EAST WEST SPORTS SUMMIT

November 7 – 9, 2007

The Olympic Legacy: Will Beijing Succeed Where Others Failed?

In 2008, a century-old vision will be put to the test. One hundred years ago, Chinese
youth from Tianjin asked when they would be sending a winning athlete to the Olympics,
when they would be sending a winning team to the Olympics, and when they would be
able to invite the world to come to Beijing for the Olympic Games. The realization of this
vision may soon be fulfilled. As hosts of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Beijing
faces the task of establishing an Olympic legacy that will be worthy of its long journey
into Olympic history.

The Olympic Legacy and the Olympic Movement

Olympic officials understand the importance of the role of the Olympic legacy in
perpetuating and invigorating the values and spirit of the Olympic Movement. Members
of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) strongly believe that the Olympic legacy
must never be separated from the Games or be taken lightly. However, in its 2002
International Symposium on the Legacy of the Olympic Games, the IOC recognized the
difficulty in defining the concept of legacy and in creating something that would have a
lasting and meaningful impact on the world. In an attempt to determine how host cities
could better plan and implement their legacies, the IOC identified two types of legacies:
tangible and intangible.

Tangible legacies include the more recognizable urban planning aspects of hosting the
Olympic Games, such as new or renovated sports complexes, improved transportation
and communication systems, or increased business ventures in renewed downtowns.
Intangible legacies are less recognizable, but are equally, if not more important than the
tangible legacies. For example, the IOC lists education and the production of ideas and
positive cultural values as the most fundamental and influential Olympic legacies.
Intangible legacies also include popular memory, new or increased sports participation,
fame and publicity at a global level, and general experience and know-how.

Intangible legacies potentially impact a host city at deeper levels than tangible legacies,
particularly at the political, cultural, and social dimensions. For example, the political
legacy of the Olympic Games can be felt through the Olympic Truce, an international
agreement ratified in the 9th century B.C. by three Greek kings that guaranteed the safety
of all athletes, artists and their families, as well as ordinary pilgrims, as they traveled to,
participated in, and attended the Olympic Games. As a promoter of this culture of peace,
the modern Olympic Games have great political significance not only for the host city,
but also for the larger international community. Moreover, the Olympic Games seek to
encourage the establishment of a peaceful society and, in conformity with the United

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Nations Charter, to contribute to the search for diplomatic solutions to international
conflicts.1

Of course, tangible legacies are also important aspects of the Olympic Games and work
in conjunction with intangible legacies. The Olympic Movement would be hard pressed
to grow if there were no new swimming pools, skating rinks, or stadiums. Olympic
Games may inspire a whole generation of youth to participate in sports. It may
strengthen the city’s sports culture and heighten people’s awareness of physical health
(the intangible legacy), which would in turn motivate more people to actually utilize the
state-of-the-art facilities (the tangible legacy) left over from the Olympic Games.
However, host cities often become consumed with producing tangible Olympic legacies,
leaving intangible legacies undeveloped.

Although the IOC appears to have significant control over the legacy of each Olympic
Games, many host cities have fallen short of creating the Olympic legacy that increases
opportunities for participation in high-performance sport and promotes the values of sport
for all. Furthermore, after an Olympic Games conclude, the IOC loses significant amount
of control over the host city and the Organizing Committee. More importantly, it loses
control over the development of a lasting and sustainable Olympic legacy. With the
increasingly commercial nature of the Olympics (starting with the 1984 Los Angeles
Games and reaching unprecedented levels during the 1996 Atlanta Games), the Olympic
legacy has become synonymous with immediate, short-term, and tangible economic
benefits.

Case Study: Olympic Legacies in the U.S.

The 1996 Olympic Games held in Atlanta have been described as the most
commercialized Games in history. For the first time ever, funds raised to support the
Games came almost entirely from private sources. Officials attracted businesspeople to
relocate to Atlanta with incentives such as meals and front row tickets. Olympic Park
often resembled a chaotic carnival.

Immediately following the Atlanta Games, new businesses did not relocate to the city and
tourists (and suburbanites) did not flock to the renewed downtown. When ACOG
(Atlanta Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games) officials realized that they were
barely going to break even in terms of revenues and expenses, the optimism about the
economic benefits from the Games turned to bitterness and disappointment. The only
evidence that the Games had been in Atlanta were the leftover venues spread throughout
the city—what many call a “bricks and mortar” legacy. Yet, even these state-of-the-art
buildings are ineffective legacies if they are left to fall into disrepair.2 And, without
adequate outreach and development programs, their accessibility is often limited to a
select portion of the population, rather than to all young Olympic hopefuls.3

To many, Olympic legacy meant urban development: public projects, transportation

improvements, and a general facelift for the host city. But IOC and ACOG officials tried
to bring the emphasis back on the athletes, on sports, and on the youth that the Games

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would ultimately influence. Atlanta, after all, had the much admired “LA model” to
aspire to. Following the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, the Los Angeles Olympic
Committee used $93 million of its $232.5 million surplus to create the Amateur Athletic
Foundation of Los Angeles (AAFLA), a non-profit institution dedicated to the
development of youth sport and to increasing public awareness of the role of sport in
society.

ACOG and the city of Atlanta, however, did not have similar luxuries of an Olympic
profit, despite the highly commercialized nature of the 1996 Games. Therefore, they did
not have the financial means to set up such an elaborate program for youth sport
development as AAFLA. The best Atlanta could do was to establish the Georgia Amateur
Athletic Foundation (GAAF), which for lack of resources did little to promote youth
sports.

B e ij in g 2 0 0 8 : W h a t W ill I t s L e g a c y B e ?

With pre-Olympic hype already raised to extreme levels, Beijing appears to be on the
same dangerous track of high expectations as Atlanta—perhaps even more so,
considering the great political weight China has placed on the Games. Chinese and
BOCOG (Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games) officials continue to
stress how the Olympic Games are an opportunity for China to project a new image of
national unity and strength to the rest of the world. Thus, the 2008 Games will not only
showcase the “real” Beijing: a new, modern city with a rich and ancient cultural heritage,
but will also demonstrate to the rest of the world that China is a nation to be reckoned
with.

The dynamics of hosting the Beijing Games are entirely unprecedented. The Games will
be hosted by a communist nation for the second time in history.4 Never before have the
Olympics been held on such a grand scale and in a country with such an enormous
population. Thirty-five new Olympic venues are being constructed; 6 highways, 8
subway lines, and 18,000 more buses (30% of which will be operating on natural gas) are
being added to the present transportation network; and around 30,000 new hotel rooms
are being built in addition to the already existing 70,000.

In terms of an environmental legacy, BOCOG and Chinese government officials have

already taken measures to ensure that the 2008 Games are the “Green Olympics” they
promised in their Olympic bid. Between 1998 and 2002 alone, for example, Beijing spent
$5.6 billion on environmental cleanup and protection projects, and has $6.6 billion set
aside for related activities between 2002 and 2007. Beijing officials also planned to
decrease citywide coal consumption from 26 million tons in 2002 to 15 million tons by
2007. Reforestation projects to help improve air quality and prevent dust storms in the
city have been a priority as well. In 2002, 2 million trees and 3 million square meters of
grassland were planted, helping to increase the number of days with blue skies 64.1
percent in 2005, 15.7 percent higher than in 2000. Yet, in spite of these and the more
recent efforts of relocating factories outside of the city, removing 1 million cars from the
streets according to their license plate numbers, and even climate engineering rainfall,

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Beijing’s poor air quality has become one of the biggest issues that could potentially
sabotage its Green Olympic legacy.

The 2008 Beijing Olympics will also open China’s doors to foreign media—as well as to
a host of foreign criticism concerning China’s record of freedom of speech abuses.
Officials estimate between 20,000 and 30,000 members of the international press will be
flocking into China for the first time to cover the Olympic Games. However, BOCOG
will only be issuing around 20,000 official Olympic accreditation cards, leaving at least
10,000 unaccredited journalists in the country. The accreditation cards will ease visa
restrictions, issue temporary driving permits and temporary housing, and even grant
permission to foreign media to take aerial photography, photos of cultural relics, and
permission to hold interviews with Chinese athletes. These unprecedented exceptions to
foreign media regulations have come about because of international pressure for BOCOG
to conform to the norms created by previous Olympics. But what will happen to the
unaccredited media? How will China control the temptation to report on issues other than
the Olympics once foreign media is inside the country? In the end, the impact the media
can have on Beijing’s Olympic legacy may be too much for China to handle.

BOCOG’s slogan for the Beijing Olympics during the bidding process was “New
Beijing, New Olympics,” which reveals—perhaps more than was intended—the impact
that China hoped the Olympic Games will have.5 For starters, China hopes that the
Olympics will serve as a powerful impetus for the further development of sports in the
country. Already, the Chinese government is investing billions of dollars in improving its
national teams across all sports disciplines, and is focused on identifying young talent
throughout the nation. The country’s desire to win gold at the Olympics has led top
Chinese sports officials to look outside national borders for assistance in improving its
athletes, providing a perfect opportunity for international sports organizations, like Major
League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and Federation Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA), to enter the Chinese sports market. And, as Chinese athletes
climb the international ranks, China will be more poised to host top level international
competitions, adding more fire to the Chinese sports fever.

The Games create a unique opportunity for foreign corporations and Olympic sponsors
(like GE and Siemens) to launch new investments in China. According to a survey
conducted by the China Research Institute of Science and Popularization, “if Beijing
attracts $9 billion in additional outside investment as a result of hosting the Olympic
Games, and if each $12,100 invested creates one new employment opportunity, then
Olympics-related investment will create 745,000 new jobs in Beijing”—an economic
legacy that comes around only once in a lifetime. Thus, if Beijing can ride the Olympic
wave better than Atlanta did in 1996, China will become even more attractive for partners
and sponsors after the Games.

Will these economic developments spark additional reforms in China, including freedom
of speech and human rights? Some argue that the Games will serve as a barrier to reform
by conveying legitimacy on current policy. Others argue that by placing China under the
international spotlight, the Games will encourage China to adopt international norms and

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institutions, thereby leading the country to political reform and further integration into the
international community.

However, these and other opinions are greatly influenced by the notion that the Olympic
Games will leave a legacy on China, rather than the other way around. That is, for many,
the Games are supposed to play a role in transitioning China towards greater democracy,
as it (arguably) did for South Korea in 1988.6 Yet, when thinking of the legacy that
Beijing will leave on the Olympic Movement—the second phrase of BOCOG’s bid
slogan was for a “New Olympics”—may be the most significant.

For the IOC, the Olympic Movement’s growth and success depends on China’s
involvement. It is in the IOC’s interest to further expand into Asia, the most dynamic and
fastest growing region in the world today. Yet, the very idea of the Olympic Movement
has in the past been defined largely in terms of Western-European history and culture.
For example, the ancient Olympic Games were a classical Greek tradition; and the
modern Olympic Movement began under the mastermind of French baron, Pierre de
Coubertin. A majority of the 28 official and five proposed Olympic sports originated in
the West.

Only two Olympic sports, judo and taekwondo, stem from Eastern traditions. Both sports
were first introduced into Olympic repertoire as demonstration sports during Olympic
Games held in Asia: judo in Tokyo, 1964, taekwondo in Seoul, 1988. For the 2008
Beijing Games, BOCOG proposed to showcase wushu, a form of marital arts, as its
demonstration sport. However, because the IOC ceased allowing demonstration sports in
1992, Beijing’s request was denied.7

Without an opportunity to leave its Olympic legacy by introducing a new sport, Beijing
faces a daunting task to create a “New Olympics” with Chinese characteristics. One long
time Olympic observer believes that the important questions to ask now concerning
Beijing’s Olympic legacy are, “How do we conceptualize China’s ancient sports as part
of ‘Olympic’ history? How do we make a space for Chinese traditions within this
Western [Olympic] institution? And how do we envision the Olympic movement as
[being truly] multicultural?” Asking these questions ultimately refocuses the discussion
onto the ways in which the 2008 Beijing Games can redefine the Olympic Movement.

Whatever Beijing’s legacy, it is highly unlikely the Olympic Movement will ever be the
same. Beijing’s organizational precision, athletic prowess, and political and economic
status in the world increases the potential weight its Olympic legacy can have on the
Olympic Games that neither Japan nor South Korea (the only other two Asian host
countries of the Olympics) had at the time of their respective Games. In the end, we will
have to reconceptualize popular perception of the relationship between Asia and the
Olympics, and not only think about the impact that the Olympics will have on China, but
also begin to think about how Beijing’s Olympic legacy will change the very nature of
the Olympics.

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NOTES

1
Taiwan’s planned participation in the 2008 Beijing Games, in spite of current controversies between it
and the People’s Republic, is an excellent example of nations using the Olympics as a platform on which to
step towards achieving friendly diplomatic relations. The “two Chinas issue” has been a controversy in the
Olympic Movement since the 1956 Games when Taiwan was permitted to send a “Chinese” team. This
recognition led the People’s Republic to withdraw from the Olympic Movement for nearly two decades.
Finally, the People’s Republic rejoined the Olympic Movement after the 1979 Nagoya Resolution, which
officially recognized the People’s Republic as “China,” and allowed them to use its original name, flag, and
national anthem. The Resolution also decided that Taiwan would have to use the name “Chinese Taipei”
during the Olympics, and use a different flag and anthem from its Taiwan National versions.
2
In order to prevent demolition, the Georgia International Horse Park (which would have cost $900,000 a
year to maintain) has been converted into a convention center, fair/carnival grounds, and even into a venue
hosting a variety of regional shows (including car shows and Civil War reenactments) and mountain bike
rallies.
3
The Olympic rowing, canoeing, and kayaking facilities are perhaps the exception. Leaving a finish tower,
two 9,000 square foot boathouses, and a launching ramp on Lake Lanier, the clubs have perhaps been the
most successful sporting legacy of the Atlanta Games, in terms of developing US rowing and paddling
sports, creating youth sports programs and opportunities, increasing overall rowing and paddling
participation rates, and continuing to serve as a central competition venue.
4
The first one being Moscow, Russia in 1980.
5
The official slogan of the 2008 Beijing Games was changed to “One World, One Dream.”
6
Jarol Manheim argues in “Rite of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy,” that
international sporting events like the Olympic Games offer a unique opportunity for public diplomacy
efforts. Manheim looks at the 1988 Seoul Games as a case study and demonstrates how hosting the Games
ultimately helped South Korea usher in democratic reforms in a once authoritarian state.
7
Although not on the official program, it should be noted that wushu will be part of the Olympic
celebration in a format yet to be determined.

The Special Reports (The Business of Asia Pacific Sports; The Olympic Legacy: Will Beijing Succeed
Where Others Failed?; China Rises: The Future of China Sports in 2009 and Beyond; and The Puzzle of
Transplanting Sports: Western Sports in Asia Pacific) were compiled for the 2007 East West Sports Summit
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the East-West Center.

(11/2/07)