ON THE PROPOSITION THAT THE PHILIPPINES MUST

SHIFT TO A FEDERAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT

TOWARDS AN EMPOWERED GOVERNANCE, INCLUSIVE
GROWTH AND COUNTRYSIDE DEVELOPMENT
(NEGATIVE)

I. INTRODUCTION

Since time immemorial the Republic of the Philippines has

been under the form of a unitary system of government, this present

unitary-centrist form of government was inherited from our Spanish

colonizers and maintained by our succeeding colonial masters, the

Americans upon their arrival, for purposes of administration and

subjugation.

Under this form of governance, “a unitary government is a

single, centralized government, exercising powers over both the

internal and external affairs of the State.”1 This is rooted upon the

notion that, the national government supervises local government

affairs, as local governments derive their existence and powers from

the national government.

By and large, the Philippines follows the vertical distribution of

power, where power is distributed between two (2) levels of

government, the upper level is occupied by the national/central

government and the lower level by local governments. In this case,

local governments are subordinate entities to the national/central

government that derives both its existence and powers from the latter.

1
Antonio E.B. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 45 (2016).

1
 Under Article X, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the

country’s territorial and political subdivision is divided into provinces,

cities, municipalities and barangays and provides for two autonomous

regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras and constitute what

we refer to as local governments.

Local governments are defined as “a body politic and corporate

endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.” 2

Likewise, it merely exercises powers as a political subdivision of the

National Government3, in this current arrangement, local governments

remain to be agents of the national/central government. Local

legislative councils exercise only powers delegated unto them by

Congress as the national lawmaking body, within this framework, the

national legislature is still the principal of the local government units,

which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.4

Criticism that this centralized form of government has caused

economic growth and development as a whole to be concentrated in

the National Capital Region or “Imperial Manila”. As a consequence

of such, peripheral areas such as provinces and far-flung areas remain

underdeveloped.

Efforts to free local governments from the control of the central

government had been made as embodied by the various provisions in

the Constitution strengthening local autonomy. Likewise, through

2
An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991[LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE],
Republic Act No. 7160, Section 15.
3
Id.
4
Magtajas v.Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994).

2
constitutional mandate, Congress enacted into law The Local

Government Code of 1991 and became effective on January 1, 1992,

which serves as the legal framework for decentralization. Said Code

transferred certain responsibilities from the national government to

local governments and entailed an overhaul of the system as it

restructured responsibilities and financing. Moreover, it may also be

said that this shift is a realization and/or an acknowledgment that

development can be only achieved through empowering local

government units by giving them further powers to address purely

local affairs and by strengthening local autonomy.

However, despite these, calls for federalism persisted. As a

matter of fact, President Rodrigo R. Duterte made federalism a major

part of his campaign promise, citing inequality among regions and

supremacy of the National Capital Region as reasons, among other

things.

Under a federal form of government, a single state would be

comprised of constituent autonomous state (local) governments

merged into one, wherein the national government would exercise a

limited degree of power with regard to domestic affairs and would

generally retain full direction of its external affairs.5

Another argument favoring federalism is that it would allow the

creation of the Bangsamoro State that would end the ethnoreligious

conflict in Mindanao as it would appease Moro separatists. Likewise,

5
NACHURA, supra note 1, at 45.

3
supporters of the move towards federalism also argue that said form

of government is best suited for a country that is geographically,

culturally, and socially diverse such as ours and add that it would

improve local government access and control over resources as a

result of re-distribution of public funds as state and regional

governments would be given direct jurisdiction over local taxes,

consequently giving them direct access to the taxes generated by their

jurisdictions endowing them with greater control over their respective

budgets.

It is important to note that the proposition to shift towards a

federal state is not a novel idea; it persisted during the infancy of the

Philippines as an independent nation. In 1899 a proposal was made to

establish three federal states comprised of our country’s three major

island groups, Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Also, the 1935

Constitution is said to be a duplicate of the US Constitution with the

exception of the federal form of government, which laid down

autonomy for local governments. The 1973 Constitution expanded

local taxing powers of local governments and subsequently the first

Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 was enacted.6

II. UNITARY AND FEDERAL FORMS OF

GOVERNMENT EXPOUNDED

6
Angeli Camille P. Ancheta & Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Minding the Gaps: Philippine-Style
Federalism, Special Issue, ATENEO LAW JOURNAL, 350, 368-369 (2018).

4
 The Philippines is under a unitary form of government where

the 1987 Constitution granted local government a certain degree of

autonomy and where local governments act and form part of a larger

whole. Though not expressly stated, it may be inferred from certain

provisions of the Constitution such as the territorial and political

subdivisions of the Philippines7, the grant of local autonomy8, system

of decentralization9, the President’s exercise of general supervision

over local governments10, the grant of the power of local taxation 11

and others of similar import. However, it does not provide for a case

of imperium in imperi, or an empire within an empire12. The central

government retains control of local governments and remains to be its

principal. It is understood that this grant of autonomy does not

contemplate making mini-states out of local governments13.

As contradistinguished, “federalism is a form of government

consisting of a sovereign State as distinguished from other States

“solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional

units in its decision[-making] procedures on some constitutionally

entrenched bas[e]s.” In this form of government, states exercise a

level of autonomy. It features a division and sharing of powers

between the federal government and federal states where member

states divide power in such a way as to prevent either the federal or

7
PHIL. CONST., Art. X, Sec. 1.
8
Id. Art. X, Sec. 2.
9
Id. Art. X, Sec. 3.
10
Id. Art. X, Sec. 4.
11
Id. Art. X, Sec. 5.
12
Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 (1996).
13
Ganzon v. CA. 200 SCRA 271 (1991).

5
state governments from each other’s powers. Thus, powers may be

shared (concurrent powers), or exercised solely by either the federal

or state government (exclusive powers). Often, exclusive powers of a

particular level of government are enumerated, whereas those not

listed belong to other levels of government14.”

III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FEDERALISM

A. THE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM ARE ALREADY

EMBEDDED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
As previously mentioned, the 1987 Constitution mandates to

“ensure the autonomy of local governments,” 15 and further mandates

that “the territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local

autonomy.”16

In the case of Ganzon v. Court of Appeals17 the Supreme

Court held that “local autonomy means "a more responsive and

accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization." The Constitution as we observed, does nothing

more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over

the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to

"liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila."

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership

and inter-dependence between the central administration and local

government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The

14
Ancheta, supra note 6 at 355.
15
PHIL. CONST. Art. II, Sec. 25.
16
Id. Art. X, Sec. 2.
17
200 SCRA 271 (1991).

6
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under

the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no

other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-

government.” Although granted a reasonable degree of freedom, local

governments are and remain to be subject to the supervision and

accountable to the national government.

The concept of local autonomy has been the subject of Supreme

Court decisions and ruled that local autonomy is either

decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. In

Limbona v. Mangelin18 ruled that “autonomy is either

decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There

is decentralization of administration when the central government

delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to

broaden the base of government power and in the process to make

local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure

their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them

more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and

social progress."  At the same time, it relieves the central government

of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate

on national concerns. The President exercises "general

supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are

administered according to law."  He has no control over their acts in

the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.” 

18
G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989.

7
 “Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an

abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units

declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is

free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum

intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional

author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since

in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to

the central authorities but to its constituency.”19

In Pimentel v. Aguirre20 the Court ruled that “the national

government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local

governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative

powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The

purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly

responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,

political and social development at the smaller political units are

expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But

to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies

effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a

common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still

lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce

Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the

national government.”

19
Id.
20
G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.

8
 The creation of autonomous regions for Muslim Mindanao and

in the Cordilleras along social, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious

lines21, does not merely refer to delegation of administrative powers,

rather, it would seem that it amounts to the grant of political

autonomy as the Constitution while calling for an organic act for its

creation required said act to define the basic structure of government

for the region, which consists of executive department and legislative

assembly and special courts with special jurisdiction.22

Pursuant to the Constitutional directive which called on

Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide for a

more responsive and accountable local government structure,23 the

Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted and served as the

enabling law that transferred power, authority, and responsibility from

the national government to local governments.

Aside from administrative autonomy, albeit, under the general

supervision of the President but only limited in order to ensure that

they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions 24,

local governments likewise enjoy fiscal autonomy, which means that

they are given the power to create their own sources of revenue to

levy taxes, fees and charges, which exclusively accrue to them.25

21
PHIL. CONST. Art. X, Sec. 15.
22
Id. Art. X, Sec. 18.
23
Id. Art. X, Sec. 3
24
Id. Art. X, Sec. 4.
25
Id. Art. X, Sec. 5.

9
 Similarly, local governments are accorded their just shares in

the national taxes which are automatically released to them 26 and are

granted their equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and

development of the national wealth within their respective areas27. In

addition, they have the power to allocate their resources in accordance

with their own priorities, that extends to the preparation of their

budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints

thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on

local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and

resources or not.28

The Local Government Code of 1991 declares the policy of the

State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall

enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain

their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them

more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward

this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable

local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more

powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of

decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the

local government units29.

26
Id. Art. X, Sec. 6.
27
Id. Art. X, Sec. 7.
28
See note 11, supra.
29
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 2(a).

10
 The system of decentralization as mandated by the Constitution

serves as a foundation of the Local Government Code as found in

Section 3 of the said law. Essential to decentralization is the concept

of devolution which is defined as “the act by which the national

government confers power and authority upon the various local

government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities 30”

and the same law expressly provides that “any provision on a power

of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,

and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be liberally

interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon

shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower

local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the

existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local

government unit concerned.31”

As such, specific powers that were once only exercised by the

national government were devolved to local governments as

enumerated in Section 17 of the Code such as agricultural support

services, health and social welfare services, infrastructure facilities,

research services, information services, environmental management,

investment support services, communication and transportation

facilities to name a few. In this regard however, “the national

government or the next higher level of local government unit may

provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a

30
Id. Section 17(e).
31
Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 119249, August 21, 1997.

11
lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities

are not made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet

the requirements of its inhabitants.32”

Another, important concept to discuss is deconcentration, which

is the transfer of “requisite authority and power to the appropriate

regional offices or field offices of national agencies or offices whose

major functions are not devolved to local government units.33”

As can be gleaned, the buzzwords of local, fiscal,

administrative and political autonomy which serve as cornerstones of

federalism are adequately addressed, provided and already enshrined

in the Constitution and the Local Government Code. To revise the

existing Constitution would be nothing more than a mere duplication,

rather, provisions of the previously mentioned laws should be

strengthened and/or amended, as these would seem more economical

and practical.

B. THE MOVE FOR FEDERALISM IS PRIMARILY

DRIVEN BY THE ISSUE OF MONEY

Much as we would like to deny it, the primary consideration

and driving force for federalism is hinged upon the issue of money, of

fiscal matters. As previously discussed, local governments are already

given the essential powers to generate and use funds.

32
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Section 17(f).
33
Id. Sec. 528.

12
 Anent this, “[C]onsidered as the most revolutionary piece of

legislation on local autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with the

fiscal constraints faced by LGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to

include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws such as the

imposition of taxes on forest products, forest concessionaires, mineral

products, mining operations, and the like. The LGC likewise provides

enough flexibility to impose tax rates in accordance with their needs

and capabilities. It does not prescribe graduated fixed rates but merely

specifies the minimum and maximum tax rates and leaves the

determination of the actual rates to the respective sanggunian34.”

Similarly, in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal

fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal

corporations. It is understood, however, that taxes imposed by local

government must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality,

must not be confiscatory, and must be within the jurisdiction of the

local unit to pass.35

The power of local taxation however is subject to the exception

that local governments have no power to tax the national government,

its agencies and instrumentalities, except as otherwise provided in the

Local Government Code.36

Also, local government units are given their just share in the

national taxes which are automatically released to them without any

34
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, April 9, 2003.
35
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecom, Inc., G.R. 162015, March 6, 2006.
36
Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006.

13
further action. At present, the local government’s share is at forty

percent (40 %) and the remaining sixty percent (60%) accrues to the

national government. However, fiscal autonomy does not prohibit the

intervention of the national government, such as in cases where "x x x

[I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public

sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized,

upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of

the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and

Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of

both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the

necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local

government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty

percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of

the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x. 37"

Moreover, there are adequate safeguards/requisites before the

President may interfere in such matters, namely: (1) an unmanaged

public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with

the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of

Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and

(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the

Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget

and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall

in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of

37
Pimentel v. Aguirre, see supra note 19.

14
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the

current one.38 In sum, said Code broadened the taxing powers of local

governments and provided them a higher share of the national taxes

collected.

As noted earlier, local governments are also entitled to an

equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of

the national wealth (natural resources) within their respective areas.

Prior, to the enactment of the Code, local governments were not paid

for the use and development of natural resources. With the enactment

and effectivity of the Code, these local governments are now paid

millions of pesos for such.

Aside from the power of local taxation, local governments are

further empowered to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or

otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their

proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for

productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or

furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions

and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant communities

and active participants in the attainment of national goals.39

Another argument anent federalism is the protectionist policy

enunciated by the Constitution in Article XII National Economy and

Patrimony, which is argued to have stunted economic growth by

38
Id.
39
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 18.

15
preventing the infusion of foreign capital to the local economy.

However, this matter could be resolved by resorting to amending

pertinent provisions of the Constitution such as ownership and

citizenship requirements, use and enjoyment to include non-Filipinos

etc. without necessitating the transition to federalism.

C. LOCAL AUTONOMY IS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Local autonomy, simply means that “local governments have

certain powers given by the Constitution which may not be curtailed

by the national government, but that, outside of these, local

governments may not pass ordinances contrary to statute.”40

Section 16 of the Local Government Code, Congress has

delegated police power to local governments which provides “Every

local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,

those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,

appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,

and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units

shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and

enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of

the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the

development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and

technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic

40
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution A Comprehensive Reviewer, pp. 415-
416 (2011).

16
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their

residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and

convenience of their inhabitants.”

This particular power, being legislative in nature is exercised by

local governments through their respective local sanggunians through

the issuance of ordinances.

The power of local taxation, as discussed earlier is also granted

to local governments, constitutionally guaranteed and such power may

not be taken away from them.

Local eminent domain power is provided for in Section 19 of

the Code which provides “ A local government unit may, through its

chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the

power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the

benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just

compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and

pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain

may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been

previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:

Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately

take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation

proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at

least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property

based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:

17
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated

property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair

market value at the time of the taking of the property.”

Similar to police power and taxation, the exercise of eminent

domain is essentially legislative in nature; and is exercised through

their respective local chief executives acting upon an ordinance

enacted by its respective sanggunians.

Aside from the previously mentioned powers, local

governments are also given the power to reclassify lands and closure

and opening, as found in Sections 20 and 21 of the Local Government

Code, to wit:

“Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. -

A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the

sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases
to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall
have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided,
That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of
the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities,
ten percent (10%); and

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):

Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by
the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other
purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.

18
 (b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits
set in the next preceding paragraph.

(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws,
continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted
through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources: Provided. That the requirements for
food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be
taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.

x x x.”

“Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. -

(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently

or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling
within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent
closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate
substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed
without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A
property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed:
Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently
without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily
closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies,
agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and
highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of
which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a
written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley,
park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic
activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local
government unit concerned.

(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance,

temporarily close and regulate the use of any local street, road,
thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday,
flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where
goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce
may be sold and dispensed to the general public.”

Also noteworthy is the fact that local government units, as an

organ of government exercises both governmental and proprietary

functions, the latter is exercised like a private corporation would as

local governments have the powers to have continuous succession in

19
its corporate name; to sue and be sued; to have and use a corporate

seal; to acquire and convey real or personal property; to enter into

contracts; and to exercise such other powers as are granted to

corporations, subject to the limitations provided in the Local

Government Code and other laws41.

Hence, under our present set-up, local governments are granted

powers of self-governance, albeit, the exercise of which are limited

by the Constitution, Local Government Code and other relevant and

related laws, rules and regulations. Nevertheless, local governments

are equipped with adequate and sufficient governmental and

proprietary powers to effectively govern their respective jurisdictions,

short of granting them full political autonomy.

D. FEDERALISM WOULD RESULT TO GREATER

UNDERDEVELOPMENT, THE VERY EVIL THAT IT

SOUGHT TO ADDRESS

Pragmatically speaking, provinces, cities and municipalities are

not all on the same footing when it comes to human and natural

resources. Out of the existing regions only few are economically

viable to stand on its own and the rest would be left behind. To add,

various studies have shown that only a few regions are capable of

raising enough taxes on their own. Take for instance Metro Manila if

constituted as a state would be more resource rich and self-sustaining

than that of say, the Cordilleras or Muslim Mindanao, consequently,

41
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 22.

20
its development in terms of infrastructure and services (health,

education, etc.) would be vastly well-funded and superior than that of

its counterparts.

As posited by Artemio D. Palongpalong in his article entitled

“The Pro and Con Arguments on Federalism” he noted that “if one

province with relatively small annual revenues becomes self-

supporting under federal structure, these revenues in absolute terms

will remain small, compared to big and relatively developed

provinces, notwithstanding the percentage of retained revenues by the

province. Thus, there will be uneven development.42”

E. TRANSITIONING TO FEDERALISM WOULD BE

EXPENSIVE AND DIFFICULT

A shift from unitary to a federal form of government would

involve a revision of the present Constitution. It would imply a change

that alters a basic principle in the Constitution and affect several

provisions of it43. Before a revision of the Constitution may be had it

is necessary that it be made by either: 1) The Congress, upon a vote of

three-fourths of all its Members; or 2) A constitutional convention.44

Under the second mode, Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds

of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority

42
Artemio B. Palongpalong, The Pro and Con Arguments on Federalism, 30 J. ASIAN STUD. 5
(1992).
43
Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006.
44
1987 Constitution, Art. XVII, Sec. 1.

21
vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of call

such a convention.45

Revision, as a result would require the allocation and utilization

of vital public funds which could be instead diverted and used to our

country’s more pressing needs such as, disaster response, disaster

mitigation, public health and public education, to name a few.

Similarly, time spent by our legislators on such matter could be better

used in deliberating on or crafting laws that would best serve the

interest of the public at large.

On top of this, if implemented, a shift to a federal form of

government according to the National Economic Development

Authority would cost P253.5 billion on top of the current cost of

running the existing government, that would cause disruption to the

economy’s growth momentum and progress in infrastructure

improvement efforts.46

Moreover, it is estimated that on the first year of its

implementation, an additional P10 billion would be spent for offices

of the regions aside from vehicles and equipment. Expenses for the

equalization fund equivalent to not less than three percent (3%) of the

yearly national budget would be allocated to federated regions.47

45
Id. Art. XVII, Sec. 3.
46
Ben O. De Vera, Shift to federalism to cost gov’t P253.5B, says Neda available at
https://business.inquirer.net/256427/shift-federalism-cost-govt-p253-5b-says-neda (last accessed
December 27, 2020).
47
Id.

22
 In addition, its implementation would result to a mismatch on

funds and spending and impede the delivery of goods and services and

similarly affect foreign investments, international trade and our

country’s credit rating.48

F. FEDERALISM WOULD SET-ASIDE THE GAINS MADE

IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN MINDANAO THAT

WAS ALREADY ADDRESSED BY THE CREATION OF

THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN

MUSLIM MINDANAO

Mindanao is marred by decades of armed conflict and remains

to be one of the biggest issues in the country. Said conflict is primarily

driven by the Muslim Filipinos/Moros’ desire for self-determination

that is heavily linked to territorial and land issues. Said group is

comprised of Islamized ethnic groups in Mindanao with a distinct

ethnic, religious, social and cultural heritage as compared to that of

the Filipino majority, which is largely Christian.

This issue is one of the primary considerations for the proposal

to shift to a federal form of government. Decades of war and

negotiations has finally resulted to the enactment of R.A. No. 11054

otherwise known as “An Act Providing for the Organic Law for the

Bangsamoro Automous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Repealing for

the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled "An Act Providing for

An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,"

48
Id.

23
As Amended by Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled "An Act to

Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region

in Muslim Mindanao".

To summarize, said law created the Bangsamoro Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in response to the Muslim

grievances in the region and bears the distinct feature of being

parliamentary-democratic, hence the legislative and executive are

closely intertwined. Also, residents of the region will elect an eighty

(80) member parliament, who shall in turn elect a chief minister and

two (2) deputy ministers.49

With respect to the financial aspect, the most notable of all is

that the BARMM is given an annual allocation equivalent of five

percent (5%) of the net national internal revenue of the Bureau of

Internal Revenue and Bureau of Customs and its share with respect to

revenue taxes, fees, charges and the like imposed on natural resources

was pegged at seventy-five percent (75%).50

Likewise, BARMM has been characterized as having an

asymmetrical relationship with the national government and having

more autonomy than other regions as it would retain exclusive powers

over justice, agriculture, customary law, creation of sources of

revenue, trade, industry, local governments, social services, and the

49
Ver Marcelo, The Bangsamoro Organic Law: Everything you need to know available at
https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/07/24/bangsamoro-organic-law-primer-everything-you-
need-to-know-bbl.html?fbclid=IwAR3WzDoVdOYw1Fc7ykA9YT-
Ve0kaTyhQaO9iyrNeqo5LCiyCKSf8cszYdKY (last accessed December 27, 2020).
50
Id.

24
like while the national governments retain powers relating to external

affairs and defense.51

Hence, the contention that federalism would resolve the

decades long strife in Mindanao is no longer tenable, with the advent

of the BARMM which was precisely put in place to address

secessionist sentiments. To push for federalism, could otherwise put

into jeopardy and undo decades of negotiation and consultation,

further, fracturing the fragile peace in Mindanao.

G. POLITICAL DYNASTIES WOULD CONTINUE TO

REIGN

Despite the constitutional provision that “the State shall

guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit

political dynasties as may be defined by law52,” up to this date,

legislature has not yet passed any enabling law to address such, to

make matters even worse, most members of Congress are composed

of scions of political families consequently making the passage of

such a law an insurmountable task.

As such, Philippine politics is ravaged with political dynasties,

where political families monopolize positions of power and influence

that is handed down from one generation to another treating it as

property of their own. Consequently, it is not unusual to see

unopposed political candidates or members of the same family

51
Id.
52
PHIL. CONST, Art. X, Sec. 26.

25
occupying various and multiple appointive or elective positions within

the same government.

It is important to take note that in one Federalism draft which

contained a self-executory provision regulating political dynasties,

some members of the House of Representatives expressed

apprehension. Moreover, by Resolution of both Houses (RBH) No.

15, a draft constitution was devoid of any provision regulating

political dynasties and term limits for lawmakers was removed.53

Hence, it is not impossible for these political dynasties to

perpetuate themselves in a more decentralized form of government

such as in federalism, where rampant and unabated graft and

corruption could possibly prosper even more. Without safeguards

against political dynasties, federal system in the Philippines would

inevitably fail and eventually strengthen the choke hold of these

political dynasties over local governments.

IV. CONCLUSION

Amending or revising the Constitution in order to shift to

federalism is not necessary. The aims of federalism which is to

deconcentrate the powers of the national/central government are

already embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government

Code, notably, local autonomy, devolution, deconcentration and

decentralization.
53
Michael H. Yusingco, [Opinion] Why Federalism won’t work with political dynasties in power
available at https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/opinion-federalism-wont-work-with-
political-dynasties-in-power (last accessed December 27, 2020).

26
 Rather, the best step is to democratize and demonopolize the

powers vested in the national government by fully implementing the

constitutional and statutory provisions previously mentioned, that

would further spare the national treasury of unnecessary expenses.

Alternatively, the Local Government Code may be amended in

order to give local governments more power, where agencies and

instrumentalities of the national government would take a backseat

and primarily serve as coordinating agencies. Such an arrangement

would best serve constituents as local leaders and authorities are more

inclined and attuned to identify and redress the particular needs of

their respective localities than the national government.

As to fiscal matters, the Code could be further amended to

change the present division of national taxes from 60-40 to a higher

portion to be retained by local governments, which could then be

similarly applied to other earnings and revenues generated by them.

Also, the provisions of the Constitution with regard to National

Economy and Patrimony could be amended to allow the influx of

foreign investment to protected industries.

As noted earlier, local autonomy is self-government, at present

local governments are already granted and adequate powers that were

once reserved to the national governments, such as local police power,

taxation and eminent domain. The most practical and feasible thing to

do in this case is to enhance and augments its existing powers by

27
implementing and strengthening local autonomy, devolution,

deconcentration and decentralization guided by the principles of

growth ,development and prosperity for all.

By further fragmenting the already fragmented Philippine State

into constituent states, would yield to greater economic and political

inequality, Imperial Manila would remain to be Imperial Manila.

To be economically viable and to spur development,

competition and inter-state cooperation, states should be more or less

on the same footing, clustering of regions/states should rest on sound

and rational terms, giving utmost priority and consideration to

economic viability and survivability, which sadly, is not the case as

only a few of the proposed states are able to generate their own

sources of revenue to capably sustain their operations, putting those

already in a disadvantaged position into a more precarious state.

Consequently, the problem of underdevelopment and inequitable

distribution of wealth would still continue and persist under

federalism, creating further divide between rich and poor regions.

Underdeveloped regions will remain to be underdeveloped,

destitute regions are free to chart their own course towards their own

economic disasters.

As previously noted, in order to shift to federalism, it is

necessary for the present Constitution to be revised accordingly to

reflect these changes. Naturally and as a matter of course this would

28
entail the expenditure of public funds as well as the more valuable

resource, time. Said resources as posited earlier could be better

dedicated and spent on other pressing matters affecting the nation that

require immediate response especially in these times of pandemic.

Likewise, the fragile peace in Mindanao which is the fruit of

decades long wars, negotiations, and bargaining would be swept aside

that could possibly spark anew rabid secessionist fervor and drag the

country to political instability with great economic ramifications.

Similarly, political dynasties which were allowed to reign

unabated would continue to do so notwithstanding the form of

government. Federalism would further incentivize these political

families to perpetuate and greatly enhance their existing powers over

local politics and affairs..

Tersely put, the Philippines should not shift to a federal form of

government as it would not guarantee and is not a band-aid solution in

order to achieve an empowered governance, inclusive growth and

countryside development. Likewise, said aims and aspirations could

reasonably be achieved through other more practical and less

expensive means that are already at hand, such as by strengthening

existing local governments through demonopolization and

democratization, strengthening local autonomy, devolution,

deconcentration and decentralization, as noted earlier, without

resorting to revision and federalism.

29
 However, this goes without saying that there is a present need

to fine-tune the existing structures so as to better address changing

circumstances that our nation is currently embroiled in and make these

structures more responsive to current trends and developments,

especially in an ever increasing globalizing world.

30
References:

Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 (1996).

An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991[LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE], Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).
Angeli Camille P. Ancheta & Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Minding the
Gaps: Philippine-Style Federalism, Special Issue, ATENEO LAW
JOURNAL, (2018).
Antonio E.B. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, (2016).

Artemio B. Palongpalong, The Pro and Con Arguments on

Federalism, J. ASIAN STUD (1992).
Ben O. De Vera, Shift to federalism to cost gov’t P253.5B, says Neda
available at https://business.inquirer.net/256427/shift-federalism-cost-
govt-p253-5b-says-neda (last accessed December 27, 2020).

City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecom, Inc., G.R.

162015, March 6, 2006.

Ganzon v. CA. 200 SCRA 271 (1991).

Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution A
Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)
Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006.

Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989.

Magtajas v.Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994).
Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, G.R. No. 155650, July
20, 2006.
Michael H. Yusingco, [Opinion] Why Federalism won’t work with
political dynasties in power available at
https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/opinion-federalism-
wont-work-with-political-dynasties-in-power (last accessed December
27, 2020).
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110,
April 9, 2003.
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.
Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 119249, August 21, 1997.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution.

31
Ver Marcelo, The Bangsamoro Organic Law: Everything you need to
know available at
https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/07/24/bangsamoro-organic-
law-primer-everything-you-need-to-know-bbl.html?
fbclid=IwAR3WzDoVdOYw1Fc7ykA9YT-
Ve0kaTyhQaO9iyrNeqo5LCiyCKSf8cszYdKY (last accessed
December 27, 2020).

32