DIVISION

[ AC. NO. 5534, Jan 17, 2005 ]

JAYNE Y. YU v. RENATO LAZARO BONDAL +

DECISION
489 Phil. 247

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal (respondent) stands charged in a complaint [1] filed by
Jayne Y. Yu (complainant) for gross negligence and violation of Canon    16[2] and Rule
16.03[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged failure to
attend to the five cases she referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount
of P51,716.54 she has paid him.

By complainant's allegation, the following spawned the filing of the present

administrative complaint:

On March 30, 2000, she engaged the services of respondent as counsel in the following
cases: (1) "Jayne Yu. v. Swire Realty and Development Corp," for Rescission with
Damages filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, (2)  I.S. No. 00-
22089-90, "Jayne Yu v. Lourdes Fresnoza Boon," for Estafa, (3) I.S. No. 2000-G-
22087-88, "Jayne Yu v. Julie Teh," for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, (4) I.S. No.
2000-D-11826, "Jayne Yu v. Mona Lisa San Juan" for violation of  Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, and (5) I.S. No. 2000-D-11827, "Jayne Yu v. Elizabeth Chan Ong," also for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[4]

In the Retainer Agreement[5] dated March 30, 2000, complainant agreed to pay

respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an
Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing;  and in the event that damages are
recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee.
Complainant later issued two checks, BPI Family Bank No. 94944 and BPI Family
Bank No. 94968, dated February 20, 2001 and April 5, 2001 in the amount of
P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively.[6]

Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent failed to file a case against Swire
Realty and Development Corp;[7] due to respondent's negligence, the case for estafa
against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City and was not timely appealed to the Department of Justice;[8] respondent
negligently failed to inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the
necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed
against Julie Teh before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was
eventually dismissed by Resolution dated August 14, 2000;[9] and respondent
compelled her to settle the two cases for violation of B.P. Blg.    22 against Mona Lisa
San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms. [10]

Respondent thus demanded from respondent, by letter[11] of June 14, 2001, for the
return of all the records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases.

Through complainant's counsel (Chavez Laureta and Associates Law Office) which sent
a letter[12] to respondent, she reiterated her demand for the return of the records of the
cases.

Respondent did return but only the records bearing on the estafa case against Lourdes
Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan.

Complainant through counsel thus demanded, by letter[13] of August 8, 2001, the return
of the rest of the files, particularly that dealing with Swire Realty and Development
Corporation and Julie Teh.  In the same letter, complainant also demanded the refund
of the amounts covered by the above-said two BPI Family Bank Checks amounting to
P51,716.54, they being intended to represent payment of filing fees for the case against
Swire Realty and Development Corporation which respondent failed to file.

As respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply with complainant's valid

demands in evident bad faith and to her prejudice, she filed the present complaint
charging him with flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

By Resolution[14] of February 4, 2002, this Court directed respondent to file his

Comment.  Respondent, through his counsel, the Escobido and Pulgar Law Offices,
filed a motion for extension for thirty days or up to April 9, 2002, which was granted by
Resolution of May 27, 2002.  No copy was, however, furnished respondent's counsel.[15]

As respondent failed to file his Comment on the present complaint, this Court, by
Resolution of July 21, 2003, considered the filing of respondent's comment deemed
waived and allowed complainant to present her evidence before the Office of the Bar
Confidant.[16]

At the hearing before the Officer of the Bar Confidant, complainant echoed her
allegations in the complaint.
As to the other cases referred by complainant to respondent, complainant testified that
the case against Julie Enriquez-Teh was dismissed because respondent failed to
present the original checks subject of the case;[17] that the estafa case against Ms.
Lourdes Boon was dismissed and was never appealed;[18] and that she was prodded by
respondent to settle the two cases for B.P. Blg. 22 even if she was not satisfied with the
terms thereof, respondent having assured her that he would waive his 10% "success
fee" in the case against Swire Development.[19]

And complainant submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Retainer

Agreement between her and Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal;[20](2) BPI Family Bank Check
No. 94944 dated February 20, 2001 for P30,000.00 payable to cash; [21] (3) BPI Family
Bank Check No. 94968 dated April 5, 2001 for P21,716.54 payable to cash; [22] (4) 
Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Makati dated August 18, 2000 on a case between
Jayne Yu and Lourdes Fresnoza Boon;[23] (5) Resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Makati on a case between her and Julie Enriquez-Teh;[24] (5) her letter to respondent
dated June 14, 2001 requesting the return of pertinent records of the cases referred to
him;[25]    (6) letter of Francisco I. Chavez to respondent dated July 18, 2001 reiterating
the request for the return of the records and an accounting of the amount of
P51,716.54;[26] (7) letter of Francisco I. Chavez to respondent dated August 8, 2001
confirming the receipt of two folders relative to the cases she filed against Lourdes
Fresnoza Boon and Mona Lisa San Juan, requesting Atty. Bondal to return the files
bearing on Swire Realty and Development Corporation and Julie Teh, and demanding
the refund of the amount of P51,716.54.[27]

The Office of the Bar Confidant, by Report and Recommendation, [28]recommends the
dismissal of the complaint for failure of complainant to substantiate it.

From the records of the case, it is culled that except for the case against Swire
Development Corporation, the other 4 cases referred by complainant to respondent
were filed in court but were dismissed or terminated for causes not attributable to
respondent.

The case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon in I.S. No. 00-22089-90 was
dismissed by the Makati Prosecutor's Office by Resolution dated August 18, 2000 due
to lack of probable cause and, in any event, the issues raised therein were in the nature
of intra-corporate disputes which are properly cognizable by another forum, viz:

After careful examination andevaluation of the evidenceadduced both by complainanta
nd respondent, undersignedInvestigating Prosecutor findsno probable cause to hold
respondent for the offense charged of Estafa.  Apparently, there was no deceit and/or
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence employed by respondent when complainant
agreed to invest her money in the restaurant business under the name and style of La
Gondola, Inc. which is owned by respondent. xxx In the present case, though,
complainant alleged that respondent immediately upon receipt of the P4,800,000.00
representing her investment in the restaurant business, executed earlier in favor of
Philippine Commercial and International Bank whereby La Gondola assumed the loans
and credit accommodations obtained by Lucre Export/Import Inc., using the funds of
La Gondola, Inc.; respondent being the President and majority owner of the latter
corporation.  However, outside of the mere allegation of complainant that respondent
allegedly assumed the loans and credit accommodations extended to the other
company using the funds    of La Gondola, Inc., no concrete and real evidence were
presented and/or proven    to this effect by complainant. xxx

Moreover, it is apparent thatthe issues being raised bycomplainant appears to beintra-
corporate disputes which could be very well settled in another forum.[29](Underscoring
supplied)
Notably, a similar complaint for the same offense, docketed as I.S. No. 99-H-2780, had
been previously filed by complainant against Ms. Boon which case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.[30] As thus observed by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
filing of an appeal from the prosecutor's resolution would have been inutile since the
facts and issues raised in the estafa case had already been twice passed upon by the
Office of the City Prosecutor, hence, it would likely be dismissed. [31]

No fault or negligence can also be attributed to respondent in the dismissal of I.S. No.
2000-G-22087-88 against Julie Teh.  By Resolution of August 14, 2000 of the Makati
Prosecutor's Office, it is clear that it was dismissed, in the main, on the ground that the
offense charged did not actually exist and complainant failed to appear and present the
original checks, viz:

After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the undersigned recommends for
the dismissal of the present complaints on the following grounds:

1. Despite reasonable opportunity given to her, complainant failed to appear and

present the original copies of the subject checks and other documents attached to
the complaint.

2. The subject checks were presented after the 90-day period hence there is no more
presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.  Accordingly, the burden
is shifted upon the complainant to prove that at the time the checks were issued,
the drawer knew that he had insufficient funds.  There is no allegation much less
proof to that effect.  The result is that the element of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds or credit is not present, therefore the crime does not exist. [32].
On the alleged failure of respondent to appear during the hearing of I.S. No. 2000-G-
22087-88 and his failure to present the original of the checks subject thereof, they
being then in the possession of complainant who was abroad at that time: [33] Such
failure to present the original of the checks cannot solely be attributed to respondent,
for she herself was guilty of neglect.[34]

As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two complaints for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with the terms dictated by the therein respondents Mona
Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong, upon the promise of respondent that he would
waive the 10% success fee in the complaint to be filed against Swire Development: 
Assuming the truthfulness of her allegation that respondent compelled her to settle,
what the terms were as alleged to have been dictated by Ms. San Juan and Ms. Chan
Ong, and the manner and/or extent of prejudice she suffered, complainant did not
establish.  Moreover, she failed to show that the promise by respondent that he would
waive the 10% success fee was for the purpose of defrauding her or of such nature as to
constitute undue influence, thereby depriving her of reasonable freedom of choice.

Subsequent to the amicable settlement, it appears that complainant never raised any
objection to the terms of the compromise.  As an accepted rule, when a client, upon
becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly
repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about
it.[35]

As for complainant's claim that the amount of

P51,716.54, which was theonly amount on record thatcomplainant paid for respondent'
slegal services, was intended for the filing fees in the complaint against Swire
Development Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact the retainer
agreement does not so confirm.

We would like to thank you for retaining our law firm in the handling and
representation of your
case.  In regard to the fivecases you referred to us, ouraggregate Acceptance fee isP200,
000 Pesos with anAppearance fee of P1,500.00Pesos per hearing.  As regards the
damages to be recovered, we will get 10% thereof by way of Success Fee. [36]
(Underscoring supplied)
If, admittedly, the only payment given to complainant by respondent is the amount of
P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his
legal services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an
absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of
the outcome of the litigation.  That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of
the four cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent
appears to have represented the interest of complainant.  Litigants need to be
reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or "magicians" who can always win their
cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate
the litigants may feel about their cause.[37]

In sum, this Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of the Bar Confidant that
complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.  The charges against him must thus be dismissed. [38]

However, since respondent had been advised by complainant through counsel Chavez
Laureta and Associates, by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his
services, as of said date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz:

Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter, to immediately turn over
all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his successor.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.  Respondent is, however, hereby

directed to RETURN all the records in his possession relative to the cases he handled
for complainant.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5485 : March 16, 2005]
ELMER CANOY, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of
the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause
of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be
perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction
of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no
reason to deviate from the norm in this case.

A Complaint1 dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by
Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and
malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his
former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in
Bacolod City.2 Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998,
the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective
position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty.
Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful
visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit
at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back
as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the
NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in
1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.3
The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never
communicated to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to
submit the position paper.

The Comment4 filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the
Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent
and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims
that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorney's
Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the "hundreds or thousands."5 At
the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung
municipalities and reaching "the people who need legal advice and assistance."6 Atty.
Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a
victory which he generously attributes to the help "of the same people whom he had
helped by way of legal assistance before."7

Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The
lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be
resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of
Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the
order dismissing the case.8 Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to
file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the
position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, "he was
frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a
practicing lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical limitations," and
he withdrew from his other cases and his "free legal services."9

According to Atty. Ortiz, "Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all
that time, he was free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as
[he] would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court
trials and report to the Sanggunian office."10 He states that it was his policy to inform
clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would
be "too difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of
clients, mostly indigents" with only two office personnel.11

Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoy's complaint was without
prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to
remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though
as far as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to
handle the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same.12

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.13 Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the
complaint, but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the
investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal
of the charges.14 Eventually, the investigating commissioner concluded that "clearly,
the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and
diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients' (sic) claim," and recommended
that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.15 The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the
recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a
repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or
low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the
Public Attorney's Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and
the Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in
the quest to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the
services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are
especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call
of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward.

Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as

grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortiz's
legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latter's
illegal dismissal case leaves much to be desired.

Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against
the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoy's case.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
...

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

...

CANON 22 A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD

CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

...

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of
Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.16

If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would
not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The
relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for
the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and
should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are
being defended.17

There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on
time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more
time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or
substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary
degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the
paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint
dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided.

That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case,
hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position
paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.18

Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz's election as a City
Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate
him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a
lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office.19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from
engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors,20 and in such instance,
the attorney-client relationship is terminated.21 However, city councilors are allowed
to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours,
and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are
not relevant to this case.22 In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to
withdraw his/her services.23 Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not
effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating
that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the
adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.24

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot
just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected.25 Indeed, Rule 22.02
requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims
that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that
Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there
was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had
not been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of
Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom
Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Court's
attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his
office.26 He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the
status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients
of the status of cases entrusted to him.27

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of
similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine
of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even
disbarment in aggravated cases.28 Given the circumstances, the Court finds the
penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the
practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu
of an admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz's undisputed negligence
in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform
Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill
afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will
not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of
negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal
representation. They deserve quality representation as well.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the
same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached
to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in
the land.

SO ORDERED.
 DIVISION

[ AC. No. 7421, Oct 10, 2007 ]

ELISA V. VENTEREZ v. ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME +

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez, Genaro de Vera,
Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera against
respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981 entitled,
"Sps. Daniel and Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al.," for Declaration of
Ownership with Damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Respondent represented the complainants, who were defendants in said
case, until a Decision thereon was rendered by the MTC on 25 February 2004. The
MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent received a copy of the said Decision
on 3 March 2004.

Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for
Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. The
15-day period within which to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration of the MTC
Decision expired on 18 March 2004. Complainant Elisa V. Venterez was constrained to
contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed on
19 March 2004. It must be stressed that the said motion was signed by complainant
Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did not enter his appearance.

On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied[1]by the MTC.
Respondent was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a
Certification[2] issued by Clerk of Court II Zenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March 2004, a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution[3]was filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment on the said
motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted[4] by the MTC on 23
April 2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of Execution[5] was issued and on 26 April 2004,
an Entry of Judgment[6] was made in the said case.
Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his
Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.

Feeling aggrieved by respondent's actuations, complainants filed the instant

administrative complaint against him.[7]

In his Answer,[8] respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon after the
Decision was rendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to file an appeal
or a motion for reconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent averred that
Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed
him that "he [was] withdrawing the case from the respondent because he already
engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent gave the records of the
case to him." Respondent explained that "after Salvador Ramirez withdrew the case
from the respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the respondent turned over the
records of the case to him and the respondent ceased as the counsel of the
complainants." Respondent further alleged that the said Motion for Reconsideration
was already prepared by another lawyer. He denied being furnished a copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration allegedly prepared and filed by another lawyer engaged by
complainant Elisa V. Venterez and that he was served with a copy of the denial of the
said Motion by the MTC. Respondent also clarified that the "last day of the 15-day
period for the perfection of the appeal is 19 March 2004 since a copy of the decision
was served on the respondent on 4 March 2004." Finally, respondent argued that
"when the respondent was served a copy of the Motion for Writ of Execution, he
immediately notified Salvador Ramirez about said Motion but Salvador Ramirez came
to see the respondent only on 3 May 2005, when the respondent asked him to sign a
Notice of Retirement of Counsel signed by Salvador Ramirez which respondent
immediately filed in court."

Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, on 15 February 2006.

On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report

and Recommendation,[9] finding respondent liable for gross negligence and
recommending the imposition upon him of the penalty of three months suspension, to
wit:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of Gross

Negligence and should be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution[10] No. XVII-2006-457 dated
8 September 2006, approving and adopting the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Rodrigo
Cosme is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. [11]
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling
complainants' case, as would warrant disciplinary action.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client,
but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. [12]Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final
and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services
without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
[13]
 Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client.[14] This means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.[15]

The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio, Pangasinan,
on 25 February 2004. Respondent admitted[16] that he was served a copy of the said
Decision on 4 March 2004. After having received a copy of the MTC Decision,
respondent did not bother to file a Motion for Reconsideration or a notice of appeal
with the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelled to engage the services of a
new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the MTC who did not, however,
enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing that during this time,
respondent had not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel for the complainants
in Civil Case No. 981. Respondent only formally withdrew as counsel for complainant
in Civil Case No. 981 when he filed with the MTC his Notice[17] of Retirement as Counsel
on 5 May 2004, on the ground that "he was also retired as Counsel for the
[complainants] two days after he received copy of the decision rendered in this case
when SALVADOR RAMIREZ, a representative of the [complainants], withdrew all the
records of the case from [respondent] to be given to his new counsel."

We cannot accept respondent's defense that he had already withdrawn from the case
two days after his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly communicated
this withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein complainants, Inocencia
Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of respondent to wash his hands of any
liability for failing to pursue any of the available remedies to complainants from the
adverse MTC Decision.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause.[18] The right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted.[19] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that
an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.[20] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[21] A lawyer's
right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's
written consent or from a good cause.[22]

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire
at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that
he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written
consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse
party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application
with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine
whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must
be based on a good cause.[23]

What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified
under Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD

CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 -- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and
rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the
client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases.

The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can
the circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly
enumerated. Contrary to respondent's contention, his professional relations as a lawyer
with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case to
his clients. Respondent's defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador
Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to
withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to terminate the latter's
services.

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he,
however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer
has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.
[24]
 Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record
who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his
clients require.[25] He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his
clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are
not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent

remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he
has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his
clients without representation. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a
written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing,
in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is
recorded in the case.[26] Respondent did not comply with these obligations. Therefore,
he remains the counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the
duty to protect complainants' interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the
status of the case, he would have known that he was still the counsel of record as no
entry of appearance was ever made by another counsel. It would have been easily
discernible on his part that there was no change in his status as complainants' lawyer.
As of that time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting. Therefore, he would
have known that the Motion for Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of execution
had been issued under the circumstances.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondent's failure to protect the
interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable." Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This
Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer

involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. [27] In
cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand,
[28]
 fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[29] suspension of three months,[30] six
months[31]and even disbarment[32] in an aggravated case.

The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer
pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-month
suspension from the practice of law is a just penalty under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record with the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.
Case 44 not copy pasted

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5859 November 23, 2010

(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P.

MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For our review is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional
malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,2 are undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P.
Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an
administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City
Extension Office.3
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor
of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank
deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario
demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the
latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the
balance was his, as attorney’s fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an
administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.4
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and
recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.5
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of
lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also
instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporation’s accountant and the
judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the
balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases
against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to
recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege
that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family
problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and
unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their
lawyers, and the family corporation.6 They maintain that the primary purpose of the
cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of
law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent
be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27,7 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to
file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George
filed against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good
faith and were based on strong facts.8
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he
was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained
to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case
so he could justify his attorney’s fees.
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his client’s family. He argues
that the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from
their perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they
must be held accountable for the public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional
language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to
intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of "extorting from Rosario shocking
and unconscionable attorney’s fees."9
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties’ submissions, we
find ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.10 Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s
right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based
on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.11 In Maligsa v.
Cabanting,12 we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any
act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred
or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor,
which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the
IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the
respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation
of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP
who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his
former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former
client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities
and Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the
Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department
of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.13
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of
the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-
139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are
re-filing of previously dismissed cases.14
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different
fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any
ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case,
however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former
client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that
the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in
conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants’ family, the defendants named
in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions15 all indicate that
the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a
barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and
frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him
for infidelity in the custody of a client’s funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,16 the Court pronounced that it is professionally
irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto, Atty.
Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right
must be exercised in good faith.17
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice.1avvphil They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself,
he is an instrument to advance its ends – the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A
lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.18 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated
his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but
he did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and
Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility19 provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 – A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage
or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and
information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario’s
counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation,
private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of
the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired
through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct
violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Case 46 not found

 DIVISION

[ GR No. 183385, Feb 13, 2009 ]

EVANGELINA MASMUD v. NLRC +

RESOLUTION
598 Phil. 971

NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated
October 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmud's (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J.

Masmud (Alexander), filed a complaint[3]against First Victory Shipping Services and
Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability benefits, medical
expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.

In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney's fees on
a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled
or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed
that any award of attorney's fees shall pertain to respondent's law firm as
compensation.

On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the
monetary claims of Alexander. The dispositive portion of the decision, as quoted in the
CA Decision, reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the [First Victory

Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A.] jointly and severally liable to pay
[Alexander's] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 and
his sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in Philippine currency at the prevailing
rate of exchange at the time of payment; and to pay further the amount of
P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
[Alexander's] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Alexander's employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died.
After explaining the terms of the lawyer's fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused her
substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a Decision
dismissing the appeal of Alexander's employer. The employer subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in an Order dated October 26,
2004.

On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification. The
award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted.[5] Alexander's employers filed a
petition for certiorari[6]before this Court. On February 6, 2006, the Court issued a
Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.

Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for
the execution of the NLRC decision, which was later granted by the LA. The surety
bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go, the surety company
delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check amounting to
P3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to
Evangelina.

On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of
P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the
sum of P680,000.00.

Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney's lien alleging
that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the
amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney's fees, thus,
leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney's fees.

In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a comment with motion to
release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier. In her comment, Evangelina
manifested that Atty. Go's claim for attorney's fees of 40% of the total monetary award
was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.

On February 14, 2005, the LA issued an Order[7] granting Atty. Go's motion, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and further considering the substitute
complainant's initial payment of 20% to movant-counsel of the monetary claims as
paid, let the balance or unpaid twenty (20%) per cent of attorney's fees due movant-
counsel (or the amount of P839,587.39) be recorded as lien upon all the monies that
may still be paid to substitute complainant Evangelina Masmud.

Accordingly, the NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the amount of

P677,589.96 which is currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the lien.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Evangelina questioned the February 14, 2005 Order of the LA before the NLRC. On
January 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a Resolution [9] dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit.

Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari.[10] On October
31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[11] partially granting the petition. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

January 31, 2006 and July 18, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the Attorney's fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. is
declared fully compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has already
received.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the CA
issued a Resolution[13]denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition.

Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF

LAW IN ITS DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED 6
JUNE 2008 INSOFAR AS IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT LAWYER'S CLAIM OF
FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES.[14]
In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation of a
lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the
losing party to the prevailing party,[15]such that, in any of the cases provided by law
where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that
the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. [16]

Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney's fees, or the compensation that Atty.
Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her husband,
before the labor tribunals and before the court.

Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should govern
Atty. Go's compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer
contract.

Article 111 of the said Code provides:

ART. 111. Attorney's fees. -- (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable
party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the
wages recovered.
Contrary to Evangelina's proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorney's fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing
party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by
his client for the legal services he rendered.[17]

In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in
determining Atty. Go's compensation. The said Rule provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees.-- An attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to
the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.[18]
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee.
The contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid, unless found
by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.[19] Attorney's fees are
unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. [20] The
decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent
fee contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a
reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services.[21]

The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered
in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should receive. Canon
20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:

CANON 20 -- A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01. -- A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the

proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in
order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.[22] The amount of contingent
fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for
his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is
allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit
fails.[23] The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go
and Evangelina's husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the
attorney's fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the
monetary award.

The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled is

the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on
appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are absent
in the case at bench. The findings of the CA, which are supported by substantial
evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.[24]

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he
should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the
reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital
role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his
honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice
or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part
of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper
and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital
consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in
money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his
just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure
justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.[25]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 5655 : January 23, 2006]
VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding
Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.
A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:
On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent's services
as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v.
Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1,
Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal
services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and
demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.
On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount
of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any
pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions
rendered when complainant frequented his law office." She recommended that
respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and
surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-
121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarro's Report and
Recommendation.
On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.
Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I,
Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the
trial court's Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that "the tax declarations and
title" submitted by complainant "are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and
the Registry of Deed." Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint1
against complainant charging her with violations of Article 1712 and 172,3 and/or
Article 1824 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered
evidence.
In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:
First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She
hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of
nullity of title and a Petition for Review of a decree.
Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered submitted for decision" as early as
August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was
engaged as counsel, hence, "he could not have done anything anymore" about it.
Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case,
preventing him from doing his job.
And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004,
prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated
the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed
falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3)
respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really
believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this
Court's directive constitutes contempt.
We deny respondent's motion for reconsideration.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But
once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established,
giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.5 From then on, he is expected to
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
devotion.6
Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00
from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had
been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, "there is nothing
in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record
for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044." Neither is there any evidence nor pleading
submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.
With ingenuity, respondent now claims that "complainant did not engage his services
for Civil Case No. 00-044" but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new
petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows
very well that if he can successfully disassociate himself as complainant's counsel in
Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any dereliction of duties.
But respondent's current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his
previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,7 he
categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044,
originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:
4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.
4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a
bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044.
4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano - did not inquire the reason for
the referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty.
Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute
and/or defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.
xxx
5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and
demanded that he provides her with free legal service.
xxxxxx
5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044)
would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the
services of Atty. Oliver Lozano.
5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her
lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein.
5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil
Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual
and legal matters surrounding the said case.
5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became
even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044.
5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is
she insists in retaining his services.
5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees.
5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he
will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be
prepared and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case.
xxx
5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty.
Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the
acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced.
xxxxxx
5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001.
The latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and
his (respondent's) decision to reduce the acceptance fee.
5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply
because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee.
Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondent's Memorandum8 filed
with the IBP.
Undoubtedly, respondent's present version is a flagrant departure from his previous
pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is
going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is
objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is
contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.9 The present administrative
case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondent's previous admission that
complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now
unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has
been achieved by respondent's inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.
At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondent's
services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his
liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any
petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should
immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Pariñas v. Paguinto,10 we held
that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for
failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand." Per
records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the
money.
Neither do we find merit in respondent's second argument. The fact thatCivil Case No.
00-044 was already "submitted for decision" does not justify his inaction. After
agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his
appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned
complainant's money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing.
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the
blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital
to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous.
When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he
possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.11 As a
lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter
of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity
of complainant's title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on
the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment
of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.
Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his
fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in
Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus
justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant.
Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case
No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon
19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of
a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon
specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 ' A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of
the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call
upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should
have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If
complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there
is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she
falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the
second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he
learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their
attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his
negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified
the authenticity of complainant's title only after the "news of his suspension spread in
the legal community." To our mind, there is absurdity in invoking subsequent
knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.
Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was
motivated by vindictiveness.
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her
retainer.12 It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly
fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character,
requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.13 If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.14 Indeed, law is an
exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral
discipline.
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent's motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated
April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately
to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4948. February 23, 2000]

ANA CECILIA G. CABATI, et al. vs. ATTY. ALFONSO R. REYNO, JR., et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 23
2000.

A.C. No. 4948. (Ana Cecilia G. Cabati, et al. vs. Atty. Alfonso R. Reyno, Jr., et al.)

This is a case for disbarment filed by complainants Ana Cecilia G. Cabati and Fernando
C. Raynon (complainants) against respondents Attys. Alfonso R. Reyno, Jr., Yolanda G.
Reyno, Ferdinand A. Domingo, Lemuel A. Santos, Ian Dela Vega, Peter Francis Zagala,
Hon. Ralph C. Lantion and Lenito T. Serrano (respondents).

Complainant Cabati was the bookkeeper of Attys. Alfonso Reyno, Jr. and Yolanda G.
Reyno (Reyno spouses) for their personal and business accounts. She was also the
bookkeeper of the Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo and Santos Law Offices. The Reyno
spouses filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City a complaint against
Cabati and her common-law husband, complainant Raynon, charging them with
qualified theft through falsification of commercial documents and theft through
falsification of commercial documents, respectively.1 Complaint-Affidavit filed by
Attys. Alfonso Reyno, Jr. and Yolanda G. Reyno against Ana Cecilia G. Cabati and
Fernando C. Raynon, Rollo, pp. 122-129. Cabati, in complicity with Reynon, allegedly
forged the signature of Atty. Yolanda G. Reyno in checks which were in her custody by
virtue of her position in order to withdraw large amounts of money from the personal
accounts of the Reyno spouses.2 Ibid.

Subsequently, complainants filed countercharges against respondents with the Office

of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City serious illegal detention, light threats, robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons and carnapping. Petitioners claimed that on
November 24, 1997, they were subjected by respondent Reyno, Jr. and a certain Col.
Douglas Rosete to separate interrogations regarding alleged unauthorized
disbursements from the accounts of the Reyno spouses. They likewise alleged that
respondents acted collectively and in conspiracy in detaining them against their will at
the Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo and Santos Law Offices, coercing them into admitting
responsibility for the aforementioned unauthorized disbursements from the Reynos'
accounts, and compelling them to execute several documents conveying their real and
personal properties to the Reyno spouses in restitution for the amounts which thy took
from the accounts of the former.3 see Rollo, pp. 75-77; 84-89.

On September 7, 1998, petitioners also filed the instant case on the basis of the events
which led to their filing of the aforementioned criminal charges against the
respondents.4 Complaint, Rollo, pp. 1-8.

Acting on the complaint, the Court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1998 required
the respondents to file their comment on the complaint.5 Rollo, pp. 34-35.

Respondent Judge on his part declared in his Comment dated February 25, 1999 that:

xxx
2. The complaint against respondent Lantion is his being a
witness in a joint Affidavit, dated November 24, 1997. The
circumstances which led to respondent being a witness to the
said document is narrated in his Counter Affidavit which he
filed before the City Prosecutor of Pasig in I.S. No. 98-0138-41 to
wit:

xxx

2.1. In the evening of 24 November 1997, I, together

with my classmate, Lenito T. Serrano were at the
Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo & Santos Law Offices
located at Strata 100 Building, Emerald Avenue,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City, to fetch our other
classmates, Attys. Ferdinand A. Domingo and Lemuel
M. Santos, as we were scheduled to go to our class
reunion that evening.

2.2. While I was at the Reyno Law Office, I was

informed of the news that their office's bookkeeper,
Cecil Cabati, was being accused of having forged the
signature of Atty. Yolanda G. Reyno and illegally
withdrew large amounts of money over a certain
period of time from the personal accounts of Attys.
Alfonso and Yolanda Reyno.

2.3. Soon thereafter, I learned that Ms. Cabati and her

common-law husband, both of whom I personally
know, and to whom I am personally known, had
voluntarily admitted to having caused the illegal
withdrawal of the Reynos' money and had agreed to
make restitution.

2.4. I was then asked by Atty. Domingo if [I] could be a

witness to the signing of a Joint Affidavit of Ms. Cabati
and Mr. Raynon. Before I agreed, I requested that I
first read the said document and to talk personally to
Ms. Cabati and Mr. Raynon. Such request were
accommodated.

2.5. I then joined Cabati and Raynon, along with Atty.

Alfonso Reyno, Jr. in the room of Atty. Domingo.
After reading the document entitled "Joint Affidavit"
(annex "H" of Reynos Memorandum in I.S. No. 97 -
19230); I asked Cabati and Raynon if they understood
the said document they signed, as well as the
 consequence of their signing it. They responded that
they did and they signed the same voluntarily.

2.6. After being satisfied of the voluntariness of the

complainants in signing the Joint Affidavit, I affixed
my signature upon such document as a witness.

2.7. During my whole stay in the Reyno Law Offices, I

did not see, hear or participate in any act of
intimidation or threat of bodily harm against the
complainants. There were no "armed men" as alleged
by the complainants. As a matter of fact, I affixed my
signature to the aforementioned Joint Affidavit
because I was convinced that the said document was
entered into by the complainants voluntarily and free
from any intimidation or threat.

xxx6 Id., at 164-165.

After the respondents filed their respective comments, the Court on August 11, 1999,
resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.7Id., at 235.

Petitioners, however, filed an Opposition dated September 23, 1999 to the referral of
the case to the IBP on the ground that the close association of respondent Atty. Reyno,
Jr. with some officials of the IBP, specifically his law firm partner Atty. Leonard De
Vera, IBP spokesperson, and his brother in his fraternity, Atty. Jose A. Grapilon,
National President of the IBP, will influence the investigation of the IBP and deny them
justice and fair play.

Complainants apprehension that the IBP may not be fair and just in conducting the
investigation is grounded on pure speculation.

The IBP, through its investigating arm, the Committee on Bar Discipline,8 The
Committee on Bar Discipline was created in August 1998 by the Board of Governors of
the IBP to take the place of the National Grievance Investigation under Section 2, Rule
139-B, Revised Rules of Court. is empowered under Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court to conduct proceedings for the disbarment of an attorney upon the verified
complaint of any person.9 Section 1, Rule 139-B, supra. The investigator or
investigators appointed to probe complaints against lawyers are mandated to adhere to
the procedure laid down by law on how to conduct such disbarment proceedings.10 See
Section 2-12, Rule 139-B, supra. They are required to take their oath of office before
discharging their duties.11 Section 2, Rule 139-B, supra. The grounds for their
disqualification are laid down in the law, which are, in particular, relationships within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsel,
pecuniary interest, personal bias or having acted as counsel for other party.12 Sec. 2,
par. 2, Rule 139-B, supra. Just because some of the respondents belong to the same
fraternity as some of the IBP officers is not a sufficient ground to brand the entire
organization as biased. If the investigator shows any manifestation of partiality during
the investigation, complainants can ask for his disqualification.

Considering the foregoing, there is no reason to warrant the transfer of the

investigation of the case to the Court of Appeals absent any showing of actual bias
and/or arbitrariness on the part of the investigator or investigators to be designated by
the IBP for the purpose.

The Court now takes occasion to clarify that its referral of the case to the IBP for
investigation does not include the charges against respondent Judge Lantion. Being a
member of the Judiciary, it is the Supreme Court alone which has the power to
discipline him. This is clear in Art. VIII. Section 11 of the Constitution which provides:

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the

lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,
or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.

The matter was further clarified in Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 dated February 9,
1999,13Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 is entitled "Complaints Filed with the IBP
Against Justices and Judges of the Lower Courts." wherein it was explained that
justices and judges are not among those who may be investigated by the Committee on
Bar Discipline of the IBP. The phrase "attorneys in the government service" in
paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court was interpreted by
the Court as excluding members of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals and Judges of the other courts.14 Ibid.

A careful examination of the complaint reveals that it failed to allege any specific
charge against Judge Lantion. Complainants did not identify what specific or particular
acts were committed by respondent Judge which would warrant his disbarment. The
complaint simply contained a general charge which was sufficiently refuted by Judge
Lantion. Specifically, it states:

24. Thereafter, in the evening of 24 November 1997, after Atty.

Reyno, Jr. and Col. Rosete unlawfully and forcibly took the
aforesaid properties and/or documents relating thereto and
while the complainants were still being unlawfully detained in
one of the rooms of the Law Firm of Reyno, De Vera, Tiu,
Domingo & Santos, Respondents Atty. Alfonso R. Reyno, Jr.,
Atty. Ferdinand Domingo, Atty. Arturo Tiu, Atty. Lemuel
 Santos, Judge Ralph C. Lantion, Atty. Ian dela Vega, Atty. Peter
Francis Zagala, Atty. Lenito Serrano. Rodolfo Reyno, Col.
Douglas Rosete and his unidentified armed men acting
collectively and conspiring with one another, pressured,
coerced, intimidated and threatened with bodily harm, death
and continued detention Complainant[s] Ana Cecilia Cabati and
Fernando Raynon to sign and execute the following documents
which the said respondents prepared x x x.15 Complaint, Rollo, p. 5.

In his comment16 Rollo, pp. 163-167.16 to the complaint, respondent Judge averred

that complainants' claim against him relates to his act of signing as a witness in their
Joint Affidavit dated November 24, 1997.17 Comment, Rollo, p. 164. Respondent Judge
explained that he and his former law classmate co-respondent Serrano dropped by the
Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo and Santos Law Offices in the evening of November 24,
1997 to fetch their classmate, respondents Domingo and Santos, as they were schedule
to attend their class reunion that evening. It was only then that he learned that
complainant Cabati who worked as bookkeeper in said law firm was being accused of
forging the signature of respondent Atty. Yolanda G. Reyno and withdrawing large
amounts of money from the accounts of the Reyno spouses without the latter's consent.
When respondent Judge was asked if he could be a witness to the signing by
complainants of their Joint Affidavit, he asked if he could read said document and talk
to them before signing as witness. Judge Lantion claimed that he signed as such
witness only after reading the document and after confirming from the complainants
themselves that they executed said document voluntarily and that they understood the
consequences o their execution thereof.18 Ibid.

Respondent Judge added that he neither witnessed nor participated in any act of
intimidation or threat of bodily harm against complainants while he was inside the
Reyno Law Offices on November 24, 1997.19 Id., at 165.

After a careful study of the complainants' allegations against Judge Lantion and the
latter's response thereto, the Court finds no real and sufficient basis for the charges
imputed by complainants upon him. There is nothing unlawful, immoral nor improper
in respondent Judge Lantion's act of signing as witness the Joint Affidavit of
petitioners given the circumstances surrounding it.

WHEREFORE, the complainants' opposition to the referral of this case to the IBP for
investigation , report and recommendation or decision and their request that the same
be referred to the Court of Appeals instead are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The complaint against respondent Judge Lantion is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of
this resolution be attached to Judge Lantio's personal record.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

 Clerk of Court

Case 50 cannot be found

490 Phil. 165

SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. NO. 6086, January 26, 2005 ]
NICANOR B. GATMAYTAN, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ISIDRO C. ILAO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons."[1]
Before Us is an appeal of the Resolution[2] passed by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation[3] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan dated 04
April 2003, dismissing the complaint[4] for disbarment filed by Atty. Nicanor B.
Gatmaytan, Jr., against Atty. Isidro C. Ilao for violations of Canons 8, 10, and 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

THE FACTS

Complainant Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr., is a practicing lawyer who represented a

certain Teofista Payuran in Civil Case No. 4381-P before the Pasay City Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 109, for cancellation of title.[5] Respondent Atty. Isidro Ilao, on
the other hand, was counsel for the respondents in the said case.

On 17 August 1995, complainant received the Decision[6] rendered in Civil Case No.
4381-P penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez, the dispositive portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby orders plaintiff Teofista Payuran to pay
the defendants and third-party plaintiff Chiu Chin Siong as follows:
P935,750.00 representing the total amount of rentals from January 16, 1976 to
December 31, 1985. P485,418.75 representing the interest earned from the time they
fell due up to December 31, 1986, and such amount representing the interest earned by
the combined principal and interest from January 1, 1987 at the legal rate of 12% per
annum until fully paid;

The amount of P220,000.00 as attorney's acceptance fee plus P500.00 per appearance
and 20% of whatever amount the defendant third-party plaintiff may recover;

For plaintiff Teofista Payuran, Atty. Augusto Gatmaytan and Pentel Merchandising Co.,
Inc., Quintin Lim Eng Seng and Quintin O. Lim to jointly and solidarily pay the sum of
One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages and Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages plus cost of suit.[7]
Thereafter, complainant, as counsel for Teofista Payuran, filed on 24 August 1995 a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, the denial of which was received
by Atty. Gatmaytan on 24 October 1995. On 07 November 1995, complainant filed a
second Motion for Reconsideration[8] which was subsequently denied, the notice
thereof received on 26 December 1995. Consequently, on 08 January 1996,
complainant, as counsel, filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo. Said notice of
appeal was however denied due course on the ground that the appeal was already time-
barred. Thereupon, complainant, on behalf of Teofista Payuran, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus[9] before the Court of Appeals.

On 14 February 2002, during the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari, Atty. Ilao, as
counsel for Clifton Chiu,[10] filed before this Court a Complaint for Disbarment[11]
against herein complainant, Atty. Nicanor Gatmaytan, Jr., for violations of Canons 10,
12, 15, and 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On 07 March 2002, Atty.
Ilao, in his personal capacity and as attorney-in-fact of his co-plaintiffs,[12] filed a
complaint for damages in the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, against herein
complainant, Teofista Payuran and Atty. Augusto Gatmaytan.

On 05 August 2002, herein complainant Atty. Gatmaytan, filed his own Complaint for
Disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Ilao. Atty. Gatmaytan claims that by filing the
complaint for damages before the RTC of Nasugbu, respondent is guilty of making false
representations and advice to his clients, as well as committing falsehood, misleading
the court and misusing the Rules of Procedure.

It is this disbarment case against Atty. Ilao which is the subject matter of herein
disquisition.

After submission of the necessary pleadings, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, on

04 April 2003, issued her Report and Recommendation[13] recommending the
dismissal of Atty. Gatmaytan's complaint for lack of merit. On 26 April 2003,
Resolution No. XV-2003-211[14] was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP,
which adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and hence, the dismissal of the disbarment case. On 10 July 2003,
complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the dismissal of the complaint
without the Commissioner conducting an investigation. The Board of Governors of the
IBP, having already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court in accordance with
Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, hence, no longer exercising
jurisdiction over it, denied said Motion for Reconsideration in a resolution[15] dated
30 August 2003. Nevertheless, the Court, in a resolution dated 12 January 2004,
resolved to treat complainant's Motion for Reconsideration as an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the earlier resolution[16] of the IBP. Hence, the instant appeal.

THE ISSUE

In his appeal, the sole issue complainant raises is the absence of an investigation
conducted in connection with the resolution of his complaint for disbarment. He
asserts that instead of dismissing outright the complaint for lack of merit,
Commissioner San Juan should have conducted an investigation of the charged
violations of the Canons of Professional Responsibility by respondent pursuant to Rule
139-B, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.

RULING OF THE COURT

To properly address the issue raised by complainant, we must analyze Section 8 of Rule
139-B in relation to the pertinent section contained in said Rule -- Section 5 of Rule
139-B. They provide, thus:
SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the
Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring
him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the
Board of Governors upon his recommendation. . . . [Emphasis ours]

SEC. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to

answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. . . .
Quite clearly, the above provisions plainly show two (2) modes of initiatory actions that
the Investigator is empowered to take upon the complaint either dismiss the same
without delay or proceed with the investigation. Perforce:
A) The Investigator shall proceed with the investigation of the case:
1 if the complaint appears to be meritorious; or

2) upon joinder of the issues (upon submission of the answer by respondent within
fifteen [15] days from the date of service), when the answer shows that the complaint is
indeed meritorious; or

3) if respondent fails to answer.

B) On the other hand, the investigator may recommend the dismissal of the same:
1) if the complaint lacks merit; or

2) if the answer shows, to the satisfaction of the Investigator, that the complaint is not
meritorious.
Verily, it is within the sound discretion of the Investigator to determine whether or not
the complaint is meritorious and if an investigation must indeed ensue.

In the case at bar, Commissioner San Juan did not see the need to conduct an
investigation because, to her mind, the instances when an investigation shall push
through did not arise. Respondent Atty. Ilao did submit his answer to the complaint
and after the exchange of pleadings between the parties, the Commissioner made the
determination that the complaint does not merit action and must therefore be
dismissed. We quote, with approval, the ratiocination of Commissioner San Juan in
reaching the conclusion to dismiss the case:
A perusal of the Complaint for Damages (Civil Case No. 684) filed by herein
respondent and his co-plaintiffs against Teofista Payuran and Attys. Nicanor
Gatmaytan, Jr. and Augusto Gatmaytan, will readily show that said complaint was filed
precisely because CA-G.R. SP No. 41717 was filed by Teofista Payuran with the
assistance of herein complainant Atty. Nicanor Gatmaytan, Jr. The pertinent
allegations of the said Complaint for Damages read as follows:
…11. As a direct result of the filing of the said unfounded and baseless petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus, the auction sale of the levied properties which was held at
Cavity City on August 30, 1996, and despite the fact that a Certificate of Sale has had
already been duly executed by the sheriff, the same could not be approved by the
Honorable Trial Court and hence, the same could not be registered and for which
reason the redemption period has not yet started which, has it not been for the filing of
the said petition, the redemption period should have been within the month of
September 1997 wherein One US Dollar was costing about x x x P32.3945 Pesos, but
now the ratio of One Dollar is more that Fifty Pesos x x x, thereby at this point in time,
plaintiffs had already suffered a loss in the purchasing power which may not be less
than Two Million Pesos . . .
Whether or not there is merit to respondent's and his co-plaintiffs' claim for damages
in Civil Case No. 684 is not relevant to the instant case. As herein complainant himself
pointed out, the right to litigate is guaranteed by the Constitution and no less than the
Supreme Court itself in "R&B Surety and Insurance Co. v. IAC," 129 SCRA 736 stated
that:
The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. Sound principles of justice and public policy demand
that the persons shall have free resort to the courts of law for redress and vindication of
their rights without fear of later on standing trial for damages should their actions lose
ground.
Regarding complainant's contention that the filing of Civil Case No. 684 with the
Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas was intended to harass the defendants in
said case because said case could have been filed with the courts in Parañaque, Metro
Manila, is likewise without merit. It was expressly stated in said Complaint for
Damages that one of the plaintiffs in said case, herein respondent, was a resident of
Nasugbu, Batangas. Since under the Rules of Court, venue may be the residence of the
defendants or of the plaintiffs, at the option of the plaintiffs, Civil Case No. 684 was
properly filed in Batangas, the residence of herein respondent.[17]
The Court, in the case of Estrella Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[18] has
enunciated that in the absence of any showing that the findings complained of are
totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand. Consequently, absent
a showing that there is grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, the Court
must give credence to the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and the Board of Governors of the IBP that the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.

Evidently, complainant is belaboring under a misapprehension of Rule 139-B of the

Rules of Court. To the extent of being repetitive, it is only when the complaint bears
merit, or when the answer fails to show that the complaint indeed lacks merit, or when
respondent fails to file an answer that an investigation shall proceed. Otherwise, if the
complaint is bereft of merit, either on its face or as proven by respondent's answer, it
will be unjust to mandate the Investigator to conduct an investigation.
For failure to establish that respondent Atty. Ilao made false representations and
advice to his clients, committed falsehood, misled the court, and misused the Rules of
Procedure in violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Resolution of the IBP dismissing the complaint must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The

Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated 26 April 2003 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 5094. August 6, 2002.]

NOEMI ARANDIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERMANDO MAGALONG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:
On July 16, 1999, complainant Noemi Arandia filed with this Court a complaint-
affidavit charging respondent Atty. Ermando Magalong of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility for making threats against her and her husband in
connection with complainant’s alleged debts to his client. 1

Complainant alleged that on August 26, 1997, she was summoned by respondent to his
office, where he threatened her that he would have her and her husband arrested if they
did not make good the checks they gave to respondent’s client, Jonelyn Bastareche.
Complainant averred that respondent’s actuations surprised her, since she was not
aware of any outstanding indebtedness on her or her husband’s part in favor of Ms.
Bastareche. On September 15, 1997, complainant received from respondent’s secretary
respondent’s August 26, 1997 letter addressed to a certain "SPO2 Bautista/warrant
officer" requesting that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against complainant and
her husband be held in abeyance pending the ongoing negotiations between them and
his clients, the Bastareche spouses. 2

For fear that she and her husband would indeed be arrested by the police, complainant
obeyed respondent’s instructions to her and signed a document captioned Malinawong
Kasabutan (Amicable Settlement) before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their barangay.
Subsequently, when she verified from the trial court whether there was a pending
warrant of arrest against her, complainant discovered that no such warrant was issued
by the court.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary

In his Comment, respondent claimed that complainant had an existing obligation to

pay his client, Jonelyn Bastareche, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), the
amount corresponding to the two bouncing checks which she had earlier rediscounted
to Bastareche. Respondent contended that after Bastareche’s and respondent’s efforts
to collect the said amount from complainant failed, they decided to file a criminal case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He instructed his client to go to the police
investigator and file a sworn complaint against complainant. 3

Respondent said that he was not able to talk to Bastareche for about a week after he
instructed her to file the complaint. He further alleged that on August 26, 1997,
complainant went to his office and submitted a proposal to settle the dispute between
her and Bastareche. Respondent informed complainant that about a week ago, he
ordered Bastareche to file a complaint against her (complainant). Upon hearing this,
complainant insisted that her proposal be relayed immediately to Bastareche, and that
the warrant of arrest against her, if such had already been issued, be held in abeyance.
Believing that Bastareche had already filed a complaint against complainant,
respondent wrote the letter addressed to "SPO2 Bautista/warrant officer" requesting
that the issuance of the warrant of arrest be held in abeyance. 4

On October 25, 1999, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 5

In a letter dated March 20, 2000, the Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline, submitted to the Court a Notice of Resolution and the Records of the case
consisting of 26 pages. The Resolution of the Board of Governors, adopting the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez, states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

IBP Resolution No. XIV-2000-23

Adm. Case No. 5094

Noemi Arandia v. Atty. Ermando Magalong

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the case against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP’s resolution. She alleged
that she was not furnished a copy of said resolution and that it was respondent who
gave her a copy thereof. Complainant further claimed that she did not receive a copy of
the Answer filed by respondent with the IBP.
On August 16, 2000, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant’s
motion.

On September 16, 2000, respondent filed his Comment and Manifestation whereby he
informed the Court that he was adopting the Comment which he submitted to the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP on September 28, 1999.

It appears that the report and recommendation of the IBP was based merely on the
Original Rollo of the case which was sent by the Court to the IBP pursuant to its
October 25, 1999 resolution. No hearing was conducted to determine the veracity of
complainant’s and respondent’s respective allegations.

In Baldomar v. Paras, 6 the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at
the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating
the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the
case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte
investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice. . . . 7 (Emphasis supplied.)

It must be emphasized that a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which

may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons. 8 Thus, Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court which outlines the procedure for disbarment and
disciplinary cases against members of the Bar, directs an investigator or a panel of
investigators appointed as such by the IBP Board of Governors to investigate all
complaints referred by said body to him, or to the panel, as the case may be. 9 In
conducting an investigation, the investigator or investigating panel must comply with
the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the

Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring
him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the
Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal
shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case
motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice
of the dismissal of the complaint.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

"x x x

"Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to

answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice,
the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors
upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall
require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP
Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with
the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing
shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a period of fifteen
(15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the
imposition of penalty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Court finds that the conduct of a formal investigation is necessary for the proper
resolution of the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 5285 April 14, 2004

JUDGE NIMFA P. SITACA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIEGO M. PALOMARES, respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:
Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr., for
having filed a falsified bail bond.

Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca was the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City. Among the cases in her sala was Criminal
Case No. RTC-1503 for murder against Dunhill Palomares, a son of Atty. Diego M.
Palomares, Jr., herein respondent. Sometime in September 1997, Atty. Palomares, in
representation of Dunhill, filed a bail bond of P200,000.00 to secure the latter’s
release. The bail bond was purportedly signed and approved by the late Judge Nazar U.
Chavez, then Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City, and with it was
a corresponding order of release signed by RTC Branch 18 Clerk of Court Atty. Glenn
Peter C. Baldado. When informed of the filing by Atty. Palomares of the bail bond,
ostensibly signed by Judge Chavez, Judge Sitaca approved the release of the accused.

When RTC Branch 35 Clerk of Court Atty. Roy P. Murallon later requested Atty.
Baldado to forward to the Ozamis City RTC the original records and supporting
documents on the bail bond, Atty. Baldado, by then already a practicing lawyer,
disavowed the existence of the bail bond. Atty. Baldado wrote to say that per the official
records of Cagayan de Oro RTC, Branch 18, the bail bond did not exist, that no
approval was made by Judge Chavez, and that no order for the release of Dunhill was
issued. Atty. Baldado concluded that the bail bond was a forged document.

Judge Sitaca directed Atty. Palomares to explain. In his letter to Judge Sitaca, Atty.
Palomares stated that he was the corporate legal counsel of Bentley House
International Corporation, and when the bail application was approved for
P200,000.00, he requested the amount from Jonathon Stevenz and Cristina Q.
Romarate, Chief Operations Officer and Treasurer, respectively, of Bentley House
International Corporation. Instead of giving the money, Stevenz and Romarate
proposed to utilize the services of William Guialani. He acceded. Guialani then
delivered the release order, which Atty. Palomares immediately presented to the
Branch 35 clerk of court of RTC Ozamis City. The clerk of court read the release order
and then issued the corresponding order for the release of Dunhill Palomares. Atty.
Palomares denied any wrongdoing in connection with the submission of the falsified
bail bond and offered, in any event, to replace the bail bond with a cash bond.

Judge Sitaca, finding the explanation unsatisfactory, filed disbarment proceedings

against Atty. Palomares.
The Court, in its 02nd August 2000 resolution, required Atty. Palomares to comment
on the complaint for disbarment. In his comment, Atty. Palomares reiterated his
previous explanation to Judge Sitaca. In addition, he intimated that Judge Sitaca was
covering up for the negligence of her clerk of court. He claimed that Judge Sitaca was
not around when the release order was issued because it was a Saturday and only a
skeletal force was in the office. Atty. Palomares said that he had asked the help of Atty.
Manuel Ravanera to prove that the bail bond was secured by Guialani who could have
possibly been in "cahoots" with some court employees.

In its resolution of 19 March 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Report and Recommendation, dated 24 July 2003, Commissioner Milagros V. San

Juan held that there was no doubt that the bail bond and order of release were
"fictitious." She stated that while there was no conclusive proof that Atty. Palomares
had been the author of the fictitious bail and release order, it could not be denied,
however, that it was he who presented the papers to the court. Atty. Palomares failed to
satisfactorily explain, she stated, why he had to take a circuitous route and secure the
services of Guialani despite his claim that he could have easily availed himself of the
facilities of other insurance companies. She recommended that Atty. Palomares be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen (18) months. The
recommendation was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors on 30 August 2003 in its
Resolution No. XVI-2002-81.

Administrative complaints for disbarment are referred to the IBP for formal
investigation by the Court after an evaluation by it of the pleadings submitted.1 An ex-
parte investigation may only be conducted when the respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice.2 In this case, it would appear that no investigation, not even just an
ex-parte investigation, was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline.

The prevailing procedure for investigation is that expressed in Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court some pertinent provisions of which read:
"SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. – The National Grievance
Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar
referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.

"x x x xxx xxx

"SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. – If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the

Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring
him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the
Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal
shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case
motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice
of the dismissal of the complaint.

"No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

"x x x xxx xxx

"SEC. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to

answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice,
the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

"The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors
upon prior application.

"Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall
require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP
Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with
the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing
shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of
fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if
warranted, the imposition of penalty."

The Court must call for the due observance of the foregoing rules, and it is thus
constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines for further proceedings; it is also directed to act on this referral with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

DIVISION

[ ADM CASE NO. 6554, Dec 14, 2005 ]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN +

DECISION
514 Phil. 15

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On petition for review is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio-
Bildner (petitioner) against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (respondent), docketed as CBD Case
No. 02-984.

In her complaint against respondent, petitioner alleges that on July 15, 1991, her father,
the late Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), engaged the services of the law office of Liwanag
Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0009,[1] "Republic of the Philippines v. Jose L. Africa, et al.," of which Ilusorio was one
of the defendants.

In that civil case, the Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares in the latter
corporation of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Respondent, together with
Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for Ilusorio.

While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Raval and
Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a
Compromise Agreement with the Republic which bore the imprimatur of the
Sandiganbayan.[2] Under the Compromise Agreement which, by petitioner's claim,
constituted the full, comprehensive and final settlement of claims of the parties, the
Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares.

Petitioner alleges that during the special stockholders' meeting of PHILCOMSAT held
on August 27, 1998 which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce
the newly appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private
stockholders of POTC, the gathering, through the "high-handed and deceitful
maneuvers" of respondent, was suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special
Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected.

Petitioner adds that Ilusorio contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, docketed as SEC Case No. 09-
98-6086, against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and
officers of PHILCOMSAT,[3] in which SEC case respondent appeared as the counsel of
Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests.

Ilusorio, together with Fidelity Farms, Inc. and Great Asia Enterprises, Inc., had earlier
filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint against respondent on the same grounds as
those raised in the present case. However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the
failure of his children, namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and petitioner, to
establish their qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was dismissed. The
dismissal having explicitly stated that it was without prejudice to the filing of a new
complaint by Ilusorio's children or any person who knows of respondent's unethical
acts, petitioner contends that her present complaint is not barred by such dismissal.
After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan found
merit in petitioner's complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for
three months.

By the now assailed Resolution of February 27, 2004, however, the IBP Board of
Governors set aside the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the
complaint.

No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner, nonetheless,
learned about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside
thereof by the Board of Governors, prodding her to write a March 10, 2004 letter to the
Board in her own name requesting "that the Board take up the matter once more" and
asking for "the remanding of the case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board of
Governors." In the same letter, petitioner stated that the very brief time it took the
Board to review the case and resolve it in respondent's favor confirms the information
she received that a former IBP official had been intervening for respondent.

By letter of April 16, 2004 bearing the signatures of all its members, the Board of
Governors denied what it considered as petitioner's malicious and reckless allegations,
stating that it was "constrained to deny [petitioner's] request for a remanding or a
reconsideration of the case" as there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such
case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to Atty.
Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently
National President of the IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been notified of
any final action on her complaint, and attaching thereto as further evidence a
document for its consideration in the event that no such action had yet been taken.

Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board
could no longer act on petitioner's July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be
considering the letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the
rules of procedure for cases of the kind. And the Chairman referred petitioner's counsel
to the Board's April 16, 2004 letter to her.

Atty. Divina thereupon sent a letter dated August 18, 2004 to Atty. Rogelio Vinluan,
National Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, requesting for a copy of the Notice of
Resolution of the Board of Governors and of the Investigation Report of Commissioner
San Juan, so that petitioner may appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
Atty. Divina later sent Atty. Vinluan another letter, dated August 27, 2004, stating that
upon further reading of the August 11 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, it appeared
that it was the Chairman's intention that the said letter be treated as a Notice of
Resolution and, therefore, petitioner had until September 2, 2004 to file a Petition for
Review (since the August 11 letter was received on August 17, 2004). Instead of asking
for the Notice of Resolution as in his previous letter, Atty. Divina only requested in his
August 24, 2004 letter for a copy of the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
San Juan and the record, if any, of the deliberations of the IBP indicating the basis for
reversing her findings. This letter, according to petitioner, was simply ignored.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004 to which respondent
has already filed his Comment.

Before delving into the merits of this case, the procedural issues raised by respondent
against the petition will first be addressed.

Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged IBP
resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004
letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board
admitting having acquired knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner San Juan's
recommendation. Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004
to file a petition for review.

Respondent further contends that even on the assumption that the petition was timely
filed, the same should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being
based not on a resolution of the IBP Board, but merely on a letter of the IBP President,
contrary to Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states:

xxx

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed
by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it
shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall
be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complaint or other interested party
filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's
resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)
This Court finds that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioner's counsel may not
be deemed to be the notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule
139-B, paragraph (c). The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers
not to an unofficial information that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter
from the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the official notice of
resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all
parties and transmitted to this Court. As paragraph (d) which immediately follows
paragraph (c) states:

(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through
their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
In its Comment to the present petition, respondent IBP admits that no such notice has
been sent to petitioner: "The Board has not to date issued the notice of resolution
confirming the dismissal of CBD Case No. 02-984 for the reason that all the relevant
records have yet to be completed for transmittal to the Supreme Court. The
complainant will be formally furnished a copy of the resolution upon transmittal of the
records to the Supreme Court."[4]

The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6, 2005 the Notice of Resolution.
A copy was supposedly furnished the petitioner; however, the IBP has not submitted
any proof of service.

Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was filed, as
the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of
resolution, the present petition has been timely filed.

Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may not
act on motions for reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the
rules of procedure for disbarment cases. For Pimentel, Jr. vs. Atty. Llorente[5] instructs:

x x x The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or

not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva, in which this
Court held:

"Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for

reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is
prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the
filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the
judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced." (Underscoring
supplied)
In another vein, respondent claims that the petition is premature as it is not based on a
notice of resolution of the Board, hence, it should be dismissed for being inappropriate
and improper.

While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBP's dismissal of a
disciplinary case should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance
that the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27,
2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner. As borne out by the IBP's
statement noted earlier, there was still no notice to petitioner as of February 9, 2005
almost one year after the dismissal of the subject complaint. The IBP has given no
reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation that records were still being
completed. In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her complaint
was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be
faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of
resolution.

Respondent also challenges the qualification of petitioner to file this case on the ground
of her purported lack of personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint. He
invokes the resolution of the IBP in the prior disbarment case against him, where
petitioner who therein sought to be substituted in place of her deceased father was held
to be without the requisite personal knowledge to pursue the complaint.

Even granting arguendo that the earlier resolution "constitutes res judicata with

respect to the finding that Petitioner does not possess personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances for which Respondent is sought to be administratively liable,"
personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment complaint. Section 1, Rule
139-B states:

SECTION 1. How instituted.Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if
there are any. Oddly enough, the quotation of the same provision by the Investigating
Commissioner who dismissed the earlier disciplinary case against respondent omitted
the phrase "any person," making it appear that complainants must have personal
knowledge of the facts they allege.[6]

Moreover, the ruling of this Court in Navarro v. Meneses III[7] bears reiteration:

The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is
unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for
the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Courtmotu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified
complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the
only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence
submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain
its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Underscoring supplied)
While this Court notes petitioner's claim that she herself has personal knowledge of the
facts alleged in her complaint, a ruling on such allegation is unnecessary in light of the
foregoing discussion.

Segueing to the merits of the petition, respondent admits that his firm represented
Ilusorio in Sandiganbayan Case No. 009[8] and that he represented Manuel Nieto, Jr.
and Lourdes Africa in SEC Case No. 09-98-6086. [9] The Court notes, however, that
besides Nieto and Africa, respondent represented Salvador Hizon as well, as indicated
in his Memorandum submitted to the SEC[10] and as found by the Committee on
Professional Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment of the IBP.[11]

Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC

cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he
proffering that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan "has been
the personal account of Atty. Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the law
partnership." Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by
respondent's own evidence and statements.

Thus, respondent attached to his Comment to the present petition documentary

evidence consisting of, among other things, two letters to the PCGG, in one of which he
signed on behalf of his firm, and in the other his name appeared as counsel on behalf of
his firm.[12] The subject of both letters was the then pending negotiations between the
PCGG and Ilusorio who was therein identified as the client of respondent's firm. In
connection with these letters, respondent claims: "If by chance the signature of the
Respondent appears on some correspondences, it is only because Respondent, in good
faith, accommodated Atty. Raval upon the latter's request who, as then Deputy
Secretary of the Senate of the Philippines, is not authorized to engage in the private
practice."[13]Besides being a flimsy excuse by itself, this claim of respondent, being an
acknowledgment that he signed correspondences with the PCGG pertaining to the
Ilusorio case, only shows that both he and Atty. Raval collaborated on said case.
Furthermore, as earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by
his firm in the Sandiganbayan case.[14] In light thereof, respondent was personally
barred by the rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier
espoused by his firm. So this Court held in Hilado v. David:[15]

x x x If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Franciso
and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado
a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estops him in the same manner
and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from
a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the
firm.  This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in
our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the
nature of his connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent denies, however, representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB
Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other. He
attempts to distinguish them as follows:

36. SB Case No. 009, initiated by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan is totally
distinct and separate, and has no relation at all to SEC Case No. 09-98-6086.
Said cases involve different parties and causes of action.

37. In Sandiganbayan Case No. 009, the opposing parties are the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as plaintiff; Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio,
as Defendant and Third party Plaintiff; and Independent Realty Corporation
(IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. (MLDC).

38. The subject matter in SB Case No. 009 are shares owned by the National
Government, through IRC and MLDC, in the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).

39. SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 involves a dispute regarding the PHILCOMSAT
election of its Board of Directors and corporate officers. [16]

The foregoing explanation fails to mention, however, that Ilusorio, a defendant in the
Sandiganbayan case, was one of the petitioners in the SEC case, and that among the
grounds Ilusorio relied upon in his petition in the SEC was the existence of the
Compromise Agreement in the Sandiganbayan, which vested in him ownership and
voting rights corresponding to 673 POTC shares.[17]

Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondent's Memorandum dated

September 28, 1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as
follows:

A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant Petition

by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of
the disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the Petitioners of the said
shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This Petition is a premature action to enforce
the Compromise Agreement entered into by Mr. Ilusorio.Clearly, this is beyond the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the
Compromise Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time.[18] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an
interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had
priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.

The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondent's firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that
there was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case "did not
in any way involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG." [19]

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004
is SET ASIDE.Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.

390 Phil. 1

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000 ]

MAXIMO DUMADAG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ERNESTO L. LUMAYA,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On the basis of an administrative complaint for Unethical Practices, Conflict of Interest
and Disloyalty To Clients dated December 22 1983[1]filed by complainant against
respondent praying that the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed on the latter,
the case was referred to Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) by the Court [2] for
investigation and report.

On February 26, 1990, the OSG submitted a Report[3] finding respondent culpable for
infidelity and disloyalty to his client, negligence of duty, unethical practices and
violation of his lawyer's oath.[4] As penalty, the OSG recommended that after due
hearing, "respondent be suspended from the practice of law for not less than five (5)
years."[5]

Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 21, 1991[6] the Court found that respondent made
a "clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility" [7] and suspended
respondent indefinitely from the practice of law.[8]

A "Petition For Reinvestigation and Reconsideration," [9] filed on July 8, 1991, was

subsequently denied by the Court per its Resolution dated January 13, 1992. [10]

The records show that thereafter, respondent sent a letter dated February 17, 1992.
[11]
 Stressing in the said letter that he was not seeking a reconsideration of the denial of
his petition for reinvestigation, respondent averred in sum that he was a "not very
healthy" sixty-two (62) year old who merely wanted to know how long he would stay
suspended and if he was disqualified to be issued a commission as a notary public
considering that his commission was not renewed. This letter was noted by the Court in
a Resolution dated March 30,1992.[12]

On June 18, 1992, respondent filed a Manifestation dated May 15, 1992 [13] where he
prayed that the Court issue a resolution or decision on his averments that:

he has been suspended from the practice of law and denied a notarial
1.]
commission for more than one (1) year already;
for lack of practicing lawyers and notaries public in the Municipality of
Baganga, Davao Oriental where Branch VII of the Regional Trial Court and the
2.]
Second Municipal Court set a popular public clamor which constrained the
undersigned to file the manifestation;
more than fifty percent (50%) of the pending civil and criminal cases were
cases handled by the respondent and these cases are still pending resolution
especially due to the lack of lawyers in the municipality considering that most
3.] of the litigants are poor and could not afford to hire lawyers from Mati, the
capital town of Davao Oriental or from Davao City where plane fare coming
from said places is Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) one way with no hotels nor
lodges in Baganga;
there is no regular judge in Baganga after the retirement of Judge Osias Y.
Verano last March 5, 1992 and many detained accused are in jail without hope
4.]
for an early resolution of their cases coupled with the fact that respondent is
still under suspension and they cannot hire "exorbitant" lawyers;
 he has been advised to secure petitions to be signed by all Barangay Chairmen
in the Eighteen (18) Barangays of the municipality, the Seventy-Four (74)
Chapters of the GKK, all NGOs, other religious and civic organizations and to
5.] submit them to the Supreme Court to request the Court to lift his indefinite
suspension so that he may help those who are actually helpless and so that he
may be issued a notarial commission in order to help those who need notarial
assistance without fear of being charged beyond their capacity to pay;
the Court can refer to the records of Branch VII, RTC, Baganga, Davao
6.] Oriental and the same would show that most of the civil and criminal cases
resolved or decided therein were cases handled by respondent;
the filing of the Manifestation is for the purpose of requesting the Court to
provide him with advice as to whether the filing of a petition was necessary to
7.]
lift the order of his indefinite suspension as well as the issuance of a notarial
commission.

The foregoing manifestation was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated July 15,
1992.[14]

On July 26, 1994, respondent filed a Petition For The Lifting Of Respondent's
Suspension From The Practice Of Law[15] which the Court referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation in a Resolution
dated March 13, 1995.[16]

In a Report and Recommendation dated August 14, 1998, the Investigating

Commissioner recommended the lifting of the indefinite suspension of respondent. On
November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIII-98-
171 adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. In acting
favorably on respondent's petition, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that:

Respondent's plea is anchored on the following allegations:

"xxx      xxx      xxx

4.  That respondent accepted his suspension as God's grace but due to respondent's
knowledge in law, he has been continuously approached for legal advice or assistance
and what respondent could do is prepare for them pleadings or documents and to
secure practitioners to do what I am suspended from doing;

5.  That respondent has remained busy in his desire to save and as a matter of fact, with
humility, respondent is the Elected Federation President of the Federation of Senior
Citizens and the Invalid[s]. He is a member of the Lupong Tagapayapa and has
performed duties as Chairman of the Pangkat Tagapayapa of Barangay Central,
Baganga, Davao Oriental;

6.  That respondent, however, has observed that there are poor people who actually
need the services of a Lawyer, and whose hunger for justice hang mercifully on a cloud
of uncertainties (sic), as they say, here is the jurisdiction of Branch VII at Baganga,
Davao Oriental;

7.  That actually there are no permanent resident lawyer[s] in the Municipalities of
Boston, Cateel, Baganga and Caraga, all in the First District of Davao Oriental. The
three practicing lawyer[s] come only to Baganga during court hearings and since they
reside in the City of Davao their fees are high. Notarial services could not be rendered
regularly;

8.  That I feel capable to fill the vacuum and be able to serve the poor people but there
is need for the undersigned to request and pray the Supreme Court to lift the
suspension imposed.
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice dated January 10, 2000, respondent who
turned Seventy-One (71) years old last October 25, 1999, once again implores and at the
same time chides the Court for `slumbering' on acting upon the IBP Resolution to lift
his indefinite suspension, although he still insists on his innocence.

The insolence of respondent's remonstrations that the Court has been sleeping on its
job in acting upon his case not only underscores his callous disregard of the myriad
administrative and judicial travails the Court has to contend with as the Tribunal of
Last Resort, among them, the chronic problem of an overflowing docket of which his
case is but one additional aggravation; it also betrays his absolute lack of appreciation
and disrespect for the efforts and measures undertaken by the Court to cope with these
concerns. Needless to state, such presumptuousness is only too deserving of rebuke.

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor,
much less, obliged to accept the same as a matter of course[17] because as the Tribunal
which has the final say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members of
both bench and bar,[18] the Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and
rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower
court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation and
report. Indeed, Sections 1, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court
state that:
SEC. 1. How instituted. -Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court
or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys including those in the
government service; Provided,however, that all charges against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan,and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower
courts, even if lawyers are charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court;
Provided, further, that charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication. (italics supplied)

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the
Secretary of any of its chapters who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Boar
of Governors for assignment to an investigator.[19]

SEC. 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator.

- Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other
Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the record
and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme
Court. (italics supplied).

SEC. 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's

answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the
instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigators,
may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes
specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such
suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court. (italics supplied)

SEC. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. -

The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice of
any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme
Court in the case.(italics supplied)

SEC. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further

proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall
make full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension,
or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant. (italics supplied)
For all respondent's protestations to the contrary, the Court is hardly convinced of his
innocence for his culpability has been established and aptly adjudicated upon. While
the harshness of an indefinite suspension, more so when viewed in the light of the
prevailing circumstances of this case, can not be gainsaid, it must be stressed that -

The indefiniteness of respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or

"inhuman" has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights
and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and
misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of
conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts. [20]
Respondent's suspension for more than nine (9) years to date, for his professional
indiscretion, underscored by his insistent protestations of innocence, appears not to
have fully reformed him and opened his eyes to the error of his ways. Such an
unrepentant attitude and unwillingness to acknowledge his misconduct puts his fitness
for re-admission to the practice of law under serious inquiry. Respondent must always
remember that -

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well xxx That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.[21]
As has been stated earlier, the indefiniteness of respondent's suspension puts in his
hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer. Until such
time as he has purged himself of his misconduct and acknowledged the same by
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to
live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded from every member of the bar
and officer of the court, respondent's suspension must deservingly be fixed at ten (10)
years. Consequently, the same may only be lifted after the expiration of the said period,
counted from the time when his suspension actually commenced.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the period of respondent's suspension
from the practice of law is hereby fixed at Ten (10) Years. The "Petition For The Lifting
Of Respondent's Suspension From The Practice Of Law" is, therefore, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo. Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9881 (Formerly CBD 10-2607), June 04, 2014 ]

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Board of Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against
respondent, Atty. Manuel Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a
contract on the complainant's client who had never been a party to the agreement.

The facts are as follows:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times
Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs.
Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of
respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for
Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble,"
establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the
common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr.
Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the
former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.

On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty [1]with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina[2] for allegedly giving legal advice to
the latter's clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr.
Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.

In his Answer,[3] Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors.
He maintained that the Times Square Preamble[4] was entered into for purposes of
maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu,
signed the document.[5]

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two
cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was
not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times
Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both
cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.[6]

Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his
client, the Lims.  They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken
matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the
Lims, thus blocking the latter's egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled
with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According
to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12 December
2008.[7]

Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the
Complaint.

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report

and Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the
following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even
assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held
accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith. [8]

On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210,
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.[9]
Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by
the IBP Board of Governors on 29 December 2012.[10] Notices of the denial were
received by the parties on 21 March 2013.[11]

No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a
petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's
resolution. This rule is derived from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed
by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it
shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall
be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested
party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's
resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board's resolution on 21 March 2013, as
evidenced by a registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a
petition for review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review
with the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the above
mentioned Section 12(c).

Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the
findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof,
which is on the complainant.[12]

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant
Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter's clients to
the effect that the Times Square Preamble is binding on complainant's client, Mr.
Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice,
however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the
corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw
respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not
proof. [13]

Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot
be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad
faith or malice. The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their
profession is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error,
an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know
all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even
a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x.[14]

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never
presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a
question of fact and is evidentiary.[15] There is no evidence, though, to show that the
legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-
will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance
of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and

approving the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

529 Phil. 128

EN BANC

[ A.C. NO. 7055, July 31, 2006 ]

NORIEL MICHAEL J. RAMIENTAS, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JOCELYN P.

REYALA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are Manifestations[1] filed by the abovequoted parties in response to Supreme
Court (SC) En Banc Resolution[2] dated 7 March 2006, wherein we resolved to require
them to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, whether they are willing to submit
the case at bar for decision/resolution on the basis of the pleadings already on record.

The present controversy stemmed from an Administrative Complaint[3] filed by Noriel

Michael J. Ramientas on 16 February 2004 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Jocelyn P. Reyala. The complaint was anchored on respondent Reyala's alleged
violative acts: (1) submitting a pleading before the Court of Appeals bearing the forged
signature of another lawyer; and (2) her continuous handling of a case while working in
the Court of Appeals; both contrary to a) Articles 171,[4]182,[5] 184[6] and 355[7] of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); b) the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers; and
c) conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

Hearing on the merits thereafter ensued.

In its Resolution No. XVII-2005-171 passed on 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of Atty. Edmund T. Espina,
Investigating Commissioner, finding respondent Reyala guilty of the abovementioned
violative acts. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to be imposed from six
(6) months suspension (from the practice of law) to two (2) years, with the
corresponding warning that a repetition of any breach of her professional duties will be
dealt with more severely.[8]

On 13 February 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant, SC, received a letter dated 30
January 2006, from Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, addressed to SC Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
stating therein that:

We are transmitting herewith the following documents pertaining to the above [9] case
pursuant to Rule 139-B:

1. Notice of the Resolution;

2. Records of the case consisting of Volume I 1-185 pages.

In the interregnum, however, respondent Reyala submitted[10] to the IBP an Urgent

Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution suspending her.

On 7 March 2006, the SC En Banc,acting on the letter and transmittal, resolved to
require complainant Ramientas and respondent Reyala to manifest whether they are
willing to submit the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings and
documents already on record.

Both parties submitted their compliance thereto.

In his Manifestation,[11]complainant Ramientas acceded to the submission of the case

for decision/resolution based on the pleadings already on record.

Respondent Reyala, on the other hand, demurred[12] to such submission for the
meantime considering that the Motion for Reconsideration she earlier filed before the
IBP remained unresolved to date. Further, she stated that when she scheduled said
motion for hearing, she was informed[13] by the IBP that it was precluded from acting
on the aforesaid motion as it had already transmitted to this Court the whole records of
the particular case together with Resolution No. XVII-2005-171, which recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Thus, she prayed that
her motion for reconsideration be decided first by the IBP Board of Governors before
submitting the case for decision/resolution to this Court.
Prefatorily, a reading of the By-Laws of the IBP will reveal that a motion for
reconsideration of its resolution or order is a prohibited pleading. § 2 of Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP provides that:

SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:

xxxx

c. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of resolution or order.

xxxx
Parenthetically, at first glance, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the rules governing the
disbarment and discipline of attorneys, shows that there is no provision regarding
motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors suspending
respondent lawyers. However, worth noting is the fact that neither does it particularly
proscribe the filing of such motions. §12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - x x x

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx
Hence, this impasse.

A judicious review of our current jurisprudence will reveal that said impasse is more
ostensible than real. Our pronouncement in the case of Halimao v. Villanueva,
[14]
promulgated close to two decades after the effectivity of the IBP By-Laws,
[15]
 effectively amended the latter in so far as motions for reconsideration of IBP
resolutions in disciplinary cases against lawyers are concerned.

In the Halimao case, we took the occasion to articulate our stance respecting motions

for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in disciplinary cases
against lawyers. This Court was confronted therein with somewhat the same set of
circumstance as the case at bar in that after the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to
us its resolution adopting the recommendation of the investigating commissioner
dismissing the disbarment complaint against respondent Villanueva for being barred
by res judicata, complainant Halimao filed a motion for reconsideration. The latter
opposed such motion on the ground that Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not
provide for such a possibility of review. In resolving the issue, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Mendoza, held that:

Although Rule 139-B, §12 (c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration,
nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may
therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such
motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an
opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of
facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the aforequoted ruling amended the IBP By-Laws in that it effectively removed
a motion for reconsideration from the roster of proscribed pleadings in the level of the
IBP. It must be remembered that it is well within the Court's power to amend the By-
Laws of the IBP - § 77 of the same vests in this Court the power to amend, modify or
repeal it, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Prescinding from the above, though the aforequoted ruling involves §12 (c)[17] of Rule
139-B, nothing in the decision contradicts its application to §12 (b) of the same rule,
thus, it now stands that a motion for reconsideration of IBP resolutions may be filed by
an aggrieved party within the period stated.

A point of clarification, however, is in order. While in the Halimaoruling we

nevertheless treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villanueva as
his Petition for Review before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, § 12
(c), such action on our part was necessitated by "expediency." In the case at bar,
acknowledging the raison d''tre for the allowance of motions for reconsideration of
resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary cases against lawyers, which is the exhaustion of
administrative remedies as expressly recognized by the same Halimao ruling, the
remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This course of action rests upon
the presumption that when the grievance machinery is afforded a chance to pass upon
the matter, it will decide the same correctly,[18]

Certainly, prudence dictates that the IBP be given the opportunity to correct its
mistakes, if any, by way of motions for reconsideration before this Court takes
cognizance of the case. This is to further insure that the grievance procedure will be
allowed to duly run its course - a form of filtering process, particularly respecting
matters within the competence of the IBP, before we step in.

In fine, though such remand will hold back the advancement of the case, nevertheless,
it bears emphasizing that it is equally important that the IBP be afforded the
opportunity to set things as it should be. Observance of this basic principle is a sound
practice and policy and should never be compromised at the altar of expediency.

IN CONCURRENCE WITH THE ABOVE, NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as

it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with our ruling in Halimao v. Villanueva,
[19]
 pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly § 1 and § 2, are hereby
deemed amended. Accordingly, § 1 of said rules now reads as follows:

SECTION. 1. Pleadings. - The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified
answer, verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a
resolution. [Emphasis supplied.]
And in § 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of the class
of prohibited pleadings.

Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of disciplinary
cases against lawyers:

1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion for
reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and
recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties
thereon;

2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an aggrieved party, the
IBP must first resolve the same prior to elevating to this Court the subject
resolution together with the whole record of the case;

3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period provided for,
the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court, for final action, the subject
resolution together with the whole record of the case;

4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IBP may file a petition for
review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of said resolution
sought to be reviewed; and

5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there exist pending
motions for reconsideration filed in due time before the IBP, the latter is directed
to withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together with the whole
 records of the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said
motions with reasonable dispatch.

Consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth, let the whole record of this case
be immediately remanded to the IBP for the proper disposition of respondent Atty.
Jocelyn P. Reyala's motion for reconsideration. SO ORDERED. Case 58 not found

EN BANC

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.

EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred
member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific
case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who
had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A.
Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be
reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was
there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of
respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief
Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues'
to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21,
1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23,
1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2,
1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the
case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend
to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is

that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that
as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which
he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of
the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the
integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore
legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was
rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting
with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by
persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the
matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the
consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent
could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously
sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the
impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the
extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances
of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He
likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times
unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it
did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance
on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to
regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred
from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said
that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as
far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership.
What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient
time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on
the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of
such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2505. February 21, 1992.]

EVANGELINE LEDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ADMISSION

TO THE BAR; GROSS MISREPRESENTATION AS A GROUND. — Respondent’s
declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was
"single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for
which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection
with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been
known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it
indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

2. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; REQUISITES AND

CONDITIONS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN MET. — Respondent can not assume that
his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and
conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code
have been met and that the Judge’s official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed.

3. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ADOPTING

CONFLICTING POSITIONS IN PLEADINGS, DUPLICITOUS AND DEPLORABLE. —
Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings
submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
Respondent has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself.
He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose.
In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; COURTS ENTITLED TO EXPECT COMPLETE CANDOR AND

HONESTY FROM LAWYERS APPEARING AND PLEADING BEFORE THEM. —
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April
1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the
candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the
Court.

5. ID.; ID.; GOOD MORAL CHARACTER, ESSENTIAL FOR ADMISSION TO AND

FOR REMAINING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — It cannot be overemphasized that
the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
692).

6. ID.; ID.; COURTS RETAIN THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE AN ATTORNEY. — As

so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney’s character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350 [1933]).

7. ID.; ID.; INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IMPOSED WHERE LAWYER IS FOUND

EVIDENTLY LACKING IN GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. — Wherefore, finding
respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly and unworthy to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take
effect immediately.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian

Tabang’s good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February
1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage

at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan,
was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1 as one of exceptional character
(Annex "A," Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had
finished his law studies (began in 1977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981),
allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had
not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January
1982).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In
his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but
Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78,
claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and,
thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer’s Oath for lack of good moral character.
Complainant also alleged that after Respondent’s law studies, he became aloof and
"abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent’s Oath-taking and required him to answer the
Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant’s conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he
admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the
marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his
law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable
our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to
take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as
single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her
conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be
dismissed.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was
Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of
a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing
her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78
and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time
praying for Respondent’s disbarment based on the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with
me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.

"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married
in his application to take the bar exam.

"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted
to the Supreme Court;

"d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the
affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment
to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only
befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and
relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint
against him with the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library

Attached to Complainant’s Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and

unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he
had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant’s help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore
and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure
to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum
cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that
effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time.
He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in
shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full pledge (sic) professional and
there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court."
According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent’s initials
appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is
Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and
take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in
the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties
shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date
of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned
Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he
applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from
the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and
conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General’s Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter
recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage
is settled.

Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we
find Respondent’s lack of good moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations
that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad
faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the
Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection
with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been
known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it
indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent’s protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as
"single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under
wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning,
are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that
his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and
conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code
have been met and that the Judge’s official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed.cralawnad

Secondly, Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various

pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
"Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married"
to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under
oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is
only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the
averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant’s own making (ibid., pp.
59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes
reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to

Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and,
instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage
contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be
made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case,
however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
order from the beginning."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition)
to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in
his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply
with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had
reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar
Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer’s Oath, which otherwise he would have
been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic)
lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent’s lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof
which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the
Court.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm:
"As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to

continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders,
the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.