THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL February 4, 1961

The Naga National Council

Origins of a Separatist Movement
Marcus F Franda
It is the purpose of this article to explore the factors which may account for the development of
the Naga National Council as a separatist movement in the north eastern portions of Assam.
For a number of years after 1947. this movement engaged the Government of India in what at
times took on the dimensions of a civil insurrection and which ultimately forced the Indian Government
to create a separate State of Nagaland.
The new State, India's sixteenth, is its smallest with an area of only 6.0(>0 square miles and a popu-
lation of 350,000 to 400,000 people.
The demand for an independent Nagaland was not supported by all the contiguous tribes residing
in the hills of Assam, nor was it even supported by all Naga tribes. _
The western must Naga tribes supported the movement, while the eastern tribes - the Konyahs
and Kalyo-Kengyus of the Tuensang Division of the North East Frontier Agency refused to sup/xnt the
Naga National Council.
A comparison of the Nagas with other tribes in Assam, and a comparison of the eastern and the
western Nagas may help us to understand the factors which entered into the creation of a separatist move-
ment.

THE most obvious contributory with the speakers of the same three annexation of the Khasi and Garo
factor to the separatist move- languages among the two other H i l l s also meant that they were
ment is the differences between the large Assamese tribes, the Garos and late-comers in a p p l y i n g themselves
Nagas of the hills and the plains- the khasis (see Table 1.,). to the task of learning non-Naga
men. The fact that the Nagas, The reason w h y so few Nagas languages.
vviih mongolian features, look speak any of the languages of the Antipathy Reciprocal
different f r o m the A r y a n plains- plains is largely due to the linguis- The differences between Nagas
men, tended to separate them in tic differences w i t h i n the tribes and plainsmen can also be seen, in
social situations and other con- themselves. The Khasis and Garos. the area of religious beliefs. W h i l e
tacts. T h i s was intensified by the each w i t h a u n i f o r m t r i b a l langu- the plains districts, like the rest of
association of the Naga, in the age, were able to devote much more I n d i a , had t r a d i t i o n a l l v been almost
m i n d of the plainsman, w i t h a time to the study of non-tribal exclusively populated by H i n d u s
head-hunting. "primitive" tribe languages before and after ventur- and Muslims, the Naga H i l l s came
whose customs were r a d i c a l l y dif- i n g away f r o m the hills. The fact to include a C h r i s t i a n population of
ferent f r o m those of other people.. that the Nagas were not conquered 45 per cent. Moreover, few Nagas
It is not insignificant that the u n t i l 1890, a half-century after the ever converted to Islam or to
Council was made up of a number
of youths who were unable to ad-
j u s t to the schools of Assam and
the cities of I n d i a . Ethnographic
differences were further accentuated
by differences in language. By m i d -
twentieth century, it was necessary
f o r educated Nagas to learn three
or four of their o w n dialects or
languages in order to matriculate
in Naga schools and this made it
difficult f o r them to learn the
languages of others, if f o r no other
reason than the l i m i t a t i o n s of t i m e .
Since few of the Assamese or
Bengalis were able to speak even
one Naga language, the l i n g u i s t i c
problem was intensified, w i t h the
result that Nagas were denied op-
portunities in the plains on the
basis of their i n a b i l i t y to speak the
language. T h e extent of the problem
can be seen by c o m p a r i n g the num-
ber of Nagas who could speak
either Assamese, B e n g a l i , or H i n d i ,
153
F e b r u a r y 4, 1961
H i n d u i s m , and when they d i d , it
was tinged w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l Naga
animism, The contrast presented
by the (faros and khasis is again
s t r i k i n g (see Table 2 ) .
These differences can be p a r t i a l l y
a t t r i b u t e d to the fact that the mis-
sionary efforts among the Garos and
Khasis were not as intense as those
among the Nagas. Hut they are also
due to the fact that H i n d u i s m and
Islam were real competitors in the
Khasi and Garo H i l l s . In the
case of the Khasis. the presence of
S h i l l o n g . the capital of Assam, in
the h i l l s meant that the tribals were
more constantly in contact w i t h re-
l i g i o n s of the plains. T h e Garos. the
westernmost T r i b e in Assam, had
been in contact w i t h the plains even
before the advent of the British
and had been somewhat assimilated.
T h e feeling of antipathy was re-
ciprocal in that the plainsmen also
thought of the Nagas in separate
terms. U n t i l independence, the
Nagas were considered a " f r o n t i e r
t r i b e " and classified w i t h the unad
ministered tribes on the border, in
contrast to the Khasis and Garos
who were considered to be an inte-
gral part of the plains districts.
Exploited by Plainsmen
The Naga tribes were never i n -
tegrated more closely w i t h the
plains districts largely because the
Naga H i l l s were not as accessible
to the p l a i n s people as were the
Khasi and Garo H i l l s . Also, since
the Khasi and Garo H i l l s contained
more natural and commercial resour-
ces than the Naga H i l l s , they offer-
ed greater opportunities to t r a d i n g
plainsmen. The accessibility of the
Khasi and Garo H i l l s to plains-
men also led to a greater degree
of economic development among
these t w o tribes than among the
Nagas. T h i s can be seen when view-
i n g the progress of c u l t i v a t i o n f r o m
1921 to 1951. Between these years,
the average net area sown increas-
ed by 1 8 % and 31% respectively
among the Khasis and Garos, w h i l e
the corresponding figure for
the Nagas was only 4 . 2 % .
A more complete view of the ex-
tent to w h i c h the Nagas were econo-
mically neglected can be gained by
a study of Table 3. r e l a t i n g to the
amount of money spent on public,
i n s t r u c t i o n . I n this case the B r i -
tish government spent more than
six times as much in the Garo H i l l s
and nearly eight times as much in
the Khasi H i l l s as was spent on the
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL
Nagas. T h i s meant that the Khasis
and Garos were being taught by
more people f r o m the plains and
thus were more l i k e l y to be instruct-
ed by those who had a favourable
view of plains people 'and culture.
At the same time, the Nagas were
getting their education f r o m a l i e n
A m e r i c a n Baptist missionaries who
d i d not know the plains people and
d i d not approve of the m a j o r i t y of
their customs.
British Offer of Crown Colony
The differences between Nagas
and plainsmen and the instances of
conflict between them, even taken
together, could not have been solely
responsible, however, for the sepa-
ratist movement since such conflicts
and differences existed also between
non-Naga hillsmen ( i n c l u d i n g the
Khasis and Garos) w h o eventually
agreed to inclusion w i t h i n the
I n d i a n U n i o n . T h o u g h the differ-
ences produced a more pronounced
feeling of separatism a m o n g the
Nagas than among the Khasis and
Garos, they were still differences
o n l y of degree and, taken alone,
m i g h t not account f o r the indepen-
dence demand. However, events
d u r i n g and immediately f o l l o w i n g
W o r l d W a r I I , peculiar t o the Naga
H i l l s and the western Naga tribes
alone, shaped the extremist position
of the Naga N a t i o n a l Council, N o t
o n l y was the w a r fought solely in
the Naga H i l l areas o f Assam, but
also the Nagas alone were offered
a separate c r o w n colony by the
B r i t i s h government and were sub-
ject to a great deal of freedom f r o m
I n d i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n after inde-
pendence.
A f t e r the war, educated Naga
leaders made extreme demands on
government. W h e n the Governor-
General-in-Council rewarded the
Naga war effort w i t h the promise
of a modern hospital at K o h i m a , a
n u m b e r of Nagas protested that it
was insufficient reward and asked
f o r educational and economic deve-
154
lopment schemes as w e l l as some
measure of self-government. B r i t i s h
administrators, i n c l u d i n g Professor
Coupland, reacted by p r o p o s i n g the
f o r m a t i o n of a B r i t i s h c r o w n colony
c o m p r i s i n g the Naga H i l l Areas and
the Naga areas of the N o r t h East
Frontier Agency. The Britishers
argued that these areas were not yet
ready for independence and that the
special conditions p r e v a i l i n g in the
h i l l s warranted their being severed
from India. Naga leaders who
were the o r i g i n a l members of the
Naga N a t i o n a l Council were called
together for the purpose of discussing
the c r o w n colony idea. They were
attracted by a proposal that sought
to j o i n all of the Naga tribes; pro-
mised the eventual transfer of gov-
ernment to Nagas; offered plans for
educational and economic develop
m e n t ; and w o u l d sever them f r o m
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the plainsmen
Thus when the B r i t i s h abandoned
the idea of a c r o w n colony and w i t h -
drew f r o m I n d i a , they left the
C o u n c i l w i t h its expectations heigh-
tened by the discussion of a c r o w n
colony, and face-to-face w i t h the
prospect of being incorporated into
the regular a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Assam.
Distrust of Assam Government
The events of the first four years
after independence contributed to the
Naga distrust of the Assam Govern-
ment. First there was a misunder-
standing about the nature of the
H y d e r i Pact, an agreement reached
in 1948 between the leaders of the
Naga N a t i o n a l Council, the Governor
of Assam, and the C h a i r m a n of
I n d i a ' s Constitutional Sub-committee
on Assam T r i b a l s . The C o u n c i l
interpreted the pact as a ten-year
treaty, after the e x p i r a t i o n of w h i c h
the Nagas w o u l d decide whether or
not to j o i n the I n d i a n U n i o n . They
were thus surprised to find that they
were, included in the I n d i a n U n i o n
when the Constitution was p r o m u l -
gated. In a d d i t i o n the Assam Gov-
ernment discontinued the p o l i c y of
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL
'Exclusion,' maintained by the
B r i t i s h u n t i l 1947. Under this policy,
those areas designated as 'Excluded
Areas" were administered by the
Central Government t h r o u g h the
Governor of the Province, but they
were not integrated into the Pro-
vince.
T h o u g h the Nagas wanted econo-
m i c development, they viewed w i t h
a l a r m the end of 'Exclusion' and
their fears were borne out when the
end of E x c l u s i o n resulted in an i n -
flux of merchants and usurers f r o m
the plains in larger numbers than
ever before, a situation made worse
by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of cheap cloth
w h i c h contributed to the breakdown
of cottage i n d u s t r y . Moreover, the
Government proclaimed its i n t e n t i o n
of i n s t i t u t i n g a policy of " d e t r i b a l i -
z a t i o n " designed, in the words of one
Governor of Assam, " t o b r i n g the
people of the hills to the same level
of the plains people w i t h i n as short
a p e r i o d as possible." It was re-
ported that this policy meant, among
other things, the teaching of Assa-
mese in all t r i b a l schools Finally,
the Nagas feared that a strong pro-
v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d mean
enforcement of the Assam Reserve
Forest Act and w o u l d p r o h i b i t many
of the homeless Naga families f r o m
clearing forests to b u i l d new homes.
Administrative Vacuum
The Council was able to gain
widespread support f o r its opposi-
t i o n to the I n d i a n U n i o n because of
the Naga fear of excessive Assamese
administration. Yet the Council
w o u l d not have been able to organize
as well as it d i d but for the lack
of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that accompanied
independence and p a r t i t i o n , a situa-
t i o n that made it impossible to ad-
minister p r o p e r l y the Naga H i l l s or
to undertake development schemes.
The f a i l u r e of the Assamese to ex-
tend their a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t o the
Naga H i l l s gave the Council an
o p p o r t u n i t y to administer the area
itself and to establish at least a
semblance of a unified Naga Gov-
ernment. In this endeavour it was
aided by the Assamese Government
w h i c h recognized A n g a m i Z a n u
Phizo. the N N C president, as the
representative spokesman of all Naga
tribes and even referred to the
N N C on some occasions as a
legitimate Government.
Once again the contrast to the
Garos and Khasis is s t r i k i n g .
W h i l e the Naga areas were always
Excluded Areas,' the Khasi and
Garo H i l l s became " P a r t i a l l y Ex-
cluded Areas" in 1935. T h i s meant
that the Khasis and Garos were
a l l o w e d to elect two representatives
to the Assam legislature and were
placed under the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of
a special M i n i s t r y in the Assam
cabinet. Moreover, local councils
were elected in some villages on an
experimental basis. " P a r t i a l E x c l u -
s i o n " served to draw the Khasis and
Garos closer to the people of the
plains. They were in constant con-
tact w i t h the P r o v i n c i a l Assembly,
and they grew accustomed to pre-
senting their demands to Govern-
ment to this body. In sharp contrast
was the case of the Nagas where the
administrative arrangements and the
period of war had caused the Assam
Government to lose contact w i t h the
tribals and thus help to strengthen
the Naga National Council. Since
the war d i d not spread to the Khasi
and Garo H i l l s , regular administra-
t i o n , d r a w i n g the t r i b a l s closer to
the Government of Assam, was
carried on u n t i l 1951 when the
S i x t h Schedule of the I n d i a n Consti-
t u t i o n replaced the existing arrange-
ments. But w h i l e the Khasis and
Garos accepted the Constitution of
1951 and were organizing to contest
elections, the Nagas were rejecting
these same arrangements, h a v i n g
already organized to demand inde-
pendence.
Why Eastern Nagas Kept Out
The Naga demand for separation
can thus be attributed to historical
differences between Nagas and plains-
men. coupled w i t h instances of con-
flict w i t h the peoples of the plains
and the lack of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
f o l l o w i n g independence. But what
then accounts f o r the f a i l u r e of the
eastern Nagas to support the organi-
zation? W h y d i d the western Nagas
f o r m an organization designed to
achieve separation while the eastern
Nagas d i d not j o i n the movement?
The remainder of this study is an
attempt to answer this question and
to conclude w i t h some observations
about organizational creation among
the Nagas.
The p o l i c y of both the missionaries
and of government served to change
t r a d i t i o n a l Naga society among the
western tribes. One of the first
effects of the intrusion of the B r i -
tish was the increased interaction
among the various tribes and
villages. Due to the expansion of
communications — roads, railways
135
F e b r u a r y 4, 1961
and even bridlepaths —- previously
isolated units came into contact w i t h
one another more frequently. ln-
deed. because of the need for por-
ters, cooks and houseboys, the B r i t i s h
administrators aided in increasing
the interaction of the various tribes
even further. Educational work
carried on by missionaries and Gov-
ernment schools, made possible by
the abolition of i n t e r t r i b a l head-
h u n t i n g , was a further c o n t r i b u t i n g
factor.
Village Political Organizations
But while tribes were tending to-
w a r d unity, the traditional village
political organizations were being
torn apart. The a b o l i t i o n of head-
h u n t i n g , for instance, undermined
the control of the chiefs and elders
whose p r i m a r y function had been to
determine the time for a r a i d or an
expedition against a n e i g h b o u r i n g
village. The power of the village
leaders was further undermined
when their j u d i c i a l powers were
usurped by British p o l i t i c a l officers.
The w o r k of the missionaries served
to weaken the force of the taboos and
the t r a d i t i o n a l system of social con-
trol. Probably the most serious
instance of this was the tendency for
boys to refuse to serve at the mo rung
( bachelor's house). The missionaries
forbade Christian youths to enter
the rnorung because of the excessive
amounts of rice-beer consumed
there. But this created a serious gap
in the social and p o l i t i c a l organiza-
tions in that there was no discipli-
nary agencies to take the place of
the morung. nor any other means of
r e c r u i t i n g future rulers.
W h i l e B r i t i s h policy and missio-
nary a c t i v i t y destroyed and weakened
the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l organizations,
it also served to introduce to the
Nagas new forms of organization.
The increased interaction of villages
and the unification of diverse dialects
made possible multi-village organiza-
tions. These were f o r t h c o m i n g in
the f o r m of "workers associations'*
and " C h r i s t i a n societies," instigated
by the missionaries to combat Naga
"laziness" and "sabbath-breaking.*"
Naga women's clubs and Naga student
groups were also formed in an
effort to provide a more f a m i l i a r
social environment in w h i c h the
missionaries could operate. By
W o r l d W a r I I , these new social
groupings were common to the
western Naga Hills-
 February 4, 1961
Educated Elite Replace
Tribal Rulers
W i t h the breakdown of the tradi-
tional p o l i t i c a l systems, t r i b a l chiefs,
ciders and councillors lost their
authority, though they were able to
m a i n t a i n their positions u n t i l inde-
pendence because of the presence of
B r i t i s h administrators. W h e n the
B r i t i s h left and Assamese were un-
able to replace the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
the t r i b a l rulers gave way to a new
set of rulers; an educated elite, cap-
able of p r o v i d i n g the skills and
knowledge necessary to f o r m a uni-
fied Naga Government that could
promise some hope of achieving the
new expectations. The result was a
new f o r m of political organization.
The voluntary associations that had
come into being p r i o r to World
W a r lb were combined w i t h other
newly formed organizations into one
bureaucratic structure, the Naga
National C o u n c i l . This new associa-
tion attempted to be a Naga central
(Government. In a sense it replaced
B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n : it collected
taxes, provided a j u d i c i a r y and be-
gan p l a n n i n g the development of
the Naga H i l l s . Moreover, it pro-
vided a vehicle which the new elite
could use to exercise its new-found
a u t h o r i t y and which t r i b a l rulers
could use to replace that aura of Iegi-
timacy that had been lost w i t h the
w i t h d r a w a l of the B r i t i s h . This
accounts for the C o u n c i l s success. It
controlled the populace of I he Naga
H i l l s to such an extent that it was
able to carry out a boycott of both
the 1051 and 1957 elections, was
able to battle 12.000 I n d i a n troops
to a five-year stalemate, and even-
t u a l l y to force the central govern-
ment to grant Naga statehood-
That the conditions of war played
a large part in shaping Naga con-
cepts of organization can be seen
f r o m the fact that the structure of
the organization was almost identical
to that of the Azad Hind Fauj (the
rebel I N A of Suhhas Bose). to
w h i c h many Naga leaders had be-
longed. In addition, the m i l i t a r y
w i n g of the Naga National C o u n c i l ,
the Home Guard. derived its name
and structure from the local A l l i e d
A r m y Units that had been set up
in 1943
No Cultural Absorption
The reason for the failure of the
Council organization to .spread to the
Konvaks, and Kalyo-Kengyus was
that these two Naga tribes had
avoided the process of change that
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL
had taken place among the western
Nagas. The missionaries had t r i e d
to evangelize the Konyaks in 1838
but had abandoned the attempt after
two years. By 1931, the Assam cen-
sus listed only two Christians among
the Konyaks and none among the
Kalyo-Kengyus. The British had
classified eastern Naga t e r r i t o r y as
an "unadmiuislered area" and only
one visit had been made to the t r i -
bes by an administrator d u r i n g the
entire p e r i o d of B r i t i s h rule. The
first attempt at a d m i n i s t e r i n g the
eastern Nagas, therefore, came in
1951 when the I n d i a n Government
attempted to place them in a single
administrative unit, t i e Tuensang
division of NFT A. But in this case
the administrators were f o r b i d d e n
to interfere in t r i b a l matters, to
encroach in any way on t r i b a l lands,
or even to collect taxes.
The Government of India was
able to m a i n t a i n f r i e n d l y relations
w i t h the eastern Nagas by f o l l o w i n g
t r i b a l customs. In 1956, when the
Naga N a t i o n a l Council began its
campaign of violence. Lieutenant-
General K S T h i m a y y a toured the
entire Tuensang division and con-
cluded a peace w i t h each p o w e r f u l
chief (Ang). The Ang d i d not feel
that he was relinquishing any of his
authority, however, since he viewed
the ceremonies merely as a m u t u a l
pledge of peace on the part of the
I n d i a n Government as well as his
own village. A l t h o u g h the eastern
Nagas were in theory thus constitu-
t i o n a l l y incorporated into the I n d i a n
Union, in fact the Aug still ruled
his village and the t r i b a l p o l i t i c a l
system remained intact- Thus, r i g h t
up u n t i l the present day, the eastern
Naga area can still be termed " v i r -
gin j u n g l e in the midst of head-
hunting country/' I Anupani Dhar
Ten Years' Progress in NEFA.
Calcutta: Sree Saraswaty Press.
1957 p. 25.) They have managed
to m a i n t a i n their t r a d i t i o n a l system
of political and social organization,
their self-sufficient village, economies,
their customs and religious beliefs-
There is l i t t l e or no trade, no inter-
village or i n t e r t r i b a l communication
and no common language. Not even
the war affected the eastern N a g a .
tribes, for the Japanese invaded to
the south of their t e r r i t o r y where
roads and paths made travel possible.
The complete isolation of Tuen-
sang Nagas accounts for their failure
to organize or to be recruited into
the Naga National C o u n c i l . The
156
eastern Nagas had no fear of cul-
tural absorption; neither the B r i t i s h
nor I n d i a n governments had tried to
impose direct rule over them. The
only threat of absorption came
f r o m the Council, and to this they
reacted by f o r m i n g t r a d i t i o n a l v i l -
lage alliances. The eastern Nagas
lacked the skills necessary to r u n a
large-scale bureaucratic structure-
None was capable of conversing in
several village dialects, none was
experienced in organizational af-
fairs, and none possessed the m i l i -
tary s k i l l s necessary to m a i n t a i n
order over a large geographic area.
Breakdown of Traditional
Authority
In contrast, a number of factors
can be put f o r w a r d to account for
the organized separatist movement
among the western Nagas. To begin
w i t h , the breakdown of traditional
authority due to the i n t r u s i o n of
Christianity and British administra-
tion caused an organizational gap
among the western Nagas. T h i s gap
was partially filled by the introduc-
tion of intervillage and intertribal
associations --which eventually c u l m i -
nated in an all-western Naga organi-
zation, the Naga National C o u n c i l .
The lack of a commensurate increase
in the authority of the B r i t i s h or
I n d i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n after W o r l d
W a r II and the f a i l u r e of the alien
riders to incorporate Naga villages
into a larger p o l i t i c a l f r a m e w o r k
gave the Council an o p p o r t u n i t y to
spread its organization over the en-
tire western Naga H i l l s .
Geographical factors were also
crucial to the emergence of an orga-
nized secessionist movement. The
rugged t e r r a i n and the difficulties i n -
volved in transporting I n d i a n troops
hampered the I n d i a n Government in
its attempts to quash the move-
ment by force w h i l e the c o n t i g u i t y of
Nagaland to foreign borders made
it realistic for the Nagas to demand
succession and also made it necessary
for the I n d i a n government to use
caution in sending troops.
F i n a l l y , the Naga war experience
was an i m p o r t a n t factor in that it
taught the Nagas m i l i t a r y strategy
and the use of weapons, brought
them into closer contact w i t h other
peoples and thus heightened their
expectations of political and econo-
mic development, and gave them
experience in that f o r m of organi-
zation w h i c h they used to press their
demand for independence.
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL F e b r u a r y -1, 1961
 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL

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