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Title: The Educational Importance of SelfEsteem
Author:
Matt Ferkany
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
506 S. Kedzie Hall
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824
Email: ferkany@msu.edu
Word count: 5821
1.
Should school teachers and administrators worry themselves much about the esteem
children have for themselves as persons, i.e. their 'global' selfesteem (henceforth, just
'selfesteem')? In recent work on the subject, two authors have advanced an array of
arguments maintaining that they need not at all (Kristjánsson, 2007) or not much (Smith,
2002, 2006). Some are consequentialist—efforts to foster selfesteem in the classroom, it
is argued, conflict with the pursuit of other more important educational aims, such as
academic achievement or character education (Smith, 2002). Others are more
deontological—it is claimed that low selfesteem persons are not all 'head cases' after all,
in need of being cured; rather, they can be lovable and perfectly successful (Smith, 2006).
Another argument is conceptual: Selfesteem is supposedly not connected conceptually to
the confidence, and thus the motivation, children need in order to be good learners or
is not connected to it causally either (ibid). Were these arguments persuasive, it would
1
seem educators could largely ignore children's selfesteem without failing them in any
educationally important way.
I do not think this is so. While there is a common account of selfesteem and its
educational significance that is somewhat vulnerable to the arguments of Kristjánsson
and Smith, I will argue that their arguments are unsound or do not apply to an
appropriately sophisticated account, which I call the attachment account. According to
that account, selfesteem is importantly connected to the confidence and motivation
children need in order to engage in and achieve educational goals and can and should be
fostered socially, i.e. not just, or even primarily, through the interactions between teacher
and student, but between student and the social environment of the school itself. This is
especially the case, I will argue, in certain domains of instruction such as physical
the selfesteem of children, especially in these domains of instruction.
The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple account of self
esteem and its educational significance and discusses its vulnerability to Smith and
Kristjánsson's arguments. Section 3 introduces the attachment account and responds to
significance of selfesteem for education in light of the attachment account and responds
argument and concludes.
2.
The current literature features various accounts of selfesteem and its educational
2
significance, e.g. Ruth Cigman's 'situated selfesteem' (2004) or Kristjánsson's 'justified'
conception (2007). Here I outline a standard account of which some of these others can
be seen as variations. I use this account in what follows for two reasons. One, while
Smith and Kristjánsson do not explicitly treat it as the target of their critiques, it
illustrates well the force of their arguments. Second, it is also a very common account in
both professional literature and ordinary talk about selfesteem.
According to the standard account, selfesteem is how a person feels about
herself, good or bad, and as manifested in a variety of ways, e.g. in pride or shame, but
especially in selfconfidence (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS),
n.d.). Because people can feel more or less well about themselves and be more or less
selfconfident, the standard account asserts that selfesteem can be high, low, and
somewhere in between. However, high selfesteem is claimed to have a variety of
ability to handle positive and negative emotions, and willingness to offer assistance to
others (ibid).
Obviously, these behaviors are very desirable educationally. People able to handle
frustration, take risks, and work independently make good learners. Were high self
stability, and altruism, it would appear to be crucial to good moral character as well.
Scholars of education and public policy makers have not overlooked these supposed
benefits. The California Task Force to Promote SelfEsteem and Personal and Social
Responsibility endorses virtually all of them (Mecca, 1990). More recently, Ruth Cigman
3
maintains that selfesteem is a crucial component of the confidence, and so the
motivation, that children need in order to succeed academically and as persons (2004).
Call this the motivational claim.
While decidedly controversial, the reasoning behind the motivational claim is
both intuitive and supported by introspection. Relative to achieving a difficult or
challenging task, a person who is preoccupied with selfdoubt cannot just get on with it or
focus on it to the degree that doing it well demands. Moreover, nervous selfdoubt
impairs the functioning of the faculties needed to execute effectively, for instance, the
ability to think clearly and critically. It is also intuitive and seemingly confirmed by
introspection that the confidence manifesting high selfesteem is important to good
character. On the one hand, people who doubt their worth or competence can be
maddeningly difficult to deal with, shuttered to the bright side and susceptible to envy
and jealousy. On the other hand, a person who is confident of her worth can respond to
threats without anxious concern to defend herself or simply shrug them off as they
deserve.
The standard account of selfesteem and its educational significance is, however,
vulnerable to Smith and Kristjánsson's arguments to some extent. Consider the
consequentialist argument. It says, contra the motivational claim, that efforts to foster
selfesteem in the classroom hinder the pursuit of other high priority aims, including
those for which the standard account claims selfesteem is a necessary precondition, e.g.
a high degree of academic accomplishment. The argument gets traction in light of the
supposed pedagogical requirements of fostering selfesteem. The authors of 'Building
SelfEsteem in Children', for instance, instruct parents to “be generous with praise”,
4
“teach positive selfstatements,” and “avoid criticism that takes the form of ridicule or
shame” (U.S. DHHS). Presumably, teachers should follow suit, and apparently many
have. Smith cites the Cantors who instruct teachers to swap talk of punishment for
misbehavior with talk of 'consequences' (2002, p. 93). But academic and behavioral
instruction inherently require criticism which is liable to engender negative feelings about
the self, which, on the standard account, is just what low selfesteem comes to. Thus, it
appears that teachers cannot both instruct children academically and behaviorally and
foster their selfesteem at the same time.
The apparent conflict between fostering selfesteem and academic and behavioral
instruction is a central problem for those who favor making selfesteem an educational
priority. Yet even were it resolvable, Smith and Kristjánsson’s other arguments constitute
their own case against worrying much about school children's selfesteem. The empirical
argument, for instance, maintains that experimental support for the motivational claim is
too weak. As Kristjánsson has noted, many studies find only what most psychologists
consider a weak correlation, about .20, between low selfesteem and undesirable
studies find as much evidence that achievement causes selfesteem as the opposite. If the
empirical argument is cogent, whether the consequentialist one is sound is beside the
point—even if teachers could both foster selfesteem and appropriately critique children's
work and punish their bad behavior at the same time, the pay off would be insignificant.
esteem and its significance is mistaken to connect selfesteem and selfconfidence in the
way that the motivational claim requires. The motivational claim connects selfesteem to
5
achievement by connecting it to selfconfidence, which has fairly obvious educational
advantages. But, as Kristjánsson argues, selfesteem and selfconfidence seem to be in
some sense distinct, neither being sufficient for the other. For example, consider a
low, but who relishes the chance of moving to a new place where she thinks she will be
able to do better” (2007, p. 260). Here confidence appears to be unaffected by low self
esteem. But then, if it is confidence that is crucial to motivation, educators ought to focus
not on selfesteem but selfconfidence. According to Kristjánsson, this view is supported
by empirical research finding a “much stronger link between selfconfidence and school
performance than between selfesteem and school performance” (ibid).
Finally, Smith maintains that there is a serious question concerning the coherence
seems to assume that our beliefs here are unified and wholly negative—low selfesteem
is a defect and should be “managed” or “cured” through the techniques of selfhelp, Circe
Time, assertiveness training, or 'personalized learning' (in which every task is tailored to
the capacities of the child) (Smith, 2006, p. 56). But when we investigate our beliefs
carefully, Smith claims, we also find admiration and love for diffidence and low self
esteem. Citing examples of diffident sorts, such as Fanny in Austen's Mansfield Park,
Smith argues against Hume's claim that we love the diffident person because of her
capacity to develop into the modest one and maintains that, “We love the diffident person
because of her very diffidence and not because, by being 'improved', she will become
otherwise” (ibid, p. 54). Smith concludes that there is thus “something chilling” about the
deployment of instructional techniques in the service of raising selfesteem, as if people
6
like Fanny “would be improved by being cured of” their diffidence (ibid, p. 56).
On the basis of arguments like these, Kristjánsson and Smith conclude that
educators ought not worry themselves at all (Kristjánsson) or much (Smith) about
children's selfesteem. Though the arguments are different and their final positions not
quite the same, the shared upshot is that educators would not fail children in any
important way if they put concern for selfesteem largely aside.
3.
The arguments of Kristjánsson and Smith fail, I will argue, to show that educators can
safely put aside concern for children's selfesteem. Some of the arguments on critical
scrutiny are simply not very strong. On the other hand, thinking about selfesteem’s
educational significance in terms of the attachment account reveals responses to the
others.
To begin with the attachment account, it is best introduced by contrast to what I
James (1950). James maintained that the esteem a person has for herself is a function of
the ratio of her aspirations to acknowledged successes. That is, the more that a person
believes she is successful according to her own standards, the more esteem she will have
for herself. The cognitiveJamesian account is thus 'cognitive' because it maintains that
selfesteem is structured by our beliefs.
The role assigned to belief in the cognitiveJamesian account is at the heart of the
difference between it and the attachment account. Like the standard account, which
identifies selfesteem with feelings, the attachment account denies that selfesteem is
7
structured at its foundation by beliefs. However, unlike the standard account, it maintains
that the most fundamental determinant of selfesteem is not any feeling itself, but a
relatively stable disposition to beliefs and feelings expressing positive or negative self
regard, e.g. pride or shame or confidence or selfdoubt. On this view, these dispositions
tend to precede and determine which beliefs about our merits we will accept. The
attachment account thus views selfesteem as a relatively stable character trait constituted
by an array of cognitive and affective dispositions, namely all those expressing a positive,
negative, or other attitude toward the self.
The attachment account is ‘attachment theoretic’ because it maintains that
whether we are disposed to largely positive, negative, or more neutral beliefs and feelings
is primarily a function of the quality of our childhood attachment to our parents. 1 All
children expect that their parents will be readily available to pay attention to them,
especially in times of distress. But repeated frustration of this expectation is thought to
ramify into a habit of selfdoubt for the child about her worthiness of that attention, or
indeed of the attention of anyone at all. In other words, into low selfesteem.
As a general theory of selfesteem, the attachment account has significant
advantages over the cognitiveJamesian account. As a matter of introspection, the
experience of selfesteem seems more affectively charged than a mere belief in one’s
success, worthiness, or lack thereof. Furthermore, the cognitiveJamesian account makes
social acceptance or approval a matter of selfesteem only insofar as we aspire to it, but
this seems mistaken. Probably the majority of people, including selfprofessed rugged
individualists, desire social acceptance and are weighed down by its absence. For
another, it is odd to think of high selfesteem as a belief, as if high selfesteem people go
8
around constantly thinking to themselves, “I’m great” and low selfesteem one's thinking,
“I'm a loser.” On the other hand, it is comparatively natural to think of it as a disposition
to assent to some such belief when prompted. However, even this disposition is
insufficient to explain selfesteem, since many persons have it, yet we would not be
willing to say that they are high selfesteem persons. What is missing is a basic
disposition to experience the self as somehow good or bad unmediated by accepted
beliefs. Imagine an academic who is high achieving, beloved by her intimates and
associates, and knows it. She has and acknowledges every reason to believe in her
success and worthiness of the love, respect, and esteem of others. Imagine however that,
well into tenure, she anxiously doubts and interrogates herself in the face of ordinary
tasks, such as writing or presenting a new paper, asking an associate for a relatively
minor favor, or confronting a trouble student. On such occasions, she encounters herself
as a problem that must be overcome before anything else can happen. Am I good enough
to work on this problem? Do I really belong in academia? And whenever things do go
wrong, she thinks, “I'm an idiot, how could I be so stupid?” I see no reason to think such
people do not exist, yet they lack the confident sense of competence and worthiness that
belongs to normal high selfesteem.
So there are many reasons for understanding selfesteem attachment theoretically.
Note however that the attachment account rejects Kristjánsson's conceptual argument, for
it maintains that some threshold level of dispositional selfconfidence is necessary for
high selfesteem. But in light of its advantages, this seems correct. Moreover, it is
perfectly compatible with Kristjánsson's claim. Of course not every occasion on which a
person judges herself to be inadequate must she lack selfconfidence about her
9
possibilities of future success. Perhaps there's something different about the imagined
future that, to her mind, justifies the optimism. But ongoing patterns of anxious self
schoolgirl is, what happens when she begins to confront genuine challenges to her
abilities in her new circumstances?
In reconnecting selfesteem to qualities in turn connected to a person's
motivational capacities, the attachment account also thus rejects Kristjánsson's empirical
argument. It is noteworthy that this argument's strength is in any case not obviously
overwhelming, for it is (or should be) controversial how weak the socalled weak
correlations Kristjánsson cites are. While a .20 correlation is commonly regarded as weak
in psychological science, in medical science, a correlation of this magnitude between,
say, smoking and cancer, would seem to be ample reason to quit smoking, for it suggests
that 1/5 of smokers will develop a commonly fatal disease. This is significant indeed.
Similarly, if 1/5 of low selfesteem students do much worse than others, this would
appear to be ample reason for concern.
But suppose I am wrong about that. Nevertheless, as just argued, habits of
nervous selfdoubt and selfrecrimination are conceptually tied to lower selfesteem,
habits of basic selfconfidence to higher selfesteem. Now many studies, as Kristjánsson
notes, connect selfconfidence to achievement more strongly than to selfesteem. So
educators should foster selfconfidence. But in light of the attachment account, this will
often not be possible without also addressing their selfesteem, since for low selfesteem
persons, the root cause of habits of selfdoubt is a deeply ingrained sense of unworthiness
stemming from experiences of rejection. Furthermore, some newly emerging research
10
finds that secure parental attachment is positively associated with academic motivation
(Duchesne and Larose, 2007) and performance (Cotterell, 1992). Other research, though
more general in scope, has obvious educational implications. Sue Gerhardt, for instance,
reviews in detail research connecting poor infantparent attachment to low selfesteem
and underdevelopment of parts of the brain responsible for regulating emotions (2004,
Part I). In turn, she connects both to educationally damaging behavioral tendencies, such
as an inability to inhibit inappropriate behaviors or seek relief from intense emotions
through strategies of selfdistraction or in the support of others (ibid, Part II). But while
the damage Gerhardt outlines is not necessarily permanent, because attachment and self
esteem are tied together, a primary avenue to its repair runs though selfesteem (ibid, Part
III, Ch. 9). Hence, in the educational domain, addressing selfesteem may be a
requirement of resolving confidence or attachment problems that affect academic
motivation and performance.
I conclude that the empirical record is at worst ambiguous on the educational
significance of selfesteem and possibly very supportive. From this claim, it does not
must, for now, fall back on reason more than Kristjánsson has. As I will argue below,
there are many good reasons for believing that low selfesteem is an important
instruction.
4.
11
Understanding selfesteem attachment theoretically, I will argue, shows that selfesteem
is important to the confidence that children need in order to engage and succeed in
fostered without hindering the pursuit of other important educational aims. The defense
of this claim will take the remainder of this section. But in light of it, I maintain that (a)
fostering selfesteem, at least indirectly, is generally an important educational priority
the arts, school educators should make concern for selfesteem among their highest
priorities.
To begin with an obvious objection, there is a definite sense in which
understanding selfesteem attachment theoretically makes it vulnerable to the problems
raised by the consequentialist argument. Because children are dependent most heavily on
their parents for their selfesteem, teachers can have relatively little direct impact. Their
relationship to their students is simply not that important. In fact, some theorists have
suggested that children's relationship to their peers is more important (Harter, 1999).
Consequently, teachers certainly should not attempt to take on such a role. Any efforts to
foster selfesteem reaching this level must indeed interfere with the pursuit of higher
priority educational aims, since it must quite literally take the place of care giving or
friendship.
However, it does not follow that there are not very important things educators can
and ought to do that will foster selfesteem without hindering the pursuit of other high
priority aims, e.g. a challenging curriculum. To show why, I need to take a fairly lengthy
detour through political philosophy via a corollary of the attachment account of self
12
esteem.
The corollary I have in mind claims that selfesteem is in a way social in nature.
Because the fundamental element of selfesteem is the extent to which a person takes
herself to be worthy of the love, respect, or esteem of others, the attachment account
trigger feelings of shame or humiliation, and therefore, reinforce habits of self
recrimination or tendencies to beliefs and feelings of unworthiness. So people are to some
extent dependent upon the acceptance of others for their selfesteem.
To elaborate this, imagine that your social world is like this. You have some
associates that you get along with, but you do not generally feel that you fit in very well
with any of them. In fact, it seems to you that you always have to make quite an effort to
fit in. Thus, you try at first to do things that they clearly value and for which they will
therefore respect you. But to your shame you find that you are not very good at them and
being bad at them seems to make matters worse. Whereas before it was merely suspected
that you were incompetent, you have now removed all doubt. As a consequence, you stop
trying these things unless you are forced to or else find yourself in that rare situation
where success is guaranteed. Though this leaves you something of an outsider, at least as
invisible you are not so vulnerable to shame or humiliation. On the other hand, there are
some things that you do rather well, but you have not found many forums for their pursuit
and it has been your experience that your talents are not very highly valued by others.
Indeed many others find your excellences comical or ridiculous and have on occasion
taunted you for them. Some of them have even threatened you physically.
13
widely believed that the social nature of selfesteem grounds a duty of justice to arrange
social institutions in ways conducive to people acquiring and maintaining selfesteem.
There is disagreement about precisely which arrangements of institutions satisfy this
duty, but wide agreement on the general criteria. Just arrangements do not shame or
humiliate anyone, at least not undeservingly, and they make it possible for everyone to
can be esteemed by likeminded others (call these esteem groups). Borrowing from John
the social bases of selfesteem. For the person in the story above, the social bases of self
esteem are sorely lacking.
Not every theorist agrees to precisely these criteria for the social bases of self
esteem, some advancing stronger requirements. 2 It is also controversial how stringent the
requirement to supply the social bases of selfesteem is or how central it is to justice.
However, it is powerfully intuitive that there is some such requirement and that it carries
significant weight. Imagine that, by virtue of the design of social institutions, specific
segments of society (women, say) are disproportionately vulnerable to the shame and
outsider status just described. The vulnerability is a significant burden and disadvantage
and, insofar as it is owing to the design of changeable social institutions, the arrangement
is prima facie unjust.
Now schools are social worlds with their own basic social structure, one that can
be more or less supportive of selfesteem. Assuming that the social bases of selfesteem
for school children are the same as those for adults, schools support and foster self
esteem just when they do not shame or humiliate children undeservedly and make it
14
possible for all to enjoy an appropriate esteem group. Unfortunately, it seems that many
school environments, like the social world described above, are not very supportive of
selfesteem. In some ways, this seems obvious. Children themselves tend to make things
difficult by forming esteem groups that are incredibly exclusive and hostile toward
outsiders. For children who find themselves on the outside, the experience can be very
painful. Insofar as this is the case, however, it points to two important general ways
educators can seek to foster selfesteem.
First, they can make efforts to ameliorate the 'popularity contest' between
children. This presumably is what advocates of strategies like Circle Time have been
trying to do directly. I think they are right to, though it is noteworthy that, on the one
hand, not all direct strategies need to have this character, and such strategies may not be
the best anyway. Take the first claim first. It seems to me, for instance, that normal
practices of punishing children who behave cruelly to others are at least as important,
though this may seem to threaten the selfesteem of the culprit. However, as I will argue
below, the threat to selfesteem of punishment is exaggerated. Second, because the
problem of fostering selfesteem socially is a systematic one, one deriving from the
design of social institutions, it needs a systematic solution. Consequently, the best
strategies may well be indirect ones setting up a school and classroom environment
minimizing occasions for shame/humiliation and motivating children to work together
collegially. This is more easily said than done, but that does not imply that teachers
children must be avoided, for whether a loss is humiliating, say, depends on the
collegiality of the social environment. Hence, if collegiality is taught, an effort is made to
15
foster selfesteem in a way that need not conflict with instruction requiring competition.
beyond traditional ones like debate club, is an independent way to work toward a school
environment supplying the social bases of selfesteem. Such clubs would provide forums
in which children of diverse talents could find themselves and their aspirations affirmed
by those whose opinion really matters, namely those who share their interests. What is
important from the standpoint of supplying the social bases of selfesteem is that there is
a diversity such associations, from computer club for the computer nerds to GayStraight
Alliances for homosexual children.
The social nature of selfesteem, however, I believe has even more specific
implications for certain domains of instruction. Take physical education. Because of the
public nature of performance in this domain, a child's degree of excellence in it, or lack
thereof, is typically widely available publicly, not least, to her peers. Consequently, in
this domain many children—especially the unathletic—are highly vulnerable to shame or
humiliation, for it is precisely public exposure as inadequate or powerless that trigger
those feelings. Furthermore, the vulnerability here is particularly acute given the value
commonly placed on athletic excellence among both adults and children. As a
consequence, many children are liable to withdraw from athletic participation first chance
they get.
I submit that this move, though in one way protective for the child, can be deeply
damaging educationally. For one thing, the child has now lost the will to participate in
athletics, which is a, if not the, primary avenue to lifelong fitness and health. Since
inculcating in children a lifelong relationship to fitness is presumably a very high priority
16
educational aim, especially given the emerging epidemic of obesity, school environments
having this effect are failures on an important level. Second, it is widely agreed that there
the child's relationship to fitness and general selfconfidence. The general selfesteem and
confidence of those who participate benefits, while those receiving the benefits are
further motivated to participate. Children who withdraw thus cut themselves out of a
crucial avenue to fitness and a higher degree of wellbeing. Third, because sport figures
so large in children's social status, those who do not participate are liable to withdraw
more generally from social life, particularly if they also do not excel in other socially
valued ways. But children in this situation are vulnerable, as the motivational claim
maintains, to lose the sort of basic confidence needed to take risks and confront
challenges smoothly. This is a disadvantage for them as learners and as moral persons.
In many American schools, this situation seems needlessly exacerbated by the
institution of school sponsored intermural sport. Despite some progress, boy's sports
appear to remain disproportionatly favored in the social world of schools to both girl's
sports and nonathletic activities such as the arts. 3 But as a symbolic expression of the
relatively greater importance of male athleticism, this is itself an affront to the selfworth
of girls and the unathletic. At the same time, it serves to reproduce the cultural obsession
with male sport, which as I have just argued, is problematic with regard to children's
physical education and, through its selfesteem related effects, potentially their education
generally.
Now the consequentialist argument maintains that efforts to foster selfesteem
impede the pursuit of other high priority aims, such as a highly challenging curriculum.
17
However, relative to domains of instruction like physical education and the arts,
instruction that inculcates a lifelong desire for involvement is more important than
instruction securing a high degree of achievement. Thus, the considerations that drive the
consequentialist argument are not operative here. Moreover, in these domains there is an
important coincidence between instruction that will inculcate a life of involvement and
that fostering selfesteem. Physical education instructors, for instance, will likely best
achieve the aim of inculcating a lifelong desire for involvement by pursuing strategies
that minimize shame and humiliation and maximize inclusiveness, in other words, that
problematic in the way I have described, some aspects of the institution could be
modified to better support selfesteem with relative ease. No doubt performance in
physical education will always be public, thus rendering children particularly vulnerable
to shame/humiliation. Yet participation and hoopla surrounding sport could be made
more equal between boy's sports, girl's sports, and other nonacademic domains of
instruction such as the arts. Sports and arts participation (where ‘art’ includes visual arts,
music, theater, dance, creative writing, etc) could also be made mandatory for all students
and exclusively intramural. Such changes would potentially have the effect of unraveling
all children will stay engaged in both athletics and the arts. In turn, it is reasonable to
think that this would ensure that more children stay engaged socially, find an appropriate
esteem group, and so continue to adjust socially.
Hence, in at least some domains of instruction, selfesteem is motivationally
important and susceptible to instruction without undue cost to the pursuit of other
18
important aims. However, I would also like to argue that, in light of the social bases of
selfesteem, the requirements of instruction in academics and behavior also need not
radically conflict with important efforts to foster selfesteem.
First consider academics. The social bases of selfesteem include esteem groups.
long as they make efforts to ensure that all children feel welcome, safe, and can find an
esteem group. Again, this aim may be achieved directly through activities like Circle
Time, but as discussed above such strategies are not intrinsically necessary. What matters
is that the teachers find ways to get children to cooperate with one another and engender
particularly shame or humiliation producing. While criticism is often frustrating or
disappointing, only particularly tactless or impolite criticism could be expected to hurt so
much as shame or humiliation. Moreover, shame and humiliation tend to be roused by
public exposure as inadequate or powerless. But academic evaluations tend to be largely
private, marks on a piece of paper easily concealed from others. Moreover, unlike
athletics, children tend not to evaluate one another so much on grounds of academics, so
even exposure as inadequate here is not so much of a threat. Hence, contra the
need not radically conflict.
Second, consider behavioral instruction. It is true, of course, that punishment
renders children highly vulnerable to public exposure as inadequate and consequently to
shame or humiliation. Of necessity, punishments tend to be public affairs. However, and
first, as a matter of ordinary decency, teachers can and should avoid carrying out
19
punishments that children are likely to experience as humiliating. But where this is not
possible, deserved punishments causing shame or humiliation tend to be deserved shames
them cannot be charged with failing to foster selfesteem. Second, while systematic,
arbitrary experiences of shame or humiliation can lower selfesteem, presumably
punishments will not amount to systematic, arbitrary public shames/humiliations, but
deserved and temporary retributions for wrongs. Hence, the threat to selfesteem of
ordinary practices of punishment is exaggerated.
5.
I have argued that selfesteem is important to the motivation children need in order to be
successful in school, especially in certain domains of instruction such as physical
pursuit of other high priority aims such as academic achievement. If so, facilitating
children’s selfesteem in schools may after all be a very important educational aim. This
is not to suggest that selfesteem is a unifying aim of education or the highest priority
aim. Other aims play crucial roles and some, such as achievement, are presumably of
imply that selfesteem facilitating education is a complete moral education, for good
character calls for many qualities, some of which may even compete with selfesteem. On
some accounts, selfrespect for instance, is an important but distinct character trait calling
for a degree of modesty or accuracy of selfregard. 4 Nevertheless, facilitating selfesteem
is an important educational priority, and this is to say that omitting it is a genuine way of
20
failing children educationally.
There is a last objection that I have not addressed, namely Smith’s character
thus, we cannot coherently think that low selfesteem is something to be cured. I
wholeheartedly agree. Nevertheless, it does not follow that concern for selfesteem is not
esteem persons is mere love or something more robust like admiration or esteem. To say
that we love them because of their diffidence is not to say we find them virtuous because
of it, but only that because they are endearing, we find their faults forgivable. But if that
is so, educating for selfesteem is a perfectly legitimate aim of moral education. Second,
if low selfesteem is indeed an impediment to achievement, as I have argued, it certainly
is something to be overcome if not cured. If so, I see no reason why educators should not
do what they can to help low selfesteem children through the process. If I am right,
namely strive to create a school environment in which the social bases of selfesteem are
readily available to all children.
NOTES
1 For more extensive elaboration of attachment and its role in the development of self
esteem, see Sue Gerhardt's Why Love Matters: How affection shapes a baby's brain (2004,
Part 2).
2 See, for example, James Tully's particularly strong requirements for social esteem in
21
REFERENCES
Cigman, R. (2004) Situated SelfEsteem, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 38.1, pp. 91
105.
Coleman, J.S., Johnstone, J.W.C. and Jonassohn, K. (1961) The adolescent society: The social
life of the teenager and its impact on education (New York, Free Press of Glencoe).
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