Table of Contents

KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW/UNLAWFUL DETAINER.....................................................................5

1. Catedrilla v. Lauron 696 SCRA 341 ABES, Nestor Jr. P...........................................................................5
2. Go v. Looyuko 700 SCRA 313 BACQUIAN, Stenard P.............................................................................5
3. Coderias v. Estate of Chico 699 SCRA 684 BALAGEO, Arvin T...............................................................5
HIERARCHY OF COURTS/QUO WARRANTO..................................................................................................5
4. De Castro v. Carlos 696 SCRA 400 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D............................................................5
5. Rosario v. De Guzman 701 SCRA 78 CADAP, Jefferson B.......................................................................5
SUMMONS..................................................................................................................................................5
6. Macasaet v. Co 697 SCRA 187 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.................................................................5
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.............................................................................................................................5
7. Hing v. Choachuy 699 SCRA 667 CADAP, Jefferson B............................................................................5
ACTIONS/CAUSE OF ACTION/CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING/CERTIORARI...........................5
8. Film Dev. Council v. SM Prime 695 SCRA 175 CALABIAS, Lesther G......................................................5
9. Ingles v. Estrada 695 SCRA 285******** CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S....................................................5
10. Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian 695 SCRA 345 Dally, Sheryl G...........................................................5
11. Heirs of Gallardo v. Soliman 695 SCRA 453 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A.................................................5
12. League of Provinces v. DENR 696 SCRA 190 DULAY, May Anne P.......................................................5
13. Garcia v. Drilon 699 SCRA 352 ESTRADA, April P................................................................................5
14. Cathay Pacific v. Reyes 699 SCRA 725 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D............................................................5
APPEALS/DOCKET FEES/CERTIORARI/MODES OF DISCOVERY.....................................................................5
15. Int’l Hotel Corp. v. Joaquin Jr. 695 SCRA 382 FORONDA, Fraulein G...................................................5
16. Boardwalk Bus. v. Villareal Jr. 695 SCRA 468 Ganggangan, Delia U....................................................5
17. Sandoval Shipyards v. PMMA 695 SCRA 560 GAWON, Gina P............................................................5
18. Adalim v. Talinas 695 SCRA 648 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C.......................................................................5
19. Royal Plant v. Coca-Cola 696 SCRA 357 KONNEK, Camille L................................................................5
20. Surigao Elec. Coop v. Gonzaga 698 SCRA 103 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A......................................................5
21. Cortes v. Officce of Ombudsman 698 SCRA 129 LAPAS, Jenelyn T......................................................5
22. Maslag v. Monzon 698 SCRA 584 LEYGO, Vanessa A..........................................................................5
23. Go v. BPI Finance 700 SCRA 125 LIPAGO, Julienne Joy C....................................................................5
24. Poseidon Int’l v. Tamala 700 SCRA 1 Nay-ud, Janice D.......................................................................5
25. POTC v. Africa 700 SCRA 453 OCTUBRE, Excel D................................................................................5
 26. Pasos v. PNCC 700 SCRA 608 PARILLO, Warren D...............................................................................5
27. Esguerra v. United Phil. 700 SCRA 687 PECSOY, Ana N.......................................................................5
28. Heirs of N. Miranda v. Miranda 700 SCRA 746 POLINNEY, Reverita B................................................5
29. Heirs of Numeriano v. Miranda 700 SCRA 747 ROSARIO, Leah L........................................................5
30. Eagleridge v. Cameron Granville 695 SCRA 714 TABUZO, Mae Abegail I............................................5
31. Special Audit Team-COA v. CA 696 SCRA 496 VARGAS, Eunice K........................................................5
32. Alcantara v. COMELEC 696 SCRA 547 ABES, Nestor Jr. P.....................................................................5
33. A-IPRA v. COMELEC 696 SCRA 563 BACQUIAN, Stenard P..................................................................5
34. Chu v. Caparas 696 SCRA 324 BALAGEO, Arvin T................................................................................5
35. Almagro v. Amaya 699 SCRA 61 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.............................................................5
36. Century Iron v. Banas 699 SCRA 157 CADAP, Jefferson B...................................................................5
37. BCDA v. Reyes 699 SCRA 217 CALABIAS, Lesther G............................................................................5
38. Natividad v. Mariano 697 SCRA 63 CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S............................................................5
39. Republic v. Bayao 697 SCRA 313 Dally, Sheryl G.................................................................................5
40. Phil. Transmarine v. Legaspi 698 SCRA 280 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A.................................................5
41. Reblora v. AFP 698 SCRA 727 DULAY, May Anne P..............................................................................5
42. Boston Equity v. CA 699 SCRA 16****** ESTRADA, April P................................................................5
43. Reyes v. COMELEC 699 SCRA 522 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D...................................................................5
44. Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz 701 SCRA 682 FORONDA, Fraulein G..................................................5
45. BPI v. Sarabia Manor 702 SCRA 432 Ganggangan, Delia U.................................................................5
46. Philippine Marine Agency v. Cabanban 702 SCRA 467 GAWON, Gina P.............................................5
47. Firaza Sr. v. Ugay 695 SCRA 26 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C.........................................................................5
48. Dycoco v. CA 702 SCRA 566 KONNEK, Camille L.................................................................................5
JURISDICTION..............................................................................................................................................5
49. Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman 695 SCRA 35 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A..........................................5
50. Pat-og v. CSC 697 SCRA 567 LAPAS, Jenelyn T.....................................................................................5
PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE/VERIFICATION..................................................................................................5
51. Galvez v. Court of Appeals 695 SCRA 10 Nay-ud, Janice D.................................................................5
52. Raymundo v. LBP 695 SCRA 152 OCTUBRE, Excel D...........................................................................5
53. Reinier Pacific v. Guevarra 699 SCRA 1 PARILLO, Warren D................................................................5
54. Swedish Match v. The Treas. o City of Manila 700 SCRA 428 PECSOY, Ana N.....................................5
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION/PROVISIONAL REMEDIES.................................................................................6
55. Solid Builders v. China Banking 695 SCRA 101 POLINNEY, Reverita B.................................................6
 56. Sime Darby v. Mendoza 699 SCRA 290 ROSARIO, Leah L...................................................................6
57. Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez 700 SCRA 399 TABUZO, Mae Abegail I.................................6
58. Province of Cagayan v. Lara 702 SCRA 183 VARGAS, Eunice K............................................................6
WRIT OF POSSESSION/SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS............................................................................................6
59. Tolosa v. United Coconut 695 SCRA 138 ABES, Nestor Jr. P................................................................6
60. Dalangin v. Perez 695 SCRA 86 BACQUIAN, Stenard P........................................................................6
61. Ampatuan v. De Lima 695 SCRA 159 BALAGEO, Arvin T.....................................................................6
62. Darcen v. V.R. Gonzales 695 SCRA 207 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D..................................................6
63. Alcantara v. COMELEC 696 SCRA 547 CADAP, Jefferson B..................................................................6
64. Lim v. DBP 700 SCRA 210 CALABIAS, Lesther G..................................................................................6
SUMMARY PROCEDURE/EJECTMENT..........................................................................................................6
65. Republic v. Narceda 695 SCRA 483 CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S............................................................6
66. Rivera-Calingasan v. Rivera 696 SCRA 613 Dally, Sheryl G..................................................................6
67. Manila Electric v. Heirs of Deloy 697 SCRA 486 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A..........................................6
68. PTA v. Sabandal- 701 SCRA 517 DULAY, May Anne P...........................................................................6
RULE OF CASUS OMISSUS............................................................................................................................7
69. Chavez v. JBC 696 SCRA 496 ESTRADA, April P....................................................................................7
FORUM SHOPPING......................................................................................................................................7
70. Encinas v. Agustin Jr. 696 SCRA 240 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D................................................................7
71. Silverio v. Marcelo 696 SCRA 694 FORONDA, Fraulein G....................................................................7
72. Kapisanang… v. Barreno 698 SCRA 79 Ganggangan, Delia U..............................................................7
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS........................................................................................................................7
73. Berenguer-Landers v. Florin 696 SCRA 589 GAWON, Gina P..................................................................7
74. RCBC v. Serra 701 SCRA 124 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C............................................................................7
TAXPAYER’S SUIT..........................................................................................................................................7
75. LBP v. Cacayuran 696 SCRA 861 KONNEK, Camille L...........................................................................7
EMINENT DOMAIN......................................................................................................................................7
76. Republic v. Samson-Tatad 696 SCRA 809 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A.............................................................7
77. LBP v. Gonzales 698 SCRA 400 LAPAS, Jenelyn T................................................................................7
78. NPC v. Cruz 702 SCRA 359 LEYGO, Vanessa A.....................................................................................7
PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS/LACHES/RES JUDICATA/LAW OF THE CASE.........................7
79. In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election of IBP 696 SCRA 8 LIPAGO, Julienne Joy
C..............................................................................................................................................................7
 80. Natividad v. Mariano 697 SCRA 63 Nay-ud, Janice D..........................................................................7
81. Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte 698 SCRA 294 OCTUBRE, Excel D..................................................................7
82. Abrigo v. Flores 698 SCRA 559 PARILLO, Warren D.............................................................................7
83. BCDA v. Reyes 699 SCRA 217 PECSOY, Ana N.....................................................................................7
84. Sy v. Young 699 SCRA 8 POLINNEY, Reverita B....................................................................................7
85. PNB v. Maranon 700 SCRA 297 ROSARIO, Leah L...............................................................................7
86. Polymer Rubber v. Salamuding 702 SCRA 153 TABUZO, Mae Abegail I..............................................7
JUDICIAL NOTICE.........................................................................................................................................7
87. Chingkoe v. Chingkoe 696 SCRA 729 VARGAS, Eunice K.....................................................................7
WRIT OF EXECUTION/EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL...............................................................................8
88. Green Acres v. Cabral 697 SCRA 266 ABES, Nestor Jr. P......................................................................8
89. Pia v. Gervacio Jr. 697 SCRA 220 BACQUIAN, Stenard P......................................................................8
90. Abrigo v. Flores 698 SCRA 559 BALAGEO, Arvin T...............................................................................8
SUPPORT/SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE............................................................................................................8
91. Lim-Lua v. Lua 697 SCRA 237 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.................................................................8
REPLEVIN.....................................................................................................................................................8
92. Agner v. BPI 697 SCRA 89 CADAP, Jefferson B....................................................................................8
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION...........................................................................................................................8
93. Metro Manila v. Toledo 697 SCRA 425 CALABIAS, Lesther G..............................................................8
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT............................................................................................................................8
94. Natividad v. Mariano 697 SCRA 63 CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S............................................................8
MANDAMUS................................................................................................................................................8
95. Priv’n and Management v. Strategic Alliance… 698 SCRA 517 Dally, Sheryl G....................................8
PROCEDURAL RULES AND TECHNICALITIES.................................................................................................8
96. Oriental Ship v. Nazal 697 SCRA 51 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A.............................................................8
97. Sy v. Local Gov’t of QC 697 SCRA 621 DULAY, May Anne P.................................................................8
INDIRECT CONTEMPT..................................................................................................................................8
98. Philworth Asis v. PCIB 697 SCRA 206 ESTRADA, April P......................................................................8
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION................................................................................................................8
99. Rep. Gas v. Petron 698 SCRA 666 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D...................................................................8
ATTACHMENT..............................................................................................................................................8
100. Lim Jr. v. Lazaro 700 SCRA 547 FORONDA, Fraulein G......................................................................8
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES..........................................................................................................................8
 101. Re Letter-Complaint of Fabiana against Justice Reyes 700 SCRA 348 Ganggangan, Delia U.............8
102. Nat’l Artist v. Exec. Sec 701 SCRA 269 GAWON, Gina P....................................................................9
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES..............................................................................................................................9
103. PNP Directorate 702 SCRA 496 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C......................................................................9
JUST COMPENSATION..................................................................................................................................9
104. LBP v. American Rubber 702 SCRA 166 KONNEK, Camille L.............................................................9
105. Sec. of DPWH v. Tecson 700 SCRA 243 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A..............................................................9
RECEIVERSHIP..............................................................................................................................................9
106. Tantano v. Espina-Caboverde 702 SCRA 508 LAPAS, Jenelyn T.........................................................9
107. Lim v. DBP 700 SCRA 210 LEYGO, Vanessa A....................................................................................9
WRIT OF POSSESSION..................................................................................................................................9
108. Nagtalon v. UCPB 702 SCRA 615 LIPAGO, Julienne Joy C..................................................................9

KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW/UNLAWFUL DETAINER

1. Catedrilla v. Lauron 696 SCRA 341 ABES, Nestor Jr. P.
2. Go v. Looyuko 700 SCRA 313 BACQUIAN, Stenard P.
FACTS:

Alberto T. Looyuko and Jimmy Go, brother of petitioner William Go,

were partners in a business called Noah's Ark Group of Companies (Noah's
Ark). Their partnership was embodied in a written agreement, dated
February 9, 1982.

William was appointed Chief of Staff of Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery

sometime in 1986. He was allowed by Looyuko to occupy the townhouse in
Gilmore Townhomes, Granada Street, Quezon City.

Some ten years after, Looyuko demanded that William vacate the
townhouse. Jimmy filed an adverse claim over the property, annotating his
interest on the title as co-owner. He claimed that the townhouse was
bought using funds from Noah's Ark and,
hence, part of the property of the partnership.

William refused to vacate the property relying on the strength of his

brother's adverse claim.

Looyuko then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against William

before the MeTC. He adduced as evidence the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in his name as well as the aforementioned demand letter. He
alleged that William's occupation was merely by tolerance, on the
understanding that he should vacate the property upon demand.

On the other hand, William presented the partnership agreements,

the contract to sell of the subject property to Noah's Ark, and the cash
voucher evidencing payment for the acquisition of the property.

The MeTC favored Looyuko, while the RTC ruled in favor of William.

The CA, however, reversed the Quezon City RTC orders and directed
the immediate execution of the MTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the issue of ownership should first be resolved before an

ejectment case can proceed.
RULING:

Yes. The Court agrees with William that the issue of ownership
should be ruled upon considering that such has been raised and it appears
that it is inextricably linked to the question of possession. Its resolution will
then boil down to which of the parties’ respective evidence deserves more
weight. Granting that all the pieces of documentary evidence presented by
William are valid, they will fail to bolster his case. A person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to its possession. The title to the
property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially
in a mere action for unlawful detainer. The TCT of Looyuko is, therefore,
evidence of indefeasible title over the property and, as its holder; he is
entitled to its possession as a matter of right. The documentary evidence
presented by William are not enough to offset Looyuko’s right as registered
owner.

3. Coderias v. Estate of Chico 699 SCRA 684 BALAGEO, Arvin T.

Case: The Court cannot sanction the use of force to evict
beneficiaries of land reform. Eviction using force is reversion to
the feudal system, where the landed elite have free rein over their
poor vassals. In effect, might is right.

Facts:
The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare
farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the farm). As tiller of the
farm,5 petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.6 In 1980, individuals
connected with Chioco – who was a former Governor of Nueva
Ecija – threatened to kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His
standing crops (corn and vegetables) and house were bulldozed.
For fear of his life, petitioner, together with his family, left the
farm.7
In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner and his family
re-established themselves on the farm.8

On March 9, 19959 petitioner filed with the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija a Petition10 against respondent Chioco’s estate praying that
his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected; that the
corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between them be
executed; that he be awarded actual damages for the destruction
of his house, his standing crops, unrealized harvest from 1980 up
to 1993, attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. 11 Respondent
moved to dismiss12 the Petition, contending that petitioner’s
cause of action has prescribed under Section 38 13 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3844,14 as amended, since the alleged dispossession took
place in 1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond
the statutory three-year period for filing such claims. Petitioner
filed an opposition15 arguing that his tenure/tillage should be
deemed uninterrupted since his departure was due to threats
made by Chioco’s henchmen; thus, the three-year prescriptive
period should not be applied to his case.

Ruling of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)

The PARAD issued a Decision 16 dismissing the Petition on the
ground of prescription. It adopted respondent’s argument, adding
that although petitioner was forcibly evicted from the farm, he
was not without remedy under the law to assert his rights. Yet, he
filed the Petition only after 14 years, or in 1995. He is thus guilty
of laches and is deemed to have abandoned his rights and
privileges under the agrarian laws.

Ruling of the DARAB

Petitioner appealed17The appealed decision is hereby set
aside. A new judgment is entered Ordering the Respondent-
Appellee to respect and maintain the Petitioner-Appellant in his
peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding;
and Ordering the Respondent-Appellee to reimburse Raymundo
Coderias of the money equivalent representing the latter’s
unrealized harvest from 1980 to 1993 or if he has not been
allowed to re-enter up to the time this decision is rendered then
his share from the harvest should be computed from 1980 to the
present, and ordering the MARO of the municipality to assist the
parties in the computation thereof.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 The CA SET ASIDE DARAB’s decision. It held that
undoubtedly, a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and
petitioner under RA 3844.24Nevertheless, it found that petitioner’s
action had prescribed, in that the complained acts occurred in
1980 but petitioner filed only in 1995, or beyond the three-year
prescriptive period under Section 38 of RA 3844. The CA held that
this delayed action by petitioner amounts to laches as well.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in setting aside the
decision of DARAB, thereby making petitoner’s contention
untenable due to prescription.

Our Ruling: The Court grants the Petition.

It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been
placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is also undisputed that a
tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a
CLT had been issued in favor of the petitioner; thus, petitioner
already had an expectant right to the farm. 31 A CLT serves as "a
provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot
owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long
as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. This certificate
proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily
devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the
tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling." 32 Since the farm
is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the
land reform law,33Chioco had no right to evict petitioner and enter
the property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that
petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed.

To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of

R.A. No. 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation
shall not be extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. With unyielding consistency,
we have held that transactions involving the agricultural land over
which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of
ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession, will
not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given
protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against
the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest.

In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of

security of tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the
relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for
causes provided by law. Security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation
of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold
relationship can take place only for causes provided by law.

The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this

juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and Chioco, which
the latter is bound to respect.

Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold

relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following
three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment of the landholding
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary
surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written
notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3)
absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x
x." None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner
cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be
recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property
through threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his
crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and
returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two years
after, or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition.

Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "an

action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be
barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of
action accrued." In this case, we deem it proper to reckon
petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his
knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he
was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as
the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb existed,
petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the
recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation
ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a case to
assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws
within the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as
enumerated above, include the right to security of tenure, to
continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration
of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons,
the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well as the right to
redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.

Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after Chioco

passed away for his life and the lives of members of his family are
not worth gambling for a piece of land. The bulldozing of his
house – his castle – is only an example of the fate that could befall
them. Under the circumstances, it is therefore understandable
that instead of fighting for the farm, petitioner opted to leave and
keep his family safe. Any man who cherishes his family more than
the most valuable material thing in his life would have done the
same.

Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the

will, and so long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of his free
will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to them,
and harvest them. He could not file an agrarian case against
Chioco, for that meant having to return to Nueva Ecija. He could
not file the case anywhere else; any other agrarian tribunal or
agency would have declined to exercise jurisdiction.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to

promote economic and social stability. Being a social legislation, it
must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its
clear intent, which is ‘to achieve a dignified existence for the
small farmers’ and to make them ‘more independent, self-reliant
and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our
democratic society’.37

We have ruled time and again that litigants should have the
amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their
cause – free, as much as possible, from the constraints of
procedural technicalities. In the interest of its equity jurisdiction,
the Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be
resolved on its merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not
defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the
Rules liberally to resolve substantial issues raised by the parties.

Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to

emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the soil. P.D.
No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with
mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated
and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to
ensure the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by
the beneficiary of the land that he tills which would certainly not
be possible where the former owner is allowed to reacquire the
land at any time following the award – in contravention of the
government’s objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil.43

HIERARCHY OF COURTS/QUO WARRANTO

4. De Castro v. Carlos 696 SCRA 400 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.
5. Rosario v. De Guzman 701 SCRA 78 CADAP, Jefferson B.
Facts:
In August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman)
engaged the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense
counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for
annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of
land in Parañaque City. Petitioner's legal services commenced from the RTC and ended
up in this Supreme Court.
Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the
case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident.
Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-
Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman
(respondents).
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees before
the RTC. He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased
Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if
the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he
had successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for
payment of the contracted attorney's fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an
amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land on the basis of
quantum meruit.
On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioner's
motion on the ground that it was filed out of time.
RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject
case, as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and executory on October 31,
2007. The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had already
lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be amended or
corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the
judgment rendered if his claim for attorney's fees would still be included.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Did the trial court commit a reversible error in denying the motion to determine
attorney's fees on the ground that it lost jurisdiction over the case since the judgment in
the case has become final and executory?
Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED
The Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court because of the denial of his motion to determine attorney's fees
by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition
for review under Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
because this case involves an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
Petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to this
Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. In this
case, petitioner should have first elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which
has concurrent jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions for
certiorari.[10] Even so, this principle is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions,
such as in this case, when it is demanded by... the broader interest of justice.
SUMMONS
6. Macasaet v. Co 697 SCRA 187 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

7. Hing v. Choachuy 699 SCRA 667 CADAP, Jefferson B.
FACTS:
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer
for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak,
City of Mandaue, Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development &
Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of
petitioners; that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear
Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case
No. MAN-5125; that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to petitioners' property; that the court, in that case, denied
Aldo's application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations; that,
in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally
set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners' property; that respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners' on-going
construction; and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners' right to privacy. Thus,
petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the
video surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of
petitioners' construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are
mere stockholders.

ISSUE: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

HELD:
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the
legal right of the former."

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance
cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another
case. During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill
testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he
immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, and thus, he reported
the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
respondents before the RTC. He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already
been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries
of their respective properties. With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that
respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

ACTIONS/CAUSE OF ACTION/CERTIFICATION AGAINST

FORUM SHOPPING/CERTIORARI
8. Film Dev. Council v. SM Prime 695 SCRA 175 CALABIAS, Lesther G.
Facts:

On June 7, 2002, Congress approved R.A. No. 9167 which created the Film
Development Council of the Philippines, herein petitioner. Petitioner’s mandate includes the
development and implementation of an incentive and reward system for the producers based on
merit to encourage the production of quality films. The Cinema Evaluation Board (CEB) was
established to review and grade films in accordance with criteria and standards and procedures
it shall formulate subject to the approval of petitioner.

On January 27, 2009, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sent a
demand letter to respondent for the payment of the sum of P76,836,807.08 representing the
amusement tax rewards due to producers of 89 films graded “A” and “B” which were shown at
SM cinemas from September 11, 2003 to November 4, 2008.

Sometime in May 2009, the City of Cebu filed in the RTC of Cebu City a petition for
declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529.

On October 16, 2009, petitioner sued the respondent for the payment of P76,836,807.08
representing the unpaid amusement tax incentive reward. Said collection suit was docketed as
Civil Case No. 72238 of the RTC of Pasig City.

Respondent filed its Reply to petitioner’s Comment maintaining that its remittance of the
amusement tax incentive reward to the City of Cebu extinguished its obligation to petitioner, and
arguing that the case should be dismissed on the additional ground of litis pendentia.

On February 21, 2011, the Pasig City RTC issued the assailed order granting the motion
to dismiss, holding that the action before the Cebu City RTC (Civil Case No. CEB-35529) is the
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties in Civil Case No. 72238.
Moreover, said court found all the elements of litis pendentia present and accordingly dismissed
the complaint. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pasig city erred in dismissing the complaint in civil case no. 72238 on the
ground of litis pendentia.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

In a direct recourse, petitioner advances the questions of law: The court does not
subscribe to petitioner’s view that the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 72238
amounts to an abdication of the Pasig City RTC’s concurrent jurisdiction to settle constitutional
questions involving a statute or its implementing rules. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides for specific grounds for the dismissal of any complaint in civil cases
including those where the trial court has competence and authority to hear and decide the
issues raised and relief sought. One of these grounds is litis pendentia.

Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits and
authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.

9. Ingles v. Estrada 695 SCRA 285******** CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S.

10. Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian 695 SCRA 345 Dally, Sheryl G.

FACTS:

The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina, during their lifetime,
bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian two parcels of land on
installment.

Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs––whose names do not appear
on the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of
them––refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late
parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina
passed away.

Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the

lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, namely:
Norman S. Mesina (Norman), Victor S. Mesina (Victor), Maria Divina S. Mesina
(Maria) and Lorna Mesina-Barte (Lorna).
 Thus, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna,
filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court
against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the
representative of the Heirs of Fian.

Thereafter, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint,

arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and that the case should be
dismissed for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

She claims that the "Heirs of Mesina" could not be considered as a juridical
person or entity authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither could the "Heirs of
Fian" be made as defendant, not being a juridical person as well. She added that
since the names of all the heirs of the late spouses Mesina and spouses Fian were
not individually named, the complaint is infirmed, warranting its dismissal.

Petitioners filed their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

Finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the RTC, granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint, ruling that the Rules of Court is explicit that only natural
or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Also, nowhere in the complaint are the Heirs of Fian individually named.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order of the RTC. The next day,
respondent Theresa filed her Vehement Opposition to the motion for
reconsideration.

The RTC issued its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.

In affirming the RTC, the CA, rendered its Decision, ruling that all the heirs
of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in
the complaint. The CA further held that the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint
for being improperly verified.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
 1) Whether the RTC is correct in dismissing the case on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action.

2) Whether the petitioners have substantially complied with the rule on

verification and certification against forum shopping.

RULING:

1)
No, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is not
proper. What the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman
Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a
reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall
mean dismissal of the complaint. The law provides that failure to state a
cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states
a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The
correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said right.

By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of

action, it can be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not
fall under any of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to
state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable party.

Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary

party or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable
party, on the other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiff or defendant. As such, this is properly a non-joinder of
indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the
complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action.

Having settled under jurisprudence that the non-joinder of

indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned.
 If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.

Therefore, petitioner Norman Mesina is ORDERED to implead all the

Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants in said civil case within thirty (30)
days from notice of finality of this Decision. Failure on the part of petitioner
Mesina to comply with this directive shall result in the dismissal of Civil
Case. Upon compliance by petitioner Mesina with this directive, the RTC, is
ORDERED to undertake appropriate steps and proceedings to expedite
adjudication of the case.

2)

Yes, because Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that

except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need
not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
on authentic records.

In this case both the RTC and the CA found said verification
defective, since the phrase "or based on authentic records," as indicated
under the second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 7 as afore-quoted, was omitted.

However, the Supreme Court stated otherwise. The verification of the

complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic records" does
not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the
disjunctive word "or." The word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative. As such, "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" need not
concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately.

Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of

procedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended
to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith
or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when
circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
 compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served."

Wherefore, this petition is granted.

11. Heirs of Gallardo v. Soliman 695 SCRA 453 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A.
12. League of Provinces v. DENR 696 SCRA 190 DULAY, May Anne P.
13. Garcia v. Drilon 699 SCRA 352 ESTRADA, April P.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.”
She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner
failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said
TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not
be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner
no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise
in futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted
product of an invalid law.” The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of
the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue
of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial
court constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction about
the case.

HELD: Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction,
 inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not
be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.

14. Cathay Pacific v. Reyes 699 SCRA 725 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D.

APPEALS/DOCKET FEES/CERTIORARI/MODES OF
DISCOVERY
15. Int’l Hotel Corp. v. Joaquin Jr. 695 SCRA 382 FORONDA, Fraulein G.
16. Boardwalk Bus. v. Villareal Jr. 695 SCRA 468 Ganggangan, Delia U.
Facts:
Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) filed a complaint
for replevin against Elvira Villareal (Villareal) covering a 1995 Toyota
Tamaraw FX for the latter’s alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained
from the former.
The MTC ruled in favor of Boardwalk. Villareal moved for
reconsideration but failed thus she appealed to Manila RTC. RTC
reversed the decision and directed Boardwalk to deliver the vehicle to
Villareal or its value.
Boardwalk filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied
by the RTC in a December 14,2006 Order, which Boardwalk received
on January 19,2007. On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying that it be
granted 30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review.
It paid the docket and other legal fees at the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Manila RTC. On even date, Boardwalk also filed a Notice
of Appeal with the RTC which the said court denied for being a wrong
mode of appeal.
On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail its Petition for
Review with the CA.
CA dismissed the Petition for Review. It held that Boardwalk erred in
filing its Motion for Extension and paying the dockets fees with the
RTC. It should have been done so with the CA pursuant to Sec. 125 of
Rule 42.Also, the 30 day extension wa irregular because the maximum
period that may be granted is 15 days pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42.
Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration invoking liberal construction of the rules
in its favor.

Issue:
 Whether Boardwalk is justified in invoking the liberal construction of
the rules to affect substantial justice in accordance with the law?

Ruling:
No. The case is not unique and there is no compelling reason to
accord it the privilege it seeks.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court.
The Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of
appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged
dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater
fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of
appellants.
In this case, petitioner must comply with the requirements laid down
in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

17. Sandoval Shipyards v. PMMA 695 SCRA 560 GAWON, Gina P.

FACTS:

Respondent entered into a Ship Building Contract with Sandoval

Shipyards, Inc. through the latter's agent, Rimport Industries, Inc.,
herein petitioners, for the construction of two lifeboats. Respondent
paid the agreed purchase price. However, upon inspection, it was
found out that the agreed specifications for the lifeboats were not
complied with. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for Rescission of
Contract with Damages against petitioners before the RTC. The RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, petitioners filed an ordinary
appeal to the CA via Rule 41. The CA ruled that petitioners indeed
committed a clear substantial breach of the contract, which warranted
its rescission. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this Rule 45
Petition before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners filed the proper petition

RULING:
 NO. In a Rule 45 Petition, parties may only raise questions of
law, because this Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, this court will
not review findings of fact of lower courts, unless the case falls under
any of the following recognized exceptions:(1) When the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;(4) When
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;(7) When
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.

The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was
different from the one who received the evidence is not one of the
exceptions that warrant a factual review of the case. Petitioners
cannot carve out an exception when there is none. The petition for
review on certiorari is denied.

18. Adalim v. Talinas 695 SCRA 648 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C.

19. Royal Plant v. Coca-Cola 696 SCRA 357 KONNEK, Camille L.
20. Surigao Elec. Coop v. Gonzaga 698 SCRA 103 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A.

FACTS:
Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) hired
Gonzaga as its lineman, he was assigned as Temporary Teller at
SURNECO’s sub-office in Gigaquit,
Surigao Del Norte. Danny Escalante (Escalante), General Manager of S
URNECO, issued a Memorandum Order with attached report of
SURNECO’s Internal Auditor, Pedro Denolos (Collection Report) and two
(2) sets of summaries of collections and remittances (Summaries),
seeking an explanation from Gonzaga regarding his remittance
shortages in the total amount of P314,252.23, covering the period from
February 2000 to May 2001.
 On July 16, 2001, Gonzaga asked for an extension of three (3)
weeks within which to submit his explanation since he needed to go
over the voluminous receipts of collections and remittances with the
assistance of an accountant. On the same day, he sent another letter,
denying any unremitted amount on his part and thereby,
requesting that the charges against him be lifted. SURNECO formed an
Investigation Committee (Committee) to investigate Gonzaga’s alleged
remittance shortages. the Committee sent Gonzaga an invitation to
attend the investigation proceedings, in which he participated. Pending
investigation, Gonzaga was placed under preventive suspension.

Thereafter, a notice of termination was served on Gonzaga. Gonzaga

sought reconsideration before SURNECO’s Board of Directors but the
latter denied the same after he presented his case. On October 25,
2001, another notice of termination (Final Notice of Termination) was
served on Gonzaga. Consequently, he was dismissed from the service.
The Labor Arbiter found that Gonzaga was dismissed illegally, the
NLRC reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter. On Appeal, the CA,
it reversed and set aside the rulings of the NLRC, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is illegal dismissal.

HELD:
YES, The Court concurs with the NLRC’s finding that petitioners
evidence –which consists of the Collection Report, the Summaries, and
the September 15, 2003 Audit Report with attached Cash Flow
Summary adequately supports the conclusion that Gonzaga
misappropriated the funds of the cooperative. The data indicated
therein show gaping discrepancies between Gonzaga’s collections and
remittances, of which he was accountable for. In this accord, the
burden of evidence shifted to Gonzaga to prove that the reflected
shortage was not attributable to him. However, despite being allowed
to peruse the bills and receipts on record together with the assistance
of an accountant and a counsel during the investigation proceedings,
Gonzaga could not reconcile the amounts of his collections and
remittances and, instead, merely interposed bare and general denials.
21. Cortes v. Officce of Ombudsman 698 SCRA 129 LAPAS, Jenelyn T.
22. Maslag v. Monzon 698 SCRA 584 LEYGO, Vanessa A.
FACTS:
In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint7 for reconveyance of real
property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT)
against respondents Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston and the
Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet.
 After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in
obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s property, that cause the
respondent to appeal to the RTC of La Trinidad.
October 22, 2003, declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over
petitioner’s cause of action. Appeal from orders dismissing case
without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

On May 4, 2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a

Resolution reversing the MTC Decision. to turn over the possession of
the 4,415 square meter land she presently occupies to [Monzon]. This
case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine whether [Maslag] is entitled to the remedies afforded by
law to a builder in good faith for the improvements she constructed
thereon.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal15 from the RTC’s May 4, 2004

Resolution and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted.
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for
being the improper remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of
appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC
rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate jurisdiction.

September 22, 2006, The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal cited

the earlier October 22, 2003 Order of the RTC declaring the MTC
without jurisdiction over the case. A perusal of the May 4, 2004
Resolution of the RTC, which is the subject matter of the appeal,
clearly reveals that it took cognizance of the MTC case in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE: W o N the CA was correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

HELD: YES, the CA is correct in affirming RTC decision.

Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real
property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC
or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.28 Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29 as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691.

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
 (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the
property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve

title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00)

Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in

determining which court has jurisdiction over the case and in
pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and exclusive
jurisdiction.In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no
one but themselves.

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

23. Go v. BPI Finance 700 SCRA 125 LIPAGO, Julienne Joy C.

24. Poseidon Int’l v. Tamala 700 SCRA 1 Nay-ud, Janice D.
25. POTC v. Africa 700 SCRA 453 OCTUBRE, Excel D.
26. Pasos v. PNCC 700 SCRA 608 PARILLO, Warren D.
27. Esguerra v. United Phil. 700 SCRA 687 PECSOY, Ana N.
28. Heirs of N. Miranda v. Miranda 700 SCRA 746 POLINNEY, Reverita B.
Facts:
The heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, a Complaint5 for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance, against
the heirs of Pedro Miranda, the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda.

Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the Decision became final and executory. 8

The RTC issued a Writ of Execution,9 which was not implemented.10

Respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion11 praying that the RTC issue a "Break-Open and
Demolition Order" in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. 12 But since more
than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced,
the RTC denied the Motion in its Order13

This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition 14 for Revival of Judgment.
Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment assailing, among others, the jurisdiction of the
RTC to take cognizance of the Petition for Revival of Judgment.15

The RTC rendered a Decision16 granting the Petition.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal18

Issues:

1. Whether an action for revival of judgment is appealable?

2. Whether the RTC below has exclusive original jurisdiction over an action for
revival of judgment?

Ruling

Yes. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. 44 It is different and
distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. 45 As such, a party
aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the
decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original
judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or
modified.46

Yes. RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition for Revival of Judgment.

An action for revival of judgment may be filed either "in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general." 47 In
this case, respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment in the same court which
rendered the Decision.
29. Heirs of Numeriano v. Miranda 700 SCRA 747 ROSARIO, Leah L.

FACTS:

In 1994, petitioners, representing themselves as the heirs of

Numeriano, filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and
Specific Performance against the heirs of Miranda. After trial, however, the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Miranda as it upheld the
validity of their TCT. Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the decision
became final and executory.

In December 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, which was not
implemented. In July 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying
that the RTC issue a "Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel
the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have
elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the
RTC denied the Motion.

Respondent then was prompted to file a Petition for Revival of

Judgment. The RTC granted the Petition pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court. On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via
LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the Decision
dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in
turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA,
insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit.

Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice
of Appeal for lack of merit. Aggrieved petitioners filed a Petition for
Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due
course. However, the CA denied the Petition for Mandamus on the ground
that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

In this petition for certiorari under rule 45, petitioners assert that an
action to revive judgment is appealable, and that their appeal was perfected
on time. They insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th
day via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific
mode of service for filing a notice of appeal.

ISSUES:
Was the appeal perfected on time?
Is an action for revival of judgment appealable?

RULINGS:
 The Petition lacks merit and the Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed.
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from."

Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed

in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of
filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the
date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the
Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the
Rules. It is established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings
to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of
filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court is
deemed the date of filing of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of
Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the
16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly
ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It

is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for
revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits
of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is
already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified.

In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated August 30, 1999,
which is the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced by
respondent.1â Considering that the said Decision had already attained
finality, petitioners may no longer question its correctness. Only the
merits of the action for revival may be appealed, not the merits of
the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced .

30. Eagleridge v. Cameron Granville 695 SCRA 714 TABUZO, Mae

Abegail I.

FACTS:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties
Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and Crispin I. Oben (Oben) are the defendants in
a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB) through a
Complaint[6] dated February 9, 2005, and... currently pending proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Makati City.
By virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated August 9, 2006, EIB transferred
EDC's outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron Granville 3
Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron)
Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB... which was
granted by the trial court.
petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA) referred to in the Deed referred to in the Deed
of Assignment.
Respondent Cameron filed its Comment dated March 14, 2012 alleging that
petitioners have not shown "good cause" for the production of the LSPA and
that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo.
Petitioners explained that the production of the LSPA was for "good cause".
They pointed out that the claim of Cameron is based on an obligation
purchased after litigation had already been... instituted in relation to it.
Pursuant to Article 1634 of the New Civil Code on assignment of credit, the
obligation subject of the case a quo is a credit in litigation, which may be
extinguished by reimbursing the assignee of... the price paid therefor, the
judicial costs incurred and the interest of the price from the day on which
the same was paid.
As petitioners' alleged loan obligations may be reimbursed up to the extent
of the amount paid by Cameron in the acquisition thereof, it becomes
necessary to verify the amount of the consideration from the LSPA,
considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on... this matter.
the trial court denied petitioners' motion for production for being utterly
devoid of merit. It ruled that there was failure to show "good cause" for the
production of the LSPA and failure to show that the LSPA is material or
contains evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on April 25, 2012, their Motion for
Reconsideration.
The trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration petitioners
filed their Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), to nullify
and/or set aside the RTC's Resolutions
Resolution dated August 29, 2012, the CA (Third Division) dismissed the
petition subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the
CA's
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production
and/or inspection of the LSPA.
RULING:
Yes. The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of
discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage.
Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court, states:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any
party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; the provision on production and inspection
of documents is one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of
Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover
all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending
before it.
Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide
the litigants with information essential to the fair and amicable settlement
or expeditious trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards
on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly
discretionary on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be
arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to
relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant hence, impair his
fundamental right to due process.
The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of
documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness
and practicability.
As respondent Cameron's claim against the petitioners relies entirely on the
validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent
Cameron to allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the Deed,
especially those documents which, by express terms, were referred to and
identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject
matter the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to
petitioners' defense.
The relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily apparent. Fair
play demands that petitioners must be given the chance to examine the
LSPA. Besides, we find no great practical difficulty, and respondent did not
allege any, in presenting the document for inspection and copying of the
petitioners.
Principle:
All documents mentioned in a Deed of Assignment transferring the credit of
the plaintiff in a pending litigation should be accessible to the defendant
through a Motion for Production or Inspection of Documents under Rule 27
of the Rules of Court. Litigation... is not a game of skills and stratagems. It
is a social process that should allow both parties to fully and fairly access
the truth of the matters in litigation.
31. Special Audit Team-COA v. CA 696 SCRA 496 VARGAS, Eunice K.
FACTS:
Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed a Petition for Prohibition with the CA dated 18 July
2005 against petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on Audit (COA) with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and a writ of prohibition.
Subsequently, GSIS also submitted a Manifestation and Motion dated 21 July 2005 detailing the urgency of
restraining the SAT. The CA issued a Resolution on 22 July 2005, directing petitioner SAT to submit the latter’s
comment, to be treated as an answer. Additionally, the CA granted the prayer of GSIS for the issuance of a TRO
effective sixty (60) days from notice.
After requiring the submission of memoranda, CA issued the assailed Resolution dated 23 September 2005 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 90484, granting the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of an
injunction bond. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and a Comment
on the petition dated 10 October 2005, after it was notified of the case, as the SAT had been represented in the
interim by one of the team members instead of the OSG. The MR was denied through a Resolution of the CA on 9
August 2006.
The present Petition seeks to nullify both the 23 September 2005 and the 9 August 2006 CA Resolutions and to
prohibit the CA from proceeding to decide the case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not prohibition is the correct remedy
2. Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued

HELD:
1. PROHIBITION IS NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY. There is an appeal or a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available. A rule of thumb for every petition brought under Rule 65 is the unavailability of an appeal or any
"plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.” Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that
historically require extraordinary facts to be shown in order to correct errors of jurisdiction. The law also
dictates the necessary steps before an extraordinary remedy may be issued. To be sure, the availability of other
remedies does not always lend itself to the impropriety of a Rule 65 petition. If, for instance, the remedy is
insufficient or would be proven useless, then the petition will be given due course. The failure to fulfill the
requirements of Rule 65 disallows the CA from taking due course of the Petition; otherwise appeals and
motions for reconsideration would be rendered meaningless.
2. Writs of injunction do not perfunctorily issue from the courts. For the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this case, respondents failed to show that they have a
right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.

32. Alcantara v. COMELEC 696 SCRA 547 ABES, Nestor Jr. P.

33. A-IPRA v. COMELEC 696 SCRA 563 BACQUIAN, Stenard P.
FACTS:

Petitioner, Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) is

a sectoral political party whose primordial objectives are the recognition,
protection and promotion of the rights of the indigenous people. It was
allowed registration and accreditation by the COMELEC Second Division.

A-IPRA participated in the May 2010 elections, with the following as

nominees and officers (Insigne Group), namely:

Nominees:

(1) Atty. Eugenio A. Insigne MNSA

(2) Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana
(3) Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo

Officers:
(1) Ruben R. Sison, President
(2) Ricardo B. Rivera, Vice President for External Affairs
(3) Larry G. Ramos, Vice President for Internal Affairs
(4) Oscar B. Rivera, Public Information Officer
(5) Ronnie T. Dizon, Secretary
(6) Antonio M. Sumilang, Treasurer

Unfortunately, the group failed to muster the necessary number of

votes to obtain a seat in Congress

On May 31, 2012, A-IPRA filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate

in the May 2013 Elections with the COMELEC with new list of nominees
and officers (Lota Group), consisting of the following individuals:

Nominees:

(1) Melvin G. Lota

(2) Mac-Mac Bernales
(3) Mary Anne P. Santos
(4) Jean Annabell S. Garota
(5) Joseph T. Evangelista

Officers:
(1) Antonio S. Abad, Chairman
(2) Jennita G. Bascones, Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs
(3) Consolacion B. Abad, Vice Chairman for External Affairs
(4) Jordan P. Cimafranca, Secretary General
(5) Oscar D. Celeste, Treasurer
(6) Thomas A. Siy, III, Auditor
(7) Frances Trina A. Salvante, Public Relations Officer

The Insigne Group, filed a Petition for Intervention with Opposition to

the Nomination filed by the Lota Group. They alleged that their members
remain the legitimate nominees and officers of A-IPRA as they were never
replaced in accordance with procedure stated in the by-laws of the
organization. Further, they pointed out that the members of the Lota Group
are complete strangers to the organization and that their names do not
appear in the roster of A-IPRA membership. Even more, they do not appear
to be members of the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous people
as they are all residents of Metro Manila and are unknown to the members
of A-IPRA. Finally, they charged the Lota Group of submitting fake
documents which contained forged signatures. Thus, they prayed that the
Lota Group be disqualified as nominees and officers of A-IPRA and that
they be recognized as the legitimate nominees and officers of the group
and be allowed to participate in the May 2013 elections.

On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC en banc cancelled the

registration and accreditation of A-IPRA.

The Insigne Group filed the instant petition with this Court, claiming
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled
registration and accreditation of A-IPRA.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling

the registration and accreditation of A-IPRA.

RULING:

It is a well-settled principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review

decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing
of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court
shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal's exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary
manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty.

The Insigne Group impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in issuing Resolution dated November 7, 2012 which cancelled
A-IPRA's registration/accreditation on the ground of disqualification of its
nominees. This issue, however, had already been resolved by this Court in
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections. It is well to remember
that the Lota Group also filed a separate petition for certiorari with this
Court, challenging the same resolution of the COMELEC. The said petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 204125 and was consolidated with several other
cases questioning similar issuances by the COMELEC. Eventually, the
Court resolved the consolidated cases in Atong Paglaum by upholding the
validity of the issuances of the COMELEC, albeit, ordering that all the
petitions be remanded to the COMELEC for reevaluation of the
qualifications of the party-list groups based on the new set of parameters
laid down in the mentioned decision.

34. Chu v. Caparas 696 SCRA 324 BALAGEO, Arvin T.

FACTS: At the root of the case is a parcel of land located at
Maguyam, Silang, Cavite, originally owned and registered in the
name of Miguela Reyes. The petitioners filed a complaint to
recover possession of the subject property against the
respondents, with a prayer to annul the sale of the subject
property executed between the respondents. In the complaint, the
petitioners alleged that they are the successors-in-interest of
Miguela over the subject property, which Caparas held in trust for
Miguela. The petitioners also averred that the subject property
was erroneously included in the sale of land between the
respondents.

The petitioners’ evidence showed that the subject property was

previously part of the tract of land owned by Miguela at
Maguyam, Silang, Cavite. Miguela sold to Caparas the eastern
portion of the land. Miguela retained for herself the rest of the
subject property, located at the western portion of the original
property. Further, the deed of conveyance executed between
Miguela and Caparas described the boundaries of the parcel of
land purchased by Caparas as: "sa ibaba ay Faustino Amparo, sa
silangan ay Silang at Carmona boundary, sa ilaya ay Aquilino
Ligaya, at sa kanluran ay ang natitirang lupa ni Miguela Reyes."

The petitioners asserted that more than fourteen years later,

Caparas caused the preparation of a consolidated survey plan
(Caparas survey plan) under her name for several parcels of land
located at Silang-Carmona, Cavite, with a total land area of
40,697 square meters. Under the Caparas survey plan, the parcel
of land supposedly retained by Miguela was erroneously
transferred to the eastern portion of the original land and now
allegedly owned by Caparas.

The petitioners also alleged that Caparas sold to the spouses

Perez the consolidated parcels of land in a deed. Considering the
alleged error in the Caparas survey plan, the petitioners
demanded the reconveyance of the subject property from
Caparas and the spouses Perez, who refused to reconvey the
subject property.

After an ex parte hearing, the RTC ruled in the petitioners’

favor.12 The RTC, however, refused to approve, for lack of
authority, the new survey plan for the subject property that the
petitioners submitted.

The spouses Perez averred that the parcel of land sold to the
petitioners was not the subject property whose title had been
confirmed in their (spouses Perez’s) names. In the alternative, the
spouses Perez claimed that they bought the subject property in
good faith and for value and had been in open, continuous, public
and adverse possession of it since 1991.

ISSUE:
Whether the appeal is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is proper.

HELD: NO. The petition must fail, as a Rule 45 petition bars us from the consideration of factual
issues.

Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court shall raise only questions of law and not questions of facts. "A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."25

The question, to be one of law, must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances and should avoid the scrutiny of the probative value of the parties’ evidence. 26 Once
the issue invites a review of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA, as in this case, the
question posed is one of fact that is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. 27

The Court’s jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived errors of law, which
the lower courts may have committed.28 The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower
courts whose findings, when aptly supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is especially true
when the CA affirms the lower court’s findings,29 as in this case. While this Court, under established
exceptional circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, we do not find this case to be under
any of the exceptions.

Nevertheless, we still affirm the assailed CA rulings even if we were to disregard these established
doctrinal rules.

35. Almagro v. Amaya 699 SCRA 61 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.

36. Century Iron v. Banas 699 SCRA 157 CADAP, Jefferson B.

FACTS: Respondent Eleto B. Banas worked at petitioner Century Iron beginning July 5,
20004 until his dismissal on June 18, 2002. Bañas responded to his dismissal by filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and money claims.

Labor Arbiter (LA) Joel S. Lustria ruled that Bañas was illegally dismissed. When
appealed, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA's ruling in
toto. On January 31, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC decision. It
agreed with the lower tribunals' finding that Bañas was merely an inventory clerk.

Century Iron filed the present petition for review on certiorari after the CA denied its
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners impute that the appellate court erred in holding
that the factual findings of the NLRC may not be inquired into considering that only
questions of law may be brought in an original action for certiorari.

In his Comment, Respondent Bañas posits that the petition raises purely questions of
fact which a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courts does
not allow. He additionally submits that the petitioners’ arguments have been fully passed
upon and found unmeritorious by the lower tribunals and the CA.

Issue: Whether or not questions of fact may be inquired into in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

We reverse the CA’s decision. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be put into issue while in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
only questions of jurisdiction may be inquired into.

The CA relied on Cebu Shipyard & Eng’g Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc. in affirming
the lower tribunals’ finding that Bañas worked as an inventory clerk. According to the
CA, this Court has ruled in Cebu Shipyard that in petitions for certiorari, only questions
of law may be put into issue and questions of fact cannot be entertained. Not noticing
such glaring error, the petitioners agree to such disquisition.They, however, assert that
there is an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be brought in an original
action for certiorari, such as when the lower court’s findings of facts are not supported
by sufficient evidence or that the same was based on misapprehension or erroneous
appreciation of facts.

A revisit of Cebu Shipyard shows that the CA has inadvertently misquoted this Court. In
the said case, we held:

In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue.
Questions of fact cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court of
Appeals is a question which this Court cannot look into as it would entail going into
factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based.

37. BCDA v. Reyes 699 SCRA 217 CALABIAS, Lesther G.

Facts:

On February 13, 2007, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. DH-1136-07, seeking to expropriate 308 square meters of a parcel of land located in
Barangay San Ramon, Dinalupihan, Bataan, registered in the name of respondent Rosa Reyes
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLOA-10265, in view of the construction of the Subic-
Clark-Tarlac Expressway.

Similar complaints for expropriation, docketed as Civil Case Nos. DH-1137-07 and DH-
1138-07, were also filed over the 156 and 384 square meter portions of certain parcels of land
owned by respondents Cenando Reyes and Carlos Reyes, respectively, for which petitioner
deposited the sums in accordance with Section 4(a) of RA 8974.

In their separate Answers, respondents uniformly alleged that while they had no
objection to petitioner’s right to expropriate, they claimed that the amount of just compensation
which petitioner offered was ridiculously low considering that the subject properties were
already re-classified into residential lots as early as October 6, 2003.

Meanwhile, on April 27, 2007, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
contending that there were no genuine issues left for resolution, except for the amount of
damages to be paid as just compensation.

In opposition, petitioner argued that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment
applies only to ordinary civil actions for recovery of money claims and not to expropriation
cases. Moreover, it claimed that the mandatory constitution of a panel of commissioners for the
purpose of ascertaining the amount of just compensation due under Section 5, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court precludes a summary judgment.

On November 27, 2007, the RTC issued an Order, granting the motion for summary
judgment and thereby ordered petitioner to pay respondents just compensation at the rate of
P3,000.00 per square meter, for a total of P924,000.00 for Rosa, P1,152,000.00 for Carlos and
P468,000.00 for Cenando.
 On May 7, 2010, the CA rendered a Resolution, dismissing petitioner’s appeal for being
the wrong mode to assail the RTC’s summary judgment.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

Ruling:

The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of “law” or “fact” is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can
resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is one of fact.

Jurisprudence dictates that there is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there
is a “question of fact” when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.

In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not
the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question
posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s
appeal.

38. Natividad v. Mariano 697 SCRA 63 CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S.

39. Republic v. Bayao 697 SCRA 313 Dally, Sheryl G.

FACTS:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture—Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU

XII) is a government office mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules, and regulations of the Department of Agriculture in its regional
area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.

Executive Order No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the
regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. (SOCCSKSARGEN: The
name is an acronym that stands for the region's four provinces and one highly
urbanized city (South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and General
Santos).
 A Memorandum was issued to immediately effect the transfer of the
administrative, finance and operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to
Koronadal City. However, respondents opposed the implementation of the said
Memorandum.

They alleged that former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a

pronouncement during one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of
Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Only three departments were not covered
by the suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), Department of Tourism (DOT), and Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE).

Respondents alleged further in their Memorandum to the DA Secretary that

on March 7, 2005, they appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture that the
implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance.

OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the
regional office to ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both
located in South Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City.

This prompted respondents to file a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City.

By Order, the trial court granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65.

Through a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for

Certiorari for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the
assailed trial court Order.

Hence, the present Petition under Rule 45.

ISSUES:

1) Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed
Resolutions.

2) Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for
filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.
RULING:

1)

Yes, a dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure
to file a Motion for Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45.

Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process

over the original case, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
original or independent action. Consequently, the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the Petition via Rule 65 as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration are the final Resolutions contemplated under Rule 45. As correctly
pointed out by petitioner, these Resolutions would attain finality if these are not
elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial court Order would also
become unassailable.

2)

Yes, the settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.

Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.

The second exception is present in this case.

 Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals
have already been raised by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings
with the trial court. The lower court, therefore, passed upon them prior to its
issuance of its Order.

Wherefore, this petition is granted.

40. Phil. Transmarine v. Legaspi 698 SCRA 280 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A.
41. Reblora v. AFP 698 SCRA 727 DULAY, May Anne P.
42. Boston Equity v. CA 699 SCRA 16****** ESTRADA, April P.
FACTS:
In this case, petitioner called the Court’s attention to the fact
that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s
jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her amended answer
was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several
opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial
court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the
doctrine laid down in another case, petitioner claimed that
respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier
stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively
participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.

Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider

that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1)
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the
parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in
cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing
which is the subject of the litigation.

The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as

a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, in the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the
authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the
collection of a sum of money in the amount of 1,908 pesos which
amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the municipal courts. The jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject matter of the case was likewise the issue in subsequent cases
citing that ruling.

For example, in Spouses Gonzaga versus Court of Appeals, the issue

for consideration was the authority of the regional trial court to hear
and decide an action for reformation of contract and damages
involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that jurisdiction is
vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. Another
example is the case of Lee versus Presiding Judge. In that case,
petitioners argued that the respondent municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the issue of
ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People versus
Casuga, accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of
which she was charged, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of
municipal courts or city courts and the then courts of first instance,
and that the judgment of the court of first instance, to which she had
appealed the municipal court's conviction, should be deemed null and
void for want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on

the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject
matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties
cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their
cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss

before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of
defendant. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction
over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

The Rules of Court provide in Rule 9, Section 1 and Rule 15,

Section 8 that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations,
the court shall dismiss the claim. Also, subject to the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

Based on the foregoing citations, the "objection on jurisdictional

grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss
or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised anytime, even for
the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived.
This is subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches.
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a
case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under
 Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or
a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense.
If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff
or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals, in this case, therefore, erred when it

made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating
that any issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even for the first time on appeal and that, therefore,
respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is,
consequently, not estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction.
As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of
the defendant, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer
or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the
defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to
waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party
who can thereby waive it by silence."

43. Reyes v. COMELEC 699 SCRA 522 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D.

44. Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz 701 SCRA 682 FORONDA, Fraulein G.
45. BPI v. Sarabia Manor 702 SCRA 432 Ganggangan, Delia U.
Facts:
Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation (Sarabia) obtained loan from
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). The debt was secured by
real estate mortgages over several parcels of land owned by Sarabia.
Sarabia paid interests on its loan as soon as the funds were
released. A delayed completion of their new building caused Sarabia
to incur various flow problems. The later filed a petition for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer for the issuance of a stay order before the
RTC as it foresaw the impossibility to meet its maturing obligations to
tis creditors when they fall due.
The said petition was approved. RTC affirm the receiver’s
recommendation of a 6.7 imposed rate including other remedies for
Sarabia to recover. FEBTC which is now the Bank of the Philippine
Island(BPI) due to merging, opposed the decision. The Court of
Appeal affirmed RTC’s decision. BPI filed for reconsideration but was
denied. It now filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is proper?
Ruling:
No. It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.
The issue raised by BPI which is the determination of whether
or not due regard was given to the interest of BPI as a secured
creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes a question of fact
since it will require a review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence
presented by the parties, among others.
The issue raised is also not one of the exceptions under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

46. Philippine Marine Agency v. Cabanban 702 SCRA 467 GAWON, Gina
P.
Facts:
Armando entered into a nine-month contract of employment
with DOHLE, through its local agent PTCI, after passing the pre-
employment medical examination (PEME) at PTCI’s accredited
medical clinic. During his medical examination, he declared that he
had no history of high blood pressure and heart trouble. While on
board the vessel, Armando felt dizzy and complained of chest pain. He
was diagnosed of "Microvascular Unstable Angina Class III B
established on medical treatment, Type II-A Hyperlipidemia, HT,
Obesity, Alcoholism." Petitioners repatriated Armando, who was
treated and monitored for three months by a company designated
physician, Dr. Alegre, who thereafter declared Armando "fit to work."
Despite the certification, Armando nevertheless claimed otherwise,
and demanded from PTCI payment of permanent disability benefits
under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). The petitioners did not heed
Armando’s demand, prompting Armando to file a complaint for illness
compensation benefit under a disability grade of 7 before the LA. The
LA dismissed Armando’s claims except for the balance of the latter’s
sickness allowance. Armando appealed with the NLRC but the appeal
was dismissed for lack of merit. Armando filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA reversed
the NLRC’s decision, declaring that all of the conditions laid out under
Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC for an occupational disease to be
compensable had been satisfied. The CA’s denial of the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration prompted the present petition.
Issue: Whether factual issues on CA’s decision reversing NLRC’s decision
may be
resolved by the SC via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:
We have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65
review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged
before it. The question of Armando’s entitlement to disability benefits
and attorney’s fees, while essentially a question of law appropriate for
a Rule 45 review, nevertheless hinges for their resolution on a factual
issue – the question whether the CAD, hypertension, hyperlipidemia,
obesity and alcoholism afflicting Armando are work-related or work-
aggravated. Based on these Rule 45 parameters, we generally cannot
touch factual questions. Nevertheless, in the exercise of our
discretionary appellate jurisdiction, we allow certain exceptions, all in
the interest of giving substance and meaning to the justice we are
sworn to uphold and give primacy to. The conflicting ruling of the LA
and the NLRC, on the one hand, and of the CA, on the other, in the
present petition is one such exception to the above general rule. A re-
examination of the record for purposes of determining the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA is justified
when this situation is present.

47. Firaza Sr. v. Ugay 695 SCRA 26 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C.

48. Dycoco v. CA 702 SCRA 566 KONNEK, Camille L.

JURISDICTION
49. Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman 695 SCRA 35 LAIGO, Jurry
Ciel A
FACTS:
Alfredo Rap Alejandro owned MICO Car Wash. They have been
illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to wash cars. The
PNP-CIDG discovered this during an anti-water pilferage operation.
Thus, the car-wash boys were arrested and their water containers were
confiscated. Herein petitioner, Franklin Alejandro, is actually the father
of Alfredo Alejandro. He is also the Barangay Chairman or Punong
Barangay of Barangay 293, Binondo, Manila. The petitioner interfered
with the PNP-CIDG’s operation by ordering several men to unload the
confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotion
and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to
escape. For this, the respondent Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau, filed an administrative complaint against him.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty

of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The
Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the petitioner cannot overextend his
authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to disrespect
proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also added that the
petitioner had tolerated the illegal acts of MICO’s car-wash boys. A
motion for reconsideration was filed. It was denied. The petitioner
appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for premature filing.
(He should have filed to the Ombudsman first.) The motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Thereafter, the petitioner argued that the Office of the

Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to order his dismissal from the service
since under the Local Government Code of 1991, an elective local
official may be removed from office only by the order of a proper court.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman answered that the

petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as he should
have filed his appeal to the Ombudsman first. And that according to RA
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials.

ISSUE:
WON the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over elective
Officials and has the power to order their dismissal from the service.

HELD:
Yes.The ponencia states that “The two laws may be reconciled by
understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Office of the Ombudsman.” The Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
provided for in R.A. No. 6770. This jurisdiction extends only to public
officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade (SG) 27 and
higher. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, similar misconduct of
those with a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the regular courts or other
investigative agencies. For administrative cases involving the
concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body
where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of
the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
 A Barangay Chairman is under SG 14. Under the LGC, the
sangunniang panlungsod or the sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official. Thus, the Office of the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was
initially filed there.

50. Pat-og v. CSC 697 SCRA 567 LAPAS, Jenelyn T.

PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE/VERIFICATION

51. Galvez v. Court of Appeals 695 SCRA 10 Nay-ud, Janice D.
52. Raymundo v. LBP 695 SCRA 152 OCTUBRE, Excel D.
53. Reinier Pacific v. Guevarra 699 SCRA 1 PARILLO, Warren D.
54. Swedish Match v. The Treas. o City of Manila 700 SCRA 428
PECSOY, Ana N.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION/PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

55. Solid Builders v. China Banking 695 SCRA 101 POLINNEY, Reverita
B.
FACTS:

China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To secure
the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety
agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Quezon City and
Cainta, Rizal.

Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged
properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole
obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the
certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the burden of updating interests on all
loans.

SBI requested to CBC the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties.

In response, CBC sent SBI a letter stating that the loans had been completely restructured.

Subsequently, CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account within ten days from receipt
thereof.

Claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and
unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a
Complaint “To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was granted.

Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from a
possible foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by
CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and unconscionable.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent
defendant bank from taking over their properties.

RULING:

NO. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in
the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for
the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of
two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.

The basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or disputable as
there is still a need to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the various
circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges
are unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and
subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them
from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to settle
its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it
from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.

56. Sime Darby v. Mendoza 699 SCRA 290 ROSARIO, Leah L.

Facts:

Sime Darby bought a Class “A” club share in Alabang Country Club. The
share, however, was placed under the name of Mendoza in trust for Sime
Darby since the By-Laws of ACC state that only natural persons may own a
club share. As part of the arrangement, Mendoza endorsed the Club Share
Certificate in blank and executed a Deed of Assignment, also in blank, and
handed over the documents to Sime Darby. From the time of purchase in
1987, Sime Darby paid for the monthly dues and other assessments on the
club share.
Nine years after Mendoza’s retirement, Sime Darby found an interested
buyer of the club share. But before the sale could push through, the broker
required Sime Darby to secure an authorization to sell from Mendoza since
the club share was still registered in Mendoza’s name. Mendoza refused to
sign the required authority to sell or SPA unless Sime Darby paid him his
unpaid separation benefits. As a result, the sale did not push through and
Sime Darby was compelled to return the payment to the prospective buyer.
Additionally, Sime Darby cannot make use of the facilities of the club
because Mendoza insists on enjoying it despite the fact that he is no longer
connected with him.

In 2005, Sime Darby filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary
injunction against Mendoza but it was denied, so trial ensued. In 2007, the
court rendered a decision in favor of Sime Darby. Mendoza filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals which ruled that Sime Darby failed to prove that
it has a clear and unmistakable right over the club share of ACC. Thus, it
reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the RTC. Sime Darby filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.cralaw lawlibrary

Issue:

Whether or not Sime Darby is entitled to damages and injunctive relief

against Mendoza?

Ruling:
YES. In order for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following
requisites must be present: (a) invasion of the right sought to be protected
is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable, and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. The twin requirements of a valid injunction
are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations.

All the elements are present in the instant case. Sime Darby bought the
subject share in 1987. As the purchaser of the share, it has interest and
right over it. There is a presumption that the share was bought for the use
of the defendant while the latter is still connected with him. This is because
when the share was registered under the name of Mendoza, the Sime Darby
signed the stock certificate in blank as well as the deed of assignment and
placed the certificate under the possession of Sime Darby. Hence, Sime
Darby did not intend to relinquish its interest and right over the subject,
rather it intended to have the share held in trust by Mendoza, until a new
grantee is named.
Sime Darby’s witnesses also testified that the former required Mendoza to
sign the said documents so that he can be assured that its ownership of the
property is properly documented. Sime Darby’s payments of monthly
billings of the subject share bolster Mendoza’s possession in trust rather
than his ownership over the share. With this, the right of Sime Darby over
the share is clear and unmistakable.

With defendant’s continued use of the subject share despite that he is not
anymore connected with plaintiff, and with plaintiff’s demand upon the
defendant to desist from making use of the club facilities having been
ignored, clearly defendant violated plaintiff’s right over the use and
enjoyment thereof. Hence, Sime Darby is entitled to its prayer for
injunction.

As to plaintiff’s claims for temperate or moderate damages, the Court

deems it proper to impose upon the defendant P100,000 as temperate
damages. Further, plaintiff having established its right to the relief being
claimed and inasmuch as it was constrained to litigate in order to protect its
interest as well as incurred litigation expenses, attorney's fees are hereby
awarded in the amount of 11250,000.

57. Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez 700 SCRA 399 TABUZO,

Mae Abegail I.
FACTS:
On August 18, 2005, the Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR) received
an Order from the Ombudsman. The order directed BSU-BOR to enforce the Office of the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution, finding herein respondents
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from
service with its accessory penalties, despite the fact that the same are pending appeal
before the CA. Pursuant to said Order, BSU-BOR issued a Resolution resolving to
implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction before the RTC but was denied. Respondents
filed their notice of appeal and Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction with the CA which granted its petition. Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a Motion to Intervene. It questioned the Order of the CA granting the injunctive relief
prayed for by the respondents. It contended that under the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure, an appeal does not stay the execution of decisions, resolutions or order issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to injunctive relief.
2. Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executory.
RULING:
1. The respondents are not entitled to injunctive relief.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1)That the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
(2)That the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
(3)That there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present case, the right of the respondents cannot be said to be clear and
unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that penalty of dismissal from the
service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executor in accordance
with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative
disciplinary cases.
2. The decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executor.
The Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by
the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers
of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ
will render nugatory the provision of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Clearly, said Rules of Procedure supersedes the discretion given
to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman
in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executor is a special rule that
prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court.
58. Province of Cagayan v. Lara 702 SCRA 183 VARGAS, Eunice K.
The Facts

On September 14, 2007, Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit[3] (ISAG Permit) from the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), authorizing him to
conduct quarrying operations in a twenty-hectare area situated in Barangay Centro, Muncipality of Peñablanca
(Peñablanca), Cagayan. For the same purpose, Lara obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate[4] (ECC)
from the DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).[5]

On January 3, 2008, Jovy Balisi (Balisi), Lara's representative, went to the Cagayan Provincial Treasurer's Office
(Treasurer's Office) to pay the extraction fee and other fees for Lara's quarrying operations but she was directed to
first secure an Order of Payment from the Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, petitioner Robert Adap
(ENRO Adap). However, when Balisi went to ENRO Adap, the latter refused to issue an Order of Payment. Despite
various pleas from Balisi and Atty. Victorio N. Casauay (Atty. Casauay), Lara's counsel, ENRO Adap remained
adamant with his refusal. This prompted Atty. Casauay to tender and deposit the amount of P51,500.00 with the
Treasurer's Office corresponding to the said extraction fee and other related fees.[6]

On January 11, 2008, Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day, however, a total of four trucks
loaded with sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were stopped and impounded by several local officials.
[7] Consequently, Lara filed an action for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7049, against the said officials, seeking to enjoin the stoppage of his quarrying
operations. After due proceedings, a writ of preliminary Injunction was issued enabling Lara to restart his business.
[8]

Nonetheless, on March 17, 2008, Lara received a Stoppage Order[9] dated March 13, 2008 (Stoppage Order) this
time from Cagayan Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying operations .

In their Answer dated June 10, 2008, petitioners raised the following defenses: (a) the mere issuance of the ISAG
Permit does not give Lara the right to commence his quarrying operations as he still had to comply with the terms
and conditions stated therein; (b) Lara has neither secured all the necessary permits nor paid the local fees and
taxes; and (c) Gov. Antonio was merely performing his duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the Province of Cagayan pursuant to the provisions of RA 7160,[12] otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991."

In an Order dated August 11, 2008, the RTC granted Lara's application for a writ of preliminary Injunction based on
a prima facie finding that he is authorized to extract gravel and sand from the Permit Area. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration which was, however denied on September 26, 2008.

The RTC made permanent the writ of preliminary Injunction and thus, enjoined petitioners from stopping or
disturbing Lara's quarrying operations. Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the Court via the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC properly issued the permanent Injunction subject of this case.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.It is well-settled that a writ of Injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2)
requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or
disputed, Injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not
a ground for an Injunction.[25]

WRIT OF POSSESSION/SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

59. Tolosa v. United Coconut 695 SCRA 138 ABES, Nestor Jr. P.
60. Dalangin v. Perez 695 SCRA 86 BACQUIAN, Stenard P.
Fact:
Respondents Clemente Perez and Cecilia Gonzales (Perez spouses)
sold to petitioners Marcelino and Vitaliana Dalangin (Dalangin spouses) a
2.3855 hectare parcel of land. The latter, however, failed to pay in full
despite demand. Thus, the Perez spouses filed a complaint against the
petitioners for recovery of a sum of money.

Petitioners failed to file their answer hence, they were declared in

default and the Perez spouses were allowed to present their evidence ex
parte.

The City Court of Batangas City, Branch 2, ordered petitioners to pay

jointly and severally the Perez. No appeal having been taken, the decision
became final and executory. Pursuant to this, a Writ of Execution was
issued.
 The Provincial Sheriff of Batangas then levied upon and sold the
petitioners’ properties at auction. For failure to redeem, the sheriff executed
a Final Deed of Conveyance over the properties of petitioners, and a Writ
of Possession was issued by the City Court.

Twelve years after the City Court’s issuance of the Writ of

Possession, petitioners filed a case for annulment of the sheriff’s sale.
Petitioners prayed that the sheriff’s sale, Certificate of Sale and the Final
Deed of Conveyance be nullified and voided for lack of publication and
notice of the sheriff’s sale, and for inadequacy of the purchase price of the
subject properties. Petitioners likewise claimed that respondents illegally
colluded and cooperated with each other to deprive them of their lands and
unduly enrich the Perez spouses at their expense.

The RTC uphold the validity of the sheriff’s sale. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Is a written notice of sale on execution required in sheriff’s sale?

Ruling:

The applicable rule at the time of the execution sale on March 15,
1972 is Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. This rule does not
require personal written notice to the judgment debtor.

It was only in 1987 that the Court required that written notice of the
execution sale be given to the judgment debtor, via Circular No. 8
amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court on notice of sale of
property on execution. Thus, the alleged failure on the part of the
respondents to furnish petitioners with a written notice of the execution sale
did not nullify the execution sale because it was not then a requirement for
its validity.

The presumption of regularity of the execution sale and the sheriff’s

performance of his official functions prevail in the absence of evidence to
the contrary and in light of the self- serving allegations and bare denials of
petitioners to the effect that they were not served with notice of the sheriff’s
sale.

61. Ampatuan v. De Lima 695 SCRA 159 BALAGEO, Arvin T.

FACTS: The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged
petitioner, and other suspects, numbering more than a hundred,
for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice
Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The records show that
petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 information for
murder when he was arraigned. In the joint resolution issued, the
Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder
in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in
issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of
Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny
Dalandag. On August 13, 2010, Dalandagwas admitted into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Petitioner, through
counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De
Limaand Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to
request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information’s for murder
considering that Dalandaghad already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn
declarations. However, Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner’srequest. Accordingly, petitioner brought a petition for
mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777),
seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another
accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC
RTC. On January 19, 2011, the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial
conference and issued a pre-trial order. In their manifestation and
motion, respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a
trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. On March
21, 2011, the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care
of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to
appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.
Respondents moved to quash the subpoena to which petitioner
opposed. On June 27,2011, the RTC of Manila issued the assailed
order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for
mandamus.

ISSUES: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of

mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder
in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

HELD:
No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive
Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the
right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion
of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public
prosecutors.

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,

mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel
respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised, 48or to compel the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
judgment or discretion.49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act
on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to
act in a certain way such as to grant or deny such letter-request.
62. Darcen v. V.R. Gonzales 695 SCRA 207 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.
63. Alcantara v. COMELEC 696 SCRA 547 CADAP, Jefferson B.
FACTS:
Petitioners are members of ABAKADA Guro Partylist. In May2007 election ABAKADA
participated and won a seat, Jonathan dela Cruz, its first nominee become the party’s sole
representative in the Congress.
Petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC when the respondents proceeded to hold a Supreme
Assembly that resulted to the approval and ratification of the revised ABAKADA CBL and the ouster
and expulsion of petitioners from their positions and to the party.

Petitioners in their petition alleged that the meeting held was void for the holding of the said supreme
Assembly(SA) were contrary to the CBL for not having been authorized by the president and the
party’s National Executive Board. And Alcantara has no authority to send communication since he is
not the secretary.

Respondent defended the validity of the meeting contending that Dela Cruz made several
communications to Alcantara to urge him to call for SA. COMELEC dismissed the petition and ruled
that the respondents had good cause to initiate the holding of the meeting. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the ruling, questioning the Division’s failure to address the issue of validity
of SA based on the non-membership status of the several meetings participants.
COMELEC En Banc denied the motion. Hence, an appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Assembly is void if not convened in accordance with
party’s Constitution and By-laws (CBL).

HELD:
The petitioners’ argument is contrary to basic tenets. If the validity of the Supreme
Assembly would completely depend on the person who calls the meeting and on the
person who sends the notice of the meeting – who are petitioners Alcantara and Dabu
themselves – then the petitioners would be able to perpetuate themselves in power in
violation of the very constitution whose violation they now cite. This kind of result would
strike at the heart of political parties as the "basic element of the democratic institutional
apparatus." This potential irregularity is what the COMELEC correctly prevented in
ruling for the dismissal of the petition.
64. Lim v. DBP 700 SCRA 210 CALABIAS, Lesther G.
Facts:

On November 24, 1969, petitioners Carlos, Consolacion, and Carlito, all surnamed Lim,
obtained a loan of P40,000.00 (Lim Account) from respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) to finance their cattle raising business.

To secure the loans, petitioners executed a Mortgage in favor of DBP over real
properties covered by the following titles registered in the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
South Cotabato:

Due to violent confrontations between government troops and Muslim rebels in

Mindanao from 1972 to 1977, petitioners were forced to abandon their cattle ranch. As a result,
their business collapsed and they failed to pay the loan amortizations.
 On September 21, 1992, Edmundo received Notice from the Sheriff that the mortgaged
properties would be auctioned on November 22, 1992 so he again paid P30,000.00 as
additional interest to postpone the auction.

But despite payment of P30,000.00, the mortgaged properties were still auctioned with
DBP emerging as the highest bidder in the amount of P1,086,867.26.

The petitioner argued that the foreclosure is void for lack of notice. On June 8, 1994, the
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC of General Santos City
issued a Notice resetting the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties on July 11, 1994.
Said Notice was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
General Santos City.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. Ordering the
dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5608; Declaring the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgaged properties as valid.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the foreclosure sale is void for lack of personal notice

Ruling:

But while DBP had a right to foreclose the mortgage, we are constrained to nullify the
foreclosure sale due to the bank's failure to send a notice of foreclosure to petitioners.

We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate, "personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because Section 3 of Act
3135 only requires the posting of the... notice of sale in three public places and the publication
of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.

In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph 11 of the Mortgage that: All
correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summons, subpoenas, or
notification of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be sent to the Mortgagor at the address
that may hereafter be given in writing... by the Mortgagor or the Mortgagee;

However, no notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was sent by DBP to petitioners about
the foreclosure sale scheduled on July 11, 1994. The letters dated January 28, 1994 and March
11, 1994 advising petitioners to immediately pay their obligation to avoid the impending
foreclosure of their mortgaged properties are not the notices required in paragraph 11 of the
Mortgage. The failure of DBP to comply with their contractual agreement with petitioners to send
notice, is a breach sufficient to invalidate the foreclosure sale.

SUMMARY PROCEDURE/EJECTMENT
65. Republic v. Narceda 695 SCRA 483 CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S.
66. Rivera-Calingasan v. Rivera 696 SCRA 613 Dally, Sheryl G.

FACTS:
 Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of
land in Lipa City, Batangas. When Loreto died, his heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of her one-half share of the conjugal estate. All the properties were
adjudicated in favor of the spouses’ daughters while Wilfredo waived his rights to
the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime,
such fact being annotated on the certificate of titles.

Almost a decade later, Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners
and Star Honda, Inc. claiming he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2)
parcels of land with a building used for his furniture business. Taking advantage of
his absence due to his hospital confinement, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc.
took possession and caused the renovation of the building on the property.

Petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred him from
entering the property. Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that
Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation
of usufructuary rights. Furthermore, another action between the same parties is
pending with the RTC of Lipa City, an action for the annulment of the petition for
cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo.

The MTCC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter
affirmed the MTCC’s findings for lack of cause of action. It held that Wilfredo
lacked a cause of action to evict the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. since
Evangeline is the registered owner of the property and Wilfredo had voluntarily
renounced his usufructuary rights.

Wilfredo sought reconsideration of the RTC’s decision and, in due course,

attained this objective; the RTC set aside its original decision and entered another,
which ordered the eviction of the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. The RTC held
that Wilfredo’s renunciation of his usufructuary rights could not be the basis of the
complaint’s dismissal. The RTC ordered the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. to pay
₱620,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property, and ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

The petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. filed separate motions for
reconsideration.

The RTC then modified its decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc. from any
liability. It found no evidence that Star Honda, Inc. participated in the
dispossession.
 The petitioners then filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA.

The CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s findings, noting that: (a)
Evangeline’s admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence (a
place different and distinct from the property) rendered improbable her claim of
possession and occupation; and (b) Evangeline’s entry to the property (on the
pretext of repairing the building) during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement had been
done without Wilfredo’s prior consent and was done through strategy and stealth.
The CA, however, deleted the award of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees since the
RTC decision did not contain any discussion or justification for the award.

The petitioners then filed the present petition.

Wilfredo died during the pendency of the case and has been substituted by
his second wife, and their children.

ISSUE:

Who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical
possession of the property?

RULING:

In this case, the Supreme Court is convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior
possession of the property and that the petitioners deprived him of such possession
by means of force, strategy and stealth.

Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.

Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in
ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It
does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Thus, an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented
proof of ownership of the subject property.

The respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.

 Furthermore, the petitioners failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain
Briones attesting to Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’ unlawful entry
to the property during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement.

Also, Wilfredo’s death did not render moot the forcible entry case.

Wherefore, the appeal is denied and accordingly affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals that, with the termination, upon his death, of respondent Wilfredo
Rivera’s usufructuary over the disputed property, the issue of restitution of
possession has been rendered moot and academic; on the other hand, the monetary
award of ₱620,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property up to the time of the Regional Trial Court decision, survives and
accrues to the estate of the deceased respondent Wilfredo Rivera, to be distributed
to his heirs pursuant to the applicable law on succession. Additional compensation
accrues and shall be added to the compensation from the time of the Regional Trial
Court decision up to respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s death.
67. Manila Electric v. Heirs of Deloy 697 SCRA 486 DOMINGO, Manolo
Jr. A.
68. PTA v. Sabandal- 701 SCRA 517 DULAY, May Anne P.

RULE OF CASUS OMISSUS

69. Chavez v. JBC 696 SCRA 496 ESTRADA, April P.
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting
in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase
“a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean
one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been met.

DECISION: Yes

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to

several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’
contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal
stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that
only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court
and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit
heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.

FORUM SHOPPING
70. Encinas v. Agustin Jr. 696 SCRA 240 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D.
71. Silverio v. Marcelo 696 SCRA 694 FORONDA, Fraulein G.
72. Kapisanang… v. Barreno 698 SCRA 79 Ganggangan, Delia U.
Facts:
 Respondents Remedios Barreno, Lilibeth Ametin, Dranrev
Nonay, Frederick Dionisio and Marites Casio are hired by Kapisanang
Pangkaunlaran ng Kababaihang Potrero, Inc. (KPKPI).
Later, respondents filed a complaint before the Department of
Labor and Employment for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
labor and standard benefit. During the pendency of the case, Barreno
was dismissed from work. She filed another complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of their money
claims before the NLRC.
The other respondents followed same suit of illegal dismissal
when disallowed to work in KPKPI.
KPKPI claimed that respondents committed forum shopping
when they filed the NLRC case during the pendency of the DOLE
case.

Issue: Was there forum shopping?

Ruling:
No. Forum shopping exists when one party repetitively avails of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court.
There is no identity of causes of action between the cases
pending with the DOLE and the NLRC. The Dole case involved
violations of labor standard provisions where an employer-employee
relationship exists. On the other hand, the NLRC case questioned the
propriety of respondents’ dismissal.

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS

73. Berenguer-Landers v. Florin 696 SCRA 589 GAWON,

Gina P.
FACTS
Berenguers are the registered owner of land in sorsogon. A
notice of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) regarding the acquisition of their land holding pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) or RA No. 6657.
They protested and applied the exclusion of their land with the DAR.
DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug denied their
application for exclusion from the CARP’s coverage in the order dated
 February 15, 1999. Berenguer filed a notice of appeal with the
Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending, Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative filed a petition for the
implementation of the order before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD). The petition was granted by Florin, as RARAD
and directed the issuance and implementation of the writ of
possession. The writ of possession was issued and Berenguers appeal
was denied

ISSUE
Whether or not the order can be ordered for execution pending
appeal?

RULING
Yes. The appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly
stayed the implementation of the Regional Director Dalugdug’s order.
Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order
executionpending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by
the DAR secretary directing the execution of the order dated February
15, 1999 during the pendency of the appeal by petitioner.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the
instances when execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or
order has become final and executor (2) pending appeal, only upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing and (3)
execution of several, separate or partial judgments.

74. RCBC v. Serra 701 SCRA 124 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C.

TAXPAYER’S SUIT
75. LBP v. Cacayuran 696 SCRA 861 KONNEK, Camille L.

EMINENT DOMAIN
76. Republic v. Samson-Tatad 696 SCRA 809 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A.
FACTS:
On 13 July 2001, petitioner, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several
defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of
several parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-
Quezon Avenue Flyover. During the pendency of the proceedings,
petitioner received a letter dated from the reporting that the subject
property was government land. Petitioner was therefore prompted to
file an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the area
conforming to the findings, and thereafter filed a Manifestation and
Motion to have the subject property declared or considered of
uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims. RTC inter alia
admitted the Amended Complaint and declared the property a subject
of conflicting claims. Private respondents interposed objections, saying
that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it
constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT No. RT-11603.
RTC rendered an order in favour of the private respondents. A
subsequent petition for certiorari was denied in the appellate court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
CAN THE COURT IN THE SAME EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING BE
GIVEN AUTHORITY TO ADJUDICATE ON THE OWNERSHIP OF A
PROPERTY?

HELD:
YES. petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its
ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to just compensation. That the court is
empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the
condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the
rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from
Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provide inter alia that “court
may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation X X X or the
benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto.” (Emphasis Supplied).

In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the

person or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be
expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor
prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely
require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of
eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership
of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.

If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court

is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine
who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains
open to challenge through proper actions. The consequences of Sec. 9,
 Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate relationship
of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment.
77. LBP v. Gonzales 698 SCRA 400 LAPAS, Jenelyn T.
78. NPC v. Cruz 702 SCRA 359 LEYGO, Vanessa A.
Facts:
NAPOCOR decided... to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of
land within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction
and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission
Line Project.
petitioner filed a Complaint[4] for eminent domain and expropriation of an
easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated,... petitioner deposited PhP
5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over the lots owned by
respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer
However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their
mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order,[6]
in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by respondent/intervenor Virgilio M.
Saulog, who claimed ownership of the... land sought to be expropriated
from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.
the trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was
concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just
compensation, and issued an Order directing the constitution of a Board of
Commissioners
The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics'
property,... Thus, both commissioners recommended that the property of
S.K. Dynamics to be expropriated by petitioner be valued at PhP 10,000.00
per square meter.
The records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties
the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct
hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to
the parties to attend hearings nor provide the concerned... parties the
opportunity to argue their respective causes.
the trial court consequently issued the Order approving the...
commissioners' report, and granted respondent Ferrer's motion to adopt the
subject report. Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate
properties to be expropriated by petitioner for its project was uniformly
pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
the Imus, Cavite RTC granted S.K. Dynamics' motion to have the 8.55-
square meter portion of its property included in the computation of just
compensation.
the trial court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP
10,000.00 per square meter.
Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, petitioner filed an appeal
before the CA.
the CA... nothing on record which would warrant the reversal of the Order
The CA then cited Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure[11] to explain why Resolution No. 08-95 could not "be used as [a]
basis for determining the just compensation of the subject lots, which by
reason of the changed commercial conditions... in the vicinity, could have
increased its value greater than its value three (3) years ago."
As regards the commissioners' failure to conduct a hearing "to give the
parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence," as alleged by
petitioner, the CA opined that "[t]he filing by [petitioner] of a motion for
reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to... dispute the findings of
the commissioners, so that [petitioner] was as fully heard as there might
have been hearing actually taken place x x x."
Issues:
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN IT WAS NOT ALLOWED
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE
EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.
THE VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION HEREIN WAS NOT BASED
FROM THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND OTHER AUTHENTIC
DOCUMENTS
Ruling:
Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular
inspection performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case,
they are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just
compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1)... notice of the
said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the
opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said
hearings.
First Issue:
Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the
opportunity to present evidence before the commissioners
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the
property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation
cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the
determination of just compensation, a hearing before the... commissioners
is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value,
the latter may only do so for valid... reasons, that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to
them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus,
"trial with the aid of... the commissioners is a substantial right that may not
be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."[15]
In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the
parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled
the trial court to disregard the commissioners' findings. The absence of
such trial or hearing constitutes reversible... error on the part of the trial
court because the parties' (in particular, petitioner's) right to due process
was violated.
In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that
the just compensation be pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The
commissioners arrived at the figure in question after their ocular inspection
of the property, wherein they considered the... surrounding structures, the
property's location and, allegedly, the prices of the other, contiguous real
properties in the area. Furthermore, based on the commissioners' report,
the recommended just compensation was determined as of the time of the
preparation of said... report on October 5, 1999.
Second Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioner was not deprived of
due process when it was able to file a motion for reconsideration... it is clear
that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation
was the commissioners' ocular inspection of the properties in question, as
gleaned from the commissioners' October 5, 1999 report. The trial court's
reliance on the said... report is a serious error considering that the
recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strong
factual moorings. For one, the report did not indicate the fair market value
of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City
Subdivision,... Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments
cited. Also, the report did not show how convenience facilities, public
transportation, and the residential and commercial zoning could have added
value to the lots being expropriated.
Moreover, the trial court did not amply explain the nature and application of
the "highest and best use" method to determine the just compensation in
expropriation cases. No attempt was made to justify the recommended "just
price" in the subject report through other... sufficient and reliable means
such as the holding of a trial or hearing at which the parties could have had
adequate opportunity to adduce their own evidence, the testimony of
realtors in the area concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration,
actual sales of lots in the... vicinity of the lot being expropriated on or about
the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the pertinent zonal
valuation derived from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, among others.
The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient
More so, the commissioners did not take into account that the Asian
financial crisis in the second semester of 1997 affected the fair market value
of the subject lots.
Furthermore, the commissioners' report itself is flawed considering that its
recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the
date when the said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of
the date of the filing of the complaint for... expropriation, or as of November
27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the complaint (when
just compensation should have been determined), and the time when the
commissioners' report recommending the just compensation was issued (or
almost one
[1] year after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct
amount of just compensation.

PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS/LACHES/RES

JUDICATA/LAW OF THE CASE
79. In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election of IBP
696 SCRA 8 LIPAGO, Julienne Joy C.
80. Natividad v. Mariano 697 SCRA 63 Nay-ud, Janice D.
81. Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte 698 SCRA 294 OCTUBRE, Excel D.
82. Abrigo v. Flores 698 SCRA 559 PARILLO, Warren D.
83. BCDA v. Reyes 699 SCRA 217 PECSOY, Ana N.
84. Sy v. Young 699 SCRA 8 POLINNEY, Reverita B.
Facts:

Genalyn alleged that she is the legitimate daughter of spouses George Young and Lilia
Dy.5 When George died, he left an unregistered parcel of land in Laguna. Lilia executed a
Second Supplemental to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition.7 The property was adjudicated
solely in Lilia’s favor in the partition. Lilia represented Genalyn, who was then a minor, in
the execution of the document.

Subsequently, Lilia obtained a loan from the spouses Sy with the property as
security.8 When Lilia defaulted on her loan, the property was foreclosed and sold to the
spouses Sy. Thereafter, the spouses Sy registered the certificate of sale9 with the Office of
the Register of Deeds and obtained a tax declaration10 in their name.

In her complaint, Genalyn argued that the partition was unenforceable since she was only a
minor at the time of its execution. She also pointed out that the partition was contrary to
the Rules of Court because it was without the court’s approval.

Genalyn filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit a Supplemental Complaint with the
attached Supplemental Complaint. In the supplemental complaint, she invoked her right to
exercise legal redemption as a co-owner of the disputed property. However, the RTC denied
the motion in its Order.

Subsequently, she filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA.

The CA denied the petition .Thereafter, she elevated the case with this Court in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issues

(1) whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC Orders which dismissed the case
for non-suit; and

(2) whether or not Genalyn guilty of forum shopping .

Ruling

No. The present action is barred by the law of the case.

The law of the case does not have the finality of res judicata. Law of the case applies only to
the same case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has
been done in another case. In law of the case, the rule made by an appellate court cannot be
departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. Furthermore, law of the case
relates entirely to questions of law while res judicata is applicable to the conclusive
determination of issues of fact. Although res judicata may include questions of law, it is
generally concerned with the effect of adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.

The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and
decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal. Without it, there would be endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on
changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once
gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case.

On the second issue, we unequivocably also settled that Genalyn committed forum shopping
when she filed an appeal and a petition for certiorari successively.

85. PNB v. Maranon 700 SCRA 297 ROSARIO, Leah L.

Facts:

To secure a loan, Spouses Montealegre mortaged to PNB the subject lot erected with a building
leased by various tenants. When the spouses failed to pay the loan, PNB initiated foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged properties, including the subject lot. PNB emerged as the highest
bidder and was issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale.

Before the expiration of the redemption period, Spouses Marañon filed a complaint for Annulment of
Title, Reconveyance and Damages alleging that they are the true registered owners of the subject
lot, and that Montealegre used a falsified Deed of Sale bearing their forged signatures.

On June 2, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision adjudging PNB to be a mortgagee in good faith
whose lien on the subject lot must be respected. It also ruled in favor of the respondents after
finding, based on the expert testimony that the signatures of Spouses Marañon in the Deed of Sale
were forged. Hence, the sale was null and void and as such it did not transfer any right or title in law.
Neither of the parties sought a reconsideration of the decision nor did they elevate the same for
appellate review.

Tolete, one of the tenants, deposited his rental fees of P 144,000.00 and P 30,000.00 to the clerk of
court. Spouses Marañon filed an Urgent Motion for the Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals praying that
the rental fees shall be deposited and released in their favor for having been adjudged as the real
owner of the subject lot. The RTC granted the motions. Aggrieved, PNB moved for reconsideration
averring that as declared by the RTC in its earlier decision, its mortgage lien should be carried over
to the new title reconveying the lot to Spouses Marañon. PNB prayed that the rental fees be
released in its favor.

In November 2006, the RTC issued an order denying PNB’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC
further held that PNB is not a mortgagee in good faith because as a financial institution imbued with
public interest, it should have looked beyond the certificate of title presented by Spouses
Montealegre and conducted an inspection on the circumstances surrounding the transfer to Spouses
Montealegre. PNB moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the CA. Hence, the
present recourse.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC Decision dated June 2, 2006 lapsed into finality when it was not appealed or
submitted for reconsideration. As such, all conclusions therein are immutable and can no longer be
modified by any court even by the RTC that rendered the same?

Ruling:

YES. The status of PNB’s lien on the subject lot has already been settled by the RTC in its Decision
dated June 2, 2006 where it was adjudged as a mortgagee in good faith whose lien shall subsist and
be respected. The decision lapsed into finality when neither of the parties moved for its
reconsideration or appealed.

Being a final judgment, the dispositions and conclusions therein have become immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties but even the courts. This is known as the doctrine of
immutability of judgments which espouses that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

Hence, as correctly argued by PNB, the issue on its status as a mortgagee in good faith have been
adjudged with finality and it was error for the CA to still delve into and, worse, overturn, the same.
The CA had no other recourse but to uphold the status of PNB as a mortgagee in good faith
regardless of its defects for the sake of maintaining stability of judicial pronouncements. "The main
role of the courts of justice is to assist in the enforcement of the law and in the maintenance of peace
and order by putting an end to judiciable controversies with finality. Nothing better serves this role
than the long-established doctrine of immutability of judgments."

86. Polymer Rubber v. Salamuding 702 SCRA 153 TABUZO, Mae Abegail
I.
FACTS:
Salamuding (Salamuding), Mariano Gulanan and Rodolfo Raif were
employees of petitioner
Polymer Rubber Corporation who were dismissed after allegedly committing
certain irregularities against Polymer. The 3 employees filed a complaint
against Polymer and Ang for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-
payment of overtime services, violation of P.D. 851with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of backwages, atty’s fees, moral and exemplary
damages.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice but directed
Polymer to reinstate the Salamuding et. Al.with full back wages. A writ of
execution was subsequently issued to implement said
judgment..
Upon appeal of Polymer with the NLRC, the decision was affirmed but
deleted only the award of moral and exemplary damages. The case was
elevated to SC deleting the award of overtime pay and then later on Sept.
30, 1993 Polymer ceased its operations
Upon motion, the Labor arbiter a quo issued a writ of execution but the
same was returned unsatisfied and until the latter part of 2004, Polymer
was gutted by fire.
Labor arbiter issued a 5th alias writ of execution so that in its
implementation, the shares of stocks of Ang and USA Resources Corp. were
levied. Polymer and Ang moved to quash said 5th alias writ of execution and
to lift notice of garnishment. They alleged that Ang should not be held
jointly and severally liable with Polymer since it was only the latter which
was held liable in the decision of the LA, NLRC and the Supreme Court. LA
granted the motion and the same was affirmed by the NLRC. Salamuding
file a petition for certiorari with CA. CA stated that there has to be a
responsible person or persons working in the interest of Polymer who may
also be considered as the employer. Since Ang as the director of Polymer
was considered the highest ranking officer of Polymer, he was therefore
properly impleaded and may be held jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of Polymer to its dismissed employe
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not after the finality of the decision, the same
cannot be altered or modified, making ANg jointly and severally
liable.
RULING:
No. To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment
of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and later by the SC had already long
become final and executory. It has been held that a final and executory
judgment can no longer be altered. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest Court of the land. “Since the alias writ of execution did
not conform, is different from and thus went beyond or varied the tenor of
the judgment which gave it life, it is a nullity. To maintain otherwise would
be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his
property without due process of law.

JUDICIAL NOTICE
87. Chingkoe v. Chingkoe 696 SCRA 729 VARGAS, Eunice K.
Facts: Respondents Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe are the registered owners of a real property. They claim that in
1990, out of tolerance and permission, they allowed respondent Faustino’s brother, Felix, and his wife, Rosita, to
inhabit the property. Due to the intercession of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed to sell the property to
Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered only after Felix and Rosita’s payment of the full purchase price,
and after respondents’ settlement of their mortgage obligations with RCBC. After further prodding from their
mother, and at Felix’s request, Faustino agreed to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of a Deed of Absolute
Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents themselves drafted the deed, the parties again agreed
that the document would only be completed after full payment.
On 24 July 2001, Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe sent a demand letter to petitioners Felix and Rosita asking them to
vacate the premises. To this date, petitioners have refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer with the MTC of QC.

In their Answer, petitioners presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 October 1994,
claiming that respondents had sold the property for P3,130,000, which petitioners had paid in full and in cash on
the same day. Due to respondents’ adamant refusal to surrender the title to them as buyers, petitioners were
allegedly constrained to file an action for specific performance with QC RTC.

The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by Felix and Rosita and dismissed the Complaint, citing their
absolute ownership as provided for in the Absolute Deed of Sale, and that Faustino and Gloiria never reserved their
rights and interests over the property after the sale,

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC but the CA reversed the findings and ruled that a mere plea of title over
disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession.
Citing Refugia v. Court of Appeals, the CA found that petitioners’ stay on the property was merely a tolerated
possession, which they were no longer entitled to continue. The deed they presented was not one of sale, but a
"document preparatory to an actual sale, prepared by the petitioners upon the insistence and prodding of their
mother to soothe in the temper of respondent Felix Chingkoe." Felix and Rosita appealed the CA ruling, claiming
that the Court’s assessment of the validity of the Deed of Sale was improper in summary proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the court could rule on the validity of a notarized Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action

Held:

. It should be noted that it was the petitioners who introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC and
the RTC, as evidence of their claimed right to possession over the property.1The CA discovered that they falsified
their copy of the document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale. They made it appear in the draft of the Deed of
Absolute Sale that there indeed was a valid and consummated sale when in truth and in fact, there was none.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in unlawful detainer
cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. This Court has repeatedly ruled that
although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally
resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. The issue is pure
physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.
The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality. Trial courts must
necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule on the right of possession.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by
the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's possession became
illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by
any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the
property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.
Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the
parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.

WRIT OF EXECUTION/EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

88. Green Acres v. Cabral 697 SCRA 266 ABES, Nestor Jr. P.
89. Pia v. Gervacio Jr. 697 SCRA 220

FACTS:

The respondent Dr. Roman Dannug (Dannug), in his capacity as

Dean of the College of Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP) of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint against
Dr. Zenaiua Pia (Pia) who was then a professor at PUP, for directly selling
to her students books believed to be overpriced, in violation of Section 3,
Article X of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers. For her defense,
Pia argued that her students were not forced to buy copies of the book.

Herein respondent Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. as the overall Deputy

Ombudsman and Acting Ombudsman, declared Pia guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Pia filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied.

Feeling aggrieved, Pia filed a petition for review with the CA.

Even before she could have filed the petition, respondents Dannug
and Dr. Ofelia M. Carague (Carague), former PUP President, implemented
the penalty of suspension that was imposed by the Office of Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dannug and Carague erred in implementing the

Office of the Ombudsman’s decision during the time that Pia’s period to
appeal had not yet expired.

RULING:

The Court finds no irregularity in Dannug and Carague’s

implementation of the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
notwithstanding the fact that Pia then still had the remedy of an appeal
before the CA.

The Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 14-A (AO 14-A),

amending Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The amendment aims to provide uniformity with other
disciplining authorities in the execution or implementation of judgments and
penalties in administrative disciplinary cases involving public officials and
employees. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by AO 14-A, reads:

"Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the

respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or
order denying the motion for reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory In case
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal,
he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal."

90. Abrigo v. Flores 698 SCRA 559 BALAGEO, Arvin T.

FACTS: Involved in the suit is a lot with an area of 402 square
meters situated in the Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna and
inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia (Faylona)
from their deceased parents. The lot is declared for taxation
purposes which Gaudencia managed to secure in her name alone
to the exclusion of Francisco and the latter’s widow and children.
It appears that after Francisco’s death, his widow and Gaudencia
entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of
the same lot was assigned to Francisco’s heirs while the eastern
half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however, no actual ground
partition of the lot up to and after Gaudencia’s death. It thus
result that both the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in
common the land in dispute, which co-ownership was recognized
by Gaudencia herself during her lifetime, whose heirs, being in
actual possession of the entire area, encroached and built
improvements on portions of the western half. In the case of the
petitioners, a small portion of their residence, their garage and
poultry pens extended to the western half.

In the RTC at San Pablo City, the heirs and successors-in-interest

of Francisco Faylona, among whom are the private respondents,
desiring to terminate their co-ownership with the heirs of
Gaudencia, filed their complaint for judicial partition in this case.
The RTC rendered judgment for the private respondents by
ordering the partition of the land in dispute in such a way that the
western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco while
the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia whose heirs were
further required to pay rentals to the plaintiffs for their use and
occupancy of portions on the western half.

The heirs of Gaudencia, petitioners included, went on appeal to

this Court (SC). And this Court affirmed the appealed judgment
of the CA, minus the award for rentals. With no further appellate
proceedings having been taken by the petitioners and their other
co-heirs, an Entry of Judgment was issued by this Court.

Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the CA a motion for

execution to enforce and implement its decision as modified by
this Court. Pending action thereon and pursuant to the parties’
agreement to engage the services of a geodetic engineer to
survey and subdivide the land in question, the CA issued an order
appointing Engr. Domingo Donato "to cause the survey and
subdivision of the land in question and to make his report thereon
within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof."

The CA took note of the report submitted by Engr. Donato. In the

same order, however, the court likewise directed the defendants,
more specifically the herein petitioners, to remove, within the
period specified therein, all their improvements which encroached
on the western half. They are given 2 months within which to
remove their garage, a small portion of their residence which was
extended to a portion of the property of the plaintiffs as well as
the chicken pens thereon and to show proof of compliance
herewith. Petitioners again prayed the respondent court for a final
extension of sixty (60) days within which to comply with the order.
Petitioners alleged that they "are about to conclude an
arrangement with the plaintiffs and just need ample time to
finalize the same." Private respondents interposed an opposition,
therein stating that the alleged arrangement alluded to by the
petitioners did not yield any positive result. The CA denied
petitioners’ motion for extension of time to remove their
improvements and issued a writ of execution.

Sheriff Baliwag served the writ on the petitioners, giving the latter
a period twenty (20) days from notice within which to remove
their structures which occupied portions of private respondents’
property. The implementing sheriff returned the writ "PARTIALLY
SATISFIED", with the information that petitioners failed to remove
that portion of their residence as well as their garage and poultry
fence on the western half of the property.

Private respondents then filed with the CA a Motion for Issuance

of Special Order of Demolition. Before the CA could act on private
respondents’ aforementioned motion for demolition, petitioners
filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, this
time alleging that they have become one of the co-owners of the
western half to the extent of 53.75 square meters thereof,
purportedly because one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco
Faylona – Jimmy Flores – who was co-plaintiff of the private
respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the western
half.

In the herein first assailed order, the CA denied petitioners’

motion to defer resolution of private respondents’ motion for a
special order of demolition and directed the issuance of an alias
writ of execution. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
thereunder insisting that being now one of the co-owners of the
western half, there is need to defer action of the motion for
demolition until the parties in the co-ownership of said half shall
have decided in a formal partition which portion thereof belongs
to each of them.
A timely opposition to the motion for reconsideration was filed by
the private respondents, thereunder arguing that the alleged
Deed of Sale and supposedly executed by Jimmy Flores was
merely falsified by the latter because one of the Floreses, Marites
Flores, did not actually participate in the execution thereof,
adding that the same document which seeks to bind them
(private respondents) as nonparticipating third parties, cannot be
used as evidence against them for the reason that the deed is not
registered. An alias writ of execution was again issued. Again,
petitioners failed and refused to comply.

Petitioners instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA

against respondents and the RTC, alleging that the RTC had
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order denying their motion to defer
resolution on the motion for demolition, and the order denying
their motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners contended that the sale to them by respondent Jimmy

Flores, one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, of
his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot
had meanwhile made them co-owners of the western portion, and
constituted a supervening event occurring after the finality of the
November 20, 1989 decision that rendered the execution
inequitable as to them.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition, but the CA
denied their motion.

ISSUE: Whether the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his share

in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot constituted a
supervening event that rendered the execution of the final
judgment against petitioners inequitable.

RULING: NO. The contention of petitioners that the sale by

Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the
402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated March 4, 1998
was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable
is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the

execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment,
one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not
obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the
final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the
western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-
in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the
¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The
reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the
November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no
longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification was meant to correct what was
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and
regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land,
rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a
final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of
substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like:
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case;
(d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine;
(e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced by the suspension.

Petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the
property in litis their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share
of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to
initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the
western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy
Flores.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event

is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter
already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights
or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution
unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of
facts that transpire after the judgment became final and
executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the
judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were
not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters
were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the
interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the
quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to
modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice
and the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening
event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts
by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy
to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable
judgment.

Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share
in the western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be
true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the partition
of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the
CA because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the
transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores,
having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of
sale itself.

The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not

constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance
would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the
execution of the final and immutable decision. According to
Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the property
subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon
special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment
obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his
agent has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable
time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed to
carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the
western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners,
the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be
upheld.
It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for
nearly 17 years now the full implementation of the final and
immutable decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the CA.
It is high time, then, that the Court puts a firm stop to the long
delay in order to finally enable the heirs and successors-in-
interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning parties to deservedly
enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.

SUPPORT/SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

91. Lim-Lua v. Lua 697 SCRA 237 BUMATANG, Mylena Kate D.

REPLEVIN
92. Agner v. BPI 697 SCRA 89 CADAP, Jefferson B.
FACTS: Petitioners spouses Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage
in favor of Citimotors, Inc. Thereafter the right and interest of Citimotors, Inc. in the
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage was assigned the same to respondent BPI. For
failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002
despite repeated demands, respondent filed an action for Replevin and Damages. A writ
of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized. After trial on the
merits, RTC ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay
the amount of Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August
20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Petitioner
elevated the case before the SC and argued that respondent’s remedy of resorting to
both actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to the provision of
Article 1484 of the Civil Code
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of replevin and ordering the
party against whom writ was issued to pay the applicant the value of the obligation
considering that the writ was never implemented.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The vehicle subject matter of this case was never
recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As
there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of
the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued,
commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully
granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of
"exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust
enrichment to speak of.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION

93. Metro Manila v. Toledo 697 SCRA 425 CALABIAS, Lesther G.
697 SCRA 425
Facts:
On October 20, 2003, petitioners filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against respondents, reiterating their claim that Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code is null
and void.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss dated November 6, 2003, In an Order dated

December 10 2003, the RTC did not address the arguments raised in the aforesaid Motion to
Dismiss but merely admitted petitioners’ amended complaint. Consequently, respondents filed
their Answer on December 16, 2003 .

In its Decision dated December 7, 2006, the RTC held that respondents’ assessment of
local business tax under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code is null and void.

On June 26, 2007, respondents filed their Petition for Review dated June 22, 2007 via
registered mail. On June 28, 2007, respondents likewise filed a Manifestation dated June 27,
2007 via personal filing, alleging that they have previously filed their Petition for Review via
registered mail on June 26, 2007 and that they are attaching another copy of the same in the
Manifestation. In its Resolution dated July 6, 2007, the CTA Division granted respondents’
Motions for Extension, noted their Manifestation, and admitted their Petition for Review.

In its Decision dated October 31, 2008, the CTA Division reversed and set aside the
RTC’s ruling and in effect for failure to contest the denial of their protest before a court of
competent jurisdiction within the period provided for under Section 195 of Republic Act No. 7160
and thus, the assessment became conclusive and unappealable.

In its Decision dated September 8, 2009, the CTA En Banc upheld the CTA Division’s
ruling and found that: (1) respondents were able to file their Petition for Review within the
reglementary period. On October 1, 2009, petitioners moved for reconsideration but the CTA En
Banc denied the same in its Resolution32 dated January 4, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CTA Division correctly gave due course to respondents Petition for Review.

Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.

Respondents’ failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of the
RRCTA militate against giving due course to their Petition for Review. Respondents’ submission
of only one copy of the said petition and their failure to attach therewith a certified true copy of
the RTC’s decision constitute mere formal defects which may be relaxed in the interest of
substantial justice.

It is well-settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on technical grounds is frowned

upon as every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.
 In this regard, the CTA Division did not overstep its boundaries when it admitted
respondents Petition for Review despite the aforementioned defects "in the broader interest of
justice."

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

94. Natividad v. Mariano 697 SCRA 63 CASTILLEJO, Mark Dave S.

MANDAMUS
95. Priv’n and Management v. Strategic Alliance… 698 SCRA 517 Dally,
Sheryl G.

FACTS:

As established by Administrative Order No. 397, the indebtedness of

Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to various government
financial institutions was transferred to the National Government (NG) through the
Committee on Privatization (COP)/Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and the Bureau
of Treasury.

Consequently, APT slated the privatization of PNCC in order to generate

maximum cash recovery for the government. Thus, sometime in July of 2000, it
announced the holding of a public bidding involving the “as is, where is basis”
package sale of stocks, receivables, and securities owned by the National
Government in the PNCC.

Dong-A Consortium signified its intention to bid. APT conducted the bid. It
first declared that Dong-A Consortium, Pacific Infrastructure Development
International, and Philippine Exporters Confederation qualified as bidders.
Thereafter, it announced that the indicative price of the PNCC properties was
P7,000,000,000.

The next day, APT faxed a letter to Dong-A Consortium informing the latter
that its offer had been rejected. Dong-A Consortium then asked for reconsideration
and requested the award of the PNCC properties.

Later, the term of APT expired. Petitioner PMO was organized to implement
the disposition of the government-acquired assets, including the PNCC shares.
PMO thus took over the correspondences involving the bid. It communicated to
Dong-A Consortium that the decision to reject the bid stood.

STRADEC filed a Complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of Award

and/or Damages on behalf of Dong-A Consortium against PMO and PNCC. It
contested the high indicative price that caused it to lose the bid. STRADEC also
pushed for the reduction of the indicative price and demanded that a Notice of
Award of the PNCC properties be issued in its favor.

During pretrial, the parties entered into several stipulations. Significantly,

they agreed that to be issued the Notice of Award, the winning bidder must satisfy
and comply with all of the ASBR’s terms and conditions, including the indicative
price.

Siding with the bidder, the RTC ruled that PMO had committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to explain the basis of the indicative price.

The trial court directed the issuance of the Notice of Award in favor of
Dong-A Consortium.

Aggrieved, PMO and PNCC appealed before the CA.

In its assailed Decision, the CA emphasized that competitive public bidding

must be fair, legitimate and honest. From this standard, it went on to state that
PMO must not only reveal the basis of the indicative price, but must also award the
sale of the PNCC assets to Dong-A Consortium.

PNCC moved for reconsideration, but the motion is still pending in the CA.
On the other hand, PMO proceeded directly to this Court via a Rule 45 Petition.

In its pleading, PMO raises several issues, including the locus standi of
STRADEC and the prescription of action. But principally, PMO contests the
directives of the courts a quo to issue the Notice of Award to Dong-A Consortium.

ISSUE:

Whether A Writ of Mandamus be issued to compel the issuance of the Notice

of Award to Dong-A Consortium.

RULING:

No, because Dong-A Consortium has no right to receive the award, since it
failed to match the indicative price.
 As accurately depicted by the OSG, to compel the issuance of a Notice of
Award is tantamount to a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Mandamus, however, will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
by a public officer on whom the law imposes the right or duty to exercise judgment
in reference to any matter in which the officer is required to act. Respondent has no
cause of action to compel APT to award the bid to Dong-A Consortium.

Neither can mandamus be issued unless a clear right of the bidder is shown.
Mandamus does not lie if the right is doubtful.

Petitioner cannot be compelled to accept the bid of Dong-A Consortium

since this forced consent treads on the government’s freedom to contract. The
freedom of persons to enter into contracts is a policy of the law, and courts should
move with all necessary caution and prudence when interfering with it.

It must be remembered that in the field of competitive public bidding, the

owner of the property to be auctioned – the government – enjoys a wide latitude of
discretion and autonomy in choosing the terms of the agreement. This principle is
especially true in this case, since the policy decision then was for APT to liquidate
nonperforming assets of the government in order to recover losses. Therefore,
absent any abuse of discretion, injustice, unfairness or fraudulent acts, this Court
refrains from discrediting the judgment call of APT to prefatorily refuse any offer
that fell below the indicative price.

PROCEDURAL RULES AND TECHNICALITIES

96. Oriental Ship v. Nazal 697 SCRA 51 DOMINGO, Manolo Jr. A.
97. Sy v. Local Gov’t of QC 697 SCRA 621 DULAY, May Anne P.

INDIRECT CONTEMPT
98. Philworth Asis v. PCIB 697 SCRA 206 ESTRADA, April P.

Facts:

On May 31, 1991, the former Philippine Commercial

International Bank (PCIB) sued petitioners in the RTC to recover upon
an unpaid debt (Civil Case No. 911536), alleging that on September
22, 1988, petitioner Philworth Asia, Inc. (Philworth) had borrowed
P270,000.00 from PCIB to be paid on or before November 8, 1988 in
accordance with a promissory note; that petitioners Spouses Luisito
and Elizabeth Mactal (Mactals) and Spouses Luis and Eloisa Reyes
(Reyeses) had executed a deed of suretyship binding themselves to
pay Philworth’s obligations under the promissory note should
 Philworth refuse to perform its obligation; that Philworth had paid
only partially, leaving an unpaid balance of P225,533.33, inclusive of
interest and penalty charges; that Philworth had not paid its balance
despite repeated demands; and that attempts to collect from the
Mactals and Reyeses had likewise failed. On July 5, 1991, the Reyeses
filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses, specifically
countering that PCIB had no cause of action against them; that Luis
Reyes had signed the promissory note as an employee of Philworth,
but had not signed the deed of suretyship in November 1988 because
he had already resigned from Philworth on October 16, 1988; that
Luisito Mactal, the President and General Manager of Philworth,
should be the person liable under the deed of suretyship; that PCIB
had not made demands upon all the parties; and that PCIB did not
exhaust all the available properties of Philworth before bringing the
suit also against them. JUNE2013 In their answer filed on August 20,
1991, the Mactals averred that the defendants had substantially paid
their obligation, but that PCIB had unreasonably refused to properly
account for and credit the payments; that PCIB had been charging
exorbitant and unconscionable interest, penalties and other charges;
and that if the previous payments were duly credited, the unpaid
balance would only be minimal. The first pre-trial conference, which
was set on May 19, 1994, was moved several times afterwards, until
the parties were notified that the conference would finally be held on
April 25, 1995. On April 3, 1995, petitioners sought the transfer of the
conference of April 25, 1995 to May 2, 1995. They later on further
moved for the conference to be held on May 12, 1995. But no
conference was held on May 12, 1995. Instead, the conference was
reset on two later dates, i.e., June 2, 1995 and July 21, 1995. Although
petitioners again moved to reset the conference on June 1, 1995, the
RTC denied petitioners’ motion for postponement on June 2, 1995,
and declared them as in default because of their non-appearance and
allowed PCIB to present evidence ex parte.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process.

Held: No. It is basic that as long as a party is given the

opportunity to defend his interest in due course, he would have no
reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes
up the essence of due process. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral argument or through pleadings, is accorded there can be
no denial of procedural due process. The most basic tenet of due
process is the right to be heard. Where a party had been afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.
 Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an
opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or
forfeited without violating the Bill of Rights.

Petitioners were not denied their right to be heard. As outlined

above, the RTC set the case several times for the pre-trial and the
trial. In so doing, the RTC undeniably relaxed the rigid application of
the rules of procedure out of its desire to afford to petitioners the
opportunity to fully ventilate their side on the merits of the case. The
RTC thereby acted with liberality. This was in line with the time
honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all
the parties the chance to argue and prove their respective sides.
Here, however, they apparently stretched the limits of the RTC’s
liberality, to the point of abusing it. A review of the proceedings has
given the Court the impression that they deliberately delayed the
presentation of their evidence by asking postponements of the
hearings. The pattern of delay that followed indicated that they did
not intend to present any evidence in their favor, and that they were
simply temporizing as a way of avoiding the inevitable adverse
outcome of the case. Otherwise, they and their counsel would have
easily completed the task of presenting their evidence and shunned
the delays. They did present Ms. Garcia on direct examination, but
they thereafter did not see to the completion of her testimony.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

99. Rep. Gas v. Petron 698 SCRA 666 FLORESCA, Jennylyn D.

ATTACHMENT
100. Lim Jr. v. Lazaro 700 SCRA 547 FORONDA, Fraulein G.

CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
101. Re Letter-Complaint of Fabiana against Justice Reyes 700 SCRA
348 Ganggangan, Delia U.
Facts:
In a claim of death benefits of the heirs of Marlon Fabiana(heirs)
against agent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) and its
principal Air Sea Holiday GMVH-Stable Organizations Italia, the
Labor Arbiter(LA) granted the claims of the heirs. Then on an appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reduced the moral
and exemplary damages but the other awards are affirmed.
 The parties separately brought their petition for certiorari to the
Court of Appeal.
The heirs assail the jurisdiction of the NLRC in entertaining the
appeal of Magsaysay and its principal and south the reinstatement of
the first moral and exemplary damages awarded by the LA.
On another petition, Magsaysay and its principal challenge the
propriety of the monetary awards granted to the heirs.
In their comment, the heirs sought the consolidation of the two
petitions. It was not acted upon but became moot and academic when
the CA promulgates on the first petition by the heirs.

Issue: Should the two petitions consolidated?

Ruling:
Yes, Section 3(a), Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals has forthrightly mandated the consolidation of related
cases assigned to different justices. The two(2) petitions showed that
they involved the same parties and the same facts. Even their issues
of law, albeit not entiretly identical, were closely related to one
another. The request for consolidation by the heirs should have been
granted and the two petitions consolidated in the same division of the
CA.

102. Nat’l Artist v. Exec. Sec 701 SCRA 269 GAWON, Gina P.
FACTS:
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select
those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set
the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted
this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction praying that the
Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to
have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claim
that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting
her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to
petitioners, the President’s discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. The choice of respondent Guidote Alvarez was
illegal and unethical because, as the then Executive Director of the
NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and arts, she was
disqualified from even being nominated.
 Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning
National Artists and insists that there could be no prejudice to the
latter, and that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are
improper as the act sought to be enjoined - the declaration of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as
National Artists - had already been consummated. In particular,
respondents were already proclaimed National Artists.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioners have the standing to bring the present case to the
court for adjudication; and
(2) Whether the remedies of prohibition and injunction are proper.
RULING:
(1) Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper
party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication. The parties who assail
the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a
direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way. They must show
that they have been or are about to be denied some right or privilege to
which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or
privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National
Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the
privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists. To allow
the untrammelled discretion and authority of the President to confer the
Order of National Artists without regard to the stringent screening and
rigorous selection process established by the NCCA and the CCP will
diminish, if not negate, the exclusive nature of the said Order. It will unduly
subject the selection and conferment of the Order of National Artists to
politics rather than to principles and procedures. It will subvert the
transparent and rigorous process and allow entry to the exclusive Order of
National Artists through a secret backdoor of lobbying, back channeling and
political accommodation.
 (2) It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are
preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is
already accomplished. Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined
has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction
becomes moot. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic
if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." There are times when the
controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to
assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the
merits of a case.

INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
103. PNP Directorate 702 SCRA 496 GOMEYAC, Lourdes C.

JUST COMPENSATION
104. LBP v. American Rubber 702 SCRA 166 KONNEK, Camille L.
105. Sec. of DPWH v. Tecson 700 SCRA 243 LAIGO, Jurry Ciel A.
FACTS:
Sps. Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of land in Maloloas,
Bulacan. This was among the properties taken by the government
sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and without the
necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of
the MacArthur Highway. The spouses demanded payment of the FMV of
the land, but was offered another amount which the spouses did not
approve of. Their demand went unheeded, so they filed a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages against petitioners. Instead of
filing an answer, they moved for dismissal of the complaint. Among the
grounds is prescription. The amount of the compensation owed them
was also disputed.

ISSUE:
WON the just compensation should be fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the governent.

HELD:
Yes, When a property is taken by the government for public use,
jurisprudence provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The
owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not,
the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for
the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed
to have waived and are estopped form assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was
 exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of compensation. The
RTC and CA found that respondents are entitled to compensation. The
only issue left is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. This rule is true when the property is taken
before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property
owner who brings the action for compensation. The RTC and CA found
that the FMV of the property in 1940 was P0.70/sq.m.

Therefore it should be used in determining the amount due

respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500. While
disparity in the amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to
respondents as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after
a very long period. It is equally true that they are also remiss in
guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just
compensation DOES NOT imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to
the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.

Petitioners had been occupying the property for more than 50

years without the benefit of expropriation proceedings. In taking
respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
and without payment of just compensation, petitioners acted in
disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights which cannot be allowed
by the Court. For this they are entitled to compensation in the form of
actual/compensatory damages (6% on value of land at the time of
taking in 1940 until full payment).

RECEIVERSHIP
106. Tantano v. Espina-Caboverde 702 SCRA 508 LAPAS, Jenelyn T.
107. Lim v. DBP 700 SCRA 210 LEYGO, Vanessa A.
Facts:
On November 24, 1969, petitioners Carlos, Consolacion, and Carlito, all
surnamed Lim, obtained a loan of P40,000.00 (Lim Account) from
respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to finance their
cattle raising business.
To secure the loans, petitioners executed a Mortgage[11] in favor of DBP
over real properties covered by the following titles registered in the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of South Cotabato:
Due to violent confrontations between government troops and Muslim
rebels in Mindanao from 1972 to 1977, petitioners were forced to abandon
their cattle ranch.[13] As a result, their business collapsed and they failed
to pay the loan... amortizations.
On February 21, 1992, Edmundo received a Notice of Foreclosure scheduled
the following day.
On September 21, 1992, Edmundo received another Notice from the Sheriff
that the mortgaged properties would be auctioned on November 22, 1992.
Edmundo again paid P30,000.00 as additional interest to postpone the
auction.[39]
But despite payment of P30,000.00, the mortgaged properties were still
auctioned with DBP emerging as the highest bidder in the amount of
P1,086,867.26.
On September 21, 1993, Edmundo received Notice that the mortgaged
properties were scheduled to be auctioned on that day.
On June 8, 1994, the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of the RTC of General Santos City issued a Notice[77] resetting the
public auction sale of the mortgaged properties on July 11, 1994. Said
Notice was published for... three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in General Santos City.
Issues:
In addition, petitioners insist that the foreclosure sale is void for lack of
personal notice
Ruling:
But while DBP had a right to foreclose the mortgage, we are constrained to
nullify the foreclosure sale due to the bank's failure to send a notice of
foreclosure to petitioners.
We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate, "personal notice
to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary"[116] because Section 3[117] of Act 3135 only requires the
posting of the... notice of sale in three public places and the publication of
that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph 11 of the Mortgage that:
11. All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters,
summons, subpoenas, or notification of any judicial or extra-judicial action
shall be sent to the Mortgagor at xxx or at the address that may hereafter
be given in writing... by the Mortgagor or the Mortgagee;[
However, no notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was sent by DBP to
petitioners about the foreclosure sale scheduled on July 11, 1994. The
letters dated January 28, 1994 and March 11, 1994 advising petitioners to
immediately pay their obligation to avoid the impending... foreclosure of
their mortgaged properties are not the notices required in paragraph 11 of
the Mortgage. The failure of DBP to comply with their contractual
agreement with petitioners, i.e., to send notice, is a breach sufficient to
invalidate the foreclosure sale.
Principles:
We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate, "personal notice
to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary"[116] because Section 3[117] of Act 3135 only requires the
posting of the... notice of sale in three public places and the publication of
that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.

WRIT OF POSSESSION
108. Nagtalon v. UCPB 702 SCRA 615 LIPAGO, Julienne Joy C.