Republic of the Philippines

Region V- Bicol
Bicol University
Bicol University Graduate School
Master of Arts Major in Social Studies

Philippines Reclamation to the West Philippines Sea: Thy Hopes or Thy Faults? As
China Insists its Nine– Dashed Line Claim Even After the Arbitral Ruling in Favored to
Philippines

Jelyn P. Tan

MASocStEd

1st Semester AY 2021-2022

Abstract

The long quest for ending the maritime and land territorial dispute over the West
Philippine Sea have resulted to invalidation of China’s historical claim of the nine-dashed
line and the full grant of rights to the said territories to the Philippines. However, China does
not even grieve but instead intensified its measures of recoupment in the Scarborough Shoal
and Spratlys Island. Philippines, even after winning, and other contesting states just suffer
from coercion and more aggressive forms of harassments. With the Duterte administration
striving for a more friendly way of settling issues between China, a far more different
strategy from the diplomatic way of previous administrations, are we to expect for a more
peaceful West Philippine Sea or shall we condemn and fight full forcefully of our
indisputable rights?

This term paper is presented to lay comprehensive discussion on the maritime

entitlements and basis for claims of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea and of China
to the South China Sea. Mitigated measures taken by the Philippines are also elaborated.
More importantly, this paper aims to elucidate the faults of the government in its failure to
establish credible maritime force and the plausibility of the Philippines to fully establish its
rights in the disputed area against the rising power economic hub of the world – China.

Introduction

As early as 1970’s countries bordering the South China Sea began to claim islands
and various zones within the area. Apparently, Philippines being one of the nearest contest its
rights in the so-called West Philippines Sea which is a maritime area directly facing the South
China Sea. China, on the other hand, professed their historical rights as basis of their 9-
dashed line claim to the South China Sea. For decades’ tension between China, the
Philippines and other contesting party-states have hooked the international arena anticipating
for what could possibly be the ending of this cinematic warfare of power. Whether this will
lead to more years of destabilization within the area, domination of a more economically
powerful country or will the rule of law reigns supreme even over the most tenacious state.

The hidden riches of the South China Sea

11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, more than
that of identified in the Luzon Malampaya project, have caused state claimants to assert their
rights and sovereignty over the South China Sea. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philipines,
Taiwan and Vietnam have internationally pronounced their disagreement over what the
China’s sweeping claims of territorial sovereignty over the sea. What is at stake is, generally,
a maritime area larger than the total land area of the Philippines, and this huge maritime area
is overflowing with fish, oil, gas, and other natural resources.
Basis for China’s Claim to the West Philippine Sea

Derive from the speech of former Justice Secretary Antiono T. Carpio, at the
Philippine Bar Association on the 13th of August 2013, he explicitly drew that the China’s 9-
dash line claimed is purely historical on basis and very ambiguous on scope and nature.
China anchors its 9 – dashed line claim on a so-called historical rights. However, China,
itself, admits that this 9 – dash was first included in an Official Chinese Map only in 1947
during the Koumintang government. In 1998, China enacted its Exclusive Economic Zone
and Continental Shelf Law to affirm its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and
ECS as ratified under the UNCLOS. A provision in this law states that, “this act shall not
affect the historical rights of the People’s Republic of China,” pertaining mostly to its claim
in the South China Sea. This 1998 Law is the first official reference in a Chinese Law to
China’s “historical rights” to maritime areas outside its EEZ and ECS. However, the rights of
a state under international law cannot be enlarged by its domestic legislation, but only by
customary international law or by a convention like UNCLOS.

Historically speaking, China’s 9 – dashed line claim was originally represented by 11

dashes in the 1947 Chinese map, then reduced unilaterally in 1950 to 9 dashes without
explanation after the Communists ousted the Kuomintang from the mainland. China’s claim
was ambiguous from the start as China failed to explain its scope and has never revealed the
exact coordinates of its 9 dashed line claim, and neither has China explained the basis under
international law of its claim. In 2009, China formally submitted to the United Nations a map
of its 9-dashed line claim showing no coordinates which lodged Vietnam and Malaysia to
protest.

China’s 9 – Dashed Line Claim

With their submitted map as reference to their 9-dashed line, China claimed
“indisputable sovereignty” over the islands and “adjacent waters” within the enclosed area as
well as sovereign right and jurisdiction over the “relevant waters”, seabed, and subsoil within
the enclosed area. China has not provide further definition of their terms “adjacent waters”
and “relevant waters” which are not used in the UNCLOS. China’s claimed remained
indefinite, whether it is claiming only the islands within the 9-dashed line area or all the
waters and resources within the 9-dashed line beyond the applicable maritime zones. Even
the Chinese incumbent judge in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Zhigou
Gao, wrote in 194 that the 9 dashes merely identify the islands owned by China within the
enclosed area but do not represent a claim to all the waters and resources within the enclosed
area.

Violation against the Philippines entitlement to the West Philippine Sea

With the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or
UNCLOS in 1994, Philippines and other party-states have gained exclusive rights within the
200 nautical mile reach waters from its land territory referred to as the Exclusive Economic
Zone. This clearly sets that no state other than the adjacent coastal state can exploit economic
resources within the 200 nm EEZ of a country. Fishing rights that other states historically
enjoyed within the EEZ of the adjacent coastal state was automatically terminated upon the
effectivity of the UNCLOS. Additionally, under the UNCLOS all water surrounding states
were granted with an extension of 150 nautical mile continental shelf familiarized as the
Extended Continental Shelf (ECS).

Taking the aforementioned rights, the Philippines has therefore awarded indisputable
rights within its 200 nm EEZ and 150 nm ECS which covers the Scarborough Shoal and
Spratlys Islands, by which the Philippines’ calls the West Philippine Sea. However, with the
China asserting its 9- dashed line claim, Philippines and other South East Asian nations loses
control over their EEZ. The 9 – dashed line area comprises almost 90% of the total area of
the South China Sea, encroaching Philippines’ 80% 200-nm EEZ and 100% of 150-nm
extended continental shelf.

Claimant States of Territories over South China Sea

China’s 9 – dashed line claim has not affect Philipines alone, EEZ and ECS of
countries’ Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan and Indonesia facing the South China Sea
were also adversely affected. In result, the mentioned countries filed separate protests in front
of the international court.

China’s increasingly assertive behavior

China’s desire to overrule the world is evident on its increasing assertive behavior
owning the entire South China Sea. As early as 1995, China started its quench for power as it
seized from the Philippines the Mischief Reef, a submerged atoll within the EEZ of the
Philippines in the WPS. In 2012, the China once again demonstrated to the world that might
makes right as it permanently occupied the Scarborough Shoal despite of mutual
understanding of vessel withdrawal between the Philippines and China. Scarborough Shoal is
within the 200-nm EEZ of the Philippines and had served as a bombing range of American
and Philippine Air Force planes from 1960s to 1980s.

Accounted from the stories of Filipino fishermen, the Beijing’s aggression in the
South China Sea has harmed the fishermen’s livelihood for years, and now the lessons of
Scarborough Shoal are playing out elsewhere in the disputed waters. People in several
communities along the Luzon coast say overfishing by the Chinese boats that prowl the
waters has led to a steep drop in their catch. Chinese Coast Guard officials do not physically
harass the fishermen, but sabotage the fishing lines left by Filipinos.

In the year 2018 China started to increase its military activity in the South China Sea
and up to present continues to construct artificial islands which served as their military and
industrial outposts. Recent developments, in addition to piling sand onto existing reefs, China
has also put up airstrips – particularly in the Paracel and Spratlys Islands, where it has more
than twenty outposts. Chinese naval fleets are also seen to dominate the entire region
provoking Filipino and other Asian fishermen to trawl in the area.

In 2019, 22 Filipino fishermen had to be rescued after a Chinese vessel struck and
sank their fishing boat. In 2020, China has used its naval forces to pressure the littoral
nations, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. In the same year, China sank a Vietnamese
fishing vessel, a maneuver that was roundly condemned by the international community.

Just recently, more than 200 Chinese boats were first spotted on March 7 at Whitsun
Reef, around 320 kilometers (200 miles) west of Palawan Island in the contested South China
Sea, although many have since scattered across the Spratly Islands.

China is also increasing its push against U.S. warships, using aggressive signaling;
dangerously close maneuvering; illuminating U.S. ships with fire-control radar, which
suggests the imminent launch of weapons; and overflying at very close range. China has been
aggressively expanding its fleet of oceangoing warships, increasing its stock of hypersonic
"carrier killer" cruise missiles and improving its undersea technology.

In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to promise that “China does not intend
to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands and that China’s outposts would not target or
impact any country. However, in September of 2020, the United States calls for China to
ceased its military drills in the Spratly Islands. China has instead pursued a reckless and
provocative militarization of those disputed outposts. China deployed anti-ship cruise
missiles, expanded surveillance capabilities, and constructed runways and hangars for fighter
jets.

These incidents give rise to Filipinos to seek for legal remedies that would hinder
China from more coercive acts and territorial invasion in the Philippines.

UNCLOS as the International Law which might resolve the West Philippine Sea
Dispute

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, which
entered into force in 1994, governs the conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea.
All the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute, including the Philippines and China,
have ratified UNCLOS.

UNCLOS is the Constitution for the world’s oceans and seas. It codified the then
existing customary international law of the sea, created novel entitlements in favor of coastal
and landlocked states, and adopted a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism to insure that
there is a final authoritative body to interpret and apply its provisions.
 UNCLOS governs only maritime entitlements, maritime space and maritime disputes.
The maritime entitlements of states – the territorial sea, EEZ and ECS and their resources –
emanates and are drawn only from baselines on continental land or islands. UNCLOS
provides for a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism, subject to certain types of disputes
that states are allowed to exclude from compulsory arbitration. All states that ratified
UNCLOS bound themselves in advance to this compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.
The Philippines and China, having ratified UNCLOS, are both bound by this compulsory
dispute settlement mechanism.

China also violates the rights to common heritage of mankind

Under UNCLOS, every coastal state is entitled as a matter of international law to a

200 – nm EEZ, plus an additional 150-nm ECS where applicable, drawn from baselines on
continental land or islands. In addition, coastal state may adopt an ECS up to 100-nm
seaward from the 2,500 meter isobaths. This legal maritime entitlement is one of the most
important reasons why developing coastal stated approved UNCLOS. Without this important
legal maritime entitlement there might have been no UNCLOS. In case of overlapping EEZs
or ECSs, the opposing or adjacent coastal states shall negotiate in good faith an equitable
maritime boundary.

Also, land-locked states joined UNCLOS for two reasons. First, the area of the sea
beyond the EEZ of a coastal states, called the high seas, is open to fishing for all states,
whether coastal or land-locked. Second, the seabed and its minerals beyond the ECS of any
coastal state is declared the common heritage of mankind. Thus, giving all states, whether
coastal or land-locked the rights to fish, explore and navigate high seas.

China’s 9-dashed line claim, thus violate the rights of all states on this planet,
including the Philippines, to fish in the high seas or the area beyond the EEZ of a coastal sea.
Their 9-dashed line claim is beyond their EEZ and ECS and encroaches other states’ EEZ and
ECS. Their claim further negates the right of all states to the seabed and its mineral resources
beyond the ECS of a coastal state.

Philippines has Only One Viable Option

Justice Antonio Carpio presented the five plausible resolution the Philippines might
take to win over the territorial disputes, particularly to bring back the Scarborough Shoal.
First was to send naval vessels and marines to retake Scarborough Shoal. This was not
feasible because of the superior Chinese naval forces. Second was to file a diplomatic protest
with China. This was useless because China would, literally, simply ignore the protest – as it
did 17 years earlier with the Mischief Reef. Third was to ask ASEAN to lobby China to
withdraw from Scarborough Shoal. This was not realistic since some ASEAN countries
would not want to offend China. Besides, Asean countries would not take sides on territorial
disputes. Fourth was to take the matter to the United Nations Security Council. This was
futile since China has a veto power in the Security Council. The fifth and only viable option
was to bring the matter to an international tribunal for arbitration, where the playing field
would be level and military power would not count, but only the rule of law would govern.

Philippine filed Arbitration Case against China

With China’s occupation of Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines had no recourse but to
pursue the provisions of Annex VII which was to lay the issue at the fore of an Arbitral
Tribunal under UNCLOS. It was the only sensible and effective response that the Philippines
could persists since it lacks in maritime warships, resources and power.

The Chinese occupation of Scarborough Shoal is an invasion of Philippine territory,

giving rise to a territorial sovereignty dispute. However, the Philippines could not bring
China to compulsory arbitration on a territorial sovereignty dispute without China’s consent.
That is why the Philippines decided to do the next best thing - bring China to compulsory
arbitration on the maritime aspect of China’s 9-dashed line claim. If China’s 9-dashed line
claim is invalidated, then China will lose its excessive claim to the waters of the South China
Sea. More significantly, China’s basis for claiming territorial sovereignty over the islands
within its 9-dashed line claim will weaken considerably since the 9-dashed line claim is
central to China’s historical claim to territorial sovereignty over the islands within the
enclosed area.

When a state ratifies UNCLOS, the state consents in advance to be bound by the
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS on “any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application” of the provisions of UNCLOS. However, a state is allowed to
opt out of compulsory arbitration for certain matters, like disputes on maritime boundary
delimitation. In 1996, ten years after ratifying UNCLOS, China opted out of compulsory
arbitration for certain types of disputes, including any dispute on maritime boundary
delimitation. A state remains bound to compulsory arbitration with respect to the
interpretation or application of UNCLOS on disputes that the state has not excluded, or
cannot exclude, from compulsory arbitration.
Thus, when an actual dispute arises involving the interpretation or application of
UNCLOS, a signatory state is already deemed to have given its consent to compulsory
arbitration, unless the dispute is one that is properly excluded from compulsory arbitration
under UNCLOS.
The Philippines’ arbitration case against China involves the interpretation or
application of UNCLOS on three main issues. The first issue is whether China’s 9-dashed
line claim can negate the grant under UNCLOS of an EEZ to the Philippines. This issue does
not involve any maritime boundary delimitation because there are no overlapping EEZs
between China and the Philippines, certainly not in the island of Luzon facing the West
Philippine Sea. Scarborough Shoal, whatever state may have sovereignty over it, does not
generate an EEZ because only small rocks are found there. Admittedly, those rocks are not
islands capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own, which is the
condition for an island to have an EEZ.
In the Spratlys there is no island capable of sustaining human habitation or economic
life of its own. This is the position of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Thus,
there are also no overlapping EEZs between the Philippines and other claimant states in the
Spratlys. However, since China claims that islands in the Spratlys generate EEZs, the second
issue is whether an island in the Spratlys actually generates an EEZ. The resolution of this
issue does not involve any maritime boundary delimitation. This issue is an inquiry into
whether an island in the Spratlys satisfies the UNCLOS requirement of being able to “sustain
human habitation or economic life of [its] own.” If none of the islands satisfies this
requirement, then there are no overlapping EEZs in the Spratlys and hence no maritime
boundary delimitation is involved. If an island satisfies this requirement, and thus generates
an EEZ, then the tribunal will so declare but will proceed no further without the consent of
China because the issue will then involve overlapping EEZs requiring maritime boundary
delimitation for its resolution.
In the event that the arbitral tribunal rules that an island in the Spratlys generates an
EEZ, the Philippines can bring China to compulsory conciliation under an UNCLOS
conciliation commission. Under UNCLOS, a state that opts out of compulsory arbitration
involving maritime boundary delimitation shall nevertheless submit to compulsory
conciliation. The conciliation commission will adjust the median line of the overlapping
EEZs, taking into account Palawan’s more than 600-nm coastline as against the less than 1-
nm coastline of the biggest island in the Spratlys. Under prevailing law of the sea
jurisprudence, such huge disproportion in the opposing coastlines will entitle the island in the
Spratlys to an EEZ either only seaward away from Palawan, or to a proportionally minuscule
EEZ facing Palawan, if at all. Although the report of the conciliation commission is not
binding on China, China is obligated under UNCLOS to negotiate in good faith with the
Philippines based on the report of the conciliation commission.
The third issue is whether China can appropriate and construct artificial islands on
low-tide elevations (LTEs) within the Philippines’ EEZ, like the massive structure China
built on Mischief Reef, which China officially describes as a shelter for Chinese fishermen.
LTEs are rocks above water at low tide but under water at high tide. LTEs beyond the
territorial sea of a coastal state do not generate any maritime zone, not even a territorial sea.
LTEs beyond the territorial sea are not subject to appropriation and to claims of territorial
sovereignty because they are not land but part of the maritime zone. Under UNCLOS, only
the adjacent coastal state can build artificial islands within its EEZ.
A corollary issue raised by the Philippines is whether China can subject the high seas
in the South China Sea to its sovereignty. The high seas refer to the area beyond the EEZs of
coastal states. China’s 9-dashed line claim subjects the high seas in the South China Sea to
China’s “indisputable sovereignty.” UNCLOS expressly provides that no state shall subject
the high seas to its sovereignty. This UNCLOS provision is a codification of centuries’ old
customary international law.
 Under UNCLOS, the refusal of a party to participate in a dispute settlement
proceedings, where such participation is compulsory, “shall not constitute a bar to the
proceedings” and the tribunal can still decide the case on the merits.

Aftermath

The Rule of Law in the West Philippine Sea dispute is UNCLOS. All the claimant
states to the dispute are parties to UNCLOS and are bound to comply with their treaty
obligations under UNCLOS in good faith. If the West Philippine Sea dispute is settled in
accordance with UNCLOS, then the world can be assured that there will be a just, permanent
and lasting peace in the West Philippine Sea.

After years of waiting, on July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Haguue issued its ruling on the claim brought against China by the Philippines under
UNCLOS, ruling in favor of the Philippines in every count. This is one of the greatest
achievements of the late President Benigno Aquino III - filing of the arbitration case against
China which legally secured our EEZ in the WPS. With the hope that it would end the long
turmoil in the disputed area Philippines sought that China would accept the decision.
However, China being hardheaded continuously refuses to recognize the court’s authority.
But what can we do? Philippines doesn’t have any guts to go in pursuit of the decision
against China. It can never command China to cease from claiming the disputed area and
demand to follow the verdict of the court. For the China is immensely powerful on its own
and just as any other state enjoyed their independence and sovereignty, they would not easily
bow over any other state or international court. Philippines should have been winning and
celebrating but it’s a misfortune that being a defenseless and economically challenged
country denotes weaker chance of regaining its’ loses. Even if it risk everything out of its
possessions the failure of not arming its own country with best suits, shields and weapons are
what makes it more impossible to earn back its integrity as a country to gain full control over
the West Philippines Sea.

A light shed in the tunnel

The Philippines and China signed last November 27, 2018 the Memorandum of
Agreement or MOU to cooperate in exploiting oil and gas in the WPS under the Service
Contract System of the Philippines. In August of 2019 the Philippines and China signed the
Terms of Reference or TOR to implement the MOU. A final meeting was supposed to have
been held in Manila between Philippine and Chinese officials last March 2020 to vet the
partnership agreement that should have been forged by that time between awarded by the
Philippine government with an area covering Reed Bank, which has gas reserves much
greater than Malampaya. However, the pandemic prevented the holding of the meeting in
Manila and a new date for a meeting has yet to be announced.
CONCLUSION

The Philippines has wisely chosen to bring its maritime dispute with China to a forum
where warships, fighter planes and missiles do not count, eliminating the military advantage
of China and insuring that the outcome of the dispute will be decided only in accordance with
the Rule of Law. It was a wise decision, but one borne out of necessity because it was
actually the only viable option open to the Philippines.
However, it must be made clear that UNCLOS has authority over maritime
entitlements, maritime space and maritime disputes only. It does not have any authority
towards territorial sovereignty disputes over land or land features in the oceans and seas. This
means that it is impossible for the Philippines to win over the disputed islands, reefs and
rocks. China’s issue on occupancy to the Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys Islands must be
bring to the proper forum which governs the rules and principles on general international law.
An international tribunal can acquire jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty disputes only
with the consent of the state parties involved. China refuses to bestow its consent, hence,
Philippines has seemingly micron of chance to regain its territorial power over the disputed
land territories. However, since Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys are exclusaively situated
within the 200 –nm EEZ of the Philippines, it is clear that Philippines has all the rights to
enjoy economic activities over the area.

In contrary, with the UNCLOS finally invalidating the China’s nine-dash line on July
12, 2016, Philippines triumphantly defended its claim over the maritime waters and resources
within its exclusive economic zones and extended continental shelf. Arbitral Tribunal has
awarded the Philippines with full sovereignty towards its maritime territory and had likewise
expressly declared that Mischief Reef is part of the Philippine EEZ.

However, with the shown continuous aggression of China in the West Philippine Sea
and it is still impossible to acclaim that we have regain what is originally ours. Unless, China,
itself, would reverts its claim on the 9- dashed line area, that’s the only time Philippines will
have to successfully reclaimed its rights over the disputed area– a thing which will only
happens when the hell freezes over.

As Secretary Carpio persists, this issue on West Philippine Sea is an inter-

generational battle and has something to do with our territorial integrity. We might have
secure a favorable ruling for now, but China will not simply abandon its massive structure in
Mischief Reef, withdraw its surveillance vessels in Scarborough, or decline from exploiting
natural gas in the Spratlys Island. To remain a sovereign and independent nation, there is a
need to build and maintain a credible self-defense force. No nation can remain sovereign,
independent and free for long without maintaining a credible self-defense force, even if
international law and world opinion are on its side. We can easily be swept by the China’s
strong military force and naval canons if they would want to.

UNCLOS does not provide for a world policeman or sheriff to execute decisions of
international arbitral tribunals. Member states of UNCLOS are expected to voluntarily self-
execute decisions of arbitral tribunals. For a losing party, like China, this will only possible if
it can survive politically even if it complies with a decision against its own state. Hence, our
generation must also win over world opinion and convince the Chinese descendants that their
government continues to violate international law. The world must explain to the Chinese
people that their adherence to the 9-dashed line claim is illegal and does only results to severe
maritime conflicts within nations. If not resolved, there is a great probability of going back to
the days where rule of naval cannon prevails, as it did from the beginning of the 15 th centuries
to 19th centuries.

China’s 9-dashed line claim simply cannot co-exist with UNCLOS. Upholding one
means killing the other. If China’s 9-dashed line claim is upheld or allowed to stand,
UNCLOS will cease to be the law of the sea in the South China Sea. China will appropriate
for itself not only the EEZs and ECSs of other coastal states but also the high seas and all the
living and non-living resources found there. This will be the beginning of the end for
UNCLOS. Other naval powers will likewise claim other oceans and seas, taking away the
EEZs and ECSs of weak or defenseless coastal states. The oceans and seas of the planet will
be governed by the rule of the naval canon.
Indeed, the maritime dispute between the Philippines and China is an acid test to the
very survival of UNCLOS - whether the Rule of Law will govern the oceans and seas of our
planet, or whether the rule of the naval cannon will prevail, as it did in the time of Grotius.
Legal scholars on the law of the sea all over the world are keenly watching the outcome of
the Philippines’ arbitration case.
Clearly, this is an international issue which is a very crucial fight for sovereignty and
a fight for the Filipino people and its descendants. It is also the same fight for down – and –
out countries all over the globe.

Though, it is in a narrower sense to say that it is the government’s negligence and

default that led us to this tension, audibly, Philippines has casts all the feasible means to
defend its rights. At least, with the final verdict of Permanent Court at Hague Arbitral
Tribunal, shadow of hope shed light to the Filipino people that ignites the plausibility of
championing the international races. However, the MOU and TOR enjoined by the two
competing parties, if materialized and pursued, could yield better result of economic
partnership in the disputed area but could as well be a diverting tactics of the China to
viciously and gradually own the area. Hence, it is too early to conclude and the world has a
lot more to beware of. Philippines destiny, for not strengthening its militaristic force, for
losing control over its territories, and for winning over against China’s claim, will lie on its
government’s perseverance and commitment to defend its nation and its people.
References

Stavridis, J., (2020), World cannot ignore Chinese aggression in South China Sea,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/World-cannot-ignore-Chinese-aggression-in-South-China-
Sea/

Gutierrez, J., (2021), Overwhelmed by Chinese Fleets, Filipino Fishermen

‘Protest and Adapt’, New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/11/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea-
fishermen.html/

Associated Press, (2020), South China Sea Watch: US says Spratly Islands are being
'militarised' as China holds drills amid new tensions, https://www.9news.com.au/world/south-
china-sea-watch-china-holds-drills-amid-new-tensions-spratly-islands-military/c2828c41-
6342-41c2-be2a-c1e758898097/

https://web.facebook.com/dfaphl/posts/the-rule-of-law-in-the-west-philippine-sea-
disputepublication-versionspeech-deli/222588677895974/?_rdc=1&_rdr/

https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disutes-south-china-sea/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands_dispute

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_v._China

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitral_tribunal
Appendix A. Key of terms

West Philippine Sea. It is the official designation by the Philippine government of

eastern parts of the South China Sea which are included in the Philippines' exclusive
economic zone. Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys Island are two important territorial features
in the West Philippine Sea.

West Philippine Sea dispute. China claims “indisputable sovereignty” over all the
waters, islands, reefs, rocks, seabed, minerals, and living and non-living resources falling
within its 9-dashed line claim in the South China Sea. This led other country-states bordering
South China Sea to protest against the inclusion of their Exclusive Economic Zone to the
China’s 9-dashed line claim.

UNCLOS or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the governing
international treaty that resolves maritime disputes among countries. Philippines filed the
arbitration case against China’s claim to West Philippine Sea to the UNCLOS Permanent
Arbitral Court.

Historical rights. China’s nine- dashed line claim was based on their preserved rich
historical culture. Chinese fishermen have fished around the Spratlys islands since 200
BC. China claims to have discovered the islands in the Han dynasty in 2 BC. The islands
were claimed to have been marked on maps compiled during the time of Eastern Han
dynasty and Eastern Wu (one of the Three Kingdoms).

Indisputable. It is used to describe something that is so obviously true that there is no

room for questions or debate. China claimed their indisputable rights within the reach of their
nine-dashed line claim in the South China Sea which was not elaborated by the China.

Arbitral Tribunal. A panel of unbiased adjudicators which is convened and sits to

resolve a dispute by way of arbitration. On 12 July 2016, the special arbitral tribunal ruled in
favor of the Philippines on most of its submissions. It clarified that it would not "... rule on
any question of sovereignty over land territory and would not delimit any maritime boundary
between the Parties". The tribunal also concluded that China's historic rights claims over the
maritime areas (as opposed to land territories and territorial waters) inside the "nine-dash
line" have no lawful effect if they exceed what's entitled to under UNCLOS.