Pakistan Mapping the Policy Agenda 2018-2023
AN INTRACTABLE CHALLENGE: MANAGING CIVIL MILITARY
RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTION 2018
RAZA AHMAD RUMI
 As the previous government completed its tenure, its
relationship with the military establishment had
considerably deteriorated. It would require a fresh
effort on the part of both the incoming civilian
government and the military leadership commanders
to rebuild a relationship of mutual work ability, trust
and cooperation. is is perhaps the most vital
condition for the continuation of democratic
transition, as well as informed and accountable
policymaking in the country.
e new civilian government that assumes power in
2018 will face a plethora of challenges, on both the
external and the internal fronts. India's hostile
approach towards Pakistan will not abate anytime
soon, and the country's new foreign minister will have
the unenviable task of balancing Pakistan's fraternity
with China, with improving relations with New Delhi
and its new strategic ally United States of America.
Relations with Afghanistan, meanwhile, continue to
remain dogged by a lack of trust and by issues such as
the presence of Pakistani Taliban on Afghan soil,
fencing the Durand line, among others. ese
problems will unfortunately persist in the new
government's tenure as well. e new government
must aim to achieve cordial relations with Afghanistan,
without compromising on Pakistan's internal security,
and on its desire for a peaceful settlement in Kabul.
Pakistan's internal landscape too is beleaguered by
multiple challenges. Quetta's precarious security
situation will continue to pose a major challenge to the
government that comes to power in 2018, with the low
grade insurgency continuing in Balochistan risking the
timely completion of projects under the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor. Although Pakistan has
substantially overcome the menace of terrorism, the
Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) has highlighted
the need to re-build and develop the country's war-
torn regions.
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Violent sectarianism is another obstacle the new
government will have to overcome. e recent rise of a
militant strand of the Barelvi movementhas
exacerbated sectarianism, and further polarized the
Pakistani society. Many radical out ts have made
inroads into Pakistan's democratic structures –
especially the political parties –and if this is not
checked, a radical and myopic narrative will come to
dominate public discourse in the country.
e list of security challenges is long and handling it
would require a collaborative vision, effective
coordination between the civil and military branches
of the government. Most importantly, it would require
that the ruling party and its cabinet views the military
not as an intrusive entity but a vital arm of
policymaking and government operations. Similarly, it
would also require a fresh start on part of the military
commanders recognizing that the constitutional
scheme of governance has an inherent logic, disruption
of which is not in national interest. is will not
happen anytime soon but if the two sides are willing to
engage and place the country's welfare above the
narrow con nes of institutional interests, Pakistan
could move towards an equilibrium of sorts.
In this context, the new civilian government will have
the uphill task of dealing with the aftermath of former
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's con ict with the Army.
Moving beyond Sharif-military duel
In May 2018,former Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz
Sharif leveled serious allegations on the military and
intelligence agencies. He complained that he was
ousted due to his decision to push Gen Musharraf's
treason trial. e succession of events since then,
according to Sharif, were steered by the military to
destabilize his government to the extent that he was
ostensibly sent a message by an intelligence agency
head to resign during the 2014 protests. In May,
An Intractable Challenge: Managing Civil Military Relations After e Election 2018
Sharif's interview with Dawncreated another rupture
wherein he told the newspaper, “Militant
organizations are active. Call them non-state actors,
should we allow them to cross the border and kill 150
people in Mumbai? Explain it to me. Why can't we
complete the trial?”
is was a reference to the 2008 Mumbai terrorist
attacks. New Delhi has always accused Pakistan's
military and intelligence agencies of having a hand in
the incident, something that both the military and the
civilian government have always denied. Nawaz
pushed the military establishment in the international
spotlight in his attempt to ght back against the
'Khalai Makhlooq' or the hidden hands he believes
were behind his ouster from the PM's office.
As expected, the Indian media voraciously jumped on
this juicy new story. A three time PM of Pakistan had
accused the Pakistani military of indirect involvement
in an act of international terrorism. It is easy to
understand the infuriated reaction of the country's
military leadership. Also in May 2018, a National
Security Council (NSC) meeting, called to address this
issue, declared Nawaz's statement as'incorrect and
misleading'. Sharif did not budge, embarrassing his
own colleagues and continued with his narrative.
History of Civil Military relations
It is well-known that Pakistan's political history is
tainted by a civil-military paradigm heavily skewed in
favor of the military. e reasons behind this
imbalance go all the way back to 1947 and to the
unique environment in which the Pakistani state was
born. Emerging from a Muslim nationalism that
gripped the subcontinent in the late nineteenth
century, Pakistan came into being with its two wings
separated by a thousand miles of 'enemy' Indian
territory. Existential fears, therefore, played on the
minds of Pakistan's founders since its inception and
necessitated the diversion of most of the country's
resources towards the military.
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e army thus bene tted from state patronage that was
unavailable to the country's underdeveloped civilian
structure. Moreover, the American largesse that the
military enjoyed because of Pakistan's decision to side
with the US in the Cold War facilitated the growth of
the army that then developed at a pace that far
outstripped Pakistan's struggling democratic
landscape.
e inability of political parties, especially the Muslim
League, to develop a strong grassroots following in
Pakistan coupled with the incessant squabbling that
came to de ne Pakistan's democracy in its rst decade,
led to popular support shifting towards the 'only
professional and competent' institution in
Pakistan—the military. is imbalance eventually
culminated in Pakistan's rst-ever military coup of
7thOctober, 1958, when Pakistan's then President
Iskander Mirza abrogated Pakistan's constitution and
declared martial law in the country.
Periods of military rules spread over decades led
Pakistan's Army to view itself as the nal arbiter of
"national interest." e military gave itself a
preponderant role in state affairs, while it continues to
exercise veto power over the nation's security, foreign,
and economic policies.
1971 marked a historic moment in Pakistan's history,
not only because East Pakistan had seceded and
formed the independent country of Bangladesh, but
also because Pakistan's military was at a historic nadir
in terms of public support and in uence. Pakistan's
new Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and
the kingpin of the party that had received the most
votes in West Pakistan in the 1970 elections, Zul kar
Ali Bhutto, thus had the perfect chance to cement
democratic control in the new and truncated country.
Although Bhutto did give Pakistan its constitution in
1973, he resorted to authoritarian rule that once again
damaged democracy, and led to the army regaining its
lost prestige. e straw that broke the camel's back,
however, was Bhutto's decision to rig the 1977
elections, which again enabled the military to

intervene once again in Pakistan's politics. us, Zia-
ul-Haq launched 'Operation Fairplay' on 5thJuly,
1977 that overthrew the Bhutto regime and installed
yet another military ruler at the helm.
Pakistan's military establishment has played a
dominant role in Pakistan since the 1977 coup. In
addition to the eleven years of direct, draconian rule
under the Zia regime, the establishment continued to
indirectly in uence the political process, especially
elections during the tumultuous 1990s. is included
the 'MehranBank' scandal of the early 1990s, as well as
the political maneuvering that led to Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif's resignation in 1993.
e country once again faced the specter of direct
military rule when Pervez Musharraf overthrew the
democratically elected government on 12th October
1999. He reigned until 2008, a period that coincided
with Pakistan's involvement in the War on Terror and
one that was marked by rapid economic growth.
Since 2008 democracy has returned to Pakistan but the
military's direct and indirect role in governance and
policymaking continues to dominate Pakistan's
political landscape. rough the past decade, the
military has dominated conversation on important
topics such as foreign policy and the overseeing of
military operations against radical out ts. At present,
the military has left the formal seat of power, but its
control over crucial policy domains continues to
undermine the authority of civilian governments.
e military in short remains an alternate and
autonomous center of in uence and power on issues
related to state affairs such as national security, foreign
policy, internal security and counter-terrorism. is
autonomy of the military in uences the consolidation
of democratic order in Pakistan.
Civil Military relations (2008-2018)
Pervez Musharraf's downfall in 2008 paved the way for
democratic transition in Pakistan, and following the
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outpour of support for the judiciary, it seemed
democracy was once again back on track. e decade
following Musharraf's ouster is, thus, a good period to
assess how Pakistan's civil-military relationship
developed and where this relationship now stands.
e PPP's tenure from 2008-2013 was marked bya
turbulent civil-military relationship. While the Asif Ali
Zardari-led government achieved some remarkable
democratic achievements, such as becoming the rst
democratically elected government to complete its
tenure, passing the eighteenth amendment, and
issuing the National Finance Commission (NFC)
award, its relationship with the military was thorny at
best.
Several factors contributed to this turbulent
relationship. e military continued to assert its
dominance rst by ensuring then Army Chief Ashfaq
Kayani gained an extension to his tenure, and then by
undertaking military operations against militants on
its own terms. ese operations did not forage into
North Waziristan, which subsequently led to the global
community, and especially Washington accusing
Pakistan of not taking on the Haqqani network, and
thus being disingenuous in its attempt to quash
militancy.
Tensions, however, reached their acme in 2011 when
the 'Memogate Scandal' rocked Pakistan's political
landscape. Following the American raid in Abbottabad
that killed Osama bin Laden (OBL) on the 2nd of May
2011, Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz revealed
that then Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, Hussain
Haqqani had allegedly approached him with a memo
that asked the American government to intervene and
protect Pakistan's democratic regime given the risk of a
coup.
e memo highlighted the rift between the civilian
government and the military in the fallout of the
American raid, and asserted that a military coup was
imminent in Pakistan. Ambassador
Haqqanisubsequently resigned, and the Supreme
An Intractable Challenge: Managing Civil Military Relations After e Election 2018
Court is still to conclude the matter.
e scandal in fact highlighted that Pakistan's civilian
government was still unable to assert itself on the
military. Differences in the response to the raid against
OBL, moreover, showed the government and the
military's inability to see eye to eye on security and
foreign policies. is tension would spillover to Nawaz
Sharif's government that took the helm in 2013, with
civilian and military institutions clashing over relations
with India and over the military operations taking
place in the country.
e PMLN years (2013-2018)
Civil-military tensionsstarted to plummet when the
PMLN government under Nawaz Sharif initiated a
special court to try former President Pervez Musharraf
for treason. A three-judge bench indicted the former
army chief in March of 2014 for abrogating Pakistan's
constitution and for declaring an emergency in
2007.Fundamentally, it re ected a desire by the
civilians to hold the military accountable and this trial
was very symbolic, because Musharraf had violated the
constitution not once but twice. Army leadership
reportedly resented the Musharraf case because the
military could not see its chief be tried for treason and
be punished particularly, as it was going to affect the
morale of the armed forces. Nawaz Sharif understood
this and despite warnings pursued the case to keep the
military in check. ere was a personal score to settle as
well since Musharraf had ousted and exiled Sharif.
e fall-out from the trial, and the behind-the-scenes
maneuvering to extricate Musharraf from facing
charges highlighted that the civilian government and
the establishment were heading towards a
confrontation. is inability to be on the same page
spilled over onto other policy domains as well,
especially with respect to relations with India and
Afghanistan, and in the military operation against the
Taliban the country launched in June 2014.
Musharraf, meanwhile, managed to avoid charges
against him, and ended up leaving the country
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reportedly for health treatment abroad.
PML-N was well aware of the animosity that existed
between Nawaz Sharif and the military. Sharif was
pressured to abandon his office in 1993by the armed
forces. In 1999, he tried to remove General Pervez
Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff for the Kargil
debacle. is attempt back red and resulted in a coup
d'état andSharif was jailed and later exiled. His last
stint in office was marred by civil-military tensions
throughout.Pakistan People's Party (PPP)that
assumed power three timeswas no stranger to this
phenomenon.
Sharif's government was destablized with three rounds
of 'dharna' (sit-in) led by Imran Khan who reportedly
enjoys the support of sections within the security
establishment. Sharif as arch rival of Benazir Bhutto in
the 1980s and 1990s played a similar role and therefore
the historic trend has continued.
Delaying action against militants for political/strategic
gains: Another strain in the civil-military relations
during Nawaz Sharif's tenure was that he delayed
giving the go-ahead for a full- edged military
operation in Punjab after the launch of Zarb-e-Azb.
Eventually, an operation had to be launched after the
March 2016 terror attack in Gulshan-i-Iqbal park in
Lahore.
Reportedly, the PML-N leadership had been delaying
the launch of an operation because they feared the
political backlash of such an endeavor, and they were
also politically dependent on some of the groups being
targeted. is led to tensions between the military and
Nawaz because here he became an obstacle between the
military and the consolidation of the gains they had
made against terrorists in operations in other parts of
the country.
Foreign & Security policies: Based on the experience of
the past decade, the civilian government and the
military have come to loggerheads over certain speci c
issues. ese are foreign policy endeavors-- particularly

when it comes to India and Afghanistan – military
operations within Pakistani territory and to deal with
the non-state actors active in the region. In fact, the
latter issue is what the infamous Dawn leaks – which
initiated the degradation of the incumbent
government's relationship with armed forces – was all
about. Apparently Nawaz Sharif, who was still PM
back then, had beseeched the military leadership to
abandon its 'good and bad terrorist' policy because it
was isolating Pakistan on the world stage. When the
contents of the meeting were reported, civil-military
relations took a nosedive.
Military's permanent interests are a reality that
needs to be acknowledged
A unique element of Pakistan's military lies in the fact
that it possesses extensive business and corporate
interests throughout the country. In 2016, for
instance, then Defence Minister KhawajaAsif revealed
to Parliament that there were around 50 entities that
were run by the military. ese include the Fauji
Foundation, the Shaheen and Bahria Foundations, the
Army Welfare Trust (AWT) and the Defence Housing
Authorities (DHA). e army also runs several
insurance and welfare trust organizations that allow it
to provide social security to its retired personnel.
Researchers have argued that the military requires
direct access to Pakistan's corridors of power primarily
because it wishes to protect and enhance its business
interests. e total (now dated) estimate of the
military's commercial holdings is around US$20
billion. e military's ability to augment its corporate
resources, moreover, stems from its ability to provide
welfare to the millions who join the armed forces, and
because of the army's narrative that it is a better
manager of organizations vis-à-vis civilian
organizations and the public sector. Following the
models of East Asian countries, this needs to be
regulated and should become the basis for a civil-
military dialogue.
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e structural issues are not going to change but an
environment of mutual mistrust and imbalance needs
to be recti ed.
Rebalancing power
With the general elections just around the corner, it is
important for the winning party to be on the same page
with military establishment while forming the
government at the center. What makes the situation
somewhat problematic is the de facto involvement of
the military in state affairs. Armed forces, according to
the Constitution,report to the elected executive. But
this has never really been the case in Pakistan.
If continued unaltered, this pattern is harmful for
Pakistan's international standing as a sovereign
country and its struggling democracy at the national
level. Nawaz Sharif, despite all his faults, had a valid
point in arguing that“you cannot run a country with
two or three parallel governments”.
To x the structural civil-military imbalance, the rst
and the foremost change must come from the
country's political elite itself. ey must stop using the
military against one another to improve their own
chances of forming the central government.
roughout the 1990s the PML-N and PPP ruthlessly
used the military establishment against one another.
Eventually, the leadership of both parties was forced
into exile. e Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and its
chairman, Imran Khan, would do well to learn from
history here, as they have used the same tactics since
the 2013 general elections.
e political elite must also make more of an effort to
make a meaningful connection with their constituents.
It will be more difficult for the military to have a role
outside constitutional/legal boundaries if the country's
citizens are politically astute and signi cantly consider
the power of their votes. When the political elite fails to
do this, it becomes easier for the military to steer its
narrative of an insecure polity cursed by corrupt
politicians necessitating a supra constitutional
An Intractable Challenge: Managing Civil Military Relations After e Election 2018
involvement in national affairs that ranges from de
facto control of policy making to direct takeover.
e Way Forward
It is absolutely essential that both the civilian and the
military establishments adopt a paradigm that brings
harmony to Pakistan's politics. For this to happen,
however, both sides must take concrete measures that
can uphold civilian supremacy, and through which
they can respect each other's mandates.
e rst step in this regard should be to activate and
strengthen the National Security Council (NSC) that
has remained, on balance, moribund since 2009. e
government must appoint a NSC adviser, and ensure
that the forum serves as a platform where civilian and
military leaders can engage in constructive and open
debate. e NSC must also be the rst avenue where
both sides can make recourse when an issue arises, and
both the civilian and the military sides must eschew
talking to the media on critical questions without rst
discussing matters in the NSC.
Tensions, however, will not subside without civilian
governments strengthening Parliament. It has become
commonplace for elected governments to circumvent
parliament on key issues, which has only eroded trust
and faith in democratic institutions. is tendency
must be jettisoned and instead, the government must
activate committees in both houses that focus on, and
deliberate important matters of national security. is
will lead to more parliamentary oversight on security-
related matters and will also lead to a more informed
debate in parliament on issues that plague the civil-
military relationship. is must then be followed by
think tanks operating in the Senate and in the National
Assembly that can help parliamentarians by releasing
reports and publishing articles on problems in
Pakistan's economic and security paradigms.
Pakistan's state institutions must also realize that it is
only through working together that they can rid the
country of the seemingly intractable problems it faces.
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us, it is absolutely essential that the civilian
government, the judiciary and the armed forces sit
together on the same platform and chalk-out ways that
bring harmony in the trilateral relationship. Former
Senate Chairman Raza Rabbani, in fact, suggested this
very idea, and it is important that other leaders pick up
this suggestion. A lot of problems in the turbulent
civil-militar y relationship stem from poor
communication and a lack of trust, which makes it all
the more necessary that the three pillars of the state
come together.
e Ministry of Defense and the armed forces must
also develop better means of disseminating
information. e present system of the Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) and the Ministry giving
separate press releases too often leads to contradicting
statements and it highlights a lack of coordination
between the civilian and military wings. is has also
often exacerbated tensions with the ISPR claiming one
thing, while the civilian side argued another.
e military on its part, must bring greater
transparency in the military operations it is
conducting. is is essential to build trust between
civil and military institutions. While a civil-led and
owned operation against militants will strengthen
Pakistan's global standing, and also bring credibility to
its claims of eradicating terrorism. is will naturally
involve a reduced role for paramilitary troops in
guaranteeing security in urban areas such as Quetta
and Karachi, and even in FATA.
For it remains a fact that the security challenges present
in these areas are the result of poor political decisions,
and it is only a healthy political process that can end the
violence which plagues these places. us, civilian
oversight is essential to ameliorate the security
concerns that exist in Balochistan, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and the rest of the country.
Both the executive and the military need to abandon
all ties with extremist groups, and the NAP needs to be
fully implemented. It is high time to realize that

militias pose a threat to Pakistani and foreign citizens,
and the Pakistani military and civilian leaderships'
alliances with them in the past have only been
damaging for the country. Not only will implementing
NAP make Pakistan safer, it will also bring the
executive and the military on the same page.
In short, the specific proposals are as follows:
Activate NSC and don't make it a hub of competition
and con ict
Activate parliamentary committees on national
security
Hire defence sector professionals in Ministry of
Defence and empower it as the civilian voice on
defence issues
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Pakistan Mapping the Policy Agenda 2018-2023
Enable Minister of Defence in management and policy
affairs of three services
Introduce a parliamentary committee on Intelligence.
DG-ISI should regularly brief parliamentary
committees
Set up think tanks within Senate and NA that assist
legislators with issue briefs and create informed debate
Build capacity within political parties for tackling
defence, security issues and foreign policy
Military should value civilian input into security policy
(on non-state actors, trade with India, etc.)