HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.

LAKSHMAN

CRIMINAL PETITION No.2061 OF 2021

ORDER:

The present Criminal Petition is filed under Section - 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash the proceedings against

the petitioners in Crime No.142 of 2021 of Gachibowli Police Station,

Cyberabad Commissionerate.

2. The petitioner Nos.2 and 3 herein are accused Nos.3 and 2

and Managing Director and Civil Engineer of petitioner No.1

Company respectively. The offence alleged petitioners are under

Sections - 304-II, 188 and 201 read with 109 of IPC and Sections -

184, 190 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘M.V.

Act’).

3. Heard Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned senior counsel for

the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf

of respondent No.1 - State. Despite service of notice, none appears on

behalf of respondent No.2 - complainant.

4. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION:

i) On 23.02.2021 at 16:30 hours, Gunti Yogesh Sagar S/o

G. Raju Sagar, aged 19 years, Occ: Student and son of

complainant’s brother, was proceeding on Honda Activa

Vehicle bearing registration No.TS 07ES 3911 from

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Sudarshan Nagar to Maseedbanda. Mr. G. Kalyan Sagar

was the pillion;

ii) when they reached near SMR Vinay Iconia, one RMC

(TATA Motors Concrete Mixer) Vehicle bearing

registration No.KA 01AF 9596 driven by its driver,

accused No.1 in rash and negligent manner came from

back side and dashed them from its back. Due to which,

Yogesh received injuries. He was shifted to KIMS

Hospital, Kondapur for first aid;

iii) later, Mr. Yogesh was shifted to Continental Hospital,

Nanakramguda for better treatment, where the duty

doctor examined him and declared the injured as dead;

iv) upon receipt of a complaint lodged by LW.1, paternal

uncle of deceased, the police registered a case in Crime

No.142 of 2021 under Section 304-A of IPC and took up

for investigation;

v) during the course of investigation, LW.16, Sub-Inspector

of Police examined the relevant witnesses and recorded

their statements under Section - 161 of Cr.P.C. and

followed the requisite formalities;

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vi) after conducting initial investigation, the police altered

the section of law from Section - 304A of IPC to Section

- 304-II of IPC and other sections mentioned above;

vii) there is an order vide proceedings No.75/1/T2/DCP-

Tr/Cyb/2020, dated 07.07.2020 of Commissioner of

Police, Gachibowli, restricting the movement of heavy

motor vehicles and medium motor vehicles including

DCMs, Eicher Vans, Water Tankers, RMC Vehicles,

Rocket Lorry, JCB, Earth Movers, Tractors in the limits

of Law and Order Police Stations during the Traffic Peak

Hours i.e., between 7.30 hours and 11.30 hours and also

between 16.00 hours and 22.30 hours;

viii) the evidence collected during the course of investigation

and the inquiries would reveal that accused No.1 drove

the crime vehicle in rash and negligent manner though

the crime vehicle is in unsafe condition and ran in no

entry area, thereby caused disobedience to the orders

promulgated by Public Servant and caused disappearance

of evidence of offence committed by accused No.1 by not

placing number plate at back side of vehicle with

abetment of accused Nos.2 and 3, accused No.1 drove the

uninsured crime vehicle dangerously;

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ix) accused No.2 being In-charge of vehicles of M/s. SMR

Builders Pvt. Ltd. allowed accused No.1 to drive unsafe

condition vehicle in no entry area;

x) accused No.3 being the owner of crime vehicle did not

follow the Rules of M.V. Act and allowed accused No.1

to drive the unsafe condition vehicle in no entry area, and

thereby accused Nos.2 and 3 abetted accused No.1 in

commission of the offence;

xi) accused No.4, mother and owner of the victim’s Honda

Activa vehicle, allowed the deceased to drive the vehicle

though the deceased did not have valid license to drive

the vehicle and the vehicle is uninsured to satisfy the

provisions of Sections - 3 or 4 of the M.V. Act to drive

the vehicle; and

xii) thus, accused Nos.1 to 4 were well aware that their acts

would cause death of others, and thereby they have

committed the aforesaid offences;

5. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:

i) Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned senior counsel would

submit that, prima facie, there is no evidence connecting the

petitioners herein with the alleged offences mentioned above, for the

reason that petitioner No.2 (accused No.3) is the Managing Director of

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petitioner No.1 company and being an Architect looking after the

building plans, permissions etc., while petitioner No.3 (accused No.2)

is the Engineer of the said company looking after the construction

activities and their nature of work would be normally done by sitting

in the office. In such a scenario, they cannot have any intention to

commit culpable homicide of an unknown person and screen the

evidence.

ii) Learned senior counsel would further submit that keeping in

view the nature of work dealt by petitioner Nos.2 and 3 mentioned

above, their monitoring driving of vehicles by drivers may not arise.

Nonetheless, accused No.1 is having a valid driving license to drive

both, Transport and Non-Transport Vehicles. He would further

submit that concept of vicarious liability is unknown to criminal law,

and IPC does not provide for vicarious liability upon the Directors of

the Company for any offence alleged to be committed by a Company.

In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel has relied on

the principle laid down in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of

Investigation1.

iii) Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that there are no

specific overt-acts attributed to the petitioners. There was no abetment

on the part of petitioners as alleged by the police. The ingredients of

Section - 304 (Part-II) of IPC do not attract against the petitioners as

alleged by the police, and so also the other provisions. Thus,

1
. (2015) 4 SCC 609
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continuation of proceedings in the aforesaid crime against the

petitioners is nothing but abuse of process of Court and cause

irreparable loss to them.

iv) With the aforesaid submissions, the learned senior counsel

sought to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in the aforesaid

crime.

6. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION:

i) Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that there are

specific allegations against each of the accused including the

petitioners herein and the same are serious in nature. Any act or

omission done on behalf of petitioner No.1 Company, petitioner No.2

being its Managing Director is responsible for such acts and he cannot

be escaped. Petitioner No.2, being Managing Director of petitioner

No.1 Company and petitioner No.3 being In-charge looking after the

construction activities, both of them solely held responsible for any

act done on behalf of the Company. There was sheer negligence on

the part of petitioners in allowing accused No.1 to drive unfit vehicle

in no entry area, that too, without any pre-cautions.

ii) Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the police

investigated the case properly and on coming to a conclusion that

there was negligent on the part of petitioners, the police made them as

accused apart from the driver of crime vehicle. Even, the police also

made the mother and owner of the victim vehicle as an accused.

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iii) He would further submit that the investigation is pending

and the police yet to collect some more evidence to conclude the

investigation. So far, the evidence collected by the police would

reveal that the aforesaid offences attract against the petitioners. The

contention of the petitioners that they had no intention to commit

culpable homicide of an unknown person and to screen the evidence

etc., are all to be investigated by the Investigating Officer during the

course of investigation. The petitioners can produce the evidence to

that effect before the Investigating Officer as well. The acts of

petitioners in allowing the driver to drive a vehicle in no entry area

without any precautions will have impact on the society and,

therefore, the proceedings cannot be quashed at this stage.

iv) With the aforesaid submissions, the learned Public

Prosecutor sought to dismiss the present petition.

7. FINDING OF THE COURT:

i) A perusal of the above stated facts and the contents of the

complaint dated 23.02.2021 and remand report would reveal that

accused No.1 drove the crime vehicle in rash and negligent manner

though the crime vehicle was in unsafe condition, ran the crime

vehicle in no-entry area, thereby disobeyed the orders promulgated by

public servant. Accused have caused disappearance of evidence of

offence committed by not placing number plate at backside of vehicle.

Accused No.1 drove the uninsured crime vehicle dangerously.

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Accused No.2 being in-charge of M/s. SMR Builders Pvt. Ltd.,

vehicles and Ready Mix Plant including the crime vehicle allowed

accused No.1 to drive unsafe condition vehicle in no-entry area.

Accused No.3 being owner of crime vehicle did not follow the Rules

of M.V. Act and allowed accused No.1 to drive the unsafe condition

vehicle in no entry area. Thus, accused Nos.2 and 3 abetted accused

No.1 in commission of the offence. Accused No.4 is the mother of the

deceased and owner of the Honda Activa vehicle bearing registration

No. TS 07 ES 3911, allowed her deceased son to drive the said

vehicle, who did not satisfy the provisions of Sections - 3 and 4 of the

M.V. Act. Thus, accused No.1 is driver of the crime vehicle, accused

No.2 is In-charge in M/s. SMR Builders Private Limited, accused

No.3 is the Managing Director of M/s. SMR Builders Pvt. Ltd., and

owner of the crime vehicle and accused No.4 is mother of the

deceased and owner of the victim vehicle.

ii) As stated above, prima facie, there are specific allegations

against each of the accused in the complaint as well as remand report.

Petitioner No.1 - accused No.3 is owner of the crime vehicle,

petitioner No.2 herein is Managing Director of petitioner No.1 and

petitioner No.3 - accused No.2 is the In-charge of petitioner No.1

Company.

iii) Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has also filed

copy of certificate of registration in respect of the crime vehicle. A

perusal of the same would reveal that petitioner No.1 herein i.e., SMR
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Builders Private Limited is owner of the crime vehicle. Thus, there is

no dispute that petitioner No.1 is owner of the crime vehicle. There is

also no dispute that petitioner No.2 herein is Managing Director of

petitioner No.1, while petitioner No.3 herein is its In-charge.

iv) Referring to the contents of the complaint and remand

report, Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned Senior Counsel, would

submit that the contents of the same lacks the ingredients of Section -

304, Part-II of IPC and other offences alleged against the petitioners

herein. There is no vicarious liability on the part of petitioner No.1

company and in criminal law, there is no concept of vicarious liability

and, therefore, the proceedings in Crime No.142 of 2021 are liable to

be quashed.

v) Referring to the contents of development agreements - cum -

GPAs, dated 26.02.2014, 06.06.2014, building permits dated

29.04.2014 and 09.09.2017, learned senior counsel would submit that

petitioner No.1 is initially a Developer and, therefore, the present

proceedings in Crime No.142 of 2021 are not maintainable against the

petitioners. Referring to the driving license of accused No.1, learned

senior counsel would submit that accused No.1 is having valid driving

license to drive the vehicles as on the date of accident.

vi) Referring to the settlement deed, dated 24.02.2021, learned

senior counsel would submit that petitioner No.1 has entered into a

settlement with the father of the deceased and also issued a receipt
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dated 24.02.2021 executed by father of deceased. He would further

submit that both petitioner No.1 Company and father of the deceased

have entered into a compromise and pursuant thereof, petitioner No.1

has agreed to pay an amount of Rs.35.00 lakhs of which, an amount of

Rs.10.00 lakhs was paid in cash balance by way of cheques.

vii) In view of the above rival submissions, it is apt to refer to

the relevant provisions of IPC and M.V. Act.

PROVISIONS UNDER IPC

“304. Punishment for culpable

homicide not amounting to murder.—
Whoever commits culpable homicide not
amounting to murder shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of
either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine, if the act by which the death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death, or of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act
is done with the knowledge that it is likely to
cause death, but without any intention to
cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death.”

“188. Disobedience to order duly

promulgated by public servant.—Whoever,
knowing that, by an order promulgated by a
public servant lawfully empowered to
promulgate such order, he is directed to
abstain from a certain act, or to take certain
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order with certain property in his possession

or under his management, disobeys such
direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or
tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or
injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or
injury, to any person lawfully employed, be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one month or with fine
which may extend to two hundred rupees, or
with both; and if such disobedience causes or
trends to cause danger to human life, health or
safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or
affray, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

Explanation.—It is not necessary that

the offender should intend to produce harm,
or contemplate his disobedience as likely to
produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of
the order which he disobeys, and that his
disobedience produces, or is likely to produce,
harm.

Illustration An order is promulgated by a

public servant lawfully empowered to
promulgate such order, directing that a
religious procession shall not pass down a
certain street. A knowingly disobeys the
order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A
has committed the offence defined in this
section.”

“201. Causing disappearance of

evidence of offence, or giving false
information to screen offender.—Whoever,
knowing or having reason to believe that an
offence has been committed, causes any
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evidence of the commission of that offence to

disappear, with the intention of screening the
offender from legal punishment, or with that
intention gives any information respecting the
offence which he knows or believes to be
false; if a capital offence.-—shall, if the
offence which he knows or believes to have
been committed is punishable with death, be
punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; if
punishable with imprisonment for life.—and
if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment
which may extend to ten years, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
three years, and shall also be liable to fine; if
punishable with less than ten years’
imprisonment.—and if the offence is
punishable with imprisonment for any term
not extending to ten years, shall be punished
with imprisonment of the description provided
for the offence, for a term which may extend
to one-fourth part of the longest term of the
imprisonment provided for the offence, or
with fine, or with both.

Illustration A, knowing that B has

murdered Z, assists B to hide the body with
the intention of screening B from punishment.
A is liable to imprisonment of either
description for seven years, and also to fine.”

“109. Punishment of abetment if the

act abetted is committed in consequence
and where no express provision is made for
its punishment.—Whoever abets any offence
shall, if the act abetted is committed in
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consequence of the abetment, and no express

provision is made by this Code for the
punishment of such abetment, be punished
with the punishment provided for the offence.

Explanation.—An act or offence is said

to be committed in consequence of abetment,
when it is committed in consequence of the
instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy,
or with the aid which constitutes the
abetment.

Illustrations: (a) A offers a bribe to B, a

public servant, as a reward for showing A
some favour in the exercise of B’s official
functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted
the offence defined in section 161.

(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in

consequence of the instigation, commits that
offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence,
and is liable to the same punishment as B.

(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A in

pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the
poison and delivers it to B in order that he
may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the
conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A’s
absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B
is guilty of murder. A is guilty of abetting that
offence by conspiracy, and is liable to the
punishment for murder.
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Same as for offence abetted—
According as offence abetted is cognizable or
non-cognizable—According as offence
abetted is bailable or non-bailable—Triable
by court by which offence abetted is triable—
Non-compoundable.”
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PROVISIONS UNDER M.V. ACT

“180. Allowing unauthorised persons to

drive vehicles.—Whoever, being the owner
or person in charge of a motor vehicle, causes
or permits, any other person who does not
satisfy the provisions of section 3 or section 4
to drive the vehicle shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three months, or with fine which may extend
to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

“184. Driving dangerously.—Whoever

drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a
manner which is dangerous to the public,
having regard to all the circumstances of the
case including the nature, condition and use of
the place where the vehicle is driven and the
amount of traffic which actually is at the time
or which might reasonably be expected to be
in the place, shall be punishable for the first
offence with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to six months or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, and for
any second or subsequent offence if
committed within three years of the
commission of a previous similar offence with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine which may extend to
two thousand rupees, or with both.”

“190. Using vehicle in unsafe

condition.—
(1) Any person who drives or causes or allows
to be driven in any public place a motor
vehicle or trailer while the vehicle or trailer
has any defect, which such person knows of
or could have discovered by the exercise of
ordinary care and which is calculated to
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render the driving of the vehicle a source of

danger to persons and vehicles using such
place, shall be punishable with fine which
may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees
or, if as a result of such defect an accident is
caused causing bodily injury or damage to
property, with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three months, or with fine
which may extend to one thousand rupees, or
with both.
(2) Any person who drives or causes or allows
to be driven, in any public place a motor
vehicle, which violates the standards
prescribed in relation to road safety, control of
noise and air-pollution, shall be punishable for
the first offence with a fine of one thousand
rupees and for any second or subsequent
offence with a fine of two thousand rupees.
(3) Any person who drives or causes or allows
to be driven, in any public place a motor
vehicle which violates the provisions of this
Act or the rules made thereunder relating to
the carriage of goods which are of dangerous
or hazardous nature to human life, shall be
punishable for the first offence which may
extend to three thousand rupees, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one year, or with both, and for any second or
subsequent offence with fine which may
extend to five thousand rupees, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years, or with both.”

“196. Driving uninsured vehicle.—Whoever

drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a
motor vehicle to be driven in contravention of
the provisions of section 146 shall be
punishable with imprisonment which may
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extend to three months, or with fine which

may extend to one thousand rupees, or with
both.”

viii) The Apex Court in Alister Anthony Pareira v.State of

Maharashtra2 had an occasion to deal with scope and ambit of

Sections - 279, 299, 300, 304 and 304 Part-II and also considered the

following questions:

“(i) Whether indictment on the two charges,

namely, the offence punishable under Section 304

Part II IPC and the offence punishable under

Section 338 IPC is mutually destructive and

legally impermissible? In other words, whether it

is permissible to try and convict a person for the

offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC

and the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC

for a single act of the same transaction?

(ii) Whether by not charging the appellant of

`drunken condition' and not putting to him the

entire incriminating evidence let in by the

prosecution, particularly the evidence relating to

appellant's drunken condition, at the time of his

examination under Section 313 of the Code, the

trial and conviction of the appellant got affected?

(iii) Whether prosecution evidence establishes

beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the

2
. (2012) 2 SCC 648
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offences by the appellant under Section 304 Part

II, IPC, Section 338 IPC and Section 337 IPC?

(iv) Whether sentence awarded to the appellant by

the High Court for the offence punishable under

Section 304 Part II IPC requires any

modification?”

ix) The Apex Court while discussing the constituent elements

of Part I and Part II of Section - 304 IPC, held as under:

“26. The above Section is in two parts. Although

Section does not specify Part I and Part II but for
the sake of convenience, the investigators, the
prosecutors, the lawyers, the judges and the
authors refer to the first paragraph of the Section
as Part I while the second paragraph is referred to
as Part II. The constituent elements of Part I and
Part II are different and, consequently, the
difference in punishment. For punishment under
Section 304 Part I, the prosecution must prove: the
death of the person in question; that such death
was caused by the act of the accused and that the
accused intended by such act to cause death or
cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause
death. As regards punishment for Section 304 Part
II, the prosecution has to prove the death of the
person in question; that such death was caused by
the act of the accused and that he knew that such
act of his was likely to cause death. In order to find
out that an offence is `culpable homicide not
amounting to murder' - since Section 304 does not
define this expression - Sections 299 and 300 IPC
have to be seen. Section 299 IPC reads as under:
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"S.-299. - Culpable homicide.--Whoever

causes death by doing an act with the
intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, or with the knowledge
that he is likely by such act to cause death,
commits the offence of culpable homicide."

27. To constitute the offence of culpable homicide

as defined in Section 299 the death must be caused
by doing an act:

(a) with the intention of causing death, or

(b) with the intention of causing such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or

(c) with the knowledge that the doer is

likely by such act to cause death.

28. Section 300 deals with murder and also

provides for exceptions. The culpable homicide is
murder if the act by which the death is caused is
done: (1) with the intention of causing death, (2)
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
the offender knows to be likely to cause the death
of the person to whom the harm is caused, or (3)
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, or (4) with the knowledge that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death
or such injury as aforesaid. The exceptions provide
that the culpable homicide will not be murder if
that act is done with the intention or knowledge in
the circumstances and subject to the conditions
specified therein. In other words, the culpable
homicide is not murder if the act by which death is
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caused is done in extenuating circumstances and

such act is covered by one of the five exceptions
set out in the later part of Section 300.”

x) Thus, to establish the offence under Section - 304 Part-II of

IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question;

that such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew

that such act of his was likely to cause death.

xi) The Apex Court has also referred to the principle laid down

in Empress of India v. Idu Beg [1881 (3) ALL 776], in which

meaning of criminal rashness and criminal negligence was explained.

Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the

knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury but without

intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused.

The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with

recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal

negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that

reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury

either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which,

having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has

arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have

adopted. After an elaborate discussion and on consideration of

various principle laid down by it in various other judgments, the Apex

Court held that indictment of an accused under Section - 304 Part II

and Section - 338 of IPC can co-exist in a case of single rash or

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negligent act. There is no impediment in law for an offender being

charged for the offence under Section - 304 Part II of IPC and also

under Sections - 337 and 338 of IPC. The two charges under Section

-304 Part II of IPC and Section - 338 of IPC can legally co-exist in a

case of single rash or negligent act where a rash or negligent act is

done with the knowledge of likelihood of its dangerous consequences.

xii) In State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas

@ Ratan Rabidas3, the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with

scope and ambit of provisions of M.V. Act and IPC, and also the

aspect that road traffic offences shall be dealt with only under the

provisions of the M.V. Act, and held that in cases of road traffic or

motor vehicle offences, prosecution under the provisions of IPC is

without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC

would be unsustainable in law. The Apex Court referring to various

provisions of IPC and also M.V. Act, held that M.V. Act is a

beneficial legislation, the primary objective being to provide a

statutory scheme for compensation of victims of motor vehicle

accidents; or, their family members who are rendered helpless and

disadvantaged by the untimely death or injuries caused to a member of

the family, if the claim is found to be genuine. The Act provides a

summary procedure for claiming compensation for the loss sustained

in an accident, which is otherwise applicable to suits and other

proceedings while prosecuting a claim before a civil Court. The IPC

3
. (2019) 10 SCC 75
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is punitive and deterrent in nature. The principal aim and object is to

punish offenders for offences committed under the IPC. It further

held that Sections - 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of IPC fall under

Chapter XVI - “Offences Affecting the Human Body”, which makes

provision for offences relating to culpable homicide not amounting to

murder, causing death by negligence by doing any rash or negligent

act, and causing hurt or grievous hurt, by endangering the life or

personal safety of others. Where the rash or negligent driving results

in hurt or grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under

Sections - 337 or 338 of IPC is committed. Where the rash or

negligent driving, results in the death of a person, without the

knowledge that the said act will cause death, Section - 304A of IPC

would be applicable. When a person drives a vehicle so recklessly,

rashly or negligently that it causes the death of a person, and of which

he had knowledge as a reasonable man, that such act was dangerous

enough to cause death, he may be attributed with the knowledge of the

consequence, and may held liable for culpable homicide not

amounting to murder, which is punishable under Section - 304 Part II

of IPC.

a) The Apex Court further held with respect to Section - 304

Part II of IPC that, the prosecution has to prove that the death of the

person was caused by the act of the accused, and that he had

knowledge that such act was likely to cause death. To constitute an

offence under this Section, the knowledge of the offender as required

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under Section - 300 of IPC is to be proved and established. Therefore,

with the said findings, the Apex Court held that there is no conflict

between the provisions of the IPC and the M.V. Act. Both the

Statutes operate in entirely different spheres. The offences provided

under both the Statutes are separate and distinct from each other. The

penal consequences provided under both the statutes are also

independent and distinct from each other. The ingredients of offences

under the both statutes, as discussed earlier, are different, and an

offender can be tried and punished independently under both statutes.

The principle that the special law should prevail over the general law,

has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in road

accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act.

b) It further held that there is no provision under the M.V. Act

which separately deals with offences causing death, or grievous hurt,

or hurt by a motor vehicle in cases of motor vehicle accidents.

Chapter - XIII of the M.V. Act is silent about the act of rash and

negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt, or grievous hurt, to

persons nor does it prescribe any separate punishment for the same;

whereas Sections - 279, 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of IPC have

been specifically framed to deal with such offences. Section 26 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897 provides, “Where an act or omission

constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the

offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or

any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice

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for the same offence.” It is well settled that an act or an omission can

constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, be an

offence under any other law. With the said findings, the Apex Court

held that there is no bar under the M.V. Act or otherwise, to try and

prosecute offences under the IPC for an offence relating to motor

vehicle accidents.

xiii) In view of the above said law laid down by the Apex

Court, to constitute an offence under Section - 304 Part-II of IPC, the

requirements are that such death was caused by the act of the accused

and that he knew that such act of his was likely to cause death.

xiv) As discussed above, the allegations against the petitioners

herein are that petitioner No.1 is the owner of crime vehicle, petitioner

No.2 is Managing Director of petitioner No.1 Company and petitioner

No.3 is employee and In-charge of the Vehicles of petitioner No.1

Company including the crime vehicle. There are specific allegations

that the petitioners herein have abetted accused No.1 in committing

the aforesaid offences. There is also allegation that the petitioners

herein have not placed the number plate at backside of the crime

vehicle. They have permitted the crime vehicle to run in no-entry

area. They have caused disappearance of the evidence of offence

committed by accused No.1 by not placing number plate at back side

of vehicle with abetment of accused Nos.2 and 3. Thus, accused No.1

drove the uninsured crime vehicle dangerously. There is also an

allegation that the crime vehicle is not having insurance which is

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24

mandatory as per the provisions of the M.V. Act. Petitioner No.3

being the In-charge of the vehicles of petitioner No.1 Company

allowed accused No.1 to drive the unsafe condition vehicle in no-entry

area. Accused No.3 being owner of the crime vehicle did not follow

the Rules of M.V. Act and allowed accused No.1 to drive the unsafe

condition vehicle in no-entry area. Thus, both of them abetted the

commission of offence.

xv) A perusal of copy of the settlement deed dated 24.02.2021

filed by the petitioners herein would reveal that petitioner No.1

Company has agreed to pay an amount of Rs.35.00 lakhs towards

compensation to the father of the deceased and accordingly, it has paid

an amount of Rs.10.00 lakhs in cash and the remaining amount

through cheques. In the said deed, there is no mention that the

petitioners are not responsible for the accident and that the criminal

proceedings against them cannot be proceeded with.

xvi) In view of the above, prima facie, there are specific

allegations against the petitioners herein. The matter is at crime stage.

The Investigating Officer has recorded the statements of respondent

No.2, paternal uncle of the deceased, as LW.1; first cousin of the

deceased as LW.2; elder brother of deceased as LW.3; maternal uncle

of deceased as LW.4; father of deceased as LW.5 and General

Manager of petitioner No.1 Company as LW.7. Thus, admittedly,

investigation is pending. Investigating Officer has to investigate into

the allegations made against the petitioners. There are several factual
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aspects to be investigated into by the Investigating Officer during the

course of investigation. On completion of investigation, if the

Investigating Officer comes to a conclusion that the petitioners have

not played any role in commission of offence and that they were not

responsible for the commission of the said offence, he will drop the

charge against them by deleting their names from the charge sheet.

Investigating Officer is having power to delete or add any section of

law on appreciation of evidence, both oral and documentary. Thus,

the petitioners herein now cannot seek quashment of FIR No.142 of

2021 on the ground of contents of complaint lacks the ingredients of

offences alleged against them.

xvii) The Apex Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. The

State of Maharashtra4 has categorically held that quashing criminal

proceedings was called for only in a case where complaint did not

disclose any offence, or was frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. If

allegations set out in complaint did not constitute offence of which

cognizance had been taken by Magistrate, it was open to High Court

to quash same. It was not necessary that, a meticulous analysis of case

should be done before trial to find out whether case would end in

conviction or acquittal. If it appeared on a reading of complaint and

consideration of allegations therein, in light of the statement made on

oath that the ingredients of the offence are disclosed, there would be

no justification for High Court to interfere. The defences that might be

4
. AIR 2019 SC 847
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available, or facts/aspects which when established during trial, might

lead to acquittal, were not grounds for quashing complaint at

threshold. At that stage, only question relevant was whether

averments in complaint spell out ingredients of a criminal offence or

not. The Court has to consider whether complaint discloses that prima

facie, offences that were alleged against Respondents. Correctness or

otherwise of said allegations had to be decided only in trial. At initial

stage of issuance of process, it was not open to Courts to stifle

proceedings by entering into merits of the contentions made on behalf

of Accused. Criminal complaints could not be quashed only on

ground that, allegations made therein appear to be of a civil nature. If

ingredients of offence alleged against Accused were prima facie made

out in complaint, criminal proceeding shall not be interdicted.

xviii) In Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v.

The State of Uttar Pradesh5, the Apex Court referring to the earlier

judgments rendered by it has categorically held that the High Courts

in exercise of its inherent powers under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C has to

quash the proceedings in criminal cases in rarest of rare cases with

extreme caution.

xix) In M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v.

State of Maharashtra6, a Three-judge Bench of the Apex Court laid

certain conclusions, for the purpose of exercising powers by High

5
. AIR 2021 SC 931
6
. AIR 2021 SC 1918
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Courts under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C and also Article - 226 of the

Constitution of India, which are as under:

“….

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised

sparingly with circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare
cases’. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its
application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
not to be confused with the norm which has been
formulated in the context of the death penalty, as
explained previously by this Court);

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of

which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at

the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an

exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping

the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of
the State operate in two specific spheres of activities.
The inherent power of the court is,
however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or
prevent the above of the process by Section 482
Cr.P.C.

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are

complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference

would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and
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the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of

investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do

not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an

encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court
should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR
does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts
to abuse of process of law. During or after
investigation, if the investigating officer finds that
there is no substance in the application made by the
complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned
Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very

wide, but conferment of wide power requires the
court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more
diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks

fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing
and the self-restraint imposed by law, more
particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in
the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal
(supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint; and
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xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the

alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider
whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence and is not
required to consider on merits whether the allegations
make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has
to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate
the allegations in the FIR.”

xx) As discussed supra, prima facie, there are specific

allegations against the petitioners herein and there are several factual

aspects to be investigated into by the Investigating Officer. Therefore,

this Court is not inclined to interdict the investigation in the present

crime.

xxi) With regard to the contentions of petitioners that there is

no concept of vicarious liability in Criminal Law and, therefore,

petitioners Nos.2 and 3 cannot be prosecuted for the offences alleged

against them in the aforesaid crime and relied upon the principle laid

down by the Sunil Bharti Mittal1. It is relevant to note that in the

said decision, the Apex Court discussed about the Corporate Criminal

Liability, and the principle that criminal intent of persons controlling

company can be imputed to company based on principle of “alter-

ego”. It further held that reverse application of principle is not

permissible. When company is the accused, its Directors can be roped

in only if (a) there is sufficient incriminating evidence against them

coupled with criminal intent, or (b) the statutory regime attracts the
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doctrine of vicarious liability. In the said decision, CBI registered a

crime and on completion of investigation, it has laid charge sheet

against the accused therein, whereas, in the present case, the matter is

at crime stage. The Investigating Officer has to consider several

factual aspects as stated above. Thus, the said decision is inapplicable

to the case of the petitioners herein.

8. CONCLUSION:

i) In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of law,

according to this Court, the petitioners failed to make out any ground

to quash the proceedings in Crime No.142 of 2021 of Gachibowli

Police Station, Cyberabad Commissionerate and, therefore, the

petition is liable to be dismissed.

ii) The present Criminal Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the

Criminal Petition shall stand closed.

_________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
27th July, 2021
Mgr