Noel Israel Khokhar Final Full Thesis PDF

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN:
MUSHARRAF’S ERA (1999 – 2003)
PhD DISSERTATION
Submitted by
Noel Israel Khokhar, HI (M)
Reg. No: NDU-IR/PhD- 11/F-008
Supervisor
Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema
Department of International Relations
Faculty of Contemporary Studies
National Defence University
Islamabad Pakistan
2016
1
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN
PAKISTAN: MUSHARRAF’S ERA (1999
– 2003)
Submitted by
Noel I Khokhar, HI (M)
Reg. No: NDU-IR/PhD -11/F-008
Supervisor
This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University,
Islamabad in partial fulfilment for degree of PhD in International

Relations
Department of International
Relations
Faculty of Contemporary Studies
National Defence University
Islamabad – Pakistan
2
2016
Certificate of Completion
It is hereby recommended that the dissertation submitted by Noel Israel Khokhar titled:
‘Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)’ has been
accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the discipline
of International Relations.
__________________________
Supervisor
___________________________
External Examiner
Countersigned by
______________________ _______________________
Controller of Examination Head of Department
Tauqir Ahmed Dr. Mohammad Khan
SUPERVISOR’S DECLARATION
3
This is to certify that PhD dissertation submitted by Noel Israel Khokhar, HI(M) titled
“Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)” is supervised
by me and is submitted to meet the requirements of PhD degree.
Dated__________ Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema
Supervisor
STUDENTS DECLARATION
I hereby declare the thesis submitted by me titled “Civil Military Relations in

Pakistan:
Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)” is based on my own research work and has not been
submitted to any other institution for any other degree.
Dated:__________ Noel Israel Khokhar, HI(M)
PhD Scholar
4
DEDICATION
To my family
5
ABSTRACT
Military coups in Pakistan have recurred frequently. This research studies the case of
Gen
Musharraf’s coup in the backdrop of conceptual framework for democratic
consolidation witnessed after Gen Zia. It employs theoretical perspective furnished by
approaches for democratisation with a focus on transition approach to understand
contributions of political elite, the independent variable and the military, the dependent
variable which resulted in military takeover and military rule. The research assesses,
why Huntington’s
‘separation and objective control’ for rendering military apolitical has not been effective
in Pakistan and explores alternative explanations to construct mechanisms for
democratic control of military. Hypothesised on criticality of the role of political a nd
military elite for democratic consolidation, it strives to answer four research questions,
why political elite repeatedly created situations necessitating military intervention, why
military took over in 1999, how successful was the military regime in realising its
aspirations and why
Gen Musharraf did not return democracy to the country in 2002 as required by the
Supreme Court judgement. The research design employs mixed methods technique,
acquires qualitative thematic data and validates it against conceptual framework.
Simultaneously it acquires quantitative numerical data to obtain societal perspectives
from opinion makers in the country and then integrates the two through ‘concurrent
triangulation method’ to extract findings and proffer recommendations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
6
The process of earning a doctorate and writing a dissertation especially when you are
also simultaneously heading a research institute is arduous and stressful. It cannot be
done single handed for which I am thankful to my wife, Aksa for supporting me
relentlessly throughout my service and this research, my children Zohair, Elishma and
Maresha for their unfailing support and especially my late parents, who envisioned. I
would like to express my gratitude to Pakistan Army, National Defence University and
Faculty of Contemporary Studies for enabling me to realise my dream. Thanks are due
to Dr Khan and Department of International Relations for facilitating me in completing
the process and the dissertation. I am thankful to my staff and Research Associates
Beenish and
Qurat ul Ain for ensuring that the script is error free. I am especially indebted to
Research Associate Abdul Rauf for his excellent abilities, knowledge and diligence. I
am hugely indebted to Dr Saif for his experience, guidance and painstaking support in
conducting the field survey and to Sufian for collating survey data and testing it for
reliability and validity. I am thankful to the NDU Library staff, Mr Obaid Anwar of
PASTIC for promptly meeting my constant craving for books and periodicals.
I wish to acknowledge that I have personally grown and developed in the process of the
research and better understand my profession and its contextual relationship to national
security and development. Most of all, I am hugely indebted to Dr Pervez Iqbal Cheema,
my supervisor for his understanding, wisdom, patience and encouragement for pushing
me farther than I thought I could go.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Serial Content Title Pages
1 Abstract vii
2 Acknowledgment viii
7
3 Table of Contents ix
4 List of Tables xii
5 List of Charts xiv
6 List of Abbreviations / Acronyms xv
7 Introduction
Prelude 1
Problem Statement 16
Hypothesis 17
Research Questions 17
Research Objectives 19
Literature Review 19
Knowledge Gap 33
Significance of the Research 33
Scope and Limitations 34
Research Methodology 35
Organisation of the Study 39
Summation 42
8 Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical
Perspective
1.1 Prelude 44
1.2 Civil Military Relations: Conceptual Framework 44
1.3 The Core Question and Explanation 48
1.4 Democracy and Political Construction 49
1.5 Civilian Control of Military 65
1.6 Military Coups 74
1.7 Interests: National and Institutional Determinants 83
1.8 Summation 90
9 Chapter 2: Democratic Construction after Gen Zia
2.1 Prelude 91
2.2 Role of Military after Gen Zia 94
8
2.3 Benazir’s First Term: December 1988 – August 1990 97
2.4 Nawaz Sharif’s First Term: November 1990 – July 1993 104
2.5 Benazir’s Second Term: October 1993 – November 1996 109
2.6 Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term: February 1997 – October 1999 113
2.7 Trends in Democratisation and Civil Military Relations 125
2.8 Summation 128
10 Chapter 3: Breakdown of Civil Military Relations 1988 – 1999
3.1 Prelude 130
3.2 Gen Karamat’s Resignation and its Impact 132
3.3 Kargil Conflict 138
3.4 Coup and Counter Coup 150
3.5 Summation 157
11 Chapter 4: Military Regime’s Aspiration
4.1 Prelude 160
4.2 Military Government – A Conceptual Framework 161
4.3 Accruing Technical Expertise to Govern 163
4.4 Setting Political Agenda 164
4.5 Legitimacy 166
4.6 Endogenous Challenges 170
4.7 Exogenous Challenges 184
4.8 Civil Military Relations during Musharraf’s Regime 192
4.9 Summation 202
12 Chapter 5: Democracy and Civil Military Relations – A
Survey
5.1 Prelude 204
5.2 Survey and its Interface with the Research 205
5.3 Characteristics of the Sample 208
5.4 Survey Respondents 209
5.5 Reliability and Validity 213
5.6 Principle Results 214
5.7 Summation 237
9
13 Findings and Recommendations
Prelude 239
Democratic Consolidation 240
Responsibility of Judiciary 243
Civil Military Relations 245
Democratic Control of Military 252
National Security Architecture 254
Healing the Relations 255
Summation 256
14 Conclusion 257
15 Appendix
A. Questionnaire 259
B. Interview Questionnaire 263
C. GALLUP Poll and its Linkage with Survey 264
D. Kargil Map 269
16 Bibliography 270
LIST OF TABLES
Serial Table Page
1 Civil and Military Regimes in Pakistan – 1947-2002 2
2 Results of 1970 Elections 8
1.1 Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspectives 47
1.2 Approaches to Democratisation 64
1.3 Civilian Control Matrix 66
1.4 Old and New Professionalism 71
1.5 Structural Reasons for a Military Coup 77
1.6 Triggers for Military Coup 78
2.1 Results General Elections 1988 – National Assembly 97
2.2 Results of 1990 Elections 104
10
2.5 Economic Growth under Different Political Regimes 127
3.1 A Comparison of Versions among COAS, Foreign Minister 146
and Prime Minister about Kargil Conflict
4.1 Timeline for Return of Democracy 167

4.2 Changes in Key Macroeconomic Indicators – October 199 174
to September 2003
4.3 Defence Expenditure as % of GDP 174

4.4 Results 2002 Elections 197
5.1 Distribution of Questionnaire 208
5.2 Profession 209
5.3 Gender 210
5.4 Education 210
5.5 Age 211
5.6 Reliability Statistics 213
5.7 Key: Reliability Statistics 213
5.8 Response Question 5 215
11
LIST OF CHARTS
Serial Chart Page





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS

ACE Anti Corruption Establishment
ADP Agriculture Development Bank
AG Adjutant General
AIG Afghan Interim Government
ANP Awami National Party
BBC British Broad Casters
BD Basis Democracies
BJP Bhartia Janta Party
CGS Chief of General Staff
12
CJCSC Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee
CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator
CMR civil military relations
COAS Chief of Army Staff
CoD Charter of Democracy
COP Combined Opposition Parties
CRB Central Board of Revenue
DCAF Democratic Control of Armed Forces Geneva Centre
DCC Defence Committee of Cabinet
DCO District Coordination Officer
DG Director General
DGMO Director General Military Operations
ECP Election Commission of Pakistan
EUEOM European Union Election Observation Mission
FSF Federal Security Force
GDP gross domestic product
Gen General
GHQ General Headquarters
HDO Higher Defence Organization
IHK Indian Held Kashmir
IJI Islamic Jamoori Itihad

IMF International Monetary Fund
ISI Inter Services Intelligence
ISPR Inter Services Public Relation
JSHQ Joint Staff Head Quarter
KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LFO Legal Framework Order
LGO Local Government Ordinance
LOC Line of Control
Lt Lieutenant
13
MMA Mutihida Majlis-e-Amal
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoDP Minister of Defence Production
MQM Mohajir Quami Movement
MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy
NA Northern Alliance
NAB National Accountability Bureau
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCAs National Command Authority
NDU National Defence University
NIC National Identity Card
NLI Northern Light Infantry
NPT Non Proliferation Treaty
NRB National Reconstruction Bureau
NSC National Security Council
NWFP North West Frontier Province
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PASTIC Pakistan Scientific and Technological Information Centre
PAT Pakistan Awami Tehrik
PCO Provisional Constitution Order
PDA Pakistan Democratic Alliance
PIA Pakistan International Airlines
PID Press and Information Department
PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
PKR Pakistani Rupee
PML(J) Pakistan Muslim League Jamiat
PML-N Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam)
PNA Pakistan National Alliance
PNA Pakistan National Alliance
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
14
PPP-P Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarian
PTI Pakistan Tehrek- e-Insaf
PTV Pakistan Television Network
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
UK United Kingdom
UNSC United Nation Security Council
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VCOAS Voice Chief of Army Staff
VIP Very Important Person
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority
15
INTRODUCTION
“Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and
prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being
of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work
in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound
to succeed.”1
Mr Jinnah’s Presidential Address to Constituent Assembly 11 August 1947
Prelude
The study of civil military relations underscores two trajectories, in countries where
people have not experienced a military takeover, the focus remains on civilian control
of the military. In countries where people have witnessed military takeovers, the focus
expands to incorporate issues related to military takeovers, military regime and
transition to democracy besides civilian control over the military. Pakistan falls in the
second country therefore the study of politics, power struggle and process of
democratisation in Pakistan due to repeated military takeovers presents a dilemma.
Since inception, the political elite, military and judiciary have conflicted and colluded
in a variety of ways to influence the process of state and nation building. Resultantly
the country has regularly alternated between civil and military rules, Till 2002, the
country has been directly ruled by the military for seventeen years and for fifteen years
by an elected government under a military President. For seventeen years, there had
been a civilian government under a civilian President and for eleven years, it had been
1
‘Independence Day Supplement’, Dawn, 14 August 1999.
16
ruled by semi civilian non-elected governments during the first decade after the
independence.
In the process of state building two competing binary trends are evident. The civilian
political elite prefer a federation with parliamentary system of government (1956 and
1973 Constitutions). Contrarily, the military’s choice had been a presidential system of
government (1962 Constitution). General (Gen) Zia-ul-Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf
during their rule, while living with 1973 Constitution, had fostered division of power
i.e. a de facto presidential system with emphasis on grass root democracy through local
governments. 2 The alternations between civil and military rule and attempts to
formulate and practice two different types of governments has had numerous adverse
effects. It in the main has impeded the process of democratisation consolidation,
maturing of democratic culture and values. These alternations are tabulated below.
Table 1: Civil and Military Regimes in Pakistan – 1947-20023

Structure of Leadership Duration Period
(1) 1947-1951: Liaquat Ali Khan

(2) 1951-1953: Muhammad Ali Bogra
Semi civilian (non- 11 Years 1947-
(3) 1953-1955: Ch Muhammad Ali
elected)government 1958
(4) 1956-1957: H.S. Suhrawardy
(5) 1957-1958: Sir Feroz Khan Noon
(1) 1958-1962: Ayub Khan
(2) 1969-1971: Yahya Khan
Direct military rule 17 Years
(3) 1977-1985: Zia ul Haq
(4) 1999-2002: Pervez Musharraf
Elected government under a (1) 1962-1969: Ayub Khan
10 Years
military president (2) 1985-1988: Zia ul Haq
2
The Constitution of 1971 was abrogated by Gen Zia and then restored as part of an agreement and later
Gen Musharraf also maintained the constitution and worked within it. However in both cases the power
was redistributed to render the Prime Minister accountable to the President with latter enjoying arbitrary
powers to dismiss the prime minister and his government.
3
Siegfried O. Wolf and Seth Kane, ‘Democratic Ambitions under Praetorian Stress - Civil-Military
Relations in Pakistan’, in Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia,
ed. Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 2010),
171–200.
17
Elected government under a civilian (1) 1971-1973: Zulfiqar Bhutto (President)
president (2) 1973-1977: Zulfiqar Bhutto
17 Years (3) 1988-1990: Benazir Bhutto
(4) 1990-1993: Nawaz Sharif
(5) 1993-1996: Benazir Bhutto
(6) 1997-1999: Nawaz Sharif
The aforementioned history presents contradictory narratives. The political elite blame
the military interventions and dominance for lack of democratic consolidation. The
military on the other hand faults political elite for their undemocratic attitude, inept
governance and corruption leading to institutional decay. Most importantly, in
military’s opinion the political elite instead of delivering good governance and
advancing national interests employ the façade of democracy to advance their personal
interests with least interest in institution building. The intra elite conflicts and inability
to resolve them through political institutions while weakens the country it also drags
military into politics which sometimes leads to military takeover.
In the international and local academia, both sides have their own sets of exponents.
Scholars, studying the interventionist behaviour of the military, trace the problem to its
initial formation and its class composition. 4 Others like Askari, 5 Shafqat 6 and Shah 7
opine that involvement of military in internal and external affairs has created a military
hegemonic system which consequences into military’s intervention in politics. 8 The
military on the other hand, considers that “army could not remain unaffected by the
conditions around it.” 9 It has to respond to the political developments like Gen Jehangir
4
Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, ‘“Punjabisation” in the British Indian Army 1857-1947 and the
Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan’, Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies, no. 24 (2010): 1–32.
5
Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Progressive Publishers, 1974).
6
Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zufikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
7
Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014).
8
The monthly meeting of Corps Commanders keeps eye on political situation in the country and discuss
remedial measures while the COAS brings these to the notice of incumbent prime minister when the
need arises.
9
Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1967). ‘Nor was it conceivable that officers and men would react to all the political chicanery,
18
Karamat suggested the need for National Security Council (NSC) 10 and Gen Musharraf
opined that “if you want to keep them [military] out, bring them in”. 10
A brief recount of history of civil military relations indicates that the first martial law
was imposed before the partition after Jallianwala Bagh incident in 1919.11 The second
occurred after independence in 1953 to quell disturbances related to Ahamdiya issue
and food shortages in Punjab. 12 However during these episodes the notion of civilian
supremacy continued to hold sway both during the British Raj and even after the
independence.14 The notion of civilian supremacy was progressively eroded because of
civilian reliance on military for combating security and survival challenges, it reduced
the distance between civilian and military domains.15 This inadvertent process of
‘political integration of the military’ commenced with the struggle for liberation of
Kashmir and during the ensuing Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 13
The martial law of 1953, followed by induction of serving Army Chief, Gen
Muhammad Ayub Khan as Defence Minister, further reduced the distance. These
intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every sphere of life.’ 10 Tim Mcgirk, ‘The General
Speaks Out’, Time, 19 October 1998; Sumaira Khan, ‘Battling Militancy:
Govt Revives National Security Council’, The Express Tribune, 23 August 2013.
10
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
11
The 1919 Jallianwala Bagh massacre in the northern Indian city of Amritsar was ordered by General
R.E.H. Dyer. On Sunday April 13, 1919, which happened to be 'Baisakhi', one of Punjab’s largest
religious festivals, fifty British Indian Army soldiers, commanded by Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer,
began shooting at an unarmed gathering of men, women, and children without warning. He marched his
fifty riflemen to a raised bank and ordered them to kneel and fire. He ordered soldiers to reload their
rifles several times and they were ordered to shoot to kill. Official British Raj sources estimated the
fatalities at 379, and with 1,100 wounded. Civil Surgeon Dr Williams DeeMeddy indicated that there
were 1,526 casualties. However, the casualty number quoted by the Indian National Congress was more
than 1,500, with roughly 1,000 killed.
12
Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press
Karachi, 2009). 14Wolf and Kane, ‘Democratic Ambitions under Praetorian Stress.’, 188. 15Ibid.190.
13
Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Pak Publishers, 1970). Kashmir issue arose between India and
Pakistan in 1947 over accession of State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the principals of
partition. Comprising majority Muslim population, the State should have been allowed to join Pakistan
however Maharaja Hari Singh delayed the decision which resulted into an uprising in the State and
subsequent occupation of State by India premised on devise accession agreement. The matter was
referred to UN by India and UNSC in accordance with its resolution asked plebiscite to decide the future
of State. However till to date, plebiscite has been denied by India and the issue still persists as denial of
self-determination to the people of Kashmir.
19
political decisions introduced army’s leadership very early into politics, policy
formulation and governance arena.
Simultaneously the process of state and nation building witnessed acute turmoil. Four
Prime Ministers were prematurely removed and equal numbers of constituent
assemblies were dissolved before finally agreeing to the first ever 1956 Constitution.
However, in order to pre-empt loss of power which he anticipated as a consequence of
the forthcoming general elections, President Iskandar Mirza imposed a martial law. He
appointed Gen Ayub as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) on 8 October
1958 and abrogated the constitution. 14 The arrangement for co-sharing of power
between a President hailing from bureaucracy 15 and military could not last for more than
a few days. On 24 October 1958, Gen Ayub Khan ousted President Mirza and gained
complete control of power which lasted till 25 March 1969. 16 In summary, these events
reveal that the first attempt for democratisation in the country ended in a failure.
Evidently the political elite could not develop consensus on application of 1956
Constitution, had they been able to put aside their differences and hold elections in
accordance with the constitution, the first step towards democratic consolidation could
14
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. After nine years of effort, Pakistan succeeded
in framing a Constitution which became effective on 23 March 1956. President kept on delaying the
holding of general elections according to the constitution until it was finally decided that they will be
held in November 1958.
15
Iskandar Mirza was born on November 15, 1899, in a feudal family of Bengal. He was inducted into
the British Indian Army in 1919. In 1926, he left the army, joined the Indian Political Service and was
posted as Assistant Commissioner in North West Frontier Province. He was promoted to District Officer
in 1931. Before the creation of Pakistan, he served the Ministry of Defense, Government of India, as a
Joint Secretary. Being the senior-most Muslim Civil Servant in the Indian Ministry of Defense, Iskandar
Mirza was appointed as the first Defense Secretary of Pakistan at the time of Independence. He served
at this position for about seven years. With the dismissal of the United Front’s Ministry in East Pakistan,
Governor General Ghulam Muhammad decided to enforce Governor’s Rule in the province and
appointed Iskandar Mirza as Governor in May 1954.
16
Khan, Friends Not Masters. He writes that martial law was imposed as ‘the central authority’ had
collapsed’ after imposing martial law the President started dividing the armed forces and asked an air
force officer to arrest Gen Ayub who had just returned from East Pakistan, the Gen and his steam assessed
that since Martial Law had been imposed and Chief Martial Law Administrator had been appointed the
office of President was redundant, therefore he was relieved and was settled in England.
20
have been taken early in country’s history. It indicates that the role of political elite is
crucial for furthering democracy. The independent variable of politics generates pull
and push effects on the dependent variable of military, which then responds in
accordance with its own political views. The persistent political commotion in the
country from 1947 to 1958 and repeated employment of military on a variety of tasks
also pulled them into politics. 17 On the other hand, poor governance created insecurity
and instability, pushing the military commanders into action to take control and rectify
the situation.18 Therefore, when Gen Ayub took over he was initially welcomed by a
large segment of population as the only way out of the mess created by the politicians
in the first eleven years. 19
Gen Ayub’s ten years rule can be divided in two periods. The first (1958-1965), stands
out for significant changes and all round achievements, while the second (1965-1968)
reflects the undoing of these achievements by its own creator. He created a balance viz
India by joining the western alliance during the cold war and accrued assistance in
different dimensions. He fostered green and industrial revolution and stood up to
obscurantist forces. Although, he was not successful in undoing the feudal class, yet he
diluted their effect by adding an industrialist class albeit comprising few families to the
polity. He was called a benevolent dictator and despite all the shortfalls, his tenure is
regarded as a period of stability in the history of Pakistan. 20 However, it was also
detrimental to the consolidation of democracy. The “misadventure” of 1965 war marked
17
Ibid., 72.
18
Refer to Table 1.1; in eleven years six prime minister changed and between 1955 and 1957 four prime
minister changed hands.
19
Kalim Bahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications,
1998).
20
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. 195.
21
the beginning of his end. 21 After the war dissatisfied by the behaviour of United States
of America (USA) he pursued a more independent foreign policy and built a lasting
relationship with China and attempted to normalise relations with Soviet Union.
In the context of civil military relations in Pakistan, Gen Ayub’s tenure raises number
of issues. Firstly, he interrupted the process of democratisation and persisted with
martial law with disastrous consequences. Secondly, the constitution of 1962 ran
contrary to the political genius of the polity which preferred a federation, a
parliamentary style of government hence the constitution of 1962 did not last beyond
his tenure. Before Gen Ayub’s take over, civil military relations, despite active
participation of military in security politics signified civilian supremacy in the country.
However, his take over severely undermined civilian control over military which
climaxed in the in 1965 war. Besides, his decade long rule entrenched the military in
the political system thus creating a new paradigm of “military politics.” 22 Thereafter,
the military emerged as a competing force against which political elite and civil society
contested.
Gen Ayub resigned from office under popular pressure, but instead of handing power
to the speaker of national assembly as required by the constitution, he handed it to Gen
Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969. He sensing military’s alienation and unpopularity of
the 1962 Constitution abrogated it on 28 March 1970 and announced a Legal
Framework Order (LFO) which laid down the basic structure for the new constitution.
However he assured that the new constitution would be formulated by the
21
M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (Vikas Publishing House Private,
1979).After the failure of dialogue to resolve Kashmir issue, President Ayub exercised the military option
to force a solution.
22
The term refers to military’s political role witnessed in the six decades of Pakistan’s history and not to
politics within the military.
22
representatives of the people. Towards this effect, he promised direct elections based
on universal adult franchise, the elections were held on 7 December 1970 and were
judged as free and fair. 23
The results mirrored differences between East and West wings which due to years of
divisive politics persistent political issues had sharply polarised the polity. Awami
League propagated provincial autonomy articulated in six points 24 of Sheikh Mujeebur-

Rehman, emerged as the largest single party, winning all but two seats, from East
Pakistan but none in West. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
emerged as the largest party in West Pakistan with could not win any seat in the East
and in Baluchistan and only one in NWFP. The results are tabulated below.
Table 2: Results of 1970 Elections

Party East Pak Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan Total
Awami League 151 - - - - 151
Pakistan People Party - 62 18 1 - 81
Council Muslim League - 7 - - - 7
Ahle Sunnat - 4 3 - - 7
Jamaat-e-Islami - 1 2 1 - 4
Qayyum Muslim League - 1 1 7 - 9
Convention Muslim League - 2 - - - 2
Pakistan Democratic Party 1 - - - - 1
National Awami Party
- - - 3 3 6
(Wali Group)
Jamait ul Ulema-e-Pakistan
- - - 6 1 7
(Hazarvi Group)
Independent 1 5 3 7 - 16
153 82 27 25 4 291
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan
23
‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above
Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 1970-2013’ (Islamabad, August 2013).The report
concludes that only 1970 elections were free and fair.
24
Muhammad Ibrahim and Razia Mussarat, “Electoral Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan (1947-1985),”
Journal of Public Administration and Governance 5, no. 1 (2015): 72.
23
The election results warranted calling of National Assembly session and transfer of
power to Awami League. However, it appeared that the political and military elite in
West Pakistan were not willing to do so. 25 The delay in transfer of power sparked civil
unrest in East Pakistan which soon snowballed into an Indian abetted insurgency and
culminated into the disastrous Indo-Pak War of 1971. The war in its outcome resulted
in creation of Bangladesh.29
Why East Pakistan chose to secede? From the perspective of civil military relations,
these happenings raise number of questions. Firstly, was it the military or the
irreconcilable behaviour of politicians, especially Bhutto who resisted handing over
power to Awami League and thereby returning democracy to the country? The delay in
calling session of national assembly by Gen Yahya was interpreted as non-acceptability
of the six points of Sheikh Mujeeb to the military. Building on it, Bhutto refused to go
to the national assembly session which was called by Awami League in Dhaka.
Cumulatively, the delay spiralled unrest in the East and both military (Yahya) and civil
(Bhutto) were responsible for it. 26 The consequent political unrest in East Pakistan was
interpreted by military as “law and order situation” which could be resolved by use of
force. 27 The rioting and violence led to rise of Mukti Bahini which was abetted by
India. 28 The increasing violence in East Pakistan sucked the military into counter
insurgency operations and subsequently a brief war with India in December 1971. The
war went badly and the military lost control of East Pakistan.
25
Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh
(University of California Press, 1991), 120. Bhutto is accused of preventing reconciliation with Mujeeb
ur Rehman and his six point agenda for regional autonomy. 29 Ibid., 122.
26
Steven I. Wilkinson, “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan,”
Democratization 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 223.
27
Aditya Bhave and Christopher Kingston, “Military Coups and the Consequences of Durable de Facto
Power: The Case of Pakistan,” Economics of Governance 11, no. 1 (2010): 56.
28
‘Indian Forces Fought along Mukti Bahini: Modi’, The News, 8 June 2015.
24
A detailed study of civil military relations during and after the war is beyond the scope
of this research. Dismayed by the outcome of war, the military lost confidence in Gen
Yahya and asked him to step down. A meeting of officers stationed in Rawalpindi was
called on 20 December 1971 in which it was decided that Gen Yahya should step down
and transfer the power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On the same day, Bhutto became the
President and the first civilian CMLA. 29 The internal dynamics of military politics led
to transfer of power and return to civilian control.
The 1970 elections were aimed at electing a constituent assembly to formulate th 30e
constitution for Pakistan (East and West). However, with secession of East Pakistan,
the representatives lost authority and a fresh elections and mandate was now essential
to elect a new constituent assembly to frame a constitution for residual Pakistan. 34
Bhutto brought in an interim constitution 31 which was presidential in nature and
remained in force till promulgation of 1973 Constitution. As per the spirit of democracy,
a fresh election under the new constitution was essential but interestingly, the assembly
elected to frame the constitution extended its own life under the new constitution till 14
August 1977.32
Bhutto was a charismatic leader with a populist style of politics. He employed the
powers of CMLA to implement his socialist agenda to include nationalisation of basic
industries, schools and land reforms. 33 During Bhutto’s tenure, political government
29
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 246. He recounts that Gen Gul Hassan and
Gen Abdul Hameed Khan went to Gen Yahya on 17 December and asked him to step down. Gen Yahya
suggested continuation of military rule which was dismissed. A meeting of all officers of rank of
Lieutenant Colonel and above was held in GHQ 20 December, in which it was decided to recall Bhutto
from USA who arrived on 20 December and the same day power was handed over to him.
30
elections were held in a different environment wherein the Presidential system was not acceptable and
a new constitution to accommodate the demand of East Pakistan was required, with loose of East
Pakistan, the environment changed and a fresh election would have most likely yielded different results.
31
Nasir Hafeez, “Evolution of National Security Structures in Pakistan,” Strategic Studies 32, no. 2–3
(2012): 158.
32
Ibrahim and Mussarat, “Electoral Politics”, 76.
33
Bhutto political slogan stated Islam as the religion but socialism was his economic philosophy, his call
for Food, Clothing and Shelter for all appealed to the masses. His major contributions were formulation
25
dominated politics and civil military relations were characterised by a robust civilian
control.34 He employed a two prong strategy for strengthening civilian control over the
military.35 First, by reforming the command structure of the armed forces 36 and secondly
by reducing reliance over the military for maintaining law and order by creating
paramilitary forces. Federal Security Force (FSF) was created to this effect.
Dissatisfaction in military soon begun to surface and quell any trouble on 3 March 1972,
Bhutto suddenly replaced Gen Gul Hassan with Gen Tikka Khan as Army Chief (Gen
Tikka Khan was earlier by-passed when Gen Gul Hassan was appointed). Similarly Air
Marshal Raheem Khan was replaced by Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhary as Air Chief. 37
On 30 March 1973, Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that a small group of military
officers had conspired to seize power. 38 They were tried in a military court headed by
the then Major General Zia-ul-Haq and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment. On
completion of term of Gen Tikka in March 1976, Bhutto appointed General Zia-ul-Haq,
a junior corps commander, as the Army Chief.
Under the new constitution, elections were to be held in 1977. On 7 January, Bhutto
announced that elections will be held on 7 and 10 March 1977 for national and
provincial assemblies respectively. On 21 January, nine opposition parties formed an
electoral alliance namely Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against the ruling PPP. It
was generally perceived that despite a strong opposition PPP would still win. 39 On 8
of 1973 constitution, land reforms, Simla Agreement and repatriation of prisoners of war and, Setting up
of port Qasim and Steel mill and laying the foundations of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and holding of
Islamic Summit in Pakistan. His major failure was the inability to stabilise the nationalisation process,
electoral mal-practices which led to his down fall.
34
Bhutto ordered a judicial inquiry and appointed Justice Hamood ur Rehman to inquire into the military
defeat in 1971. He kept the findings confidential and employed it as a coercive tool against the military
rather than an instrument for reforms.
35
Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 174.
36
Large scale reshuffling and retirement were orchestrated in three services.
37
38
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 292.
39
Ibid. 308.
26
March, after national assembly election, PNA alleged massive electoral rigging and
boycotted the provincial assembly’s elections. Resultantly, a very low turnout was
witnessed on 10 March. The alleged rigging proved to be a turning point leading to
another military coup on 5 July 1977.
In the context of civil military relations, the events during March- July 1977 once again
reveal that political elite due to intra elite conflict, create situations of prolonged
impasse, compromising national security and also involve military into politics which
sometimes results in military takeover. 40 The negotiation process started on 13 March
and continued up till 4 July and comprised twelve rounds. 4142 And even on the last day
when the agreement was finalised, Bhutto said that he will sign it on the next day. In
the process, widespread political agitation was witnessed leading to imposition of
partial martial law in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad. Secondly, Bhutto kept military
informed and also invited Gen Zia to attend the negotiating process and cabinet
meetings. Under societal considerations and inconclusive political situation, Gen Zia
imposed martial law on 5 July 1977 and remained in power till 17 August 1988.43 Gen
Zia ruled the country for more than a decade and his regime can be divided into four
phases.47 In the first, 1977-1979, he worked for demobilisation of PPP and sought
cooperation with PNA. In the second, 1979-1983, he distanced himself from political
parties in general and the strengthened the military rule. During third phase, 1983-1985,
he granted limited political activities by holding the party-less general elections in 1985
under the increased pressure from Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).
40
Ibid. 309.
41
Tahir Amin, “1977 Coup D’état in Pakistan,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 28, no. 2 (2007):
42
.
43
Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 218. 47Ibid.,
218.
27
The last phase was of party-less parliamentary democracy with strong interventionist
presidency during 1985-1988.
In the context of civil military relations, while the military enjoyed complete autonomy
in the economic, political and social life, Gen Zia was not a revolutionary and substance
of his policy was adhocism. His policy of Islamisation and his strategic alliance with
USA after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were most detrimental for the national
security. The increased role of military in politics and holding of non-party elections
during his tenure adversely affected the possibility of return to democracy.
Accidental death of Gen Zia triggered phenomenal changes in the political dispensation
in the country.48 Therefore, politics and operation of civil military relations in ensuing
decade is of special interest to this research. After Gen Zia, the military took a back
seat, facilitated general elections on party basis and fostered return to democracy albeit
the constitutional amendment which distributed power between the prime minister and
president. The political elite had two options; they could either unite for strengthening
democracy or fight among themselves to aggrandize their personal and political gains
at the cost of democracy. Unfortunately, they opted for the second option, offering
opportunity to non-democratic forces to exploit their differences.
Twice Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had the opportunity to govern the country from
1988 to 1999. Ironically, this period was characterised for perennial political instability,
consistent strife between government, opposition and judiciary and frequent direct and
indirect intervention by President and military.49 In February 1997, Pakistan Muslim
League Nawaz (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif won general elections with two thirds
majority. Despite relatively low turnout, Nawaz Sharif claimed it as a landslide victory
with a heavy mandate. The nation fatigued by consistent instability hoped that the
installation of new government would mark a new beginning. It was indeed a new
28
beginning but in ways different from that what they expected. Detailed study of this
period is of interest to this research to ascertain the role of political elite in process of
democratic consolidation after Gen Zia.
48
President Zia ul Haq died in an air crash on 17 August 1988 near Bahawalpur. He was
accompanied by a number of senior army officers and the US Ambassador to Pakistan and military
attaché. A meeting took place in Islamabad to decide on the issue of succession and it was decided to
follow constitutional provisions. In accordance with the provisions of Article 49(1) of the Constitution
Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan took over as the President, General Mirza Aslam Beg was
appointed as COAS.
49
1988-1990 and 1993-1996 Benazir Bhutto. 1990-1993 and 1997-1999 Nawaz Sharif, a total of
11 Years with a civilian President in place
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rapidly embarked upon a journey to concentrate power
and was able to do so with considerable success. 44 On other counts his performance in
the second term was not much different from the previous. Confrontation with judiciary,
storming of Supreme Court and forcing President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari to
resign stand out as significant features. Also, his inability to sustain political alliances
in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sind and
Balochistan alienated smaller provinces and aggravated internal security situation.
Incidents of terrorism, rampant lawlessness and corruption multiplied and even special
judicial arrangements like anti-terrorism courts could not bring them under control. His
economic policies were equally not successful and his desire to concentrate power
accentuated the systemic imbalances in socio-political structure of the country.
The deteriorating state of internal security situation prompted Gen Karamat, Chief of
Army Staff (COAS) to indicate that there was a need for taking note and instituting
NSC for handling and stabilising the situation. The suggestion irked Nawaz Sharif who
44
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Resignation of President Leghari and tabling of Shariat Bill
etc.
29
asked him to resign which he dutifully did. Gen Pervez Musharraf was handpicked by
Nawaz Sharif as his replacement on 8 October 1998.
On 12 October 1999, Gen Musharraf who was on a flight on his way back from Sri
Lanka was unceremoniously replaced with another handpicked Lieutenant (Lt) Gen Zia
ud Din Butt, the then Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This
decision triggered events which unfortunately led to fourth military take over and the
country relapsed into the déjà vu paradigm. 45 After announcing the appointment of new
COAS, Nawaz Sharif realised that COAS designate would need time to consolidate his
command, the flight control staff on behest of Nawaz Sharif was ordered not let the
deposed COAS land in Pakistan and when that was not possible they were asked to
direct his aircraft to Nawab Shah and he should be detained there. The military reacted
in favour of Gen Musharraf and took political control of the flight operations to safely
land the commercial airliner which was running low on fuel and simultaneously seized
political control which some termed as a ‘counter coup’. 46 Gen Musharraf ruled till his
resignation on 18 August 2008. His rule lasted for nearly nine years. “When he seized
power he was welcomed by many political parties, elites and by urban middle class”. 47
In his address to the nation on night of 12 October, he said that Army has moved in as
45
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 472. He outlines the dismal performance in
great detail.
46
Sartaj Aziz and Syed Babar Ali, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 287. They recounts the mistakes committed by Nawaz Sharif
when he planned to remove General Pervez Musharraf and not allow the plane carrying him on his return
from Sri Lanka to allow time to induct General Zia ud Din as new Chief of Army Staff.
47
Sadaf Farooq, ‘Rule by the Generals: The Influence of Military Regimes on Pakistan’s Internal
Security’, in 60th Political Science Association Conference (Edinburgh: Political Science Association,
2010). 54 “Back to Future? Countdown to Oct 12 Coup”, Dawn, 13 October 1999. “You are all aware of
the kind of the turmoil and uncertainty our country has gone through in recent times. Not only have all
the institutions been played around with, and systematically destroyed, the economy too is in a state of
collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed, which have rocked the very
foundation of the Federation of Pakistan. The armed forces have been facing incessant public clamour to
remedy the fast declining situation from all sides of the political divide. These concerns were always
conveyed to the Prime Minister in all sincerity, keeping the interest of the country foremost…I wish to
inform you that the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilization”.
55
The one requested by General Jahangir Karamat.
30
a last resort.54 In his speech on 17 October, he laid out a seven point agenda for rectifying
the situation and announced his government. He asked President Rafiq Tarar to continue
in office, formulated NSC and a cabinet of ministers to work under it.55 The provinces
similarly were to function under their respective governors with a small cabinet under
them. Six months later, premised on the law of state necessity, the Supreme Court in its
judgment of 12 May 2000 validated the military takeover, granted him three years to
achieve his seven point agenda i.e. to rebuild national confidence, strengthen federation,
revive economy, improve law and order, depoliticise state institutions, devolve power
to grass root level and ensure swift across the board accountability. 48 The judiciary also
vested in him the unprecedented powers to amend constitution but asked him to hold
general elections before expiry of the three year period and transfer power to elected
representatives.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s judgement Gen Musharraf did hold elections in 2002
but prior to that he signalled his desire to continue in power beyond his permitted tenure
of three years by holding a Referendum in April 2002. After the elections, he engineered
a loyalist coalition into power which passed Seventeenth Amendment to the
Constitution to provide constitutional cover to General Musharraf’s takeover. Later, a
bill was passed in October 2004 which enabled him to simultaneously retain two offices
i.e. of the President and COAS till December 2004.
From the foregoing brief historical review, two significant trends can be gleaned. First
relates to the inability of the political elite to utilise opportunities for democratic
consolidation and convert them into conditions fostering stable democracy in the
country. Secondly, due to the repeated military takeovers followed by prolonged
military and quasi-military rule, the perception about military as a competing political
48
Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 149-150.
31
force had strengthened. The interface of political elite with the military in keeping with
the two trends has resulted into a non-normative paradigm which merits investigation
to understand the process of democratisation and its interface with civil military
relations with a view to extract findings and proffer recommendations to rectify the
situation.
Problem Statement
“Research is creating new knowledge”
Neil Armstrong
The study of military coups in general provides an opportunity to understand the
political process which leads to military intervention, takeover and subsequent military
rule. The casual relation between politics and military leading to Gen Musharraf’s
takeover and rule makes an interesting case study for understanding the process of
democratic consolidation in the third round49 and developments in the realm of civil
military relations therein. The foremost problem relates to understanding the reasons
for inability of political leaders to consolidate democracy, democratic institutions and
values and why the process after Gen Zia once again resulted into a military takeover.
Secondly once military is in power how does it utilise political power and why it persists
on retaining power instead of returning country to democracy at the earliest. This
research is an endeavour to answer these questions.
Hypothesis
Civil military relations in Pakistan is an interplay of push and pull factors in which, the
political elite create conditions which can trigger military intervention or coup and
military rule.
49
The first round lasted from 1947 to 1958 and resulted in Gen Ayub’s Martial Law. Gen Yahya’s martial
law is considered as continuation of Gen Ayub’s rule. The second from 1970 to 1977 and led to Gen
Zia’s coup and Martial Law. The third form 1988 till 1999 and resulted in Gen Musharraf’s coup.
32
Research Questions
Evident from the problem statement cited above, the political elite, their interests and
objectives (personal and political) and the political situation which consequences out of
the decisions taken by them to advance these interests emerges as an independent
variable. The main dependent variable for this research is the military and its reactions
in form of intervention or coup d’état representing the interests, aspirations, world view
and outlook of the military elite. In this context, four stands of inquiry emerge. First
relates to of process of democratisation after the death of Gen Zia, secondly reasons of
military takeover in 1999, thirdly the regime outcome of Gen Musharraf’s rule and
fourthly why he failed to return democracy to the country after three years. These enable
formulation of main research questions enumerated below.
1. Why the process of democratisation started after the death of Gen Zia
culminated into another military coup in just a decade?
2. How a gulf created in the civil military relations during the second tenure of
Nawaz Sharif ended up in the breakdown of civil control of military?
3. What was the regime outcome of Gen Musharraf’s rule?
4. Why Gen Musharraf failed to restore democracy in the allotted three years’
time?
To answer these questions, following areas are investigated.
1. The process of political reconstruction after Gen Zia with the focus on
democratisation and policies of political elite to gauge their effect on democratic
consolidation and civil military relations.
2. The political developments in the backdrop of civil military relations during
second tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) to ascertain the
circumstances which led to takeover by Gen Musharraf.
33
3. The objectives and policies of Gen Musharraf to analyse the efficacy of his
regime.
4. The role of judiciary in validating Gen Musharraf’s takeover and his subsequent
failure to restore democracy, after the lapse of three-year period granted to him
by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
5. Gen Musharraf’s stance to “keep them [military] out, bring them in”, determine
its veracity or otherwise and suggesting ways how civil military relations can
be improved, democratic control over the military can be exercised effectively
and how military can be kept out of politics.
Research Objectives
This research studies Gen Musharraf’s takeover, also called an institutional response/
counter coup with a view to understand the interface between process of
democratisation and civil military relations. It aims to achieve two main objectives.
Firstly, to understand the responsibility of political and military leaders in consolidating
democracy, nurturing participatory democracy and mature democratic culture leading
to positive regime outcomes. Secondly, how in a democratic framework, optimum
civilian control over military can be achieved? What institutions, processes, measures
and resultant culture would bring about such a change?
Literature Review
A variety of literature from primary and secondary sources from diverse subjects
connected to civil military relations, democracy, democratic consolidation, military
coups and regimes and methods for exercising democratic control over the military has
been consulted in this research. Since, the thesis focuses on civil military relations,
therefore the works related to this field is the starting point. Huntington in his seminal
work analysed growth of military in Europe and U.S. and concluded that military is a
34
profession like any other profession. Contextualised in Cold War setting i.e. external
threat paradigm, he developed institutional theory as a mechanism to control the
difference between civil and military. He looked at separation of powers, autonomy to
the military and objective control as the optimum methods for exercising civilian
control. In his view, this arrangement would foster professionalism and render the
military apolitical. 50 He also views civil military relations as an interaction between the
elites i.e. “the relation of the officer corps to the state” and disregards the relationship
of military as a whole with the civil society which narrows its scope. 59 His proposition
of objective control has been practiced in Pakistan since inception but it has not been
effective in preventing military’s repeated intervention in politics.
Janowitz, took a wider look on the military and its relations with the society as a whole
and not just the elite. His “convergence theory” focuses on finding ways to diminish
rather than accentuate or compartmentalize the differences between the civil and
military. War (external or internal) in his opinion is a joint enterprise and in keeping
with developments in the cold war setting, he went on to propose the constabulary
concept as a model for addressing aspects of civilian control. 60
Proximate to Huntington’s approach on professionalism as a mean for inhibiting
military interventions in politics, Janowitz differed in method. He concludes that
protection of democracy is a civic responsibility of the soldier which is achieved
through greater interconnectedness. His theoretical and structural construct of fusion
and connectedness is of interest to this study of civil military relations in Pakistan. In
this context, the cooperation between civil and military elite can assure consolidation
of democracy and effective control over military.
50
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(New York: Harvard University Press, 1957).; undertaken for United States when the country was
35
In terms of exercising the control over military, “structural theory” of Desch on civil
control over military explains the parameters and methods of its operation. In his
findings he asserts that, civil military relations is good when the external threat is high
and internal threat is low, which did not work in Pakistan as all four military
looking to reorient its politics by shedding the effects of WWII and determining the future role of military
in security system of the country.
59
Ibid. 3.
60
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (USA: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1961), 418.
interventions occurred in the similar settings. 51 In the preceding years, other scholars
have also deliberated on the subject. Some explained the phenomenon and suggest
remedies e.g. Finer, provides insight into military interventions and their outcomes by
connecting politico-cultural developments of a country to military interventions. 52 His
categorization of countries with minimal, low, developed and mature political culture
provide the backdrop to understand the military interventions. The low political culture
in Pakistan, characterized by authoritarianism, non-adherence to democratic values,
corruption and absence of rule of law provides the backdrop to understand Gen
Musharraf’s coup and regime.
The end of cold war and dissolution of Soviet Union radically transformed the bipolar
political landscape and led to the rise of a unipolar political order. The process
unleashed new issues, challenges and threats. In the field of civil military relations,
three areas of concern emerged, first the issue of crisis in civilian control as studied by
51
Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore,
Maryland.: JHU Press, 2001).
52
Samuel Edward Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, Third (London:
Transaction Publishers, 2004).
36
Kohn,53 Weigley,54 and Bacevich. 55 Second issue related to problem of likely military
interventions and growth of resultant civil military relations in the newly liberated
countries of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The third concerned with the conflicting
trend of autocracy giving way to democracies in many areas and simultaneous rise of
dictatorship in other parts of the world, including Pakistan. 56
With the onset of age of terror, scholars after events of 9/11 have studied the
phenomenon of terrorism and its impact on civil military relations. Lyon asserts that the
age of terror poses series challenges to the orthodox western civil military relations,
investigating three particular challenges. The changing security environment, issues
relating to use of force, and issues relating to the role of western militaries in the
reconstruction of weak and failed states. He projects that in relation to each of these
challenges one should expect an increase in civil military tensions. 67 Reviewing
developments in civil military relations from a generational sense (first age from total
war to end of WWII, second during Cold War and third from 1990 onwards),68 it
provides framework for making future projections which is employed in this research.
Similarly, Dr Wong examines the occurring changes in roles and responsibilities of
civilian and military leadership and how they impact civilian control. 69
Gen McChrystal’s affair emerged as the penultimate contemporary issue in civil
military relations which focused attention of the polity in USA on the tensions between
53
Richard H. Kohn, ‘Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations’, World Affairs 170, no. 3 (2008):
69–80.
54
Russell F. Weigley, ‘The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to
Powell’, The Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (1993): 27–58.
55
Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver’, Armed Forces &
Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 447–53.
56
Addressing third aspect Huntington evaluated the revolution in forty countries from authoritarianism
towards democracy and observed that the new democracies faced a daunting challenge and needed to
reform their civil military relations. He analysed their success and failure in the context of his original
assertions for objective civilian control and rise of military professionalism. Exploring the connectivity
between military interventions / coup phenomenon and development he advanced the coup attempt
ceiling in terms of per capita income i.e. Countries with per capita GNP of $1000 or more do not have
37
civil and military elite during conflict situations. Ulrich examined the issue from the
perspective of “dissent over policy, and for failure to implement strategy”. He studied
the willingness of the military to continue to subordinate itself to the preferences of
political elite, adhering to norms of behaviour in civil military relations and maximizing
the chances of success in Afghanistan are of interest to this research. 70
successful coups and countries with per capita GNP $3000 or more do not have coups. If GNP is less
than $1000 the coup are successful and between $1000-3000 the coups are not successful.
67
Rod Lyon, “Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror,” in The Australian American Fulbright
Symposium (Citeseer, 2004),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.188.9440&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed on
6 June 2015). 68Ibid.
69
Dr Wong Leonard, “Civil-Military Relations in a Post 9/11 World,” Colloquium Brief (Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483557.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2015).
70
Marybeth P. Ulrich, ‘The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations’
(DTIC Document, 2011).
In the context of civil military relations, one serious issue relates to military coups/
takeovers. The first reference in this contest is made to John Locke’s explanation about
pre-requisites of a society in context of civil military relation. He emphasised on
interplay of societal and economic factors on civil military relations and their impact
on the process of democratisation. Locke analyses their impact on society, alteration of
legislature and reasons supporting dissolution of governments. In his views when the
government fail to deliver their dissolution becomes inevitable. According to him,
“When he who has supreme executive power neglects and abandons that
charge, so that laws already made can no longer be put into execution;
this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectively
dissolve the government”. 57
57
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1965), 376.
38
Because of a large number of military takeovers in Latin America, Africa and Asia, the
subject of civil military relations has evolved since WW-II and various scholars have
examined these developments from a holistic perspective. The debate mainly focused
on the role of military in nation-building. Forgoing in view, Foster examined the
changes from epistemology, ontology and policy making perspective and developed a
framework for security sector reforms in view of the changing nature of the state. 58 The
discourse further expands and Bruneau extended the conceptual breadth of the
literature on civil military relations beyond civilian control to include two further
dimensions namely effectiveness and efficiency. 59 Smith highlighted that security
sector reforms needs to be an engaged, but gradual approach and it is not an “either/or”
position.60
Within a decade after its creation, civil military relations in Pakistan evolved in a
nonnormative manner when the political system failed to find answers to political
issues, deadlocking politics, defying resolution and resulting into direct and indirect
military interventions. Scholars researching in the field of civil military relations look
at the military’s role in politics and how it has emerged as the predominant political
player. Stephen P. Cohen, an expert of South Asian affairs, has extensively worked on
Pakistan and India. In Idea of Pakistan, he has evaluated the political dimensions in the
backdrop of latent challenges to the security of state in the choice of policy options. 61
Its connection with the Pakistan military has been analysed in this research. Adding to
58
Anthony Forster, ‘New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agendas’, Connections 1, no. 2
(2002): 71–88. He has analysed these dimensions to identify new research agendas which will in focus
during this section of research.
59
Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, ‘Towards a New Conceptualization of
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’, Democratization 15, no. 5 (2008): 909–29.
60
Chris Smith, ‘Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?’,
Conflict, Security & Development 1, no. 01 (2001): 5–20.
61
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 76 T.V.
Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014).
39
it, scholars T.V. Paul, 76 and Christine Fair, 62 have also depicted one sided story
regarding the centrality of armed forces in Pakistan. On the other hand, both authors
have ignored the geostrategic security compulsions faced by the state of Pakistan.
Consequently, their analysis lacks objectivity as it disregards the connection of Kashmir
issue with politics in Pakistan and the existential threat from India. To balance these,
Pakistan has exercised different policy options at different times as evaluated by these
authors. Exploratory and explanatory in essence, majority of these studies aim at
substantiating ideas of western scholars about a garrison, praetorian state and a military
hegemonic system. On the other hand, scholarly work Burki, 63 Bahadur,79 studying the
role of political elite and their failures do not establish resultant causal relationship with
military interventions. The majority of scholars in Pakistan locate the causes of military
intervention in the weaknesses in the political system in its political leaders. 64 As Askari
cites, political decay, weak institutions and inadequate legitimacy of civilian regimes
and use of soldiers in administration as opportunities for military to expand its role in
politics.65
Khan identifies the “military’s self-image of custodian of the state” as the basic reason
for Pakistani military’s participation in politics. 66 According to him, the military
differentiates state from the political elite, apparently due to the persistent weaknesses
manifested by those in power to further their personal and party interests rather than
those of the public and the state. On the other hand, Jalal discards the common view
62
C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
63
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999).
79
Bahadur, Democracy in Pakistan.
64
K. K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958 (Sang-E-Meel Publications, 2007).
65
Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 2000).
66
Aslam Khan, “Civil Military Relations: The Role of Military in the Politics of Pakistan” (Master’s
Programme in Asian Studies, Lund University, 2012), 11.
40
that the weaknesses of political parties are the main variable explaining the military
interventions in Pakistan. 67 She gives a detailed account on how a state, maimed and
mutilated at birth, managed to survive and how in the process of exercising Pakistan’s
sovereignty, the bureaucratic and military institutions rose to the position of dominance.
Since this research studies the weakness in political system as the main variable
therefore her work figures out as the alternative argumentative framework.
Shafqat explains “why Pakistan has continued to oscillate between military-hegemonic
rule and the democratic propensities [and] why democratic processes and institutions
have not gained ground in Pakistan and military’s hegemony has continued to
prevail”.68 His conclusions significant to this research are;
“[first] breakdown in the social and political order in Pakistan has
occurred because of social and economic change, as well as the attitudes
and workings of the leaders-both in government and in opposition
political parties; [second] political parties and religious groups have yet
to accept elections and parliamentary democracy as legitimate
instrument of transfer of power; [third] greatest weakness of political
elites and political leaders is their inability to project democracy as a
preferable [to military led] alternative system of government”. 69
He further narrates that “the greatest weakness of political elites and political leaders is
their inability to project democracy as a preferable alternative system of government”. 86
Siddiqa considers that, since military has emerged as an institution therefore it
67
Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence
(Lahore: Vanguard, 1991). The frequency of military rule in Pakistan is commonly attributed to
weaknesses in its political party system and to difficulties inherent in welding together a linguistically
and culturally heterogeneous society. But such explanations have done more to obfuscate than to lay bare
the complex dynamics.
68
69
Ibid., 265.
86
Ibid., 266.
41
intervenes in politics at the time of crisis to protect its institutional interests; dictating
the need to identify such interests and how are these protected. 70 Ahmed in a recent
publication examines the role of military in politics in ‘post-colonial garrison state’ and
projects that the direction Pakistan takes in coming months and years will depend on
the role of military plays. 71 Likewise, T.V. Paul classifies Pakistan as a garrison state in
which the military has progressively moved from rulers to arbitrators. 72 Shah examines
the role of military and democracy and concludes that that the army now prefers to
control politics indirectly. 73
The military’s point of view in this discourse has not been adequately represented in
scholarly literature, save through a few interviews and public statements. However, a
few former military officers have deliberated on the issues related to politics and civil
military relations. Ayub Khan in his autobiography explains the military mind and
military’s approach to resolving political problems. His argument is in line with the
military training of the officers i.e. appreciation of the situation and formulating policy
options to solve Pakistan’s problems. His basic premise is that politicians are unable to
put their act together, therefore military has to intervene. 74 After 1971 debacle, Gen
Yahya had immense time at his disposal but he refrained to express his views. Gen Zia
did not get an opportunity but Gen Musharraf did document his views about
contemporary Pakistan and his role in shaping it. 75 Being one of the central figures for
70
Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto, 2007).
71
Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in Politics: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (New Delhi:
Amaryllis, 2013).
72
T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2014), 75-101.
73
Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014).
74
Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography.
75
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
42
this research, frequent references have been made to him about his role and political
views.
Two concepts of garrison and praetorian states, constructed by Lasswell and Perlmutter
respectively somewhat also deserve attention as they are occasionally referred in
context of Pakistan. 76 Lasswell noting the trends in politics that in future politics will
dominate by soldiers instead of the businessman. He predicted that “the future world
will be dominated by garrison states; a mystic democracy, with all social activity
governmentalized and military recruitment based on obedience rather than objectively
and originality”.77 Presented as anti-thesis to the civilian dominance, such states were
to evolve out of the democratic system and not imposed by the military through
interventions. His projections were not entirely true but still many thinkers segment the
concept and apply it selectively to Pakistan. Essentially to criticize the military without
realizing that the concept finds greater applicability too many civilian regimes, where
authoritarianism and oligarchy are defining characteristics.
Seen as the theory of the part, Perlmutter’s typology of states and soldiers led to the
advancement of the idea of praetorian state, society and military. 78 Distinguishing
professionalism from corporatism at the outset, he categorized the soldiers into three
categories, to include professional, praetorian and professional revolutionary. The idea
of praetorian state is also occasionally applied to Pakistan without realizing that
Perlmutter has preconditioned its rise to “collapse of executive power of civilian elite”
and not to military interventions. 79
76
Harold Lasswell, Essays on the Garrison State (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Amos
Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and
Revolutionary Soldiers (New York: Harvard University Press, 1979).
77
Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1, 1941):
455.
78
Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, 90-94.
79
Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State’, in The Military and
43
Surveying literature on democracy, its conceptual framework and theoretical
perspectives, several themes stand out. Democratisation, edited by David Potter, David,
Margaret and Paul, 80 covers diverse themes and aspects related to democracy. It studies
causes and process of democratization and its literature is distributed in to six major
parts contributed by different scholars. The first, discusses theoretical approaches to
democratization, second, democratization in Europe and USA from 1760 to 1989, third,
addresses distinctive story of democratization in Latin America and Asia from 1930 to
1990. In part four weaknesses and drawbacks of democratization are discussed on the
basis of case studies of Sub Saharan Africa and Middle East. Part five gives a detailed
account on democratization in communist and post-communist countries, whereas the
last part provides detailed analysis of democratization as a whole. The approaches for
democratic consolidation i.e. modernisation, structural and transition are of special
interest to this research.
Two works of Ayesha Jalal merit attention, the first, The State of Martial Rule, examines
political and economic history of Pakistan’s during first crucial decade in an effort to
find root causes of Pakistan’s military and bureaucratic domination. 81 The emphasis is
on the dialectic between state construction and political processes in Pakistan and it
focuses on ways that the initial problems of state construction were addressed, as these
set the long-term political course of the country. Her study about role of religion and
strong trends of authoritarianism and ethnicity were resourced by this research. Her
second book, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia; A Comparative and
Historical Perspective, explains the democratic and authoritarian patterns in South Asia
Democracy in Asia and Pacific, ed. R.J. May and Viberto Selochan (Melbourne: ANUE Press, 2004),
88–100; Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in Politics: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (New
Delhi: Amaryllis, 2013); Shah, The Army and Democracy.
80
David. P, David. G, Margaret. K &Paul. L “Democratization”
81
Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence
(Lahore: Vanguard, 1991).
44
through comparative study of historical perspective. 82 Her brief about prevalent
political concepts and processes, political economy, central power and regional
dissidence in South Asia provide backdrop to this research.
The process of democratic consolidation when evaluated from comparative perspective
of South Asian countries the work of Philip Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and
Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, attempts to solve the puzzle by an
in-depth analysis of India’s and Pakistan’s political trajectory since independence. 83 It
is thematically divided into two parts. The first, examines the colonial period, the years
around the independence movement, and the three decades afterwards. In his opinion,
a country is a democracy if its citizenry remains sovereign, in spite of a “political system
that is undemocratic in some way or even in which day-to-day politics consists of rulers
who are not held accountable, on the other hand, if a strong majority of citizenry
concedes the right to rule to a person or institution, the country would have a “legitimate
autocracy.” 84 In the second part, he focuses on events from 1977 until the end of 2009.
In this section, the author examines the implications and aftermath of elections in
Pakistan and India, and the divergent paths of these two countries. Oldenburg places a
particular importance on the year 1977; as he notes, “this is not just a convenient
marker, but indicates a turning point in Pakistan and India’s political trajectories”. This
was the year India was under emergency rule imposed by Mrs. Gandhi and the prospects
for democracy seemed brighter for Pakistan than India, the reason being the military
regime’s handover of power to a civilian government. Instead, India returned to
democracy after the elections of 1977, while Pakistan returned to authoritarianism
82
Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1995).
83
Philip Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths (London:
Routledge, 2010).
84
Ibid., 4.
45
marked by Gen Zia’s takeover. Assessing the role of religious and external factors in
explaining political stability in India and a democratic deficit in Pakistan, he also
reviews compatibility of Islam and Hinduism with democracy.
Building Democracy in South Asia by Maya Chada is an effort to reshape perceptions
on the nature of democracy in South Asia. 85 An analysis of South Asia’s political
experience with democracy in 1990s, she emphasises that, if democratic norms are to
be universalized, they must first absorb the interpretations and experiences of the
nonwestern countries. Especially those related to democracy. She argues that any
discussion of democratization must be founded on mapping its course amid the
constraints of state consolidation, national integration, and conflicting notions of
individual and group rights. Within this context, she deconstructs four sets of
developments; the repeated dismissals of elected governments in Pakistan, the
dilemmas produced by changes in caste politics, separatist confrontations in Punjab and
the northeast, and the end of Congress Party dominance in India; the political and
ideological contest over Kashmir in both India and Pakistan; and the restoration of
democracy movement leading to a constitutional monarchy in Nepal. She exposes the
underlying goals and logic of these political events to identify regime objectives and
priorities, capabilities, and responses to various types of challenges.
For cognizance of the politico-legal history of Pakistan for the period under review, two
major works besides others are consulted. First the work of Hamid Khan which provides
an objective and detailed account of the developments occurring during the period in
focus of this research. 86 The second work of Arshad Rizvi titled Political System of
Pakistan: A Constitutional Study, provides detailed account of political system of
85
Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan (Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000).
86
Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press
Karachi, 2009).
46
Pakistan. 87 As a documented PhD thesis, it tries to establish a relation between
constitutional development and political instability in Pakistan. The author has analysed
the political system of Pakistan by highlighting the periodic political and ideological
changes, which have marred the constitutional evolution in Pakistan from 1947 to 1971,
during which the country faced four martial laws and three constitutions.
He also focuses on political and constitutional developments which occurred in Zia’s
regime and subjects them to criticism.
The Daughter of East: An Autobiography by Benazir Bhutto is a well-known passionate
account.88 Being one of major stake holder, during the period on which this research
focuses, reference to it despite some inaccuracies is inescapable. It is about her struggles
in which she presents detailed account of the misdeeds of others but glosses over her
own mistakes. Yet she became prime minister during a period, in which peace and
democracy appeared fleeting and fragile and securing of democracy was her main
concern. In the last few chapters, she comments on a range of issues related to Pakistan
possibly in retrospect, her criticism of Gen Musharraf is of interest to this research.
Work of Sartaj Aziz, being a close ally of Nawaz Sharif is of immense significance to
this research. His book, Between Dreams and Realities, provides detailed and analytical
account of many events investigated by this research. 89 His work stand out for
neutrality, accuracy and objectivity. An autobiography it accounts for all major events
up till 1999. Huntington’s second book titled, Political Order in Changing Societies,
analyses economic development, political order and political decay in changing
87
Arshad Rizvi, The Political System of Pakistan: A Constitutional Study (Karachi: Paramount Books,
2014).
88
Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: Pocket Books, 2008).
89
Sartaj Aziz and Syed Babar Ali, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
47
societies. 90 His argument about work of institutions and inevitability of economic
growth and development in the sense of arrangement for sequencing is of interest to
this research.
The literature reviewed for this research also brings out certain inadequacies which this
research aims to fill. Although, a lot has been written on the subject of democracy, civil
military relations, political elite and their contributions. Similarly there are many
critiques of the role of military in politics in Pakistan but there is no doctoral level
research done on the subject of Gen Musharraf’s coup in the country. Amina Ibrahim
identifies that there is a general dearth of theory based research about military
interventions in Pakistan. There are only a limited number of research works undertaken
on civil military relations and only few experts Askari, Shafqat are available on the
subject. Till Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT)
was established and focused on civil military relations there was no significant research
work undertaken to evaluate the subject of civilian control over military. There is
general neglect on part of political elite and academics about the subject of national
security, no national security policy has ever been formulated and all significant
suggestions about national security architecture have come from the military. Lastly
there is near deficiency of research work on civil military relations which brings
together theoretical and societal perspectives.
Knowledge Gap
Above discussion reveals that although a substantial literature exist on civil military
relations, military interventions, role of political and military elite, performance of
governments and military regime outcomes, yet there is a general dearth of theory
90
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1970).
48
guided research and case studies about military interventions in Pakistan. The discourse
on civil military relations in Pakistan mainly comes out as critique of either the military
or the civilian leaders or the military hegemony in general. Few research works have
explored the subject of civilian/democratic control over the military and understand
why despite the existence of the constitutional arrangements i.e. the hardware, civilian
regimes are largely unable to capacitate themselves and improve the effectiveness of
their control over the military: above all what are the remedial measures keeping in
view their consistent failure. Also it may be noted that there is near absence of doctoral
level and theory guided research on the causes of military intervention in Pakistan and
especially of Gen Musharraf’s intervention in 1999; this research aims to fill the gap.
Significance of the Research
The study is significant for a number of reasons. First, there is paucity of theory guided
doctoral level research about military interventions in Pakistan and there is none related
to military intervention of 1999.This research fills this gap. Second although the widely
acclaimed Huntington’s framework for civilian control over the military is adopted and
formalized in the constitution of Pakistan, yet it has failed to stop the military
interventions and takeovers. This research not only explores the reasons of its failure
but also provides a perspective and offers recommendations to optimise civilian control
over the military, while applying the transitional approach in the civil military relations
discourse. Thirdly, in the age of terror in which Pakistan’s internal security stands
imperilled for a range of reasons and causes, this thesis also looks at security reforms
so that the civil and military can work jointly to contribute democratic consolidation in
the country.
49
Scope and Limitations
Emanating from the aim of the study, this research evaluates the time period from 1988
to 2003 through the prism of democratic consolidation and civil military relations. The
term military in the context of this research includes the armed forces and law
enforcement agencies in Pakistan, although Army takes a lead while interfacing with
the political elite. The actions and preferences of political elite and military leaders have
been studied in this time period but Gen Musharraf’s coup remains the focal point of
study. The regime outcome of political leaders (1988-1999) has been discussed as a
reference to determine their preferences. On the other hand, Gen Musharraf’s regime
(1999-2003) outcome has been discussed in detail to establish the preferences of
military elite when holding political power. Role of institutions like judiciary and
military are evaluated to understand the process and validation of military takeovers.
The events leading up to military takeover of 1999 and its aftermath have been
examined from theoretical perspective as well as societal perspective. For the later, a
survey and unstructured interviews of key politicians, military officers and
academicians have been conducted. In the pre take over events, Kargil conflict and its
impact also emerges as a contributory factor, therefore, from the perspective of civil
military relations, it has been analysed.
During the conduct of study, two limitations emerged while collecting the primary
information. First is related to the availability of key players for interview and second
concerns the factoring in of the societal perspective. In this saga there are three key
actors i.e. Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Gen Musharraf. Unfortunately, Benazir is
assassinated before this study took place, while Nawaz Sharif is again elected as Prime
Minister and therefore not available for interview. Only Gen Musharraf agreed for an
interview, findings of which are included in the study. For Benazir, her autobiography
50
and for Nawaz Sharif, the accounts documented by his close ally Sartaj Aziz have been
resourced for evaluation of the events.
As far as the survey to gauge public opinion is concerned, there has been no census
since 1998 and the statistics on demography are only estimates. Keeping in view the
limited number of educated people in Pakistan who are also familiar with the subject a
proportionate sample has been selected to ascertain the societal perspective from
opinion makers in Pakistan.
Research Methodology
Research, in terms of reasoning, is classified into two types i.e. inductive and deductive.
Inductive research relates to investigation of a new phenomenon on which little
literature is available. In this type of research, a specific issue is evaluated to understand
the general behaviour of a certain event or phenomenon. In simple words, it is called as
“bottom up” approach where researcher begins with specific observations, detects
patterns and regularities, formulate some tentative hypotheses and finally end up
developing some general conclusions or theories. Contrariwise, deductive research
starts from the more general to the more specific. It is also termed as “top-down”
approach where the researcher starts with a theory, narrow sit down into specific
hypotheses, collects data and tests the hypotheses for a confirmation or otherwise of the
original theory. This research evaluates the civil military relations in a democratic
framework which is a multidisciplinary subject and encompasses numerous theoretical
explanations. Since the existing theories have been used to determine the patterns of
democracy and civil military relations in Pakistan, therefore this research is deductive
in terms of reasoning.
Similarly there are two types of research in terms of data analysis i.e. qualitative and
quantitative research. Qualitative research, “also known as exploratory research is used
51
to understand the opinions and motivations behind a certain event or a phenomenon.”
It provides detailed and in-depth information by uncovering trends and thoughts about
the objective of study. On the other hand, quantitative research focuses more “in
counting and classifying features and constructing statistical models and figures to
explain what is observed. It is used to quantify attitudes, opinions, behaviours, and other
defined variables – and generalize results from a larger sample population.”
The subject of democratic consolidation and civil military relations is built around the
trends, motivations and opinions which can be analysed by both quantitative and
qualitative analysis i.e. mixed methods of research. The latter enables valuable
conclusions related to validation or otherwise of the public opinion about political,
social and psychological aspects of civil military relations especially the causal
relationship between politics and the military interventions and regime outcomes.
While the former being interpretative and logical in nature assists this research in
effectively discerning and corroborating the perceived reasons for military
interventions and regime outcomes with public perception about host of casual factors
i.e. the contributory reasons and identification of a single cause as the casus belli
triggering an intervention. Therefore, a mix of the two approaches has been followed in
this research to accrue objective and balanced outcomes. The use of mixed method
approach indicates that the concept under research is neither deterministic (positivist)
nor socially constructed (interpretivism), rather it is a blend of both ontological
explanations. Since the research first evaluates the conditions followed by actions and
resultant consequences therefore the ontological explanation of this research is rooted
into pragmatism.
52
Research Design
Mixed methods of research involve integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches
to generating new knowledge and can involve either concurrent or sequential use of
these two classes of methods to follow a line of inquiry. The research design and main
focus on either qualitative or quantitative approach depends on research proposition.
Generally, there are various types of research designs available in mixed method
research and their selection depends upon the research problem. One of the types is
‘concurrent triangulation method’ in which data is collected in two concurrent phases.
The data can be integrated during interpretation or analysis phase. This method is
primarily used for confirmation, corroboration or cross validation within a single study.
The literature review reveals that subject of civil military relations, majority of times,
is studied either through qualitative approach or quantitative approach. Addressing this
drawback, this research uses concurrent triangulation method. Firstly, it qualitatively
analyses the topic as a case study while employing theoretical explanations. Secondly,
quantitative approach is used to bring out the societal perspective on the issue. At the
end, results of both methods are compared which cross validates the findings.
Data and Sources
The mixed methods of research require both primary and secondary data in terms of
theoretical and numerical. The primary sources include Economic Surveys of Pakistan,
data on census and elections available at Election Commission of Pakistan, judgements
of Supreme Court from its archives and the reports and studies undertaken by PILDAT
and the surveys conducted by GALLUP Polls. The content analysis of two important
national newspapers i.e. Dawn and Jang from period January 1999 to December 2003
resourced from Press and Information Department (PID) of Pakistan has also been
undertaken.
53
Field survey stands out as the primary instrument for obtaining numerical responses
through a set of closed and open ended questions. The survey draws upon a considerable
sample of informed and experienced respondents from all walks of life to inform this
research about their opinions on the quality of democracy and reasons for military
intervention etc. Forgoing in view, a survey is conducted to enable comparison and
transportation of key findings, through questionnaire to draw upon the public opinion
about civil military relations.
The survey is supplemented by interviews and discussions with notable actors from
cluster of political, military and civil society entities including judiciary to validate the
theoretical framework and the propositions. The interviews followed a standard process
i.e. sharing of a questionnaire in advance and response lasting 30-40 minutes. To instil
confidence and get the maximum output, given the general reluctance in Pakistan for
recorded interviews, the interviews were not recorded and were instead transcribed later
by the researcher. Besides the interviews, the personal acquaintance of this researcher
with many leading academicians, military and some political actors and frequent
interaction with them on the range of issues at the university enabled the researcher to
add depth to the research with the information thus obtained.
On the other hand, the secondary sources include relevant books and writings on the
subject and the journals published regularly by think tanks and institutions based in
Pakistan and internationally. The researcher has consulted a range of data banks from
variety of sources. Access to National Defence University (NDU) library and Pakistan
Scientific and Technological Information Centre (PASTIC) and their ability to on-line
access and consult through multiple search engines huge number of books and research
work done in the field of civil military relations and relevant fields which is available
in the leading libraries and universities of the world added depth to the study.
54
Data Analysis
The research problem of the study indicates two variables i.e. role of political elite as
independent and role of military and military intervention as dependent variable. Both
the primary and secondary data has been analysed keeping in view these two variables.
Qualitatively, a thematic analysis has been carried out to gauge the preference and
actions of political elite and resultant military interventions. Quantitatively, IBM SPSS
software has been used to calculate the societal response on the issue. The research
employed Zotero, research tool to gather, organise, analyse and cite sources which are
shared in this research. Moreover, United Kingdom (UK) English language has been
used throughout the study.
Organization of Study
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.”
"I don't much care where –" "Then it doesn't matter which way you go.”
Lewis Carroll (Alice in Wonderland)
Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspectives
In this chapter foundational structures of this research have been expounded. In
accordance with the core question, the conceptual framework for democratisation and
its related theoretical perspectives i.e. modernisation, transition and structural have been
explained. It identifies how the role of political elite in the context of transition approach
is critical for democratic consolidation. Within the conceptual framework of state, civil
society and civil military relations the theoretical perspectives set out the hypotheses
which would be studied in the research. Civil military relations finds context in
democratic system and is closely connected with the threat matrix. Identifying measures
for exercising civil control over the military it explains the push and pull factors,
55
military’s interests and studies the phenomenon of military coup and its triggers. It
identifies that Huntington’s framework of civil control of military i.e. objective control,
separation and institutional autonomy practiced in Pakistan since inception has largely
been ineffective in preventing military interventions in Pakistan. Chapter 2:
Democratic Reconstruction after Gen Zia
In this chapter death of Gen Zia and military’s support for moving the country from
partial to liberal democracy during the two tenures of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif provide
context and enables this researcher to test two hypotheses. First that political elite create
situations of deadlock, involve military as arbitrator, which for want of reconciliation
in the face of deteriorated security situation sometimes results in military takeover. The
second that, in the process of democratic consolidation the transition approach and it
application is most value able. The approach identifies political elite as the primary
agency which through its actions fosters democratisation or otherwise. In this chapter
interplay between the political elite during the decade 1988-1999 with a focus on
interaction between the president, prime minister, chief justice and the joint and service
chiefs and its impact on process of democratisation and civil military relations in the
country.
Chapter 3: Breakdown of Civil Military Relations 1998-99
In the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif authoritarianism premised on heavy mandate led
to creation of multiple political situations in quick succession heightened concerns of
the polity and the military. These in the context of constitutional framework included
undoing of Eighth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment to arrogate complete power.
Which was followed by forced ouster of president, physical assault on the Supreme
Court and engineered ouster of chief justice. Also the resignation of Gen Karamat
COAS on suggesting the need for setting up National Security Council as a forum for
56
addressing rising security concerns. The negative impact these developments had on
the military, appointment of Gen Musharraf and the civil military divide created by the
Kargil conflict led to sacking of Gen Musharraf, which was interpreted by the military
as a coup. It resulted in a counter coup by the military to protect its COAS. These
aspects contextualised in the theoretical frameworks of civil military relations and coup
theories would be studied in this chapter. The analysis of the Kargil conflict and the
coup and counter coup focuses not merits and demerits but on the interpretative and
explanatory powers identified in theoretical framework for extracting findings.
Chapter 4: Military Regime’s Aspiration
The counter military coup had led to installation of military regime. In this chapter the
aspirations and outcome of military regime in the backdrop of conceptual framework
set out by Finer will be studied. It will ascertain how, after incorporation of technically
qualified individuals, the regime went about to set up the agenda, acquire legitimacy
through a judgement by Supreme Court and dealt with endogenous and exogenous
challenges. It also studies developments in the realm of civil military relations during
the regime and identifies how the personal interests of Gen Musharraf became the
primary determinant for the major policy decisions. The chapter focuses on the process
related to extension of military in power in contravention of the Supreme Court
judgement for returning democracy to the country after expiry of three years.
Chapter 5: Democracy and Civil Military Relations: A Survey
In order to ascertain societal perspective on civil military relations and elite
responsibility for consolidating democracy in Pakistan, a survey through questionnaire
comprising sixteen closed ended and one open ended question from a broad based
sample comprising opinion makers from all segments of civil society has been
conducted. The survey is tested for internal consistency through Cronbach Alpha
57
analysis. As a primary source, the results of the survey corroborates with the findings
of the research. The chapter also compares the survey results with those conducted by
GALLUP Polls on same issues which add to its credibility and reliability. The
interviews with leading key players and the scholars drew on their personal insights and
opinions to understand elite interface and its impact on civil military relations and
democratisation in the country.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter brings together the results of theory based qualitative thematic data for the
period of 1988 to 2003 and collates it with the qualitative numerical data accrued
through the field survey to ascertain public opinion and societal view on the subject of
civil military relations. It taking into account developments since 2004 proffers
recommendations in seven clusters of democratic consolidation, responsibility of
judiciary, civil military relations, democratic control of military, national security
architecture and lastly measures for eradicating contentious issues.
Summation
This chapter provides a comprehensive perspective about this research and what it
wants to achieve in the context of civil military relations. Initially the description about
the alternations between civil and military rules sets the stage to crystallise the problem
statement and identify research questions. The research design elucidates how this
research aims to bring together theoretical and societal perspectives in order to extract
comprehensive findings and proffer practical recommendations. Types and sources of
data, scope and limitations has also be identified. The literature review takes cognizance
of the existing literature so as to benefit from the works undertaken up till now and also
identify the gaps which this research aims to fulfil. In the end the organisation of
research provides insight to the reader, what to expect in the succeeding chapters.
58
CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
“Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other

forms that have been tried from time to time.” 91
Winston Churchill
1.1 Prelude
In this chapter, research structure formulated as conceptual framework and theoretical
perspective is elaborated. Together, they provide direction and set parameters for
exploring the core and ensuing research questions. Conceptual framework comprises
the process of democratisation in Pakistan, exercise of civilian control over the military
in a democratic framework, causes of military intervention (coup d’état) and what
interests they serve. Correspondingly, theoretical perspective elaborates the conceptual
framework and focuses on interplay of democratisation and politics to ascertain the
efficacy of approaches for managing civil military relations and civilian control. The
framework developed in this chapter establishes that the societal military and foreign
influences create environment conducive for acceptance of military coups on account
of national and institutional interests.
1.2 Civil Military Relations: Conceptual Framework
Civil military relations is defined as a “web of relations between the military and society
within which it operate, and of which it is necessarily part. Such relations encompass
all aspects of the role of the military (as a professional, political, social and economic
institution) in the entire gambit of the national life. Civil military relations involve
issues of the attitude of the civilians towards the military, the civilian society’s
91
Richard Langworth, Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations (London: Public
Affairs, 2011), 574.
59
perception of, and attitudes of the military towards the civilian society. Moreover it
involves the civilian society’s perception of, and the attitudes to the military and the
role of armed forces in relation to the state.” 92 Clausewitz visualised it as a relationship
between the state, people and the armed forces. 93 Civil military relations is not a separate
academic area of study but draws upon the diverse fields of political science,
international relations, economics, history, psychology, anthropology, and sociology
etc. Scholars have and continue to study the evolving dimensions of these relations to
identify challenges in general. They investigate specific cases to understand the
dynamics or group the cases for comparative studies in an attempt to understand the
non-normative behaviour of certain militaries i.e. their intervention in politics directly
or indirectly. These studies are contextualized in global, regional and domestic settings.
A political system of a country exists in and responds to external and internal
developments and is shaped by them. Analysing these developments in international
security environment and system, Rod Lyon categorised evolution of civil military
relations in western countries in three distinct ages. 111 First, during the period of total
war 1860-1945, second in the age of cold war 1946-1990 and third commencing form
1990 to-date which he labels as the age of terror. Since this research focuses on Pakistan
therefore it will in the main emphasis on the second and the third age.
Conceptually, the discussion of civil military relations revolves around three major
questions. First relates to the process of democratisation and political construction.
Second, how civilian control over military can be optimized and third, what inspires a
92
Adedeji Ebo, Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and
Challenges (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 2; Naison
Ngoma, “Civil—military Relations in Africa: Navigating Uncharted Waters,” African Security Studies
15, no. 4 (2006): 98.
93
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. James John Graham (New York: Routledge, 2005), 281. 111Lyon,
“Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror,” 4.
60
military intervention and coup and its relationship with the institutional interests of the
military.
Civil military relations operate within the political process of the country. In a
democratic system, pre-eminence of elected political elite and military subordination is
considered essential. However, strengthening of democracy largely remains in the
purview of the political elite. Studies for democratization 94 identify three main
approaches95 i.e. modernisation, transition and structuralism which provide perspective
to this research as it investigates the process of democratisation and construction of civil
military relations in Pakistan.
In a democratic setting, civil control over the military is exercised by application of
different methods. Huntington identified separation approach, in his view separation of
the military from civil can help in building civilian control over the military while
ensuring optimum professional growth. 96 On the other hand, Janowitz argues for an
integrated approach. 97 He perceives protection of democracy as a joint responsibility
and integration of civil and military for a better civilian control. Another important
question in civil military relation is what inspires the military to intervene in politics
and launch a coup. To answer this question, scholars in Janowitzian sense identify three
major perspectives, namely the pull factors (societal factors which pull the military
towards politics). The push factors i.e. the factors indigenous to military’s institutional
structures (also seen as interests) which forces military’s involvement in politics and
94
The research does not include a debate on the formal and participatory democracy yet it takes into
account the process involved in strengthening either.
95
David S. Potter et al., eds., Democratization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 10.
96
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(New York: Harvard University Press, 1957).
97
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (USA: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1961).
61
thirdly the factor of foreign influence i.e. on the society and the military. These aspects
have been discussed in this chapter.
In summary this conceptual framework and the theoretical perspective is tabulated
below.
Table 1.1: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspective

Conceptual Framework Theoretical Perspective
Democratisation and Political Construction 1. Modernisation Perspective

(Interface between politics and military) 2. Transition Perspective
3. Structural Perspective
Civilian Control over Military 1. Separation: Huntington

(why separation approach does not work) 2. Integrated: Janowitz
Triggering a Military Coup d’état 1. Societal Perspective: Pull Factors
(what inspires a coup in Pakistan) 2. Military Perspective: Push Factors
3. Foreign Influences
Interests 1. National
2. Institutional
The forgoing framework and perspective is employed in this research to study the civil
military relations in Pakistan. Since Pakistan was created during the initial stages of
cold war therefore these external settings influenced the civil military relations in the
country while the process of state construction furnished the internal context. Later the
onset of age of terror contextualised the relations. The evolution of civil military
relations in Pakistan can be divided into these two sub-stages with two distinctions. 98
First, although created in 1947, the polity in Pakistan maintains strong linkage with the
Islamic history, the Islamic political system in general and developments in the
subcontinent in particular. Secondly, the interplay of persistent Indo-Pak rivalry due to
98
Lyon, ‘Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror.’ Corresponding with Lyon’s categorisation, these
are cold war stage and age of terror and much of its external and internal politics is related to these stages.
62
unresolved Kashmir dispute (during cold war and age of terror), resulted into a cold war
of its own, layering historic and existing rivalry with additional complexities.
After creation, domestic politics and civil military relations in Pakistan has witnessed
two broad thrusts. The first relates to the process of democratic and political
construction and second to intermittent military rules. Unfortunately the process of state
and democratic construction in the first decade ended in imposition of martial law in
1958 by a civilian President. The second attempt for democratisation from 1971 to 1977
also ended in a martial law due to allegations of electoral fraud and similarly the third
attempt from 1988 to 1999 again ended in Gen Musharraf’s military rule. The study of
this decade and the consequent military takeover is of primary interest to this research.
1.3 The Core Question and Explanation
This research is a case study of the military takeover of 12 October 1999. It has been
undertaken to identify reasons of its occurrence, how military utilised power from 1999
to 2003 and why Gen Musharraf did not restore democracy at the end of three year
period permitted by Supreme Court of Pakistan. Consistent with the identified
methodological approach, this core question comprises three main aspects elucidated
below.
The first aspect concerns with the study of democratic interlude from 1988 to 1999. 99
What role the political elite played in strengthening or undermining the process of
democratisation in this period? The second relates to study of the efficacy of civilian
control over the military in the process of transition from authoritarian rule to
democracy. Third, what were the reasons which led to military takeover in 1999 and
the influence of national and institutional interests on the decision of military takeover,
99
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A New History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 143.
63
on the consequent military regime and in the military’s failure to restore democracy
within the permitted time period of three years?
1.4 Democracy and Political Construction
Consensus on democracy 100 as the defining political thought and system of governance
was achieved soon after creation of Pakistan which was later expressed in form of 1956
Constitution. The process of democratisation pursued thereafter refers to political
changes moving in a democratic direction. Scholars identify three main approaches to
study the process of democratisation i.e. modernisation, transitional and structural. 119 It
is generally perceived that democracy is strengthened by pursuing anyone or a
combination of these approaches. Operating in a functionalist construct, modernisation
approach focuses on socio-economic development as the key instrument for sustaining
democracy. The structural approach focuses on the influence of state and societal
structures on the process of democratisation.
The transitional approach locates the success or otherwise of the process of
democratisation in the conduct of political elite: what they do, when, where and how. It
distinguishes between the stages of transition and consolidation. In nutshell, the
transition approach regards the political elite as primary agency for promoting or
impeding the democratic process. These approaches are not mutually exclusive but
overlap and intersect as the state and society evolves. Yet the emphasis of each approach
100
Democracy is understood as rule of the people, by the people and for the people. It comprises three
aspects i.e. democracy, the rule of the people elected through free and fair elections, it operates on the
principles of equality of all citizens and participation of citizens in governance and availability of
alternate means of information. The second aspect is that of constitutionalism i.e. to limit the government
by law and free and just judicial system. The third aspect of liberalism comprises different freedoms i.e.
of religion, political, media and association etc. While the debate on the nature of democracy in Pakistan
is beyond the purview of this research therefore it accepts the common practice of these three aspects in
a manner that the democratic system sustains itself. 119Potter et al., Democratization.
64
is distinct. Within each approach, variety of explanations by different authors who differ
from each other exist. Each approach is discussed in preceding sections.
1.4.1 Modernisation
The modernisation approach focuses on the socio economic conditions and their
significance for sustaining democracy. Lipset in his seminal work established a
theoretical link between the level of development and the probability of a polity being
democratic.101 According to him, the level of development can be gauged in per capita
income of a country and other indicators of economic wealth. He argued that various
aspects of economic development i.e. wealth, education, industrialisation and
urbanisation contribute in creating the continuing conditions which help in democratic
transition and stability. Alternately “a society divided between large impoverished mass
and small favoured elite would result either in oligarchy or in tyranny.” 102
Moore, attributed five factors which determine the path to democracy and emphasised
on the significance of middle class and advanced “no bourgeoisie, no democracy”
thesis.103 The proposition of economic development sustaining democracy was studied
by Prezwoski and others in their study concluded that while socioeconomic
development may not help in transition to democracy, it certainly helps in sustaining
it.104 The benchmark of $5000 per capita income was generally regarded as the threshold
for sustaining democracy. According to them, no democracy fails if the gross domestic
101
Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53, no. 01 (1959): 69–105.
102
Ibid. 75.
103
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making
of the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 1967). Power distribution amongst the elite 2, the
economic basis of upper agrarian class, 3, the class constellation, 4, Distribution of power between the
classes, 5, and the state’s autonomy viz a viz a dominant class.
104
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the
World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178.
65
product (GDP) per capita is above $5000; it is susceptible below that; and dictatorships
persist if it is below $1000. It implies that wealth is a primary determinant of
democracy, yet India and other such countries which do not fit the wealth and
socioeconomic indicator criteria practice and exist as stable democracies.
In Pakistan, the GDP per capita income in 1947 stood slightly above $200 and after
sixty seven years it increased to $1512 in 2014-15.105 Apparently, attainment of the goal
of $5000 per capita income looks to be a distant objective. It implies that socioeconomic
conditions in Pakistan are still not and will not likely to be for quite some time
conducive for sustaining democracy. Contrarily, India which was below the wealth
criteria continues to function as a stable democracy. Amrityia Sen, the Nobel laureate,
attributes it to the history of India rather than socio-economic conditions. 106 On the
contrary, Singapore with high level of socio economic development and oil rich Middle
Eastern countries practice an authoritarian rather than democratic system. The inherent
contradictions in the argument of the modernisation approach make it a weak analytical
frame work for study of the process of democratisation in Pakistan.
Ishrat Hussain, 107 while studying economic growth in Pakistan considers determinants
for long term growth and counts initial conditions, investment in physical and human
capital, macroeconomic policy, quality of institutions and governance and external
environment facing a country. He makes an interesting observation:
“The inter-decade differences in economic performance halted the
secular rise of the growth rate. The 1960s, 1980s and 2000s
[authoritarian governments] witnessed robust economic growth with
105
Government of Pakistan, “Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-2015” (Islamabad: Finance Division,
2015), vi.
106
Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (London:
Penguin Books, 2006).
107
Ishrat Husain, ‘Pakistan’s Growth Experience 1947-2007’, Business Review 5, no. 2 (2010): 11–33.
127
Ibid. 16.
66
average annual rates exceeding 6 percent while the 1950s, 1970s and
1990s [democratic governments] were marked by a decline in the trend
growth rate to 4 percent”.127
In conclusion, the authoritarian regimes could not sustain perpetual rule and had to quit
under public pressure generated by reasons other than prosperity. Similarly,
democratically elected political actors who have focused essentially on development
and prosperity for gaining legitimacy have also faltered. Therefore, it can be argued that
when it comes to democracy, the polity in general manifests strong desire to move
beyond formal to participatory democracy.
The focus of modernist approach is important for creating conditions (wealth) for
sustaining democracy in the long run yet it is not the most appropriate instrument for
promoting democracy especially in the developing countries. Wucherpfenning explores
the economic development proposition of modernist and asks “are poor countries less
likely to be democratic than rich countries and if yes, why?” 108 He states that
“democracy does not come about randomly, and for democracy to be stable it must
come about from within.” 109 His democracy from within proposition is an important
indicator that for success of democratisation process the casual relationship resides
somewhere else. Stephan in an effort to understand relationship between “citizens
perceptions’ of socioeconomic efficacy of a democratic regime versus the legitimacy
of the regime identifies that there are number of theory based reasons why a regime
could be insulated for a range of reasons and concludes that the rule of law rather than
socioeconomic performance is the vital asset of the new democracy. 110
108
Julian Wucherpfennig and Franziska Deutsch, “Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence
Revisited,” Living Reviews in Democracy 1 (2009): 1.
109
Ibid., 3.
110
Alfred C. Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 140.
67
To summarise, if one goes by the modernist approach then the desirable sustaining
conditions for democracy do not exist in Pakistan. They have not existed since inception
and are not likely to be attained in the near future, yet people of Pakistan manifest strong
desire for practicing democracy so what should be done to reconcile the contradiction.
There is a need to study the democracy from within proposition and look at other
approaches to determine the most appropriate approach for promoting democracy in
Pakistan.131
1.4.2 Structural
The structural approach to democratisation envisages a long term process of change
influenced by changes in structures of power. These structures relate to distribution of
power amongst the individuals and social systems comprising groups, organisations,
communities and societies. A state and society comprises many power structures and
the basic premise of the structural approach is that:
“The particular interrelationship of certain structures of powereconomic,
social, and political as they gradually change through history provide
constraints and opportunities that drive political elite and others along a
historical trajectory leading towards liberal democracy. Other such
structural relationships lead historically in other political
directions.”132
Moore investigating social origins of democracy questioned why the slow change, from
agrarian to industrialised societies during seventeenth to twentieth century, facilitated
democratisation in some countries (England, France and USA), while others (Japan and
Germany) moved towards fascism, and still others (Russia and China) turned towards
communism. While studying the interplay of four changing power structures i.e. the
peasants, lords, urban bourgeoisie and the state, Potter concludes five general
68
131
Liang-chih Evans Chen, “Development First, Democracy Later, or Democracy First, Development
Later: The Controversy over Development and Democracy” (Annual Meeting of the Institute for the
Study of Democracy, California: University of California, 2007),
http://isia.ccu.edu.tw/isiaUpload/doc/English%20CV%20%28December%202012%29.pdf (accessed on
7 July 2015). He concludes that the controversy over development and democracy is inconclusive and
will be continuing.
132
Potter et al., Democratization., 18-19.
conditions essential for development of democracy. First, the development of a balance
between state and landed aristocracy (not too strong a state) and second the growth of
appropriate forms of commercial agriculture. Third, the weakening of landed
aristocracy, fourth, the prevention of aristocratic-bourgeoisie coalition and lastly a
breakup from a bourgeoisie led past. 111
The social structures also represent social classes and struggle between these classes
produces different forms of government. Amongst these classes, the most
prodemocratic is the urban working class and least, the landed aristocracy (feudal) while
the position of others is ambiguous and varies according to prevailing political
conditions and settings. If the fourth power structure represented by the state becomes
powerful and autonomous from social classes then it is likely to impede the process of
democratisation. Consequently “changing structure and form of state power is
fundamental to democratisation.” 134 Rueschemeyer and others studied the impact of
transnational power on class alignment and changing nature of the state. They observe
that if a state is economically dependent on other states, than it will delay
industrialisation and urbanisation and consequently democratisation as the most
prodemocratic class would remain weak. 112
The state and societal power structures are also seen as institutions which either could
be social, historical or political. The historical and political institutionalisms’ define
111
Ibid. 20.
134
Ibid. 21.
112
Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
69
institutions as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions in the
organisational structures of the polity or the political economy”. The social
institutionalists “add cognitive scripts, moral templates and symbol systems” that may
exist at supra-state or supra-organisational levels. 113 These institutions impact politics
by influencing policy or organising political action. The impact of political institutions
on democratisation could be longstanding, systemic and structural influencing in terms
of outcomes and interests. They may affect the interaction of actors who mainly work
within institutional constraints but may sometimes choose to bypass them. Changes in
state policies also set into motion processes that influence interests of such actors and
determine the success of a program like democracy. 114
Moore applied the structural approach to study the process of democratisation in India
which started in seventeenth century and observes that India moved in a different
direction. 115 Instead of industrialising and urbanising, it surrendered to become a
colony, a supplier of resources and subsequently a market for industrialised countries.
The colonisers in two centuries of domination altered the indigenous social power
structures. They created new power structures like a centralised bureaucracy, police
force and armed forces, a district system of administration and a feudal class which
could serve as the agents of the crown. They also altered the education system139 to
produce a class which could serve the new power structures and aligned the tax
collection system with the district system of administration. Greater home rule (i.e.
113
Edwin Amenta and Kelly M. Ramsey, ‘Institutional Theory’, in Handbook of Politics: State and
Society in Global Perspective, ed. Kevin T. Leicht and J. Craig Jenkins (New York: Springer Science &
Business Media, 2010), 15–40.
114
Ibid., 27.
115
Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 139Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Minute on
Indian Education [1835],” in Bureau of Education. Selections from Educational Records, Part I (1781-
1839), ed. H. Sharp (Calcutta: Superintendent,
Government Printing, 1920), 107–17,
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_education_1835.ht
ml (accessed on 18 June 2015).
70
partial sharing of power) and independence was achieved after a long historic political
struggle.
Pakistan on its inception inherited a milieu of such power structures which were spread
in the society. Its most significant assets were the founding political party (All India
Muslim League) and the founding fathers (Quaid e Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan etc.). Other
political actors who migrated from India to Pakistan lacked social roots and a therefore
a political base and were forced to co-opt the local feudal and other power holders in
the society. Jalal, 116 investigated how the weak state survived and bureaucratic and
military institutions rose to the position of dominance in the country. She refutes the
weaknesses of political parties as a contributory factor and explores the tensions
between the centre and the provinces in a federation and observes that the collusion
between the bureaucratic and military institutions and their interface with international
centres of power in Washington and London facilitated the process.
Adeney and Wyatt while studying the structures of democracy in South Asia after
decolonization contends the findings of Jalal. 117 They are of the view that Pakistan and
India both inherited a formal democracy which had colonial roots. Both had structural
and institutional capacities to facilitate the practice of formal democracy and
progressively convert it into participatory democracy. The developments in India were
encouraging while in Pakistan they were not satisfactory. All India Muslim League in
Pakistan mostly comprised elite with insignificant pubic roots. Even after the creation
of Pakistan, it denied the membership to the minority, which was 22 percent of the total
population at that time, hence becoming a non-inclusive party.142 On the other hand,
116
Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1995).
117
Katharine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure–
agency Dichotomy’, Political Studies 52, no. 1 (2004): 1–18. 142Ibid., 11.
71
Indian National Congress was not only having greater public support but also open for
all the ethnic and religious groups.
It is also argued that the founding fathers (Gandhi and Nehru) in India lasted long
enough to ensure the process of transition and consolidation. Contrarily in Pakistan, due
to early demise of the founding fathers (Quaid e Azam and Liaquat Ali) without giving
a constitution, transition towards democracy and democratic consolidation was stalled.
These differences created structural weaknesses in the overall political landscape of the
country and gave birth to the elite-driven politics.
In the subsequent decades, the interplay between political actors and state institutions
(bureaucracy, military and judiciary) further distracted the polity and process of
democratisation and despite opportunities available to political actors they could not
consolidate the process of democratisation in the country. Rather, each democratic
attempt ended in a military rule. If the structural aspects and role of institutions is taken
into account then the outcome should have been different. The structural approach,
while provides insight into the role of the institutions cannot fully account for the
reasons of this inadequacy.
In historical structural dimension, there is also a debate on compatibility of Islam and
democracy as political ideas. It may be noted that the debate within Islamic world and
in Pakistan about democracy and process of democratisation right from the start was
influenced by thought of Islamic exceptionalism i.e. the belief that “Islam offers a total
and comprehensive model of life whose adoption in our time is not only possible or
desirable but also mandatory”. 118 Such an Islamic state is neither an autocracy nor
theocracy but a monocracy (rule of rules) and is seen simply as a vehicle for achieving
security and duties of advocating good and preventing evil. However beyond that, there
118
Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 345.
72
is no single model of Islamic State in existence which has been constructed on the basis
of foregoing argument while autocracies of different types with authoritarianism as the
defining feature exist. Resultantly, it is often asked “is democracy at all possible in the
Muslim world” while contrarily it is argued that “Islamic countries contains elements
that are both congenial and uncongenial towards democracy” and democracy in Islamic
countries is only delayed. In Pakistan, inclusive approach and process of reconciliation
of democratic norms and institutions with the Islamic injunctions undertaken during
Zia’s regime by Islamic Ideology Council has settled the question to the satisfaction of
polity and in the interest of democracy.
To summarise then, the importance of human agency in the process of democratisation
emerges strongly and the criticality of political elite in creating and consolidating
democracy stands out. State and societal structures do impact on the process of
democratisation however it is long term in nature. Once democracy takes hold and
becomes the societal norm, its importance becomes significant for its quality and
substance. Since democracy in Pakistan could not take roots then only its focus shifts
to its quality and substance. Therefore the role of political elite assumes critical
dimensions. The wealth, structures and institutions only facilitate the process.
1.4.3 Transition
The process of democratisation aims at establishing liberal democracy in a polity. It
implies that the binding rules and policy decisions are made by community
representatives (political elite) who are accountable to the community. Such
representatives are chosen through free and fair elections organised on adult franchise
basis in which all members of the community and all communities have equal
opportunity to compete. A polity in which people have the right to express themselves
freely without danger of severe punishment, importantly on issues of politics and
73
ideology and enjoy the freedom to form organisations, independent political parties and
interest groups. 119
Transition approach is a theoretical and analytical construct which combines the
influence of the historical process and the role of human beings for promoting liberal
democracy.145 The former focuses on, and attempts to answer the question, as to how
democracy is constructed in the first place; as opposed to what sustains democracy
(modernists approach). It sees human beings (political elite) as the primary agency and
their initiatives and preferences as the principal means for creating and consolidating
democracy. 120 Adeney and Wyatt are also of the view that “elite politics and choices
have clearly played a large role in the democratisation or otherwise of South Asia”. 121
Higley defines political elite as “persons who by virtue of their strategic locations in
large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements are able to affect political
outcomes regularly and substantially”. 122 In political sense, elites are “restricted to
persons who are at the top of the pyramid or pyramids of political, economic and social
power.”123 Higely opines that the “presence or absence of stable political institutions is
one of the major differences between political systems that can be explained on the
basis of difference between elites.” 124 He has also identified two types of elite namely
119
Potter et al., Democratization. 5.
145
Ibid. 15.
120
John Higley, “Elite Theory in Political Sociology” (XX IPSA World Congress of Political Science,
Fukuoka: International Political Science Association, 2006),
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_4036.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2015). Surveying the works of
Mosca, Pareto, Michel’s on elites, Higley posits an elite theory. He defines elite as “persons who, by
virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organisations and movements, are able to
affect political outcomes regularly and substantially. The elite could be ideologically or consensually
united.
121
Adeney and Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia.’, 7.
122
Higley, “Elite Theory in Political Sociology,” 3.
123
Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall,
1976), 14.
124
Higley, ‘Elite Theory in Political Sociology.’ 149.
74
“ideologically united elite” and “consensually united elite”. The former is marked by a
single and defined ideology by all or nearly all elite person. While the latter provides a
set of rule under which the elite with conflicting ideologies struggle for decision making
but avoid disruptive actions to keep the political situation manageable as a collective
interest.
Rustow,125 in his influential case study determined that countries generally follow a four
phased historic route to democratisation. The first phase aims at creating national unity
in the territory in which the country is being established. Unity does not imply that
agreement by all is essential, alternately a broad agreement i.e. all are Pakistanis and
there are no secessionist movements is sufficient. 126 The second phase is marked by a
prolonged inconclusive political struggle i.e. “a family feud”. 127 Employing that
“democracy, is born of conflict, even violence, never as a result of simply peaceful
evolution”.154 Democracy during this preparatory phase is fragile and the struggle
continues till one group dominates others or the struggle can also tear the national unity
apart.
In the third phase, first there is a transition to a decision to cohabit, 128 compromise and
adhere to democratic rules. It is also called the historic moment, a decision taken by
political elite which leads to the fourth phase of habituation i.e. the conscious adoption
of democratic rules and application of the decision arrived at historic moment. 129
125
Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics,
1970, 337–63.
126
Quaid e Azam in a public gathering, on his visit to Dacca, East Pakistan on 21 March 1948, asked the
question whether everyone wants to be Pakistani. All agreed to become Pakistani besides minor issues.
127
Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy.’, 355.
154
Potter et al., Democratization. 14.
128
Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan (Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000), 68. He uses the term ‘Elite Bargain’ and identifies its flaws. He studies the application
of the term to Eighth Amendment and reviews the decade of 90’s for transition from authoritarianism to
democracy.
129
Huma Baqai, ‘Transition to Democracy in Pakistan: A Comparison to Rustow’s Thesis’, Pakistan
Vision 13, no. 2 (2012): 71–95. She studies the application of the thesis in Pakistan and concludes that
75
Adeney and Wyatt named this historic moment as “critical junctures” and according to
them, decolonisation of subcontinent was a critical juncture. 157 In a politically and
ideologically fragmented polity, the historic moment accords with the consensus
amongst the elite who have consensually united. Such elite may take divergent positions
in public yet a general consensus on political rules of conduct i.e. not taking positions
which could interrupt or endanger democracy is adhered to. Contrarily, it also ally’s to
the fear that consensual unity may further and strengthen formal democracy and cement
elite control of power while denying participatory democracy to non-elite.
Application of the transition approach to Pakistan brings out that the first phase of
national unity i.e. establishing a Pakistani identity was quickly completed. It was
possible due to historical reasons and decades long struggle for Pakistan i.e. antecedent
Pakistan Movement. However, in some areas like Kashmir and Junagarh etc. where the
populace wanted to join Pakistan they were not allowed. The second phase described
as intense inconclusive power struggle lasted from 1948 to 1956 and culminated in
agreement and formulation of 1956 Constitution. However, when it came to putting the
constitution into practice by conducting elections, President Iskander Mirza fearing
curtailment in his powers imposed martial law in 1958.
The martial law lasted from 1958 to 1962 during which the military replaced the 1956
Constitution with 1962 Constitution. The latter envisaged a presidential form of
government while the former was a parliamentary democracy similar to the one
practiced in Great Britain. The presidential system lasted till 1968. President Ayub
relinquished power and handed over to the military which remains an enigma. The
martial law of Gen Yahya viewed itself as a transitionary government with a mandate
‘the country needs a functioning federal design’ and application of unity in diversity concept. 157Adeney
and Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia.’, 7.
76
to hold fresh elections, elect a constituent assembly and transfer powers. However the
results of the 1970 elections manifested sharp division between East and West Pakistan
as already discussed. The inability of military government to ensure transfer of power
in accordance with the new mandate led popular unrest in East Pakistan leading to
secession. Therefore as Rustow had indicated the second phase remained inconclusive
and literally tore the country apart.
Arguably the second phase in remaining Pakistan ended in formulation of 1973
Constitution. Could the formulation of 1973 Constitution be equated with ‘historical
moment’ of reconciliation remains a moot point, the allegations of rigging in elections
of 1977 and imposition of another martial law certainly interrupted the process. The
power struggle, witnessed from 1988 to 1999, however indicates that 1973 Constitution
in some ways could be equated with the historical moment. However the real historic
moment i.e. third phase did arrive on 16 May 2006 with the signing of Charter of
Democracy (CoD). The fourth phase began in earnest in 2009. The practices witnessed
in the fourth phase will also be studied by this research to yield contemporary findings
about civil military relations.
Contained within the overall process of democratisation is another sub process of
transition from military led or authoritarian governments to liberal democracy. Scott
reviewing the works of Levine, O’Donnell and Schmitter analyses their contrasting
approaches for studying transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy. Two
opposing models are evaluated i.e. when transition is undertaken by ‘regime leader’ or
is undertaken ‘against him’. 130 These contain two options i.e. gradual and rapid. Gen
Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and

130
Comparative Issues,” Working Paper, no. 130 (1989): 1–44.
77
Zia’s death created a situation in which neither of the two fit in. Although it can be
argued that the efforts by Prime Minister Junejo, before his removal could in the broader
perspective place this transition process as being undertaken against the regime, which
initially was gradual but after Gen Zia’s death became sudden. The methods to study
transition suggested by them have been suitably modified to suit the case with accent
to the Smithsonian’s model where the individual makes decisions in his own interest
under the utility maximizing approach.
The process of transition starts when an incumbent regime due to certain calamity
decides to ease repression and liberalise the polity. The decision for change polarises
political elite into hard and soft liners or modernists and extremists each striving to
influence the process of change. The initiation of the process also divides opposition
into opportunists, moderates or radicals who seek to further their interests. The change
can trigger institution of an interim government which depending upon the political
circumstances could be led by the opposition, shared by regime and opposition, the
regime itself could become the caretaker or an international organisation like United
Nation may appoint an interim government setup. The second stage of transition is
marked by the transfer of power form interim to a democratically elected government.
Since the modernist approach only explores the conditions which support democracy
and not the process which creates democracy. While the structural approach examines
the long term influence of the state and societal structures on the process of
democratisation therefore this research determines that the transition approach is most
apt to study the process of democratisation in Pakistan. While doing so it maintains
cognizance of the cognitive aspects argued by other two approaches and their interplay
with elements of transition approach. The three approaches and their main points are
tabulated on the next page.
78
Table 1.2: Approaches to Democratisation
MODERNISATION TRANSITION STRUCTURAL
Lipset ‘Democracy is related to Rustow. What factors can best Long term process of historical
a country’s socio economic preserve or enhance the health change. Democratisation
development or level of and stability of democracy.160 process explained by changing
modernisation.131 Five of fifteen structures of power.
indices considered.
Variables considered: wealth, Historical approach, marked by Historical route to liberal

industrialisation, urbanisation holistic considerations of a democracy is determined
country provide sound basis for fundamentally by changing
and education which have a analysis than for functional structures and form of state
universal and linear casual prerequisites. All countries power. Moore’s 132 five general
travel on a four phased route for conditions for democratic
correlation with democracy.
democratisation
Quantitative helps explain
quality of democracy
Socio-economic development Phases of national unity, Development: balance to avoid
strengthens the middle class and inclusive political struggle, too strong a state or
large middle class is good for decision marked by a historical independent landed aristocracy
democracy moment and habituation. and their weakening overtime,
Rooted in a functionalist view Primary agency is political elite Other forms of commercial
and in contemporary social data. and democracy is produced by
agriculture, prevention of
initiatives of human beings. aristocratic-bourgeois coalition
Huntington’s waves of and revolutionary break from
democracy from 1828-1974. the past led by bourgeois.
Foregoing in view, the reasons for choosing transition approach as primary analytical
framework to study and interpret the process of democratisation in Pakistan are evident.
This process and politics surrounding the process stands out as the independent variable
to which the dependent variable of military responds. Interestingly, after the military
take over the dependency of the variables inverses as the military led rule emerges as
the independent variable to which political elite responds in different ways. At a certain
point in time of the military rule, the process of return to democracy commences. This
131
Potter et al., Democratization.11-22.
160
Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy.’
132
Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
79
marks the transition process elucidated above which will be employed to study the
process of return to or otherwise to democracy during Musharraf’s era from 1999-2003.
1.5 Civilian Control of Military
“Now you have to stand guard over the development and maintenance
of Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of
manhood in your own native soil. You will have to be alert, very alert,
for the time for relaxation is not yet there. With faith, discipline and
selfless devotion to duty, there is nothing worthwhile that you cannot
achieve.” 133
Quaid e Azam
The terms civil control and democratic control over the military are today used
interchangeably. Understandably, the concept has not been satisfactorily defined. 134
The “field still lacks a universally accepted definition of civilian control”. 135 In terms of
approaches and methods for exercising such control, Huntington explored subjective
and objective methods as a mutually exclusive binary and preferred latter for providing
optimum balance of power. Janowitz contrarily, proposed a convergence model;
implying a societal control and power sharing at the state level.
Various theories have been formulated to optimise civilian control. The structural
theory of civilian control postulates threat (external and internal) as the independent
variable on which the dependant variable of civilian control depends. Different
scenarios of internal and external threats and the correspondingly civilian control (Q) is
highlighted in the following table (Table 2.3). This structure operates through the
133
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-1948
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Directorate of Films &
Publications, 1989) 153-154.
134
Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80.
135
Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant, eds., Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South
and Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 2010), 25.
80
mechanisms of socialization, emulation and competition. Although case studies by
Desch do not include Pakistan but they determine that if the external threat is high and
internal threat is low than the civilian control is good. 136 This has been the case in
Pakistan till off late, yet contrarily the relations were not healthy and military coups
occurred despite the similarity. This dichotomy is investigated in this research.
Table 1.3: Civilian Control Matrix

Internal Threat External Threats
High Low
Threat High Threat (Q3) (Q4)

Matrix Poor Civilian Control Worst Civilian Control
Low Threat (Q1) (Q2)
Good Civilian Control Mixed Civilian Control
The term “civilian control over the military centres around three crucial questions why
to control, what to control, and how to control?” 166 Why to control relates to civilian
pre-eminence over decision making who are voted by public to exercise power and are
constitutionally mandated to do so. Feaver, also emphasised on the right of the civilians
to exercise control over military. 137 In terms of what to control, five decision making
areas are identified; “civil-military relations, elite recruitment, public policy, internal
security, national defence, and military organisation.” 138 Irrespective of the difficulties
faced in the exercise of such control, these areas stands out as important factors. What
to control also relates to the degree and type of such control. The third question about
how to control refers to the method to exercise such control over the military.
136
Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 14. 166Ergun Ozbudun, “Civilian Control of the Military: Why
and What?,” Study on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Venice, September 2007), 2.
137
Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University
Press, 2009).
138
Chambers and Croissant, Democracy under Stress, 29.
81
It may be asked that “is civil military relations all about civilian control” and if so what
constitutes civilian control and what is there to be controlled. Democratic Control of
Armed Forces Geneva Centre (DCAF) 139 has defined eight key features that characterise
an effective system of democratic control, wherein democratically elected authorities
have control over: (1) military’s missions, composition, budget, procurement policies
and that the military policy is approved by the civilians; (2) Democratic parliamentary
and judicial institutions, a strong civil society, and an independent media oversee the
performance of the military; (3) Civilians have the necessary military expertise to fulfil
their defence management responsibilities; (4) Neither the military as an institution nor
individual military leaders attempt to influence domestic politics; (5) The military is
ideologically neutral; (6) The military has minimal role to play in the national economy;
(7) There is an effective chain of command; (8) the members of the military are free to
exercise their rights. These aspects are legislated and enshrined into the state
constitutions.
The constitutional provisions, state structures and institutions act as hardware to
exercise civilian control. The degree of control i.e. the software part is perceived as a
relative condition. It is a continuum of political decision making distributed between
political leadership and military. 140 It can be strong, when the civilians make all the
decisions. It could be shared or weak when the decision making power is distributed
between the civilian and military leadership. Waltz indicated that civilian control has to
be maintained “through persistence and hard work” by the civilians. 141 Aziz interprets
139
DCAF is a centre for security development and the rule of law set up as an initiative of Swiss
Confederation. The Centre contributes to security sector reforms.
140
Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz, “Breaking With the Past? Civil-Military Relations
in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia,” Policy Studies 63 (Hawaii: East West Centre, 2012),
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps063.pdf (accessed on 8 November 2014).
141
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 04 (1997): 913–
17; Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (New York: Routledge, 2008), 73.
82
hard work as “informal politics” – a mechanism for interaction with military leadership
to develop familiarity by employing a range of activities. 142 The concept of informal
politics is particularly important when the formal structures are weak.
Evidently, civilian control over the military sits at the heart of civil military relations. It
signifies who is the master. In the decades preceding WWII, the research discourse was
mostly focused on understanding causes, opportunities and motives of military coups.
Correspondingly, absence of military coup implied control of civilians over the military.
In countries where military interventions have taken place “the point of reference for
comprehensive understanding of civilian control... [is].. whether the military yields
political influence, but how and how much”. 143
It is therefore necessary to think of civil-military relations as a continuum of political
decision making power distributed between the civilian political leadership and the
military. One extreme is where civilians make all decisions and have the power to
change them at any time. They may delegate decision making and implementation to
the military in certain policy areas where as the military has no autonomous power to
make policy related decisions. It also implies the civilian capacity to effectively
implement the decisions they have made. On the other end is a situation where military
makes all the political decisions and civilian slack autonomy to make decisions which
was witnessed during military and quasi-military governments in Pakistan. Huntington
and Janowitz suggested two distinct ways of addressing the problem of civilian control.
In Huntington’s view, separating the military from the civil (separation), granting
autonomy to the military and by exercising objective as opposed to subjective control
would promote professionalism in the military, which would in turn render them
142
Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, 75.
143
Claude Emerson Welch, Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing
Countries (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976), 2.
83
apolitical. It facilitates exercise of civilian control over the military and also enables
them to accomplish the assigned tasks efficiently. This mechanism aim at controlling
the differences between the civil and military and became a standard which was imbibed
in most democratic political systems including Pakistan.
The de facto practice of Huntington’s theoretical conception in Pakistan however did
not render the military apolitical, as it repeatedly intervened in the politics. The
framework did augment professionalism but the military did not disassociate itself from
the political and security related developments within the country and its
neighbourhood. Apparently, there is a need for inquiry as to why Huntington’s
framework has not worked in Pakistan and what alternate arrangements are needed to
render the military apolitical.
Janowitz, contrary to Huntington’s approach, looked at ways for diminishing the
differences between the civil and military. He recognised that civil and military are part
of one organic whole and cannot be separated. He opposed to separation and identified
the need for greater integration of civil and military in the decision making process.
According to him, it is very dangerous to treat the military as an institution separate
from the society and in his theoretical conception, civilian control is best achieved by
participation and by encouraging competition for resources.
Noting the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenal for war, Janowitz
advocated institution of constabulary concept for addressing military’s conceptual and
organisational problems. He explains constabulary concept as under:
“The military establishment becomes constabulary force when it is
continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and
seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has
84
incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is
grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine”. 144
Civilian control of such a constabulary can be fashioned as a standing professional force
or through a system of universal public service (conscription) or a mix of the two. The
narrowing gap between civil and military due to technological reasons (civilians are
performing greater roles in many of the hitherto for military functions) necessitates
greater integration.
Absorbing multiple environmental impacts, Janowitizan conception of integration has
overtime emerged as a de jure model of civil military relations in Pakistan. Although it
is biased towards military’s pre-eminence rather than that of civilian in the field of
security and foreign policy. Pakistan’s political system, as it stood in the 90’s thereby,
incorporated significant features of both Huntington’s and Janowitzian conceptions.
This study while exploring effectiveness of ‘separation’ will also explore the
‘integrationist view’ as means for restoring better balance in civil military relations. 145
Stephan termed Huntington’s approach ‘old professionalism’ and contrasted it with
‘new professionalism’ which emerges when the threat variable is replaced with that of
internal security and national development.176 His study corresponds with the de jure
approach of Pakistan’s military which since inception has been involved in internal
security and national development tasks. The salient features are tabulated on the next
page.
Table 1.4: Old and New Professionalism

Old Professionalism New Professionalism
144
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 418.
145
Rizvi, ‘Pakistan: CMR in a Praetorian State.’ He had observed that once military has intervened in
politics the politics can no longer be the same or return to the pre-intervention stage it has to shape up in
accordance with the changes that have occurred in the system and political thought. 176Stepan, Arguing
Comparative Politics, 27.
85
Function of military External Security Internal Security
Civilian attitudes towards Civilians accept legitimacy of Segments of society challenge
government government governments legitimacy
Military skills required Highly specialised skills Highly interrelated political and
incompatible with political military skills
skills
Scope of military professional Restricted Unrestricted

action
Impact of professional Renders the military politically Politicizes the military

socialisation neutral
Impact on civil military Contributes towards apolitical Contributes to military –

relations military and civilian control political managerialism and role
expansion
Nielsen, studying Huntington’s ‘separation’ as a weakness and its continued relevance
to US military, revisited the main concept and identified issues related to autonomy,
objective control, functional and societal imperatives. She identified challenges like
“when the military goes to war and state as a whole does not” and how it affects the
military in its interface with the state and society”. She concludes that “a day may come
when The Soldier and State becomes irrelevant”. 146 Hooker Jr, similarly studied the
impact of civil-military gap and erosion of civilian control in the US and opines that
“for military officers working at the level of politico military interface, the problem of
civil-military relations exists in its most acute form”. 147 His observation accurately
reflects the civil-military problematic in Pakistan.
Huntington’s concept of separation, autonomy and objective control for its productivity
and effectiveness, as a theoretical construct will be studied in this research work with
an eye on impact of integrationist approach of Janowitz as an alternative. Although, the
146
Suzanne C. Nielsen, “American Civil–military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel
P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 369.
147
Richard D. Hooker Jr, Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations,
Parameters (DTIC Document, 2004), 16.
86
focus of this research is Gen Musharraf coup and its aftermath, yet the study will take
into cognizance the developments since than in the realm of state security in general
and Pakistan in particular. This will enrich the findings with contemporary insights and
render recommendations which are futuristic in nature.
Tracing the history of availability of constitutional mechanism for resolving political
disputes and preventing military intervention, the 1956 constitution contained
“Emergency Provisions” in Part IX, for handling emergency situations. However, it did
not contain any provision for breakdown of constitutional machinery in the centre; the
exact problem faced by the country. A number of Prime Ministers 148 resigned in quick
succession leading to imposition of martial law in 1958 by a civilian president. 149
Similarly, 1962 constitution was based on presidential system in which President was
directly elected while the other executive appointments were nominated by the
President. Also, there was no position of vice president. According to this constitution,
the president if resigns, was to be succeeded by the Speaker National Assembly. Since
executive appointments did not enjoy the public legitimacy therefore Gen Ayub, when
resigned, handed power to the Chief of Army Staff rather than the Speaker. The
Constitution of 1973 has survived two direct military interventions and has rid itself of
the redesigning done through Eighth Amendment. In this constitution, civil military
relations manifest in three main areas; legislative, executive and policy. The
constitution empowers National Assembly and Senate as apex forums entitled to handle
civil military relation through their respective committees. Executive oversees military
through ministry of defence and ministry of defence production, while the cabinet
148
Ali 1956, Suhrawardy 1957, Chundrigar, 1957, Noon 1958
149
Keith Callard who wrote before the military formally took over power, political parties have waxed,
waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued and reduced each other to impotence. Men of
religion have laid claim to complete authority and achieved almost none. In the meanwhile the state has
been run largely by civil service, backed by the army, which was carried on much as did before
independence.
87
committee of defence provides a forum where civil and military can discuss security
issues, formulate policy options or oversee their implementation. Besides these formal
mechanisms, civil and military elite can also meet informally to address security
concerns. Ministry of Finance makes budgetary allocation through the finance bill and
requests and requirements of the military are rooted through ministerial mechanisms.
The above elucidated hardware provides effective means for civilian control over the
military by authorising size of the forces, budget, which approved by national
parliament, financial oversight administered by accounts department and by Public
Accounts Committee of the Parliament. The question emerges that despite an elaborate
mechanism for civilian control why it fails to exercise itself or does the issue of control
resides elsewhere i.e. in politics of the country. What inhibits the civilians from
exercising effective civilian control over the military?
Nuclearisation by India and similar response by Pakistan under compulsion in 1998
introduced another factor in the security construct of the country. Owing to the changing
nature of external and internal security calculus, the need for redefining frame work for
interaction between civil and military leaders with a focus on comprehensive national
security has been growing. In fact, it is an accepted practice in many countries like US,
UK and Japan. India has constituted comprehensive national security architecture after
1998 nuclear tests. Similarly, National Security Strategy in US is issued on regular basis
to coordinate the national policy overseen by national security advisor.
The need for National Security Council was identified after the debacle of 1971 in
Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report. Since the report was not made public
therefore the council was not constituted. It was made part of the constitution first by
Gen Zia and later during Gen Musharraf’s era (Article 152-A) as a consultative and
decision making body on strategic matters like sovereignty, integrity and security of the
88
state and democracy, governance and inter provincial harmony. On the contrary,
politicians interpret National Security Council as an instrument of political control,
coercion and power sharing by military and hence resisted. But is the institution of this
council practical manifestation of Gen Musharraf’s claim i.e. “to keep them [the
military] out bring them in” or otherwise?
1.6 Military Coups
“One thing more, I am persuaded to say this because during my talks

with one or two very high-ranking officers I discovered that they did
not know the implications of the Oath taken by the troops of Pakistan.
Of course, an oath is only a matter of form; what are more important
are the true spirit and the heart.” 150
Quaid e Azam
The term coup d’état or coup, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica, is defined as
sudden and violent overthrow (illegal) of an existing government by a small group
(typically the military) of people. A coup consists of the “infiltration of a small, but
critical, segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government
from its control of the remainder”. 151 It is change in power from top with a pre-requisite
of control of military and police as well as para-military forces. Despite its abruptness,
“it rarely alters nation’s social and economic policies, nor does it significantly
redistribute power among competing political groups”. 152
Coup is perceived as an ‘exceptional event’, literally a blow to the state and marks
unconstitutional transfer of the power. It refers “not to the takeover of the state but to
successful and overt seizure of power by the military”. 153 It has to be an overt event to
150
Jinnah, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 264.
151
Edward Luttwak, Coup D’état: A Practical Handbook (New York: Harvard University Press, 1979),
27.
152
Ibid, 27.
153
David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín (California: University of
California Press, 1987), 7.
89
separate it from conspiracy. Welch opined that “a coup d’état is a sharp, clear event
easy to date and (if successful) possible to document”. 154 Powell and Thyne have
explored fourteen case studies and identified the target, perpetrator and tactics. They
explain that the target is more or less the executive authority, government or regime i.e.
the state’s primary leader. 155 Number of studies conducted from 1998 onwards although
limit perpetrators to the armed forces yet it is significant to note that coups may be
undertaken by “any elite part of the state apparatus”. 156 The tactics related to coup act
has to be illegal while it may or may not be accompanied by violence. However, “near
universal criterion for coups is that, violence does not have to be present”. 157 The first
spike in military coups occurred in the decade between 1970 and 1980 with a success
rate of 48%, while another spike started in 2003.
Perlmutter observing numerous military interventions in the new states and third world
countries set about to explore reasons. To explain their findings they created models of
civil military relations i.e. western, praetorian, communist and interventionist and
developed typologies like pressure group, blackmail, displacers and categorised
military interventions as palace, reform and revolutionary coups. 158 Comprehensive
model relating to strengths and weaknesses of military institution, its coercive, political
and organisational resources available at its disposal and boundaries between military
and its socio-political environment were explored. 159
154
Welch, Civilian Control of the Military, 1.
155
Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 A New
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249.
156
Ibid., 250. The middle ground includes non-military elites who perpetrate coup because...civilian
members of the government alone with military playing a later role in deciding whether the putsch will
be successful. This has been the case in Pakistan where civilian elite has instigated the military to act and
when the coup is launched and is successful celebrating its success.
157
Ibid, 250.
158
Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
159
A. Robin Luckham, ‘A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations’, Government and
Opposition 6, no. 01 (1971): 5–35.
90
The coup occurs when military officers challenge the oligarchy for waste, backwardness
and corruption. It is also termed as benevolent modernisation by Huntington and
Janowitz regards it as heroic public service. Having seized power, the military promotes
social class and economic reforms, national integration and some measures for
extension of political participation. The evidence towards modernisation and
commitment to national development can be witnessed in Chile, Brazil and Middle
East. Finer, presenting an alternative interpretation to Huntington’s professionalisation
of officers to render them apolitical, argued that it was precisely the officer’s sense of
their professionalism which might propel them to intervene in the political sphere. 160
1.6.1 Structural Reasons
Finer describes four categories and modes of intervention available to military officers
in a political entity. Firstly to act constitutionally like any other pressure group,
secondly to deploy threat of sanctions/blackmail, thirdly displace a civilian regime with
another and lastly displace a civilian regime and govern themselves. In a purpose
oriented typology of military coups, Huntington groups them into three categories i.e.
palace coup, reform coup and a revolutionary one.
Aslam Khan while analysing the inspirations for launching a military coup, developed
on the Allan Wells model and applied it to Pakistan. His work employed societal
perspective i.e. pull factors, military perspective or push factors and foreign influence.
The combination of these factors provides structural reasons for a military coup as
tabulated on the next page:
160
Finer, The Man on Horseback, 207.
91
Table 1.5: Structural Reasons for a Military Coup
Societal Perspective: Pull Factors
Social Dimensions
Institutional Dimensions
Political Dimensions
Military Perspective: Push Factors
Military’s role belief, custodian
Structural Reasons for a Military Coup Officers grievances
Role of civil society
Ethnicity
Foreign Influence
Societal/ Military
Foreign Influences/ Alliances
Strategic Location
The first dominant perspective which explains triggers is the pull factor contained in
domestic or societal perspectives. It has three sub dimensions, first, the social dimension
which accords with Janowitz’s perspective that militaries do not operate in a vacuum;
there is always a factor which pulls it towards politics (absence of preconditions of
democracy i.e. poverty, literacy, economy, social disorder, ethnicity, mobility of masses
etc.). Second relates to institutional dimension i.e. adherence to or otherwise to rule of
law, constitution and institutional efficacy etc. The third comprises political dimensions
which relate to nature and functional aspects of political government.
The push factors or in other words the military perspective (about politics) comprises
three dimensions. The first looks at the reasons which reside inside the military
institution and leads military out of barrack to civil offices. 161 The second relates to
officers personal grievances which deals with professionalism of the military, threat to
the institutional integrity and corporate or economic interests of the officers. The third
dimension deals with role of civil bureaucracy, sections of civil society and opposition
161
It comprises the military’s role belief which leads to custodian nature of military, high self-esteem in
the society and internal and external threats to the country.
92
political leaders who themselves collaborate with military officials to stage a coup or
facilitate it in the post-coup environment.
The foreign influence operates in both spheres of societal and military perspectives. It
deals with the contagious effects of foreign influences on militaries and military or
economic alliances with superpowers. Similarly, the strategic importance of the
countries for international community also effects the democratisation of a country. In
conclusion, it can be said that launching of a military coup can be best understood by
evaluating following triggers:
Table 1.6: Triggers for Military Coup

Domestic/Societal Perspective: Pull Factors
Triggers Military Perspective: Push Factors

Foreign Influence
A brief survey indicates that direct military rule in Pakistan lasted 17 years, civilian rule
for 11 years, elected government under a military President for 15 years and non-elected
government for 11 years. The government and national assembly have been dissolved
till 2009 a dozen times. This analysis raises the question as to why military has
conducted so many coups. 162 Review of the literature suggests that push factors and
foreign influence play limited role in triggering a military coup. On the other hand, pull
factors play a greater role in inspiring a military coup. To justify this argument,
dimensions of pull factors, push factors and foreign influence have been further
elaborated to understand their relevance in case of Pakistan.
The studies in civil military relations, military interventions and Praetorianism focus on
the socio-political conditions as contributing factors. These described as pull factors
162
Constitution other than appointment of Joint and Service Chief the functioning related to recruitment,
promotion and employment remain the prerogative of the services with no interference from political
authorities.
93
relate to social disorder, weak political institutions and economic crisis. 163 Such
conditions found in formative years of state construction result into social conditions
which pull militaries towards intervention in politics. 164 Political and democratic
inadequacies create participatory crises and alienate polity. Weak national institutions
are unable to control law and order situations and rely on military for restoring order as
well as helping in times of natural calamities. Inadequate focus of political elite on
economy and want of appropriate development policies impair economic growth create
dissatisfaction amongst the masses, undermine legitimacy of political leaders.
Resultantly, militaries intervene in politics and assume a civil role to address political,
administrative and economic problems.
Political crisis caused by preferences of political elite in policy and strategy framework
also pull military towards politics. These relate to state’s external which do not accord
with public sentiment and some internal policies which create crisis of legitimacy like
rigging in elections, widespread agitations against political mal-practices delegitimising
political elite. The national crises may force involvement of military in politics for
resolution of political disputes etc. Practice of low level of political culture and reliance
on formal democracy manifesting minimum desire for moving towards participatory
democracy results in creating an oligarchy. Internal social conditions characterised by
a dissatisfied polity thereby pulling military towards politics.
Amongst the push factors, firstly, it is military’s role and belief as a custodian of state.
Since the inception of Pakistan, political leadership has unfortunately failed to resolve
their internal issues. Notwithstanding the security issues, civilian leadership time and
163
Gary W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 57.
164
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1970).
94
again involve the military in the situations which should have been handled by the civil
government. Reliance on military for handling civilian affairs not only undermines the
civilian government but also raises the military’s stature in the eyes of the people.
Therefore, the people look towards military in crisis situation. Over the period of time,
this reliance phenomenon has given birth to a belief in the military about their role as
custodian of the state. This role and belief has been further strengthened by the prevalent
massive corruption, nepotism and incompetency. Janowitz also feels that military is
propelled into politics due to its high ideals of public service.
Second point relates to the officers grievance. It is worth mentioning that these
grievances are not personal rather they are institutional in nature and can be divided
into two categories i.e. direct and indirect. Direct grievances include the policies and
actions which affect the military as an institution while the indirect grievances includes
the efficacy of governance which affects the people and the military personals as an
individual citizen of the state. But such grievances play insignificant role in triggering
a military coup. For instance in 1998, Gen Karamat was forced to resign. Although it
generated a lot of direct grievances yet the situation did not lead to a military coup and
the military remained subservient to the politics.
Role of civil society as a third dimension is again linked with the governance factor and
the leading figures of civil society involve the military for its solution. The governance
factor is purely civilian affair and the failure of political leadership in providing good
governance creates enabling situation for a military coup. Practically, the military tries
to keep itself away from these issues. This direct interaction with the civilians may help
in triggering but one cannot find any coup in Pakistan purely based on this issue.
Kukreja describes role of military in civil institutions and argues that long years of direct
and indirect rule has enabled the military to spread out so widely in civil institutions,
95
and control the lever of power that civil society penetration of military emerges as the
casual factor. 165 Aziz argues that pervasive civil society presence makes military path
dependant i.e. prone to coups. 166 The presence of military does increase in post-coup
environment but it also shrinks after the end of military government or quasimilitary
government and the residual presence at the time of next coup can at best be accepted
as a contributing factor, an enabler but not the primary cause.
Amongst the push factors, another important issue is ethnicity. Sometime, it is
considered that since the Pakistan military is overwhelmingly Punjabi in its
constitution, therefore ethnicity is a casual factor for coups in the country. 167 Cohen
argues that the army has so far failed to emerge as a unifying institution, in which the
Punjabi predominance is reduced in favour of greater representation of areas like Sind
and Balochistan. 168
Contrarily, Huntington opines that “it is equally fallacious to attempt to explain military
interventions in politics primarily by reference to the internal structures of the military
or the social background of the officers doing the intervening”. He questions that “what
characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement
in domestic politics?” According to him, “the debate is misdirected because the most
important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political [which]
165
Veena Kukreja, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries’, India Quarterly: A Journal of
International Affairs 45, no. 2–3 (1989): 154–92; Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia:
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (Sage Publications, 1991).
166
167
Ann Gregory and Dewitt C. Ellinwood, ‘Ethnic Management and Military Recruitment in South and
Southeast Asia’, Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives, 1981, 64–119.
168
Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 114-115.
Since last decade, Pakistan army has made a visible effort to diversify its ethnic composition by
incorporating more than the proportionate representation from Balochistan and Sind. Resultantly, the
ethnic structures at the unit level has also been modified. However, irrespective of its ethnic composition,
the military has been and remains a unified force, continuing its role to strengthen the federation. 200
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 193-194.
96
reflects not the social and organisational characteristics of the military establishment
but the political and institutional structures of the society”. 200
Mazhar reinforces the “case for the need to shift the focus of scholarship away from
explanations driven by class, religion and or ethnicity-based interpretations”. 169 He
deploys the argument that how could Urdu speaking COAS lead a predominantly
Punjabi Army and topple a Punjabi Prime Minister who commanded two-third majority
in the parliament. Zaheer also ascribes foreign policy as a casual factor and argues that
the first coup attempt in Pakistan occurred due to political (foreign) policy grievances. 170
1.6.2 Foreign Influence
The explanatory factor of foreign influence on incidence of military coup has three
aspects which intersect pull and push factors. These aspects are categorised in political
(inter political elite relationship), foreign policy interests and the military to military
contact.203 The proposition that “military training missions from foreign nations
inculcate attributes favourable or unfavourable to military interventions in politics” 171
is the only well researched aspect of the foreign influence in military takeovers. A study
about thirty two coups in South America that occurred in the period of fifteen years
from 1951-65 disconfirms the proposition. 172 Huntington has also falsified the role of
169
170
Rawalpindi conspiracy of 1948 is generally seen as a consequence of failure to secure accession of
the state of Jammu and Kashmir through military and political means. Inept handling of political issues
and reluctance to provide material support to volunteers and tribesmen mobilised to liberate the State
added fuel to fire. Maj Gen Akbar, the architect of the Kashmir War in 1948, was the primary actor and
his attempt was supported by few left wing activists and sympathetic officers against the then Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was due to personal reasons and feeling of betrayal. This attempt was a
handiwork of few individuals which did not coincide with the institutional thinking (push factors)
prevalent at that time and hence was unearthed and quashed. Similarly the 1980 plot by Maj Gen Tajamal
Hussain to assassinate Gen Zia was exposed and thwarted and Maj Gen Zaheer ul Islam attempted coup
against Government of Benazir Bhutto for furthering Islamic causes was foiled by the military itself. The
aforementioned attempts permit inference that military as an institution does not allow individuals within
its ranks to act on their own and for individual purposes. However, how much the Kargil conflict with
India contributed towards the military coup of Gen Musharraf as a casual factor will be analysed later.
203
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
171
Ikuo Kabashima and Lynn T. White III, Political System and Change: A “World Politics” Reader
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 193.
172
Ibid, 197.
97
American Military Assistance in prompting military coups in South America.173
Researched data for political and policy related foreign influence on military coups is
not available but in the context of Pakistan it is considered that the US did play some
role in inspiring the coups. Askari opines that couple of days before the coup Iskandar
Mirza had informed the US Ambassador to Pakistan and President of US Eisenhower
had sent a letter endorsing the coup and also a member of his Cabinet visited Pakistan
on 27 October 1958.174 Similarly, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had alleged in the Parliament
that there was an “International Conspiracy” against him and US was flooding money
into the country and backing up his political opponents in a bid to topple him however
the US had denied any such involvement. 175 These two cases do however point out to
US interest in Pakistan. Did US influence the aforementioned military coups and if
yes to what degree has not yet been established? This research will study the influence
of US factor in case of Gen Musharraf’s takeover in 1999.
1.7 Interests: National and Institutional Determinants
“Finally, let me appeal to you to keep together, put up with

inconveniences, sufferings and sacrifices, for the collective good of our
people. No amount of troubles, no amount of hard work or sacrifice
contribution for the collective good of your nation and your State. It is in
that way, that you will build up Pakistan as the fifth largest State in the
world, not only in population as it is but also in strength, so that it will
command the respect of all the other nations of the world. With these
words I wish you God speed.” 176
173
Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Reforming Civil-Military Relations’, Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (1995):
9–17.
174
Wayne Ayres Wilcox, ‘The Pakistan Coup D’état of 1958’, Pacific Affairs, 1965, 142–63; Hasan
Askari Rizvi, ‘Op-Ed: Significance of October 27’, Daily Times, 27 October 20003. Ayub Khan had
written a paper A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan, which was also
presented to closed military audience in The US and the Wilcox article appreciated the positive effects
of the coup.
175
Amin, “1977 Coup D’état in Pakistan,” 44.
176
Jinnah, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 184-185.
98
Quaid e Azam
Interest generally implies a concern. It is something which draws attention, arouses
curiosity, requires involvement and is of significance. In the context of civil military
relations, interests have three dimensions; national, institutional and personal interests
of the political and military elite. National interests are combined expression of interests
of the citizens, groups or communities which constitute the state, and at international
level those which are universal in nature or concern a group of states. National interests
include political, security, economic and cultural aspects. In terms of their importance
these are grouped in the categories of vital (for which a nation is ready to go to war),
important and less important (also termed peripheral).
The conception of national interests corresponds with the process of evolution of nation
state.177 In the formative years, “interests of Kings or Divine Interests” were perceived
as a conceptual unity as seen in the writings of Machiavelli in Italy, Bodin in France,
Grotius in Holland, Hobbes in England. Rousseau, however questioned the notion with
the alternate notion of ‘people’s sovereignty’, adopted later by nation states in
general.178 In the contemporary perception, national interests emerge as a social concept
with concrete and tangible dimensions. 179 It also comports a moral dimension, wherein
loyalty and service to state is concerned or wherein a decision, in case of conflict is
required between national and personal interests. 180
Modern nation state is recognised as a distinct territorial integrity with privileges and
responsibilities. In the functionalist construct, the state structures and its polity
organises political and administrative action through political and state institutions.
177
Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3
(1 September 1996): 275–318.
178
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Courier Corporation, 2012).
179
Miroslav Nincic, ‘The National Interest and Its Interpretation’, The Review of Politics 61, no. 01
(December 1999): 29–55.
180
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
99
Military is one such institution entrusted with safeguarding the vital interest of defence
of the state. Its input is accordingly factored in state security policies. Huntington had
recognised and argued that military has emerged as a profession in line with other
reputable professions which serve the society and therefore it has developed its own set
of interests. 181 Similarly, there are political institutions which serve interests of the
political elite. Since the primary component of a state are its people therefore collective
political interests of the populace are increasingly factored in when the national or
institutional interests are defined or advanced.
In a democratic framework, the primary interests of political elite comprise winning
elections, providing good governance and advancement of such policies through which
their personal and political legitimacy is sustained and the chances of winning next
elections are improved. They have to however reconcile these with the advancement of
national interests and when there is a possibility that advancing a particular national
interest intersects with their political interests, decisions are made in a manner that the
latter do not suffer. It is this clash which when exploited by opposition sometimes create
situations which undermine the basic functions of the state and politics and creates crisis
in which military intervention becomes probable. In extreme circumstances, when a
situation of political deadlock worsens, it leads to military intervention or a coup. The
resultant sudden shift in power arrangement raises a range of questions. The foremost
is, what inspired the coup? Was it to advance military’s institutional interests or serve
the national interest of returning order, redistributing power or imposing military’s
perceptions and policies on the polity?
This research argues that political elite focus on attainment of their political interest i.e.
legitimacy, survival and regime continuation (winning elections). In case of Pakistan,
181
Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” 12.
100
this has been witnessed repeatedly. For instance President Iskandar Mirza imposed a
martial law to safeguard his presidential powers in 1958. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto allegedly
conducted widespread election rigging to continue in power and in the face of strong
street protests by opposition parties involved military into politics which ultimately led
to imposition of martial law by Gen Zia. A similar conflict persisted from 1988 to 1999
in which two major political parties when in power focused on undermining the other
to the extent of causing personal financial losses to the principal political leader. 182
In the context of civil military relations in Pakistan, the aspects of national and
institutional interest are discussed below. Security for people of Pakistan since
inception has been and continues to persist as a vital national interest. Security in
contemporary anarchic world necessitates appropriate state power, a primary
prerequisite for furthering other interests. Security concern for Muslim polity of Sub
Continent is of historic significance, emanating initially from the fear of political
dominance in united India. It was followed by concerns about Indian aspiration to undo
Pakistan, witnessed in Kashmir war of 1948, creation of Bangladesh and continuing
incessant strategic competition resulting in policies with emphasis on accentuating
instability in Pakistan. Consequently, unresolved Kashmir issue has put Pakistan and
India in a bind, which each finds difficult to escape from.
Insecurity in Pakistan during the initial period of establishing ‘nationhood’ emanated
from external as well internal sources and actors. Structural causes like early demise of
founding fathers, especially without formulating a constitution and establishing national
institutions. Intense competition between the two wings exacerbated internal insecurity
and growth of diverse cultural and economic problems led to imposition of first partial
182
Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market
System (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 77-85. Benazir’s case of detaining the scarp ships bound
for Nawaz Sharif’ steel mills reference.
101
martial law under civil government. 183 In such circumstances, military finds itself in
difficulty and a dilemma as Gen Ayub indicates:
“Army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it; nor was
it conceivable that officers and men would not react to all the political
chicanery, intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every sphere
of life. The public pressure on the army was immense.”
While a ‘well-organised, trained and disciplined army would find it extremely
distasteful to be turned into an instrument for securing political power, but as conditions
are, the army could act as a coercive force and restore normalcy. He notes that the
“primary role of Martial Law was to give support to the civil authority so that it should
be able to rehabilitate itself and cope with the new problems which should arise with
introduction of reforms”. 184
Insofar, protection of institutional interest is concerned the foremost interest for military
remains solidarity and unity of its command. For instance, when President Iskandar
Mirza after imposing martial law and appointing Gen Ayub as CMLA found that he
had lost relevance started subverting the Army. When Gen Ayub discovered it on his
return from East Pakistan he relieved President from his appointment and moved him
to London, UK. 185
Askari explains Pakistan military’s major interests in six clusters. First national security
as the paramount, overseas weapons and equipment procurement, military autonomy
and civilian interference in internal organisational matters and service affairs,
183
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 71. The Ahemdiya riots which erupted all
over Punjab and the food shortages led to imposition of first partial martial law on 6 March 1953 under
Gen Azam. The Munir Report 1954 accurately portrays the reasons which led to imposition of Martial
Law.
184
Khan, Friends Not Masters, 81.
185
Khan, Friends Not Masters, 82. Constitutionally it was argued that since martial law was declared the
office of President had become redundant and military could function better sans him.
102
opposition to unilateral cut in defence expenditures, protection of perks and privileges
acquired over time especially during periods of martial law and that the military expects
the civilian government to ensure socio-political stability. 186 Two aforementioned
clusters relate to national security and remaining can be categorised as institutional
interests.
Siddiqa includes corporate interests i.e. protection of certain business concerns operated
by the military in the institutional interests. 187 Nordlinger in his corporate interest
hypothesis argues that “the military will intervene to protect or enhance its corporate
interests defined as its share of national budget, its corporate autonomy, and its
exclusive rights to bear arms in the defence of the country”. 188 Chaitram Singh furthers
the “corporate interest hypotheses”. 189 The institutional interest theory and corporate
interest hypothesis as casual factors leading to a coup are discussed in the research to
reach a clear conclusion insofar coups in Pakistan are concerned.
Aziz in his enquiry into three military interventions in Pakistan argues that “these coups
took place to protect and extend the institutional interests of the military”. 190 He argued
that the military removed the civilian government in two of its three military coups,
“pursuant to its economic interests”. To validate the hypothesis, however, he concedes
that the definition of its corporate interests has been more expansive than that proffered
by Nordlinger. In case of Pakistan, “it would mean interpreting corporate interests as a
more elastic concept than that intended by Nordlinger” and concludes that “only one,
186
Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan,” Survival 40, no. 2 (January
1, 1998): 99-100.
187
Siddiqa, Military Inc, 18. ‘The most noticeable and popular component of Milbus relates to the
business ventures of the four welfare foundations: the Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust
(AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Baharia Foundation (BF)’.
188
Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (New Jersy: Prentice-Hall,
1977), 65.
189
Chaitram Singh, “Military Coups in Pakistan and the Corporate Interests Hypothesis,” Journal of Third
World Studies 28, no. 1 (2011): 47.
190
103
the 1977 coup comports with the Nordlinger hypothesis”. 191 But the evidence he
presents i.e. creation of Federal Security Force by Z.A. Bhutto which impacted directly
on the corporate interest of the military is partial and inconclusive. He does not further
expand on what these interests are and why did the military felt these interests would
be compromised should it not intervene in politics.
In summary, the coup discourse in Pakistan revolves around the casual factors leading
to the coup and then its consequences. Amina Ibrahim indicates that “attempts to
analyse Pakistani coups d’état have rarely involved testing of any theory or the
investigation of trends, particularly as scholars tend to focus on political events,
personalities and institutional structure and interests. [and] there has been little
empirical investigation of the preconditions or patterns that increase the risk of coup”. 192
She has referred to twenty one possible theoretical explanations of military coups in
Pakistan. Some are possible explanation of the events i.e. hypothesis, while others (e.g.
implementing communist ideology) have lost relevance owing to changes in the
sociopolitical construct of the exogenous factors.
Protection of institutional interests by the military in Pakistan and its casual relation
with military takeover is however weak. Contrarily, its relation with national security
stands out prominently. President Ghulam Ishaq opines that “in our system, the army
[military] intervenes when, in there and public perception, there is an imminent
breakdown of the civilian system”.226 Cohen opines that there are militaries which
defend the national borders, others defend their position in the society while others
defend a cause or an idea but Pakistani military does all three.
Singh, “Military Coups in Pakistan and the Corporate Interests Hypothesis,” 49.
191
192
Amina Ibrahim, Guarding the State Or Protecting the Economy?: The Economic Factors of
Pakistan’s Military Coups (Crisis States Research Centre, 2009), 9. 226 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan,
103.
104
The primary reason leading to military intervention is the structural perspective of
national security situation while institutional interests only become significant in given
situations and infrequently become triggers for military coup. In case of military’s
counter coup in 1999,193 while the structural reasons persisted the military perspective
and within that the officers’ grievances triggered the counter coup. How did this come
about? This research aims to explore the casual relationship of military takeover of
1999.
1.8 Summation
Democracy is by and large accepted in Pakistan as the governing political thought. Its
development and consolidation is dependent upon the conduct and efficacy of the
political elite. There can be three forms this process i.e. structural, modernisation and
transition. The process of democratisation in Pakistan can be best explained by the
transition approach which locates the success or otherwise of the process in the conduct
of political elite.
The conceptual framework and theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter provides
perspective to civil military relations in the democratic framework of Pakistan. Civilian
control over the military is exercised through separation/institutional (Huntington’s)
approach. Yet it has not been able to prevent military’s intervention in politics. What
drives these interventions, national or institutional interests? The process of
democratisation and interplay of civil military relations from 1988 to 1999 would be
studied in the next chapter.
193
Counter Coup: Military’s response, as a dependent variable to the larger and independent variable of
politics.
105
CHAPTER 2
DEMOCRATIC RECONSTRUCTION AFTER GEN ZIA
“There are no people in the world who are more democratic even in their
religion than the Muslamans”
All India Muslim League Session, Lucknow 1916
2.1 Prelude
Consistent with the three approaches for democratisation elucidated in chapter 1, this
research while taking account modernisation and structural approaches focuses on
‘transition approach’ to study the process of democratisation in Pakistan after the death
of Gen Zia. This approach identifies a four phased democratisation process. First is
“national unity” phase in which government and nationhood is established within a
given territory. It is followed by a prolonged second phase of “inconclusive political
struggle” which lasts till one group gains prominence over all others. Alternately, lack
of such a conclusion can tear national unity apart. The third, the decision phase, is
marked by a “historical moment” in which political elite decides to compromise and
adopt democratic rules. The compromise accords each player, some share in the polity.
In fourth follow up phase, a second transition called “habituation” occurs. It is
characterised by conscious adoption of democratic rules agreed in the historical moment
which are the widely practiced by the polity.
In Pakistan, national unity and nationhood establishment phase lasted from 1947 to
106
1958.194 Despite early loss of the founding fathers and dissipation in stature of Muslim
League, the founding party, it was expected that the agreement on 1956 Constitution
would mark commencement of the second phase during which different groups in the
community would intensely struggle to secure their place and share resources under
rule of law. However, imposition of martial law and prolonged military rule 1958-1971
arrested the transition and propelled the country from democracy into authoritarianism.
The hard approach adopted by the military government denied the possibility of
political reconciliation between East and West Pakistan, tearing the country apart and
resulting into secession of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh. Post 1971
democratic transition and formulation of 1973 Constitution marked re-commencement
of second stage which was again interrupted by the military intervention of Gen Zia.
This research hypothesises that political transition after death of Gen Zia marked
recommencement of the second stage as many political, extractive and re-distributive
questions related to Pakistan were still not settled. Political developments from
19881999 will therefore be explored in light of this proposition contextualised in the
transition approach. It postulates that the primary agency for democratisation is the
political elite, and their actions decide the fate of the process of democratisation.
Understandably, decade long military rule of Gen Zia had considerably altered
politicosocial landscape in the country. His policies had sown seeds of radicalisation,
politically fragmented the society, encroached heavily on political consensus and
deepened ideological chasms. 195 The Eighth Amendment which redistributing power
between Prime Minister and President had altered the structure and character of
194
This phase included formulation of 1956 constitution however before it could be practiced, martial law
was announced in 1958.
195
Talbot, Pakistan, 144.
107
parliamentary democracy. 196 The thrust towards according greater powers to the
President as opposed to Prime Minister affected federalism and alienated smaller
provinces especially Sind.
The process of Islamisation tilted state policies in favour of orthodox elements,
interjecting intolerance and fanning spread of nationalist elements. The developments
in Afghanistan and Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) solidified military’s pre-eminence over
Afghan and India policy. In such a backdrop, death of Gen Zia and support of his
successor for restoring democracy was indeed a historic opportunity on which the
political elite could have capitalised and converted it into an “historic moment”. After
the elections of 1988, in which Peoples Party led by Benazir won a majority, the
opposition and the newly elected government had two mutually exclusive options. The
opposition led by Nawaz Sharif could have recognised the mandate of Benazir and
bided time in opposition and Benazir could have respected Nawaz Sharif’s mandate in
the provinces and emphasised on economic development (modernisation), focus on
democratisation (transition) and develop consensus within the polity to undo Eighth
Amendment (structural).
Careful handling of such issues by political elite could have enabled the polity to transit
later into fourth stage of cohabitation. Political leaders who strive for structural changes
must first accrue substantive legitimacy in the polity as the political capital and then
through personal charisma and mass mobilisation generate such changes. After free and
fair elections, multi-fold legitimacy can be accrued through democratic functioning of
the political parties, sound economic management and support of state institutions.
196
Gen Zia introduced Eighth Amendment to Constitution of 1973 Pakistan, under which eighteen
articles of the constitution were amended as a bargain for lifting of Martial Law by Gen Zia. Most
significantly President was endowed with the power to dissolve the National Assembly at his discretion,
appoint chiefs of armed forces and Chief Election Commissioner and appoint Governors etc. while
Article 152-A required establishment of National Security Council. The dissolution order of Prime
Minister Junejo’s government was challenged in Supreme Court which was not upheld.
108
Alternately, they could pursue a policy of confrontation (continuation of second phase)
to secure greater political space and dominance over other groups and parties in the
polity. Confrontation, friction, lack of economic development and reduced ability to
bring about structural changes would be the cost such a policy could extract. Foregoing
in view, this research hypothesises that political leaders create situations of political
deadlock, provide opportunity to military to become arbitrator and intervene and if
conflict resolution amongst political elite is not forthcoming, convert the intervention
into a takeover. It examines the two tenures of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif as Prime
Ministers from 1988-1999 to establish causal relationship. It studies how political elite
during the process of reconstruction and democratisation engendered repeated military
interventions, shortening their tenures in government and ultimately leading to another
military intervention in 1999. It will also study the role of military during this period
and articulation of civil military relations.
2.2 Role of Military after Gen Zia
Gen Zia took over on 5 July 1979 when national crisis had erupted over allegations of
massive rigging in general elections of 1977 and the ruling PPP and opposing Pakistan
National Alliance (PNA) had deadlocked themselves into a tight corner. Gen Jahan Dad
Khan notes that “on the advice of Bhutto and his Corps Commanders, Zia met with the
political leaders of both sides and urged them to reach a mutually acceptable formulae
to solve the political crisis confronting the country”. 197 Opposing views state that an
agreement between Bhutto and leaders of PNA was about to be reached and there was
no need for the military to takeover while others state that military took over since an
197
Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 160.
232
Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 185. Although Bhutto claims that his government was
other thrown on behest of United States for his nuclear policy and the protest movement was also
financed by United States. However the military despite the perception continued with nuclear
programme.
109
agreement was not forthcoming.232 Shafqat concludes that the “accounts vary and are
intensely personal, subjective and some are apparently an effort to exonerate oneself
and further research is needed to understand the circumstances and motives of the coup
makers”.198 Amin provides a detailed account of the negotiation process, in his opinion
the inability to conclude an agreement led to the takeover. 199 He states that the military
was supportive of the government as the service chiefs’ issued an unprecedented joint
statement in support of the Prime Minister. 200
Gen Zia ruled the country from 1977 to 1988. In 1985, he organised general elections
on non-party basis in which Prime Minister Junejo formed the government. Although
he agreed to transfer the complete powers to the newly elected civil government yet the
arrangement of transfer of power could not last. On 29 May 1988, Gen Zia, dismissed
Prime Minister Junejo’s government invoking article 58 (2) (b). On 20July, he set 16
and 19 November 1988 as dates for the general elections for national and provincial
assemblies respectively. Given his aversion to political parties, it was expected that
these elections will also be held as separate electorates and on non-party basis. However
on 17 August 1988, he died in a mysterious plane crash. 201 It ended an era of
“intolerance, bigotry and division” and provided hope for transition towards democracy
in the country. 237
At this critical juncture, role of Gen Aslam Beg, the then Vice Chief of Army Staff
(VCOAS), the de facto army chief, became very important. Academics tend to gloss
over it and even Talbot, while providing fresh perspective on Pakistan’s history has
198
Ibid, 189-190.
199
Amin, “1977 Coup D’état in Pakistan,” 50.
200
Ibid, 46.
201
Zia along with 19 military officers and US Ambassador to Pakistan were on a visit to Bahawalpur to
witness a demonstration of Abram A1M1 tanks as a prospect for induction in the Army. C130 the air
force aircraft crashed soon after taking off on 17 August 1988. 237Talbot, Pakistan, 144.
110
over looked it. Hoffman, on the contrary, asserts that the “authoritarian elite agreed to
allow the democratisation knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidations
were dim”, he termed it as “a period of temporary democracy”. 202 Employing that the
military had clairvoyants who could look ten years ahead and predict the future. It is
easier to assert this ten years later. In a similar situation in 1969, President Ayub Khan
after resigning under public pressure had handed the power to military instead of
Speaker of National Assembly and Gen Yahya resultantly took over. If institutional
interest theory held credence, then Gen Beg should have also followed a similar
trajectory. In fact this time, it was much easier as all major political and military offices
were vacant. Mr Ghulam Ishaq was an acting President. There was a caretaker
government without a Prime Minister and Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee
(CJCSC), Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman, a close associate of Zia had also died in the
accident. He himself was also acting as chief of the army. In such a delicate situation,
Gen Beg opted for democracy.
The supreme institutional interest for military is always a strong and vibrant Pakistan
capable of furthering its national interests and playing a constructive role in the comity
of nations while the military could differ with the political elite in ways and methods
for achieving it at structural and the policy plane.203 Gen Beg opted for constitutional
transition and went ahead with general elections. 204 “The elections were held more or
less in a peaceful atmosphere... they appeared, by and large, to be free and impartial as
202
Michael Hoffman, “Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan,”
Democratization 18, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 75.
203
Khan, Friends Not Masters, 58.
204
There were apprehensions that elections could be postponed as an appeal in Lahore High Court titled
Muhammad Sharif versus Federation of Pakistan was filed but court held the decision for dissolution of
national and provincial assembly. An appeal before Supreme Court titled Haji Muhammad Saif Ullah
versus Federation of Pakistan, Supreme Court upheld the decision of high court paving way for the
conduct of elections as scheduled.
111
is evident from almost universal acceptance of the verdict by all political parties”. 205
Some analysts observed that due to the new requirement of national identity card, a
significant number of [PPP] voters could not vote. 242 PILDAT report observes that
“despite minor allegations, polling day rigging did not affect the outcome of the
Election on the National level”.243 “The low voter turnout i.e. below 50% in contrast to
previous elections could be attributed to general public apathy towards politicians and
political process”. 206 PPP emerged as the largest single party by winning 93 out of 205
seats. Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI), an alliance purportedly cobbled by the establishment
could only win 55 seats, and it could not prevent PPP from forming the government in
the centre and two provinces. The results of 1988 elections are tabulated bellow.
Table 2.1: Result General Elections 1988 – National Assembly

Province PPP IJI Other parties Independents Total
Punjab 53 44 4 12 113
Sind 31 - 15 - 46
NWFP 7 8 7 3 25
Baluchistan 1 2 6 2 11
ICT 1 - - - 1
Total 93 54 32 17 196
2.3 Benazir’s First Term: December 1988 – August 1990
In transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, Benazir’s term was the first,
but a crucial step as it would set direction and determine trends for inter-institutional
relations, governance and establishing democratic norms. “PPP emerged as the largest
single party but did not secure absolute majority”. 207 Benazir had two options, one to
205
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 391. 242Tahir Mehdi, ‘An Overview of 1988
General Election: Triumph but No Glory’, Dawn, 11 April 2013. 243PILDAT, “A Dispassionate Analysis
of How Elections Are Stolen & Will of the People Is Defeated: Reflections on the Electoral History of
Pakistan (1970-2008)” (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2008), 14.
206
207
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 98.
246
Ibid, 98.
112
form a weak coalition government or to remain in opposition and let IJI consisting of
PML and eight other parties govern. She chose former and consistent with the power
arrangements that had emerged during the prolonged military rule and due to the
constitutional changes, conceded, that she would not “interfere with senior appointment
in armed forces or try and alter the course of foreign policy in Afghanistan”. 246
As the first women prime minister in an Islamic state comprising heavily patriarchal
society, she was bound to encounter numerous difficulties, yet she had Bhutto legacy
and goodwill of the masses was behind her. 208 Economy under Gen Zia had remained
stable as GDP had grown at an average of 6.2% (4.1% agriculture, manufacturing 8.2%
and services 6.6%), and inflation remained in single digit at 7.2%, poverty at 23.2% and
unemployment at a low of 3.5%.248 As a Harvard graduate with majors in comparative
government, it was expected that Benazir should have known that modernist approach
for democratisation would require her to focus on economic development and good
governance. The transition approach would underscore the need for consensus building
and having delivered on these two counts she could then focus on restructuring of the
constitution.
Benazir lasted twenty months as prime minister, during which she acted contrarily,
undermined the role of parliament and other democratic institutions and mainly focused
on expanding her political space. In an attempt to wrestle Punjab from IJI and Nawaz
Sharif by winning over twenty five members, she sacrificed a lot of political capital.
Her government deployed Peoples Works Programme as a parallel government and by
passed the provinces in decision making. Owing to an autocratic style of governance,
208
Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: Pocket Books, 2008), 392.
Farooq Rasheed, Eatzaz Ahmad, and Aqdas Ali Kazmi, “An Evaluation of the Performance of
248
Government of Pakistan,” The Pakistan Development Review, 2006, 837. 249Shafqat, Civil-Military
Relations in Pakistan, 229.
113
she created an environment of conflict and distrust and four significant cases further
alienated her from the President and the military. First, on appointment of a committee
to review role of intelligence agencies in democratic establishment, second for
appointment of service chiefs and CJCSC, third the incident of Pucca Qilla and lastly
in the case of other senior military appointments.249
Based on the findings of the committee report on intelligence organisations, she exerted
control over ISI by removing Lt Gen Hamid Gul and appointing Lt Gen (retired) Shams
ur Rehman Kallu as its head (an unprecedented first). Secondly, on the issue of
appointment of service chiefs and CJCSC, she contested with President who
constitutionally prevailed over her. The incident tarnished her image as a leader, after
these two incidents it “was expected that she would be more careful and cautious in
dealing with military [and President] but proved illusory”. 209
Victory of Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) in urban Sind during the elections had
come as a surprise. PPP had won majority in Sind but formed an alliance with MQM
which had won 15 out of 17 National Assembly seats in urban Karachi and Hyderabad
but the alliance could not last for more than a year. Parting of way by MQM created
political weakness which the combined opposition parties (COP) quickly exploited by
moving a no confidence motion against her. COP had to win only four members to carry
the motion. What followed was unprecedented saga of political bribery from both sides
horse trading and herding of the members to safe houses in Swat till the time the motion
was defeated. 210 This political process hugely tarnished the image of political elite,
political parties and democracy.
209
Ibid., 229.
210
Najam Sethi, ‘Rock Bottom Is Quicksand’, accessed 2
September 2015, http://www.najamsethi.com/1993/04/29/.
114
Benazir also disappointed her party and the people of Pakistan. Khan ascribes her failure
to authoritarian and monarchical tendencies(like freeing of hardened criminals in the
pardon on assumption of office), a direction less foreign policy, extensive corruption
by her husband (who also alienated her from old guard of PPP), inability to manage
economy and frequent recourse to horse trading for political gains etc. 211 Benazir did
not appoint a finance minister and retained this important portfolio. She centralised
development works by creating a board of investment which was chaired by her and a
placement bureau to adjust nearly 200,000 PPP workers. Khan opines that these led to
her early exit, he concludes “Benazir had no economic programme, no future plans, and
no clear idea about how to govern”. 212 “During the twenty-odd months she hung on to
power, not a single piece of legislation was placed before parliament by the treasury
benches – a record that is unlikely to be surpassed easily”. 213
Abundant literature on arguments for and against her rule is available. In a federal state,
democratic transition entails adherence to rule of law, consensus building, patience and
broad based consultations to maximise political capital. These were most needed as
Jalal observes that after Zia the “precarious condition of state finances and uncertain
regional environment coupled with international pressures limited the possibility of any
significant departures in economic and foreign policies”.214 Long years of dictatorship
did result into sympathy vote for PPP. She could have built on it by furthering
democratisation, adhering to democratic norms, focusing on governance, economy and
law and order. She could have remained away from contentious issues till the time she
211
Bhutto, Daughter of the East, 407. She thinks that ISI invented ‘politics of personal destruction’ a
deliberate and methodical programme to sully her name and suggest that my government was corrupt.
My businessman husband was a key target of this conspiracy. Later evidence to the contrary surfaced.
212
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 403. On assumption of office, she accorded
clemency to prisoners, reminiscing traditions of Mughal kings and freeing hardened criminals in the
office.
213
Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 111.
214
Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 327-328.
115
was politically strong enough to be able to rebalance the power in favour of elected
institutions.
Wanting performance, confrontations and tussle with President over the appointment of
Judges to Supreme Court finally led to her ouster. It was argued by the Federal
Government that President while interpreting Articles 48, 177 and 193 of 1973
Constitution had to act on PM’s advice, while the President asserted that since Article
193 did not specifically mention PM, he was autonomous in appointing such Judges. 215
The differences with the President led to her ouster and President exercising Article
58(2)(b) dissolved National Assembly on 6 August 1990 (two days after Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait). The charges against her government levelled by the President include
corruption and incompetence, horse trading, usurping powers of the provinces,
nepotism, deterioration in law and order in Sind and ridiculing superior judiciary and
civil services of Pakistan. Dissolution of provincial assemblies followed.
The dissolution order was challenged in Lahore and Sind high Courts but both courts
upheld President’s order. The decision was challenged in the Supreme Court which by
a majority vote upheld judgements of High Courts, however there were two very strong
dissentions.
On the contrary, it can also be vigorously argued that Benazir never got a level playing
field and all odds were stalked up against her. During Zia’s era, establishment had
developed strong anti-PPP attitude, she was not acceptable to them as a leader and was
considered a security risk. She was even termed as a Kafir (apostate) by Minister for
Religious Affairs and Jam Sadiq (her ally in Sind) even called her a terrorist. 216 She did
survive IJI sponsored no-confidence motion and the challenges were enormous but the
215
216
Talbot, Pakistan, 149.
116
option of biding time in opposition or working in harmony as hypothesised in the
transition approach was equally attractive. Once in power, it is imperative for political
elite to be mindful of the needed delicate balancing act.
In terms of civil-military relations, Prime Minister Benazir initially worked closely with
the military as she recounts in her book Daughter of the East. During her interaction
with military, she notes that mostly civilian preferences prevailed and even when
military’s logic was accepted, it was implemented after a decision by the Prime
Minister. These policy decisions related to Afghanistan, India and Middle East.
However, she had misgivings about the political role of ISI. At that time, Afghan Jihad
was succeeding and the Soviets were preparing to pull out from Afghanistan. For
Pakistan, choice was between providing face saving to Soviets and demand recognition
of Durand Line in exchange or go for final putsch and install mujahidin government in
Kabul. On merit, she opted for the latter option. However, when Kabul did not fall
quickly, her decisions for not augmenting mujahidin with resources from Pakistan
military was upheld. Similarly, the decision for not forming a confederation with
Afghanistan as well as her preferred choice of leader for Afghan Interim Government
(AIG) were accepted and implemented by the military.217
Towards the end of 80’s, indigenous political unrest had erupted in IHK due to years of
oppressive rule by India. Militarily, it was a defining moment for Kashmir struggle,
making it possible to rethink military strategy with advantages stacked in favour of
Pakistan (absence of threat on western border and a destabilised IHK). Prime Minister
Benazir refers to series of such discussions in which military presented her the options
and sought approval. Similarly, military is responsible for defence of their country.
Given the threat matrix and obtaining environment it analyses range of options and does
217
Bhutto, Daughter of the East, 392-431.
117
contingency planning in an order of priority. She recalls that within the defensive
construct, pre-emptive as an option was discussed with her by the COAS but when she
did not agree to it as a leading option the war plans were amended accordingly.
However, her concerns relating to ISI and its role in undermining her government merit
discussion. It is alleged that the organisation had grown in stature as it interfaced with
CIA and other intelligence agencies during the period of Afghan Jihad as the sole
interlocutor with mujahidin. 218 It had developed foreign contacts, was awash with
money and its position largely remained intact despite refocusing of US from
Afghanistan to Europe and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Benazir alleged that ISI initially interfered with the general election which was followed
by efforts to undermine her government’s credibility and lastly its dominant influence
on policy areas. The fact remains that PPP had comfortably won the elections and if
requirement of national identity card (NIC) would not have been imposed it would have
bagged a few more seats. In order to stem the influence of ISI, she installed her
confidant as its chief. However her failure lay elsewhere. This research has
hypothesised that political elite through their political decisions create an environment
which facilitates military interference and secondly despite opportunities, military
intervenes only out of extreme compulsion. In this case, opportunity was provided by
the tussle between President and Prime Minister but military left it to them to find a
solution to the problem, negating institutional interest theories. President Ishaq Khan
confirmed the same.219
218
Bruce O. Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (Brookings
Institution Press, 2012), 130.
219
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 103. “In our system army intervenes when, in there and
public perception, there is imminent breakdown of the civilian system”.
118
In the context of role of judiciary as guardian of the constitution, it is to be noted that
Article 58(2)(b) had altered the essence of parliamentary democracy. Interestingly,
when the President’s decision to dissolve Benazir government was reviewed by the
Supreme Court, the Judges interpreted the Article differently. Majority of them in both
(High and Supreme) Courts argued about validity of President’s decision or otherwise
and did not noticed, expect the two dissenting judge’s debate, that the Article had
distorted basic structure of democracy and constitution and merits a review. They could
have stuck down the article declaring it ultra-virus. However, the judges as prisoners of
the “doctrine of necessity” shied away from such a course.
Herein, consolidation of democracy, irrespective of performance and regime outcome
was impeded and derailed by President and Judiciary and not by the military. The
Judiciary previously used to validate military takeovers now validated Presidential coup
de grace undermining democratic consolidation.
2.4 Nawaz Sharif’s First Term: November 1990 – July 1993
Having ousted Benazir from government, it was evident that President Ishaq Khan
would endeavour to keep her out of government. 220 Exploiting his presidential powers,
he accordingly appointed a caretaker cabinet comprising people who were opposed to
Benazir both in centre and Punjab and Sind, the two major provinces. 221
Thereafter, the general elections were held in October 1990 during which the contest
was between two main alliances. IJI in which PML led by Junejo was the main party,
within it Nawaz Sharif had emerged as strong contender. On the other hand, Pakistan
220
Rahat Zubair Malik, ‘Elections of 1990: An Analysis of Electoral Manipulation’, Pakistan Journal of
History and Culture 32, no. 2 (2012): 43–70.
221
119
Democratic Alliance (PDA) was led by Benazir Bhutto. The results of the elections are
appended below: 222
Table 2.2: Results of 1990 Elections

Province IJI PDA MQM JUI ANP PNP JUP PKMAP Indep Total
(N) & JWP
NWFP 8 5 - 4 6 - - - 3 26
FATA - - - - - - - - 8 8
ICT 1 - - - - - - - - 1
Punjab 91 14 - - - - 3 - 6 114
Sind 3 24 15 - - - - - 4 46
Baluchistan 2 2 - 2 - 2 - ½ - 11
105 45 15 6 6 2 3 ½ 21 206
After a delay of two weeks, when National Assembly was convened, Nawaz Sharif was
elected as the Prime Minister with 153 votes i.e. two third majority. Nawaz Sharif was
perceived as the choice of the President and people considered that the
mentorapprentice like relationship would last. 223 Besides, it was for the first time that a
person from business-industrial community had become the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Nawaz Sharif accordingly recognising the importance of economic development
pursued modernist approach to strengthen democracy and declared that he will reform
the economic policy and put Pakistan on the path to economic prosperity.
Sartaj Aziz, the Finance Minister recalls that he constituted six committees to initiate
fast pace reforms in (1) privatization and deregulation (2) industrial policy (3) export
policy (4) exchange and payments system (5) tax and resource mobilization and (6)
self-reliance. The policy on privatization emphasised on nationalised industries, free
222
There were allegations by PDA that an election cell was set up in President’s Secretariat which
together with caretaker government rigged the election, two decisions of Supreme Court (1990 and 2012)
did find that such a cell was indeed established and money was distributed to influence the results. Friday
Times observed that at least elections in 30 constituencies were rigged which the PDA could have won,
NDI assessed 15% rigging etc.
223
120
movement of foreign exchange and measures to promote foreign investment in the
country. Privatization commission was set up on 22 January 1991 to identify enterprises
for privatisation and to lay down procedure to this effect. 224 Protection of Economic
Reforms Act 1992 was enacted to facilitate and protect the process. A number of
initiatives for deregulation of the economy, development of infrastructure, addressing
water distribution and meeting of Federal Finance Commission including measures to
address unemployment were undertaken. These measures generated economic activity
on diverse fronts and Nawaz Sharif can take credit for them. The economy grew at an
average of 5.2 percent annually from 1990-1993.
But soon irregularities in the privatization and deregulation process started to surface
which tarnished Nawaz Sharif’s image. Kahn gives a detail account of these and
concludes that “the process of denationalisation and privatization was contaminated by
those involved in it, obviously out of consideration of their own interest or interest of
their political bosses, without any regard for common national interest”. 225 Towards the
end of his rule, when an overall assessment about his economic performance was made,
it is observed that not much had changed due to governmental policies and during much
of Sharif period, economic growth remained at the traditional 6%. Inflation too
remained as before-within 10%. Similarly current account deficit remained close to its
historic value – about 3% of GDP. 226 For this economic performance, Sharif can take
no credit.
224
Rehana Kouser, Toseef Azid, and Karamat Ali, ‘Emergent Thinking on Privatization: A Review
Analysis’, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) 31, no. 1 (2011): 79–93. During March to July
1991 25 units were offered while during August 1991, 100 units were offered for privatization. GoP
accepted 26 bids amongst 235 bids for sale of 81 units. At the time of dismissal of the government the
total number of completed. Transactions included 2 banks, 68 industrial units and 10% share of Sui
Northern Gas Pipeline. Five Banks were also privatized later.
225
226
Mahnaz Fatima and Qazi Masood Ahmed, ‘Political Economy of Fiscal Reforms in the 1990s’, The
Pakistan Development Review 40, no. 4 (1 December 2001): 503–18.
121
Nawaz Sharif’s desire for rapid structural changes by exercising his democratic
autonomy as an elected representative pitched him against the President and finally led
his downfall. Authoritative tendencies both in President and in Nawaz Sharif impeded
consolidation of democracy. President’s desire to micromanage governance sowed the
seed of misunderstanding and mistrust. The rift widened on appointment of new army
chief due to untimely death of Gen Asif Nawaz. President and Prime Minister both
wanted a person of their choice, in the tussle President prevailed and appointed a less
likely candidate i.e. Gen Kakar without consulting anyone. Nawaz Sharif took it as an
affront and their relationship worsened. These differences came into open on the issue
of re-election of President Ishaq Khan scheduled in November 1993. It is observed that
authoritarianism rapidly alienates leaders form the electorate, and President Ishaq
exploited this weakness. 227
On the other hand, PPP soon after the election had commenced a political campaign
calling for ouster of President “Go Baba Go” was the choice mantra. Sensing the
differences their focus shifted to Nawaz Sharif. The long March by PPP against Nawaz
Sharif did not succeed which emboldened him for a more vigorous confrontation with
the President. In a speech on 17 April 1993, Nawaz Sharif declared “I would not accept
dictation from the presidency. I would uphold the principles of democracy and
constitution; he thundered”.269
As the differences widened, President Ishaq developed understanding with PPP and
exercised article 58(2)(b). He dissolved National Assembly on 17 April 1993 and ousted
Nawaz Sharif from power. The charges President brought against Prime Minister
227
Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 115. ‘Democracy and authoritarianism in
Pakistani context are so thoroughly imbricated as to fore-close the possibility of any straightforward
resolution following even a reasonably free and fair electoral exercise.’ 269Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams
and Realities, 135.
122
Nawaz Sharif included mass resignation of members from the opposition, making false
and malicious allegations against the President, maladministration, corruption,
harassing the opposition, extensive misuse of resources etc.
President appointed a caretaker government led by Balkh Sher Mazari and co-opted the
opposition members who hithertofore were crying hoarse against the President for
stealing the 1990 election. The dissolution order was challenged in the court and on 26
May 1993, the Supreme Court, in a historic ten to one judgement, restored the assembly.
Due to the need of preparing and presenting the budget before National Assembly, the
confrontation between President and the restored Prime Minister halted for a short time.
It again picked up with President manipulating the chief ministers in Punjab and NWFP
against Nawaz Sharif. The later could have shown the patience as President Ishaq was
due for re-election. The confrontation ultimately led to governor rule in Punjab. In this
confrontation between the provincial assembly, prime minister and president military
was asked to intervene but it refused. 228 Resultantly, the political situation led to a
constitutional deadlock and on 18 July Gen Kakar, COAS brokered a deal in which the
Prime Minister advised dissolution of National Assembly under article 58(2)(b),
President ordered dissolution and resigned under Article 43 and both relinquished
power.
The mindless confrontation however continued dead locking the governance to an
absolute stand still forcing the military to intervene calling for a fresh election and
facilitating the election of a new government. The pattern of military’s behaviour for
its impartiality (President had favoured Gen Kakar for his out of turn appointment as
COAS), supporting democracy and facilitating it when requisitioned for security and
228
Ibid., 138.
123
even administrative duties as an expectation should be noted as efforts for supporting
the democracy.
A care taker government under Moeen Quershi was installed and general elections were
scheduled for 6 October 1993.A range of good governance measures were undertaken
by Interim Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi in his brief ninety days tenure. He exposed
the extant of corruption and maladministration and also demonstrated to the public that
if intentions are positive a lot can be achieved even in ninety days. He brought into light
the misdeeds of the previous government, published list of loan defaulters: people who
had obtained huge loans exploiting their connections with no intentions of returning
them. He published a list of taxpayers, exposing tax defaulters and imposed, though
nominal yet an agricultural tax. Made State Bank of Pakistan and Pakistan Television
and Radio autonomous bodies, abolished discretionary powers of the prime minister
and chief ministers etc.
Khan opines the main reason [Nawaz Sharif] failed was due to inherent conflict between
his and his families interests with national interests and due to his “mindless
confrontation with outgoing president and sordid efforts to oust the Punjab government
through horse trading, led to the fall of his government”. 229 Sartaj Aziz attributes his
failure to an impulsive personality and lax financial discipline. 230
Military’s role during first tenure of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister reinforces the
hypothesis that the political elite create situations of political and constitutional
deadlocks forcing military to intervene. The political intrigues in Punjab created a
similar situation and the military was asked to politically intervene but it restrained.
The military could have conveniently taken over when Gen Kakar relived both the
229
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 423-424.
230
124
Prime Minister and the President from their appointments, but it abstained.
2.5 Benazir’s Second Term: October 1993- November 1996
Elections were held on schedule. The voter turnout was low 40.54% indicating public
apathy towards politics and fast eroding confidence in democracy. PPP emerged as the
victor but was closely followed by PML-N of Nawaz Sharif (86 versus 72 seats in
National Assembly. She formed government in the centre and to secure Punjab formed
an alliance with Pakistan Muslim League – Junejo (PML-J).231 The results are appended
on the next page.

Province PPP PML PML (J) (PIF) Pakistan ANP Others Total
(N) Islamic Front
Punjab 47 52 6 - - 2 107
Sind 33 10 - - - 1 44
NWFP 5 9 - 2 3 4 23
Balochistan 1 - - 1 - 9 11
ICT - 1 - - - - 1
Total 86 72 6 3 3 16 186
PPP had absolute majority in Sind, while PML-N with its alliance partners formed
government in NWFP and Balochistan. Benazir had two challenges to contend with, a
President armed with Eighth Amendment and the opposition. “Nawaz Sharif in his first
speech as leader of the opposition in the National Assembly assured the government of
Benazir Bhutto that the opposition would respect the mandate of the people and would
231
Pakistan Muslim League, Junejo carved out from PML and led by the former Prime Minister Junejo.
125
fully cooperate with government in affairs of the state”.232 In informal contacts between
treasury benches and opposition, some areas were identified for joint legislative.
Benazir could have converted this opportunity into a “historical moment” to strengthen
the process of democratisation. But as witnessed, she was more interested once again
in expanding her political space rather than delivering good governance and democracy.
Having denied the opposition an opportunity for forming a government in Punjab, she
also out manoeuvred President Ishaq Khan and contrary to general expectations
nominated her party loyalist Farooq Ahmed Leghari for the elections of President.
Having her nominee elected as the President, Benazir felt safe and thought that Eighth
Amendment had become ineffective at least for next five years.
Second time in power, people expected that Benazir would have learnt from past
mistakes and would this time deliver better governance. But far from it, her thrust still
remained on petty politics. She concentrated on expanding her political base and the
first effort was to install PPP’s government in NWFP. She blatantly used Article 245 to
impose emergency, governor’s rule and through rampant horse trading installed her
own chief minister in the province. Nawaz Sharif having learnt of government’s plan
to arrest him, initiated a country wide protest movement “Tehrik e Najjat” (movement
for deliverance) in September 1994. The movement destabilised the country and
resultantly he was spared but his father was arrested. However, he had to be soon
realised as he suffered a heart attack during custody.
Benazir’s tussle with chief justice on appointment of judges strained government’s
relations with judiciary. Falling out with MQM in Sind followed by replacement of Mr
Watoo with Mr Nakkai as Chief Minister in Punjab greatly sullied the political
atmosphere. In Punjab, the matter went to the high court, which restored Mr Wattoo on
232
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 149-150.
126
3 November 1996. Similarly, the policy to improve law and order situation in Karachi
through questionable means (extra-judicial killings) did initially meet a degree of
success but soon came under public scrutiny. 233
In arena of foreign policy, her efforts to maintain good relations with United States bore
fruit. She leveraged these relations to restore macro-economic stability and rein in a
budget deficit. Also, she strove hard to mitigate the effects of Pressler Amendment and
sought return of payments made for purchase of F-16 aircrafts. On both these accounts,
she did meet a certain degree of success.
However, PPP’s economic policy lacked coherence and her handling of economic
matters was inept. In one of the first moves, she reconstituted privatization commission
and appointed Mr Naveed Qamar, a close associate of Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, as its
chairman. He lacked corporate sector craftiness. The bid to privatise different public
sector concerns (United Bank, Saudi Fertilizer, Oil and Gas Development Cooperation
and Pakistan Petroleum Limited) had to be abandoned due to hue and cry by public,
stake holders and presidential intervention.234 The power purchase agreements signed
with independent power producers at a very high capital cost was tantamount to
bankrupting Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and compromising
national interests. This also came under severe criticism.
Civil military relations worked well but were punctuated by an unsuccessful attempt for
a coup by few army officers led by Maj Gen Zaheer-ul-Islam which was checked by the
military itself. The coup makers intended to first take over command in GHQ followed
a military coup of the government with a view to implement Islamist agenda in the
country. The plot was uncovered and Gen Kakar tasked Lt Gen Javed Ashraf
233
Saeed Shafqat, “Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto,” Asian Survey 36, no. 7 (July 1, 1996): 670–71.
234
Shahid ur Rehman, Who Owns Pakistan (Islamabad: Aekia Communications, 2006), 44.
127
Qazi, DG ISI to rid Islamists from the ranks of ISI, “a task he carried out with
determination and courage”.235
Benazir precipitated her premature exit for a range of reasons. Frequent collaboration
between judiciary and executive in Pakistan has been part of country’s political history.
“Appointment to Superior Courts in Pakistan [are made] generally on considerations
other than merit, being decided on the basis of political affiliations, nepotism, or
favouritism”. 236 Benazir was no exception, rather she even broke the tradition of
appointing senior most judge as the Chief Justice and appointed Justice Sajjad Ali Shah
who ranked number fourth in the seniority. Expecting that the beneficiary of out of turn
elevation would remain compliant, she went on a rampage and had judges of her own
choice placed in all high courts. 237 The interventions by International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and inept handling of economy led to repeated devaluation of Pakistani Rupee
(PKR). Confrontation with judiciary, murder of Murtaza Bhutto, restoration of Wattoo
as Chief Minister of Punjab and her machinations to once again de-seat him also created
an environment of extreme dissatisfaction. Accumulatively, her actions led to the
invocation of Article 58(2)(b) and dissolution of National Assembly on night 4 -5
November 1996 by her own President.
The dissolution order charged her government for extra-judicial killings in Karachi,
inability to maintain law and order, insinuating Presidency for hatching a conspiracy
against her which resulted in murder of Murtaza Bhutto, ridiculing of Judiciary and
sustained assault on judiciary, illegal phone tapping and corruption, nepotism etc. which
became the legacy of her government. The dissolution was challenged in the Supreme
235
Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in Politics, 280.
236
237
Ibid. For detail account of posting and transfers and Judges Judgement on appointment of Judges refer
to pages 432-437.
128
Court which was upheld by a majority of six to one. 238 Malik Meraj Khalid, a founder
member of PPP was appointed as caretaker Prime Minister with mandate to hold
elections on 3 February 1997.
2.6 Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term: February 1997 - October 1999
A low turnout was expected due to public fatigue and apathy and on polling day, 26%
in urban areas and 27% in rural areas was reported but later it was adjusted to 36.1%
percentage. 239 Military interference in these elections was absent. 282 However the
outcome was interpreted as heavy mandate which in reality was different, as 40% of
36.1% meant that only 14.44% of electorate voted for Nawaz Sharif and if Election Day
reporting is kept in view then 27% of 36.1% equals to a paltry 9.75% of the total votes
cast. The results are appended on next page:

Province PPP PML-N MQM BNP ANP Others
Punjab - 107 - - - 7
Sind 18 9 12 - - 4
NWFP - 14 - - 9 1
Balochistan - 3 - 3 3 1
ICT - 1 - - - 7
Total 18 137 12 3 10 21
Gillani in his analysis, opines that these elections reversed the long term trend. In the
past, PPP would poll 40% vote and 60% was distributed amongst the rest but in these
elections due to PPP’s pathetic performance, its vote bank declined to 22% while
PMLN polled 40% vote. The outcome surprised many, suspecting election day
malpractices, the results even surprised Nawaz Sharif. Sartaj Aziz attributes the victory
238
Pakistan Legal Judgement 1997, S.C. 27. Benazir Bhutto v Farooq Ahmad Leghari
239
PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from
Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law : 1970-2013” (PILDAT, 2013), 27. 282
The researcher was the key functionary to assist the conduct of election in Gujranwala Division and
confirms this through personal experience.
129
to methodical preparations but accepts that the result was even beyond their
prediction. 240 The heavy mandate signified that new relationship between state
institutions and political elite could now be cast. Aziz notes that “the heavy mandate,
as the media repeatedly emphasized, had probably changed his [Nawaz Sharif’s}
political mind-set forever”. 241
On 18 February 1997, Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister for the second time.
PML-N had won a two third majority. In Punjab, it swept the polls and formed
government on its own, in NWFP it formed a coalition with ANP, in Sind with MQM
and in Baluchistan, Akhtar Mengal formed a government as no party was able to make
majority. PPP was routed expect from Sind, it did not win even a single seat in any other
province. People of Pakistan had placed their trust in Nawaz Sharif for the second time
expecting a better deal. Contrarily, with governments in centre and three out of four
provinces Nawaz Sharif considered his ‘heavy mandate’ an authorisation to redefine
relationships, change structures and rule as he deemed fit.
At this stage, modernist approach would require greater focus on economic
development. The transitionary approach necessitated to understand the context and
tread with political prudence to develop a broad based consensus especially when
Benazir who had conceded defeat and indicated that she would perform her role as
opposition leader effectively. The imperatives of structural changes however exerted a
pull in a contrary direction i.e. expanding political space and maximising his power by
altering the state structures.
On the socio-economic front, except for the first speech on assumption of the office of
Prime Minister, no government paper or a vision statement or projected policy
240
241
Ibid., Chapter 10, The Perils of Heavy Mandate, 161-201.
130
initiatives were announced. To distil reality, content analysis of national newspapers
has been carried out in this research.242 The manifesto of PML-N stressed on satisfying
the public need for good governance, a corruption free country, accountability and
restoration of economy and industries. 243 Nawaz Sharif took oath and stated that PMLN
has learnt lessons from the past mistakes and would endeavour to serve the country in
a better way by eliminating VIP culture, 244 heavily cut non-developmental expenditure,
reduce the size of bureaucracy, make no new recruitments and broaden the tax base by
including agriculture sector as well as recover bad loans. 245 He was enthusiastic that
government will make drastic changes in the country’s socio-economic condition aimed
at ameliorating the lot of common man. 246
The lure of structural changes with two-third majority appeared equally attractive and
he indicated that he was mandated to take decisions on issues like Eighth Amendment
and increasing women seats etc. Interestingly, Nawaz believed that Allah had provided
him a golden opportunity to introduce ‘Nizam e Mustafa’ in the country and provide
justice to the people. 247 He indicated his desire to build good relations with military and
on 11 February 1997 called on Gen Jahangir Karamat COAS and formed Council for
National Defence and Security as an apex body for civil military consultations.
Despite these healthy developments, Sethi, given the past performance and persona of
Nawaz Sharif while appreciating the intentions, posed certain pertinent and profound
questions “Does his [Nawaz Sharif’s] selection of cabinet colleagues inspire confidence
242
The researcher had consulted the major newspapers in English and Urdu, (Dawn and Jang) from the
period 1997 to 1999 and constructed the intended policy initiatives.
243
‘PML Kicks of Poll Drive’, Dawn, 4 January 1997.
244
VIP stands for ‘very important person’.
245
‘The Agenda for Nawaz’, Dawn, 17 February 1997.
246
‘Battle of Manifestos’, Dawn, 15 January 1997. Reduction in budget deficit, lessening dependence on
foreign loans, support privatization, reform management if financial institutions, recover bad loans,
launch a new health scheme etc.
247
Daanish Mustafa, ‘(Anti) Social Capital in the Production of an (Un) Civil Society in Pakistan*’,
Geographical Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 328–47.
131
in his ability to deliver? Will honest professionals be hired to man the Planning
Commission, Privatisation Commission and various banks and development finance
institutions? Does Mr Sharif have the foresight to retain good relations with President
Farooq Leghari and General Jahangir Karamat? Do his actions promise good
government and political stability? There is, finally, the question of good relations with
donors like the IMF and World Bank which lend international credibility to Pakistan”. 248
Rooted in the feudal background, authoritarianism is a particular cultural characteristic
of political elite in Pakistan. 249 They cleverly guise their inbred authoritative tendencies
in a facade of democracy and democratic values. Nawaz Sharif, a businessman was no
different from the feudal and his first urge was to secure his rule and maximise power
by removing Eighth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment which undid the Eighth
Amendment and took away the discretionary powers of the President was passed on 4
April 1997 in matter of minutes, by relaxing rules and without giving due time for
debate. It can be rightly argued that in a parliamentary democracy, power is vested in
the elected representatives and Nawaz Sharif only restored the constitution in its true
spirit. Besides, it was also due to Eighth Amendment that four elected governments
could not complete their tenures. 250 Their premature removal, arguably, impeded the
consolidation of democracy. However as events unfolded, it became clear that Nawaz
Sharif had plans which went far beyond the imagination of even a worst dictator.
Fourteenth Amendment which added Article 63-A to the Constitution on the issue of
248
Najam Sethi, ‘A Good Beginning but’, The Friday Times, 6 March 1997.
249
Sumit Ganguly and C. Christine Fair, “The Structural Origins of Authoritarianism in Pakistan,”
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 51, no. 1 (2013): 124. The article contends that early choices
that culminated in military rule helped forge a political culture that did little or nothing to dismantle the
feudal features of parts of the Pakistani state, bolstered the role of the civil service and above all the
military. Once embarked on this path of constitutional and political development that viewed mass
political participation with both disdain and distaste, it became exceedingly difficult for the state to instil
a democratic political ethos and to reinforce democratic norms.
250
The governments of Junejo, two governments of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were dissolved by the
President using powers given by Eighth Amendment.
132
defection from the political party was similarly passed on 3 July 1997 by relaxing rules
without tabling the bill or allowing due discussion on the matter. 251 Given the experience
of horse trading in the previous tenures, it can be argued that the practice needed to be
stopped. But the solution offered in form of the Fourteenth Amendment went far beyond
the problem itself. In effect it “silenced dissent within political parties rather than
defections there from”. 252 Voting against and abstention from voting, a normal practice
in established democracies, could now be equated with defection and lead to loss of
assembly seat. The amendment effectively established political dictatorship in political
parties: especially when such parties, would not even hold elections within their party.
Authoritarianism meant that any individual or state agency that resisted authority of
Prime Minister would be brought down. 253 In the process of redefinition of relationship
with state institutions, the first ire fell on the Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah who had
taken suo motto action of freeing certain government functionaries whom Prime
Minister had ordered to be handcuffed in Faisalabad. Dissatisfied with the existing
judicial system Nawaz desired to construct a parallel system of anti-terrorist courts and
if need be military courts to deliver speedy judgements. The Chief Justice a rgued that
instead of diverting money towards a parallel system, the existing be strengthened.
Progressively, differences between the two grew as an alternate view point would not
be tolerated by the Prime Minister. He struck down the recommendations of the Chief
Justice to elevate five judges to the Supreme Court. Two out of the five were not
acceptable to Nawaz Sharif as they in the past had given hostile judgements against
him. Instead of giving reasons for disagreement, “once again, personal and family
251
Fourteenth Amendment added Article 63-A to the Constitution. For details refer to The Constitution
of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
252
253
Ganguly and Fair, “The Structural Origins of Authoritarianism in Pakistan,” 122. They argue that
failure of civilian democratic institutions to fully abandon authoritarianism even when military is not
power impedes democratisation.
133
interests stood in the way of decision making”. 254 Prime Minister notified reduction in
number of judges from seventeen to twelve but the Chief Justice stuck back and
suspended notification, the government had to eat a humble pie and withdraw: with a
heavy mandate such an outcome was not acceptable.
The events which followed the occurrence resulted into an open war between executive
and judiciary with President unnecessarily becoming party to the issue and sucking the
military (COAS) as the arbitrator in this three way tangle. Chief Justice went on to
suspend the Fourteenth Amendment and invoked Article 190 asking the President to
notify the judges. Government surrendered and Chief Justice considering it his personal
victory became haughty and oppressive turning many judges against himself. The
parliamentarians argued for supremacy of parliament and Nawaz Sharif gave statements
which were construed as contempt of the court and once again the Prime Minister had
to back down. In this open battle between Chief Justice and Prime Minster, the
parliament amended the Contempt of Court through a bill to protect the Prime Minister
at which point the President led Supreme Court to restrain him from signing the bill.
“At this point military leadership was sucked into the situation. It was the army
chief who once again asked to become an arbitrator between the President, Prime
Minister and the Chief Justice”. 255
The government misused the respite and instead of resolving the matter went on to
divide the judiciary and get a verdict against the appointment of the Chief Justice. A
bizarre battle ensued and resulted in once again involving the military. This time by the
Chief Justice, requesting for personal protection. He first requested the Prime Minister
and then wrote directly to COAS. The military, however, time stayed away allowing
254
255
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 454-455; “White Paper on the Role of
Judiciary” (Islamabad: Pakistan Bar Council, 2012), 5-6.
134
the contending parties to resolve their differences themselves as now three important
organs of the state (President, Prime Minister and Chief Justice) were involved. In the
final outcome, under threat of impeachment President resigned and the workers of
PML-N stormed the Supreme Court to oust the sitting Chief Justice from his office.
The episode amply reflects on the mind-set of authoritarianism not amongst the
uninitiated and unlettered but amongst those holding public office. Who acted in
complete disregard to the dictates of their offices and public decorum seriously damage
the standing of democracy. Sethi in his editorial, opines that:
“Mian Nawaz Sharif should go home because he is guilty of the
premeditated murder of democracy in Pakistan. He is guilty of
destroying the legitimacy of the parliament. He is guilty of contemning
the Supreme Court of Pakistan and instigating attempted coups against
the Chief Justice of Pakistan. He is guilty of attacking the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. He is guilty of spreading
institutional anarchy and political chaos across the length and breadth
of Pakistan. And he is guilty of the most abysmal mismanagement of
the economy which brought it to the brink of breakdown.” 256
Nawaz Sharif in his first round of authoritarianism had effectively divided and
politicised judiciary and made it a party to inter-institutional conflicts. He generated a
situation of political deadlock and forced military to intervene in politics. The military
did get him off the hook only to find that any further intervention would not be good
for the country and military. Should military have not done so, the results would have
been detrimental for democracy and the country.
256
Najam Sethi, ‘The Way out’, The Friday Times, 4 December 1997. In a gruelling six hour cabinet
meeting on 20th November in which it was finally decided to impeach President Leghari and drag Chief
Justice out of Supreme Court before national Assembly’s privileges committee.
135
Parallel with quest for dominating all state institutions, victimisation of the opposition
is another favourite hobby of the political elite in Pakistan. Passage of Ehtisab
(accountability) Act, expanding its scope to include government servants of grade 17
and above and creation of Ehtisab Cell to conduct inquires undermined the power of
Ehtisab Commissioner. It virtually turned the Cell into tool for coercion and persecution
of political opponents rather than for processing objective accountability to check
corruption. Khan notes:
“The developments that followed the Act prove that the Ehtisab
Commissioner and all resources had been placed at the disposal of the
Cell. It was headed by Saif ur Rehman a close confidant of Nawaz. This
precluded the accountability of Nawaz and his cronies, making it a
selective weapon used to victimize any member of the opposition that
the Cell chose to proceed against”. 257
During second term of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister, significant developments in
civil military relations occurred. These included decision for overt nuclear testing in
response to Indian nuclear tests, forced resignation of Gen Jahangir Karamat COAS for
identifying the need for NSC and appointment of Gen Musharraf as COAS. The initial
bonhomie with military taking on non-military roles like Bhal Safai (annual cleaning
of canals), supporting WAPDA in recovery of dues to bolster civilian government and
facilitating holding of census in the country. These were followed by Kargil conflict
and ultimately the counter coup by military in response to Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to
oust Gen Musharraf while he was on a visit abroad. These events are studied in greater
detail to understand development in civil military relations in the country.
257
136
On 25 May 1997, a day after Mazar-e-Sharif fell, Pakistan recognised Taliban
Government in Afghanistan which was followed by Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates, confirming internal and external consensus about Pakistan’s Afghan policy. 258
Later, it turned out that the decision was taken in haste without allowing time to absorb
the ramifications of these developments. 259 Reasons for such a decision could be
attributed to pre-eminence of ISI on Afghan policy and initial days of Nawaz Sharif in
governance. However, it could not be ascertained that MoFA was rushed into a prompt
decision could not be found. Professionalism demanded that Minister for Foreign
Affairs should have taken time to deliberate on such an important development and the
saved the country from embarrassment and subsequent need for policy re-adjustment.
An oft repeated political mantra tends to attribute military with such and many other ills
of institutional decay and present it as an impediment to consolidation of democracy.
Perceptional in nature, such assertions lack credibility. This research argues that after
exit of Gen Zia, military consistently supported democracy and if political elite would
have focused on reviving economy and providing good governance and by such actions
accrued greater legitimacy, there were no reasons that military would not stand with
them.
The judicial crisis was initiated by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif which engulfed
judiciary and later involved Presidency. Aziz gives a detailed account how, when
President before packing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif solicited support of military on
2 December 1997. Gen Karamat instead backed continuation of democracy and
resultantly President had to resign. On all counts, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should
258
A city in northern Afghanistan considered a strong hold of Northern Alliance, a group of forces
opposing Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
259
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 211. Taliban were soon ousted from Mazar e Sharif and
soon Saudi Arabia pulled out support due to differences with Taliban leader for handing over of Osama
bin Ladin. The decision was to have immense consequences in times to come.
137
have been grateful to the COAS but it was not so. Another evidence of involving
military in political decision making can be found in the process of selecting President
Lehgari’s successor when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asked Gen Karamat to evaluate,
short list and recommend most appropriate candidate for appointment as President and
then took decision on political basis disregarding the institutional process. 260
The COAS is responsible for defence and security of Pakistan. If there are changes in
security matrix, it is his duty to bring them in the notice of the government and
recommend appropriate measures. Pakistan’s security was adversely challenged on 12
May 1998 by nuclear tests conducted by India. Although nuclear capability of China
was cited as the primary reason for the tests by India, yet Pakistan was most affected
by the decision. Meeting of the Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) was scheduled
on 13 May 1998 to deliberate on the diplomatic, economic, strategic and security
dimensions of Pakistan’s response. Dilemma was to test, incur severe sanctions and
further imperil the fledging economy or not to test and accept security and economic
leverages being proposed by US. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in consultation with the
military took the decision to test and till 28 May 1998 the military facilitated
preparations and testing and stood with the Prime Minister. 261
In the context of constitutional amendments to acquire greater powers for the Prime
Minister, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and approval of
Fifteenth Amendment by lower house for imposition of Islamic Rule in the country
raised serious concerns in the political community. The bill even unnerved Jamat-
eIslami, a strong proponent of Shariat, because of the perceived real objective of
religiously sanctioned dictatorship. Gen Karamat identifying poor state of affairs in the
260
Ibid., 179.
261
Ibid., 194
138
country and unrest amongst the political elite highlighted the need of setting up NSC in
a lecture to Naval College. When the media published the news, Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif perceived it as a challenge to his authority. Intoxicated in absolute power and
having already removed the Chief Justice and the President, he thought it was an apt
moment to subjugate military as well, the remaining bastion of political challenge. He
asked Gen Jahangir Karamat to resign which he (surprisingly) did. However, if military
seriously wanted NSC to be considered, the matter would have been discussed by the
COAS with Prime Minister or taken up as an agenda point in the DCC but that was not
the case nor a military takeover was on the mind of Gen Jahangir Karamat, he chose to
respect the constitution. 262 Sartaj Aziz, states that he himself was working on a similar
proposal of NSC and noted that “Nawaz Sharif’s decision to remove Gen Jahangir
Karamat as the most serious mistake rather a blunder”. 263 Clearly, it was an irrational
decision, emanating from hubris and it would have monumental consequences in future.
Historically, immense speculation precedes appointment of COAS in Pakistan and
subsequently the personality and professional attributes of the new COAS are subjected
to extensive analysis to understand the considerations and motivations behind choosing
him for the appointment. There is no legal and constitutional bar on the Prime Minister
to appoint senior most officers as the COAS or CJCSC nor there is any constitutional
process specified for making such an appointment, save recommendation by the
outgoing chief and procedural processing by Ministry of Defence. He can elevate any
of the serving three star to these appointments. In appointing Gen Musharraf as the
262
Susan B. Maitra and Ramtanu Maitra, ‘Pakistan’s Sharif Gets yet another Opportunity to Set Things
Right’, Executive Intelligence Review, 30 October 1998. “What Karamat said was neither wrong nor
malicious considering the state of affairs that prevails in Pakistan, but it was construed as a warning to
the present government and a clarion call for implementing a new period of military rule”.
263
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 200-202. Aziz was independently working on the
proposal to convert DCC into Cabinet Committee on Defence and National Security and Gen Karamat
agreed that the proposal would serve the purpose.
139
COAS, Nawaz Sharif had political rather than professional considerations on his mind.
Lacking an institutional process he only consulted his brother Shehbaz Sharif and
Chaudhary Nisar. Apparently, he opted for Gen Musharraf due to his political
weaknesses.
He superseded Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan the senior most officer. He could have appointed
him as CJCSC but intriguingly, he double hatted Gen Musharraf with the office of
CJCSC. By doing so, he also missed the opportunity to reform Higher Defence
Organisation (HDO). Nawaz Sharif used this opportunity to appoint his own man Lt
Gen Zia ud Din Butt as Director General (DG) ISI. This alerted Gen Musharraf and
prompted him to make changes in the military hierarchy to safeguard his position. He
appointed Lt Gen Aziz, on promotion as the Chief of General Staff (CGS). The officer
was serving in ISI and he brought with him expertise of handling Kashmir affairs.
Gen Musharraf’s one year period between appointment and the takeover can be
subdivided into two half’s; one prior to the Kargil conflict and one after that. The major
issues in the context of civil military relations included handling India’s large scale
coercive military exercises along her western border, her relentless demonstration and
consolidation of nuclear and missile capability and the negative developments in
Afghanistan. Internally, the military’s support for shoring up WAPDA, sustaining
governor rule in Sind and handling internal security troubles in the country can be noted.
Apparently, the military was doing all what the federal government expected from it
but there were too many political issues on the table and the government did not look
comfortable.
2.7 Trends in Democratisation and Civil Military Relations
Death of Gen Zia provided an opportunity for return to democracy to Pakistan. The
political elite could have used the opportunity to consolidate democracy and make it
140
attractive and sustainable. This research has hypothesised that the transition approach
is most significant for consolidation of democracy. From the study of the period of
democratic reconstruction from 1988 to 1999, significant trends are discussed below.
• Benazir in her two tenures had the freedom of choice for formulating
socioeconomic polices, constructing inter-institutional relationship in the realm
of foreign and security policies. According to her own account, she was
consulted by the military and her decisions were honoured. Confrontation with
President (one his own nominee), Judiciary and opposition led to her down fall.
The two dissolution orders against her have remarkable similarities where
corruption, mal-governance, nepotism and economic mismanagement are
concerned.
• Nawaz Sharif in his two tenures largely followed a similar trajectory
accentuated by strong authoritarian tendencies which made him clash with
President and Chief Justice. The military, in his first tenure, bailed him out of a
tricky situation but he used the opportunity to increase the level of
confrontation. Although he was more inclined towards socio-economic
development but his desire for rapid structural changes to maximise political
space created an environment of confrontation in the country.
• Nawaz Sharif’s desire to control the military by forcing resignation of Gen
Karamat and then creating an environment of uncertainty by keeping the post
of CJCSC vacant and posting his own man as DG ISI were not well received by
the military in general.
• Low economic growth under democratic regimes has not been acceptable to
common people. Giunchi argues that one of the “key internal factor that
hampered to government commitment to social welfare were the pre-eminence
141
among elected representatives of social groups to invest in human capital of the
majority”. 264 “With return of democracy, people expected something very
positive and drew rosy picture of the future. Instead, what they saw were
rampant corruption in the public sector, deterioration in law and order, increase
in violent crimes, and so on. Still people put their faith in Nawaz Sharif and
expected him to bring the economy back on track. Unfortunately, he was a lso
not able to come up to their expectations”. 265
Table 2.5: Economic Growth under Different Political Regimes 266
Competitive 1st and 2nd Civilian 3rd Military Return of 2nd 2nd
Parliamentary Military Dictatorship Dictatorship Parliamentary Nawaz Nawaz
Democracy Dictatorships Bhutto (Zia) Democracy Regime Regime
1947-1958 (Ayub & 1971-1977 1977-1988 1988-1999 97/98 98/99
Yaha) 1958-
1971
GDP 2.9 5.3 5.4 6.7 4.1 4.3 3.1
Growth
Population 2.5* 2.2 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.3
Growth
Per Capita 0.4 3.1 2.2 3.9 1.6 1.9 0.8
GDP
Growth
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, various issues. Note *Figures for the period 1950 to
1958
• In the context of structure of the constitution, the Eighth Amendment had
divided the power between the Prime Minister and President. The political elite
sought measures to safeguard their regimes for the use of the amendment against
them. Benazir sought relief by installing a President of her own choice while
Nawaz Sharif attempted to undo the amendment.
264
Elisa Giunchi, “Democratic Transition and Social Spending: The Case of Pakistan in the 1990s,”
Democratization 18, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 1270.
265
Ibrahim, Guarding the State Or Protecting the Economy?
266
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999); Ibrahim,
Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy?
142
• Different presidents repeatedly employed the arbitrary power to dissolve the
political governments. The reference of the Presidential Dissolution Order to
Courts endowed the Judiciary with a political role. Besides judging the validity
of the order it could have also judged the validity of the Eighth Amendment and
facilitated consolidation of democracy. However it shied away from such a duty.
• The desire of political elite to control the Judiciary by appointing judges of one’s
own choice persisted as a malaise throughout the decade pitching the Prime
Minister and Chief Justice against each other to the extent of storming of the
Supreme Court by stalwarts of PML-N to remove a sitting Chief Justice.
In the context of civil military relations following trends can be noted.
• Sudden exit of Gen Zia opened two divergent options, a military takeover
(Ayub-Yahya precedent) or facilitate the interim structure to hold elections and
facilitate return to democracy. It opted for former and PPP which had been
politically excluded during Zia’s era and marginalised won the elections.
Benazir in recognition awarded a ‘democracy medal’ to the military.
• The study of the process of political reconstruction from 1988-1999 in the
context of independent variable (political choices and action) in its interface
with dependent variable (military response) validates this research proposition
that political elite generate situations of political dead lock and then directly or
indirectly involve the military in politics to which the military responds in
different ways.
• The defence budget which stood at 7% of GDP in 1988 was consistently
downsized to 5% in 1999. In terms of percentage of government capital
expenditure in 1990, it stood at 34.49% which progressively reduced to 26.34%
143
in 1999 i.e. a reduction of 8.15%. 267 The need for reforming the institutions for
civil military cooperation in wake of rapidly changing external and internal
situation was noticed not only by the military but also by the political elite.
However, asking Army Chief to resign for identifying the need humiliated the
rank and file in the military.
2.8 Summation
In the disposition and opportunity calculus where in despite varying but ever increasing
levels of civilian dependency on military from tasks ranging from internal security to
resurrecting civilian institutions to arbitration in situations of political deadlock and
military’s persisting popularity, the military consistently demonstrated their disposition
to remain away from politics. 268 Despite numerous opportunities i.e. pull factors it
demonstrated that it had no desire to intervene directly in politics and wanted the
political elite to do their jobs better. Contrarily, one can hardly trace the role of push
factors in this decade except in second tenure of Nawaz Sharif where such tendencies
started to emerge because of certain political decisions.
The argument that the Eighth Amendment had altered power in favour of the President
and strengthen the hand of military initially held weight. But with the appointment of
loyalist Presidents (Leghari and Tarar), it also progressively lost validity shifting the
focus squarely on the preferences of political elite. In this chapter, the research
investigated choices and preferences of political elite to govern the country and
consolidate democracy in the context of three broad approaches with emphasis on the
transition approach. The political elite did very little to improve elite interaction for
strengthening democracy, rather preferred confrontational approach to bring about
267
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament,
and International Security (OUP/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook
Series, 1999), 359.
268
Finer, The Man on Horseback, 72-85.
144
rapid structural changes (which otherwise is slow and historical process) not to improve
democracy but to increase their respective political space. They repeatedly involved the
military in political situations as arbitrator. The process of democratisation undermined
standing of democracy amongst the electorate. The development related to civilmilitary
relations and its breakdown during the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif is focused in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
BREAKDOWN OF
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 1998 – 1999
“Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people and you
do not make national policy, it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues
and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted”. 269
Quaid-e-Azam
3.1 Prelude
Huntington’s framework for civil military relations characterised in objective control
and institutional autonomy leading to professionalization and creation of apolitical
military has largely been practised in Pakistan since its inception. In this context, the
architecture for civilian control over the military laid out in 1973 Constitution
comprises.313 President of Pakistan is the supreme commander and the prime minister
as chief executive exercises control over military through parliament, cabinet and
269
Roedad Khan, ‘Quaid’s Visit to Staff College Quetta’, The Nation, 22 November 2012.
313
The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973.
145
administrative services. Senate and National Assembly comprises standing committees
on defence and the Cabinet Committee of Defence (DCC) is the highest consultative
and decision making body related to military and security matters. Minister of Defence
runs the affairs of the ministry while Minister for Defence Production (MoDP) ensures
that the military’s needs for war munitions are adequately met. The ministry of defence
(MoD) is resourced with a mix of civil and military officers while secretary of defence
manages MoD.
Federal government allocates the defence budget in accordance with the military’s
needs. Capital requirements for purchase of major equipment are met through grants on
required basis. An elaborate audit branch comprising civilian auditors is deployed in
the military down to the lowest self-accounting unit. It ensures financial discipline
which is overseen by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the parliament.
Military is responsible for territorial defence of the country and supports civilian
government when requisitioned. The Constitution does not accord any political role to
the military, however it was witnessed since 1988 that the military was frequently
engaged in political matters as arbitrators, and for supporting the government in
administrative tasks as well as internal security matters. Repeatedly, the military had
demonstrated its desire to remain apolitical and assist the political elite (prime minister,
president and chief justice) to resolve their disputes. And if not possible let the politics,
under the law, take its course. 270
The history of civil military relations in Pakistan had reinforced the military’s
perception in which they saw “themselves as the servants of the sate rather than of the
government in power.”315 They distinguished themselves from the political elite on
270
The perceptions about ISI’s role in politics and claims b Benazir Bhutto that ISI had rigged the 1998
election (although she won them) and then managed a coup with constitutional dressing. Also during her
second term the military persuaded Farooq Leghari (a PPP stalwart) to dismiss her government. 315Finer,
The Man on Horseback, 25.
146
grounds of moral and organisational proficiency. Consistent with theoretical
perspectives developed by Finer, explaining military intervention in politics, this
research analyses the process of breakdown of civil military relations and resultant
military takeover.
It can be observed that political elite had considerably undermined their legitimacy for
range of reasons elaborated in the previous chapter. Despite disposition and
opportunities in shape of pull factors, the military had repeatedly demonstrated its lack
of desire and mood to politically intervene and takeover. It preferred defensive interface
with political elite for preserving the institutional interests.
During the second term of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, there were significant
departures from the past which merit attention. First, as Sartaj Aziz opines, the burden
of heavy mandate weighed heavy and affected his style of governance i.e.
authoritarianism. Second, the country had acquired nuclear capability necessitating a
nuclear policy and re-evaluation of defence policy. Third, the economy, due to the
impact of post nuclear test sanctions, was in dire state meriting extensive emphasis and
focus. Fourthly, the internal security situation had over a period of time deteriorated
and the civilian security institutions were unravelling under such challenges. Lastly, the
forced resignation of the President Leghari, his replacement with a Nawaz loyalist, and
division of judiciary and ouster of chief justice had considerably disturbed and charged
the political atmosphere.
Foregoing in view, the research in this chapter focuses on the political and operational
aspects of civil military relations and the exercise of civilian control over the military
both during peace and conflict. Consistent with the transition approach, it studies elite
actions to ascertain how their choices and decisions affected civil military relations and
finally led to its breakdown. It explores why Huntington’s framework for exercising
147
civilian control over the military i.e. objective control, institutional autonomy leading
to a professionalised and apolitical military could not prevent the Kargil conflict and
subsequently the military takeover of 1999. It explores major theories and hypothesis
proposed to explain the reasons for military interventions in Pakistan and ascertain their
validity or otherwise to 1999 take over with a view to discern the primary reason and
to extract findings which can be instructive for future.
3.2 Gen Karamat’s Resignation and its Impact
Gen Karamat in an address to Naval War College on 5 October 1999 had identified the
emerging challenges faced by the state of Pakistan and recommended a few measures
for improving governance and security management in the country including the need
of NSC.271 Need for such an apex body for decision making in the past had mainly been
identified by the military once included and then removed from the Constitution. The
politicians, however, perceive it as power sharing and intrusion by the military into
politics. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz identified that in view of the emerging challenges
he was himself deliberating on the need for such a body. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
without hearing about the merits of the suggestion asked Gen Jahangir Karamat to
resign, to which he complied. 272
In an already disturbed and charged political atmosphere, the resignation generated
strong apprehensions in the military ranks and they felt humiliated. The trumpeting of
the resignation as a personal triumph for Nawaz Sharif by media, calling him the most
271
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 741. National Security Council: A debate on
institutions and process for decision-making on security issues, PILDAT Discussion Paper 2012, notes
that by 2012 NSC is fully functional in USA, UK, India, Iran and Turkey etc. Hence Gen Karamat was
merely identifying the growing need in view of the environmental changes.
272
Maitra and Maitra, “Pakistan’s Sharif Gets yet another Opportunity to Set Things Right,” 61. ‘What
Karamat said was neither wrong nor malicious considering the state affairs that prevails in Pakistan, but
it was constructed as a warning to the present government and a clarion call for implementing a new
period of military rule’.
148
powerful Prime Minister who had forced the President and Chief Justice to resign and
secured his power by passage of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment further
accentuated the apprehensions in the military. It is routine affairs that service chief are
invited to the leading military institutions where they share their evaluation of the
environment, identify the changes required and instruct next generation of officers. It
was mistake on part of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) to release such a
statement to the press, which even after that should have been seen for its scholarly
rather than political value. If such a suggestion would have been in active consideration
for presentation to prime minister in a military brief or DCC meeting, then it would
have been sent as an agenda point for acceptance or otherwise as is the practice.
Actions of political elite especially the prime minister for strengthening democracy in
the context of transition approach are critical. Nawaz Sharif had a range of options open
to him. He could have ignored statement by Gen Karamat, taken time to gather more
details and ascertain facts, consulted his cabinet colleagues before making a decision,
could have talked to Gen Karamat to ascertain institutional position, conveyed his
unacceptability etc. But taking the extreme measure first, speaks volume about the
nature of his personality and the cultural attitude. Seeking resignation was not in order
however Gen Jahangir Karamat willingness to resign confirms the trend that military
had taken a back seat, was professionalising and expecting the political elite to deliver.
Gen Musharraf notes that Gen Karamat’s resignation had caused great resentment in
the army, as soldiers and officers alike felt humiliated. However, after the assumption
of appointment of COAS, he states that “the resentment in the army was even greater
than he had imagined”. 273 The reasons for such strong feelings were multiplied by the
comparative effect i.e. how do the soldiers perceive the political elite and their failures
273
149
especially their preference to advance personal interests at the cost of national interests
etc. The widespread malpractices witnessed after 1988 and repeated reference to
massive corruption and nepotism etc. documented in four Presidential dissolution
orders accentuated such perceptions.
Thus Gen Musharraf had the difficult task of pacifying these feelings, consolidating his
control over the army and focusing on professional matters. The later was important
due to the scheduled Indian large scale military exercise in the winters of 1998. This
exercise was significant due to the recent deployment of Prithvi Missiles along with
Pakistan’s border. He notes:
“One of the first things he did was to tell the army that our job was to
assist the government in all possible ways, particularly in areas where it
asked us to help. We should stop brooding over the forced resignation
of Gen Karamat and get on with our jobs.” 274
It is perceived that trust is an important plank in developing intrapersonal relations
especially amongst the governing elite. Such a trust builds confidence and results in
greater organisational efficacy and helps maintaining societal order. Trust is described
as “social capital, a quantifiable sector which relies on individuals, encourages
networking and results in coordinated action needed for competitive economic function.
In addition, trust yields good governance, better education, lower crime and increased
civic participation.”275 With regards to civil military relations, the interaction between
political and military elite and their behaviour in “trust diagnostic situations” helps
274
Ibid., 85-86. In an interview to this researcher, Gen Musharraf had emphasised the same and explained
his intent to support the prime minister and his government where ever the military can.
275
Khaled Ahmed, “Are We a Low-Trust Society?” in Political Developments in Pakistan: 1999-2008,
vol. 1, 2 vols. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010), 268. He evaluates and geographically places the varying
standards of trust and the impact of emphasis on Islamisation on trust in the society. Civil Society is a
matrix in which trust functions as a value
150
strengthen trust and improves credibility. In Pakistan, its significance multiplies owing
to “collectivist nature” of its polity. 276
While appointing army chief, the primary consideration for prime minister is that he
will not intervene in politics given Pakistan’s history of military interventions.
Accordingly, he selects the one who is least likely to do it while taking up professional
credentials as supporting factors. Selection of Gen Musharraf as COAS carried similar
considerations and one expressed by the Prime Minister that “since Gen Musharraf had
not approached him for the job” and he came from an Urdu speaking family and
therefore generating collective action for military intervention would be difficult for
him as opposed to Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, who came from NWFP, was classmate of
President Leghri and politically well established. 277 Owing to sudden resignation by Gen
Karamat, enough time was not available for more robust evaluation and institutional
advice from military. Amongst the top three, Lt Gen Ali Kuli was not acceptable and
Lt Gen Khalid was not a strong candidate therefore Lt Gen Musharraf appeared to be
the likely choice.
At this juncture, it was significant that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should have
invested in building trust and a comfortable interpersonal relation with Gen Musharraf.
This trust was significant in view of the anger and humiliation which prevailed in the
army over forced resignation of Gen Karamat. Contrarily, Prime Minister made other
moves which unsettled the polity. He kept the appointment of CJCSC vacant after
resignation by Gen Karamat from November 1998 to March 1999. Second, within a
276
Masood ul Hassan et al., “Interpersonal Trust and Its Role in Organizations,” International Business
Research 5, no. 8 (2012): 33; Jeffry A. Simpson, “Psychological Foundations of Trust,” Current
Directions in Psychological Science 16, no. 5 (2007): 264–68. The article explains four core principles
of interpersonal trust, since there was inadequate time to observe Gen Musharraf behavior prior to
appointing him as COAS, therefore consultation to generate greater trust becomes critically important.
277
Pervez Musharraf, Civil Military Relations and 1999 Coup, interview by Noel I. Khokhar, 30 March
2015.
151
few days he appointed Lt Gen Zia ud Din who was serving as DG ISI without consulting
Gen Musharraf. 278 DG ISI reports directly to the Prime Minister but also enjoys the
confidence of COAS therefore the army recommends a suitable officer who is
experienced and can handle the challenges. Lt Gen Zia did not fit the bill, besides the
move amounted to visible demonstration of lack of trust in Gen Musharraf and in
violation of the organisational procedures, it stands out as an affront.
Since the country had developed nuclear capability therefore it needed an appropriate
command structure. Perception was strengthening that there was a likelihood of Gen
Musharraf to be appointed as CJCSC and Lt Gen Zia promoted and appointed as COAS.
Surely, it concerned Gen Musharraf as he appeared to be only an interim choice.
Given the rising differences between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Gen Musharraf,
Chengappa claims that Gen Musharraf initially kept quiet but then expressed his
dissatisfaction over the arrangements by missing the ceremonial part of the visit of
Prime Minister Vajpayee of India in Lahore. 279 Sartaj Aziz provides opposite point of
view and he clarifies that this happened due to the visit of Chinese Defence Minister on
the same day. Since there was no defence minister, therefore it was decided that foreign
minister (Mr Sartaj Aziz) along with the three service chiefs would receive the Chinese
Defence Minister, hold talks and join the Prime Minister next day in Lahore. He further
states that:
“In light of this background the speculation in the media and the
statement of Qazi Hussain Ahmad on 21 February that General
Musharraf and other senior chiefs had refused to go to Wagha to receive
278
At that time, Lt Gen Zia ud Din was serving as Adjutant General (AG) in GHQ.
279
Bidanda M. Chengappa, “Pakistan’s Fourth Military Takeover,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 9
(December 1, 1999): 1437.
152
the Indian prime minister is not factually correct. They duly carried out
the decision which the prime minister had made in my presence.” 280
Pakistani military over time has come to enjoy a unique status in the country. Its prestige
and authority associated with the appointment of COAS is immense both among the
civil and military. Repeated martial laws and prolonged tenures of military rules have
reinforced this perception. In the history of Pakistan, no Prime Minister has ever
demanded resignation from neither COAS nor any COAS has ever resigned, therefore
resignation of Gen Karamat is a unique event which had far reaching impact on the
overall political landscape of the country. Pursuant to the conceptual and theoretical
framework, Gen Karamat’s resignation invoked push factors for the first time in the
ranks of the military. The political moves by Prime Minister continued even after
appointing Gen Musharraf as COAS. The immediate challenge for Gen Musharraf was
to organise the military ranks which were dissatisfied with political actions but a web
of uncertainty was built around him. The office of CJCSC was kept vacant and DG ISI
was appointed without consultation him. In their combined effects, these events give
air to the push factors in the military.
3.3 Kargil Conflict
The unresolved Kashmir issue which has genesis in the partition of sub-continent led to
wars (1948, 1965) and conflicts along Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistan and
India. In this context, Kargil conflict should be seen as continuation of a struggle for
right of self-determination for people of Kashmir. This in Pakistan is regarded as an
important national objective. 281 Resolution through a dialogue in keeping with UN
Resolutions is the accepted way forward. But given Indian intransigence, occasionally
280
281
Kargil town in IHK is habituated by Shia Muslims and has historically been part of Pakistan. It was
occupied by India in 1971 war and after the conclusion of Simla Agreement they did not vacate it. Map
of Kargil is attached as Appendix D. 327 Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, 171.
153
recourse to quasi-military means was made in the past (1948, 1965 and post 1989
uprising in IHK) with a view to nudge the dialogue forward, albeit with a mixed result.
In 1948, the Laskhars did partially succeed in liberating a portion of Kashmir. 327 But
their inability to garner widespread popular support, seal the valley and secure airport
allowed India to hoax an accession letter from Maharaja, launch a military offensive
and consolidate control on much of Valley. In 1965, the limited action by the freedom
fighters rapidly escalated into an all-out war without any political and military gains.
The indigenous uprising in IHK in late 80’s continued into 90’s, but India sustained the
pressure and did not yield any concession. The brief parleys to find a solution to the
issue died in April 1999 when BJP’s government fell due to a no confidence vote.
Geographically, the road connecting Srinagar to Leh in IHK runs perilously close to the
LOC.282 According to Simla Accord, signatories (Pakistan and India) were required to
maintain the sanctity of LOC. 283 Indians however occupied Siachin glacier in 1985,
exploiting interpretational differences in the agreement. The LOC was delineated up till
NJ9842 and the agreement identified the general direction of LOC as ‘thence north to
the glaciers’ without specifying the exact terminus on the international border with
China. Historical practice located the terminus at Karakorum pass. 284
The LOC between Dras and Siachin with average heights between 12000 to 18000 feet
overlooked Srinagar – Leh road. As per practice, Indian Army would withdraw in
282
Kashmir is the long standing un-resolved dispute between Pakistan and India. Comprises three regions
i.e. Hindu majority Jammu, the Muslim majority Srinagar valley and Buddhist majority Laddakh, overall
the Muslims enjoyed majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir which according to the Partition
Agreement should have joined Pakistan. However the Maharaja delayed the decision which led to
Muslim uprising in the valley and Indian occupation under dubious instrument of accession. The resultant
war between two countries was referred to UN by India and the UN Resolutions for peaceful settlement
was to be administered through plebiscite which could not be realised due to Indian intransigence. The
two countries have fought a major war in 1965 and have since remained in a state of conflict and instances
of firing along LOC were frequent before 2003 ceasefire.
283
Simla Agreement was concluded after 1971 war between Pakistan and India.
284
Shireen M. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: Ferozsons,
2003), 2-3.
154
winters to lower heights and return to re-occupy when the weather improved i.e.
normally in April/May. This would also accord with opening of passes for moving of
logistics from Srinagar to Leh and Siachin.
Kashmir freedom movement active in IHK in 90’s although was able to force
substantial commitment of security resources yet it could not meaningfully contribute
to resolve the issue. It could be argued that if mujahedeen (freedom fighters) could
occupy the positions along Dras – Kargil and interdict the only supply route between
Srinagar and Leh, they could theoretically starve Leh region by limiting to air
connection only with rest of India and IHK. Resultantly, a dialogue with India will not
only become essential but can be held from a position of advantage.
The operation came out in open in first week of May when the Indians returned to
occupy their position only to find them already occupied. 285 They discovered that
intrusion comprised 130 square km area, 100 km wide and 5 to 14 km in depth in which
132 posts were located. India rushed in additional forces to IHK to evict the
mujahedeen. Due to the Indian actions close to LoC, a conflict ensued. Shooting of
Indian aircraft and terrain difficulties soon precluded combat role of air force leaving it
to Indian artillery (the newly inducted state of art BOFOR Guns) to turn advantage in
their favour. From May to mid-June, Indian forces struggled for meaningful gains but
after that under massive artillery support and increased numbers, they did manage to
take two posts in one of the five intrusions.
India had to choose between three difficult options to evict mujahedeen form their
positions. To evict with resources already committed to IHK or to induct additional
285
India Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report
(Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2000). ‘The intrusion was detected on 3 May 1999 by Shepherds’. 332 P. R.
Chari, Pervez Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American
Engagement in South Asia (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2007), 123-128.
155
forces but compromise on her capability to escalate along international border. Or it
could escalate in Kashmir to relieve pressure. It may be noted that should India want to
enlarge the conflict in IHK, it enjoyed the advantage of interior lines with metalled
roads while Pakistan was disadvantaged by exterior lines with rudimentary
communication south of road Gilgit – Skardu. All these options had to be exercised in
a nuclear environment.
The military advantage of the mujahedeen action was evident, but there were many
unanswered questions about strategy.332 The foremost question was that if dialogue was
intended out of conflict, what would be the political outcome of such a dialogue. The
second question related to contingency planning. It is a common adage that no plan lasts
beyond the first engagement. Therefore contingency plans are prepared to bring a
conflict to a successful conclusion. It appears that was not so in the case of Kargil.
Strategies for conflict around built under certain assumptions, the basis of the
assumption that India would accept the occupation as a fait accompli and at best would
try to dislodge the positions with men and material already committed in IHK, or live
with the problem is not known. 286 The logic manifested in the planning reflected path
dependent linear reasoning, witnessed earlier during 1965 war as well. In a similar
situation, when lines of communication between Jammu and Nowshera were threatened
(Operation Grand Slam) resulted into escalation of the Kashmir conflict into a general
war.287 The three weeks long war that ensued resulted only in a stalemate.
From the experience of 1965 war, it should have been considered that what if India does
not accept fait accompli. Will then, Pakistan be willing to fight a larger war in Kashmir
or across the international borders and that too in a nuclear environment. Will the
286
This is the common perception among the military officers who have been surveyed during the
research.
287
Mahmud Ahmed, History of Indo-Pak War - 1965 (Karachi: Services Book Club, 2006), 81-128.
156
political leadership be willing to go along if the need arises? Operational surprise can
accrue an initial advantage but what after that? Benazir Bhutto from an experience
during her second term as Prime Minister when invited by the military for a briefing at
Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) records that such a plan was presented to her by none
other than Maj Gen Musharraf, then Director General Military Operations (DGMO),
which she did not approve due to international ramifications of the adventure.288 But,
Mazari and Gen Karamat strongly refute this claim. 289
In terms of civil-military relations, Clausewitz wrote that “war is a mere continuation
of policy by other means.” 337 Although, the government decides on the policy for
waging a war yet its execution falls in the ambit of the military. This division of labour
is consistent with Huntington’s framework for pre-eminence of civil for deciding the
policy and its final outcome. One of the doubts regarding Kargil conflict is its political
sanctioning which has been discussed in detail in this study. Significant to this research
is not the merits and demerits of Kargil Conflict. Choice of a limited incursion is
contextualised as indirect approach and indirect strategy. It was not that, were the
mujahedeen indigenous to Kashmir and that the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) was a
second line force raised to defend Northern Areas but rather was the planning process
subjected to rigorous inquiry. In this context, Kargil conflict raises numerous questions
i.e. was the international environment conducive for such an undertaking, how the
major powers will respond and who will support Pakistan, should the conflict escalate?
What were the political objectives? Will the people and national resources be mobilised
by the political elite etc.
288
Bhutto, Daughter of the East, 418.
289
Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 1999, 16-17.
337
Clausewitz, On War, 23.
157
Kargil conflict was not a united effort of civil and military leadership. After the conflict,
a conspiracy emerged about Prime Minister being taken on board by the military or
otherwise. 290 Gen Musharraf indicates that during preparatory stage from January to
May 1999, Prime Minister was informed during his visit to Skardu on 29 January, then
on 5 February in Kel, followed by a formal meeting on 12-13 March in Islamabad and
finally matter was discussed at length on 17 May.339 Sartaj Aziz, on the contrary, claims
that no such discussion took place in Kel (he was not present during the Skardu visit)
but he confirms the meeting on 12-13 March. In this meeting, Prime Minister was
informed about intensification of mujahidin activity in Kargil area and a decision was
sought for possibility of arming them with stinger missiles or otherwise. It was not
approved by Prime Minister however the impact of development in Kargil and resultant
peace talks was discussed. 291
In the meeting on 17 May, when the conflict fully came into open, Prime Minister was
then briefed in detail. During the meeting, inquiry by Gen (retired) Majid Malik,
Minister for Kashmir Affairs, about the possibility of escalation and an open war and
his question that “are we prepared for an open war” should have sounded alarm bell
with the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (if he was not briefed before, as he claims). 341 A
professional discussion should have ensued within the cabinet. However, no such thing
happened and in fact Sartaj Aziz says that the Prime Minister awarded what looked like
an ex post facto sanction to involvement of own troops and crossing of LOC. 342 After
the conflict, Prime Minister in an interview in 2006 to Suhail Warraich states:
290
Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning.‘The balance of probability suggests that he [Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif] was fully in the picture. This is borne out by the tapes referred to earlier and the repeated
assertions of General Musharraf. Those who know Nawaz Sharif personally believe that he has a limited
attention span and is impatient with detail. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Nawaz Sharif
was at least aware of the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when he so warmly welcomed the Indian Prime
Minister in Lahore. The report calls it ‘Operation Badar’ 339Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 87-98.
291
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities,
253. 341Ibid., 257. 342Ibid p.255 343Ibid., 259.
158
“I as prime minister was not taken into confidence about Kargil. Four months
after the operation when some details were revealed they [military] also reaffirmed that
this attack would not lead to any complications, no major loss of life would be expected
and mujahedeen rather than Pakistan Army would be mostly involved in the
operation.”343 In his autobiography, Gen Musharraf addresses five myths about Kargil
Operation. The first was that “the operation was launched without the army taking
political leadership into confidence.” He terms it as an “unfortunate perception, because
nothing can be farther from the truth” and claims that Prime Minister was briefed about
the operation during his visit to Sakardu on 29 January 1999 and then on 5 February
during his visit to Kel Sector. 292 The details about remaining meetings corroborate with
those documented by Sartaj Aziz the Finance Minister, who was not present in the 29
January meeting while he also recalls that no mention was made about Kargil on 5
February brief which he attended. However, in the meeting on 12-13 March,
mujahedeen activity and the Indian response were discussed and decision for giving
stinger missiles to mujahedeen was sought which was not accorded by the Prime
Minister. When the operation came into open on 2 May, Prime Minister was formally
briefed on 17 May during which he got excited and inquired “will this road eventually
lead to Srinagar?” Sartaj Aziz thinks that Prime Minister accorded “what amounted to
ex-post facto approval.” 293
The second myth that “military situation on the ground was precarious, and the Prime
Minister dashed to Washington to get the army out of it.” In Gen Musharraf’s
assessment India, due to certain redeployment of forces to address the Kargil situation,
was not in a position to expand the war by opening up along the international border.
292
293
159
Sartaj Aziz on the contrary recounts his visit to India and states that the Indians had
ample proof and were not willing to accept Pakistani side of story and warned to “vacate
the aggression or be prepared for a wider conflict.” 294 However, after mid-June when
Indian position on ground slightly improved, their focus shifted towards harnessing
international support (US and G8) in favour of their demand and ultimately succeeded
in coercing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif into a unilateral withdrawal. It did not matter
that Pakistan had strategic parity and India could no longer expand the war.
To the third myth, that military hierarchy was not involved, Gen Musharraf himself
concedes that the operation was conducted on need to know basis. Against the fourth
myth that the two countries were on the brink of nuclear war he argues that although
the two countries had conducted nuclear tests a year ago but had not operationalised the
nuclear capability or mobilised such elements to be on the brink of war. From the
evidence available, it appears that his position is correct. 295 In fact, this research opines
that the US employed the nuclear escalation threat to coerce Nawaz Sharif into
unilateral withdrawal.
In defence of the fifth myth about the casualties during the conflict, Gen Musharraf
claims that actual figures of Indian causalities are much higher as reported by the Kargil
Commission Report of India which narrates 600 killed and over 1500 wounded. He
does not state the number of Pakistani casualties and no official figures were released
but the general estimates were that the number of our shaheeds (martyrs) was closer to
the Indian figure.
294
Ibid., 273. The telephonic conversation taped by RAW between Gen Musharraf and Gen Aziz while
the former was on a visit to China had exposed the truth about Pakistan army’s involvement in the
mujahidin operation along LOC in IHK. He also quotes Gen Zinni of US who in stern words had warned
Prime Minister before his visit to China on 25 June that ‘if you do not pull back you are going to bring
war and nuclear annihilation down on your country’.
295
During the content analysis of this period, it was observed that no nuclear deployment has been made
from both sides.
160
For clarity, a comparison of different versions of top three leaders i.e. COAS, Foreign
Minister and Prime Minister is appended on next page.
Table 3.1: A Comparison of Versions among COAS, Foreign Minister and Prime
Minister about Kargil Conflict

Gen Prime Minister
Meeting Sartaj Aziz Remarks
Musharraf
29 January 1999 Not present in
PM was informed Not Informed
Sakardu the meeting
5 February 1999 No mention of
PM was informed Not informed
Kel Sector, AJK Kargil
The consequences of
12-13 March mujahedeen activity
PM was informed Yes Yes
1999 Islamabad in Kargil sector were
discussed in detail.
Gen Musharraf was also appointed as CJCSC in March 1999.
A conflict ensued when it came into lime light on 2 May 1999.
All confirm that the
17 May 1999 Yes Yes Yes matter was
discussed.
Favourable international environment and availability of interlocutors is essential for
successful conflict. During Kargil conflict, the international arbitrators included China,
G-8 and US. Gen Musharraf (25-29 June), Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz (9-10 June) and
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (29 June) visited China to gather support but evidently
the advice was to diffuse the situation. Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, also
visited China (13-15 June) and National Security Advisor went to Geneva and was able
to solicit a resolution from G-8 for vacation of the positions. Gen Zinni visited Pakistan
on 25 May and issued a stern warning. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif approached US
and solicited a statement about unacceptability of any un-constitutional action. Later he
opted for a meeting with President Clinton on 4 July and agreed to a unilateral vacation
of the area. The recourse by Nawaz Sharif to President Clinton on a holiday (4 July)
was not well received in Pakistan. At the meeting, he succumbed to unilateral
161
withdrawal without Indian Prime Minister even being present there and that too without
any noticeable change in ground situation. It frustrated the military generating the
‘dolchstoss’ stab-in-the-back feeling. 296
Apparently the prevailing international environment, reaction of major powers and
acceptability of the conflict were not factored in during planning stage by the military
or by the political elite. It had the most devastating impact. Generally, before
proceeding for a foreign visit, extensive preparations are made and if the visit is of
security significance, a DCC meeting helps in preparing for such a visit, despite its
shortcomings. 297 During Kargil conflict, a DCC meeting in which an accurate
assessment about the ground realities, Indian position and the external pressure could
be taken into account and a national response with military on board appears essential.
Before the visit to US, instead the Prime Minister proceeded to Lahore for consultations
(ostensibly with his father and his siblings) and listen to the brief of Foreign Minister
Sartaj Aziz after his recent visit to India. Gen Musharraf proceeded to Murree for the
weekend and the two only met briefly at the tarmac before departure of Prime Minister
to Washington. These circumstantial evidences prove that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
travelled to US without contextualising a national response and hence unilaterally
decided to vacate the occupied positions.
Without preparations and formal brief, Pakistan was politically and diplomatically out
manoeuvred, international community and President Clinton placed the responsibility
296
Finer, The Man on Horseback, 69. The theory propounded by Ludendroff in case of German Army
inn 1918 ‘The army had never been beaten; the home-front had crackled and had betrayed it.’ Drawing
a parallel the problem was not in the military manoeuvre but in the political elite in owning it and accruing
advantage through display of will after all conflict is a dialectic of wills.
297
There is structural inadequacy with the Senate, Parliamentary Standing Committees and the DCC as
they take only on agenda items and are devoid of in-house expert input. Also, the absence of their
secretariat leads to lack of institutional memory which is essential for recording the decisions and
monitoring their implementation.
162
of misadventure on Pakistan. 298 At that critical juncture, a DCC meeting would have
possibly been instrumental. It would have saved from misperceptions like the success
on the battlefield was compromised by Prime Minister or that the myth that military
was in difficult position and Prime Minister rushed to the US to save it.
During the conflict (May/June), the dialogue process being pursued through Foreign
Ministers and the scheduled meetings between the two Prime Ministers would have
become essential. Should the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the political elite
demonstrated political will and resolve and mobilised the nation in its support rather
than plainly succumbing to the pressure from US. Perhaps the outcome of the conflict
could have been different. The consequences of blowing of mujahedeen cover could
have been dealt through an internal political discourse. The price the military paid in
terms of casualties and loss of face and undertake withdrawal ordered by its own prime
minister was nothing less than dolchstoss.
Leadership is about will, courage, determination and resolve to accomplish the given
objectives. This irrespective of the merit of the Kargil plan was visible in the military
but at the crunch time not displayed by the prime minister. In a contest situation, it is
dialectic of wills and the stronger resolve which more often wins. An argument can be
made that even if the operational details were shared only on 17 May, but the effects of
the mujahedeen activity in that area was discussed on 12-13 March meeting and it was
very much possible for the prime minister to politically deliberate on the importance of
the issue and mobilise required political and national support to demonstrate resolve
and bring the impending conflict to a favourable conclusion. It was possible because
298
Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper
Series 1 (2002): 14.Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was told to come to US only if he was prepared to
withdraw and the other option was isolation. In fact the real beneficiary of the Summit was US as ‘Doors
opened
163
Indians had already displayed willingness for a negotiated settlement. Alternately, he
could have asked the military to take measures that the activities of mujahedeen do not
result into an open conflict between the two countries.
in New Delhi to Americans that had been shut for years. The Indian elite – including the military- and
the public began to shed long held negative perceptions of the U.S’.
In case of Kargil, a comparative analysis of responses of Pakistan and India makes an
interesting study. The political leadership in India was surprised by the intrusion and
Nawaz Sharif also claims that he was unaware of the issue till it came to open on 2 May.
Both were surprised in a way but each responded differently. While the interim
government in India, despite the disadvantages, clearly defined the nature of conflict it
was willing to engage in and launched a strong external manoeuvre in support of its
military efforts. Contrarily, the political leadership in Pakistan failed to seize the
opportunity, could not effectively force a dialogue on India and quickly succumbed
under the international pressure. Regime continuity appeared to be its sole interest.
Indian media acted as a cohesive force and rallied strong national support for Indian
military and politicians urging them to evict the intruders. In Pakistan, such a resolve
was missing mainly for want of a clear position and direction from the Prime Minister.
This resultantly led to the breakdown of the civil military relations and by end of June,
Prime Minister could clearly sense it. Probably, he lost legitimacy in his own eyes
otherwise he would not have sent his brother to Washington for seeking regime
continuity. 299 The bubble of heavy mandate had busted otherwise an elected leader
should have made recourse to the electorate even if forcefully removed. It also belies
the perception amongst the political elite about the US and its capacity to influence
politics in Pakistan in a few months that myth was also broken.
Saeed Shafqat, ‘The Kargil Conflict’s Impact on Pakistani Politics and Society’, in Asymmetric
299
Warfare in South Asia: Causes and Consequences of Kargil, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
164
In final analysis, even if not clearly informed, it was naive on the part of a head of state
to accept the military’s brief on 11-12 march for its face value. Consistent with
requirements of the secrecy, he should have asked for a formal brief at an appropriate
forum. Equally, it was professionally required from the military leadership to provide
such a brief highlighting the course of action after the surprise was over. Kargil conflict
transformed civil military relations in many ways. It undermined the trust between civil
and military leadership. The military felt grieved because of loss of face, fanning the
push factors in the military.
3.4 Coup and Counter Coup 300
The transition approach, identified in chapter one, emphasises that political elite are the
primary agency, who through their actions/inactions either impede or foster
democratisation. The process of democratic reconstruction from 1988-1999, explored
in chapter two, concludes that the confrontationist policies of political elite resulted into
intra institutional clashes and consequently three successive governments could not
complete their tenure. Huntington has hypothesised that most important cause of
military intervention in politics are not military but political with institutional structures
of the society its primary contributor. This hypothesis remained very much valid in
Pakistan. During this period, the political elite frequently involved military a s
arbitrators between in a tussle between the prime minister, president and chief justice.
Resultantly, the political elite not only weakened democracy but also agitated pull
factors for military’s involvement in politics. However, as history suggests, although
military participated to resolve the political deadlocks but refrained from direct
takeover.
300
Coup refers to the removal of Gen Musharraf from the office of COAS and then not allowing his
plane to land in Karachi while he was returning from an official visit to Sri Lanka. The counter coup
refers to the military’s response to force the landing of his plane (PIA Commercial flight) and removing
the Prime Minister in the process offering him to resign.
165
Rapid deterioration in civil military relations was witnessed after Kargil conflict. On
his way back from Washington, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stopped in London where
he was interviewed by Tim Sebastian of BBC programme Hard Talk, who sensing the
public and military mood in Pakistan asked him “how will you now go to Pakistan?” 301
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on his return had two broad options. He could order a
judicial inquiry into Kargil conflict following Indian precedence or ask Gen Musharraf
to step down. Sartaj Aziz opines that latter was doable as public opinion was divided
and the decision would not have invoked a strong military response. Alternately, he
could have taken the issue in the parliament and solicited political support.
Prime Minister, however, did nothing which allowed Gen Musharraf to garner support
within the military and make contingency plans should he be removed. Instead, on 4
October, Gen Musharraf sensing the possibilities of his removal threatened that he is
not Gen Karamat. Instead of taking action against him, Prime Minister extended his
tenure as CJCSC up till 16 October 2001. 302 Apparently, it looked like a policy of
appeasement on the part of Prime Minister. On the other hand, the decision undermined
Gen Musharraf’s position, who then had to clarify that he had not done any deal to get
the extension. By stating so, Gen Musharraf implied that the threat of military takeover
still persisted.
In a corps commander’s conference in early September, before leaving for a visit to Sri
Lanka, Gen Musharraf consolidated support in the event of his dismissal and built
consensus on the response should he be ousted. Reportedly, the happenings in the
301
302
Musharraf, Civil Military Relations and 1999 Coup; Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 110. Gen
Musharraf explained that on his statement that he is not Gen Karamat, Shabazz Sharif and Chaudhary
Shujjat intervened and later his tenure was extended. Some think that it was done to lull him into false
sense of security.
166
conference were leaked to the Prime Minister by Lt Gen Tariq Pervez, brother of
Interior Minister, Nadir Pervez. 303 Gen Musharraf called for his explanation on 7
October and later retired him. Three days later, he left for visit to Sri Lanka. Prime
Minister’s unscheduled visit to UAE while Gen Musharraf was in Sri Lanka with DG
ISI as part of entourage raised suspicion and alerted the military which was anticipating
such an eventuality.
Enumerating the details of the happenings on 12 October leading to the coup and the
counter coup are important to understand the breakdown in civil military relations.
Prime Minister was well within his right to ask the COAS to resign as he had earlier
asked Gen Karamat to do so. But this time, he handled the proceedings in a very clumsy
manner. Aziz observes that “unfortunately he [Prime Minister] did not follow a prudent
course’ to remove Gen Musharraf.” 304 Sacking Gen Musharraf while he was abroad and
appointing Lt Gen Zia ud Din Butt as his replacement was not in order as per protocol.
Accordingly, GHQ informed the designate COAS that command will be handed over
to him after return of Gen Musharraf. It implied that Gen Butt would need more time to
consolidate his position and to facilitate this, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered that
Gen Musharraf’s aircraft be taken somewhere else. These happenings on 12 October
look like a scene from a thriller movie rather than the decisions and actions of an elected
Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif directed to take the flight to Dubai or Islamabad on which
Gen Musharraf was travelling. When informed that the airplane had little fuel to go
elsewhere, it was allowed to land in Nawab Shah. He did so to provide more time to
Gen Butt to consolidate his command. These decisions of Prime Minister backfired and
303
Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 112.
304
Ibid., 290.
167
the military moved in to launch a counter coup and seize power. It moved to take hold
of Prime Minister and other important ministers in Islamabad. It prevented the
transmission of the news about change of command on Pakistan Television Network
(PTV) in the evening news. In this saga, there were numerous normative breaches and
no wonder military’s response was termed as a counter coup. 305
The decision to appoint Lt Gen Zia ud Din Butt, DG ISI as COAS was also not well
considered as prior to this, DG ISI due to the nature of his appointment was not
promoted as COAS. Secondly, the appointment remains within the fighting arms
(armour, artillery and infantry) and Lt Gen Butt was not from fighting arms but from
Corps of Engineers. Third with respect to his suitability for the appointment, his
competence can be gauged from the fact that as DG ISI he was oblivious of the Kargil
operation and the preparations for a counter coup contingency which purportedly were
developed in mid of September. He also failed to inform and alert the Prime Minister
about these developments.
The counter coup, when analysed from societal perspective (pull factors), reinforces the
proposition that military cannot disassociate itself from the society. It is affected by the
national discourse but the casual relations with takeover remains weak and was not the
overriding factor. It is also perceived that the Eighth Amendment acted as safety valve
in the past and since it was removed therefore the situation resulted in a military
takeover. The position is inaccurate, even if the amendment was in place, it is
incomprehensible that in time compressed environment how military would have forced
the President, whose sole claim to that appointment rested on loyalty to Nawaz Sharif
to exercise the power bestowed on him.
305
168
In the context of the military perspective (push factors), the military’s self-image viz a
viz the political elite and its very strong sense of grievance supplemented by the
institutional resolve to prevent the repeat of Gen Karamat’s episode emerges as the
primary motivating factor for launching a counter coup. However, in the absence of
trigger, it would not have compelled the military to take over. The trigger was i.e.
sacking of Gen Musharraf which was provided by the political elite which in its
interface with pull and push factors led to the counter coup. Aqil Shah in his study
confirms the same and states that “threat to integrity of military institution, politicisation
of the army, sham democracy and to save the unity of the army”, military launched a
counter coup. 306
The breakdown of civil-military relations can be noted from the fact that after Kargil
conflict, whenever Gen Musharraf used to go to meet the Prime Minister, GHQ would
take appropriate measures to prevent repeat of Gen Karamat incident. 307 The military
high command was determined that they would not accept double humiliation at the
hands of the Prime Minister. Due to these apprehensions, understandably, the
protections of institutional interests cited above were important but not the primary
reason for the military takeover. However, institutional affront suffered on the forced
resignation of Gen Karamat for no significant reason and the resolve to not let it happen
again, certainly was. 308
306
Shah, The Army and Democracy, 183.
307
Musharraf, Civil Military Relations and 1999 Coup.
308
Aditya Bhave, “The Military: A ‘Strangelovian’ Arm of the State?” (Amherst College, 2006), 46. He
analysed the military as an independent interest group in a game theoretical framework. Employing
Acemoglu and Robinson model (interaction between the rich and poor) and interjecting military as the
third independent player conclude, a three player model reveals the diversity of options available to a
democratic government when it attempts to preclude regime change. As long as the government can
safeguard the institutional interests of the military, democracy will be sustained irrespective of the
preferences of the elites, because elite lack the power to oust the existing regime singlehandedly.
169
The counter coup did not face any opposition from the other political elite as Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif had isolated himself for range of reasons. The polity was already
unnerved due to proposed imposition of Islamic rule under Fifteenth Amendment which
had already been passed by National Assembly. The public was also critical on Kargil
conflict as military had suffered causalities and its pride had been politically
compromised. Instead of seeking regime continuity through public support, Prime
Minister’s effort to seek support from US through his brother was also not well received.
Resultantly, he could not establish control of the army and sacking of Gen
Musharraf triggered a counter coup.
The civil military relations post Kargil withdrawal marked a breakdown but the drama
that surrounded coup and counter coup surprised everyone. PPP workers burnt posters
of Nawaz Sharif, Benazir and even Jamat-e-Islami, allied with ruling PML-N, tacitly
welcomed the takeover, hoped that democracy will soon be restored and she asked the
Western countries not to support Nawaz Sharif. Lawyers considered that Nawaz Sharif
was himself responsible for the action and within two days it was noted that it was
business as usual. 309 Nawaz Sharif’s government had lost credibility and nobody came
out in his support.
How did the civil society respond to the coup? On 13 October, a day after the takeover
GALLUP Polls conducted a snap poll on the military takeover. 75% were polled in
major urban centres, they approved the action taken by the military but only one third
favoured military rule, the remaining two third favoured other civilian alternatives.
Form within the other civilian alternatives, approximately 75% favoured a government
comprising non-political reputable experts while the support for returning power to
Nawaz Sharif stood only at 10%. However Muslim League remained the single largest
309
The content analysis of Dawn 13, 14 and 15 October 1999 shows these findings.
170
party.310
It was first ever military takeover in a newly nuclear armed country and there were lot
of curiosity in the international arena. The Time, UK in its editorial titled “Distortions
of Democracy” wrote that while “military coup was not a substitute of democracy the
[military] interference may be a less bad option for Pakistan.”363 The reaction from U.S.
was cautious, as per their law, all aid to Pakistan was suspended which had already been
curtailed earlier after the nuclear tests by Pakistan and India. U.S. State Department
spokesman James Foley said, “[W]e join the rest of the international community in
pressing for the rapid return to democracy in Pakistan.” 311 President Clinton also urged
quick return to democracy and William Milan after meeting Musharraf said United
States is “confident that General Musharraf is a moderate man who is acting out of
patriotic motivation and was provoked into what he is doing.” No one in the US
administration called for the return of the Sharif government. 312
Britain and European Union under rotating presidency of Finland suspended all aid to
Pakistan and Commonwealth suspended Pakistan’s membership. On one hand, this
international reaction is typical whenever there is a military takeover. On the other hand,
these countries were mindful of Pakistan’s nuclear status, the fragile economic situation
and the rising extremism and terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan and were willing
to give time to new administration in Pakistan.
Due to the actions of political elite especially government the demise of democracy was
long time coming and 12 October was only the formal burial day. 313 Asking “What
310
GALLUP Pakistan, Poll Findings On Military Rule (Islamabad: GALLUP Pakistan, 1999). 363
Summary of media response in UK to the events of 12 October was reported in Dawn 15 October 1999.
311
U.S. State Department Briefing October 15, 1999
312
Ken Guide, Case Studies in Collective Response,
313
Najam Sethi, ‘Saviours?’, The Friday Times, 21 October 1999. ‘It is clear that majority of the people
of Pakistan had had enough of the Sharif’s and the hangers-on. They were repressive, deceitful, corrupt,
incompetent and dangerous. Not too many tears are going to be shed at the passing of their rogue regime.
171
Now” Ayaz Amir opined that:
“first a few words, by way of obituary, regarding the dolt (no other
description fits him) who took a step too far and who had not the wit to
understand that it is only so much incompetent audacity the furies can
stand.”367
The military takeover as a response to a political decision by political elite reconfirms
the main proposition of this research that it is the political elite which creates
circumstances that either result into situations of political deadlock or in confrontational
situations forcing military to intervene as arbitrators.
After the takeover on 13 October 1999, Gen Musharraf announced that PML-N
government was removed and the armed forces had moved in and taken control of the
affairs of the country as a last resort. He stated that the Armed Forces would preserve
the integrity and sovereignty of the country at all costs. It was indicated that Martial
Law would not be imposed, next day Emergency was imposed in the country and Gen
Musharraf assumed the office of Chief Executive. Constitution was held in abeyance
and President was asked to continue in his office. The national assembly, senate and
four provincial assemblies along with their speakers and chairmen were suspended. A
Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) was promulgated, all courts were to continue to
function however they were restrained from passing any order against the Chief
Executive. The fundamental rights provided in the Constitution and not in conflict with
the emergency order would remain in force. All laws other than the constitution would
And as for democracy, it died in Pakistan when the supreme court was stormed and the judiciary
humiliated and undermined, when the parliament was gagged, when provincial governments were
arbitrarily removed, when the press was attacked, when bureaucracy was politicised, when checks and
balances on power of the prime minister were systematically removed and the sword of impending
Shariah Bill was waved to scare away conscientious dissenters. If a formal burial of this long – decaying
corpse was ordered on the day of successful counter-coup, does it matter?’ 367 Ayaz Amir, ‘What Now’,
Dawn, 15 October 1999.
172
continue to remain in force until altered, amended or replaced. All persons who were
members of the services would continue to remain in office. 314 It was noted that Gen
Musharraf is not an innate, politically ambitious coup maker. The sincerity in his short
but emphatic four minutes address to the nation on October 13 rings true, every word
of it.
3.5 Summation
As hypothesised by transition approach, it has been established that the political elite
play a pivotal role in consolidating or undermining democracy. Actions of political elite
during the period under review at numerous occasions created situations that military’s
involvement in politics became inevitable i.e. dictates of pull factors. In such situations
of political deadlock, although the military repeatedly played a role yet it refrained from
directly taking over. During the second tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,
however, civil military relations started to deteriorate and certain decisions of the Prime
Minister also led to germination of push factors in the military for the first time.
The first instance in this case was forced resignation of Gen Karamat for highlighting
the need for NSC, an apex body which could aptly handle the changing security matrix.
The reason appears to be trivial as some elements of political leadership were also
working on the same idea. Yet Gen Karamat’s statement was perceived as a political
challenge. It was the first time such an event had taken place, the incident generated
strong reservations in the rank and file of military, as they felt humiliated. The
trumpeting of the resignation as a triumph by media further aggravated the feelings in
the military. The second issue related to key appointments in the military. Nawaz Sharif
appointed Gen Musharraf as COAS and kept the appointment of CJCSC vacant. The
314
173
move generated apprehensions that appointment of Gen Musharraf as COAS was a
transitionary arrangement. Secondly Lt Gen Butt was appointed as DG ISI without
consulting the new COAS which further strengthened the feelings of distrust between
civil and military leadership.
Third relates to contradictory claims about Kargil conflict and its outcome. Political
leadership claims that they were not been taken on board before the issue came into
lime light. Contrarily, Gen Musharraf provides an account of the various meetings in
which the issue had been discussed. Owing to the lack of availability of Nawaz Sharif
for interview it cannot be accurately ascertained if he was on board from the outset or
otherwise. Irrespective of the contradictory claims, it is noteworthy that when such an
event can also accidently occur, political leadership reacts in a manner to convert
disadvantages into an advantage. The interim government in India was also surprised,
but despite the disadvantage, it was able to harness the situation into its favour while in
Pakistan, despite the advantages and a legitimate cause (Kashmir issue) the political
leadership compromised the pride and prestige of the nation.
The post Kargil events further aggravated the now evident, political military divide. The
actions of political elite generated a situation in which the combined effect of pull and
push factors affected feelings within the military. But even then, the military did not
directly intervene in politics. The dramatic sacking of Gen Musharraf however acted as
a trigger, the military perceived it as a political coup and it reacted, as a counter coup
to protect its institutional honour. It was an institutional reaction, as Gen Musharraf was
out of the country and not in a position to directly influence the events. Should the Prime
Minister had not acted in a manner as he did, the military coup would have never
happened. The counter coup was bloodless and orchestrated with negligible violence.
174
Its effect will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
MILITARY REGIME’S ASPIRATION
“Democracy must be something more than two wolves and a sheep voting
on what to have for dinner.”
James Bovard315
4.1 Prelude
In the previous chapter, this research has explored the construction and breakdown of
civil military relations leading to the military counter coup. This research has argued
that in a democratic political structure politics acts as the independent variable whose
operation is shaped by multiple endogenous and exogenous factors. Civil military
relations and military politics act as a dependent variable which impelled by push and
pull factors responds to the political developments in the country in constitutional and
sometimes extra constitutional ways. In an event of military takeover, the paradigm is
notionally inversed. The military politics, a sub part of the larger polity attains
dominance and acts as an independent variable to which the larger variable must now
respond.
It is argued by this research that the political elite, the primary agency, by its preferences
and decisions strengthens or undermines the democratic process. In case of the Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif’s political decisions and the manner in which they were
articulated led to the military takeover by Gen Musharraf on 12 October 1999. After the
takeover, it is the military elite which assumes a predominant political role and incur
upon themselves the rights, privileges and responsibilities once enjoyed by the political
315
James Bovard, Lost Rights: The Destruction of American Liberty (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 333.
175
elite. From that point onwards, it is their preferences and decisions which either can
return to better form of democracy or retard the process by prolonging military rule.
Civil military relations become military civil relations with focus on military attempting
to control the civil trough constitutional or coercive means. Foregoing in view, in this
chapter the research explores the construction of military elite, the options it had for
returning to better democracy or otherwise and to what effect.
4.2 Military Governments – A Conceptual Framework
At the instance of a military takeover, a military regime is seen as a “set of techniques
used by the military to carryout policies rather than as a political or constitutional
structure.” 316 Finer argues that three forms of governments can emerge after the
takeover, first an indirect rule in which (another set of) civilians take constitutional
responsibility and govern, such arrangements consequence out of blackmailing by the
military. Second is a dual system comprising civilian and military rulers and third a
direct military rule. 317 Whatever the case may be, the approach of decision making
changes according to the situation. Theoretically, there are two major types of decision
making i.e. consultative and unilateral. In a democratic setting, the decisions are to be
taken after a rigorous consultative process in which the policy moulders, political
parties, pressure groups, press and public opinion contribute towards the decision
making. On the other hand, in a military led setting, it is mostly a top down approach.
Military in 1999 had essentially deployed the threat of takeover to pre-empt Gen
Musharraf’s removal from the appointment of COAS due to the differences which had
arisen between him and Prime Minister after the Kargil conflict. The earlier unfortunate
saga of Gen Karamat’s resignation provided the background and acted as the motivation
316
Finer, The Man on Horseback, 164-167.
317
The forms of intervention can lead to indirect (limited/complete), dual, direct
(complete/quasicivilianized).
176
for the military to not to be humiliated twice. Beyond that it had no revolutionary or
pre-prepared political agenda to implement. 318 The contingency planning of takeover
therefore did not proceed beyond streamlining the tactics of the takeover and
rudimentary compilation of information about political and former military elite who
could be incorporated in the military regime. The opposition parties were although
apprehensive about Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s authoritarian style of governance
and his attempts for arrogation of absolute power, yet none had displayed their
preference for siding with the military after the takeover. Benazir Bhutto although
tacitly accepted the takeover yet demanded that elections be held within ninety days as
stipulated in the Constitution. 319
Given the position of the polity in general and the suddenness with which the events
unfolded, it appeared that declaring of the martial law was the most likely option i.e. a
direct military rule.374 The military suffers from two crippling weaknesses. One of
technical inadequacy to rule and second lack of legitimacy and for political survival has
to rapidly make up for these shortcomings.375 History of previous military takeovers in
Pakistan indicates that after takeover, military has to rapidly and simultaneously work
in multiple directions to gain legitimacy by de-legitimising and criminalising the ousted
regime and its key leaders. Make recourse to the Supreme Court for validating its
actions, “doctrine of state necessity” exercised in the past and makeup for technical
shortcoming by co-opting civilian experts in regime administration. It was no surprise
318
Gen Musharraf in an interview had said that he had said he was not Gen Karamat meaning that he will
contest the decision of his removal.
319
The content analysis of the newspapers (October 1999) indicates Benazir’s acceptance of the
takeover. 374Finer, The Man on Horseback, 179. ‘In its brute form, unjustified by any other principles
than its own success and its vague promises to do well by for the people is short lived form of rule’.
375
Ibid., 14.
177
that it went about setting a dual form of government which also indicated that it was in
no mood for an early election (90 days) for variety of reasons.
4.3 Accruing Technical Expertise to Govern
Precedent in view (Gen Zia’s martial law), after the takeover it was perceived that Gen
Musharraf will impose martial law but he had dual governance model in mind, in which
technocrats would govern but the military would monitor. 320 The first task was to
convince his closest aides Gen Aziz and Gen Mahmud who were somewhat surprised
at his preference. 321 The next task was to take corps commanders on board who in this
case were more or less willing to go along with their Chief. Having secured a consensus
among the military, Gen Musharraf went on to declare his governance agenda and
government structure to the nation on 17 October 1999.
The adhoc governmental structure formulated was presidential in nature although
President Rafiq Tarar (nominee of Nawaz Sharif) was requested to continue as the
(nominal) head of the State. Gen Musharraf would be the Chief Executive as opposed
to Martial Law Administrator and would govern through a NSC comprising six
members: the chiefs of navy and air force, a specialist each in legal, finance, foreign
policy and national affairs. NSC would be supported by a think tank of experts to
provide institutionalised advice and input. A cabinet of ministers would be appointed
which would work under guidance of NSC while each province would be headed by a
Governor functioning with small provincial cabinet. The Chief Executive would be
assisted by two secretaries, one from military and one from civil service.
These appointments were filled on the basis of professional competence, merit and
repute. The government was rapidly put into place and mandated to be functional with
320
321
Gen Aziz was Chief of General Staff (CGS) and gen Mahmud was Commander 10 Corps, Rawalpindi.
178
effect from 15 November 1999. It included three governors from the military (retired
officers, two from army and one from the navy) and one from judiciary. NSC comprised
experts as indicated and was supported by a think tank named as National
Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) which was led by a military officer. The cabinet
comprised one military and five civilian technocrats. A renowned expert was appointed
as head of State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). In essence, it was direct military rule, a
quasimilitary government with a civilian face.
Gen Musharraf set about to govern the country in which of the three pillars of state
legislature at federal and provincial levels was missing. Judiciary was intact and was
permitted to function in accordance with the constitution but was restrained from acting
against the Chief Executive and his appointees. An adhoc executive at federal and
provincial government level was put into place. The civil society and the international
environment were by and large permissive and were willing to give some time to Gen
Musharraf to return to democracy and preferably a better democracy.
4.4 Setting the Political Agenda
For want of pre-prepared revolutionary agenda, Gen Musharraf contemplated for a few
days on the problems the country faced and possible remedial measures. He formulated
seven point agenda and priority areas for policy and strategy consideration which
include; rebuild national confidence and morale; strengthen federation, remove
interprovincial disharmony; revive economy and restore investor confidence; ensure
law and order and dispense speedy justice; depoliticise state institutions; devolution of
power to grass roots level; and ensure swift and across the board accountability. The
policy and related priority areas placed revival of economy, introduction of good
179
governance, alleviation of poverty and political restructuring to introduce a sustainable
democracy at the highest pedestal.322 These policy priority areas are explained as under:
• Revival of economy was crucial which would be revitalised by measures like
recovery of looted national wealth, rebuilding of investor confidence through
stability and consistency in economic policies and economic security and
encourage local investors and Pakistani’s abroad and foreign investors who
were accorded priority.
• Introduction of good governance to include all elements of social development
i.e. health, education, and the emancipation of women.
• Pragmatic tax reforms, turning around state enterprises towards profitability,
boosting agriculture and revival of industry while exercising strict austerity
measures.
• Accountability in its true essence, cementing federation, freedom of media, and
practice of a tolerant and inclusive Islam.
• On external relations strengthening of brotherly ties with the Islamic countries
as a central pillar of foreign policy, search of a just and a peaceful solution in
Afghanistan, strengthening of time tested relations with China. International
security, disarmament and relations with India were the key feature with an
unconditional, equitable and result oriented dialogue as the way forward.
The obtaining international, regional and domestic environment in 1999 that provided
perspective to policies and actions of Gen Musharraf and his regime characterised
following. At the international plane, after the end of cold war, a unipolar world
emerged as the basis of power polarity. Russia was reeling from consequences of
dismemberment of USSR and the threat of international terrorism from Al Qaida was
322
180
rapidly taking shape. Pakistan’s foreign policy was faced with four major issues. There
was a significant drift in Pakistan USA relations. The Afghanistan problem where the
failure of mujahidin factions to reconcile on power sharing had given birth to Taliban
and presence of Osama bin Laden had become an international problem. Kashmir issue
in the aftermath of Kargil conflict and insurgency in IHK provided perspective to
tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations and nuclear explosions. 323 In the context of economy,
during 1980’s, Pakistan grew at an average of 6.3%, however during first half of 1990’s
it fell to 4.9% and further to 4% during the second half. Resultantly, inflation rose to
peak rates, debt burden escalated substantially, macroeconomic imbalances widened
and worst of all the incidence of poverty almost doubled. 324
4.5 Legitimacy
The foremost issue which military faces after takeover is of legitimacy. In the past (Gen
Ayub and Gen Zia), the takeovers were initially legitimised by Supreme Court and then
at the time of transfer of power constitutional cover was provided by a new constitution
(1962) or appropriate amendments in the constitution i.e. Eighth Amendment. Gen
Musharraf after takeover did not suspend the constitution and only constrained it for
acting against him as Chief Executive and authorities under him. The judiciary was
allowed to function normally. The legal question first came into focus on retirement of
Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court in January 2000 and it was agreed that the
incoming Chief Justice will take oath on the Constitution.
PML-N leaders had filed a number of petitions in Supreme Court challenging the
military takeover which had been entertained and the hearing was fixed for 31 January
2000. The military government perceived these developments as a threat. Apprehending
PILDAT, “The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan” (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2004), 35.
323
324
Khawaja Amjad Saeed, Pakistan’s Economy 1999/2000 – 2007/2008 : An Objective Appraisal
(Karachi: Institute of Business Management, 2000), 1.
181
possibility of restoration of assemblies and government of Nawaz Sharif, it started to
get unnerved and took a decision to promulgate Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)
on 25 January 2000. According to which the judges to superior courts were required to
take a fresh oath that they would discharge their duties and perform their functions in
accordance with the Proclamation of Emergency dated 14 October 1999. A time frame
was fixed to administer oath and those who fail to do so would cease to hold their
offices. The move angered the judiciary and Chief Justice and five
Supreme Court judges refrained from taking oath while seven judges took the oath,
Justice Irshad Hussain, the senior most judge was appointed as Chief Justice. The judges
of the four high courts also took oath and no one abstained. The move did protect
Gen Musharraf’s government but did not accord him legitimacy. 325
The petitions against the military government were heard by a bench of twelve judges
and after several months of hearing it issued judgement on 12 May 2000. The judgement
validated Gen Musharraf’s takeover by extra constitutional means. It entitled him to
perform all legislative functions and even granted him the power to amend 1973
Constitution to promote good of the people. 326 The judgement however, constrained him
from altering the salient features of the constitution and fundamental rights. The court
considered the military government a constitutional deviation and transitory in nature.
It granted Gen Musharraf a three year period from the date of takeover for achieving
his stated objectives and then transfer power through general elections.
Table 4.1: Timeline for Return of Democracy

Military Takeover 12 October 1999
Return to democracy by 11 October 2002
325
It is alleged that intelligence agencies had made inroads into judiciary and had won over sufficient
number of judges who will side with military. Evidence affirming the allegation could not be gathered.
However Hamid Khan states that the Chief Justice was put under virtual house arrest so that he could not
interfere with the process of fresh oath taking. Khan, ibid, p.480
326
Declared by him in his speech dated 13 and 17 October 1999.
182
The date for these elections was required to be Election scheduled announced 12 July 2002
determined ninety days before the expiry of the by
three year period.
The three year period ended on 11 October 2002 hence elections were to be announced
ninety days before that i.e. by 12 July 2002. Gen Musharraf had total of thirty six
months out of which eight months had already elapsed and he was left with twenty eight
months to achieve the objectives which Supreme Court had referred in its judgement.
Given the protracted nature of the political issues and administrative issues, there was
hardly any time available and it is not understood why Supreme Court did not take into
cognizance the practicability aspects of its order.
Gen Musharraf had identified the centrality of financial viability of the country to his
success. It implied correcting the fundamentals to prevent default, undertaking tax
reform to enhance the tax base and documenting the undocumented economy. Also,
improving internal security and business environment to enhance foreign direct
investment was essential. Across the board accountability would be an ongoing process
which would be achieved by providing constitutional framework, protection against
political interference and required authority to the institution created for the purpose.
Pakistan is a two tiered governance state (federal and provincial) and local governments
are not part of the constitutional framework. Requisite constitutional amendment and a
local government system which suits the genius of people, is protected from disruption
after return of democracy was needed. For the remaining objectives which were
amorphous in nature, the requirement was to identify the prevalent standard, significant
problems and the set of standards which the military government would work to achieve
in the available time. Apparently no such exercise in entirety was carried out before
setting the agenda.
183
The case of promulgation of PCO explained above and the need for fresh oath provides
important insight into functioning of judiciary and yields important lessons which could
be replicated in the military for greater common good. The oath of office for Chief
Justice is laid out in Third Schedule (Article 178 and 194) of 1973 Constitution. 327 The
most significant clause is “That I will preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
Islamic Republic of Pakistan” which imposes a duty on the Chief Justice and Judges of
superior courts an obligation to defend the constitution. When a case of military
takeover and disruption is brought to them, the judges are honour and oath bound to
take a decision which would protect the constitution and render the takeover illegal. An
oath under PCO liberates the judges from their constitutional duty allowing them to
employ expediency and validate takeovers under the doctrine of state necessity. The
question arises that can new oath supersede the first oath and liberate a judge from the
original bindings? Since the constitution is silent therefore the military succeeds in
legitimising its takeovers with the help of Judiciary. An amendment to the constitution
and oath to office schedule can prevent recurrence of such a phenomenon in future. A
similar oath to office is also laid out for the members of the military (Article 244) which
is administered on commissioning into the armed forces. 328 The oath binds the officers
to uphold the Constitution and not indulge in political activities. Despite taking the oath,
why officers have repeatedly violated it with impunity is an issue which merits
attention. Experience 329 indicates that the oath is administered on the day of
commissioning and is not preceded by any formal education/ explanation during their
stay in the academy. Therefore its implications are not fully absorbed and then are lost
in time. Secondly, there is no separate oath for the service or joint chiefs like the office
327
The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan
328
Ibid.
329
It is the personal experience of the researcher while having served at Pakistan Military Academy.
184
of Chief Justice and Prime Minister which is administered to them on promotion and
appointment to these offices. In complex political environment of Pakistan such
initiatives if taken as part of security sector reform may be helpful.
It is sometime argued that Eighth Amendment provided a “safety valve against
imposition of martial law.” Despite being an undemocratic proposition, it enabled
continuation of democracy albeit at the peril of incumbent regime. 330 In 1999, even if
the amendment would have been intact could it have prevented military counter coup
on 12 October i.e. President Tarar acting against Nawaz Sharif and in favour of COAS.
As in a similar situation, President Leghari, in the case of tussle between Benazir and
Chief Justice had acted in favour of the latter and dissolved her mentor Benazir’s
government in 1997. Would President Tarar had reacted in the same manner as
President Laghari did remains an open academic question?
On 12 October, in order to increase its options the military did ask Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to resign which he declined. Had he resigned the military’s options would
have increased; either the parliament could have chosen a new leader, which in any case
would have come from PML-N but would have been acceptable to the military or the
parliament would have been dissolved on the advice of Speaker to National Assembly
and elections called after ninety days as required by the constitution. It would have
saved the country from the military rule. Evidently, the solution lies not in distributing
powers of prime minister but in developing institutions and mechanisms for conflict
management and resolution between power centres.
330
Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 294. The passage of thirteenth amendment to undo the
eighth amendment was a major blunder, despite being an undemocratic practice.
185
4.6 Endogenous Challenges
Finer identified military government as a set of techniques to carryout policies rather
than conduct politics or construct constitutional structures. This research explores how
military government employed these techniques to handle endogenous challenges, how
they were different form the ones employed by the civil governments and what was the
outcome.
Gen Musharraf had identified the criticality of the economic revival in his seven point
agenda and chose Shaukat Aziz as his Finance Minister (for being a self-made man
from middle class family). Razzak Dawood, an entrepreneur as minister for commerce
and Tariq Ikram, a businessman as head of export promotion bureau. The team
formulated an integrated strategy for economic stabilisation with four areas of
emphasis.331 (1) achieve macroeconomic stability (2) make structural reforms to remove
microeconomic distortions (3) improve the quality of economic governance and (4)
alleviate poverty.
Reviewing economic performance in the areas listed above, Dr Ishrat notes that
“comprehensive programme of reform was designed and implemented with vigour and
pursued in earnest, so as to put the economy on the path of recovery and revival.” 332
Macroeconomic stability was fostered through growth in export and resurgence in
workers remittance by the efforts to minimise hundi and the impact of 9/11 together
contributed towards the resurgence. 333 External debt burden was reduced in absolute
terms from $38 to $35 billion (from 62.5% to 46% as portion of GDP). Risk of default
331
Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 182. Announced on 15 December 1999.
332
Ishrat Husain, ‘The Role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy’, Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1
(2009): 1.
333
Hundi is the local name for informal banking which is used by the workers abroad to transfer the
money to their homes where banking services are not available or even if available for reason of
convenience. The operators of hundi make profit on the difference between the interbank transfer rates
thereby depriving the government from the much needed foreign currency. 390 Husain, “Pakistan’s
Growth Experience,” 15.
186
was mitigated and country’s capability to service its restructured debt was considerably
improved.390
Central to structural reforms was deregulation of the economy. To encourage
investment, foreign exchange regime was liberalised. Foreign Portfolio Investors were
enabled to enter and exit market without restrictions. Karachi Stock Exchange
registered 15% increase during the period. Non-resident and residents were allowed to
maintain foreign currency accounts. Banking sector was opened to competition
resultantly the banking sector was able to increase the market share by 60%. Tax
reforms aimed at broadening the tax base, bringing in evaders under the tax net,
minimising personal interaction between the tax payer and tax collector, eliminating
multiplicity of taxes and ultimately reducing the tax rate over time. The Federal Board
of Revenue (FBR) was restructured to improve tax administration including taxpayer
facilitation but at the lower level the business community remained dissatisfied due to
attitudinal issues. 334
Gen Musharraf’s government focused on promoting good governance. Transparency,
consistency, predictability and rule based decision making was emphasised.
Discretionary powers were minimised and the freedom of press, devolution of power
and accountability process impacted positively on the overall economic governance.
The Agriculture Development Bank (ADB) in its review for performance of Pakistan’s
economy concludes; the economy’s overall performance improved significantly in
fiscal year (FY) 2003. The GDP growth rate is estimated at 5.1% compared with 3.4%
in FY2002. The higher growth was made possible by strong performance in all sectors
of the economy i.e. 4.1% growth in agriculture, 5.4% in industry, 7.7% in
334
Ibid., 11.
187
manufacturing, and 5.3% in services. Supported by the sharp fall in interest rates, total
investment increased to 15.5% of GDP in FY2003, and the fiscal deficit declined to
4.6% of GDP. For the first 9 months of FY2003, inflation declined to 3.3%, exports and
imports increased by 16.6% and 21.9% respectively and workers’ remittances increased
to $3.1 billion from $1.5 billion during the same period. As a result, the current account
surplus, excluding official transfers, increased to $2.6 billion compared with $1.0
billion during the same period. The foreign exchange reserves with SBP, at
$9.3 billion on 31 May 2003, have increased to 8 months of imports. 335
The overall economic picture displayed all round signs of positivity when compared
with the performance of two Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments and the difficulties
Pakistan had plunged into after the mishandling of economy after nuclear tests and
given that the sanctions were still by and large in place.
On the negative side, despite the fact that poverty reduction was the stated fourth
objective yet incidence of poverty remained high. It stood at 30% in 1999 and jumped
to nearly 32% in 2001.336 Similarly, unemployment jumped from 6% to 8%. Comparing
with similar low income countries in the education sector, Pakistan has 20% fewer boys
and 40% fewer girls going to elementary school and infant mortality rate stood at 84
per thousand which was astonishing. The report identified extreme political volatility
(ten governments changed from 1990-2003), economic cost of conflict with India,
power of feudal, the problem of ethnic, religious and other divisions. Resultantly in
2003-2004, the government planned to spend merely 0.5% and 1.8% of GDP on health
and education. Development expenditure fell from 6.4% of GDP in 1999 to 3% in 2003.
335
Asian Development Bank, ADB Annual Report 2003 (Asian Development Bank, 2004), 71.
336
Nancy Birdsall, Adeel Malik, and Milan Vaishnav, “Poverty and the Social Sectors: The World Bank
in Pakistan 1990-2003.,” World Bank’s Operations Evaluation, 2005, 19.
188
The table 4.2 indicates the change in key macroeconomic indicators is on the next
page.337
Table 4.2: Changes in Key Macroeconomic Indicators October 1999 to

September 2003
1999 2003 Change in

indicator
GDP growth rate 4.2% 5.3% Positive
Inflation 5.7% 3.3% Positive
Fiscal Deficit/GDP -6.1% -4.0% Positive
Current account/GDP -3.2% +5.0% Positive
Domestic Debt/GDP 52.0% 43.4% Positive
External Debt $ 38 billion $ 35 billion Positive
Remittances $ 88 million per month $ 300 million per Positive
month
Exports $ 7.8 billion $ 12 billion Positive
Tax Revenues Rs 391 billion Rs 510 billion Positive
Rupee-Dollar Parity Depreciating Appreciating Positive
Foreign Direct Investment $ 472 million $ 500 million Positive
Foreign Exchange Reserves $1.6 billion $ 12.0 billion Positive
Poverty Incidence 33% Data not available but Negative
perhaps rising
Poverty related expenditure Rs 133 billion Rs 161 billion Positive
Unemployment 6% 8% Negative
During this period, defence budget was also curtailed which negates the institutional
interest hypothesis. Some scholars (Jalal, Nordingler, Chitram Singh) identify the
institutional interests as a reason and motivation for military takeovers in which
protection of the defence budget figures out prominently. Conversely, Gen Musharraf
endeavoured to bring down the defence expenditure which in early 1990s stood at 7%
of GDP was brought down to 3.8% of GDP in 2003. 338 The slide was even steeper as
portion of government revenue and total expenditure as indicated in the following table.
337
Husain, “Pakistan’s Growth Experience,” 13. All indicators in Column 1 pertain to 1998-99 or October
1999. All indicators in Column 2 pertain to 2003-04 or end September 2003.
338
Ahmed Rizwan Raheem, Parmar Vishnu, and Meenai Yaseen Ahmed, “Comparison of Key Economic
Indicators of Pakistani Economy: Democratic Governments (FY89-FY99) with Military Regime
(FY00FY05),” Research Journal of Recent Sciences 3, no. 6 (June 2014): 47.
189
Table 4.3: Defence Expenditure as % of GDP
Year % of GDP % of Revenue % of Expenditure
1990-91 6.9 39.4 24.8
1991-96 5.6 32.5 23.1
2000-2001 4.0 23.7 18.3
2003-2004 3.8 22.7* 19.5*
*increase due to the expenditure incurred on logistical support provided to U.S troops
4.6.1 Local Government
Governance and structural reform agenda point “putting the system right” emphasised
on devolution of power to grass roots level. NRB under Lt Gen Naqvi was tasked to
formulate a devolution plan which aimed at empowering people at the grass root level
and transferring power to the masses. It intended to lay foundations for an enduring
democracy. The plan was unveiled on 23 March 2000, disclosed to public for discussion
on 14 August 2000 and the new system of local governments under Local Governments
Ordinance (LGO) 2001 were installed one year later on 14 August 2001.
The local government comprised a three tiered structure, the district (zila) government,
the tehsil (sub district) government and the union administration. The district
government comprised Zila Nazim (district administrator) and district administration
with district offices including sub offices at tehsil level. The erstwhile office of deputy
commissioner was restructured as district coordination officer (DCO) who was to be
appointed by the provincial governments.
The zila nazim was responsible to the people through the elected members of the zila
Council. It had its secretariat under the niab (deputy) zila nazim with a separate budget
allocation. Adequate checks and balances were incorporated in the system. Seats were
reserved for women, peasants, workers and minority. The second tier comprised the
tehsil administration and was headed by the tehsil nazim, tehsil municipal officer, tehsil
officers and other officers of local council services and those posted to the tehsil
municipal administration were entrusted with functions of administration, finances and
190
management of offices of local and rural development and other subjects at the lower
level. The third tier was that of union council, which was a corporate body covering the
urban and rural areas. It consisted of the union nazim, his deputy and three union
secretaries’ along with supporting staff.
The elections were held on non-party basis in five phases for members of union
councils, union nazims and naib nazims. After these direct elections, indirect elections
were held for nazims and their deputies at zila and tehsil levels. The minimum age of
local government election was reduced from 21 years to 18 years and one third of the
seats were reserved for women. In 2002, the local governments were allocated a budget
of Rs 32 billion and they were also allowed to raise their own revenues.
The British introduced local government system in India (1843 Sindh and 1849 Punjab)
not by building on the native system of village based panchayat (council of elders) but
by constructing a district system to co-opt the local elite for extending their
nonrepresentative rule to grass root level. Later with introduction of representative
governments in centre and provinces, the focus of nationalist parties shifted away from
the local governments to these upper bodies where greater political power lay and
progressively local governments became dormant in areas that later constituted
Pakistan.339
The first push for setting up local governments came during martial law of Gen Ayub
through Basis Democracies (BD) Ordinance 1959 and The Municipal Administration
Ordinance 1960. They segregated the rural from urban areas and envisaged a four tiered
system with union councils in rural and town and union committees in the urban areas
as the lowest tier. The next tier in rural areas was represented by the thanas (police
339
Ali Cheema, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Adnan Qadir, “Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context,
Content and Causes,” Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative
Perspective, 2006, 410.
191
stations)/ tehsil councils and municipal/ cantonment boards in urban areas. The
subsequent two tiers were identical for rural and urban at the district and division
councils. Members to the lowest tier were elected while others comprised a mix of
elected and nominated with bureaucracy enjoying overarching powers. 340 The system
perceived as an exit strategy for the military actually resulted in constructing a
presidential system of governance but owing to its close association with military, the
system lost credence after the general elections of 1970.
Gen Zia replicated the local government system of Gen Ayub by promulgating Local
Government Ordinance (1979) through which local bodies was elected in all four
provinces in 1979 and 1980. In a significant departure, it abolished the role of
bureaucracy and stipulated that members including chairmen of all four tiers be elected
through adult franchise on non-party basis. The system however, continued with the
rural–urban divide and financial functions as constructed during BD system. However
due to changes in demographic and economic features of the country, the urban areas
enjoyed a significant financial advantage over rural areas limiting latter’s capacity to
deliver common good. Later, when the elections to provincial and federal governments
were conducted in 1985 on non-party basis, the representatives of local government
found avenues to these assemblies, transporting the culture of local body politic to these
legislative bodies.
Gen Musharraf’s devolution plan although consistent with the previous features was
implemented in the absence of representative governments at federal and provincial
levels. It comprised significant departures from the past. First, related to closure of
340
Marco Mezzera, Safiya Aftab, and Sairah Yusuf, “Devolution Row: An Assessment Of Pakistan’s
2001 Local Government Ordinance,” Report for the Research project: “The ‘Political Economy ‘of
State-building–The Pakistan Case Study”, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, The Hague,
2010.
192
deputy commissioner office and making DCO (without magistracy and revenue
collection powers) answerable to the elected mayor. Second, devolution of services
previously arrogated to the district administration to local governments. Third is related
to creation of political linkages between provinces and local governments through
electoral reforms. These signalled a desire for greater devolution of functional and
financial powers as well loosening of the bureaucratic control. Some departments could
however not be entirely devolved due to cross district/ divisional spill over jurisdiction.
Education department as well as some budgetary heads of expenditure were retained at
provincial level.
Based on the experience accrued from the local governments functioning from 2001 to
2005, a series of amendments were introduced in the LGO accommodating preferences
of political parties but fundamentally opposed to the spirit of devolution. Provincial
governments once again regained control and power over the local governments.
It is observed that the military when in power prefers to promote local governments as
opposed to the political elite’s preference for a strong centre and the provinces
administered through mixed administrative structures. What is the underlying reason
between the difference in approaches and what is the remedy? It is perceived that the
military pursuing divide and rule policy employs local government for gaining
widespread legitimacy and weakening civil institutions and political elite. The exercise
losses focus when more representative governments are installed in the centre and
provinces. Contrarily, the political elite in absence of devolution of power to provinces
prefer arrogation of power at centre and in the provinces for retaining political authority
and manoeuvring conditions to enhance the possibilities of their re-election.341 The 1973
341
Junaid Qaiser, ‘Pakistan: Main Challenges and Constraints in Local Govt’, LUBP, 1 August 2013,
https://lubpak.com/archives/279693. He concludes, political parties don’t believe in decentralisation /
local democracy, their mind set is over-centralised, there is no constitutional and legal recognition for
local democracy, economic constraints and lack of infrastructure and bureaucratic hurdles, grant of
193
Constitution envisages Pakistan a two tiered governance state, leaving institution of
local government to the provinces. 342343 In the absence of specific constitutional
provisions, the provinces tend to employ a local administration system which
maximises their powers. The financially endowed political elite use the facade of
elections to get elected in whatever ways they can and then employ the state’s financial
collection and distributive powers to indulge in personal expansion at the cost of general
masses. Local government does not suit the entrenched political elite. They oppose such
governance systems and undo it at the first opportunity. Gen Musharraf perceived a
financially and functionally empowered local government as a political game changer
which would transform the formal democracy into a more participatory democracy. If
allowed to develop roots, it would lay foundations of sustainable democracy thereby
changing the political landscape of the country.
Research report prepared to assess the comparative performance of the local
governments across 19 districts of Pakistan yielded certain significant findings. Larkana
achieved highest score and Nawabshah the lowest. The elected representatives felt that
the honorarium given to them was satisfactory, women participation was sub optimal
and the number of bye-laws passed was mixed. Score on number of sub committees
formed was encouraging, Faisalabad and Sanghar produced best district reports and the
relations with lower tiers ranged from average to good while determination on internal
audit was satisfactory. More training for elected representatives need for greater
democracy throughout the country, budget formation and the monitoring system
emerged as major weaknesses.400
development funds to MNAs and MPAs and Senators undermine the role of local governments, lack of
public participation and growing urbanisation impede democracy. However he concludes that local
government is the basic pre-requisite for effective democracy.
342
The provisions for the local government were inserted vide Eighteenth Amendment dated 20 th April
343
[Article 140A – (1) Each province, shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve
194
political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the
local governments. (2) Elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission of
Pakistan]. Since 2009 two democratic governments have been in power till date and each has shied away
from holding elections to local governments and are now appear to be acting only after the intervention
of Supreme Court.
400
Syed Mohammad Ali, ‘Ranking Local Government Performance in Pakistan through Scorecards’
(Lahore: South Asia Partnership - Pakistan, 2007).
4.6.2 Accountability
Ensure swift and across the board accountability was the seventh policy objective. The
incidence of corruption in public sector is generally attributed to the ruling elite which
comprise feudal class, industrial clique, incumbent bureaucrats and some military
persons involved in politics. Corruption has social, legal and impact dimensions.
Tracing the history of the legal dimensions, first time the term corruption was included
in Penal Code of 1860 which after the independence was adopted by Pakistan. Although
it did not use the word corruption and bribery but “allurement to unduly influence or
corrupt the conduct of a person were deemed illegal” was seen as criminal activity. 344
With passage of time, terms like allurement etc. were considered inadequate and on 11
March 1947 Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was passed. It introduced the offence
of “criminal misconduct” and expanded the scope of the term corruption to include
bribery, illegal gratification, obtaining anything of value dishonestly, fraudulently
misappropriating. It implied that even before creation of Pakistan, corruption had
become considerably nuanced and widespread. Quaid e Azam in his 11 August speech
to the Constitution Assembly called it a curse and urged the members to deal it with an
iron hand.
344
Penal Code of 1860.
195
The West Pakistan Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) Ordinance of September
1961 and Federal Investigation Act of 1974 consolidated the offences punishable as
corruption. The Martial Law order No 7 of 1977, later amended in 1978 elaborately
defined corruption and deemed that all such cases be tried by the military courts. The
Ehtisab Ordinance of 1997 promulgated on 1 February 1997 during the second tenure
of Nawaz Sharif spread the net wide to include holders of public office in its ambit and
expanded the scope of the term to include rigging in elections. 345 After the military
takeover, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance 1999 was promulgated and
the NAB was set up to eradicate corrupt practices from the society. In this ordinance,
the first five clauses were same as the Ehtisab Ordinance and four more clauses were
added.
NAB started functioning as Pakistan’s apex anti-corruption organisation and was
charged with the task of elimination of corruption through a holistic approach of
awareness, prevention and enforcement. In the initial three years, it focused on
detection, investigation and prosecution of white collar crime.
Transparency International’s system country study report formulated for Pakistan in
2003 elaborates the process followed to energise accountability and stem corruption. 346
NAB was set up as an anti-corruption agency, it formulated a National Anti Corruption
Strategy in 2001 which envisaged:
• Undertake a review and assessment of the causes, nature extent and impact of
corruption from a broad perspective,
345
The use of this act as a political instrument by the Ehitasab Cell during second tenure of Nawaz Sharif
has been discussed at length in previous chapter two.
346
Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, ‘National Integrity Systems: Transparency International Country
Study Report - Pakistan 2003’ (Berlin: Transparency International, 2003).
196
• Develop a broad based high level and integrated strategic framework for
tackling corruption, focusing on prevention as well as monitoring and
combating corruption, ensuring consistency with good governance reforms,
• Create an implementation plan based on strategic framework to tackle
corruption,
• Create a broad coalition of stakeholders committed to implementing the strategy
and rooting out corruption.
NAB organised an international workshop to seek views and proposals from different
segments of the society and obtain recommendations from Transparency International
and fifty plus other stake holders. It prepared a post conference report which was
approved by Cabinet of Ministers on 5 October 2002. The short run objective of the
strategy was to set into motion systemic improvements that will strengthen the national
integrity system. Long run objective was to eliminate corruption by engaging all
stakeholders. It was divided into two main phases; diagnostic and strategy development
and implementation of action plan developed from the strategy.
NAB was considerably successful which could be attributed to the 800 plus staff of
technical, financial and administrative personnel, its relative autonomy and access to
the President and later to the Prime Minister.
The process of construction of democracy in Pakistan has been turbulent, impacted by
political and military forces. Pakistan “was conceived as a progressive, democratic
welfare state for the tormented Muslim masses of the sub-continent, with not the
slightest touch of theocracy.”347 But in reality, the rule by the people for the people was
347
Dr. Arshad Rizvi, The Political System Of Pakistan: A Constitutional Study (Karachi: Paramount
Books, 2014), 314. 405Ibid., 315
197
not allowed to take root, the meaning of progressive nature was lost due to absence of
participatory democracy and the same happened to the objective of welfare state. 405
After the early demise of founding fathers, the political elite emanating from areas
which became Pakistan (mostly comprised colonial era constructed feudal class) have
repeatedly exploited the facade of democracy to expand their personal and political
space and fill their coffers instead of delivering common good. Military interventions
to undo the doings of political elite only aggravated the problems and consequently a
democracy characterised by free and fair elections, predominance of rule of law, public
accountability with focus on good governance has since remained elusive.
Unfortunately the polity in Pakistan has not been able to find the right balance between
executive and state institutions. Once in power the executive work to secure their rule
by removing challenges irrespective form where they arise. They either co-opt judiciary
by appointing judges to superior courts on political basis and when that is not possible
they orchestrate change through political and if required by physical means: so much
for rule of law in democratic Pakistan. The bureaucracy prior to the partition provided
flesh and blood to the iron structure of colonial sub-continent still continues to do so in
India. In Pakistan the bureaucracy initially tried to govern on their own, when military
took control it co-opted with them and since their successful subordination by Bhutto
now political elite strives to have the thanaydar (police station in-charge) and deputy
commissioner their own choice to conserve their fiefdoms.
Yet continuation of democracy irrespective of its quality is semantically a cherished
objective. Consequently whenever there is a disruption in form of military takeovers it
is resisted at home and abroad, the erring country is isolated with the hope to return it
to democracy sooner than later. The democratic government of Pakistan was isolated
after the nuclear tests of May 1999. US had imposed sanctions conveniently obscuring
198
the close cooperation between the two in the fight against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. The isolation was reinforced after the military takeover, Commonwealth
suspended Pakistan’s membership and major powers regretted military takeover urging
early return to democracy. Gen Musharraf recognising the challenge visited nineteen
countries in first sixteen months after the takeover to dilute its effects and succeeded to
a certain degree.
The judgement of Supreme Court dated 12 May 2000 legitimising Gen Musharraf’s
takeover acted as a dampener making his regime acceptable. Supreme Court’s order to
restore democracy after three years from the date of takeover satisfied domestic and
external audience. It was expected that the military interruption has a time limit which
will be respected. Promulgation of LGO 2001 followed by elections and setting up of
the local governments in 2002 reinforced these expectations. A large number of
established political elite participated in these elections not wanting the field left to new
entrants and also be in a position to influence the projected general elections of 2002.
4.7 Exogenous Challenges
Because of nuclear explosions and the military coup, Pakistan was internationally
isolated to certain extent. Externally, the strongest challenge to keep Pakistan isolated
came from India. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government, which had returned to
power courtesy in the aftermath of Kargil conflict, pursued this policy actively. It
emphasised on denying dialogue to Pakistan and accentuating its economic and political
difficulties. While many countries desired Pakistan’s early return to democracy, none
wanted Nawaz Sharif back, save India. 348
348
Except for Prime Minister of India, PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee at Durban Summit of Non Aligned
Movement at Durban stated that India still recognised Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. Reported in
Pakistan Chronology Vol VI (1997-2001), 93.
199
The analysis of India’s Pakistan policy under BJP led government merits evaluation. It
was observed that due to US diplomatic intervention in Kargil conflict had brought the
two countries closer, there is a strong likelihood that New Delhi decided to exploit these
new found relations. It exploited weaknesses of military government and the internal
fault lines and started projecting Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism which gained
intensity after the events of 9/11. The policy manifested in multiple arenas. Initially, it
focused on IHK, incidents of cross LoC firing multiplied and many resulted in killing
of innocent Kashmir’s. Indian Army Chief threatened that Indian Army will if required
cross LOC. In such circumstances, focus on dialogue for encouraging stability was lost.
Hijacking of Indian Airline airbus on 24 December 1999, its diversion to Lahore and
accusations that Pakistan was involved in it added weight to the propaganda. Another
dimension related to developments in Afghanistan where Indian support for the
Northern Alliance (NA) was relentless. 349 Gen Musharraf recognised that the relations
between these two countries were at the lowest ebb and Cohen feared that an accidental
war could occur. 350 The paradigm would change after Pakistan became a non NATO
ally in US war against terrorism but would be discussed later.
The second area related to continuing instability in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal.
Pakistan with little international support had endeavoured to reconcile mujahidin on
power sharing and bring stability to Afghanistan. It succeeded to a certain extent but
the instability and infighting accentuated after Rabbani violated Peshawar Accord and
extended his term of Presidency beyond 15 December 1994.351 The breach of trust led
349
Mohib Ullah Durani and Ashraf Khan, “Pakistan-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror,” The Dialogue 4,
no. 1 (2002): 45.
350
Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 129.
351
Peshawar Accord was signed on 25 April 1992 and Professor Rabbani will remain as the President of
the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for four (4) months.
He will commence his work officially at the time when the two months of the transfer of power will be
elapsed.
200
to rise of Taliban. They were supported by Pakistan with the hope to stabilise and unite
Afghanistan. India and Iran supported Northern Alliance which redrew conflict lines
between these two entities on sectarian and ethnic lines. The Taliban installed emirate
in Afghanistan and appointed Mulla Omar as the Amir (leader). In 1996, Osama moved
to Afghanistan, financially supported Taliban and enjoyed their hospitality. The style
of governance of Taliban and their protection of Osama Bin Laden soon became
significant international issue and reoriented U.S focus on the region. 352 To stabilise
Afghanistan, UN Security Council (UNSC) through their resolution number 1214 dated
9 December 1998 called for a cease fire and negotiations between the Taliban and NA.
A meeting was held form 10-14 March 1999 which ended in a fiasco. Later, UNSC
adopted Resolution Number 1267 dated 15 October 1999 asking Taliban to hand over
Osama bin Laden failing which economic sanctions were imposed on them on 14
November 1999 i.e. soon after the takeover by Gen Musharraf.
Pakistan’s Afghan policy before Gen Musharraf had emphasised on the need for
multiethnic broad based government in Kabul which remained unchanged under him.
Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar reiterated that there was no change in the Pakistan’s
Afghan policy and assured that Pakistan will continue to pursue the idea of an Afghan
Government in which all ethnic groups are represented and emphasised the same on
Taliban. Pakistan desired that Taliban should develop better relations with US and
arranged a meeting between the Taliban leadership and US under Secretary Thomas
Pickering in which both sides agreed to talk and understand each other’s position better.
Resultantly Taliban, to honour their commitment closed down number of training
352
The Tahreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban had emerged in 1994 around Kandhar and captured Kabul on 11
September 1996 and set up Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (although was not able to gain control of 27
out of 32 provinces by May 1997). It refused to endorse Durand Line as International border and since
then the relations remained uneasy.
201
camps, cracked down on narcotic trade and placed restrictions on movement of Osama
related Arab fighters in Afghanistan. 353
The events of 9/11 however, diametrically altered the international security
environment. On that unfortunate day, a group of hijackers hijacked four aircrafts and
crashed one each in the twin towers in New York, another in the Pentagon while a fourth
went down in Pennsylvania. The attacks were attributed to Al Qaida and Osama bin
Laden who was being sheltered in Afghanistan by Taliban. These developments had
grave political and security implications for Pakistan. Gen Musharraf noted that
“September 11 marked an irrevocable turn from the past into an unknown future.” 354
Pakistan was faced with a decidedly changed reality and had to rapidly make
adjustments in its foreign policy.
It was for the first time that homeland of US, the only super power was attacked. NATO
invoked its Article 5 (collective defence and response) to facilitate a response. 355
Accordingly, the matter was reported to UNSC and it adopted Resolution 1373 on 28
September 2001. The resolution condemned the attacks and Article 3 called upon all
states to:
“work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators of,
organisers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those
responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators,
organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held responsibly.” 356
353
Durani and Khan, “Pakistan-Afghan Relations,” 50.
354
355
The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), dated 4 April signed in Washington D.C. The Parties agree that an
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack them
all and consequently they all agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
other Parties, such as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.
356
UNSC Resolution Number 1373 dated 28 September 2001
202
The resolution placed acts of terrorism in the ambit of UN Chapter VII which authorises
use of force. The resolution did not authorise any specific military action but it was
apparent that US had decided to punish the perpetrators specifically Al Qaida in
Afghanistan. In such circumstances, Pakistan’s position as a neighbour of Afghanistan
which maintained strong linkages with Taliban would be critical and US wanted her to
be on its side. To ensure this, its leaders resorted to blatant coercion. Colin Powell rang
up Gen Musharraf and said “You are either with us or against us” and later as he was
too learn from DG ISI who was visiting US at that time Richard Armitage had gone
much further and said “not only that we had to decide whether we were with Americans
or with the terrorists, but if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be
bombed back to the stone age.” 357
The situation was akin to what Gen Zia had faced when Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. Gen Zia had taken over on 5 July 1977 and had to
make a foreign policy decision after nearly two and half years. Gen Musharraf had to
do so one month less than two years. In both situations, parliament was not in place and
the decisions had to be made without factoring in the public opinion. Gen Zia was not
threatened by any super power and had the luxury of time to consider pros and cons.
He chose to join US in its covert war against Soviet Union to expand his political space
and ensure continuity in power. What were Gen Musharraf’s considerations? Gen
Musharraf writes that he took the decision to join United States “based on wellbeing of
my people and the best interests of my country-Pakistan always comes first.” 416 He
argues that if Pakistan would not have joined US, it would have to face double jeopardy.
India would have joined the alliance and would then utilise the strategic advantage to
357
Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201. 416Ibid.,
202.
203
alter situation in Kashmir and put Pakistan under military pressure. Secondly, US would
treat Pakistan as an adversary and should it expand the zone of operation to include
Pak-Afghan border belt or Pakistan, then the country would have been devastated. Its
infrastructure would have been destroyed and its parity (owing to nuclear capability)
would be undermined. These are reasonable calculations but it meant jettisoning
Taliban in favour of US which was beneficial as it would help Pakistan eradicate
terrorism from its own soil with technical support from US. Pakistan will have to pay
the economic cost as front line state yet it would help in loosening stranglehold of debt
and lifting of economic sanction. Thirdly, it would help ending the international
isolation incurred due to the nuclear tests. 358 Gen Musharraf did not mention the
international obligation mandated under UNSC Resolution 1373 in support of his
decision. Although his considerations were logical and rationale yet he did not gauged
the sentiments of some segments of the society who had affiliation with the Taliban
owing to historical nature of Pashtun relations on both sides of Pak-Afghan border.
Pakistani’s in general, perceived US as an un-trustable ally due its role in 1971
IndoPakistan war and abandonment in Afghanistan after a decade of collaboration. Her
policies in Middle East for supporting Israel to the detriment of Palestinians and her
dubious role in Gulf War of 1990-91 provided the general background which had
shaped anti-US opinions in Pakistan. Interestingly, the public opinion in US about
Pakistan was also similar. “Prior to September 11, 2002, American policy towards
Pakistan was quite critical.... Pakistan was framed as a ‘foe’ before 9/11 and remained
a ‘foe’ after 9/11 even though it chose to support US.” 359
358
Ibid., 203.
359
Muhammad Ashraf Khan, “The Image of Pakistan in Prestigious American Newspaper Editorials: A
Test of the Media Conformity Theory,” Strategic Studies XXVIII, no. 2 & 3 (2008): 15. The author tests
the theory in case of Pakistan i.e. after 9/11 when US policy enlisted Pakistan as an ally, the domestic
public opinion should have according to the theory also changed. But it did not and Pakistan was
continued to be perceived as a foe.
204
Policy preferences which do not conform to public sentiments are not well received, are
resisted and lead to a discourse and efforts advocating change. The decision to support
US in view of the international and domestic considerations would not be a popular
decision and would generate strong domestic response from right-wing sections of the
society. Gen Musharraf accurately assessed that there would be adverse reaction from
right wing political parties and in NWFP. In Sindh specially Karachi and in Balochistan
the reaction would be neutral or lukewarm but he was not certain about Punjab and
thought that he will be able to convince the Punjabis. 360 Gen Musharraf addressed the
nation on 19 September, explaining the rationale and his expectations he said “they
[India] want Pakistan to be declared a terrorist state and thus damage our
Kashmir cause, I want to tell them to layoff”. 361
Simultaneously, the military planners in US were working on a military response. On
13 September, Armitage met Pakistani ambassador to United States, Maleeha Lodhi
and DG ISI, Gen Mahmud who was then visiting US and asked that Pakistan should
take seven steps. The same demands were presented by U.S. ambassador to Pakistan
Wendy Chamberlain to Gen Musharraf on 13 September. These include; 1) “stop al
Qaida operatives at its borders and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; 2) to give
the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and
intelligence operation; 3) to provide territorial access to US and allied military
intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda; 4) to provide
the United States with intelligence information; 5) to continue to publically condemn
the terrorist act; 6) to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from
going to Afghanistan; and, 7) if evidence implicated bin Laden and al Qaeda and
360
361
‘Text: Pakistan President Musharraf’, The Washington Post, 19 September 2001.
205
Taliban continued to harbour them, break relation with Taliban government.” 362
Constructed in the theory of state and elite approach to decision making, U.S. and
Pakistan present two contrasting models in which different processes were led to
different decisions.422 The consultative process followed in U.S. since 9/11 till 25
October started from a limited action against al Qaeda titled “game plan for a
politicalmilitary strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.” It expanded into a larger
objective of “defeating the terrorist threat to United States i.e. a global war against
terrorism” focused at “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our [U.S.] way of life” by
25 October. 363 It is not clear whether anybody in Pakistan was mindful of the changes
taking place in U.S. However in Pakistan, Gen Musharraf made the decision himself,
took it to the cabinet and then to the corps commanders meeting. At both places,
concerns and reservations were expressed. He addressed the nation on 18 September
and thereafter till 3 October he engaged a cross section of society to explain his decision
to the society. 364 Such are the perils of non-democratic governments that the burden of
the decision and the consequences rested on him. 365
Catharsis of the decision indicates that Pakistan had agreed to support U.S. military
action against Taliban and al Qaeda. Gen Musharraf expected that he will have to pay
political cost and expected recompense. 366 It also implied that Pakistan will abandon its
362
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 331; Musharraf, In the Line of
Fire, 204. Demands as listed in the Commission Report, however there are add on in what Gen Musharraf
has listed, probably to amplify the understanding to the common reader but the essence remains the same.
422
While it may be argued that in both cases the elite make the decision and the difference may not be in
kind but degree yet degree is important in politics.
363
The 9/11 Commission Report, 334.
364
365
Ibid., 207. Gen opines that some of the clauses of the demands were ludicrous and he did not accede
to all and curtailed the support to non-sensitive areas, yet the charge against him was that he crumbled
on a phone call.
366
The 9/11 Commission Report, 331. ‘Pakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us,
Musharraf said the GOP was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that we
would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he
needed to show that Pakistan was benefitting from his decisions.’
206
Afghan policy and support U.S. Afghan policy instead, what will be the new Afghan
policy was not discussed. The intermediary role which Pakistan attempted to play by
asking Taliban to accept U.S. demands and hand over Osama bin Laden did not succeed,
indicating limited residual influence Pakistan had on Taliban.
Operation “Infinite Justice” later renamed to “Enduring Freedom” comprised four
phases. In the first phase, forces were deployed to the region. The second phase
comprised air strikes and special operations attacks that would hit key al Qaeda and
Taliban targets, this phase began on 17 October 1999. In the third phase, decisive
operations using all elements of national power including ground troops would be
carried out by U.S. In this phase, Mazar-e-Sharif fell on 9 November, four days later
Kabul fell and by early December all major cities had fallen. Afghan forces (Northern
Alliance) supported by U.S. engaged Tora Bora cave complex in early December and
on 22 December, Hamid Karazai was installed as the chairman of Afghanistan’s interim
administration. The largest military engagement took place in March 2002 in Shah-iKot
area south of Gardez in which al Qaeda forces were decimated. The fourth phase
comprised the security and stability operations which continued till 2003. 367 368
4.8 Civil Military Relation during Musharraf Regime
In the first two years of Musharraf regime, Gen Musharraf remained quiet popular and
non-controversial. At the start of 2002, he had two options available. First, to work for
optimising of EC and NAAB and then hold free and fair elections in accordance to the
constitution as it stood on 12 October 1999 and transfer power to the elected
representatives by end of October 2002. He could have then negotiated an agreement
with the political parties for expos facto legalisation of his actions as Chief Executive.
367
Ibid., 337-338.
368
The 9/11 Commission Report p.337,338
207
This option had number of advantages. The foremost that the military would have
returned the country to full fledge democracy in accordance with the judgment of
Supreme Court. The second option in consonance with Gen Zia’s rule would be that of
continuation of military rule with limited transfer of power to the elected representatives
while retaining military supremacy. Exercise of this option would have implied serving
the personal interest of Gen Musharraf who was now acting as political elite. The
second option was detrimental to return and consolidation of democracy as well as civil
military relations. Unfortunately, he chose to exercise the second option.
4.8.1 Prolongation of Military Rule
One of the research questions aimed at understanding the reasons why Gen Musharraf
did not return democracy to the country and hand over power. It can be argued that the
system of local governments despite its shortcomings was a genuine attempt to transfer
democracy to the grass roots level. After the local government reforms and the elections
the natural course in 2002 would have been to hold elections for national and provincial
assemblies in October and then let the elected representatives elect their own leader and
the president (option 1 as elaborated above). He could have made a mark in history by
holding free and fair elections and enabling the election commission to perpetually do
so to consolidate real democracy. However the manipulations witnessed in the elections
to local bodies did send out mixed signals about the intent to exercise option one. His
actions related to option two and their outcome on civil military relations is discussed
below.
4.8.2 Presidency, Referendum and Legal Framework Order (LFO)
Earlier in 2001, in response to the question of status of Gen Musharraf during the
upcoming visit to India in July 2001, he, on 20 June 2001 promulgated Presidents
Succession Order 2001 and relived President Rafiq Tarar from his appointment. Gen
208
Musharraf assumed the office of President on June 2001 and became the President as
well as the Chief Executive. The events of 9 September 2001 provided an opportunity
to Gen Musharraf to prolong his rule in Pakistan. The US invasion of Afghanistan had
created a unique situation. While it challenged Pakistan in many ways sit also propelled
Pakistan in an alliance with US as a non-NATO ally. Gen Musharraf employed this
opportunity to his advantage. Having removed Taliban and decimated Al Qaida, US
installed Hamid Karzai in conjunction with Northern Alliance and shifted its focus to
Iraq. Gen Musharraf exploited the opportunity to validate his presidency and
continuation in power. It was announced on 8 April that a referendum would be
organised on 30 April 2002. The question he put to the electorate stated:
“For continuation of the system of local government, establishment of
democracy, continuation and stability of reforms, elimination of
sectarianism and extremism and attainment of the ideals of Quaid-
iAzam, do you want to make General Pervez Musharraf President for
next five years?”
Election Commission was assigned the responsibility to conduct the Referendum.
Unlike the practice no electoral lists were prepared and everyone was free to vote where
ever he or she wanted to vote. In the run up to the referendum Gen Musharraf made a
public spectacle when he went about campaigning in uniform. It embarrassed the
military and the polity alike. Reportedly, the turnout was low yet when Election
Commission announced the final result 71% of the electorate had voted and 97.5% gave
verdict in favour of Gen Musharraf.429
The exercise was a clear signal of Gen Musharraf’s intent to continue in power for next
five years i.e. up to 2007. The research has argued that political elite by their preferences
and decisions consolidate democracy. The same applied to Gen Musharraf, a military
209
leader who now had assumed a political office after the coup. He was popular, people
then expected that he would restore democracy as desired by Supreme Court and would
step down. He, contrary to the expectations followed a route already carved by Gen
Ayub and Zia and thus could not claim any morale ascendancy. The referendum was
429
Massoud Ansari, ‘How the Referendum Was Won’, Newsline, 15 May 2002.As per the 1998 census,
there were then 61.2 million people 18 years of age and above in the country, a number estimated to have
increased to 61.9 million at present. A total of 87,074 polling stations and 163,641 additional polling
booths were set up across the country and 414,356 public sector employees appointed to carry out
electoral duties on polling day. The entire country was designated one constituency and all citizens aged
18 and above were deemed eligible to vote by establishing their identity through any reasonable means.
“A total of 43,907,950 votes were polled, out of which 42,804,030 were in the affirmative, while the rest
– 833,676 – said ‘no’. These numbers translate into a 71 per cent voter turnout – the highest in the history
of Pakistan,” announced Chief Election Commissioner, Justice (Retd) Irshad Hasan Khan.
challenged in the Supreme Court. It was argued that the constitution lays down special
provisions for election of the president, referendum was not one of them and was
therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court declared that it was premature to judge
the consequences and left it to the future parliament to debate the matter. The role of
the honourable court was questionable as the short and detailed order differed. 369
The Economist noted that “normally, such a bogus attempt to win democratic support
would result in widespread howls of international protest, instead of just the muted
response it has provoked”. 370 The reason of course was the support of US and the west
due to his role in toppling the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan. In the country, major
political parties PPP and PML-N and many others from the civil society opposed the
referendum. The state was employed to gather support and silence those in opposition.
Undeniably, the referendum damaged Gen Musharraf’s and military’s credibility and
commenced the process of downslide in his popularity which continued thereafter.
369
370
‘Musharraf’s Referendum’, The Economist, 25 April 2002.
210
The process of perpetuating Gen Musharraf’s rule and limited transfer of power was
next orchestrated through promulgation of LFO 2002.371 Lt Gen Naqvi retired was given
the task to formulate the constitutional amendments. On 26 June 2002 NRB published
a 58 page documents titled “Establishment of Sustainable Democracy” in Pakistan. The
78 Amendments in 29 Articles looked at ways for promoting sustainable democracy
and strengthening institutions. 372 These amendments were premised on the conception
that the balance of power was lacking in 1973 Constitution which actually allowed
prime minister to arrogate too much power as witnessed during the second term of
Nawaz Sharif in office. These amendments were actually designed to legalise Gen
Musharraf’s presidency for next five years, the elections of 2002 and the divide powers
between president and the prime minister. The amendments accorded the president and
the governors appointed by him the powers to dissolve the federal and provincial
government as well critical appointments like CJCSC and service chiefs, chief justice
etc. It also confers constitutional status to the local governments and constitutes NSC.
In the aggregate, the constitutional engineering in Gen Zia’s stead led to weakening the
parliamentary system, it also rewarded the judiciary for the favourable judgements. The
LFO was promulgated on 21 August 2002.Gen Musharraf had reversed the process of
political construction and democratisation to mid-1980’s firstly by the coup and then
more substantially by the LFO 2002.
4.8.3 General Elections 2002
The general election set for 10 October 2002, seemingly were scheduled to implement
the judgements of Supreme Court to return democracy to the country. All political
371
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 485-488. Detailed analysis of the LFO and its
effects.
372
Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 226. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the elections and its
outcome as well as the observable trends.
211
parties participated in the elections. Two notable factors, first formulation of Pakistan
Muslim League, Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) with Chaudhary brothers in lead and
comprising political elite who could be coerced due to their past misdeeds through NAB
and ISI. The second was formulation of electoral alliance of six religious parties titled
Mutihida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Thirdly, the election commission posed a new
restriction of graduation degree to be the members of national and provincial
assemblies. 373 The results of 2002 elections are elucidated below:
Table 4.4: Results of 2002 Election

Parties National Punjab Sind NWFP Balochistan
PML-Q 78 128 10 07 10
PPP-P 62 63 51 08 02
MMA 45 07 15 47 13
IND 28 34 05 14 07
PML-N 14 37 - 05 -
MQM 13 - 31 - -
NA 12 12 10 - 04
PML-F 04 - 04 - -
ANP - - - 08 -
PPP-Sherpao 02 - - 09 -
Other 10 06 02 01 11
Total 268 287 128 99 47
During the elections, the voter turnout was 41.68 percent. The turnout manifests
consistent decline and apathy towards politics. 374 PML-Q won the maximum votes
mainly due to the effects of establishment.
373
Ibid., 115. The political parties argued that the requirement was against the principal of genuine public
representation and given the past history of Pakistan, a number of legislators who are not graduate, have
gained a lot of experience which will now be excluded. The new entrance could not be experienced in
electorate politics as well as legislative experience. Besides the country had poor literacy rate, with no
more than 3% of population holding graduation degree. While the government argued that the
requirement for holding government jobs is bachelor degree, so how the legislative could be any
different.
374
In 1970 elections, the voter turnout was 63.42% which declined to lowest (35.4) in 1997. It did pick
up approximately 6 percent in 2002. But during this time, the registered voters also increased 30.59%.
436
Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan, 156.
212
All the mainstream political parties participated in the elections. However they
“contributed to overall disillusionment by linking the fortunes of their parties with the
political destine of their leaders who were transformed into icons at the expense of party
programme”.436 In the pre-poll forecasting, a hung parliament with a weak prime
minister was predicted. The significant development as evident from the results was the
meteoric rise of MMA which won seats in NWFP and Balochistan and also a few seats
in Karachi and one in Punjab. This was attributed to a clear religious agenda – anti
Americanism (due to continuing presence of US and NATO in Afghanistan) and a
proTaliban attitude. PPP was wiped out in 1997 elections due to poor performance
managed to stage a comeback mainly as the Muslim League votes were divided between
PML-Q and PML-N. MQM which has boycotted the local government
elections also lost seats as it failed to generate the required momentum due to previous
boycott. However, ANP suffered the heaviest defeat as it could not win a single seat
in the National Assembly.
A large number of foreign agencies and domestic groups were engaged as observers
during the electioneering process. It was the largest monitoring exercise ever carried
out in the country. In their reports, 22 members group from 18 commonwealth countries
termed the polls as well organised and for the most part transparent. European Union
Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Pakistan using standard 7 point criteria for
judging electoral process found faults on several accounts and termed it seriously
flawed. It criticised the misuse of state resources in favour of political parties
particularly the PML-Q. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
observer group in its final report judged the elections positively. The two main stream
political parties PML-N and PPP-P in their election reports highlighted the instances of
213
irregularities and rigging. 375 Waseem observes that the “main complaint of foreign
observers focused on pre-election phase. Although they did express some reservations
on actual polling of votes, the same were generally regarded as relatively fair and
transparent. The political environment leading up to the elections, however, was far
from satisfactory”. He further observes that “the general context of 2002 elections can
be defined in terms of non-issues and non-politics, which was underlined by political
de-alignment in general”. 376
During the elections, role of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) under Chief
Election Commissioner, Irshad Hassan Khan was also criticised. He was the one who
previously as chief justice has validated the takeover of Gen Musharraf. ECP failed to
fully implement the code of conduct issued for electronic media issued on 8 Aug 2002
which resulted in bias coverage of PML-Q. It also failed to check the influence of
District Nazims and state bureaucracy. By reducing the electioneering period from 90
to 40 days, major political parties which were banned after the military takeover in 1999
suffered setback as they did not had enough time for popular mobilisation.
Another significant aspect relating to women participation in national and provincial
assemblies favoured Gen Musharraf. In 2002 elections, the reserved seats for women
were restored and its ratio was increased to 26 percent. The total number of women
parliamentarian was now 74 out of the 342 house. It signalled attitudinal and structural
change in largely patriarchal society.
Despite all the governmental efforts, the two pro Musharraf parties, PML-Q and
National Alliance (NA) could not secure majority and had to be helped by compelling
independents and creating a forward block comprising ten members within PPP-P
375
Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan, 192-195.
376
Ibid., 196
214
called patriots. On 24 November 2002, Zafar Ullah Jamali from Balochistan was elected
as Prime Minister. He secured 172 votes in a house of 342 members. The division
between PPP and MMA, as each fielded its own candidate, helped his election.
However, he remained ineffective during his term, accepting the military pre-eminence
in the governance.
4.8.4 Legitimising Powers through Seventeenth Amendment
In the scheme of things, the next logical step for Gen Musharraf was to get the
provisions of LFO incorporated in the constitution through an amendment approved by
the newly elected National Assembly and Senate to consolidate his hold of powers as
President. The role of political parties and elected representatives and their efforts for
restoration of full democracy derailed Gen Musharraf’s plans. Firstly, they desired to
take oath under the 1973 Constitution as it stood on 12 October 1999 refusing to accept
the LFO. This resulted in delay of 36 days for convening the first session of National
Assembly and consequent delay (till February 2003) in senate elections scheduled on
12 November 2002. The strong resistance from the opposition in the parliament led to
a dialogue with the government in May 2003 but did not yield any result. The process
of negotiations continued and during the entire year, no serious business could take
place in the parliament. On 24 December, PML-Q and MMA signed an agreement for
package on constitutional amendment. The significant provisions of the seven point
package included deletion of NSC and subjecting presidential powers of dissolution of
national and provincial assemblies to Supreme Court review. Gen Musharraf was
required to take a vote from national and provincial assemblies and he would give up
the power by 31 December 2004. A sunset clause of six years for local government,
removal of three years extension in retirement of judges of superior courts and the
215
requirement of non-binding consultation for appointment of service chiefs was also part
of the package.
Consequently, a constitutional bill was tabled on 26 December 2003 in National
Assembly. But once again, a dispute rose on the difference of wordings of bill and the
agreement with MMA. The reworded bill as seventeenth amendment was finally passed
on 29 December in which 248 out of 342 voted in favour. It was passed by Senate on
30 December 2003. Hamid Khan notes that LFO had amended/ added 29 articles in the
constitution out of which 20 were left untouched by seventeenth amendment. Only the
provisions of 9 articles were amended by the seventeenth amendment. Although “LFO
was never submitted before the parliament and seventeenth amendment bill only
contained amendments which were being made to the constitution under the assumption
that LFO had become part of the constitution”. 377 This allowed Gen Musharraf to
consolidate his powers.
As elucidated earlier, Gen Musharraf exercised option two to consolidate his hold on
power. After general election of 2002, it took him one year to do so i.e. by end of
December 2003. Yet in the final outcome, the contest between civil and military, the
military in power and having state intuitions at its disposal finally prevailed to inverse
the framework from civilian to military supremacy. The political leaders and
representatives initially presented a joint opposition. If they would have continue to do
so then there was likelihood that seventeenth amendment and by implication LFO
would not have been passed by the house. This would have resulted in departure of Gen
Musharraf and restoration of full democracy.
377
Hamid Khan 492.
216
4.8.5 Civil Military Integration
Like his predecessors, Gen Musharraf’s perception that military is an integral part of
the civil society remains strong. In order to keep them out of the politics he had
suggested “to bring them in”. During his regime, he employed various mechanisms to
integrate military into governance. Firstly, through formulation of NSC; secondly, by
incorporating military for monitoring the performance of technocrats and local
government at multiple levels; thirdly by appointing military officers in important
civilian institutions thereby extending military’s influence in executive and political
domain. While as expected, after the elections and return to partial democracy, the
military’s role for monitoring would terminate, it is the reaming two which merit
consideration. History is indicative that military officers’ secondment to civil
appointments is time bound and reduces proportionately with the return to full
democracy.
However, the formulation of NSC was hotly contested by the civilian political elite.
They consider NSC as an encroachment in the democratic framework and the powers
of Prime Minister and hence resisted its inclusion in seventeenth amendment.
Contingent upon the security situation, NSC as a consultative and decision making body
is instituted and practiced in many developed and developing countries. In Pakistan,
this role of NSC is contested. As a consultative body it would be acceptable and fit into
Janowitisian paradigm of integration for formulating security policies while remaining
in the framework of democracy.440 Interestingly, National Command Authority (NCA)
with a similar composition as NSC exists as a decision making body. In a democratic
framework, civilian supremacy is normative and existence of such arrangements like
NSC and NCA are part of political system but not as constitutional bodies. In Pakistan,
formulation of national security architecture is yet in its formative stage and opens to
217
assessment. Military’s integration into formulation and execution of security policies
has to be in accordance with the aforementioned framework and political culture.
4.9 Summation
In this chapter, Finer’s theoretical framework for formation of military government
coopted with technical expertise from the civil society was employed for analysis of
Gen Musharraf’s regime from 1999 to 2003. It was observed that in first two years, the
regime despite political, financial and societal challenges was able to deliver favourable
outcomes and Gen Musharraf remained popular up till 2002. However, as hypothesised
in the research that consolidation of democracy or otherwise rests on preferences and
decisions of political elite. Gen Musharraf acting as the primary political elite took
decisions to prolong his regime, based on his personal interest contrary to the judgement
of Supreme Court. It was not only detrimental to democracy but also subverted the civil
440
1973 constitution formulated DCC, which is also a kind of consultative body for defence issues.
military relations. In the struggle between civil and military to impose its preference on
each other after 2002, Gen Musharraf ultimately succeeded in amending the
constitution to distribute powers between President and Prime Minister. He
consolidated his hold on power and reversed the normative civil military relations
paradigm to one of military domination over the civil.
The formulation of quasi-military regime resulting from 2002 elections adds to Finer’s
classification and substantiates the options available to military after intervening in
politics. Finer pointed out four types of military intervention but the case of Pakistan
presented another type of military intervention i.e. quasi-military regime. The same
quasi-military regime was witnessed during Gen Zia and Gen Musharraf’s era. The
concept of quasi-military regime surfaces when the military tries to prolong its regime
and also opts to share limited powers with the civilians. The personal interest behind
218
prolongation of military regime resulting into quasi-military regime is a theoretical
addition to Finer’s explanation by this research.
CHAPTER 5
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS:
A SURVEY
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and everything that counts
can be counted”
Albert Einstein
5.1 Prelude
This research contextualises civil-military relations in democratic framework and
politics of Pakistan. In this regard, the study hypothesised that amongst various
approaches to consolidate democracy, transition approach is the most significant. The
approach emphases that political elite are primary agency, who by their preferences,
actions and inactions consolidate or impede process of democratisation. It focused on
the process of political reconstruction and democratisation from 1989 to 1999 and
confirmed that while the military favoured the continuation of process of democratic
consolidation, the political elite regularly created situations of political deadlock. They
then provided opportunity to or themselves involved military for arbitration. During the
period under review, the military did engage itself in arbitration but refrained from
directly taking over the country, preferring continuation of democratic process instead.
During the second term of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif however, certain decisions by
political and military elite led to premature removal of COAS, Gen Musharraf. The
affront was perceived by the military as a political coup to which it responded with a
military coup. The resultant takeover and military rule lasted till 2007. However, Gen
Musharraf did not return the country to democracy in 2002 in accordance with the
219
judgement of the Supreme Court. Reaffirming the proposition that military elite which
had replaced the political elite, acting in self-interest impeded the process of
democratisation, substantiating the hypothesis.
To gauge the public opinion on the contested subject of democratic consolidation and
civil military relations, a survey was conducted. The data in this chapter represents
perceptions and behaviour of respondents on the important issue of role of political and
military elite in consolidation of democracy or otherwise. Their decision leading to
military’s involvement in politics and arbitration, reasons for military takeover and their
governance.
5.2 Survey and its Interface with the Research
In the previous chapters, this research provides a link between the theoretical construct
of civil military relations and its practical manifestation in Pakistan. In chapters 2, 3
and 4, the hypothesis of the study has been validated. To understand the societal
perspective, an independent survey was conducted to examine the public opinion on
civil military relations.
5.2.1 Identification of Variables
To ascertain the attitude of the variety of respondents (societal view), irrespective of the
findings of the research (theoretical proposition), a broad based structured questionnaire
comprising sixteen multiple choice and one open ended question was formulated.
Provocative and loaded questions were avoided but instead the questions were
formulated in a manner that the desirable response could be extracted. The open ended
question focused on bringing out respondent opinion based i.e. augment qualitative
method of research. The multiple choice questions were graded into five shades of
response. The questions were formulated with structural and attitudinal perspectives but
were distributed randomly in the questionnaire in order to solicit variety in response. In
220
both cases, the independent variable i.e. criticality of the preferences of political elite
for consolidation of democracy and dependent variable of attitude of military were
targeted. The key questions are enumerated below:
• Q5: The military is forced to intervene in politics because of inaptitude of the
civilian politicians and public pressure.
• Q7: Politicians themselves precipitate military takeovers.
• Q10: The military (in power) provides better administration, improves security
and economic situation and living standards of common people.
• Q11: The civilian leaders are unfamiliar with mechanisms of democratic
civilian control of the armed forces.
• Q14: The civil and military need to work in close harmony and develop strong
trust and confidence for consolidating democracy.
Questions 5 and 7 in the main and questions 1, 2, 3 and 9 as supplementary wer e
designed to reflect attitude and expectations of civil society from the larger independent
variable of political elite. These questions also gauge the relationship with the
dependent variable of the military to identify reasons of military intervention and
takeover. Question 10 in the main and questions 4, 6 and 16 as supplementary cover
structural, organisational and attitudinal aspects of the respondents towards the
dependent variable of military. Questions 11 and 14 relate to the current and future
dimensions of civil military relations. Questions 8, 12, 13 and 15 are secondary
questions to tease out solution to the complex problem of civilian control over the
military and security of the country from respondents. The supplementary questions are
structured in a manner to draw independent responses on the issues in order to add depth
to the understanding on the subject.
221
Question 17 was however open ended. It aimed to extract comments and remarks about
the role of political and military elite in the country. The open ended question is
considered important as it provided opportunity to respondent to independently express
opinion on the subject, irrespective of the questions posed. Understandably, the opinion
could substantiate response to the closed questions, it could either contradict or bring
out new ideas on the subject.
“The one who asks questions doesn’t lose his way”
African Proverb
In summary, the questions are clustered in areas of democracy and military intervention,
civil military relations, and military regimes. The questionnaire is provided at Appendix
A.
5.2.2 Survey Population and Sample
Civil military relation is a technical and complex subject. It pre-requisites understanding
of democracy, governance, comparative political systems etc. and practices prevalent
in the world. It also requires experience and exposure of the civil military interface in
practical term i.e. in terms of knowledge which moves beyond the theoretical
understanding and relates to the practical aspects related to the problem. It is expected
that various age groups would have a different expectations and perspectives. Keeping
in view these factors, a typical respondent emerges as a person who is educated, has
good knowledge base and is exposed to the subject. Variety in professional background,
gender, age and education would enable the research to benefit from a profound societal
perspective.
Unfortunately, there has been no census in Pakistan since 1998 and the exact figures
about the demography of the country are projections. According to Ministry of
Education in 2013, the literacy rate in Pakistan stood at 49 percent and 1,349,000
222
persons had post-secondary qualification. Therefore, the total population for this survey
is 1,349,000, however names and professions of this body of people are not available.
Keeping in view the limitations, four clusters of professions i.e. military officers, civil
officers, academia and civil society were purposively developed. An equal number of
questionnaires were sent to the each cluster. It is worth mentioning that the latter three
clusters represent the civilian population of the country. A total of 300 questionnaires
were distributed as under:
Table 5.1: Distribution of Questionnaire
Distribution of Questionnaires
Category Number Percent
Military Officer 75 25
Civil Officer 75 25
Academia 75 25
Civil society 75 25
Total 300 100
5.3 Characteristics of the Sample
Having determined the parameters and limitations of the population, the respondents
categorised as opinion makers were sampled from National Defence University for the
category of military and some civil officer. For academia, respondents were chosen
from a variety of universities in Islamabad. The participants from civil society in
workshops and seminars organised in Islamabad over a period of time were approached
for voluntary participation in the survey. To ensure that the respondent can reply
conveniently, questionnaire in print and via e mail was provided. The questionnaire was
constructed in a manner that the respondents were only needed to tick the shade which
would not take more than a few minutes. However to document comments to the open
ended question, more reflection and time was needed. The convenience resulted in a
high percentage of recall. From the 300 respondents approached 151 responded, making
223
it slightly more than 50% which is considered satisfactory. Many respondents also
engaged with the researcher via email and in person for more profound discussion on
the subject.
Since the subject of democratic consolidation and civil military relations cuts across
ethnic and majority-minority boundaries therefore the sample population was not
clustered along these lines. However, the uneducated and under educated population of
the country who regularly involve in the political process were inadvertently excluded
from the survey. The weakness was overcome by consulting the Gallup Poll on similar
or closely related questions conducted during the same period. The aspect of gender
was factored in while formulating the sample, but since female population in Pakistan
is included in four clusters therefore a separate category is not created. Given the limited
number of educated females engaged in different professions in the country, the recall
was correspondingly limited. The survey was conducted in Islamabad on the basis of
non-random purposive sampling.
5.4 Survey Respondents
The research hypothesis presented a theoretical proposition which supplemented by a
societal perspective would make conclusions and findings wholesome. These
categorisation and distribution of the respondent in professional, gender, age and
education basis is explained below.
5.4.1 Profession
The respondents were clustered into four Table 5.2 Profession

categories in accordance with their Military officers 23 15.2
Civil Officers 31 20.5
professional background. These
Academia 42 27.8
comprised military 15.2 %, civil service Civil Society 55 36.4
20.5%, students and teachers belonging Total 151 100
224
To the academia 27.8% and civil society in general 36%. The latter comprised variety
of respondents to include members of parliaments, businessmen, journalists, lawyers
and those from private sector. Together, they represent majority of politically active
segments of the civil society, politics and governance in Pakistan. It was ensured that
majority should reflect the views of civil society i.e. 63.6% without officers from civil
services and 84.15% including them.
5.4.2 Gender
Secondly, an effort was made to distribute the questionnaire to equal number of male
and female members of civil society. It was expected that the female respondents
would respond proportionately, however lesser than expected responded. A majority
of female respondents were frequently reminded, yet for cultural reasons they did not
oblige. The percentage of replies from Table 5.3: Gender

female respondents included in the
Male 123 81.5
survey, however exceeds the number
Female 28 18.5
that is educated and engaged
Total 151 100.0
in some
professional activity.
5.4.3 Education
Thirdly educated respondents, who were considerably better informed about the
constitution, mechanics of democracy and public policy formulation as well as the
global, regional and domestic
Table 5.4: Education
environment in the country were
preferred. In terms of education
PhD 29 19.2
qualifications 12.6% are MPhil, 19.2%
M. Phil 19 12.6
PhD and 68.2% graduates and above.
Others 103 68.2
Total 151 100.0
225
5.4.4 Age
Lastly, respondents were selected to represent all age groups from the society. Age
groups between 20 and 70 years were

Table 5.5: Age
targeted to draw upon variety of
response. The younger segment had seen 20-30 21 13.9
democracy at work in previous decade 31-40 43 28.5
under PPP and PML-N and those with 41-50 55 36.4
51-60 29 19.2
more age had greater experience and
61-70 3 2.0
exposure. They were capable of
Total 151 100.0
comparative analysis of civil as well as
military regimes in previous three to five decades and could comment more profoundly.
5.4.5 Environmental Variable
The obtaining political environment impacts on perceptions about democracy and civil
military relations. It is significant to understand the political environment prevailing in
the country and most significantly Islamabad during the survey as it may have
contributed to perception formation process. To recall, owing to the unfortunate death
of Benazir Bhutto during the election campaign for general scheduled in 2008 elections,
the elections were delayed by a month. When these elections were conducted, the
electorate returned PPP to power with President Musharraf still the President. In the
ensuing months, the military withdrew support from the ex COAS President Musharraf
which led to his departure and installation of Mr Zardari, the co-chairman of PPP as
President. The PPP hold over power was considerably weakened when Gen Kayani, the
then COAS intervened to get Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhry, the deposed CJ of Pakistan
226
reinstated.378 After assumption of the office, the Chief Justice kept PPP’s government
under considerable and consistent pressure. The interplay of PML-N, Judiciary and the
military is a subject for analysis for follow up research in the field of civil military
relations. Here it suffices to say that the democratic government of PPP completed its
tenure, gave way to an interim government under which election were held in 2013.
Although the threats from terrorists to PPP and Awami National Party (ANP) to desist
from open campaigning, otherwise their rallies and meetings would be targeted with
suicide bombers is another subject for research. Thereby a perception was created that
PML-N will be able to win the elections but not two third majority.
During the elections, two significant developments took place. Firstly the youth which
now comprised bulk of Pakistan’s population mobilised young and old to get out and
vote, nearly 60 percent voted. Secondly, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) led by Imran
Khan drew lot of support from urban areas and emerged as a serious contender.
However immediately after the elections, perceptions of massive electoral irregularities
and rigging surfaced and with time more and more allegations started to come fore.
Consequently, PTI decided to take their protest to streets in combination with Tahir-
ulQadri and his Pakistan Awami Tahreek (PAT). Indexed in rising political polarity and
attitudinal differences, the political situation was charged because of public
mobilization and “sit ins” by PTI and PAT with calls for resignation of Prime Minister
and mid-term elections. Understandably, the respondents may have been polarized to
some degree by the political environment prevailing in the country. But considering
that the respondents are well informed, educated and belong to different professions,
378
Since the military was engaged in operations along the western borders against terrorists, Gen Kayani
had done so to maintain stability as PML-N had taken to the streets and had started a long march from
Lahore to Islamabad to get the deposed CJ reinstated.
227
they did bear in mind the political situation and endeavoured to remain objective in their
responses.
5.5 Reliability and Validity
5.5.1 Reliability
Psychometric reliability of the survey has been tested through Cronbach Alpha
Reliability Test and the outcome was Table 5.6: Reliability Statistics found to be
acceptable, the test data is placed opposite Cronbach's Cronbach's N of

Alpha Alpha Based Items
and the key is appended below. on
Standardized
Items
.650 .668 16
Table 5.7: KEY
Cronbach's alpha Internal consistency
α ≥ 0.9 Excellent (High-Stakes testing)
0.7 ≤ α < 0.9 Good (Low-Stakes testing)
0.6 ≤ α < 0.7 Acceptable
0.5 ≤ α < 0.6 Poor
α < 0.5 Unacceptable
5.5.2 Validity
Validity relates to the degree, to which the tool measures what it claims to measure. It
is important for this research since the survey aims to independently draw upon the
societal perspective about the subject. In a survey attempting to accrue qualitative
assessments and opinions related to human behaviour, content and face validity
assumes greater significance. 379 Prior to composing the questions, precedents for similar
surveys were consulted and Gallup Polls Pakistan stood out for authenticity. Questions
379
Anne Anastasi and Susana Urbina, Psychological Testing (New York: Prentice Hall, 1997), 114. ‘The
systematic examination of the test content to determine whether it covers a representative sample of the
behaviour domain to be measured’.
228
designed by Gallup Poll on subjects of politics, governance and civil military relations
were consulted for guidance. This was followed up by consultations with experts on
civil military relations in Pakistan, thereafter leading to careful formulation of a
questionnaire which should bring out all aspects of the phenomenon under study. Face
validity as an extension of content validity stands out as a starting point and relates to
the question, whether the test appears to be a good measure or not in testing the
phenomenon being studied. A comparison of findings of this survey (explained later)
with those of Gallup Polls Pakistan on similar questions further validates this survey.
Similarly to prevent duplication, those questions which had already been included by
Gallup Poll Pakistan in different surveys over a period of time were excluded including
those concerning the military takeover and governance of Gen Musharraf. A detailed
survey on this had already been carried out by Gallup Poll on 13 October 1999, a day
after the takeover.
“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts”
Daniel P Moynihan
5.6 Principle Results
Questions 5, 7, 10, 11 and 13 of the questionnaire were the critical questions response
to which related to the variables and hypothesis tested and confirmed in this research.
Therefore the response to these questions assumes greater significance. This has been
explained below.
5.6.1 Democracy and Military Intervention: Response
The first theme is democracy and military intervention for which questions 5 and 7 are
posed. The former looked at the military intervention resulting out of weaknesses and
ineptitude of political elite and the latter reflected on the political elite themselves
precipitating military intervention through their faulty preferences. The target was the
229
political elite, their faulty preferences and inability to consolidate democracy resulting
into military interventions. The first presented them as victims.
Table 5.8: Response Question 5
Question 5 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Incompetence of Strongly Disagree 13 8.6 8.6 8.6

political elite provides
Disagree 38 25.2 25.2 33.8
opportunity to the
military to intervene Neutral 25 16.6 16.6 50.3
Agree 60 39.7 39.7 90.1
Strongly Agree 15 9.9 9.9 100.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
In case of question 5, nearly 50% agreed with the proposition, while one third (33.6%)
disagreed with it. Of those who agreed, majority come from age group 31-60 years. In
response of question 7, the 67.6% was of the view that political elite themselves
precipitate military takeovers. Of those who agreed, the qualification of majority of the
respondents is graduation. In both questions, there was similarity in population who
chose to remain neutral. At a closer look, it becomes apparent that a lesser number
places blame on incompetence and ineptitude of political elite but a far greater number
of respondents opine that political elite are responsible for military intervention.
On the other hand, nearly 39% disagreed with proposition in question 5.The
disagreement percentage reduced to about 18% in case of question 7. The response of
question 7 is tabulated below.

Political elite Strongly Disagree 4 2.6 2.6 2.6
themselves precipitate
Disagree 23 15.2 15.2 17.9
military takeovers
Neutral 22 14.6 14.6 32.5
Agree 93 61.6 61.6 94.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
230
The result confirms the hypothesis of the research. The latter could also be interpreted
that Nawaz Sharif’s actions led to a counter coup. Further insight in this regard can be
drawn from contributory questions 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9.
There is a general perception that elections in Pakistan are not free and fair and state in
various forms has and continues to influence the outcomes. Secondly, the landholding
and later the elite emerging from business community have by and large dominated the
political scene irrespective of their political merit. Since large sum of money is required
to contest elections therefore a common man is generally excluded resulting into apathy
toward politics and participation in politics.
In a democratic system, elections are primary step through which voters elect their
representatives. Elections are held regularly since creation (indirect elections between
1947 and 1948, direct elections to provincial assemblies between 1951 and 1954 and
since then 1970, 1977, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008 and 2013
elections).Waseem notes that elections in Pakistan “are held in social milieu which is
characterised by continuing domination of the tribal or landed elite ”He identifies three
distinct features, first rather than legislation elections are regarded as means for gaining
primacy over “administrative authority for allocating resources” a way to control the
district administration and central focus on district politics in which extra local
influence input through [political] party was minimal. 380 Countries have developed a
variety of mechanisms to conduct free and fair elections under different oversight
mechanisms. Shafqat notes that political parties have not contributed to strengthening
of the party system, with each election the ideological centre of political parties has
380
Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan, 1.
231
shifted towards religious right and increasingly political parties have become
instruments of bradari (cast)/ tribal affiliations and criminal mafias that acquire
power.381
Chart 5.1: Response Question 1
Question 1 gauges the
electioneering process in
Pakistan. It has been noted that
more than two third (78.8%)
respondents are not satisfied
with the electioneering
process. Neither they consider it
free and fair, nor do they get to
elect most suitable candidates.
On the other hand, only 12.6% of respondents agreed that the elections are free and fair
and 8.6% remained neutral on this issue. This response is reflective of nature of politics
and credentials of political elite. The Gallup Polls has also reflected the same results.
According to their survey, against a global average of 42% about elections being fair
and free in their respective countries, in Pakistan 49% consider that elections are not
free and fair. One of the respondents said that “free, fair and transparent elections can
only improve and take over country out of crisis”. Another respondent pointed out that
“fairness of elections process in Pakistan and people electing most suitable credentials
need to be viewed separately. While electioneering process could be taken as more or
less fair or on election to election basis, people almost never elect or get to elect the
381
Saeed Shafqat and Maheen Saleem Khosa, “Electoral Politics and Electoral Violence in 2013
Elections: The Case of Punjab,” Monograph, December 2014, 5.
232
leaders with suitable credentials due to weakness of social and political culture”. Details
of the response of question 1 are elaborated in the following table.

Electioneering process is Strongly 40 26.5 26.5 26.5
fair and people get to Disagree
elect legislators with
most suitable credentials Disagree 79 52.3 52.3 78.8
Neutral 13 8.6 8.6 87.4
Agree 16 10.6 10.6 98.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
The results further explain and reinforce the findings of question 2 which relates to
contemporary nature of political culture in Pakistan. Politics is perceived to be dirty
word and political elite are the ones with money who use politics as a means for
enhancing their financial gains. Secondly, it is perceived that those who get elected use
the power to have government functionaries (police and administration) of their choice.
This question aimed at ascertaining the primary motivation of aspirants for participating
in politics i.e. money and greed for power. While it can be argued that the quest for
power is inbuilt in any political system the reference in this question relates to the
illgotten wealth and use of political position to advance personal interests. The response
is reflected as under:

Greed for Strongly Disagree 8 5.3 5.3 5.3
money and
Disagree 11 7.3 7.3 12.6
power impels
aspirants into Neutral 17 11.3 11.3 23.8
politics
Agree 70 46.4 46.4 70.2
Strongly Agree 45 29.8 29.8 100.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
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More than two third of respondents
(76.2%) agree that greed for money
and power impel people to
participate in politics at different
levels. Of those who agreed, majority
belong to academia because of their
comparative knowledge and rich
experience. Slightly more than 11%
chose to remain neutral and 12.6% think otherwise perhaps having better political
figures as role models. It can be argued that not all aspirants join politics for greed yet
if not individually corrupt they by their silence ascribe to the systemic failure of
democracy to deliver better quality of life to the people. This includes the military rulers
as well. In response to a similar question of Gallup Polls, 53% of Pakistanis are highly
sceptical about the sincerity of the rulers. One of the respondents said that
“selfcenteredness is the curse of Pakistani decision makers. Intolerance to others’ point
of view and unwillingness to experiment also contribute in bad governance”.
Question 3 referrers to the public service by political elite. Since politics is perceived
as public service, therefore the aspirants inspired by their political vision and
motivations join to serve the country and fellow countrymen. Politics in Pakistan has
noble roots as people like Sir Syed, Allama Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and others
were inspired by the plight of Muslims and nature of Indian state which would emerge
after decolonisation. They perceived the need for a separate homeland for Muslims of
sub-continent, a country in which they can realize their potentials and make a name for
234
themselves in the comity of nations. It was therefore expected that leaders and
politicians succeeding him would carry the vision and continue with similar nobility in
zeal and purpose. At least that was the expectation irrespective of the de facto position.
Secondly due to host of reasons, Pakistan today has slipped considerably down on the
scale for measuring efficacy of governance and policies to improve state and human
security in the country. The question 3 therefore also reflects on the potential need for
matching quality of governance with the requirement of the people. Another respondent
told that “the civilian leadership has not had a prolonged period of maturity to breed the
best quality within their ranks, unlike the military, which has regular programme of
enrolment and education. As such the civilian leadership is not considered too bad.
However, to gain personal advantage in politics should be regulated”. The results are
enumerated on next page.

civilian political Strongly Disagree 23 15.2 15.2 15.2
leaders work for Disagree 69 45.7 45.7 60.9
serving the Neutral 34 22.5 22.5 83.4
common people Agree 22 14.6 14.6 98.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
While responding to the question, 60% of
the respondents agreed with the
proposition. In their view civilian
political leaders when in power do not
work to serve the common man. The
perception is created and reinforced due
to inadequate regime outcomes as
235
successively human security situation in Pakistan has deteriorated. Major policy areas
concerning health, education and law and order have witnessed considerable downslide.
Also, institutions related to these policy areas are not functioning at par with the
requirement. On the other hand, less than one fifth (18.6%) are of the view that the
civilian political leaders work for serving the common people. Almost 22.5% of the
respondents remained neutral on this question.
The response on the above stated questions reflects the perceptions of respondents about
the aspirations and functioning of political elite. The criticality of response about the
political leaders means support for military intervention. In this context, question 6
aimed at inquiring the people support for military takeover and subsequent rule. The
military rulers to perpetuate their rule frequently claim that common people support
them. The response is reflected as under.

Most people support Strongly Disagree 17 11.3 11.3 11.3
military takeover and
Disagree 48 31.8 31.8 43.0
some extent military
rule Neutral 26 17.2 17.2 60.3
Agree 54 35.8 35.8 96.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
236
Contrary to the claim, the support for
democracy or otherwise is quite
divided on the response spectrum. A
slight majority (43%) disagreed with
the proposition and supported the
continuation of democratic system.
Inversely, almost equal (39%) agreed
with it. Interestingly 17.2% chose to
remain neutral. Apparently they represent the undecided ones who swing the vote
depending upon the prevailing public sentiment either way. They could be the ones who
would support takeovers and later support the return to democracy when the military
regimes failed to measure up to their perceptions or fail to find a political role in the
military setups. It is to be noted that democracy has returned in Pakistan since 2007 and
after the lapse of almost seven years, still the political elite is unable to favourably win
the majority of the common people.
One respondent said that “in the past, masses always appreciated the military over
politicians. Now though time has changed and it is a recognised fact that military coup
cause more damage not just to the civilian setup but also the military itself. Because of
its political endeavours, the military has also become much politicised and we also see
that within the military, there is an increase of politics”.
Shifting focus from civilian politicians to military, question 8 is a direct question to
accrue a direct response about the military’s responsibility for creating hurdles in the
way of democracy. The question in view of the peculiar history and construct of civil
237
military relations in Pakistan assume special significance and understands the reasons
of gap between the legal and real position of the respondents.
The response is tabulated below.
Table 5.14: Question 8

Military is Strongly Disagree 21 13.9 13.9 13.9
responsible for
Disagree 45 29.8 29.8 43.7
creating hurdles in
the way of political Neutral 28 18.5 18.5 62.3
culture/democracy
Agree 45 29.8 29.8 92.1
in Pakistan
Total 151 100.0 100.0
Similar to the question 6,
this question also got a
divided opinion.
Surprisingly, a slight
majority (43.7%) of the
respondents did not agree
with the proposition.
Understandably in their
view the political leaders were
themselves responsible for not improving upon the quality of democracy and
governance may it be at federal or provincial level and most importantly at the level of
local governments. Noticeably there is quite a sizeable population (37.7%) who think
that military does play a role in inhibiting the politics and democracy in some ways.
Significantly, these include the more experienced respondents. On the other hand,
238
18.5% remained neutral. All above questions relate to the military intervention while
the question 9 relates to post legitimisation period of military takeover. It is important
as it motivates many to work with the military during their rule. The response is on the
next page.

The takeover was the Strongly Disagree 6 4.0 4.0 4.0
only way out of the
Disagree 25 16.6 16.6 20.5
situation created by the
civilians Neutral 36 23.8 23.8 44.4
Agree 71 47.0 47.0 91.4
Total 151 100.0 100.0
Majority of the respondents 55.6%
agree with the proposition. The
perception could be generated by the
post take over propaganda by the
military in which it sets out clear
objectives, building grass
root
democracy and policies for transfer of
power through elections.
History however indicates that the military hardly ever adheres to the timelines and
direct military rule soon converts to a quasi-military rule i.e. with a civilian faced
experimenting in different ways to bring such a rule into place.
239
5.6.2 Civil Military Relations: Response
Question 11 targeted the heart of civilian control over the military in terms of intra elite
relationship, understanding and utilisation of the constitutional hardware for exercising
civilian control over the military. The political elite has the model of developed
countries to emulate and many parliamentary delegations visit parliaments of developed
countries and there are yearly conferences where such measures would be formally and
informally discussed. The question aimed at contextualising civil military relations in
exercise of democratic civilian control and the consequent misunderstandings that
emerge leading to conflicts. The clear reference to democratic civilian control was made
to distinguish the tensions related to trial of Gen Musharraf. It was expected that the
reference to developed countries will assist respondents in visualising a clear and
effective model of democracy which is mature and delivers.
In response to this question,
65.6% agreed with the
proposition. While there was
consistency in the number of those
who remained neutral while only
20% disagreed with the proposition.
Details of response are as under.

Political elite’s Strongly Disagree 3 2.0 2.0 2.0

ability to develop Disagree 27 17.9 17.9 19.9
good relations with
military elite and Neutral 22 14.6 14.6 34.4
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exercise civilian Agree 80 53.0 53.0 87.4
control as practiced
Strongly Agree 19 12.6 12.6 100.0
in developed
countries Total 151 100.0 100.0
Significant conclusions from this response can be drawn. First is the need for greater
cordiality amongst the political and military elite. This could result from greater and
more frequent communication by exercising the institutions for civil control over the
military. It could also be inferred that a large majority of the respondents were not
appreciative of the approach which PML-N government had taken in case of trial of
Gen Musharraf under Article 6 (treason) of the Constitution. 382 There is a general
indifference in political elite where it concerns exercise of the institutions provided for
civilian control in the Constitution. Thus, trapping civil military relations in formal
practices of democracy and inability to transcend into a participatory democra cy
exercised through institutions.
Question 12 which deals with the definition of the term civilian also contributes towards
the understanding of question 11. The implications of question 12 are that firstly the
term civilian is narrowly defined. In English press, it focuses more on the political elite
who contest elections and form governments. While the Urdu Press recognizes that the
entire civil society is categorised in the term civilian and their views, aspirations and
opinions need to be accounted for in civil military relations. Secondly, only few
mechanisms available in the constitution are used for exercising civil military relations.
The first relates to the infrequent meetings of DCC relying more on informal meetings
of the joint and services chief with the Prime Minister. The second forum where
meetings are held more frequently is Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the
parliament where mostly the undertone is negative.
382
At the time of survey, it was one of the issues prevailing in the environment.
241
Question 12 aimed at understanding whether respondents recognise the need for
redefining civil military relations to include the civil society as stakeholders in
consolidation of democracy or otherwise.
The response is reflected below.

The term civilian is narrowly Strongly Disagree 1 .7 .7 .7
defined and focuses on Disagree 13 8.6 8.6 9.3
politicians and neglects the Neutral 28 18.5 18.5 27.8
interest of civil society Agree 84 55.6 55.6 83.4
Strongly Agree 25 16.6 16.6 100.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
The respondents in this case were
overwhelmingly of the view that the
proposition was accurate. It reaffirms
the need for reappraisal of the term
civil in the civil military relations. The
redefinition would be a two
dimensional process in which the civil
society interacts with the civil as well
as the military and holds opinion on either which can now be accurately ascertained
through different polls and public discourse especially on the free media. One of the
respondents wrote:
“In Pakistan, by civil military relationship we mean relationship
between a bunch of politicians who are heading political parties and
242
armed forces of Pakistan whereas civilian segment of society is very
diversified including students, trade unions, government servants,
women and professionals from different walks of life. This segment of
society is neglected in both civilian and military rulers. In civilian rule,
all energies of the states are focused to keep away threat of army
intervention or reduce the powers of armed forces to satisfy the personal
ego of politicians by criticising and humiliating armed forces of
Pakistan. Where as in military rule, all efforts are made to win over few
discredited politicians, build their image to support military rule and a
major section of civilians who were expecting s betterment are left at
the mercy of those discredited politicians. Civil military relations can
only be built on strong footing by involving all sections of civil society
as participants and stakeholders in the future of country otherwise this
disconnect of civil segment of society with civilian government as well
as military governments will be more widened with passage of time”.
Question 13 relates to the confrontation between the political and
military elite and its impact on democratic consolidation. The history of
confrontation has three dimensions. First in which the military
intervenes in politics383 (Kakar), or military takes over and persecutes
the political leaders (Ayub, Zia and Musharraf, acting against Fatima
Jinnah, Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif). The second in which the political
elite act against the military leadership (Nawaz Sharif versus Gen
Musharraf) and the third in which the political elite persecute each other
383
Gen Waheed Kakar intervened and when the PM and President could not resolve their differences, it
was agreed that both would resign and fresh elections will be called.
243
when in power (Nawaz Sharif versus Benazir Bhutto in 90s). On the
other hand, the political elite perceives that to correct the imbalance in
civil military relations, it is essential that the all those who had violated
the constitution be subjected to law as witnessed in Turkey. However,
the political elite would need massive support from the people to
strengthen their hand and such a support would be forthcoming only if
the leaders have delivered good governance and won the trust of the
people. Without overwhelming popular support the institutional tussle
would only retard the process of democratic consolidation. The results
of question 13 are as under.

Question 13 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative %
Valid Strongly Disagree 4 2.6 2.6 2.6

Disagree 5 3.3 3.3 6.0
Neutral 15 9.9 9.9 15.9
Agree 76 50.3 50.3 66.2
Strongly Agree 51 33.8 33.8 100.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
Overwhelming majority, 84.1% of the
respondents subscribe to
the
proposition due to a variety of reasons
confirming the need for collaborative
approach for consolidating democracy
and addressing the pressing needs of
the country.
244
Question 14 and 15 are framed to accrue response which could help conclude a way
forward for civil military relations in Pakistan in view of the enormity of the challenges
faced by the country. Post 9/11, terrorism manifested by non-state actors exploiting
religion as the motivating force, emerged and persists as primary threat especially in
Pakistan. Combating terrorism dictates the need for a whole of nation approach.
Necessitating intimate coordination between different state organs both for intelligence
gathering and responding to terrorist threats. Different countries in accordance with
their respective threat matrix have revamped their security mechanism especially
internal security. US devised Homeland Security and harmonised it with the existing
system of national security council, national security advisor etc. In Europe, India,
Japan etc. where such mechanisms were lacking, similar setups were formulated and
optimised.
In Pakistan, considerable resistance had been witnessed for reasons other than security
losing substantial time leading to critical compromises in national security in the
process. It was only in 2014 that national security committee was instituted; national
security advisor was appointed who was supported by a secretariat, a national internal
security policy was formulated yet its performance remains far from satisfactory. It is
evident that respondents were aware of these developments and desired that the military
and civil need to work together to rid the country from the menace of terrorism,
sectarianism etc. One of the respondents narrated that “trust and confidence between
civil and military is more detrimental to the nation. As in the past some selected persons
of military and civil joined hands to serve the personal interest of each other and not the
society at all. In fact, the emphasis should be on the functions of each organisation or
institution within its own domain. Everybody should make efforts to excel in his/her
own profession for the service of the nation. All the public institutions have the
245
responsibility to serve the public at large. If the quality of general public improves that
means some institution or certain organisation or a group of people is working for the
public interest. Only dedicated leadership and trained professionals, if work in close
harmony, can turn the fate of the country. The example of United States in its initial
period and South Africa in recent times can be a beacon for us to progress”. Response
of question 14 is tabulated below.

The civil and military Strongly Disagree 4 2.6 2.6 2.6
need to work in close Neutral 4 2.6 2.6 5.3
harmony and develop Agree 43 28.5 28.5 33.8
strong trust and Strongly Agree 100 66.2 66.2 100.0
confidence
Total 151 100.0 100.0
Almost unanimously, the
respondents 94.7% agreed with the proposition. Significantly in this case, the number
of neutrals shortly reduced to 5.3% only. Apparently they had taken side to affirm the
need for civil military cooperation in the constitutional framework to improve
country’s security situation.
246
Different respondents gave almost similar opinion in their comments about the
harmonisation. One respondent said that “military and civil forces are not parallel to
each other. For the best interest of the state, they must stand on the one page”. Another
told that “the civil military harmonisation relations are the primary task of leaders”.
Another narrated that “every state institution must work as per powers assigned in the
constitution”.
The question 15 relates to responsibility which is inserted to supplement the earlier
response (question 14) for seeking a way forward in a democratic setup. Arguably, the
military leaders are equally responsible yet enjoying pre-eminence the civilian leaders
will have to take initiative to accrue such cooperation. The response is elucidated on
the next page.

The responsibility rests Strongly Disagree 3 2.0 2.0 2.0
on civil leaders
Disagree 25 16.6 16.6 18.5
Neutral 29 19.2 19.2 37.7
Agree 65 43.0 43.0 80.8
Strongly Agree 29 19.2 19.2 100.0
247
Total 151 100.0 100.0
While a majority of the respondents 62.2% thought that it is the responsibility of the
civilian leaders to foster such cooperation. The difference in the numbers from those
agreeing with the proposition in the previous question indicates the need of a joint
responsibility of both civilian as well as military leaders with definite accent towards
former. One of the respondents said that “pre-Pakistan military in sub continent did not
take active part in independence struggle. After independence, CMR in India differs to
a great extent than in Pakistan – why? The clergy or civil dispensation on both sides is
the
sole cause of civil military
relations in both the countries.
While in India it remained
balanced, but in Pakistan remained
strained. In my view this balance
also affects the professionalism of
military and civilians in their
individual spheres”.
5.6.3 Performance of Military Regimes: Response
Question 10 relates to performance of military regimes. In the course of research, it was
identified that the military regimes focus on managerial aspects and are less capable of
resolving political issues or consolidating new structures of governance (as defined by
Finer). Contrary to the perception, Gen Musharraf and others (Gen Ayub and Gen Zia)
had embarked on transmitting democracy to grass roots level by instituting local
248
government systems. This question and the supplementary questions 4 and 16 aimed to
solicit a value comment about the perceptions of better administrative skills of military
as compared to the civilian leaders and their regimes.
The response of question 10 is as under.

and Strongly Disagree 9 6.0 6.0 6.0

Disagree 41 27.2 27.2 33.1
Military’s Neutral 30 19.9 19.9 53.0
administrative
Agree 58 38.4 38.4 91.4
managerial skills
Total 151 100.0 100.0
249
Contrary to the popular perception,
there is a divided opinion about the
military’s rule. On third of the
respondents (33.2%) think that
military rule does not stand out for
better managerial skills. While a
slight majority (47%) think that
military rule is marked for better
administration and law and order related issues impacting positively on the lives of
common man. Nearly 20% of the respondents are neutral. The survey is therefore
instructive, yet it is also indicative of the divided public opinion which the civil
governments will have to negate through performance and better governance. One of
the respondents said that “had we invested in strengthening the institutions, making
major developmental decisions and undertaken infrastructural projects, we would have
redeemed ourselves during the periods of military takeovers. Except for Ayub Khan,
none had done anything except maintain status quo”. Contrarily, one respondent said
that “I think military leadership played more positive role in security policies. Ayub
Khan’s decision not to enter in NPT played vital role in acquisition of nuclear weapons
and there are lots of other examples which can be quoted. Democracy is for educated
and well aware people. We need strong and focused military leadership”.
Similarly, question 4 is a direct question which aims at investigating the regime
outcome of the political elite. This question aimed to separate fact from perception and
comment on the impact of the policy preferences of political elite, especially in view of
the option of comparison between military or quasi-military rules. The response is
reflected as below.
250
Decisions made by civilian Strongly Disagree 23 15.2 15.2 15.2
leaders improve economy, Disagree 60 39.7 39.7 55.0
security and living Neutral 36 23.8 23.8 78.8
standards of common Agree 29 19.2 19.2 98.0
people Strongly Agree 3 2.0 2.0 100.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
The response in this case was more
evenly balanced as 55% confirmed
the unsatisfactory performance of
the political leaders, their policy
preferences and regime outcomes.
On the contrary, the perception
relates to the frequent charges of
ineptitude and corruption, lack of
accountability and coercive politics.
The respondents had the option to compare with the performance of the military rulers
in which Ayub and Musharraf stood out while the regime of Zia was laden with a
political agenda, squandering the opportunity of engagement with US for combating
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Since the performance of military rulers lacked
sustainability therefore their impact was momentary and it is expected that it did affect
the thought process of the respondents.
Question 16 aimed to solicit response from the respondents based on their comparative
analysis and judgement about people’s perception and attitude towards the civil and
military for their work ethics. It was general perception not related to governance or
251
military rule but to the institutional values in general. While it may be argued that since
the military invokes spirit of nationalism, therefore the response would be in favour of
the military not only in Pakistan but in most countries of the world. However since
Pakistan’s military owing to the repeated military interventions has been exposed to the
people more than other militaries therefore a substantive number of respondents choose
to remain neutral.
For the civilian elite however, the outcome merits attention as it reinforces the
perceptions that political elite aspire to gain political office to advance their parochial
interests and not for delivering common good. In this value judgement, sense of
responsibility figure out prominently. Politicians are held accountable during the
elections and only those who display such attributes are returned to the office, other
than that there is no accountability for lack of performance or for incorrect decisions.
One of the respondents said that “while nation supports [military], one may regard
military more than civilian leaders, it does not imply that they support or prefer military
rule over civilian rule. There has been quite a clear division in Pakistan on provincial
basis on civil versus military rule, Punjab and KPK on one side and Sind and
Balochistan on the other side”. The response of question 16 is on the next page.

nation supports the Strongly Disagree 8 5.3 5.3 5.3
military more than the
Disagree 20 13.2 13.2 18.5
civil leaders for its
Neutral 31 20.5 20.5 39.1
252
sacrifices, devotion and Agree 57 37.7 37.7 76.8
sense of responsibility
Strongly Agree 35 23.2 23.2 100.0
Total 151 100.0 100.0
Majority i.e. 60.9% agreed with the
proposition and confirmed
the general perceptions about
the military. However quite a
sizeable number 20.5% chose to
remain
neutral on the question. It is a value
judgement with no particular
consequences for civil military
relations in Pakistan.
5.7 Summation
This independent survey conducted to gauge public opinion from representatives of all
segments of the society yields substantive results. Firstly, the research hypothesis about
critical role of political elite in consolidating democracy or otherwise stands validated.
It is vital that the formal democracy should transcend into participatory democracy
through political and institutional measures. In this context, the role of local
governments is a first important step. Secondly, conduct of free and fair elections and
improvement in quality of political leaders is of utmost important for long term
legitimacy of the elected governments and democracy. Thirdly, the society has to rid
itself from the malice of corruption and inefficiency. Political elite have to become role
253
model and the state institutions like NAB have to perform their role fairly and
effectively.
From the perspective of civil military relations, most respondents have identified the
need for attitudinal change in the civil and military elite. According to one respondent
“both sides should show patience and restraint in dealing with each other and lead the
country towards progress as a team”. The need for redefining the term of civil in civil
military relations to include all segments of the society in its interface with the military
has been identified. It emerged that it is the joint responsibility of the political and
military elite to consolidate democracy in the country, affirming the importance of
Janowitzian approach.
Thirdly, most respondents, despite the success of military rule in some areas, felt that
on the aggregate, there was no major difference in regime outcomes of civil and
military. Both have failed to address substantive issues related to peace, security and
development in the country.
In final analysis, the survey has substantiated and immensely contributed in confirming
the findings of the research and in formulating recommendations, which are discussed
in the next chapter.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
“For there is nothing lost, that may be found, if sought”
Edmund Spencer 384
Prelude
Consistent with the ‘research design’ this research employed ‘mixed methods’
technique i.e. collecting qualitative thematic data and testing its validity against the
384
Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene (London: George Routledge, 1843), 247.
254
conceptual framework and theoretical perspectives explained in Chapter 1. It related to
failure of process of political reconstruction and democratic consolidation after Gen Zia
which led to the military takeover by Gen Musharraf, installation of his regime and his
inability to return democracy to the country. It simultaneously collected quantitative
numerical data through survey, interviews, content analysis and by consulting primary
sources related to the topic. Consequently the thematic quantitative and numerical
qualitative data has been integrated through ‘concurrent triangulation method’ and
interpreted to conclude findings and formulate pertinent recommendations.
Qualitative data yielded findings related to theoretical, political and legal aspects of
democracy, political elite, military coup and military regimes while from the numerical
quantitative data, societal perspective about these aspects was drawn. The process of
corroboration between the two sets of data adds objectivity to the research and cross
validates the findings elucidated in this chapter.
Since departure of Gen Musharraf in 2008 numerous political developments have
occurred. These include return of democracy, successful completion of tenure in
government by PPP, holding of elections under an interim civil setup and transition of
power to PML-N government, including devolution of power under the Eighteenth
Amendment etc. therefore some of the recommendations resulting from the findings of
this research have already been implemented. However some areas have still not been
addressed and some portions of contemporary societal perspective obtained through
survey in 2014 look beyond the aforementioned issues for addressing the problems that
have emerged since. Resultantly, the findings relate to the period under review while
recommendations focus on sustainable democracy and civil military relations. The
findings and recommendations for greater cognizance have been clustered into four
areas, namely democratic consolidation, judicial responsibilities, ordering civil military
255
relations and optimising democratic control over the armed forces. Recommendations
have been formulated with a view to consolidate democracy as an efficacious political
which delivers positive regime outcomes. Secondly to stabilise civil military relations
and lastly suggest measures to enable effective democratic control of armed forces.
Democratic Consolidation
• The research employed theoretical perspectives of modernisation, structural and
transition approaches for consolidating democracy as governing framework for
civil military relations. It focused on the transition approach and evaluated the role
of political elite and its impact on process of democratisation and civil military
relations in Pakistan. Cumulative analysis of the latent and continuing challenges
indicates a persistent tension between political elite and military. Initially the
military’s endeavoured to foster a presidential system (Gen Ayub) and later to
distribute political powers concentrated in the prime minister between the prime
minister and the president (Gen Zia and Musharraf). The latter resulted into
constitutional changes against which the political elite contested. The second
tension relates to devolution of democracy to grass root level through local
governments system.
• Related to the first contention, the political elite during the period form 1988-1999
struggled to undo the Eighth Amendment and restore the constitution in original
form. Benazir and Nawaz Sharif in their first terms were not in a position to realise
this. Benazir in her second term instead of undoing the powers of president
attempted to skirt around the problem by installing her own party person as the
president. He could not provide her the security she sought, rather he acted against
her. Nawaz Sharif during his second term directly approached the problem and
undid the amendment. However, he then proceeded to arrogate even more powers
256
through later amendments which became a substantial concern. The tussle although
is settled for the moment, can be classified as a contributory cause for public
dissatisfaction leading to a military takeover.
• Since 2008, the political elite acting in accordance with the four stages of
democratic consolidation predicted by transition approach did arrive at a historic
moment and converted it into an accord (CoD). They agreed to respect each other’s
mandate and graduated to next stage of struggle for equitable distribution of
resources. PPP under President Zardari in its fourth tenure accrued consensus to
transfer presidential powers to the prime minister and then further devolve them to
the provinces in accordance with the original spirit of the constitution under
Eighteenth Amendment. The political process continues to be shaped by entry of
new political forces and internal security challenges. It is imperative for the political
elite to sagaciously handle political situations and not undermine their democratic
achievements thus far.
• The second contention relates to transmission of democracy to grassroots level. Gen
Musharraf formulated a workable local government system to meet the military’s
aspirations. However it was undone by political elite after 2008. There are
significant developments which merit cognizance as these will continue to impact
political stability in diverse ways. First Pakistan’s administrative structures
inherited from colonial era were structured to serve the interests of colonisers, these
have since independence been exploited by political elite. Frequent changes have
resulted in disarray. Second Pakistan’s population has and is rapidly growing, to
satisfy the populace further devolution of power through local governments and /
or by readjusting the federation emerges as an absolute necessity. Third, in order to
257
maintain internal stability and a satisfied polity, integration of local governments
with structures of state powers is important.
• Up till now, the provincial governments have delayed holding of local governments
elections, which are now being organised on the orders of the Supreme Court. Yet
without devolution of authority and requisite finances, three tiered governance
would at best be half way attempt. Secondly, owing to concentration of population
in Punjab (approx. 54%) the party which wins Punjab can with little assistance form
government in the centre. This unnerves the smaller provinces and recreates big
brother syndrome which is detrimental for the federation. Administrative
restructuring at some point would become essential. While institutionalising
effective local governments’ solution lies in dividing up existing and creating new
provinces. Pakistan’s political stability can be considerably augmented if Punjab is
divided into three, KPK and Balochistan in two each and cosmopolitan Karachi be
governed as a federal area. This is a subject for further doctoral level research.
• Authoritarianism, want of maturity in democratic culture and democratic values,
respect for law etc. also stood out during the period under review. The use of state
institutions and NAB for political purposes was a common scourge for civil as well
as military governments. Unlike India, the bureaucratic iron structure of Lord
Macaulay has under political pressures rusted and withered in Pakistan. There is an
absolute need to de-politicize and make bureaucracy and police independent and
become reputable state institutions of merit. Formulation of national commission
with similar terms of reference is an absolute necessity. Given the state of our
society an independent NAB with jurisdiction over all citizens especially those
holding offices in legislature, executive and judiciary is a requisite.
258
• After the devolution of power under the Eighteenth Amendment, there are still
many residual matters related to ministries and their interface with bureaucracy.
These merit resolution on priority basis. Similarly, the need to ameliorate the
standards of bureaucracy and major state institutions is equally essential.
Responsibility of Judiciary
• Supreme judiciary, amongst other things is entrusted with the sacred responsibility
of guarding the salient and structural aspects of the constitution. In order to ensure
political stability, it is equally responsible to not let the democratic consolidation be
interrupted and also ensure that fundamental rights of all citizens is safeguarded.
• Witnessed during the period under review the judgements by Supreme and High
Courts did not take into account their responsibilities. After dissolution of Benazir’s
first government, the Supreme Court should have taken notice that the Eighth
Amendment fundamentally altered the structure of parliamentary system of
government and should have quashed the dissolution order and also referred the
matter to parliament to undo the amendment by declaring it ultra-virus. Ironically,
they did neither and encouraged two more dissolutions only then to take notice of
the issue. However by then the political waters had been thoroughly stirred.
• Similarly the judiciary did not take notice of the arrogation of power under the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendment during the second term of Nawaz Sharif, had
they acted in time, probably they could have averted the military coup.
• Invoking ‘doctrine of state necessity’ to legitimize military interventions figures out
as proverbial fatalistic stab in the back of democracy. Unfortunately it has happened
recurrently as witnessed in the case of Gen Musharraf. The judgement by Supreme
Court initially encouraged military government and subsequently also its desire to
continue beyond its mandated three years by not taking timely notice of Gen
259
Musharraf’s referendum.
• It was witnessed during the lawyer’s movement for reinstatement of Chief Justice
Iftikhar that under pressure of collective conscious for having sided with the
military too often, the judiciary resolved to undo its past mistakes. Yet as time
passed the passion has receded and once again it is back to original normal of
collusion between judiciary and executive to the detriment of justice and safe
guarding fundamental rights of all citizens.
• In the context of civilian control over the military it is oft said that that ‘who would
guard the guardians’ as witnessed during the research, the same analogy emerges
‘who will guard the democracy. It is recommended that the oath for judges should
be amended i.e. once having taken oath under the constitution fresh oath under PCO
will not be valid and similarly mechanism developed to prevent administering of
similar fresh oath to new aspirants under PCO etc.
• It has since been witnessed that inability to administer timely and affordable justice
has inspired internal unrest and fostered practice of alternative culturally or
religiously sanctioned system of justice. It is proposed that a commission
comprising member from legislature, judiciary and representative of public be
appointed to identify ways and measures for providing speedy, fair and affordable
justice and its recommendations be implemented on priority.
Civil Military Relations: Reasons for Gen Musharraf’s Intervention
• The main question which this research focused on was ‘why did Gen Musharraf
takeover. Various terms are used for the takeover each signifying different aspects.
It was called a ‘counter coup’ even by members of Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet since
they considered that actual coup was dramatic sacking of Gen Musharraf, COAS.
Especially when he was out of the country and in the air and then denying the
260
aircraft to land at its destination to buy time for designate COAS to take control.
Probably physical harm was not intended but could have occurred given the limited
fuel the aircraft was left with and it also endangered the life of other passengers. It
was also termed an ‘institutional coup’ as Gen Musharraf was not effective and
orchestrating it personally. The commanders and staff reacted to protect the COAS
and the honour of the military.
• In essence the underlying argument in both cases carry weight. However the counter
coup would not have happened if Nawaz Sharif would not have made the first move
in the manner he did. It confirms the conceptual framework of the research and
theoretical perspective founded on transition approach i.e. it’s the preferences of
political elite which facilitates or impedes consolidation of democracy. Gen
Musharraf despite the humiliation after Kargil was willing to continue to function
in the democratic framework, had Nawaz Sharif not sacked him.
• In this case the decision of Nawaz Sharif also reflects inadequate understanding of
the military and its functioning as an institution. It also reflects poorly on the idea
of accruing political security by appointing an officer of one’s choice (similar to
Benazir having a president of her own choice). Lt Gen Butt had failed twice, once
by not forewarning Nawaz Sharif about the Kargil operation and then about
possibility of military reaction should Gen Musharraf be sacked. Irrespective of his
professional standings, perhaps as military elite, he was more inspired by his
personal interest of becoming the COAS.
• Similarly during third tenure of Nawaz Sharif commencing 2013 the urge of PMLN
to selectively place Gen Musharraf under trial for treason charges did once again
sour civil military relations. It is important for political elite to determine the
perceptions of military for security and good governance and integrate it in a
261
manner that the twin objectives are attained while the process of democratic
consolidation is also advanced.
• Gen Musharraf coup stands out differently as it was the first coup in which push
factors rather than pull factors emerged as detriment of the coup. First, Gen
Karamat’s resignation had agitated the sentiments of rank and file and the sentiment
lingered on. Second, after the Kargil conflict, military had come out badly despite
significant military advantages which could have been converted into political
gains, favouring resolution of Kashmir issue. Later a controversy erupted on its
ownership. The outcome further aggravated the lingering feelings in the military
against the prime minister. Lastly after the Kargil conflict, rumours about the
possibility of sacking of Gen Musharraf allowed time to him and the key members
in the military to prepare contingency plans and execute them little they had known
that they would have to implement them in his absence. The sacking of the COAS
and preventing his aircraft from landing became the penultimate reason and the
trigger to which the military responded.
• The significant pull factors which indirectly contributed to coup included, foremost
the strong trend of constitutional authoritarianism demonstrated by Nawaz Sharif
during his second term. The weight of mandate, Fourteenth Amendment and Article
63A i.e. the defection clause which implied a virtual civilian dictatorship had raised
serious concerns in the polity. Nawaz Sharif’s assault on judiciary and physical
assault by his party workers on the Supreme Court etc. However these pull factors
can at best be taken as contributory reasons but none individually or all of them
collectively could have triggered a coup by the military on its own.
• This leads to the question, how future coups can be prevented. Significantly the
continuing military’s role in combatting internal threats and supporting national
262
development structurally creates a situation which leads to expansion in its role.
What would be the political impact of this role expansion is a subject for further
research. However it is the responsibility of political elite to undertake measures for
bringing about structural correction, Secondly, in the context of this research
hypothesis it is for political leaders to not let the push and pull factors become cause
of future military interventions. Democratic consolidation and adherence to
democratic norms and rule of law will certainly help.
Military Regime
• The military despite better organisational and administrative skills lack technical
expertise to govern. Hence, it has to co-opt technocrats and politicians of dubious
credentials and bear the political cost. Same held good for co-option of the regional
political leaders and parties as well as the right wing parties and organisations.
Resultantly the initial positivity and impact of positive economic performance soon
gets diluted in political issues. When hard political decisions are to be taken as
witnessed during Gen Musharraf’s regime politics overcomes economics. Later
Gen Musharraf despite sound economic performance had to quit under political and
institutional pressures.
263
The third main question on which this research focused was, why Gen Musharraf
did not return democracy to the country in 2002 as required by the Supreme Court.
The counter coup was reaction to protect Gen Musharraf, beyond that the military
did not carry any political agenda. Commanders close to Gen Musharraf’s thought
that he would impose a martial law, contrarily the Gen came up with a different
option and a corresponding seven point agenda. The agenda was open ended and
required significant period of time for implementation. The Supreme Court also did
not debate the practicability of the agenda while giving him three years period. Yet
the decision to continue beyond 2003 was his own and served his personal interest.
The national and institutional interests intersected and warranted that after holding
free and fair elections the power be transferred and democracy restored. It could
have then become a democratic coup and the agenda to shore up bureaucracy, police
and election commission would have propelled the country on democratic trajectory
with greater resilience.
• Engagement of USA and NATO in war in Afghanistan after the events of 9/11 and
their dependency on Pakistan opened a window of opportunity which he exploited
for personal gains. However, the initial legitimacy provided to him by Supreme
Court judgement about his take-over was limited to three years after that he had to
accrue political legitimacy through the parliament. Creation of PML-Q and
supporting it to form the government weakened his bargaining power by fostering
exclusivity as far as the political elite were concerned. Although the political parties
participated in the 2002 elections yet most of them remained in the opposition. After
2003, Gen Musharraf behaved politically which distorted the civil military relations
ultimately leading to a situation in 2008 when the military officers were forced to
hide their identity in public.
264
Finer had identified four means of political intervention available to the military.
Gen Musharraf’s regime manifested the one in which military chooses to govern
itself. However after general elections of 2002 and by 2003 a new mechanism of
continued intervention i.e. a military president with a ‘king’s party’ in governance
had developed. A modified form of continued intervention, this research adds to
Finer’s contribution. 385
Public Policies
• Critique of political role of military abounds (literature review). A perception, about
military’s pre-eminence on foreign and security policies persist. An impression is
conveyed as if the political and societal aspirations run contrary to military’s views.
These perceptions do not accord with ground realities. In the period in focus of this
research, three issues related to Pakistan’s Afghan and India policies and relations
with US after 9/11 were reviewed.
• Instability in Afghanistan and neglect by US after Soviet withdrawal had burdened
Pakistan with the problem of three million plus Afghan refugees and instability in
Afghanistan. Its efforts to bring stability in Afghanistan and subsequent rise of
Taliban are a matter of record. It was found that in the context of Afghan policy no
significant difference existed between the political and military leaders during the
decade of 90’s and later during Gen Musharraf’s regime. The same hold good even
in the current setting. In fact Pakistan had distanced itself from the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan prior to the events of 9/11 and after that the readjustment was
supported by a majority less the right wing parties.
385
Some might question that Gen Zia had followed a similar course, the significant difference is his party
less elections versus Musharraf’s inclusive approach which included almost all major political parties.
Although they had their own reasons for joining the process.
265
The second relates to Pakistan’s India policy and the most significant assertion
relates to the Kargil conflict, which it was alleged had been orchestrated to derail
the peace process initiated during Nawaz Sharif’s second tenure. In absence of
verdict from Nawaz Sharif, it is difficult to ascertain the truth, however later policy
of Gen Musharraf strongly indicated that he wanted meaningful dialogue which
could lead to resolution of Kashmir issue. Kargil conflict also aimed at acquiring
better bargaining position and forcing a dialogue. However the political elite
differed sharply with Gen Musharraf for desiring to work out a solution for Kashmir
issue outside the UN Resolutions.
• The third relates to Pakistan-US relations after 9/11 when military regime was in
place. US had coerced Gen Musharraf to cooperate initially for providing logistic
support to the war In Afghanistan and later as war unfolded the cooperation and the
relationship also expanded. These were peculiar circumstances due to involvement
of regional and extra regional countries and Indian zest to cash on the opportunity
detrimental to the interests of Pakistan. It is difficult to assess that how even a civil
government would have responded any differently given the circumstances.
However the right wing parties did exploit the anti US sentiments and created a gulf
between the government and the civil society.
• Issues with India still persist and the foreign and defence policy intersect to ensure
country’s security. There is need to review Pakistan’s India policy and develop a
well-considered strategies to respond to India’s Pakistan related security policy.
Such a policy will emerge form employing the national security architecture which
would apolitically owned and consistently implemented in bipartisan manner.
• To undertake robust policy review and ensure that all stakeholders are on page there
is a need for an effective national security architecture. Recourse to such
266
architecture would dispel the notions of division and block external propaganda
aimed at weakening the state institutions and exploiting the divide. This will be
discussed in subsequently.
Structural Dimensions
• The research had endeavoured to understand why Huntington’s separation theory
and its application has not been effective in rendering the military apolitical in
Pakistan. It was found that the theory works fine when the threat is external and
military is not involved in internal security and national development.
• Military in Pakistan contrarily had been involved from the very outset in the
Kashmir issue, internal security, in aid of civil power and national development. It
has been hypothesised by Desh and Stephan that when the external as well as
internal threat is high and military is regularly involved in internal security and
development duties then the civilian control becomes weak. Weakness is visible in
number of ways. Absence of coups and military interventions do not imply that the
control is good. Stephan had also projected that commitment in internal security
and development efforts reduces the distance between civil (in the widest sense of
the term) and military, it results in role expansion and propels the military in to the
grey zone of politics. The civil military relations during the decade of 90s and
second term of Nawaz Sharif studied by this research project affirm the same.
Current civil military relations in Pakistan effectively demonstrate the projections
of these effects.
• Two options are available to political elite. First to continue with the existing
paradigm and readjust national security architecture and mechanisms for civilian
control. It can co-opt military while progressively working to improve situation and
267
at an appropriate time review it. The second is to disassociate military from these
tasks and take on these responsibilities led by civilian institutions and civilian
leadership. Given the current capacity of the state institutions such a decision looks
less probable but the political elite can work towards it in the long run. Hence if the
civil want to correct the paradigm they have to build civilian institutions which can
effectively handle internal security and developmental challenges and progressively
disassociate military form these tasks. A similar spill over correction would also be
required with respect to Kashmir and Afghan policies as discussed in the preceding
paras.
Democratic Control of Military
• The civilian control of military relates to three areas i.e. why, what and how. What
comprises five decision areas (1) civil military relations, (2) public policy, (3)
internal security (4) nation defence (5) military organisation. How relates to the
degree and type of such control. The control can be best exercised through
appropriate institutions at different levels.
• Response to the why question resides in the ability to prevent military takeovers.
This can be optimised by instituting a fresh oath to protect the constitution on
assumption of office by joint and service chiefs to be administered by President of
Pakistan. The same should also be applied to the senior bureaucracy (federal
secretaries). It is a subject for further research.
• In response to the second question for what to control, the premier institution to
exercise such control is the parliament and in their respective committees related to
defence and national security i.e. senate and national assembly. To capacitate these
committees, there is need to augment them with secretaries, advisors and by think
tanks. Other than that, the committees are empowered by the constitution to perform
268
their duties efficaciously. Frequent and regular meetings on issues entrusted to the
committee would help in exercising effective democratic control. The committee
should be mandated to recommend national security, defence policy, military
strategy and civil military relations aspects to the executive.
• What also relates to the appointments of the joint and service chiefs. The present
system of selection for these appointments from the senior most officers is
appropriate and suits better than the seniority only system. However no extensions
in the tenure of these appointments should be allowed as a matter of principle and
requisite constitutional change should be made to prevent recurrence. The immense
negative impact of Gen Kayani’s extended tenure on military is a subject for another
research. Within the military the promotion system is rigorous, efficacious and
inspires confidence amongst officers. However the promotion system from two to
three star is not as rigorous and robust and lacks in transparency. It should be
structured on the same lines as the system for promotions from one to two star i.e.
through an open board. The military also employs retired officers in its welfare
commercial organisations. It is proposed that the rule of two year wait period after
retirement should be applied before another employment opportunity is offered by
the military.
• The second level is the interface of the military with the executive the findings and
recommendations in this context are discussed under the heading of national
security architecture.
• The term civilian control of the military needs to be replaced with democratic
control of military in all literature related to the subject used in Pakistan. The
conception of the term should be expanded not just the political elite but also the
entire civil society as stake holders in the role of military as well as political elite.
269
National Security Architecture
• Pakistan owing to its geographic location is seriously affected by the cumulative
impact of policies of major extra-regional and regional countries. The country is
today faced with highly complex security environment comprising external, internal
and systemic challenges. Since 9/11 all major countries, recognising the evolving
nature of threat have reorganised their internal security architecture to manage old
and emerging challenges and threats. Unfortunately the architecture and its
institutions like National Security Council were wrongly politicised, the political
elite construed it as power sharing bid and have since been reluctant to implement
the concept in its entirety.
• Today a national security committee exits but it has been side lined in the process
of implementation of National Action Plan. It has been replaced with adhoc
arrangements like apex committees etc. such adhoc mechanisms can only be as
effective as adhoc mechanisms can be, albeit with serious consequences. Therefore
there is a need to review the national security architecture, its structure and
composition of committees. The recommendations should be legislated as
constitutional consultative bodies. The national security architecture should
permeate down to provincial level and interface effectively with security
dimensions of upcoming local governments.
• At the apex, national security committee should be multi-tiered consultative body.
It already has been resourced with a national security advisor, secretary who heads
national security division and think tanks which assist the academic committee. At
the next level there is a need that the provinces should have similar committees
which are interfaced with the national security committee and resourced with
270
requisite institutions. The composition of these committees can be reviewed for
which a commission should be constituted to study the subject. The review should
proffer recommendations which are consistent with the requirements of national
security policy, defence policy and military strategy. Formulation of such policies
and strategy in a nuclear environment is subject for further research. Expectedly its
findings will also impact on the command structure of the military.
• The committee should be mandated to produce national security policy which
should be published in the first year by the prime minister after taking the oath and
the recommendations of the policy should be tied in with the national budget. The
policy can then be reviewed in accordance with the changes in the environment.
The committees at federal and provincial level should also be mandated to monitor
the implementation and improve coordination measures.
Healing the Relations
In the context of civil military relations the political and military elite have both erred
in the past. This was found during the period under focus in this research and is also
evident form general political history of Pakistan. Continuing to remain engaged with
the past events accentuates acrimony, which given the nature of our polity and civil
military relations destabilises and divides the society. This does not accords with the
current requirement of civil military relations to eradicate terrorism and extremism form
the country and shore up security and governance related institutions in the country.
Therefore divisive issues like Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report, the Kargil
conflict, Gen Musharraf’s intended trial and its related controversies etc. dictate that
government should refer these matters to the military asking for internal review and
necessary action to gather lessons, prevent recurrences and inform the defence
committee of the parliament.
271
Summation
The findings and recommendations documented above, relate to the outcomes of the
research focused on a finite period 1993-2003 in the backdrop of definite theoretical
and societal perspective. These provide food for thought and subjects for further
research in the field of democracy and civil military relations. Consolidating democracy
is a process, it demands consistent diligence, focus and foremost the right intentions. It
emerges as an act in which each character 9institution) has to play its role, yet the
responsibility of acting as well as directing the act is entrusted on the political elite.
They can make and break the show. Pakistan, therefore deserves smart dedicated
leaders who while are well versed in the art of state craft but their heart beats with the
down trodden. Leaders who can envision beyond their personal self.
272
Conclusion
This research is an endeavour to study the phenomenon of military coups in Pakistan
form the case study of Gen Musharraf’s take-over. It reviews the role of political elite
during the decade of 90’s and how they failed not only to consolidate democracy but
also led to another military coup within a decade. The consequent military regime with
little technical expertise to govern, when faced with hard political questions succumbed
and its efforts for self-legitimisation and regime continuation were not different from
the one it had displaced. It confirm that military elite when acting as political elite are
no different. The research evaluates the state of civil military relations and mechanisms
for exercising civilian control over the military in the theoretical context of Huntington
which has been exercised in Pakistan since inception but has not been effective in
rendering the military apolitical. Alternative evaluation by Stephan about military’s role
expansion and its impact on civil military relations points towards options available to
political elite to either step up with superior governance skills and assume the
responsibilities themselves or co-habit and incorporate military in the national security
architecture while simultaneously building institutions and their capacities to effect
smooth transition at an appropriate time. The research analyses the role of judiciary in
validating coups and its inability to safeguard the basic structure of the constitution.
In its contributions the research finds that Gen Musharraf’s coup was different from the
previous coups in which the pull factors and decisions of political elite drew military
towards politics and led to military interventions/ coup. In this case the push factor i.e.
protecting the honour of the military as an institution was the primary reason. It also
finds that the resultant military government was not able to contribute substantially to
improve strategic stability, rather the military elite like political elite were driven by
personal interest rather national. It contributes a new form to Finer’s four modes of
273
intervention i.e. a quasi-military government. Towards the end, it brought the findings
of qualitative thematic analysis and the results accrued from the quantitative numerical
data through a survey to ascertain societal perspective and integrating the two it has
proffered recommendations to stabilise the polity, consolidate democracy and
strengthen civil military relations as well as democratic control of armed forces to
prevent future military interventions.
274

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CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN:

MUSHARRAF’S ERA (1999 – 2003)

Noel Israel Khokhar, HI (M)

Reg. No: NDU-IR/PhD- 11/F-008

Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

Department of International Relations

Faculty of Contemporary Studies

National Defence University

Noel I Khokhar, HI (M)

Reg. No: NDU-IR/PhD -11/F-008

This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University,

Islamabad in partial fulfilment for degree of PhD in International

‘Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)’ has been

Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

Controller of Examination Head of Department

Tauqir Ahmed Dr. Mohammad Khan

“Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)” is supervised

by me and is submitted to meet the requirements of PhD degree.

Dated__________ Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

I hereby declare the thesis submitted by me titled “Civil Military Relations in

submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

Dated:__________ Noel Israel Khokhar, HI(M)

Musharraf’s coup in the backdrop of conceptual framework for democratic

consolidation witnessed after Gen Zia. It employs theoretical perspective furnished by

approaches for democratisation with a focus on transition approach to understand

in Pakistan and explores alternative explanations to construct mechanisms for

democratic control of military. Hypothesised on criticality of the role of political a nd

aspirations and why

acquires qualitative thematic data and validates it against conceptual framework.

Simultaneously it acquires quantitative numerical data to obtain societal perspectives

triangulation method’ to extract findings and proffer recommendations.

also simultaneously heading a research institute is arduous and stressful. It cannot be

to Dr Khan and Department of International Relations for facilitating me in completing

me farther than I thought I could go.

4.1 Timeline for Return of Democracy 167

4.3 Defence Expenditure as % of GDP 174

5.2 Response Question 2 219

5.4 Response Question 6 221

5.6 Response Question 9 224

5.8 Response Question 12 227

5.9 Response Question 13 229

5.11 Response Question 15 232

5.13 Response Question 4 235

5.14 Response Question 16 237

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS

IJI Islamic Jamoori Itihad

“Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and

prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being

Mr Jinnah’s Presidential Address to Constituent Assembly 11 August 1947

expands to incorporate issues related to military takeovers, military regime and

democratisation in Pakistan due to repeated military takeovers presents a dilemma.

effects. It in the main has impeded the process of democratisation consolidation,

Table 1: Civil and Military Regimes in Pakistan – 1947-20023

(1) 1947-1951: Liaquat Ali Khan

governance and corruption leading to institutional decay. Most importantly, in

military into politics which sometimes leads to military takeover.

hegemonic system which consequences into military’s intervention in politics. 8 The

occurred after independence in 1953 to quell disturbances related to Ahamdiya issue

independence.14 The notion of civilian supremacy was progressively eroded because of

formulation and governance arena.

Prime Ministers were prematurely removed and equal numbers of constituent

However, in order to pre-empt loss of power which he anticipated as a consequence of

in the first eleven years. 19

different dimensions. He fostered green and industrial revolution and stood up to