The Strategic Performance in Asymmetric War,

A Case Study of Israel and Hezbollah

Mohamed Boraik

Centre of Strategic Studies,

Reading University,
Academic Year 07-08
 INTRODUCTION

Small Wars, Insurgency, guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflict, irregular warfare and terrorism,
are predominant terms in the era of strategic transformation. The primary academic task is to
clarify the entangling nomenclatures. Actually, we find many theoretical models to sharpen the
edges between these terms; each has its norms, conditions and classification. Mixing all together
is not wise.
Colin Gray attempted to solve this problem by gathering all types under the title of “irregular
warfare” and “small wars”, although he considered the term of irregularity based on illegality. 1
This scheme is plausible, but “irregularity” should mean the conduct not the legality. Firstly, the
legality is debatable in most of the political conflicts, and there is another dispute between the
legality and morality.2 Moreover, the (legal) forces may use the irregular techniques (Special
Forces) and the (illegal) forces may escalate its practice to the level of regular war (the war of
position). Having this proposition in mind, the theorist, as Gray did, may claim that the
dependant factor in this equation is “the legality” not “the conduct”, as it is constant but the
conduct can be variable. This is true only if we mean the “tactical” conduct. The irregularity,
that we mean, describes the strategic level of practice not the tactical, whose irregularity should
codify the “guerrilla” fighting. In the irregular conflict, one of the sides – or both – uses an
“irregular strategy” not focusing on the “direct engagements” to reach its ends, as we discuss
later.
Another theoretical scheme is what was adopted by the formal doctrinal US thinking after
Vietnam, where it includes all forms under the title of “low intensity warfare”.3
Lastly, we need to discuss our adopted scheme of definitions; “asymmetry”. Most of the theorists
use the term of “asymmetrical conflict” to describe a conflict where one of the opponents is a
disproportional “weaker” to the other.
There are many trends about the scale and type of measuring the power. Although, some used the
“quantitative” formulas to describe the level of proportional disparity, the wiser approach
combines that with the “qualitative” formulas. The quantitative formulas extend from the basic
physical and human findings up to the industrial, developmental and weaponry assessments. The

1
Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Phoenix Paperback (2005), page 115
2
Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province, (Uni. Of
California, 1992), pages 10-15
3
The US Army – Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Uni. Of Chicago Press 2007), page xi

1
qualitative formulas are complex. As Cordesman described, they involve very sophisticated
comparisons of the land, air and sea forces, the operational strength, the training and doctrinal
capabilities and the quality of manpower.4
Again, the threshold of asymmetry produced another dispute. As Arreguin-Toft wisely wrote,
“the weak and strong only have meaning in particular conflict dyads; though these may include
individual actor or coalition of actors”. Literally, the asymmetry can be claimed if the disparity is
1:1.1, but this threshold was raised by many authors to higher degrees (Arreguin-Toft for
example raised the ratio up to 10:1). 5
Obviously, this trend in defining the asymmetry relies on the nature of actors (in power).
Another trend used the asymmetry to codify the disparity in conduct not in power.
In the field of international relations and power, it may be acceptable to focus primarily on the
nature or the power of actor, but not in strategic studies. Although strategy is absolutely
depending upon the whole nature of actor, including the power, the scope of its context should be
refined to tackle the process “how” of using the power means to achieve the political ends. For
this reason, I claim that “asymmetry” should mean the “conduct”. Rupert Smith found this
attitude absurd “as the practice of war, indeed its art is to achieve an asymmetry over the
opponent. Labelling wars as asymmetric is to me something of euphemism to avoid
acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning”. Here
again we need to differentiate between “the difference” and “the asymmetry”, and between the
asymmetry in the “tactical” and “strategic” levels.
In conventional war, one actor makes a strategy to “counter” the opponent’s and to push the
whole conduct to his objectives, so this strategy should be “different” than the opponent’s, not
just “the mirror image”. But both strategies are “similar” and following the same category of
strategy.

4
For detailed comparison based on mixed formulas, see: Anthony Cordesman, Arab-Israeli Military
Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, pages 32-55
5
Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict, (Cambridge Uni. 2005),
page 2-4

2
Even Arreguin-Toft, though he saw the “asymmetry” in the context of power disparity, he
interpreted the outcome of conflict where the weak defeat the strong by the strategic disparity,
“my central thesis is that when actor employ similar strategic approaches (direct-direct or
indirect-indirect) relative power explains the outcome: strong actors win quickly and decisively.
When actors employs opposite strategic (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), weak actors are much
more likely to win.”6 Although, I feel discomfort to reduce the disparity between strategies to
directness or indirectness simply, his explanation is an example of asymmetry in strategic level,
not lower levels of conduct.
Rupert Smith himself in the book of “utility of force” spoke about the change of “paradigm”. He
advocated the evolution of new form of war; “war among people” which has “sub-strategic
objectives”. He said, “War amongst the people is different. Military engagements can take place
anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the
targets, objectives to be won, as much as opposing forces. In which case perhaps the model of
war rather than its name is no longer relevant: the paradigm has changed”.7
I think the reason of this confusion is a common problem in the academic field where the
differences among theorists are in research paradigm, scope and nomenclature. What was
considered by Smith as a shift in the paradigm of nature of war is simply an asymmetric conflict
which has been always there. But this asymmetry is in conduct, not at the tactical level, but in
strategy.
Asymmetrical Strategy:

In conventional wars, the actor seeks accomplishing his objectives through an engagement in a
battle or series of battles. The conventional strategy can use direct or indirect approaches, but the
engagement is its essence. The conventional strategy attacks the opponent’s will or capabilities
or both. In contrast, the asymmetrical strategy where the weak, usually non-state actors, avoids
the direct engagement and relies on harassing the opponent to erode its will. As the effect of this
strategy can not be achieved without long time passed, and the actor needs a special medium for
mobilization, recruiting and conciliation, the centre of gravity for this strategy is atypical; the
people.
The people is the centre of gravity, not only because of its basic functions to the non-state actor,
but because it is related to the political ends for all actors in the conflict. In insurgency for
example, both actors work to win the people for its side to achieve the end state or exit strategy.

6
Areeguin-Toft, page18
7
Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the art of war in the modern world, (Penguin 2005), pages 3 - 5

3
Robert Thompson, interestingly, identified this fact.8 Also, COIN Field manual emphasised that
“The civilian population is the centre of gravity. The real battle is for civilian support for, or
acquisition to, the counter-insurgents and host nation government. The population waits to be
convinced. Killing the civilians is no longer just collateral damage. Civilian casualties undermine
the counter-insurgent’s goals”9
The asymmetrical strategy exhibits plenty of faces, depending on the end status, the nature of
actors and contexts, ideology and cultural preferences, geopolitics...etc. In spite of this
heterogeneity, the climax of this strategy is the same; harassing the opponent to erode its will,
enhancing the public base, avoiding the direct engagement and gradual acceleration. Che
Guevara pointed successfully, in the beginning of his revolutionary treatise, at this paradoxical
nature of strategy; the united essence and different patterns. The role of theory is to reduce the
current or historical practices to their primary nature.10 Being a Mao Tse Tong’s people of war
against Japanese then Nationalists, Che Guevara’s guerrilla warfare, PLO’s Palestinian
Revolution, Hamas and Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance or even Bin Laden’s War against
Tyrants, will not make a difference in approaching the real theory of asymmetrical conflict, at
least in its abstractive level.
Why weak won? A theoretical battle
As the asymmetrical conflict was occupied by the definition of “the power of actors”, and the
outcomes of this conflict were in many occasions in favour of the “weak”, the question of “why
the weak won” has been researched continuously. In his valuable study, Arreguin-Toft translated
the question into empirical facts: more than 80 % of the wars since 1890 were asymmetrical
(under the light of his definition of course) and the weak won in 28.5%. Moreover, the trend of
victorious weak actors rose significantly (the weak won in 51.2% in conflicts in 1950 -1999).11
He discussed three major academic propositions to explain why the weak won in the first
instance, and why the trend of this attitude was uprising after that. Though he accepted the nature
of regime, the arms diffusion and the interest rivalry as participatory explanations, he recognised
the strategic interaction as the central theoretical explanation. He categorized the types of
strategy into two categories; direct and indirect. The direct type of strategy includes the
conventional attack (by strong) and the conventional defence (by weak). The indirect type

8
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, (Hailer
Publishing, 2005), page 15
9
COIN, page xxv – xxxi
10
Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Souvenir Press 2006, page 7-8

11
Arreguin-Toft, Pages 3-4

4
involves the coercion (by strong) and the guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) by weak. He claimed
that the weak is most likely to win if both strategies interacted as quoted above.
Although this approach is more plausible than its rival theories, I think it needs another
modification.
I claim that the central factor is the strategic ability which is more complex to be reduced to one
dimension. I agree that this kind of conflicts has very unique “nature” with special norms and
conditions, but identifying this nature, and formulating and implementing a “victorious” strategy
efficiently is the climax of victory. Reducing the strategic performance to “the making of a
different type of strategy” to achieve the victory is not fully logic. Many conflicts with this
strategic interaction had an outcome in favour of the strong. Also, assuming this interaction is the
solution, it is not the dependent, but rather it is independent factor. This is a famous academic
fallacy that corrupts the strategic research, as what Sir Liddell Hart was blamed for, because of
his reducing and simplifying manner in “strategy...the indirect approach”. The strategist is
making his best strategy whatever its assumed type (direct or indirect). The nature of this
strategy is multidimensional, and more complex and dynamic to be reduced to the sole formula.
Notwithstanding, the asymmetrical conflict has a “different” paradigm with special characters as
mentioned before.
Victorious strategy:
In war, two kinds of elements exist; natural and humanitarian. In spite of its crucial implications,
the natural elements, as the natural resources, the geopolitical status and the environment, can
not lead alone to a victory or defeat, rather, how they were handled can. The Human or Human-
made elements (as weapons) can be claimed to be responsible, but the most of this statement
should be devoted to the human decisions, rather than weapons. The humanitarian faults, mainly
at the levels of grand strategy and strategy, can lead to victory or defeat. The tactical weakness is
a problem, but it can be compensated through mastering the strategy. In contrast, the tactical
excellence cannot be a lever for bad strategy.
Another fact should be kept in minds; strategy is always reactive. As Clausewitz said “war is not
an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as in the case with the mechanical arts, or at
matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human mind and
emotions in the fine arts. In war the will is directed at an animate object that reacts.”12 This wise
notice does not only interpret some part of the ambiguity of war, but it can make our concept of

12
Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, and abridged by Beatrice Heuser
(Oxford 2007), p 112

5
the “victorious strategy” much different. Victory is usually not about one side who practises
better than the other, rather, less worse.

Assessing the Strategic Performance:

Some analytical work is needed to answer the main queries of the subject: why the weak win,
what is the essence of asymmetry, and how the strategic performance in this kind of conflict is
assessed? In another meaning; is there any analytical framework to habituate all the cases in it?
My main proposition is the centrality of multidimensional approach in understanding the
strategic performance. I am really convinced with what was created by Colin Gray in “Modern
Strategy” and the similar frameworks. He indicated that strategy has about seventeen dimensions
and can be categorized in three major categories: the people and politics, the preparation to war
and the war proper. “The first category, (People and Politics), comprises: the people, the society,
the culture; the politics and ethics. Category two, (Preparation for War), includes: the economics
and logistics; the organisation (including the defence and force planning); the military
administration (including recruitment, training, and the most aspects of armament); information
and intelligence; the strategic theory and doctrine; and technology. The final category, (War
Proper), is composed of: the military operations, the command (political and military);
geography; friction (including chance and uncertainty); the adversary, and time.”13
Furthermore, the strategic performance is a complicated process involving three temporal stages:
formulation, implementation and reviewing. All strategic dimensions and phases are managed by
the strategic body to reach the ends. The plenty of dimensions can obscure the view if there is no
good acquaintance of the proportional relationships and the nature of conflict. These dimensions
are dynamically interacting with each other. Also, there is a proportionate weight for each
dimension, in each conflict, and changeable over the time. Lastly, the nature of conflict dictates a
special way of performance depending on: the centre of gravity, and the inter and intra-
dimensional characters.
The asymmetric conflict is more politicised with the centre of gravity shifted more towards the
people. Also, there are peculiar characters painting the operational and tactical atmospheres.
What was prescribed, long time ago, by Sir Robert Thompson is strongly emphasised. His
strategic concepts of having: a clear political aims, balancing the military and political work,

13
Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford 2005), page 24

6
establishing safe, well administrated and attractive state (winning stage) and defeating the
political cells before neutralizing the warriors, are completely valuable.14
Methodology:
The case study approach
The Case study is an important tool in the research methodology in political and social sciences.
However, it was believed to pursue the exploratory functions only. Robert Yin asserted,
however, that the case study does function as exploratory and explanatory tool; all depends upon
the questions and the nature of research.15 The rationale behind the explanatory function is to
“assess dependent and independent variables to find the causal links”. Case studies have some
privileges in testing the theoretical propositions empirically especially over the time series. This
is because of the variability of its tools; documents, literature, archives, observation,
interviews… exc.16
The multiple-case study is the most valuable approach in finding the dependant and independent
elements. However, the single case study can participate in refining the theory. This study is a
single case study of Hezbollah and Israel. The rationale behind preferring single over multiple-
case study despite the more strength of the latter is the limited time, the wordage, and the unique
nature of the current case study.17
Studying the case study of Hezbollah and Israel can be considered unique for many reasons. First
we have good time series analysis as the conflict has a time extension from 1982 till the current
time. Most of the patterns and phases in asymmetrical conflict were matured over this long
period. This can not be claimed in the most current conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
outcome of the asymmetrical conflict in favour of the weak is usually related to the disparity and
efficiency between both actors’ strategy. In the conflict, this disparity was at the maximum and
the outcome, in turn, was very clear. I argue that this is a purified form of asymmetrical conflict.
Moreover, no enough literature or research was devoted for this conflict despite its importance.
The clandestine nature of Hezbollah and Israeli militarily bodies, and the linguistic problems of
the resources might be a reason. Also, this conflict has a very characteristic patterns; the
multidimensional and multi-participant patterns. It is clear to find the direct reflections of all the
strategic dimensions in the conflict, especially the forgotten dimensions of strategy, as portrayed

14
Thompson, pages 50-56
15
Robert Yin, Case Study Research: design and methods, (SAGE 2003), pages 5-20
16
Yin, pages 12,13
17
Yin, pages 39,40

7
by Williamsons Murray; the society, the culture and the politics.18 Moreover, this conflict has a
central position in the Middle East conflict. Five direct regional participants and plenty of
regional and international actors are existent. This complexity, similar to the cold-war conflict,
gives more space to discuss the interactions and self modifications among different sectors in
strategy.

Tools:

This study is composed of five chapters and conclusion. The first and second chapters deal with
the “process” of making strategy in both Israel and Hezbollah. They deal with the main
dimensions, conceptually and practically, in formulating the strategy. The third chapter, “the
protracted war”, examines the long-term conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, since the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon 1982 till the unilateral retreat in 2000. By a historical tale, it tries to
elaborate the main themes of “asymmetrical strategy and counter-strategy” and assess their
efficiency. The fourth chapter studies the period from the retreat till the 2006 War. The final
chapter, “the shifted strategy”, studies the different aspects of the Second Lebanon War; mainly
at the grand and military strategic and operational levels.
The main search tools are reviewing the literature, the interviews, the close observation, and
reviewing the documents.
The main challenge in literature was the scarce amount of the works examining Hezbollah,
especially from the strategic perspective. To solve this problem I intended to pursue an active
step: I did one week research trip in Lebanon in June 2008 where I performed more than fifteen
interviews. I use this space to direct my gratefulness to Lt Colonel Dr Amin Hetit, the former
head of the Commands and Joint Staff College in Lebanon, for his thorough assistance and
guidance. We could arrange some interviews with the high class cadre in Hezbollah; members in
the Political Bureau, the Administrative Body, the Centre of Strategic Studies and two former
military commanders.19
In Conclusion chapter, I tried to trace the theoretical propositions through the preceding chapters.
By “pattern mapping”, I could examine the actual conflict and its phases in the shadow of the
theoretical principles. Although, this conclusion adds valuable emphasis to the basic theory,
further comparative studies are still needed to upgrade the results to more generalised pattern.

18
Williamson Murray, The Making of Strategy: Rulers. States, and War, (Cambridge Uni. Press, 1994),
Pages 1-17
19
Appendix A; for a list of interviews.

8
CHAPTER ONE: MAKING OF ISRAELI STRATEGY

People and Politics:

The quest of Israel is the quest of the survival and security. No example in the comparative
geopolitics shares a similar position; small state surrounded by aggressive and much vaster
enemies. Israel’s strategic depth is a nightmare tragedy; it reaches to only ten miles between
Jordon Frontiers and the sea in some places. All Israeli airspace is prone to Arab Surface to Air
Missiles, and Arab rockets can hit any place inside Israel.20
All Arab states shared, at some points, in hostilities against Israel. Peoples’ position is much
clearer; more than 80%, as shown in many occasions are with destructing, rather than,
threatening Israel.
The demographic facts are another threat; 25% of its population, not including those who live in
the occupied territories 1967, are going to be Arabs. Military Participation Ratio (MPR) has been
high during the Israeli history. The army depends totally on the reservists, who are inferior to the
professionals in training. This led that war must end “quickly and decisively”. 21
Although military expenditure was about 30% of GNP in 1979, it declined to about 12% in the
late 1980s and roughly stabilized. Return to the former pattern with the major military operations
restrains the military strategists. Israel has been relying almost on the foreign aids; USSR
between 1947 and1949 (through Czechoslovakia), France between 1955 and 1968 and West
Germany from 1953. Once the military aid with France dissolved, Israel found in US the major
source. This economical pattern emphasises that wars need to be quick and decisive.22
Two thousands in the Diaspora, after the destruction of the first and second temples, and the
trauma of holocaust shaped the psychology of Israelis with the sense of insecurity; especially
with the regeneration of such experiences in education, media and all social grounds. As Handel
noticed, “for Zionists, then, the quest for a State of Israel was part of a quest for security”. This
highly stimulated security threshold made the threshold very low to any threat. So, “most Israelis
still prefer security to taking risks for peace”.23 Moreover, it made the society very liable to be
manoeuvred by “security” issues. Ariel Sharon in 2000 sparked Al-Aqsa Intifada by his visit to

20
Micheal Handel, The evolution of Israeli strategy: The psychology of insecurity and the quest for
absolute power, in “Making of Strategy”, pages 537-538
21
Ibid., pages 544-547
22
Ibid., pages 548-549
23
Ibid., page 543

9
the holly Mosque. Sharon’s adversaries accused him, that he did that for a political profit. Once
the Intifada erupted, the sense of threat peaked in Israelis. In such case, Israelis go extreme.
Also, any threat can foster the ghetto mentality that impend the political and diplomatic
dimension of strategy. David Rodman indicated that “Israel’s military activism-its propensity to
seize the initiative and to take bold risks on the battlefield- has frequently been contrasted with
its diplomatic passivity- its inclination to sit tight and to be extremely cautious at the negotiating
table.” He analysed this attitude by two rationales. Firstly, the attitudes during the Jews history in
Diaspora and recent experience in Holocaust were transmitted through generations and secondly,
the tremendously sophisticated geo-strategic situation of Israel.24
The political system in Israel, where no party can hold the political majority without wide
unions, increased the proportional weight of the non-formidable public currents and increased
the vulnerability of the political leadership to the public waves.
As levy notices, “Since the First War of Lebanon (1982), the Israeli state’s internal autonomy in
directing and implementing the military policies has been eroded, much due to the appearance of
protest movements formed by groups of discharged soldiers and their families. This phenomenon
reached its climax in the late 1990s with the Four Mothers movement, comprised mostly of
mothers of soldiers who had served in Lebanon protesting against what they viewed as the
pointless sacrifice of lives in the ongoing Lebanon War. The Four Mothers’ protest was one of
the factors that prompted the Israeli government’s decision to unilaterally pull the IDF out of
Lebanon in 2000, after eighteen years of war.”25

Who makes strategy? (The Political-Military Relations)

The case of Israel is about a movement that founded a state. The military sectors commenced in
1921 when Hagana was established. Over time, Argon and Shtern groups were created too, as
divisions. The former was always subordinated to the political decisions. After 1945, all military
sectors were amalgamated under the same political leadership.26
During the early stage of the state, the military weight increased sharply in the decision making
process, although such process was never devoted to a specific institution. The military has its

24
David Rodman, Defence and diplomacy in Israel’s National Security Experience Tactics, Partnership,
and Motives, (Sussex Academic Press 2005), pages
25
Yagil Levy, Israel’s Materialist Militarism, (Lexington Books 2007), pages 1-3

26
Ritchie Ovendale, The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars, (Pearson, 4th Edition 2004), pages 30-50

10
bifacial influence over the political decision making: direct and indirect. Directly; the national
security policy was always kept a responsible of the few (Ministerial Defence Committee);
Prime Minster, few Ministers and high military leaders. The Ministerial Defence is the executive
shape. Indirectly: most of the Prime Ministers were infiltrated from the military organisation.27

The idealistic instrumental pattern in describing the political-military relations was existent at the
first days of Israel as a state. As David Ben-Gurion said, “It is not up the military to decide on
the state’s policy, regime, laws and governmental arrangements. Moreover, it is not up to the
military to decide on its own rules, structure and courses of action, and it certainly should not
decide weather there will be peace or war. The military is not more than an executive branch, the
Defence and Security branch of Israel’s government”. As Puri described, “though the democratic
nature of Israeli society has been preserved and the military continues to subscribe to the
democratic values, Israel exists as a nation in arms and, therefore, lacks integral boundaries
between its military and society. This has inevitably led to the militarization of certain societal
spheres and the politicization of the military in other spheres”28
Yari writes, “There is a most conspicuous weakness in the Israeli governmental system, with
regard to the development of overall strategy. In the past… only the military possessed the staff
requisite for strategy development”. Perlmutter adds, “The heart of the matter is that IDF is the
institution that formulates Israel’s grand strategy and makes its tactical decisions, although not
necessary the decision to go to war”. Meir, however, asserts on the “obscured” relations and the
swapping responsibilities, “It is universally accepted that a prime responsibility of the civil
authority is to determine the goals of war, leaving it largely to decide on how they are to be
achieved, The Israeli paradox is that while the civilian echelon intervenes quite actively in
deciding on the how, it fails dismally to meet its primary responsibility to determine the what.”29

Studying the political-military relationship in the Lebanon crises for example, while Mofatz and
Barak were in agreement about the peace process with Palestinians, they were in dispute about
Lebanon. Barak promised during his election campaign to move the army out of Lebanon in one
year. Mofatz was insisting on postponing this point till the agreement with Syrians and with
assuring a security arrangement. After the negotiation failure with Syria and the escalation of the

27
Handel, page 537
28
Yoram Peri, Generals in the cabinet room: how the military Shapes Israeli Policy, (United States
Institute of Peace 2006) , pages 23,24

29
Yehuda Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel, (Columbia Uni. Press 1995), pages 144-145

11
internal protest because of the “blood drain” in Lebanon, Barak had no choice to set a unilateral
withdrawal. Mofatz and most of the General Staff officers contested to this move and expected
that would leave dangerous drawbacks. This would leave a chance to the Palestinians or even
Hezbollah to keep attacking Israel through the northern Frontier. The worst; “they predicted that
Hezbollah would regard this move as a cowardly Israeli retreat and see its own violent actions as
having led to this victory, thus weakening Israel’s deterrence power.”30
Another example occurred in the conflict with Syrians. No doubt that sorting out this conflict
would deprive Hezbollah from the majority of its strategic arsenal. Although the negotiations
with Syria were claimed to be failed because of Asad’s stiffness, CGS Mofatz had different
interpretation. To Mofatz and the other officers, Barak’s refusal to Assad’s demand of having a
narrow strip on the land at the eastern shore of the Lake of Galilee was mainly because of the
internal dimension. Barak thought he was not able to get the public agreement on such
concession.31
These elements of domestic and societal nature and political-military relations, deprived the
Israeli strategic its essence; the logic. As Clausewitz indicated that the “fascinating trinity”
should work in harmony; however, the Israeli arm of the “logic” decision making and calculating
the probability was left victim to the wings of hatred and chance.

Strategic Doctrine:

Israel did not use to have a written form of doctrine. However, some strategic principles were
transmitted hereditary for both grand and military strategic levels. The foreign policy focuses on
the amalgamated relationship with a superpower. The leaders of Israel saw its survival as
indefinite struggle that can not be overcome unless they hold a continuous military and coercive
supremacy, and hold the backup of superpower.
Another rational policy options were not researchable in the Israeli mind, although they were
proclaimed by some political bodies. Combination between the strategic supremacy and nuclear
deterrence, avoiding any flare of waves of enmity, building up side tracks channels to reach a
political resolution and approaching the economical predominance, were, almost, undiscovered
topics in the Israeli strategy.
Adding to the diverted military-political relations, the Israeli strategy has been heavily
militarized and “Israel’s leaders too often viewed diplomacy as an instrument to support the
military, rather than the reverse.” What enhances the military occupation to the Israeli strategy

30
Peri, pages 94, 95
31
Ibid., 95

12
was the adopted concept of “conventional deterrence”. Shimshoni believed that the essence of
conventional deterrence is mixing the denial and punishment; this can not be reached without a
reputation built on frequent violent actions. He said, “Decision maker who would pursue
deterrence may face a rather uncomfortable set of choices, not between war and peace, but
rather, between a small war now and a larger one later, or vice versa. The latter kind of choice is
precisely the idea of reputation, which requires violence now to prevent greater violence later.”
32

This defected policy, if there is any, caused two major drawbacks: occupation of the policy by
the pure military perspective and, because of lack of the plausible political objectives, a defective
military strategy in turn. The military conduct did not serve, or was dissociated with, the logical
political insight. So, military strategy was devoted only to the effectiveness in military operations
and focused on “short-run, day-to-day operational matters”; this status was labelled by Handle,
“tacticization of strategy”.33
The weak strategic depth, the hostile external environment, the need to have a decisive and rapid
victory – to avoid the economical strains of total mobilization- and the centrality of the military
in the decision making process, shaped Israel’s strategy. “Not yielding any inch” and “peripheral
zones”, by using the paramilitary settlements at the frontiers to delay any advancing adversaries,
were the first strategic patterns. After that, the strategy was shifted to the “pre-emptive attacks”
and “coercion”.34 So, the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1982, attacking Iraqi nuclear assets in 1981,
the recurrent operations on the occupied territories (1967) and 2006 war; were prominent
examples.
As Naveh wrote, “Since the logical roots of the operational doctrine of pre-emptive offensive lay
in the siege mentality and the strategic circumstances that proceeded the 1967 War, it seems only
natural that the decisive victory and the ensuing profound territorial changes should have led the
country’s military and political leaderships to re-examine the validity of the traditional concepts.
To the contrary, unable to resist the addictive temptations of success the captains of Israel’s
strategy became ever-more obsessed with the magic formula of combining a pre-emptive
approach with the operational method of offensive armoured manoeuvre.”35
To overcome the Arab supremacy in numbers, “the quality over quantity” and “the art of
weaponry” concepts were adopted. Israel relies on “the capital-intensive warfare- that is, on
32
Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: border warfare from 1953 to 1970 ,
(Cornell Uni. 1988), page 236
33
Handel, page 570
34
Ibid., pages 538-540
35
Shimon Naveh, The Cult of the Offensive Pre-emption and future Challenges for Israeli Operational
Thought, in “ Between War and Peace: dilemmas of Israeli Security”, (Frank Kass 1996), page 169

13
automation, technological surprise, massive, accurate fire power, area munitions, and standoff
weapons- to reduce casualties and minimize the destruction of expensive platforms”. 36 Israel
showed very low temper to resort to weapons as its panacea. Alas, weapons can not achieve the
victory, on their own. In asymmetrical conflict, many of these weapons privileges were silenced
by primitive methods. Also, the strategic context is not suitable for these “capital-intensive
warfare” as it is indiscriminate. As in COIN Marines Field Manual, “The civilian population is
the centre of gravity. The real battle is for civilian support for, or acquisition to, the counter-
insurgents and host nation government. The population waits to be convinced. Killing the
civilians is no longer just collateral damage. Civilian casualties undermine the counter-
insurgent’s goals”.37
Intelligence was the most reliable arm in the Israeli strategy; to unravel any early primitive
attitude of hostility, in the war against irregular and for selective coercion. The chief of
intelligence holds a high position; very similar position to the chief of staff. 38 This causes the
intelligence central role in decision making, in turn, the process becomes very unstable.
Recently, after longstanding debates about the way to silence Hamas’ rockets, the decision was
in favour of a medium scale – might escalate to high scale- operation in Gaza. At that time, the
intelligence found a target; the military figure of Hezbollah “Emad Moghneyya”! The decision
was taken to assassinate him; this action which would lead to flaring up the superior frontier in a
time which is not advantageous for Israel: for Israeli domestic plans, for her regional and
international allies and for Lebanese political dispute (any new wave of conflict will back up
Hezbollah and resolve his tension). This exactly occurred, as Hezbollah intended to make its
command’s funeral at the same day of 14th March Current’s public escalation; the later was
successfully demolished

Israel’s Strategy in the Asymmetric Conflict:

Avi Koper pointed to the transformation of Israel’s wars into an asymmetrical trend. The
traditional strategy, if we pretend it was reasonable, it is lump here. He says, “During the past 25
years, low intensity conflicts have become Israel’s most frequent type of confrontation with its
enemies. Hezbollah is an example of an organisation confronting Israel which, despite its
extreme military inferiority, has managed to compensate by demonstrating both reasonable loss
ratios and stronger social prevalence. According to former Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak

36
Ibid., page
37
COIN Marines Field Manual, page
38
Handel, page 541

14
Mordechai, from his very first day in office, in mid-1996, he appreciated that terrorism and
guerrilla actions couldn’t be defeated militarily.”39
All aspects of criticism to Israel’s grand and military strategies rule in the context of the
asymmetrical conflict. The militarized toned strategy, the resort to technology, the obscured
political aims, focusing on the operational or “battlefield” destruction of enemy forces, and the
diseased political-military relations are short prescription of failure in the struggle with
Hezbollah.

Israel tried mixed measures of military offence and defence, adding to determent trials to build a
status of deterrence; all did not meet any success.
As Rodman said, “IDF in the Pre Six-Day War employed a mixture of defensive and offensive
means at the tactical and operational levels. After the war, its approach to the similar conflict got
more developed. New assets were such as (ultra-sophisticated electronic warning equipment,
maritime and airborne reconnaissance, border fences and patrol roads in addition to pre-existing
fortified outposts, minefields, and ground patrols.)”,40 adding to that, all forms of offence, were
adopted in the operational anti-guerrilla doctrine.
He added, “Only in the realm of low intensity conflict does Israel’s deterrent posture seem to
have grown over time. Israel, to be sure, has always been plagued by terrorism and guerrilla
warfare; however, its ability to deter this type of warfare has been declined noticeably, especially
over the last decade. Its ability to “deter by punishment” – that is, to deter its enemies by
inflicting pain and suffering on them- didn’t work as well in Lebanon during the 1990s as it had
in past decades. Despite Operations Grapes of Wrath and Accountability, not to mention small-
scale incursions, the IDF proved unable to bring Hezbollah attacks under control to the extent
that it had been able to limit PLO attacks in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.”41
Shamuel Bar studied the deterrent ability of Israel towards the irregular groups, Hezbollah,
Hamas and PLO. He concluded that if there is any success by using the deterrence strategy, it
will be at the tactical level and temporary. This is because the nature of the adversary, being
religiously fanatic and successful in establishing a strong public base, the type of the conflict,
being heavily politicized, and the adversary’s manoeuvre. He mentioned that, “Hezbollah have

39
Avi Kuper, Israeli War Objectives into an Era of Negativism, in Uri Bar-Joseph’s “Israel’s National
Security Towards the 21st Century”, (Frank Cass Publications, 2001), page 149

40
Rodman, pages 36, 37
41
Ibid., page 37

15
benefited from what is called in Israeli deterrence parlance, “the power of the weak”. This is the
relative power that the weaker side maintains vis-à-vis the stronger party. It can be based on one
or a combination of three strategies:
1. Neutralizing key components of its opponent’s advantage. This is done:
a. By finding a defence against the tactics that are central to that advantage
or;
b. By creating circumstances that prevent the enemy from using those capabilities that give it the
advantage
2. Creating an internal situation in the target society that renders acquiescence to pressure or to
deterrent threats virtually impossible.
3. Posing counter-threats that occupy the superior power and narrow its room for manoeuvre”42
In short, Israel dealt with the asymmetrical conflict as a “conventional” campaign. All defects in
its strategy, as we discuss later, exhibited in all stages of the conflict from 1982 till the current
time.

42
Shmuel Bar, Israeli Experience in Deterring Terrorist Organizations, Herzelia Conference 2007.

16
CHAPTER TWO: MAKING OF HEZBOLLAH’S STRATEGY

Shia revival (Lebanon – Islamic Revolution and new theory)

Although Hezbollah was created in 1982, its ideology, virtual existence and labour started long
time ago. The advocates of strategic culture indicate the centrality of collective human
experience and cultural themes in shaping the current practice. This assumption without proving
its holistic penetration is very obvious in studying Hezbollah as a movement.
Being a Shiite movement and erupted in the Lebanese Shiite community, Hezbollah had unique
characters that shaped the movements’ vision, mission, ways of thinking, its organisational
culture, modes of actions and mobilizing techniques.
Shia’a and Sunni share the major theological topics in Islam, however Shia have very
characteristic identity. The major difference is in the way both casts consider the political role in
Islam and its norms and conditions. In Sunni, “the authority was preoccupied in order”. Despite
giving the “Umma” the right to choose its political leaders, “medieval Sunni jurists developed a
theory of government according to which clerics would uphold the government’s authority so
long as the rulers provided stability and order and protected the Muslim community.” The
theological background of this trend is related to what would be identified in the West by the
“low church” Protestant “that all believers are capable of understanding religious truth in a way
and to degree that renders special intermediaries between man and God.”43 Shia on contrast
believed that the “political” authority should be identified by God or his Prophet. They believe
that the rightist Imams who succeeded the Prophet were 12 persons started with Ali (his cousin
and son-in-law) to Husayn (his son and the Prophet’s orphan) till the 12th Imam (Al-Mahdy),
who has been disappeared for about 11 centuries. As a result of that, Shia did not recognise the
Islamic authorities (Caliphs) and were in continuous dispute; escalating and deescalating waves
of insurgency. Shia were always recognised as the (Revolutionary form of Islam). Their claims
were not devoted only to the 12 Imams but also to justice and social reforms. The Shia had very
crystallized image on the Battle of Karbala (630 C.E.) where Husayn with very few companions
faced the hugely outnumbered Caliph’s army. In this Battle, Husayn and his companions were
killed, but Shia, and all Moslems really, considered this battle a symbolic to “the victory of blood
over the sword”. The Sunni dealt with the history – apart from the Prophet’s history- without any
theological reflections, but Shia considered this battle as the iconic theme in their belief. The
famous description of Shiite religious daily practice is “every day is Karbala”. Values of

43
Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future, (Norton 2007), pages
31-45

17
sacrifice, activism, revolution, justice, how the weak defeat the strong, have been eternal socio-
theological warship in Shiite old and current history.
The major paradox in the Shia’s theory was the preconditioning of this revolutionary function to
the existence of Imam. As the 12th Imam was in his “Great Absence” for centuries, the Shia
communities were victim to isolation, low social activity, injustice and clandestine architecture.
But in Lebanon, where the Shiite community were mainly transferred by the Othman Empire, the
Shia had a new wave of revival by Imam Mossa Al-Sadr. He stimulated the Shia community to
participate in the socio-political life and to ask for their deprived rights. He established the
movement of the Deprived (Mahromoon) in 1974.44 After the recurrent Israeli incursions over
the Lebanese border from 1968 (as a respond to the new PLO activity in the region especially
after the Black September of 1970), he established Amal Movement (Lebanese Resistance
Detachments) as a military wing to The Deprived in 1975.45 These new progressions catalysed
the Shiite community to the more advanced revival; The Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Imam Khomeini created a new theory of The Jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian (Welayet Al-
Faqeh) to end, permanently- the eternal Shiite self-segregation. He argued that with the Absence
of Imam, the Shia should have a Waly to preserve the functions of Imam. Moreover, the Imam
will not come back unless the Shia accomplished the proper pavement for its coming; performing
the revolutionary mission.46 In few years, he succeeded in averting the pro-American leader in
Iran and the American Bi-pillar Strategy in Gulf was demolished. The Shiite community in
Lebanon became very stimulated and just waiting for a spark; Israeli invasion of 1982.
Israeli invasion and “the group of nine”

Before the 1982 War, Amal movement was the prominent political body in the Shiite
community. However, three more currents were building up their zones. An Islamic current
inside Amal itself as a response to the Islamic Revolution in Iran; one of the famous figure was
Hassan Nasrullah, the head of Amal sector in south Lebanon at that time. The second was the
Lebanese branch of the Party of Invitation (Da’wa Party). The Third was the public currents
around Ayatullah Mohamed Fadlullah and Mohamed Shamuddin, those organized themselves in
cultural and charity organisations. Once the Israeli invasion commenced and the crisis escalated,
members of the three groups met together and had deep discussion about the prospects of the
Shiite community in Lebanon after these radical changes.47 The Group of Nine was composed;

44
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religions, (Pluto 2002), pages 7-9
45
Amin Mostafa, Resistance in Lebanon 1948-2000 (Arabic – Dar Al Mahdy), page 376
46
Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: the story from within, (Saqi, London 2004), pages 50-53
47
Qasem, pages 87-90 – Mostafa, pages 409-420

18
three from each current. After massive discussions they agreed over the main themes of the new
movement. It would be an Islamic movement, following Al-Waleyy Al-Faqeeh and seeking the
resistance against the Israeli enemy. The formal “insurgency” program of da’wah, to establish an
Islamic revolution in Lebanon was abandoned because of the social, political and regional
contexts.48
After that, the Group of Nine travelled to Tehran and got the blessing and permission from Imam
Al-Khomeini in 1982.

Vision and Mission

The critical issue in understanding any movement is elaborating its vision and mission. However,
in the case of Hezbollah with the strict clandestine nature, different socio-political phases; for
each it develops a unique media portfolio, and different commentators from all sides, the
haziness prevailed. What is the distant object for Hezbollah? Is it getting Israelis out of Lebanon?
Or using the struggle to enhance its hands over the internal arena? Or it is something else?
Inaccuracy in identifying this core topic is decisive in misleading the strategic analysis and
response. I argue that the major fallacy in Hezbollah’s adversaries, inside and outside Lebanon,
lies in this area. Shimon Naveh, for example, sees the mere logic, the rationale behind their
operation against Israel is that, “they don’t want to destroy Israel, they know they cannot destroy
Israel, and people are often much taken by the rhetoric. “Liberating Jerusalem” – well, this is
nonsense. Their whole idea is to continue this fight against Israel deliberately in order to enable
them to maintain this duality within the Lebanese state, which enables them to maintain their
own sovereignty within the Lebanese state of the south, to pursue other avenues of political and
strategic potential, etc.”49
Hezbollah as the main political representative in Shiite community and by what it achieved in the
conflict with Israel, hold very prestigious position without entrapping any conflict with Israel.
On contrast, after 2006 War Hezbollah reached very weak position politically and was pushed in
the defence corner. Hezbollah sees the domestic struggle as a tool for the conflict with Israel not
the reverse, at least in this phase.
Hezbollah’s vision and mission are legitimate newborn of its ideology and pragmatic
composition. The long-term objective are to pave the road for the 12th Imam (Al-Mahdy)’s
return. This mission can not be accomplished before sorting out some duties: the destruction of
Israel, averting the regional regimes that were articulated by the western powers, removal of the

48
Interview with Sheikh AbdelMagid Ammar.
49
Interview with Naveh by (Combat Studies Institute)

19
American hegemony over the Middle East, and most essentially, being the strong arm of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran. This revolution is considered much more than merely a political step
in the Shiite theology.50

Structure

The structure of Hezbollah is related again to the marriage between the ideology and the realistic
needs. The leadership in Hezbollah is collective through Maglis Shura-Alkara (the party’s
Supreme Decision-Making Council), however, the role of the General Secretary is much more
than other members inside the council. He manages the Security and Military office directly.
Also, he is the intermediate channel between Hezbollah and the Supreme Leader in Tehran
(Morshed). As, the Morshed has very highly respect among the cadre and public base, The
General Secretary’s positions are always seen primarily under the religious scope, the pragmatic
calculations are coming afterwards.51
The subordination of Hezbollah leadership to the Supreme Leader’s decisions is out of question,
but the dynamics and threshold are searchable. Generally, the General Secretary has a delegation
to carry on all tactical, operational and most of strategic agendas. Only, the high scale heavy
strategic issues should be formulated in contact with Supreme Leader, The time interval of
Hezbollah’s decision making emphasise this point.

The Political contexts: Lebanon, neighbours, Middle East

Lebanon, as a state, gave Hezbollah all what were needed, ideally, for a revolutionary
movement. Physically, Lebanon is surrounded by the Mediterranean in the West, Syria in the
north and east and Israel in the south. The Lebanon-Syria border stretches over 375 kilometres
(233 miles) and the Lebanon-Israel border for 79 kilometres (49 miles). The border with the
Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in Syria is disputed by Lebanon in a small area called Shebaa
Farms, but the border itself was demarcated by the United Nations. Most of Lebanon's area is
mountainous terrain, except for the narrow coastline and the Beqaa Valley. 52

50
Interviews with the four members in Political Bureau.
51
Magnus Ruslip, Hizba’llah in Lebanon: the politics of the western hostage crisis, (Palgrave 2003)
pages 40-54, Interviews with members in Political Burau and Sheikh Aly Damoosh.
52
Alasdair Drysdale, The Middle East and North Africa : a political geography, (OUP USA 1985), pages
195-204

20
Politically, Lebanon was a weak state as a victim to a protracted civil war, the sectarian society,
and the regional and international players opposing and fighting over the internal vacuum.
Socially, the domestic and national grievances and fertilized Shiite community were futile
environments for insurgency. The central grip of the Lebanese authority has been weak since the
first days of the Great Lebanon of 1920; this grip was lost completely with the beginning of Civil
War in 1975. This decentralized nature was not only because of the dozen of ethnicities but also
the unlimited domestic and regional political organisations working in the Lebanese theatre. Two
major fronts were fighting mainly in Civil War. The Nationalistic front, supported by the the
Palestinians and Syrians, including Amal and Socialistic Party against Maronites (Phalanges and
Haddad’s militias) supported by Israel. After while, the Syrians shifted their support against the
Nationalistic side to reach some balance till the Israeli invasion 1982.53
After PLO was obliged to leave Lebanon, huge amounts of arm arsenal were left in Lebanon
especially in the south, moreover, unlimited amount of Shiite community, mainly from Amal,
were trained in PLO camps.54
Syria always used Lebanon as its strategic back door, where the Palestinian activities in
harassing Israel were a part of its deterrent arm. After the Israeli campaign of (Litany 1978),
Syrian army became an active participant in Lebanon; mainly in the Beka’a Valley and around
Beirut. With the invasion, Syria permitted huge amounts of the Iranian troops and Basak (the
Revolutionary Guard) to be settled at the Syrian border and in Beka’a Valley in a protection to
what was expected to be an extended war. After the war limits were reached, all Iranian troops
went back; only 1-2 thousands of Basak stayed in the Valley. These troops became the hard
nucleus for Hezbollah’s tactical and operational future. All Hezbollah’s military cadre were
trained and indoctrinated in the Basak’s camps.55

Strategic doctrine and stages

Hezbollah developed has had a strategy since beginning; however this strategy was matured over
the time. Also, Hezbollah, even in its internal doctrine, preserves different levels of

53
Edgar O’balance, Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92, (Palgrave Macmillan 1998), pages 32-40
54
Amin, pages 418-422
55
Amin, pages 422-430 – Ruslip, pages 30-33, Saad-Ghorayeb, pages 8-15

21
consciousness. Generally, Hezbollah divided its long-term vision into broad stages; the first; is
the destruction of Israel, then going to participate in the regional manoeuvre to create a new
Islamic and independent regime in the Middle East. The first phase, in turn, is divided into
consecutive stages. Hezbollah aimed in the first instance to build its solid nucleus and to
increase its public support; inside Shiite community, among the Lebanese People and among
the Arab peoples, so it can reach the final stages of “the Decisiveness” against Israelis and the
formal architecture of the Middle East.56
The strategic end of this phase is “the destruction of Israel”. Hezbollah has a main theory and
different “scenarios” of implementation. By understanding Israel’s socio-political and strategic
environments, Hezbollah claims that pushing Israel to a protracted war will attack the stronghold
of “the state of Israel”; security, economy and deterrence. The process of destruction can be
autonomous as portrayed in Shikh Hassan Nasrullah’s spider-web theory. The Israelis think that
this theory is related to the economical and socio-political rationales. As Levi described the
theory of Hassan Nasrullah, “he believed that, with constant bloodshed, the staying power of
Israeli society would decline, causing bonds of societal solidarity to attenuate and to eventually
disintegrate like a spider-web.”57 Actually, this theory works at more conceptual, holistic and
indirect levels. Another scenario is by the external approach or combined. Whether the Iranians
get the nuclear balance and involved directly into the struggle, or Hezbollah, directly or
indirectly, can escalate the internal situations in the surrounding Arab countries to avert the
regimes for more participation in the struggle, Hezbollah relies totally on the Iranian role. Under
these facts, Hezbollah saw its “victory” over Israel in 2006 War as a catalyst for Israel’s
dehiscence.
Hezbollah, I argue, was successful in managing its strategy towards its ends till the moment,
albeit being still away from the ends. Ignoring its strategic perspective led to a gross
misinterpretation of its attitude, both internally and externally.
In Lebanon, its adversaries claim that the resistance work was merely a lever for its political
position. This claim did not interpret Hezbollah’s positions that deprived it some domestic
political privileges, although they fit well with its grand strategy.
After the withdrawal of Israel in 2000, Hezbollah announced that this victory was accomplished
by all the Lebanese people and did not ask for special rewards. Being in the Iranian-Syrian axes
and harassing Israel before 2006 war discredited its position internally, however, it raised its
credits among the Arab peoples.

56
interviews with Political Bureau members
57
Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: how the military shapes Israeli policy, page 140

22
In the military perspective, Hezbollah has a characteristic doctrine relying on: the tactics of
guerrilla warfare, building the public support, gradualism, being a “learning institution”,
Intelligence and understanding the opponent while depriving it any information, depending on
the Syrian and Iranian weaponry and logistics, mastering the public mobilization, and an
efficient planning and manoeuvre operationally and strategically.
Dr Amin Hetit thinks that the main military strength of Hezbollah was a result of having the
learning and gradualism ability. Hezbollah matured its tactics over the time, and was learnt from
defaults more than winning. Over 25 years, it constructed its tactics, training modules, logistic
and operational art, and command channels through its protracted war with Israel.58 John Nagel
offered us a short list of assessing the learning ability of any institution (suggestions from the
field, questioning superiors about policies, questioning the basic assumptions, close contact
between high and low ranks and dual way of creating the doctrine)59; the party leadership and
many expertises claim that it has these criteria.
Another merit was its ability to manage the contradictions among its cadre and the public
spheres. I argue that Hezbollah is mobilizing the ideological themes rather than being totally
subordinated to them. Mobilizing the Shiite ideology, and in its extreme form of Welayet Al-
Faqeeh, gives Hezbollah all the privileges of immersing the cadre and public in the values of
activism, sacrifice and absolute loyalty to the leadership. However, it brings some drawbacks as
well; mainly the frictions with the Sunni and spreading the metaphysic and religious illusions
among the cadre.60 The majority of intermediate, bottom and military cadres believe heavily on
dreams and metaphysic things. Hezbollah through its intellectual process and its institutional
order could use these metaphysic concepts in mobilizing the cadre and preserved its high
command body away from its drawbacks. I asked one on the intermediate cadre about what he
thinks about the future war, its nature, strategy and limits. He answered that he believes that
Hezbollah will enter Jerusalem as he saw Al-Mahdy in a dream and mentioned that. He also
mentioned that Hezbollah, by its own, is already eligible for the destruction of Israel. Comparing
that with the answers of Aly Hagg Mostafa, one of the prominent figures in the political Bureau
shows the difference. The later explained, in a very scientific and organized way, what he thinks
about the strategic “prerequisites” to launch the decisive phase. He mentioned that he totally
believes that Hezbollah, and all the regional circumstances, are still too primitive in getting
58
Interview with Dr Hetit and Hagg A.A. (a former military command in Hezbollah)
59
John Nagl, Learning to eat soap with knife: counter-insurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
(Chicago Press 2005), page 10
60
My interviews with most of Hezbollah cadre, except with members of Political Bureau, were full of
metaphysical claims; such as “involuntary” and accurate SAM attacks and shadowed knights over horses
fighting to their sides, etc,

23
through this phase. He also said that if Iran gets its peaceful way with Americans, and Israel is
(unfortunately!) wise to leave Iran alone, Hezbollah will not find any path to escalate in the
conflict.
Regarding the frictions with Sunni, mainly from the Shiite lower cadre and the public, they are
balanced with the wise leadership’s speech that nullifies any sectarian differences. The
leadership actively abandoned any invitational activities to the Sunni, and could build strong
relationships with all sectors of the Lebanese people. Looking to the political co-operation that
Hezbollah launched against 14th March Current, where the Party united with General Michael
Awn, its long-term adversary, unravelled its talent. Also, inside the Shiite community, the
relations with Amal shifted from being attacked militarily by Amal in the late 1980s (under the
permission of the Syrians) to practically controlling the movement and its public base.
Interestingly, Hezbollah considered Nabeh Berry, the leader of Amal and the head of Public
Assembly, as the main representative of the Opposition. Many commentators, some were in
Amal, saw that Hezbollah, by giving Berry this position, could put its hand on the movement. 61 I
think that the real situation was not reached by this simplicity, rather, by a long-term and
sophisticated approach based on benign behaviour, addressing the concerns of allies and
scarifying some advantageous positions politically and socially. This happened with the Syrians
too.
The Syrians were very suspicious of Hezbollah as an increasing power in South Lebanon. They
were afraid that Hezbollah would play out of their norms and conditions; for this reason, they
permitted Amal incursions against the Party. Few years later, Hezbollah became the most
valuable Syrian ally in Lebanon, although it is not totally subordinated to them. Hezbollah’s skill
in prioritizing the files and managing the opposing factors is obvious.
Another theme of Hezbollah’s asymmetric strategy is its mastering of gaining the public support.
Hezbollah’s leaders consider this point the climax of their strategy. As Lebanon, as a state, was
always weak and dysfunction, the administrative and social welfare systems were down,
especially in the Shiite community. A quick look over what Hezbollah provided in these topics
will show us that it is already a state inside the state, but functioning one! Hospitals, charity
organisations, security and local administrations were totally founded by Hezbollah and mainly
by the Iranian budget. Another valuable point is Hezbollah’s determined attempt in the relief
work in response to the Israeli incursions. By Jihad-Al Bena’a (Jihad of Re-construction), mainly
Iranian, and Organisation of Martyr, all losses of building and humans are repaired. In the case

61
An interview with one of Amal’s cadre.

24
of Organisation of Martyrs, efficient monthly salaries are paid for the wounded and martyrs’
families.62
In a visit to a Shiite family, who spent more than 20 years in Canada, they described how they
were shifted from being a secular family to a truly Shiite family because of Hezbollah’s role in
Lebanon. All of these social movements in favour of Hezbollah deprived the Israeli a very potent
deterrent weapon.
As Shamwel Bar mentioned, “Israel has tried to deter terrorists through the host populaces both
in the Palestinian and the Lebanese context. However, this policy also did not yield any real
success in either theatre.” Especially in 2006 war, Israel launched a campaign of strategic
bombing to overt the people against Hezbollah or at least pushing it to yield concessions. One
thousand civilian victims, three thousand houses and over one quarter million refugees did not
make any difference. On contrast, the public bases were upheld to the Party at least in the Shiite
community; the target of the campaign.63
Another strategic tool is heavily appreciated by Hezbollah: “the propaganda”. Hezbollah
launched its channel “Al-Manar TV” in 1991. Since then, it became its main weapon in th
psychological warfare. The targets of its propaganda are: the Shiite community, the Lebanese
people, the Israeli people and leadership, and other Arab and Moslem countries. Al-Manar has a
Hebrew section responsible for receiving and sending messages in the open stream. The Hebrew
Bureau in Al-Manar was headed by Hassan Ezzeddin, the fighter who was captured and
imprisoned in Israel in 1996 where he learnt Hebrew. He believes in “the proactive approach”;
“using the modern satellite communications to reach Israeli citizens directly, pointing out the
negative consequences of their government’s policies towards Arabs and Palestinians and trying
to influence their opinion”.64 In this new era of asymmetric warfare, the media as a weapon is
central to reach the strategic ends.
Last theme lies in the internal architecture of Hezbollah. The party is strictly clandestine and
have an aggressive security apparatus. People who work in the security or military apparatus are
unknown even to their colleagues. The military body is decentralized at the tactical level. As was
shown in 2006 War, the local and operational commanders can survive and manoeuvre freely
without sustaining a momental contact with the leadership. Although there was some sort of
connection, mainly a wire connection, it’s reserved for the higher operational and strategic

62
Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism, (I.B.Tauris 2006), pages 81-93
63
Shmuel Bar, Israeli Experience in Deterring Terrorist Organizations, Herzelia Conference 2007.
64
Harik, page 161

25
commands. This internal order deprived Israel any valuable information as was shown in last
war.
Moreover, the military and security apparatuses are totally subordinated to the political
command.65
The main sort of Intelligence is the tactical and forward reconnaissance. Adding to the natural
familiarity with the physical and human-made geographies, this gave Hezbollah a real
superiority, at tactical and operational levels. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has a specific branch to
collect the information about Israel in cooperation with the Iranian Intelligence.
This outstanding superiority of Hezbollah over Israel in Intelligence was noticed in 2006 War
especially; Byman had an interpretation: “Hizballah had much better local intelligence than the
Israelis had, both because of the familiarity of its operatives with local terrain and conditions and
because it had a vast network of sympathizers. In addition, the organization was effectively able
to coerce or intimidate those Shia who might otherwise not support its efforts, while Israel’s
threats were less credible because the Israeli presence on the ground was not permanent.
Moreover, in some ways Israel’s attacks strengthened the movement by allowing it to
demonstrate its prowess and determination.”66

65
Interviews with Hagg Mohtady and A.A.
66
Daniel Bayman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, Journal of Strategic Studies, April 2008

26
CHAPTER THREE: THE PROTRACTED WAR
War of 1982 (the flawed strategy):

Israel invaded south Lebanon in the Operation of Peace for Galeel. The primitive objectives were
to “overrun PLO strongholds and throw the guerrillas back to a line twenty-five miles north of
the border, thereby putting them beyond the range of their Katyusha rockets”.67 Gradually, more
objectives were topped up; getting PLO outside Lebanon completely and establishing a pro-
Israeli Lebanon state in alliance with Maronittes. The military actions escalated from clearing out
the guerrillas in an area of (25 miles) to a real extended war. Six and have armour divisions
invaded Lebanon from the south: two divisions (Yaron and Mordechai) moved alongside the
coast till Siddon and to link with another landed brigade at the mouth of Awly River. Another
division (Kahalani) passed through the central area till Siddon. More two divisions at the east
(Eitan and Ben Gal) aimed to control the Beka’a Valley and to engage the Syrians if needed. 68
This development of the plan led to the massive air-land battle with the Syrians at Al-Bekaa, and
to the Battle of Beirut. The Syrians were defeated, mainly in the air battle where they lost more
than 100 planes over 2 days in comparison to 2 Israelis. The real nightmare was in Beirut. The
Israelis allied with Phalanges and faced the Palestinians, remnants of the Syrians and the
(Nationalist) parties of Lebanon. After a period of massive irregular fighting supported by air
raids and strategic bombing, where the grievances were intolerable to the civilians, a deal was
reached for. PLO went out of Lebanon and new elections were tailored. However, the massacre
of Sabra and Shatella was performed by phalanges, with a “claimed” permission of the Israelis.
Then, the new president (Bashir Al-Gemayyel) was assassinated. Moreover, the foreign forces
from US, France and Italy that came purposefully to assure the implementation of the deal and
assuring the new situation were attacked. US and French marine bases were exploded. The
attacker was claimed to be the nascent Hezbollah without the adoption of the later.69
In the Israeli side, the losses were accelerated. The internal situation was growing against war,
mainly protesting against the Israeli incursions on the civilian lives in Lebanon. The great protest
was in (Tel Aviv) square, where more than 400,000 Israelis called for getting the troops out of
Lebanon. Kahn committee was formulated to investigate the great mistakes of the campaign; the

67
Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and Olive: a critical history of the Israeli Defence Force, (Public
Affairs 2002) pages 290-1
68
Ibid., pages 291-4, Amin Mostafa, Resistance in Lebanon 1984-2000 (Arabic – Dar Al Hady), pages
200- 213
69
Creveld, pages 295- 300 and Mostafa, pages

27
shifting of the primitive nature of the campaign to an uncontrollable campaign, and the massacre
of Sabra and Shatilla. Sharon was forced to resign.70
In Lebanon, although PLO troops (around 15.000) were lifted outside, the guerrilla activities
sparked. As Nabeh Berry was a part in the new agreement (17th May), the internal opposition
inside Amal was at the maximum, many of the members left the movement including the current
of the Islamic Amal. All of these infrastructure were moved easily to the new movement;
Hezbollah. In Al-Bekaa for example, 90% of Amal’s infrastructure were given to Hezbollah. The
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, now reached more than 1000, gave the major help to the new
movement. They built the internal structure, trained and indoctrinated the new volunteers and
helped the spread of the social and cultural charities. Over three years, the activities were in
crescendo; ranging from attacking patrols, truck bombing, kidnapping the western hostages to
attacking the command and operational centres (as explosion of the military command post in
Siddon). When Shimon Peres came as a prime Minister, more than 650 Israelis were killed and
5000 wounded. The economic expenses reached 2-5 billions $.71
As Ben Gal wrote retrospectively, “of all Israeli wars the one in Lebanon was probably the best
prepared. However, of all Israeli wars, it was based on the most profound misunderstanding of
what the IDF could and could not achieve. For the first time it had entered the capital of an Arab
country. This done, however, there could be no question of imposing a political settlement.”
Lebanon was decentralized and dysfunction state, that can not make a separate peace with Israel
because of its total dependent on the Arab economy. Also, “given Lebanon’s fragmented
political system, the ubiquitous militias, the nature of terrain and the long border with Syria, it
ought to have been clear from the beginning that the country was ideal for guerrilla tactics.” 72

Retreating to the Security Zone 1985

Israel took the decision to retreat to a security zone (the depth of 12 km at Hamra passage in the
west and the width of 15-40 Km) and to leave the operational and political administration to their
puppet troops; the South Lebanon Army; a new stage started.73
Israel had the idea that the best strategy in the situation was to have a “buffer zone” controlled by
its allies. As the South Lebanon Army was not in the full readiness, the Israeli troops had to
pursuit a direct command. Hezbollah’s strategy at this period was to raise the level of guerrilla to

70
Creveld, pages 301-2
71
Mustafa, pages 230-236
72
Creveld, pages 302-3
73
Mustafa 44-48

28
show the Israelis the inefficiency of their allies, so they would be entrapped to the security zone.
The Israelis created co-operated strongholds and some pure Israeli strongholds. The command
centre was purely Israeli in Margeyoon.74
During the period of 1985-1993, Hezbollah had some operational objectives; enhancing its
internal cadre quantity and quality, the increase of the public base and support, and more
obviously, inflicting more damage to the Israelis. Sheikh A. Ammar, he was responsible for the
southern area at this period, mentioned that the major challenges among the public acceptance of
Hezbollah, even inside the Shiite community, were the transmitted deterrent Israeli image and
public’s convention with the uselessness of any resistance, and Amal’s threat. For the first
challenge, Hezbollah aimed through the direct engagements to break this traditional image of the
invincible Israelis troops.75 The major operations at these period were: the suicidal attacks
against the Israeli strong holders, patrol columns and communicating lines, the active guerrilla
engagement, mainly attacking the military strongholds (38 major operations in the period), and
ambushes and explosions of trucks (232 in the period).76
In the Israeli side, the strategy was really hazed. Israel relied on mixing coercive and pacifying
techniques. However, the centre of gravity was misdirected. The people inside the security zone
where the majority were Maronittes, the classic allies, were not the real centre of gravity in the
conflict; the people outside the zone were. Nevertheless, Israel did very alienating behaviour in
the security zone: massive actions towards the Shiite community, creating two major isolating
camps, opening the borders between the zone and Israel, encouraging the cultural and
economical relationships, but at the same time, some colonial activities. Israel tended to
accomplish some economical and geographical privileges, even with the expense of normal
habitants. Normalizing the economical relations led to great losses for the domestic market.
Resources, like water and electricity, were sucked to feed the Galeel areas. The hospitals and
social status were worse than before.77
Israel assassinated Sheikh Abbas Musawy, and his wife and son, in 1992, in attacking his car by
a rocket. Hezbollah responded by massive terrorist attacks against some Israelis overseas assets
in Latin America and Europe.
All of these measures did not do much in weakening the party. Now, Hezbollah had strong tracks
among the domestic population in the security zone; those helped mainly for the tactical
intelligence and conciliation.

74
Interview with Hagg Muhtady, and Sheikh A. Ammar
75
Interview with Sheikh A. Ammar.
76
Mustafa, 456-493
77
Mustafa, 69-88

29
1993

Israel used the direct retaliation as a response to Hezbollah’s attacks. However, these retaliations
were, in the major part, affecting the public base of Hezbollah. The Israelis aimed to create a
status of “deterrence by punishment” even at the tactical level. Hagg Mohtady, one of the
operational commanders in Hezbollah at this period, said to me that these retaliations were
painful to Hezbollah as they were rendering its progressive activities to widen its base support,
especially with the bad experience of the people in the south with PLO.78 However, the solution
came with the Operation of Accountability. At any deterrent status, there is a mutual status of
agreement about the “unspoken” limits. Once the Israelis breached this status, this gave
Hezbollah the chance to develop a new situation of deterrence, where the worst of his concerns
was addressed.
Israel launched its operation over seven days started on 25th July 1993. Israel used a land-air-sea
operation aiming to destruct Hezbollah’s bases in the south and to coerce the party by attacking
its public support areas. Once the air raids commenced, the real nightmare came; the Katyusha
were launched on the northern Israeli settlement. The operation left 152 Lebanese killed (30
militants and 123 civilians). Moreover, it left more important outcome; an (oral) agreement
between Hezbollah and Israel to spare the civilians of both sides. Hezbollah built more
credibility among the Lebanese about its efficiency to establish some form of
”balance of terror” with Israel, and to protect the Lebanese lives.79
Hezbollah, with its new General Secretary Sheikh Hassan Nasrullah, entered the political scene
in Lebanon. The internal opposition to this step was rapidly evacuated by the delegation he had
from the Supreme Leader in Iran. By this participation, the party commenced to normalize its
existence in the domestic political scene and gain more public support.80

1996 (Operation Grapes of Wrath)

After the privileges he had in the Operation Accountability, Hezbollah enhanced all activities;
social, political and military. As a response, Israel thought again to launch a new campaign. The
objectives were: destroying the Katyusha launchers, attacking the operational, command and
logistical channels in south Lebanon and again, performing coercive raids of strategic bombing
to weaken Hezbollah’s support and alienate the internal political system in Lebanon against it.

78
Interview with Hagg Mohtady
79
Mustafa 164-180,
80
Harik, pages 134-136

30
The campaign commenced on 11th April 1996 and lasted until 27th April. Israel launched about
1.100 air raids. Again, once the air raids started, the Katyusha commenced to shell the Israeli
northern settlements. The accelerating trend in the incursions did not weaken the rockets rain. On
18th April, Israel made a great mistake, when 150 civilians were killed while they were protected
in one of UN safe posts. The massacre of Qana exploded the situation internationally and inside
Israel. The formal agreement of Nissan was signed between Israel and Lebanon with US and
Syria’s supervision. It dictated the sudden stopping of dual incursion, sparing the civilian areas
from the incursions and counter-incursions.
At the end of campaign, all Israeli objectives were proved to be unreachable and Peres lost the
general elections, in turn. The military machine of Hezbollah survived the campaign. The
Lebanese government, because of the Syrian pressure, mainly, did not let Hezbollah down. The
public support was in its peak after the campaign. The Israeli government’s reputation was
smeared, internally and internationally, as a result of the massacre of Qana and lost more
deterrence.
In spite of the outstanding operational, weaponry and tactical superiority, Israel did not silence
the rockets. Crevald described the campaign, “Israel sought to answer the Katyusha by deploying
massive firepower against the guerrillas. Both times, some of the world’s most modern weapons
were put on display. On the ground, PRVs, artillery radar, and the laser range finders fed
coordinates directly to computers that now equipped every big gun, enabling them to locate
Katyusha launch sites while rockets where still in the air and to shift from one target to the next
in seconds. At the sea, the Israeli missile boats shelled the coastal highway. The performance of
IAF attack helicopters- including Apache- was even more impressive”. However, “had the
targets been Syrians armoured divisions attempting to drive from Golan Heights to Jordan
Valley, no doubt they would be annihilated. After sixteen days during which 13.000 rounds were
fired and hundreds of strikes by fighter-bombers and attack helicopters took place, between six
(says Hezbollah) and fifty (says IDF) persons were killed. Meanwhile the Katyusha, though
perhaps no longer as numerous or well-aimed as during the first days of the operation, kept
coming, bringing life along the border to a halt, demolishing hundreds of houses, and causing
damage of approximately 30 million $.”
This efficient description pointed to what we discussed about the “essence of asymmetry”. The
“conceptual gap” in the Israeli strategy was victim to the missing of the “paradigm change”. In
this conflict, there is a different “nature” of: objectives, centre of gravity, means and operational
patterns. Hezbollah, merely, aimed operationally to survive the attack, be able to drive the

31
Katyusha rockets, even one a day, and wait for the Israeli mistakes or the international pressure.
The Strategic objectives lied in “non-conventional theatres; the peoples of Lebanon and Israel.
Israel’s outstanding weaponry arsenal was useless. The rationale behind the strategic bombing to
stimulate the “circular deterrence”, people press on the government to press on the Syrians to
press on Hezbollah was really absurd. This rationale could be tried if the strategy was not
ignorant to the nature of conflict and its actors. The people, especially those in the Shiite
community and especially with the Israelis incursions, would not press on the government. The
Lebanese government, being weak and subordinated to the Syrians, could not press on them, and
the nature of Hezbollah-Syrian communicating passage does not yield the total subordination.

Hezbollah guerrilla activities were re-launched after the campaign. In 1998, as Sheikh A. Ammar
said, Hezbollah did a thorough strategic analysis of the whole situation. Some facts were
reached: there was a good readiness and capability to escalate the fighting to the point of getting
the Israeli out, reaching this point, although it will be considered a real strategic achievement in
the Party long-term strategy in demolishing Israel’s deterrence and enhancing the spider-web
theory, it had a major drawback. It would leave Hezbollah without any political excuse inside
Lebanon to fight Israel or even being militarized. The other option was to deescalate to keep the
Israelis in close contact to be continuously harassed. The Leadership chose the first option. They
needed a victory to increase more of their credibility and achieve very unique development in the
Arab-Israeli conflict; when Israel looses “its image” strategically. 81

Before the fall

The operational targets of the last stage were carefully chosen by Hezbollah. The objectives were
the operations that could induce much more “disappointment” among the Israeli cabinet about its
ability to control the situation. Also, the other audience; the Israeli pubic, should be faced by
more “blood dropping”. The majority of operations in this period were mainly aiming for this
“psychological campaign” rather than the tactical outcomes, such as: the assassination of Akl
Hashem, the key figure in South Lebanon Army, attacking a military column beside Shokeef
Castle by one Lebanese militant, and attacking of Dabshah stronghold, the strongest one in the
south with more than 100 soldiers inside. All of these operations were recorded and broadcasted
by Al-Manar TV.82

81
Interview with Sheikh A. Ammar
82
Mustafa, pages 477-8

32
Hezbollah aimed too to deprive the Israelis any honoured or privileged retreat. It managed the
timing and escalation process carefully to be associated with the changes in the domestic Israeli
politics sphere. Barak’s announcement about retreat with some security agreement in July
stimulated the party to escalate. Moreover, when Israel announced the retreat without any
agreement but to have safe one with its allies, the South Lebanon Army, Hezbollah sent some
signs about its intention to attack the Israeli and depriving them a safe retreat. Also, the Party
launched its public demonstrations leaded by military groups to show this determination. So, the
Israeli were forced to retreat suddenly without any co-operation with their allies. Hezbollah
intended to show, through his propaganda, the images of the retreating soldiers in a hurry and
unlimited happiness as a stunning victory.83

83
Interview with Hagg Muhtady and A. Ammar

33
CHAPTER FOUR: DECENT INTERVAL
The aftermath of the Israeli Retreat:

The critical outcome of the Israeli unilateral retreat was related to Israel’s image in the Arab
world. Israel’s survival theory, as portrayed by Israeli strategic theorist, is relied on maintaining
an image of invincibility. This image is functioning in both internal and external schemes.
Internally, it’s the base of “security”; the climax of Israeli socio-political and strategic skeletons.
Externally, it is exhibited in the deterrent function. As Ben Gurion mentioned, “from our point of
view there can never be a final battle. We can never assume we can deliver one final blow to the
enemy that will be the last battle, after which there will never be the need for another clash or
that the danger of war will be eliminated. The situation for our neighbours is the opposite. They
can assume that a final battle be the last one, that they may be able to deliver such a blow to
Israel that the Arab-Israeli problem will be liquidated”84
Fortunately, this occurred in the post-Gulf War Arab world, where all regimes were
amalgamated in a new pro-American order, apart from Syria. In Syria, the domestic, political,
strategic and militarily challenges put Syria away from the re-activation road. Only, in the
Palestinian Authorities, where non-state actors had a strong grip, there was a growing threat.
Moreover, after the political failure of Camp David 2000 negotiations, Arafat was excited by the
Lebanese case to permit and spark the second Intifada.
In Lebanon, the position of Hezbollah was unimaginable. His propaganda showed its “victory”
as the cornerstone of the struggle of “Umma”. However, Hezbollah, as Naveh described had two
major conflicts, “All of a sudden they got victory, they won the war, they won the campaign, but
this implied that they may need to reframe their entire concepts, ideas and modes of behaviour
because their old way of thinking, learning, living and operating was very much embedded in the
fight against the Israelis, in forcing the Israelis out of southern Lebanon. Once this occurred, all
of a sudden the entire world fell upon them because this implied that they may need to change
their rationale, their raison d’être. The second time was when the Syrians withdrew. When the
Syrians were forced to withdraw from Lebanon by the new dynamics taking place inside
Lebanon, Hezbollah went through their second shock. Their whole existence very much
depended on this symbiosis. It’s not an alliance, a formal alliance; it’s a very unique kind of
infraction between a state that is intervening in its neighbour’s state – I mean, taking over – and a
group of Lebanese patriots.”85

84
Handel, page 537
85
Interview with Shimon Naveh

34
I think the challenging point was not the threat to the politico-military “duality” of Hezbollah as
an end point, but this duality was needed as a “tool” to accomplish Hezbollah’s strategic
objectives; where fighting against Israel is in its essence. As a solution, Hezbollah re-invented
two files; Sheba’a Farms and the War Prisoners. Sheba’a Farms were Lebanese in origin but
were dominated by the Syrians for domestic reasons lond time ago. In Six Days War, Israel
occupied this land as a part of Golan Heights. Dr Amin Hetit stated that, during his career as the
Lebanese convoy in the UN committee of the Border Drawing, helped in refocusing the light on
this issue; Hezbollah, quickly, took it over.86
The second file was the war prisoners in Israel. After a period of negotiation, Hezbollah
accomplished a swap with the Israelis with good conditions in 2004; it was shown in its
propaganda as another “victory”. This action increased its credibility in the Lebanese internal
politics. However, one prisoner was left (Samir Kentar) adding to some lost people. Samir
Kentar, the Druze militant who has been imprisoned for more than 25 years, since his
participation in a border kidnapping attack in 1979, became a major figure in Hezbollah raison
d’être.
Hezbollah, and some of its closer circles including the past president Emil LaHood, created a
new theory of the “Strategic defence”. This theory claims that the Israeli hostilities are eternal,
and recommends the marriage between enhancing the conventional ability of Lebanon as a state
and legitimizing the resistant guerrilla ability of Hezbollah.87
In spite of its excellent behaviour in most issues; the prisoners swap, creating a new cause and
handling the problem of the security zone; he rehabilitated the local Marionette community
smoothly, Hezbollah was heavily criticised because of its behaviour in the file of the criminal
court after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Because of its crucial relations with Syria and
avoidance of this file to be used for increasing the western predominance over Lebanon, it had
no choice, as claimed by its leadership, to not stand with the Syrians.88 This attitude alienated the
majority of Sunnis and their politicians, and served as a scaffold for a bitter internal conflict
later.

Israeli Camp
On the Israeli side, the situation became worse. The horrific experience of Al-Aqsa Intafada led
to another “unilateral” withdrawal from Gaza Strip, and establishing the Security Fence. The

86
Interview with Dr Hetit
87
Dr Amin Hetit, The Defence Strategy for Lebanon, pages
88
Interview with Hagg Mostafa Al-Hagg Aly

35
Israeli traditional COIN was tried against the Palestinians but failed. After five years of anti-
guerrilla fighting, including attacking the political and military cadres, the position of Hamas
became much stronger, tactically and strategically. With gaining much more people’s support
Hamas could survive and even won the general elections in 2006.
Another drawback was described by Naveh as “corrupting” the IDF, “The point is that the IDF
fell in love with what it was doing with the Palestinians. In fact, it became addictive. When you
fight a war against a rival who’s by all means inferior to you, you may lose a guy here or there,
but you’re in total control. It’s nice. You can pretend that you fight the war and yet it’s not really
a dangerous war. This kind of thing served as an instrument corrupting the IDF.” 89
People on the other side, Hezbollah, were preparing for both conventional and unconventional
battles, while increasing their rocket arsenals and refining their doctrine.90

89
Interview with Simon Naveh
90
Interview with Hagg A. A

36
CHAPTER FIVE: SHIFTING OF STRATEGY

After frequent attempts, Hezbollah succeeded in kidnapping two Israeli soldiers in a shocking
operation at the border close to the settlement of Zar’it, facing Eta-Alshab village. After the
artillery pavement, Hezbollah fighters destroyed 2 Hummers at the other side. The earlier Israeli
response was after one hour, one Israeli Merkava (cimon2) intended to breach the border to
chase the kidnappers but it was destructed in an ambush.91 One of Hezbollah military
commanders said that the preparation for this operation commenced in Jan 2006 but the decision
was taken just 3 days before the operation. After long-term forward reconnaissance, all data were
hold. At the time of operation, the electrical-laser sensitive border was breached in different
points to mislead the Israelis. This led to delaying the Israeli response for one hour.92
Hezbollah made many announcements to the media about its intention to do this operation in
order to swab the kidnapped soldiers for Lebanese prisoners.
Also, Hezbollah had some intelligence data about the Israeli intention to launch an operation in
September 2006. However, Sheikh Hassan Nasrullah said that Hezbollah would not go for this
operation if he would expect the Israeli retaliation. Actually, most of the Party elites that I met
asserted that Hezbollah made a possibility, albeit far, of the Israeli retaliation and were prepared
for all scenarios. Hezbollah’s operational attitude during the war confirmed that.93
At the Israeli side, there was an earthquake, as Naveh said, “It was the ambush and then when
the tank went rushing in it hit a huge demolition charge and was almost totally destroyed. Most
of the people at the General Staff were really suffering some kind of trauma. I have indications
that very much point out that he (Dan Halutz, COG) was in a state of shock. All of a sudden he
became sick two or three times.”94 The main objectives for this rush campaign were to
decompose Hezbollah’s military, paralyse its efficacy, as it was considered Iranian western arm,
before Iran get nuclear ,and to restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after being affected by
the unilateral withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon.95
From the strategic perspective, the Israeli strategy was full of holes. IDF developed recently a
new doctrine of (Systemic Operation Design) and created efficient plans for such COIN
scenarios. Naveh mentioned the tale, “We developed some very interesting ideas of a joint

91
Mustafa Amin, The Twister: secrets of the second victory of Hezbollah over Israel (Arabic – Dar Al
Hady), pages
92
Interview with A.A and Hagg Muhtady
93
Interviews with members in Political Bureau
94
Interview with Shimon Naveh (Combat Studies Institute)
95
Anthony Cordesman, with George Sullivan and Williamson Sullivan, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah Ear,IISS, pages 9-20

37
campaign, which was basically conducted and driven by light infantry, Special Forces, Air Force
and intelligence, to assault them and then infest the area. Not just attack from the east and from
the south, which were the expected directions of advance, but assault from all over and isolate
the Shi’a militant component – listen to what I tell you now – from the political. Our idea was
not to kill Nasrallah or destroy his organization. The idea was to move in small teams and
identify, feed the intelligence circles, exploit our advantage in the air in remotely piloted vehicles
(RPVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, fixed-wing and helicopters. when Gal Hirsch tells
him to mobilize, let’s review the plans and see what our options are because we’ve been running
out of time, he totally brushed this aside. Halutz: we don’t need that. It’s a waste of time. We can
do whatever you say in a much speedier and shorter time, more effective, more decisive”96
The Israeli military strategy was focusing on air campaigns, aiming to isolate the south by
destructing the communicating lines and infrastructure, decapitating Hezbollah by attacking its
leadership and to do a strategic bombing campaign. Then, clearing stage by armours supported
by Special Forces follows.97
However, as Naveh said, “Once the Air Force started bombing, the Katyushas started firing back
at us. Now you see, after a week, everybody became aware that we were going nowhere. This
asymmetric dual in which we destroyed southern Lebanon and they – they’re are not capable of
destroying but they very much damaged the way of life in the north. Half of the country was
paralyzed.”98
As was shown, the Israeli strategy was criticized at both grand and military strategic levels.
Decomposition of Hezbollah in these circumstances can not be achieved, especially militarily.
Moreover, the (air-born) panacea is not working in such case. Naveh thought that the rationale
behind this strategic fallacy may lie in Dan Halutz’ characters, “Halutz is a victim of subculture.
He might have been a good fighter pilot, he was probably even a good base commander in the
Air Force, but he’s totally innocent of any education that could have prepared him for the
challenge that awaited him as a general. Being both arrogant and ignorant, he never bothered,
like so many generals, to really study.” Halutz was deprived any sense of jointness, he was
totally ignorant with the doctrine he signed.99
Hezbollah’s strategy was very dynamic, albeit simple. The centre of gravity was defined as
inflicting a sense of “failure” to both the Israeli cabinet and people. This would be accomplished
by creating a new status of “balance of deterrence”, of both punishment and denial. Insisting on

96
Interview with Naveh
97
Cordesman, pages – Mustafa, pages
98
Interview with Naveh
99
Naveh’s interview

38
maintaining the rocket launching till the last day did not target the tactical damage on settlement,
or coercive way of deterrence, rather, it meant deterrence by “denial”.
Also, shifting the strategy to more conventional form, where Hezbollah fought at fixed defence
lines mixed with mobile defence for this purpose, was obvious.100 The main operational target
was inflicting more casualties among the Israelis, as Nasrullah said, “We are fighting to inflict
more casualties, not for geography”. However, Hezbollah insisted to deprive IDF some cities, or
make them at least with very high price. IDF had the message. Bent-Gebyl for example was
claimed frequently by the Israelis to be taken, however it became unreachable till the end of war.
One of the central themes in Hezbollah’s propaganda was to show the Israelis that their political
leadership is lying, inefficient and inhuman.101
Hezbollah mastered the “crescendo” way in widening the operational targets. As Dr Hetit
mentioned, this was related to the strategic objective. This gradual transition is more effective in
producing the psychological status of failure and convention with lies and ignorance of political
and military leadership. The event of attacking the warship (Saer) by land-sea rocket was
devastating. It happened during one of Nasrullah’s on-air speeches and was a sign of intelligence
failure to detect that Hezbollah has such weapon. Similarly, was what happened in attacking
Haifa and “further to Haifa”.102
At operational level, Hezbollah carved up south Lebanon into over 170 combat quadrants
managed from circa 50 scattered command bunkers. Hezbollah, prepared to have minimal and
short logistical line as short as possible. The military organisation for the War was fitting well
with the operational needs, with preserving the rocket launcher lines in isolation to the normal
combat groups. IDF, in contract, suffered major operational fallacies in the efficient jointness
capabilities and logistic problems. However, the major fallacy lied in the inaccurate, and
unstable, guidance from the operational command. The lines of operations were very unstable.
However, the major fallacy lied in the guidance of the political and military commands who
made the ground intervention in south Lebanon slow and late, when they entered, the theatre was
prepared under the norms of Hezbollah.103
Tactically, it was proven through the battle of “Mercava”, about 22 were destroyed mainly by
Cornett, and the failed air lifting in Bent-Gebyl, Marron-Arras, Etassha’ab and Margeyoon , the
superiority of Hezbollah’s militias over the Israelis special forces troops.104

100
Interview with Dr Hetit
101
Interview with A. Ammar, Hagg Muhtady and A.A
102
interview with Dr Hetit
103
Sergio Catitgnani, Israel-Hezbollah Rockets War: a preliminary assessment, Global Strategy Forum
104
Mustafa, pages

39
The decisive factor in the ground actions of Hezbollah has been the improving light-infantry
capability. In 1995, five Lebanese guerrillas were being killed for every Israeli soldier. For late
nineties, the ration became 1:1.105 In the face to face engagements that occurred in 2006 was, the
ratio was reversed. As Cordesmann noticed, Hezbollah’s village fighters had the most decisive
factor in the direct engagements, “Hezbollah made the IDF pay for each inch of ground they
take. (The fighters)’ job – to slow and to bleed the IDF as much as possible- was carried out with
both determination and skills”106
What was said by Naveh before about corrupting the IDF by Intifada was confirmed by
Catitganin. He mentioned that IDF during Al-Aqsa Intifada were trained in company or battalion
levels but were not trained efficiently for division level fighting. Also, this inefficiency at
operational level left the tanks isolated from other battalions, so became easy target for anti-tank
missiles. Moreover, all tactics of facing the anti-tank, dealing with camouflaged under-ground
bunkers, dealing with south Lebanon terrain (not urban fighting as in Intifada), and tactical
intelligence, IDF were proved to be naive to. 107
As Naveh concluded, “IDF was totally unprepared for this kind of operation, both conceptually,
operationally and tactically – mainly conceptually and practically.”108

The Broader Contexts

The Second War of Lebanon, however, should be considered in the broad regional scene. Some
suspicions were raised about the Iranian hands in pushing Hezbollah for the operation from the
start to relief US pressure for its nuclear project. Hezbollah’s leadership deny repeatedly this
claim. They says that the decision of operation was taken long time ago and there was not strong
connection between the operation and the Israeli disproportionate campaign. Moreover, the
Iranian nuclear struggle is more complicated and time-consuming, especially with the expected
US political changes and situation in Iraq, to be relieved by such action.109
Another, more formidable, scope is US role in the War. Dr Rice’s speech at the peak of war,
when she was very pleased about the “New Middle East that peering its head in the Horizon”, is
a symbolic feature. Israeli leaders were always emphasising Israel’s cornerstone position in US
“global war on terrorism”. As Achcar and Warchawski indicated, “during Condoleezza Rice’s
105
H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Military Muslim Combat Methods, (Posterity 2004),
page 42.
106
Cordesmans, page 83
107
Catitgnani.
108
Interview with Dr Hetit
109
Interview with the members of Political Bureau

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many visits to Jerusalem in August 2006, the prevailing view in the media, and among Israeli
antiwar activists, was that the US secretary of state was attempting to force Ehud Olmert’s hand
and make it understood that Washington expected Tel Aviv to do the job expected for it”.110
Indeed, the formal Hezbollah speech portrayed the war as an American war by Israeli hands.
The human losses were grave in Lebanon, as UN estimated, 1071 were killed (30% of them were
children), 4000 wounded and about 1 million temporary refugees. The economical and
infrastructure losses were estimated of more than 2 billion $.
In Israel, 157 were killed (40 civilians) and more than 5000 wounded. The economical expenses
were devastating; 5.2 billion $, including 1.6 billion as military expenses.111
However, the main objectives of war proved to be unreachable. Hezbollah’s rockets kept hitting
Israel till the end (145 on 12th Aug).112 The military and political machines of Hezbollah
survived the war. Accepting resolution of 1071 did not make a difference. Hezbollah, as
announced by Israeli many times, duplicated its activities, bunkers and rocket arsenal in south
Lebanon. The more determent effect was the stroke in Israel and dehiscence in its deterrent
image.

Israel created a special high committee to investigate the catastrophe (Winograd Committee). In
its published 140 pages, it concluded the shared responsibility of the political and military
leadership for this “failure”. Moreover, it recommended huge structural changes in all levels of
political-military practices and preparing for the next wave of conflict. As it said, “learning these
lessons and actually implementing them are the most implication of the conclusions of the
Commission.” Also, there was an emphasis on the grand strategic level of waging war decision,
“The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the decisions of senior political and
military decision-makers concerning the decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the
two soldiers on the morning of July 12th.” 113

110
Achcar and Warchawski, The 33 days War, pages 100-102
111
Ibid, page 112
112
Mustafa, pages 340-350
113
The Official English Summary of Winograd Report (Press Release)

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 CONCLUSION

The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, from 1982 till now, has been very “typical”
asymmetric conflict. The longevity of the conflict led to clear image of asymmetric strategy,
phases and consequences, in its pure form.
The theoretical propositions of the nature of asymmetry, the form of “victorious” strategy in such
conflict and the value of multi-dimensional framework for strategic analysis could be
emphasised.
The asymmetry is meant to describe the “conduct”, at the “strategic” level. The asymmetric
warfare has a different “paradigm” than the conventional warfare. This paradigm has a different
“nature” of the strategic objectives, the centre of gravity and the operational logic. The
asymmetry is not merely “ways of fighting”. As was shown in the case of Hezbollah, especially
in 2006 War, the fighting went more “regular or symmetric”, but still strategy was kept
asymmetric.
The victorious “asymmetric” strategy comprises of: identifying the people, in both sides, as the
centre of gravity, mastering the strategic logic; having clear political aims and managing the
struggle to achieve them, balancing the political and military resources and actions, and building
the “cause” (or decomposing it in the case of counter-asymmetry).
In the asymmetrical warfare, especially in the most recent conflicts, the major fallacy of the
counter-asymmetry is dealing with the opponent by the self-inherited way of strategy, and
without knowing the kind of war the one fights, as recommended by Clausewitz.
However, prescribing the “victorious” strategy does not mean reaching the victory. This
prescription deals with only one “conceptual” dimension, the strategic doctrine, of many
strategic dimensions. Managing all strategic dimensions, after being identified, is the climax of
the “strategic performance”.
The theory of “strategic dimensions” was proved to be relevant. As all dimensions in the major
three categories, people/politics, preparation to war and war proper, were determining the
strategic performance. However, the proportional weights of its dimensions, on its own and in
comparison to the others, are variable in each conflict or in the same conflict over the time line.
As Clausewitz, accurately, indicated, if the strategic guidance was proved to be absent, the
tactical and operational spheres would be accumulated to produce a strategic effect, albeit
chaotic. Similarly, at any war, all the strategic dimensions are acting in the “spaces” of human
and physical environments, being interacting positively or negatively or even segregated. The

42
role of leadership, or the body who is responsible for formulating and implementing the strategy,
is to try active handling of these dimensions, of the self and the adversary, to achieve the
political aims. However, this active handling is not hundred percent determined, but rather, it is
liable to all waves of ambiguity and uncertainty.
No framework of strategic analysis can be accepted without having an acquaintance to all
strategic dimensions. Nevertheless, from the strategic perspective, the weight of command and
strategic ability, as the most active component in the equation, should be highly appreciated.

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 LIST OF INTERVIEWS

1- Lt Colonel Dr Amin Hetit, the former head of the Lebanese Command and Joint
Generals College.
2- Sheikh Abdel-Mageed Ammar, a member in the Political Bureau and the former
head of the south sector in Hezbollah.
3- Sheikh Nawwaf Mosawy, a member in the Political Bureau and the head of
International Relations Office in Hezbollah.
4- Mustafa Hagg Aly, a member in the Political Bureau in Hezbollah.
5- Sheikh Aly Da’moosh, the head of Foreign Relations Office in Hezbollah.
6- Dr Aly Mohamed, the head of Centre of Strategic Studies in Hezbollah.
7- Hagg Muhtady, the deputy chief in the south and a former military command in
Hezbollah.
8- Hagg AbdelKareem, a member in the Foreign Relations Office in Hezbollah.
9- Hagg Abdel-Tawwab, the head of opposition camp in Beirut, member in Hezbollah
10- Sheikh Fathy Yakan, Sunni Islamic Scholar, Moslem Brotherhood in Lebanon
11- Ayatullah Mohamed Hussayn Fadlullah, The Shiite highest Scholar in Lebanon.
12- Ahmed Thakeb, a member in Amal Movement
13- John Ramez, Maronite and a member in the National Liberal Current.
14- Abu-Fatemah, a member in Hezbollah and former prisoner in Israel
15- Abu-Nedal, a member in Hezbollah and serves in the Medical Military sector
16- A Shiite Family: the father; Hag Aly Yazbac, professor in Lebanese Uni. The
Mother, Umm Husayn; housewife and the daughters: Nadeen; lecturer in Pharmacy College,
Maya; student in food sciences.

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