INTRODUCTION

The Philippines features a checkered history of constitutions. After announcing independence from
Spain, the Philippine revolutionary government gathered the Malolos Congress to create the first
republican constitution for the nation (Majul 1957, 7). This “Malolos Constitution” was short lived,
however, as the United States involved the Philippines formally since the signing of the Treaty of Paris in
1898. The country would not have another constitution until 1935, and such was made as part of
a transition to freedom as stipulated in Tyding-Mcduffie Act of 1934. From 1935 to 1973, the Philippines
remained as a democracy. Ferdinand Marcos, however, turned it into a dictator administration, with him
at its helm. His administration made the 1973 Constitution, afterward revised in 1976 and 1981, to support
and legitimize his snatch of both executive and legislative power within the Philippine government
(Rebullida 2006, 163-4). Political and socioeconomic pressures, however, detonated against the
administration in a series of events, beginning with the assassination of the opposition’s standard bearer
Benigno Aquino Jr., and ending with the first People Power Revolution. Having toppled the dictatorship,
Corazon Aquino and her administration pushed into reinstalling democracy. The primary step was the
creation and ratification of a new democratic constitution. Mrs. Aquino in this way made a Constitutional
Commission to compose such a constitution in 1986, succeeding to do so through its confirmation in
1987.

Since then, the current Constitution has remained unamended in spite of the various attempts made
by the post-Corazon Aquino administrations (Alconga 2006, 142). The Ramos administration made
an attempt in 1997 that pointed essentially at moving the system of government from presidentialism to
parliamentarianism (Alconga 2006, 141). This was the People's Activity for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) that was shot down through a Supreme Court decision in 23 September 1997 due
to need of an empowering law for such move. The Estrada organization, meanwhile, made the
Constitutional Amendment for Development (CONCORD) that aimed at lifting the prohibitive economic
provisions of the Constitution (Alconga 2006, 142). Allies of the Arroyo administration, led by then House
Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr., made an endeavor to gather a constituent assembly through the
Concurrent Resolution no. 16 in 2003-4.

The Arroyo administration itself gathered a Consultative Commission in 2005, which pointed both
at shifting the government system into a federal parliamentarian system and lifting the restrictive financial
arrangements of the constitution (Alconga 2006, 142-3). Concurrently was the Sigaw ng Bayan initiative,
headed by previous Consultative Commission member Atty. Raul Lambino, which was shot down by
another Supreme Court decision in 25 October 2006 due to the initiative’s failure to comply with the
necessities of people’s initiative and its recommendation of revisions instead of amendments (Lambino et
al. v. COMELEC 2006). Afterward, de Venecia made another attempt to gather a constituent assembly in
2006-7 (Hutchcroft 2008, 148-9). Then-Davao First District Representative Prospero Nograles and then-
Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. made the same attempt.

In line with this, the conflict in Mindanao has been just one of five major conflicts in the
Philippines since independence. It has to a great extent been gathered in the Muslim-majority areas of
central and southwestern Mindanao, which comprises of three of the present administrative regions
(Region IX—Western Mindanao; Region XII—Central Mindanao; and the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, or ARMM) and of four territories in Region XI—Southern Mindanao (Davao del Sur;
Sarangani; South Cotabato; and Sultan Kudarat) (Campo & Judd, 2005).

The goal of this study focuses on the following; To provide statistical data of the aggression of
MNLF in a Constitutional reform and to provide solutions to the practical problems between the Philippine
Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Another is to recommend ways on how to
maintain peace in the society. Therefore, this paper will focus on the solution to the conflict between the
Philippine Government and MNLF on a Constitutional Reform.

Statement of the Problem

This study seeks to determine the following:

1. What is the stratum of aggression of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on the proposition
of a Constitutional Reform? How aggressive they are?
2. What are the processes that the Government had implemented in order to conduct a resolution to
the conflict between MNLF?
3. What are the recommended ways on how to maintain peace in the society?
 Significance of the Study

The stratum of the aggression of MNLF on a constitutional reform must be studied in-order to
serve as a basis to the readers and future researchers to determine their strata of behavior using statistical
data and to provide an in-depth solution to the practical problems between the Philippine Government and
MNLF. Moreover, the study will give them hints on how to make comprehensive research in the future
by providing recommendations on maintaining peace in the society.

Conceptual Framework

• Origins of the Conflict
• Constitutional Reform
and the proposed
solution to the conflict
between the Philippine
Government and
MNLF
INPUT
PROCESS
• Determined solution of
• Provide statistical data conflict between MNLF
of the aggression of and the Philippine
MNLF on a
Government.
Constitutional Reform
• Provide timeline of the • Recommend ways on
Peace process between how to maintain peace
the Philippine in the society.
Government and MNLF
• Analysis of the given
data
OUTPUT

Figure 1. Research Paradigm

The researcher considered the three-process reflected in the Figure 1 such as the first process
(input) includes the discussion about the Origins of the Conflict between MNLF and the Philippine
Government and another one is the Constitutional Reform and the proposed solution of the conflict. In
addition, the second (process) includes the indication and analyzation of statistical data of the MNLF’s
behavior on a Constitutional Reform and providing a timeline of the peace processes. Lastly, the third
process (output) includes the determined solution of conflict between the two parties and the
recommended ways on how to maintain peace in the society.

Origins of the Conflict

Muslims within the Philippines make up 5 percent, or around 4 million, of the Philippines’ add up
to populace of 82 million. They are geographically concentrated within the islands of Mindanao and
Sulu within the southern Philippines, where they constitute around 20 percent of the region’s populace of
more than 16 million. They belong to three major (and ten minor) ethno-linguistic bunches: the
Maguindanaoans within the Pulangi Stream Bowl of central Mindanao, the Maranaos of the Lanao
Lake locale in central Mindanao, and the Tausugs within the Sulu archipelago. Muslims are within
the majority in five provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) and within
the Islamic City of Marawi, which are currently ARMM constituents.

The Muslims’ historical claim on Mindanao and Sulu as their homeland originates before the
Spanish colonization of the Philippines that started with the arrival of Common Legaspi in 1565. As early
as the latter portion of the thirteenth century, local Islamic communities and settlements of outside
Muslims were already thriving in Sulu. The first sultan of Sulu came to control around 1450; Sharif
Kabunsuan, who established the Maguindanao sultanate, came to Mindanao around 1515. Hence, long
before the Spaniards solidified their control over the northern portion of the Philippines, Islam was
thriving within the southern islands, and the sultanates in Sulu and Maguindanao were already well
organized. Trade and commerce by Muslim dealers over the Malay regions and past were too prospering.

For three centuries, the Muslims within the south effectively stood up to the incursions of the
Spanish colonizers, who were able to set up a firm foothold as it were within the Christian North. As they
called their enemies from Mauritania and Morocco, the Spaniards alluded to the Muslims within the south
as “Moros,” a term that afterward got to be an image of boldness and nationhood for the Muslims within
the Philippines. As the unconquered individuals of the South, the Moros were the masters of Mindanao
and Sulu, where they constituted 98 percent of the populace.

But American colonization succeeded in oppressing the Muslim south by 1914. Aijaz Ahmad
has distinguished the factors behind the moderately quick victory of the Americans in contrast to the
repeated failures of the Spaniards: First, the balance of forces: the Americans had advanced weapons and
the capacity to concentrate strengths over the archipelago successfully. Second, a new model of colonial
administration: the Americans designated impressive regulatory powers to governments at the civil and
locale levels, which clinched their steadfastness to the colonial specialist. Third, the demographic model of
colonization: entire populations, for the foremost portion landless and ambitious, were empowered to
migrate from the Visayas and Luzon to form Christian enclaves in overwhelmingly Moro areas, that is,
on lands the Muslims claimed as their possess. At the time the Philippine commonwealth was built up in
1935, government policy was already equipped toward acclimatizing the Moros into the bigger Philippine
society.

As large Christian resettlement communities grown rapidly in Mindanao from the 1930s ahead,
the Moros got to be the minority within the land they considered their own; the extent of Moro inhabitants
to the entire populace fell from 98 percent to 40 percent by 1976, and to around 20 percent as of now.
Moros presently possess less than 17 percent of the property on the islands, for the most part in
impoverished areas within the countryside. By the most recent estimates, 80 percent of the Moros are
landless.

From 1968 to 1971, political organizations composed for the most part of Moro students pursued
various campaigns for the recognition of the Moros’ right to self-determination as a people with a distinct
history and identity. These developments finished within the establishment of the Moro National Freedom
Front (MNLF), headed by Nur Misuari, a teacher at the College of the Philippines. Hundreds of youthful
Moros were sent to Malaysia for paramilitary preparing; Sabah in Malaysia got to be the supply and
communication center of the Moro rebels. At the same time, violent incidents including Christian and
Moro paramilitary bunches raised. These incidents obtained a more ominous dimension in 1971, when
the Philippine Constabulary sided with Christian paramilitary groups in offensives against the Moro
rebels.

On September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos announced martial law against the growing
insurgency. The MNLF pursued armed counter offensives and requested acknowledgment for an
independent state for the Bangsamoro (“the Moro homeland”). From 1972 to 1976, military and civilian
casualties come to 120,000. More than 100,000 individuals fled to adjacent Malaysia, and around one
million occupants of the southern Philippines were internally displaced. In 1975, the MNLF gained
recognition from the Organization of the Islamic Conference as the representative of Muslims within
the Philippines. President Marcos sued for peace and set out on a flurry of political activities with
OIC member states, which encouraged a cease-fire understanding and the opening of transactions
between the government and the MNLF.

In December 1976, the Marcos government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement in Tripoli
that called for the establishment of independence in 13 territories and 9 cities within the southern
Philippines. But the two sides had serious disagreements on the implementation of the agreement,
especially on the issue of a plebiscite. President Marcos unilaterally implemented the agreement and built
up temporarily autonomous governments in two locales that secured the territories and cities beneath the
Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF did not recognize the autonomous governments and denounced the
government of damaging the terms of the Tripoli Agreement. It was not until the peace agreement in 1996,
when previous Common Fidel Ramos was the Philippines’ president, that the MNLF and the Philippine
government settled all questions on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement and given an equation
for autonomy acceptable to the MNLF.

Constitutional Reform

A constitution might be characterized as a body of fundamental rules a society follows concerned

with the general determinations on the organization of the society’s government, the general
imperatives and strategies on both its individual and collective actions, and the general scope of its
individual’s freedom through the specification of rights (Rasch and Congleton 2006, 321; Elster 2000, 88-
101). The literature contends the value in a democracy of constitutional stability. A constitution ought to
be protected from intemperate change so that no one would accomplish financial and political gains from
the changes without consideration, let alone in expense, of others (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Ease
of change would possibly open nations to the “tyranny of the majority” against the minority (Riker 1982).

It was observed, however, that nearly all constitutions concede the possibility of amendment,
stemming from the reality that these prescriptive descriptions of the countries’ socio-political realities are
distant from idealize (Roberts 2009; Levinson 1995; Lutz 1994). It has been argued at that point that such
affirmation is based on the truth that reality itself is inalienably unsteady, that the nations themselves
would inevitably change, and hence time would come where there's need for the constitutions to reflect
such realities (Lutz 2006; Rasch and Congleton 2006; Holmes and Sunstein 1995). Rasch and Congleton
(2006) further argued that these constitutions constantly contain “unintended, unforeseen, and undesirable
consequences” to the society at huge, which would unavoidably thrust the society to request changes,
depending of course on the character, seriousness and complexity of these “consequences” at hand.
Constitutional change, within the form of amendments and revisions, are hence seen as an adapting
mechanism to maintain, at the exceptionally slightest, the fundamentals of the governance system that the
constitutions builds up and ideally keeps up. Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2009) imply that constitutional
change and longevity is eventually reflective of the kind, gravity and recurrence of the arrangements and
re-negotiations among the interested members of the society, as these are influenced by the environment
and structure of society on which they live.

Unfortunately, the conflict in Mindanao has been just one of five major conflicts in the Philippines
since independence. It has to a great extent been gathered in the Muslim-majority areas of central and
southwestern Mindanao, which comprises of three of the present administrative regions (Region IX—
Western Mindanao; Region XII—Central Mindanao; and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
or ARMM) and of four territories in Region XI—Southern Mindanao (Davao del Sur; Sarangani; South
Cotabato; and Sultan Kudarat) (Campo & Judd, 2005).

However, within the conflict-afflicted island of Mindanao, residents voted this year to approve a
landmark peace deal that it is hoped will signal an end to one of Southeast Asia’s bloodiest and
most recalcitrant insurgencies. Since the early 1970s, separatists have pursued an outfitted campaign
against the central government in Manila in interest of full autonomy or greater political independence for
the region’s abused Moro Muslim populace. After failed peace agreements and untrue first lights in 1976,
1989 and 1996, the past year has seen major progress. Yet, there are still certain peace agreements that
The Philippine Government with the MNLF had established. This aim to maintain stability of peace in the
society.
Data Analysis

Figure 1: Timeline and type of ceasefires by actors in the Philippines, 1990–2018.

Source: ETH-PRIO Ceasefire Dataset

Between 1990 and 2018, 149 ceasefires were declared within the Philippines. The larger part of
declared ceasefires were related to the CPP conflict (113). Within the Mindanao conflict, 35 ceasefires
were declared, basically by the two primary military groups, MILF and MNLF, but also with some of the
other militant groups working within the region (Moro National Freedom Front Misuari group (MNLF-
NM), Abu Sayyaf Bunch (ASG), and Maute Gather)

As Figure 1 shows, more than half of the ceasefires are related to devout occasions. Each year, the
Government pronounces a unilateral ceasefire with Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) over the
Christmas holiday, and in most a long time CPP has responded it. In 2018, however, it was CPP who to
begin with reported the Christmas ceasefires; as of now, the government has not responded the gesture.

Figure 2:

Conflict events and battle deaths, the Philippines, 2013–2017

Figure 2 appears the conveyance of strife occasions and fight deaths

within the two conflicts between 2013 and 2017. The CPP conflict has the
largest degree and the most noteworthy number of events, but the Mindanao
conflict, constrained to the southern island, has been more extreme in terms
of fight deaths.
Figure 3. Shows the timeline of the peace agreements between the Government of the Philippines
and the Moro National Freedom Front (MNLF).
Source: iiss.org

However, in spite of growing hopes for peace after voters embraced the creation of the BARMM,
Duterte has kept Mindanao beneath military law in an attempt to handle the danger from ISIS-
affiliated groups. Military law has remained in place since the attack of Marawi erupted in May 2017,
when jihadists from the Maute Bunch (MG), Abu Sayyaf Bunch (ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Opportunity
Warriors (BIFF) and Ansar Khalifah Philippines (AKP) joined strengths to take the city. In spite of
progressing peace efforts, these radical components have denied to yield.

The 30,000 strong MILF long ago dropped their request for full autonomy in favor
of independence. The last few decades have seen episodes of violence in spite of an arrangement of past
peace agreements having been signed. There's presently genuine optimism on both sides that the proposed
Bangsamoro region may represent a veritable way to peace.

The new jurisdiction will have its own 80-member chosen parliament, headed by a chief minister.
The locale will get 75% of taxes collected inside its region, whereas profiting from central government=
grants and improved get to natural resource incomes. Rebel leaders are moreover confident the new locale
will be a significant improvement on the flawed ARMM, which has been related with corruption and
censured for constituting independence in title as it were.

CONCLUSION

The frequency of human rights violations by diverse armed parties remains a major subject of
concern for civil society actors, who are finding it troublesome to come up with a reasonable reaction due
to pressures, security dangers, and need of support structures. Certain exceedingly delicate parts of Central
and Western Mindanao are blocked off or off-limits for human rights defenders and legitimate counsels
due to the obstacles postured by different armed parties and uncivilized groups. Civilians and communities
that have experienced abuses are incapable to share their grievances with relevant sources of help since of
fear of revenge and non-appearance of active human rights systems on the ground.

The peace process in Mindanao has gotten to be something of a political football in Manila. On
the one hand, for successive presidents confronting other political issues, a renewed offensive in Mindanao
has frequently given useful distraction. Marcos ‘beginning statement of crisis that empowered him to stay
in power for another fourteen a long time was legitimated in portion by the violence within the South,
whereas both Estrada and Arroyo propelled unused offensives when their popularity was sinking. On the
other hand, however, for rivals of incumbent presidents, peace transactions have every so often given
opportunities to score focuses against the administration by delineating them as deceiving the regional
solidarity of the Philippines.

The key test for a lasting peace in Mindanao will be whether the hearts and minds of Moro
Muslims can be won over by the new independent locale, which guarantees to decrease poverty and make
the conditions for more equitable development (Hart, 2019).
Recommendations

Figure 1. Strategic Framework to Attain Just and Lasting Peace

Source: neda.gov.ph.

The guide contains the six-point peace and development plan that would guide the peace process,
the execution of peace agreements, and the assurance and development of conflict-affected and powerless
communities.
 Attaining fair and lasting peace is one of the pivotal foundations that back the columns of the
Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022: Malasakit, Pagbabago, and Patuloy na Pagunlad. To
attain this, peace agreements with all internal armed struggle groups will be arranged and implemented.
Whereas engaging in peace talks, the government will also guarantee that conflict-affected and
defenseless communities are protected and developed. This is often outlined within the schematic graph
underneath.

Figure 2. Supplemental Strategies to attain Just and Lasting Peace

Source: neda.gov.ph
References:

• Alconga, H.L. (2006). “On the Crossroads: The Urgency and Propriety of Charter Change.” UST
Law Review 50:137-159. Retrieved from ustlawreview.com pdfvol. L Articles
On_The_Crossroads.pdf

• Anderson, B R O (1998) The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the world.
London: Verso

• Brown, G. (2019). The Long and Winding Road: The Peace Process in Mindanao, Philippines.
Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265074189_THE_LONG_AND_WINDING_ROAD_
THE_PEACE_PROCESS_IN_MINDANAO_PHILIPPINES/citation/download

• Brussels (2017). History of the conflict in the Philippines: an overview. Retrieved from
http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-692_en.html

• Campo, S. & Judd, M. (2005). The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and
Potential Peace Dividend. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-
1111996036679/20482477/WP24_Web.pdf

• Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton. 2009. The Endurance of National
Constitutions. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

• Hart M. (2019). Deciphering the jihadist threat to Mindanao’s Moro peace process. Retrieved from
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/05/philippines-jihadist-threat

• Lutz, D. (1994). “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment.” The American Political

Science Review 88. Retrieved from
http://econweb.umd.edu/~wallis/398W/lutz_amendment_APSR_1994.pdf
• NEDA (2017). Attaining Just and Lasting Peace. Retrieved from http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/SER-Chap-17_as-of-March-26.pdf

• Rasch, Bjorn Erik, and Roger D. Congleton. 2006. “Amendment Process and Constitutional
Stability.” In Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence, eds.
Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg, 319-42. Cambridge,Massachusetts: The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

• Roberts, A. (2006). “What Kind of Democracy is Emerging in Eastern Europe?” Post-

Soviet Affairs, 22 (1), 37-64. Retrieved from
sites.google.com/site/robertspolisci/kindofdemocracy.pdf

• Ryland, R. (2019). The Effects of Ceasefires in the Philippine Process. Retrieved from
https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/82e9f335-d5c1-4b27-b9d4-
f68f0aa82179

• South, A. (2017). The Mindanao Peace Process and Roles of Civil Society. Retrieved from
https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-mindanao-peace-process-and-roles-of-civil-
society

• United States Institute of Peace (2005). The Mindanao Peace Talks; Another Opportunity to
Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines. Retrieved from
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr131.pdf

• Vivo, M. (2015). Ammending the 1987 Philippine Constitution: An Examination of Contexts,

Interests and Movements and Failed Attempts during the Arroyo Administration (2001 – 2010).
Retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/18490376/AMENDING_THE_1987_PHILIPPINE_CONSTITUTIO
N_An_Examination_of_Contexts_Interests_and_Movements_in_the_Failed_Attempts_during_t
he_Arroyo_Administration_2001_-
_2010_Masters_Thesis_University_of_the_Philippines_Diliman_2015_