KILUSANG MAYO UNO, Petitioner, – versus - THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent. G.R. No. 167798, EN BANC, APRIL 19, 2006, CARPIO, J. The
right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. EO 420
shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected,
recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further
provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID
systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguard

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner, – versus - P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, Respondent. G.R. No.
193636, EN BANC, July 24, 2012, SERENO, C.J. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of
the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other. In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to
prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made
her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, – versus - ST.
THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. G.R. No. 202666,
THIRD DIVISION, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that
many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to
their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. Considering that the default setting
for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner,- versus - P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 203254,
FIRST DIVISION, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. In order to support a petition for the issuance
of such writ, the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on one hand, and the right to life, liberty, or security on the other, which
must be supported by substantial evidence. In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly
renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.