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IN BRIEF

Europe’s Response to the U.S.-UK-Australia


Submarine Deal: What to Know
By
Charles A. Kupchan, CFR Expert September 22, 2021 2:47 pm (EST)

AUKUS, a deal for the United States and United Kingdom to provide Australia
with submarines, has infuriated France at a time when transatlantic
coordination to deal with China’s rise is crucial.

Why has France reacted so strongly to AUKUS, and how serious is the
rift in the transatlantic relationship?

The rift is serious, as made clear by France’s decision to withdraw its ambassador to
Washington and by the French foreign minister calling the deal a “stab in the back.” The
two countries have just started to patch things up with a call between President Joe
Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron, and plans for the leaders to meet next
month.

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French officials are angry that they were effectively left in the dark about the AUKUS
deal, which scuttled their own contract to sell submarines to Australia. They contend,
not without justification, that such a lack of transparency is inappropriate among close
allies and represents a breach of trust. Paris is upset about the demise of its own
submarine deal with Canberra, which was worth more than $60 billion; the cancellation
of the contract will cost France jobs and revenue.

The episode has tapped into France’s Gaullist sentiment, a political tradition that looks
to a strong French state to resist subordination to other nations. (In 1966, President
Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO’s) military structure to regain “the full exercise of her sovereignty.”) As
President Emmanuel Macron positions himself to run for reelection next year, this
Gaullist tradition could prompt him to react with particular pique to the AUKUS deal.
And the fracas comes on the heels of NATO’s messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, which
prompted many alliance members to complain about insufficient consultation between
Washington and its partners.

Could it weaken NATO or accelerate European Union (EU) efforts to


strengthen the bloc’s common defense policy?

While it is unlikely to pose any operational challenges for NATO, the fallout from the
AUKUS deal is already fueling stronger calls for the EU to move toward what France
calls “strategic autonomy”—a Europe that is a more capable geopolitical actor and thus
less dependent on the United States for its security. The appeal of strategic autonomy
grew during the presidency of Donald Trump, whose America First approach to foreign
policy led many Europeans to question Washington’s reliability and its commitment to
European security. President Joe Biden’s arrival in the Oval Office led to a quick repair
of the transatlantic bond, but the bumpy exit from Afghanistan and the fallout from the
AUKUS deal are bringing the debate over the EU’s defense aspirations back into focus.

U.S. President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron speak at the June 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium.
Dursun
Aydemir/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

For now, the debate is more theoretical than practical. Europe needs to acquire greater
military capability and a firmer common security policy before it can achieve strategic
autonomy. Also, most European members of NATO prefer a strong transatlantic link
over a more independent EU. Mainstream thinking in Europe could be characterized as:
A strong transatlantic security partnership if possible, strategic autonomy for Europe if
necessary. For now, Europe would be wise to get on with the hard work of acquiring
more military capability. Doing so is likely to strengthen transatlantic ties by enabling
Europe to become a more capable partner to the United States.
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Europe’s Global Gateway Plans To Counter China, But Questions Remain

Charles A. Kupchan
The Atlantic Alliance After Afghanistan

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Does the diplomatic blowback undermine U.S. efforts to work with


the EU on countering China?

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The AUKUS deal is part of a broader U.S. effort to balance against growing Chinese
power and ambition. Australia’s acquisition of highly capable submarines advances that
effort. At the same time, the Biden administration has made clear that it wants to forge
a united front of democracies to deal with China across the board—on security, trade,
technology, and human rights. The AUKUS deal, even while getting more maritime
capability in the hands of an ally, has produced a diplomatic setback to advancing
transatlantic unity. It is one step forward, one step back.
Furthermore, especially in the aftermath of Brexit, striking a deal that involves the
United Kingdom (UK) but not France or any other EU members has troubling optics. It
makes sense to encourage London to deliver on its promises of a post-Brexit “Global
Britain.” But might there have been a way to build a package that involved not just the
UK, but also France and other EU members? The military and diplomatic elements of
U.S. strategy toward China should be more fully integrated.

What does this say about Washington’s communication with allies?


Are there ways for Biden to mend relations or concessions he could
make to France?

Communication with France was not what it should have been. Washington should seek
to repair relations with Paris by looking for ways to bring France, and Europe more
broadly, into its Indo-Pacific strategy. That could entail participation by France, other
EU members, and the EU collectively in military, diplomatic, and trade initiatives
regarding the Indo-Pacific.

The United States and its European allies might not see eye-to-eye on all aspects of
policy toward China. But there is a great deal of commonality, and Washington should
bend over backward to sustain the integrity of the transatlantic bond and to forge a
united front of democracies to deal with the rise of China.

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