Lesaca vs Lesaca
One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that
Facts: Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on
November 8, 1946. He was survived by his second wife (Juana
Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his
marriage, and three acknowledged natural children by a third
woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F.
Lesaca, his children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. It
appears that the deceased and his widow, Juana Felix, had
lived together maritally since 1924 but were not married until
December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his death.
Issues and Holdings:
Whether the allowances for support granted by the court to
legitimate minor children of the deceased pending liquidation of
his estate are subject to collation and deductible from their
share of the inheritance? Obviously, the answer should be
the affirmative.
Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of
land sold a retrovendendo before such
marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property
or not. In our opinion the question calls for a negative
answer.
Whether a standing crop of palay planted during coverture, and
harvested after the death of the one of the consorts, constitutes
fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil
Code, and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the
surviving spouse. It should belong to the conjugal
partnership
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Yaptinchay vs Torres
Facts: Teresita C. Yaptinchay alleged that the deceased Isidro
Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and
publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from
1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964
to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay City; that the
deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of
personal and real properties situated in the Philippines,
Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about
P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge and information, the
deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary
Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of age; that on
July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the
residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the
deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner.
It was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of
a special
administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the
deceased pending appointment of a regular
administrator became an urgent necessity.
Issue: Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably
based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be
decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership."
Held: But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of
the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed
by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown
before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue.
the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-
ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the "present
right" or title that would make available the protection or aid
afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the existence of a clear
positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights;
nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
************************************************************************
So vs Valera
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973
after being introduced to each other by a common friend. The
petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school student;
the respondent was a 21-year old college student. Their
meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law
relationship, culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the
Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991. They had three (3)
children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni) in their relationship and
subsequent marriage. Petitioner related that respondent asked
him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage
contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the
condition that these documents would only be used if they
decide to get married. He maintained that no marriage
ceremony took place in 1991.
 Petitioner shows the ff proof for psychological
incapacity and initiated proceedings that will annul his
marriage with respondent:
 respondent did not want to practice her profession
after passing the dental board exam; and that she
sold the dental equipment he bought for her
 Respondent locks petitioner out of the house leaving
him to sleep in his car.
 Respondent went out with his employees to gamble
whenever there were no clients
 Respondent threw petitioner and his things out of the
house and refused to take him back.
 Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioner’s
clients
 Respondent was not the one who took care of their
children
Issues:
W/N the marriage was void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity using proof presented by petitioner.
Held:
Petition (to hold that marriage is void ab initio) Denied.
The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack of the
essential and formal requisites of marriage. RTC decision
shows that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule on,
the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage.
RTC decision was based on psychological incapacity and not
the absence of requisites. Marriage license submitted by
petitioner as evidence is prima facie evidence of the essential
and formal requisites.
Petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to ―no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.‖ It must be confined
to ―the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.‖
Molina case:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of
the celebration‖ of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.‖
Normal course of annulment: Marriage, cohabitation,
annulment due to psychological incapacity. Present case:
cohabitation (almost 18 years), marriage, psychological
incapacity.
************************************************************************
Odayat v Amante
FACTS: Petitioner filed an administrative case against
respondent for Oppression, Falisfication and Immorality.
For Immorality, petitioner claims that respondent is cohabiting
with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children,
even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive;
Long before he filed his complaint against respondent, he
came to know that the respondent and one Beatriz Jornado
were living as husband and wife; that they had several children
and that one of the reasons why he filed his complaint against
the respondent was because of their land dispute.
Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella. He also
admits that he has been living with Beatriz Jornada whom he
married. Respondent, however, claims he was coerced into
marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was already
married to another man, and they separated in 1949 after
Filomena Abella told him of her previous marriage; that from
1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or received any
communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of her
whereabouts.
To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in
evidence the certification of the Local Civil Registrar attesting
that Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on
February 16, 1948. Respondent’s contention is that his
marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of
her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales.
HELD:
The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his
exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no question that
Filomena Abella’s marriage with the respondent was void ab
initio under Article 80 of the New Civil code, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages.
************************************************************************
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
Facts:
Karl Wiegel filed for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
with Lilia Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing
marriage to another man. Lilia, while admitting the existence of
said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion
having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. She
asked to be allowed to present evidence to support her claim.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence.
Issues:
W/N there was a need for Lilia to present evidence.
Held:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to Karl Wiegel is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law.
************************************************************************
Carino vs Carino
Facts:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino.
He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second
marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his
second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was
under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his
marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was
able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k.
Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized
during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao
but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and
void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified
by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found
out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE:
W/N the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.
HELD:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between
Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.
Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity,
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In
such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by
SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy;
she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages
and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her
exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full
benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is
likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to
marry each other for there were no impediments but their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the
FC which provides that everything they earned during their
cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by
each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each
party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
************************************************************************
People vs Cobar
Facts:
In September 1964, Marriage License No. 3942696 was issued
at Marawi City in favor of appellant and Rosalita Decena. On
September 1, 1965 or about a year later, the two were married.
On July 19, 1991, appellant contracted a second marriage with
co-accused Genara Herodias. At that time, appellant’s
marriage with Rosalita Decena had not been judicially declared
void ab initio.
Issues:
Is a party to a void marriage who remarries without a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of such marriage guilty of bigamy?
Under the foregoing facts, is appellant liable for bigamy? Trial
court believes so, this despite its ruling, which we find to be in
accord with law and the evidence, that accused Vicente Cobar
and his first wife Rosalita Decena not having made use of their
marriage license No. 3942490 within the limited period of 120
days from its issuance in September 1964, the same was
automatically cancelled thereafter and their marriage
contracted on September 1, 1965 was deemed solemnized
without a license and as such void from the beginning.
The Solicitor General disagreed and recommended appellant’s
acquittal for the following reasons: An accused is entitled to
acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. In
this case, it was established as a fact that appellant’s
supposed first marriage was void ab initio; hence, he was
never legally married to Rosalita Decena. However, the trial
court convicted appellant based on the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
The trial court’s reliance on Domingo is misplaced. The
pronouncement thereon has no relevance to a prosecution for
bigamy. The petition which gave rise to the aforesaid decision
―seeks the reversal of Court of Appeals’ ruling finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property‖.
The Supreme Court summarized the issues confronting it in
said case as follows: ―First, whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration of a void marriage is necessary, if in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes of
remarriage. Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-5 is the
proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real
and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.‖
The Domingo v. Court of Appeals case is the authority for the
rule that ―in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage is legally unassailable, he is
required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void; otherwise,
said subsequent marriage is void ab initio. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses as well as an action for the
custody and support of their latter’s presumptive legitime, (i)n
such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void‖.
In convicting appellant, the trial court disregarded the doctrine
laid down in Domingo and focused wholly on the Supreme
Court’s casual comment which actually cited the opinion of J.
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, found on page 46 of her book Handbook
On the Family Code of the Philippines, stating that Article 40 of
the Family Code is ―also for the protection of the spouse who
believing that his or her marriage is null and void, marries
again and (w)ith the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or
her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.‖ Article 40 of the Family Code states:
―Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.‖
The foregoing opinion of J. Sempio-Diy only means that getting
a court judgment declaring a previous marriage void ab initio
makes matters clear between the parties and thus prevent the
person who contracted a subsequent marriage from being
exposed to a prosecution for bigamy. This is so because
without such court declaration the other party to the previous
marriage of his/her heirs naturally might contend that said
marriage is valid, hence, raising doubts that the subsequent
marriage could be bigamous.
It being established that appellant’s first marriage is void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration, appellant is not liable for bigamy because the
element that there should be a first valid marriage when he
contracted the second one is lacking.
We share the view of the Solicitor General. In addition to the
reasons given in support thereof, we shall state our own
justification for that view. Bigamy is committed by ―any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings‖
(Article 349, RPC). Thus, constitutive of said crime are the
following essential ingredients:
************************************************************************
People vs Mendoza
Facts
Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5,
1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting,
Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941.
de Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted
another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna
on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for
the second marriage.
ISSUE:
W/N Mendoza is liable for bigamy?
HELD:
No. Acquitted.
1. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613: Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been
annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7
consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial
declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case (or
someone wants to marry a third time and there is a subsisting
marriage regardless of its validity). THUS, HIS MARRIAGE
WITH LEMA IS NULL AND VOID WITHOUT NEED FOR
JUDICIAL DECLARATION.
2. Third marriage was contracted after the death of the first
spouse, thus not bigamous.
People vs Aragon
Facts
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his
marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical
marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is
in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted
between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol
to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later
on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical
maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo
treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third
marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of
bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
HELD:
The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second
wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the
death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot
prosper.
************************************************************************
Gomez vs Lipana
Facts
• The case at bar resolves the question whether Lipana
forfeited his share in the conjugal partnership during the
second marriage where he acted in bad faith.
• Lipana in this case contracted to marriages:
o With Maria Loreto Ancino on 1930
o With Isidra Gomez on 1935, unknown to her was
the first marriage.
• Lipana and Gomez acquired a property in Cubao, Quezon
City; Torrens title in the name of Joaquin Lipana married to
Isidra Gomez.
• Gomez died on February 1, 1958, intestate and childless and
survived only by her sisters.
• Ofelia Gomez, administrator of the estate, instituted the action
to forfeit Lipana’s interest in the estate since the marriage with
Isidra was void ab initio and Lipana gave the cause for nullity.
• Lower court favored the appellee, hence the appeal by
Lipana with the ff errors:
o That the lower court erred in collaterally attacking
his marriage with Gomez holding it bigamous and void
ab initio
o Whether Article 1417 forfeited Lipana’s share in the
estate. (Article 1417 terminates conjugal partnership
through: 1) dissolution of marriage 2) declaration of
nullity; forfeiting the share of the spouse who acted in
bad faith to the favor of the other spouse)
• SC affirmed that the second marriage was void and illegal
(bigamous). However, it ruled that Article 1417 was no longer
in force since the New Civil Code was already in effect since
1950 and Article 1417 should not be reckoned as of the
celebration of marriage, rather to the dissolution, which in this
case through death of Gomez. It did not forfeit Lipana’s share
on the estate, giving the other half to the conjugal partnership,
being the only just and equitable solution.
SC emphasized that since the first marriage has not been
dissolved, the conjugal partnership has not ceased either,
hence the first wife has interest in the husband’s share in the
property in dispute even if it was acquired during the second
marriage.
It also said that the second marriage, since entered into by the
second wife in good faith established a conjugal partnership
where the second wife has rights.
************************************************************************
Consuegra vs GSIS
Facts:
In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, with
respondent Rosario Diaz and the second, which was
contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting,
with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin
Being a member of the GSIS when Consuegra died the
proceeds of his life insurance to petitioner Basilia Berdin who
were the beneficiaries named in the policy. Consuegra was
also entitled to retirement insurance. Consuegra did not
designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement
insurance benefits due to him. Respondent
Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, claims that the
retirement insurance benefits be paid to her. Petitioner Basilia
Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the
GSIS.
GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were
Rosario Diaz, entitled to ½ and Basilia Berdin entitled to the
other ½. It is the contention of appellants that the lower court
erred in not holding that the designated beneficiaries in the life
insurance of the late Jose Consuegra are also the exclusive
beneficiaries in the retirement insurance of said deceased.
Issues:
W/N the petitioners as the named beneficiaries in the life
insurance become the automatic beneficiaries in the retirement
plan as well.
Held:
If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of
his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to
his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with
law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named
in the insurance policy.
GSIS ruled correctly that the proceeds of the retirement
insurance should be divided equally between his first wife and
his second wife, it being accepted as a fact that the second
marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted
in good faith.
In Gomez vs. Lipana, in construing the rights of two women
who were married to the same man, the SC held
FOR THE FIRST WIFE: "that since the defendant's
first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in
his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has
an interest in the husband's share in the property here
in dispute.... "
FOR THE SECOND WIFE: ―And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as
the conjugal partnership formed by the second
 marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of Maning died and at the time of his death he had two families
its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this living separately.
case would be to recognize the right of the second
The question of who the legal heirs of Maning arose. Lower
wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired
court using an earlier ruling asserts that ½ should go to Talina
by her and her husband and consider the other half as and her children and the other half to Nancy and her children.
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage." The petitioners contend that Maning died in 1964 when the
New Civil Code had already superseded the old Spanish Civil
************************************************************************ Code. They state that pursuant to Article 2263 of the New Civil
Code, the distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in
accordance with, the new codal provisions and not the Leyes
Tolentino vs Paras
Partidas, which is an old law no longer applicable
Facts:
Issues:
Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with
W/N the NCC has superseded the old Spanish code making
private respondent while his marriage with petitioner, was still
Talina and her children the only legal successors of Maning’s
subsisting. Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy, upon
estate.
Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the
corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison
Held:
sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private
We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a
respondent until his death His death certificate carried the entry
person who died before the effectivity of the New Civil Code
"Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente."
shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous
laws and by the Rules of Court, while the rights to the
Petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in
inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the New
the death certificate from the private respondent to her own.
Civil Code shall be governed by the New Civil Code.
The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper
requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more
There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to
detailed proceeding
Maning Yap was valid and that the second marriage contracted
by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (Section 29: Illegal
Issues: Marriages).
W/N the petitioner is the surviving spouse of Amado.
How will estate be distributed? ½ to Maning, ½ to legal wife,
Held: Talina. Maning’s ½ to be distributed as follows: ½ to Talina’s
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for children, ¼ to Talina, ¼ to Nancy’s children as natural children.
Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the Nancy cannot inherit because their marriage was void ab initio.
marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no
better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of NOTE: This is in direct contradiction to Gomez vs Lipana and
the existence of such marriage. Consuegra vs GSIS. Both deaths occurred after the
promulgation of the NCC and second marriages in both cases
The second marriage that he contracted with private were entered into in good faith like Nancy’s.
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and
void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without need of
further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private
respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased
Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in
the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be
validly made.

************************************************************************

Yap vs CA

Facts:
Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina
Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on December 11,
1948. Maning and Bianong were married in accordance with
the Muslim rites and practices. Out of the marriage, two
surviving heirs were produced: Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap.

While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap

married Nancy J. Yap. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in
the belief that Maning Yap was not a married man. They had
four children.