also Verkuyten,
2014), as well as in the Netherlands (Onraet et al., 2019; Verkuyten et al., 2018). Our results confirm these
trends and suggest that false beliefs are crucial factors in facilitating people’s acceptance and support for
policies that reject or exclude asylum seekers from the society. As social psychologists, we are urged to
investigate how to reduce the impact of false beliefs and other legitimizing myths on citizens’ support for
discriminatory policies as well as to decrease the likelihood that other false beliefs could become strong
justifications. A case in point is the strong emphasis recently placed by the Italian political and media
debate on criminalizing the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in the rescue of
migrants at sea and on their integration in the Italian context. As the literature has shown, using similar
arguments could reinforce the false belief that among asylum seekers there were people out to “cheat the
system” or the belief that asylum seekers must be “cashed up” to pay for people smugglers (Pedersen
et al., 2005, 2006). Previous research has shown and the present study confirms that false beliefs as well as
the rhetoric of the possible threat could encourage citizens’ support for restricted accommodation
(reception) or to asylum policies addressed to rejection.
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 763

It should be borne in mind that the migration crisis and the large number of asylum claimants
that European countries have to manage today are linked to complex geopolitical events that have
led to the constant rise in migrant numbers and therefore to what is known today as the refugee
crisis. This crisis is unlikely to change in the short-term and political programs aimed at rejecting
asylum seekers or at restricting their rights seem to be unable to arrest the migration flow. In the
latest United Nations (2019) report on the world population, it is forecast that the number of
migrants will remain stable until 2050 so that Europe will continue to absorb around one million
migrants a year. Thus, a serious debate on the best and most appropriate measures European
countries and European community should adopt in the coming years seems necessary. As the
psychosocial literature has shown, encouraging a climate based on fears and threats may well
guarantee high levels of political support, but certainly does not foster migrant integration, which
is the only real type of guarantee for European citizens’ improved security.

Notes
1. We tried to test the model considering two dimensions of threat (i.e., symbolic and realistic). However, the
analysis supplied unreliable results as latent traits of threats were strongly correlated (r =.93) and shared
a similar effect on other variables. This indicates severe multicollinearity and a strong overlap between
a realistic and symbolic threat, and confirms that the two kinds of threat are not distinguishable, in the
investigated sample at least. Thus, we decided to not consider the bi-dimensional structure of threat any further.
2. We also tested a model in which policies were considered as a one-dimension latent trait. Results showed that
SDO (b =.22, SE =.11, p =.035), RWA (b =.25, SE =.08, p =.001), threat (b =.83, SE =.11, p <.001) and bogus
refugees (b =.06, SE =.01, p <.001) were associated with support for policies against asylum seekers. Moreover,
both threat and bogus refugees significantly mediated the relationship between SDO and RWA and policies
regarding asylum seekers. This model, however, had a lower fit than the model with both reception and
rejection policies, χ2 (291) = 843.73, p <.001, CFI =.913, TLI =.902, RMSEA =.059, p <.001, 95%CI [.055,.064],
SRMR =.048, AIC = 39773.84, BIC = 40142.76.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Data availability statement


The data described in this article are openly available in the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/927wd.

Open Scholarship

This article has earned the Center for Open Science badge for Open Data and Open Materials. The data and materials
are openly accessible at https://osf.io/927wd.

ORCID
Tiziana Mancini http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7173-6478
Luca Caricati http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5456-2621
Gian Antonio di Bernardo http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3922-5712
Loris Vezzali http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7536-9994
764 T. MANCINI ET AL.

Notes on contributors
Tiziana Mancini is Associate Professor in Social Psychology and member of CIRS (Interdepartmental Center for Social
Research) at the University of Parma. Her research is mainly focused on interethnic relations and acculturation
processes.

Luca Caricati Research Assistant in Social Psychology and member of CIRS (Interdepartmental Center for Social
Research) at the University of Parma. His research is mainly focused on intergroup relations, triadic social stratifica-
tion and legitimizing ideologies.

Gian Antonio di Bernardo is Assistant Professor of Social Psychology and member of RIMILab (Research Center on
Interethnic Relations, Multiculturality and Immigration) at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. His research
is mainly focused on intergroup contact and social change.

Loris Vezzali is Full Professor of Social Psychology and Director of RIMILab (Research Center on Interethnic
Relations, Multiculturality and Immigration) at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. His research is mainly
focused on intergroup relations and strategies for prejudice reduction.

References
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. University of Manitoba Press.
Anderson, J. R. (2018a). Implicit and explicit attitudes towards asylum seekers in Australia: Demographic and
ideological correlates. Australian Psychologist, 53(2), 181–191. doi: 10.1111/ap.2018.53.issue-2
Anderson, J. R. (2018b). The prejudice against asylum seekers scale: Presenting the psychometric properties of a new
measure of classical and conditional attitudes. The Journal of Social Psychology, 158(6), 694–710. doi: 10.1080/
00224545.2017.1404958
Anderson, J. R. (2019). The moderating role of socially desirable responding in implicit–explicit attitudes toward
asylum seekers. International Journal of Psychology, 54(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12439
Anderson, J. R., & Ferguson, R. (2018). Demographic and ideological correlates of negative attitudes toward asylum
seekers: A meta-analytic review. Australian Journal of Psychology, 70(1), 18–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajpy.
12162
Anderson, J. R., Stuart, A., & Rossen, I. (2015). Not all negative: Macro justice principles predict positive attitudes
towards asylum seekers in Australia. Australian Journal of Psychology, 67(4), 207–213. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajpy.
12085
Barlow, F. K., Paolini, S., Pedersen, A., Hornsey, M. J., Radke, H. R. M., Harwood, M., & Sibley, G. (2012). The contact
caveat: Negative contact predicts increased prejudice more than positive contact predicts reduced prejudice.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(12), 1629–1643. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212457953
Barretta, P. Ed. (2015). Notizie di confine. Terzo rapporto Carta di Roma 2015 [Border news. Thrid report of Carta di
Roma 2015]. Retrieved April 3, 2016, from http://www.cartadiroma.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Rapporto-
2015_-cartadiroma.pdf
Barretta, P., & Milazzo, G., Eds. (2017). Notizie da paura. Quindi rapporto Carta di Roma 2017 [News for fear. Fith
report of Carta di Roma 2017]. Retrieved December 18, 2018, from https://www.cartadiroma.org/wp-content
/uploads/2017/12/Rapporto-2017-Notizie-da-paura.pdf
Biloslavo, F. (2014, November 1), La truffa dei rifugiati, uno su due è falso [The scam of refugees, one in two is false]. Il
Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/truffa-dei-rifugiati-su-due-falso-1064229.html
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen & J. S. Long (Eds.),
Testing structural equation models (pp. 136–162). Sage.
Canetti, D., Snider, K. L. G., & Pedersen, A. (2016). Threatened or threatening? How ideology shapes Asylum Seeke rs’
immigration policy attitudes in Israel and Australia. Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(4), 583–606. https://doi.org/10.
1093/jrs/few012
Capdevila, R., & Callaghan, J. E. M. (2008). “It’s not racist. it’s common sense”. A critical analysis of political discourse
around asylum and immigration in the UK. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 18(1), 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.904
Caricati, L. (2018). Perceived threat mediates the relationship between national identification and support for
immigrant exclusion: A cross-national test of intergroup threat theory. International Journal of Intercultural
Relations, 66, 41–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.06.005
Caricati, L., Mancini, T., & Marletta, G. (2017). The role of ingroup threat and conservative ideologies on prejudice
against immigrants in two samples of Italian adults. Journal of Social Psychology, 157(1), 86–97. https://doi.org/10.
1080/00224545.2016.1176552
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 765

Cataldi, V. (2018). Notizie di chiusura. Sesto rapporto Carta di Roma 2018 [Closing news. Sixth report of Carta di
Roma 2018]. Associazione Carta di Roma. https://www.cartadiroma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/cartadiroma_
rapporto2018.pdf
Cohrs, J. C., & Stelzl, M. (2010). How ideological attitudes predict host society members’ attitudes toward immigrants:
Exploring cross-national differences. Journal of Social Issues, 66(4), 673–694. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.
2010.01670.x
Cotterill, S., Sidanius, J., Bhardwaj, A., & Kumar, V. (2014). Ideological support for the indian caste system: social
dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism and karma. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2(1),
98–116. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v2i1.171
Cottrell, C. A., Richards, D. A. R., & Nichols, A. L. (2010). Predicting policy attitudes from general prejudice versus
specific intergroup emotions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 247–254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jesp.2009.10.008
Cowling, M. M., Anderson, J. R., & Ferguson, R. (2019). Prejudice-relevant correlates of attitudes towards refugees: A
meta-analysis. Journal of Refugee Studies, 32(3), 502–524. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey062
Croston, J., & Pedersen, A. (2013). ‘Tell me what I want to hear’: Motivated recall and attributions in media regarding
asylum seekers. Australian Journal of Psychology, 65(2), 124–133. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajpy.12012
Demos,, & Pi, (2017). Gli italiani e lo stato. Rapporto 2017 [Italian and the State. Report 2017]. Retrieved September
16, 2018, from http://www.demos.it/2018/pdf/4626itasta2017_20180122.pdf
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: A dual-process motivational model.
Journal of Personality, 78(6), 1861–1894. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00672.x
Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., Jackson, L. M., & Armstrong, T. L. (2001). The immigration dilemma: The role of
perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice and national identity. Journal of Social Issues, 57(3), 389–412. https://
doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00220
Esses, V. M., Veenvliet, S., Hodson, G., & Mihic, L. (2008). Justice, morality, and the dehumanization of refugees.
Social Justice Research, 21(1), 4–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-007-0058-4
Giurovich, I. (2017, January 13). Il giallo dei falsi rifugiati Pakistani [The mystery of the false Pakistani refugees]. Il
Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/giallo-dei-falsi-rifugiati-pakistani-1351063.html
Goodman, S., & Burke, S. (2010). “Oh you don’t want asylum seekers, oh you’re just racist”: A discursive analysis of
discussions about whether it’s racist to oppose asylum seekers. Discourse & Society, 21(3), 325–340. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0957926509360743
Goodman, S., & Burke, S. (2011). Discursive deracialization in talk about Asylum Seeking. Journal of Community &
Applied Social Psychology, 21(2), 111–123. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.1065
Graham, J. W. (2009). Missing data analysis: Making it work in the real world. Annual Review of Psychology, 60(1),
549–576. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085530
Gregurović, M., Kuti, S., & Župarić-Iljić, D. (2016). Attitudes towards immigrant workers and Asylum Seekers in
Eastern Croatia: Dimensions, determinants and differences. Migracijske I Etničke Teme, 32(1), 91–122. https://doi.
org/10.11567/met.32.1.4
Hartley, L., & Pedersen, A. (2007). Asylum seekers: How attributions and emotion affect Australians’ views on
mandatory detention of “the other”. Australian Journal of Psychology, 59(3), 119–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00049530701449455
Hartley, L., & Pedersen, A. (2015). Asylum Seekers and resettled refugees in Australia: Predicting social policy attitude
from prejudice versus emotion. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3(1), 142–160. https://doi.org/10.5964/
jspp.v3i1.476
Hartley, L. K., Anderson, J. R., & Pedersen, A. (2018). Process in the community, detain offshore or ‘turn back the
boats’? Predicting Australian Asylum-seeker policy support from false beliefs, prejudice and political ideology.
Journal of Refugee Studies, 32(4), 562–582. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey048
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria
versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling, 6(1), 1–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118
ISSP Research Group. (2015). International social survey programme: National identity III—ISSP 2013. GESIS Data
Archive. https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12312
Klocker, N. (2004). Community antagonism towards asylum seekers in Port Augusta, South Australia. Australian
Geographical Studies, 42(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8470.2004.00239.x
Koc, Y., & Anderson, J. R. (2018). Social DISTANCE toward Syrian Refugees: The role of intergroup anxiety in
facilitating positive relations. Journal of Social Issues, 74(4), 790–811. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12299
Landmann, H., Gaschler, R., & Rohmann, A. (2019). What is threatening about refugees? Identifying different types of
threat and their association with emotional responses and attitudes towards refugee migration. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 49(7), 1401–1420. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2593
Louis, W. R., Duck, J. M., Terry, D., Schuller, R., & Lalonde, R. (2007). Why do citizens want to keep refugees out?
Threats, fairness and hostile norms in the treatment of asylum seekers. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(1),
53–73. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.329
766 T. MANCINI ET AL.

Lynn, N., & Lea, S. (2003). A phantom menace and the New Apartheid: The social construction of asylum seekers in
the United Kingdom. Discourse & Society, 14(4), 425–452. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926503014004002
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., & Sugawara, H. M. (1996). Power analysis and determination of sample size for
covariance structure modeling.psychological. Methods,1(2), 130–149. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.1.2.130
Mancini, T., Caricati, L., & Bottura, B. (2018). The role of perception of threats, conservative beliefs and prejudice on
prosocial behavioural intention in favour of asylum seekers in a sample of Italian adults. Current Psychology. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s12144-018-9909-4
Manganelli, A. M., Bobbio, A., & Canova, L. (2007). A short version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale.
Personality and Individual Differences, 43(5), 1223–1234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.03.013
McFarland, S., & Adelson, S. (1996, July). Meeting of the international society of political psychology [Paper presented].
An omnibus study of personality and prejudice, Vancouver, Canada.
Nickerson, A. M., & Louis, W. R. (2008). Nationality Versus Humanity? Personality, Identity, and Norms in Relation
to Attitudes Toward Asylum Seekers. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(3), 796–817. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1559-1816.2007.00327.x
O’Doherty, K., & Augoustinos, M. (2008). Protecting the nation: Nationalist rhetoric on Asylum Seekers and the
Tampa. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 18(6), 576–592. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.973
O’Doherty, K., & Lecouteur, A. (2007). “Asylum seekers”, “boat people” and “illegal immigrants”: Social categorization
in the media. Australian Journal of Psychology, 59(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049530600941685
Onraet, E., Van Hiel, A., Valcke, B., & Van Assche, J. (2019). Reactions towards Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands:
Associations with right-wing ideological attitudes, threat and perceptions of Asylum Seekers as legitimate and
economic. Journal of Refugee Studies, fez103. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez103
Pedersen, A., Attwell, J., & Heveli, D. (2005). Prediction of negative attitudes toward Australian asylum seekers: False
beliefs, nationalism, and self-esteem. Australian Journal of Psychology, 57(3), 148–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00049530500125157
Pedersen, A., Watt, S., & Hansenet, S. (2006). The role of false beliefs in the community’s and the federal government’s
attitudes toward Australian asylum seekers. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 41(1), 105–124. https://search.
informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=157615711086279;res=IELFSC
Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Costa-Lopez, R. (2010). From prejudice to discrimination: The legitimizing role of perceived
threat in discrimination against immigrants. European Journal of Social Psychology, 40(7), 1231–1250. https://doi.
org/10.1002/ejsp.718
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research:
A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879
Polchi, V. (2016, October 13). Migranti, gli otto falsi miti da sfatare [Migrants, the eight false myths to debunk].
Repubblica. https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/10/13/news/migranti_falsi_miti_bonino-149688642/
Pratto, F., Çidam, A., Stewart, A. L., Zeineddine, F. B., Aranda, M., Aiello, A., Eicher, V., Cohrs, J. C., Durrheim, K.,
Eicher, V., Foels, R., Górska, P., Lee, I.-C., Licata, L., Liu, J. H., Li, L., Meyer, I., Morselli, D., Muldoon, O.,
Henkel, K. E., & Chryssochoou, X. (2013). Social dominance in context and in individuals contextual moderation of
robust effects of social dominance orientation in 15 languages and 20 countries. Social Psychological and Personality
Science, 4(5), 587–599. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550612473663
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2006). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking
stock and looking forward. European Review of Social Psychology, 17(1), 271–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10463280601055772
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable
predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,67(4), 741–763. doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.67.4.741
Preacher, K. J., & Coffman, D. L. (2006, May).Computing power and minimum sample size for RMSEA [Computer
software]. Available fromhttp://www.quantpsy.org.
R Core Team. (2018). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical
Computing. https://www.R-project.org/.
Report on International Protection in Italy. (2017). Gemmagraf, Roma. Retrieved February 26, 2019, from https://
www.unhcr.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Rapporto_2017_web.pdf
Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2013). The dual process model of. ideology and prejudice: A longitudinal test during
a global recession. The Journal of Social Psychology, 153(4), 448–466. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2012.757544
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge
University Press.
Suhnan, A., Pedersen, A., & Hartley, L. K. (2012). Re-examining prejudice against asylum seekers in Australia: The role
of people smugglers, the perception of threat, and acceptance of false beliefs. The Australian Community
Psychologist, 24 (2), 79–97. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11049
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 767

Thomsen, L., Green, E. G. T., & Sidanius, J. (2008). We will hunt them down: How social dominance orientation and
right-wing authoritarianism fuel ethnic persecution of immigrants in fundamentally different ways. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 44(6), 1455–1464. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.06.011
Trounson, J. S., Critcheley, C., & Pfeifer, J. E. (2015). Australian attitudes toward asylum seekers: Roles of dehuma-
nization and social dominance theory. Social Behavior and Personality, 43(10), 1641–1656. https://doi.org/10.2224/
sbp.2015.43.10.1641
United Nations. (2019). World population prospects 2019. Highlights. https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/
Files/WPP2019_Highlights.pdf
Verkuyten, M. (2004). Emotional reactions to and support for immigrant policies: Attributed responsibilities to
categories of asylum seekers. Social Justice Research, 17(3), 293–314. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SORE.0000041295.
83611.dc
Verkuyten, M. (2014). Identity and cultural diversity: What social psychology can teach us. Routledge.
Verkuyten, M., Altabatabaei, H. G., & Nooitgedagt, W. (2018). Supporting the accommodation of voluntary and
involuntary migrants: Humanitarian and host society considerations. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 9
(3), 267–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617737600
Vuong, Q. H. (1989). Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses.Econometrica,57(2), 307–
333. doi:10.2307/1912557

You might also like