76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

*
G.R. No. 153206. October 23, 2006.

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs.

LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.

Family Code; Marriages; The Constitution provides that

marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected
by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union
and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55
of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and
convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation
among the spouses.—The Constitution provides that marriage is
an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State,
thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its
infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the
Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly
proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the
spouses.

Courts; Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and

factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.—This Court is
not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when
confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.

Same; Same; It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the

subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds
the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is
generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower
courts.—It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule
finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is
generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower
courts. The only instances when this Court reviews findings of
fact are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are con-

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

77

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 77

Ong vs. Ong

trary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls
under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general rule
applies.

Same; Evidence; The Supreme Court also gives a great

amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the
unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.—The Court
also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of
the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court
judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment
of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate
tribunals. Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial
court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and
weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
 Evidence; Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit
and label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence
and a witness’ relationship to one of the parties does not
automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.—
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a
witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of credence and a
witness’ relationship to one of the parties does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her testimony.

Family Code; Marriages; Abandonment; As it was established

that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.—Also
without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which
provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties
have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita
left William due to his abusive

78

78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by

the said provision.

Same; Same; With the enactment of the Family Code, this has
been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.—We reiterate
that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening
the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself
however does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same.
With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been
accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Renecio S. Espiritu, Jr. for petitioner.
     Hermogenes S. Decano for private respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a 1 Petition for Review seeking the

reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City
granting the petition for legal separation
2
filed by herein
respondent, as well as the Resolution of the CA dated April
26, 2002 which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 30-44; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-

Magtolis and concurred in by Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and
Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
2 Rollo, p. 46.

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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 79

Ong vs. Ong

Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and

Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at
the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three
children: Kingston, Charleston,
3
and Princeton who are now
all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal4
Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked
by physical violence,
5
threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage,
she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical
violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout
invectives at her like “putang ina mo,” “gago,” “tanga,” and
he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head
against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could
reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty
things regarding their children or their business; William
would also scold and beat the children at different parts of
their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried
to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his
ire on her and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she
protested with William’s decision to allow their eldest son
Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, “it
is none of your business”; on December 14, 1995, she asked
William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent
quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek,
eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the
stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her
on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to
leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and
brought to their

_______________

3 See Records, p. 1.
4 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of petitioner;
xxx
5 Records, p. 2.

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80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to

her parent’s6 doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of
her injuries.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted
physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against
her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.
While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December
9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo,
Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their
Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of
December 14, 1995, 7 their laundrywoman told him that
Lucita left the house.
 On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision
decreeing legal separation, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant,
with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties,
for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a
complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make
a just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a
supplemental decision.
8
SO ORDERED.”

The RTC found that:

“It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William)

had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by
the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not
quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff
negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed
her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their
children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical
violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against the
plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and
language were heaped upon her.

_______________

6 Rollo, pp. 49-51 (RTC Decision).

7 Id., at p. 53 (RTC Decision).
8 Rollo, p. 56.

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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 81

Ong vs. Ong

The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and physical

anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she
had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty
years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the
plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of love,
harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As
very well stated in plaintiff’s memorandum, “it would be
unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of
relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated
from her children, whom she loves,
9
if there exists no cause, which
is already beyond her endurance.”

William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC

decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA
found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward
and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art.
55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct
10
directed against Lucita, were
adequately proven.
As the CA explained:

“The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses

were uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was
able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by
[William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained
redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the
stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both shoulders
and a “bump” or “bukol” on her head. The presence of these
injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and
her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also
confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the
doctor’s main testimony—that [Lucita] suffered physical violence
on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma,
slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-
called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate
questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust of
the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and
constantly established that [William] inflicted repeated physical
violence upon her during their marriage and that she had been
subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled
invectives at her even in front of their customers

_______________

9 Id., at p. 55.
10 Id., at pp. 40-44.

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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

and employees, shouting words like, “gaga,” “putang ina mo,”

“tanga,” and “you don’t know anything.”
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated
by Linda Lim who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991.
She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she
(Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a
witness to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had
during the three years she lived with them. She observed that
[William] has an “explosive temper, easily gets angry and
becomes very violent.” She cited several instances which proved
that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and
despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly
established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were
not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a
general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative
assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to the
affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances
testified to by [Lucita] and her sister. The injurious invectives
hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in
front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute
grossly abusive conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] 11
warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x”

William filed a motion for reconsideration

12
which was
denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.
Hence the present petition where William claims that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW

IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION
FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF
REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND
OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO
TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
FAMILY.

_______________

11 Rollo, pp. 40-42.

12 Id., at p. 46.

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Ong vs. Ong

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW
IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY
13
ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE
PART OF PETITIONER.

William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her

family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership
of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these
properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong,
Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during
the marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only
parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation
are Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree would
condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater
and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially
among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts
and circumstances have been overlooked which warrant an
exception to the general rule that factual findings of the
trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of
the trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical
violence against Lucita and their children were not
sufficiently established; what took place were
disagreements regarding the manner of raising and
disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucita’s
favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot be
impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the
complaining party must adduce clear and convincing
evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying
on the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister
Linda Lim, and their parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship
and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not
complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in
relation to their marital and family life; William expressed
his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally
however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling
on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below
in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the
conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be

_______________

13 Id., at pp. 8-9.

84

84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Ong vs. Ong

protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of

the marital union and not its infringement; only for
grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which
grounds should be clearly and convincingly proven, 14can the
courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts
that: the issues raised in the present petition are factual;
the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear
evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of
facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by
the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the
case for legal separation in order to remove from William
the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and
to transfer the same to Lucita’s family is absurd; Lucita
will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the
companionship of William and her children just to serve
the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home
because of the repeated physical
15
violence and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner.
Petitioner
16
filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his
petition, as well as a Memorandum where he averred for
the first time that since respondent is guilty of
abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be 17
denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given
ground for legal separation by abandoning the family
simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto
unless the conjugal properties were placed

_______________

14 Rollo, pp. 9-24.

15 Id., at pp. 149-152.
16 Id., at pp. 157-169.
17 Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the
following grounds:
xxx
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
xxx
Rollo, pp. 210-236.

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 Ong vs. Ong

in the administration of petitioner’s in-laws,18no decree of

legal separation should be issued in her favor.
Respondent likewise 19
filed a Memorandum reiterating
her earlier assertions.
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject
of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule finds more stringent application where the CA
upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such
instance, this Court is generally20bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the lower courts.
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of
fact are:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which,
21
if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.

As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls

under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general
rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on
appeal, especially when they are borne out by the records
or are based on sub-

_______________

18 Id., at p. 221.
19 Id., at pp. 188-203.
20 Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006, 494
SCRA 1.
21 Id.
 86

86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

22
stantial evidence. In this case, the findings of the RTC
were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by
the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself
admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel
with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames
her for being negligent of her wifely duties and23 for not
reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous
accounts of the instances when William displayed violent
temper against Lucita and their children; 24
such as: when
William threw25 a steel chair at Lucita; threw chairs at
their26 children; slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at
27
her; use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children;
pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost
strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick 28
rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray;
shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of
Linda and the employees of their business, 29
because he
could not find a draft letter on his table; got mad at
Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting
William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston,
then slapped Lucita and shouted at her “putang ina mo,
gago, wala kang
30
pakialam, tarantado” when she sided with
Charleston; and the December 9 and December 14, 1995
incidents31 which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal
dwelling.
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on
December 14, 1995, were not the first. As she related before
the trial court:

_______________

22 Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405-406; 401 SCRA 391, 398
(2003).
23 TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 29-32.
24 TSN, Lucita Ong, June 11, 1997, p. 14.
25 Id., at p. 20.
26 Id., at p. 21.
27 Id., at p. 23.
28 TSN, Linda Lim, June 25, 1997, p. 5.
29 Id., at pp. 5-6.
 30 Id., at pp. 7-8.
31 TSN, Lucita Ong, May 9, 1997, pp. 9-11, 16.

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Ong vs. Ong

“q You stated on cross examination that the injuries you

sustained on December 14, 1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very
serious because before it is only on the arm and black
eye, but on this De-cember
32
14, I suffered bruises in all
parts of my body, sir.”

To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer 33

are
denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents.
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and
the general denial for William, the Court gives more weight
to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount
of consideration to the assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges
enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment
of witnesses
34
on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate
tribunals. Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the
trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great
respect and weight having had the opportunity to observe
the conduct 35
and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying.
In this case, the RTC noted that:

“[William]’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of

physical violence committed by him could not be given much
credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and
the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon
defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted
with bias and they could not be considered as impartial and
credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong 36
who lives with
defendant and depends upon him for support.”

Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of

Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with
her. We do not

_______________

32 Id., at p. 21.
 33 See TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 11, 53; TSN,
Kingston Ong, September 24, 1997, pp. 16-18.
34 Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333; 350 SCRA 414, 420
(2001).
35 Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA
625; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353,
364.
36 Rollo, p. 56.

88

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit

and label37 a witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of
credence and a witness’ relationship to one of the parties
does not automatically
38
affect the veracity of his or her
testimony. Considering the detailed and straightforward
testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano,
bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court,
the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with
bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in
filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of
the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that
Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the
legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings
could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court
finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would
Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and
siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her marriage?
What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground
for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to
seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC,

“...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty

years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be
separated from her children whom she loves,39if there exists no
cause, which is already beyond her endurance.”

The claim of William that a decree of legal separation

would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater
and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this
Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation
then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek
relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to
go to court in the first place.
 Also without merit is the argument of William that since
Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be

_______________

37 Roca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at p. 334; p. 421.

38 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473,
December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 196, 207.
39 Rollo, p. 55.

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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 89

Ong vs. Ong

granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code

which provides that legal separation shall be denied when
both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment
40
without justifiable cause for more than one
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is
committed to the policy41 of strengthening the family as a
basic social institution. The Constitution itself however
does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and
put into operation
42
the constitutional provisions that protect
the same. With the enactment of the Family Code, this
has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes
the limitations that affect married and family life, as well
as prescribes the grounds for43
declaration of nullity and
those for legal separation. As Lucita has adequately
proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the
Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC
and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under
the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.

_______________
 40 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
…
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one year.
41 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180; 256 SCRA 158, 168-
169 (1996).
42 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 35 at p. 372.
43 Id., at p. 372.

90

90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,

Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Notes.—Marriage is an inviolable social institution

whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulations. (Acebedo vs. Arquero,
399 SCRA 10 [2003])
Neither is Article 36 of the Family Code to be equated
with legal separation, in which the ground need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA
755 [2000])

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