NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

Excerpts from 2018 Decisions of the Supreme Court

Compiled by

CARLO L. CRUZ

Fundamental Principles

Nature of the Constitution

As defined, "a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action." (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges
and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

[Note: In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, it was ruled that all
provisions of the Constitution are presumed self-executing, because to treat them as requiring legislation
would result in giving the legislature "the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law." And this could result in a cataclysm. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)]

This pronouncement notwithstanding, however, the Court has, in several cases, had
occasion to already declare several Constitutional provisions as not self-executory. (Council of
Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No.
216930, October 9, 2018)

[Note: In Tañada v. Angara, it was settled that the sections found under Article II of the 1987
Philippine Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In fact, in the cases of Basco, Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato, and Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically ruled
that Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of Article II, Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV, of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, respectively, are non-self-executing. The very terms of these provisions
show that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation.
And the failure of the legislature to pursue the policies embodied therein does not give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)]

In specific application to the present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the

Court also ruled that Section 1, Article XIV on the right of all citizens to quality education is also
not self-executory. The provision "for the promotion of the right to 'quality education' xxx [was]
put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights."
Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of instruction is
also not self-executory. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

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 Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of labor and security of tenure, was also
declared by the Court in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, (Agabon) as not
self-executory. Reiterating Agabon, the Court explained in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc., that Section 3, Article XIII, does not automatically confer judicially demandable and
enforceable rights and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a declaration of unconstitutionality xxx.
(Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education,
G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Here, apart from bare allegations that the K to 12 Law does not provide mechanisms to
protect labor, which, as discussed, have no legal bases, petitioners have not proffered other
bases in claiming that the right to protect labor and/or security of tenure was violated with the
implementation of the K to 12 Law. To be sure, the protection of labor from illegal dismissal has
already been set in stone with the enactment of the Labor Code and the Civil Service Law.

Given the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim that the K to 12 Law and/or any of its
related issuances contravene or violate any of their rights under the foregoing constitutional
provisions because these provisions simply state a policy that may be "used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws." They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. In other
words, the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law and its related issuances cannot be
nullified based solely on petitioners' bare allegations that they violate general provisions of the
Constitution which are mere directives addressed to the executive and legislative departments.
If these directives are unheeded, the remedy does not lie with the courts, but with the power of
the electorate in casting their votes. As held in Tañada v. Angara: "The reasons for denying a
cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade 'into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy-making." (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

State Immunity

Estoppel does not also lie against the government or any of its agencies arising from
unauthorized or illegal acts of public officers. Hence, we cannot hold petitioners estopped from
invoking their immunity from suit on account of having raised it only for the first time on
appeal. (The City of Bacolod v. Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289, January 17, 2018)

No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere
conferment and exercise of the power to issue business permits and licences. Accordingly, there
is merit in petitioners' argument that they cannot be sued by respondent since the City's consent
had not been secured for this purpose. This is notwithstanding petitioners' failure to raise this
exculpatory defense at the first instance before the trial court or even before the appellate court.
(The City of Bacolod v. Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289, January 17, 2018)

[Note: It must be emphasized that the nature of bingo operations is a form of gambling; thus, its
operation is a mere privilege which could not only be regulated, but may also very well be revoked or
closed down when public interests so require. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that injury
alone does not give respondent the right to recover damages, but it must also have a right of action for the
legal wrong inflicted by petitioners. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,

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there must be damnum et injuria; that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. (The City of Bacolod v.
Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289, January 17, 2018)]

Solco theorizes that the CA necessarily held the City Government of Makati liable for the return of the proceeds of
the tax sale to him when it nullified the tax sale proceedings. According to Solco, this could not be done without
violating the principle of the State's immunity from suit as the payment he made in the tax sale already formed part
of the public funds of the State as taxes, having been paid to answer a delinquent tax, and as such cannot be
withdrawn therefrom without the proper appropriation law. Solco pointed out, in addition, the importance of taxes
as the lifeblood of the government.

As expressly stated in Section 267, the amount deposited shall be paid to the purchaser
at the auction sale if the deed is declared invalid; otherwise, it shall be returned to the depositor.
In fine, such deposit is meant to reimburse the purchaser of the amount he had paid at the tax
sale should the court declare the sale invalid. xxx. With this, there is an assurance that the public
funds shall not be made liable whatever may be the outcome of the case. Thus, contrary to
Solco's contention, the City Government of Makati is not an indispensable party in this
annulment of title/land registration case, wherein the validity of the tax sale upon which the
applicant's claim is grounded, is in issue. (Solco v. Megaworld Corporation, G.R. No. 213669,
March 5, 2018)

Separation of Powers

Verily, this Court cannot - in the guise of interpretation - modify the explicit language of
R.A. No. 9903 in waiving the collection of accrued penalties to also include claims for refund. It
obviously violates the Trias Politica Principle entrenched in the very fabric of democracy itself.
(H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018)

In other words, the Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6,
2018)

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its
rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, et
al., explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

The Court's power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article VII, does not
empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and
how these military powers should be exercised. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935,
February 6, 2018)

In the same vein, Ordinance No. 092-2000 reflects the wisdom of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod as elected representatives of the people of Davao City. In local affairs, acts of local
officials must be upheld when it is clear that these were performed squarely within the statutory
authority granted to them and in the exercise of their sound discretion. (Evasco v. Montanez, G.R.
No. 199172, February 21, 2018)

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 Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is an
unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the pretext of dire exigency or urgent
necessity. This action runs afoul the separation of powers between the three branches of the
government and cannot be upheld. Even the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to
promulgate rules is limited in that the same shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. (Genuino v. de Lima, G.R. No. 197930; Arroyo v. de Lima, G.R. No. 199034;
Arroyo v. de Lima, G.R. No. 199046, April 17, 2018)

Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic
postulates for exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding
the Judiciary's privileged and confidential documents and information from any compulsory
processes which very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Such
exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the
exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one Supreme Court and lower courts created by
law. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

[Note: However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The invocation
of the Court's judicial privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are part of the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and duties.
xxx. By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the Judiciary's
deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)]

[Note: As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is
principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which Members of the
Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations, are called to appear and testify do
not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial
privilege may not be successfully invoked. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)]

Considering that its determination of what constitutes the just share of the LGUs in the
national taxes under the 1987 Constitution is an entirely discretionary power, Congress cannot
be compelled by writ of mandamus to act either way. The discretion of Congress thereon, being
exclusive, is not subject to external direction; otherwise, the delicate balance underlying our
system of government may be unduly disturbed. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3,
2018)

We agree with respondents that the issue presented is a justiciable question which allows
the exercise by this Court of its judicial power, and does not involve a political question. xxx. In
the case at bar, however, while it may appear that contesting the creation of the OPMF amounts
to questioning the wisdom behind the measure, such is not the case. As correctly argued by
respondents, the Court may take judicial action on said question since it is not contesting the
creation of the OPMF per se, but rather its inclusion in RA 9483, and the specific parameters
incorporated by the legislature in the implementation of the contested provision. More
importantly, violations of the due process and the equal protection clauses of the 1987
Constitution alleged by the respondents are well-recognized grounds for a judicial inquiry into
a legislative measure. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport
Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018)

Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to
look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Stated otherwise, the judiciary

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does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.282 Indeed, whether
an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the
best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner — all these are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them
within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. (Council of Teachers and Staff of
Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9,
2018)

Delegation of Power

Tests for a Valid Delegation

For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be
(1) complete in itself, that it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it
must fix a standard - limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the
delegate must conform. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport
Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018)

[Note: On the second requirement, Osmeña v. Orbos explained that a sufficient standard need not
be spelled out and could be implied from the policy of the law xxx. (Department of Transportation v.
Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018)]

[Note: Thus, this Court has previously instructed that a standard as general as the phrases "as far
as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market," and "stability of the peso exchange rate
to the US dollar" are neither unclear nor inconcrete in meaning, but are in fact determinable by the simple
expedient of referring to their dictionary meanings. The Court even stated that "[t]he fear of petitioners
that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To
be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.”
Indeed, the Court has, in numerous instances, accepted as sufficient standards policies as general as: xxx
"public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public
convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v.
Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was
accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United
States. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R. No. 230107, July
24, 2018)]

Put otherwise, in authorizing the OPMF Committee in determining the rate of impost for
the succeeding years, Congress in fact directed them to ensure that 90% of the funds that will be
accumulated will be enough to finance the following: (1) emergency response measures for oil
pollution cases; (2) clean-up operations for oil spill incidents; (3) research; (4) enforcement; and
(5) monitoring activities of the stated agencies in connection with oil pollution. These
parameters - the specified inclusions and exclusions, and the share that the itemized activities
shall have in the OPMF- to Us, adequately meet the required standards that make a delegation
of legislative power valid. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport
Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018)

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 Another ground that favors the validity of the assailed provision is that what Section 22
vested in them is merely the authority to fix the rate of the impost, taking into consideration the
parameters therein clearly stated. In other words, this authority is actually limited by the
sufficiency of the Fund to meet the identified items. They were not given any discretion to add
to these parameters or to disregard them. In other words, the delegates are expected to faithfully
follow these standards set by the law, lest their actions will be struck down as illegal for having
exceeded the terms of the agency. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea
Transport Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018)

Third, there is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the K to 12

Law. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

[Note: In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative

power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein. The sufficient standard test, on the
other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)]

The K to 12 Law adequately provides the legislative policy that it seeks to implement.
xxx. Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide the DepEd,
CHED and TESDA in carrying out the provisions of the law, from the development of the K to
12 BEC, to the hiring and training of teaching personnel and to the formulation of appropriate
strategies in order to address the changes during the transition period. xxx. Clearly, under the
two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential terms
and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED
and TESDA. The fact that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision on labor does not make
said law incomplete. The purpose of permissible delegation to administrative agencies is for the
latter to "implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide."152 With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the legislature has found it
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies, who are supposed to be experts in the particular
fields assigned to them, the authority to provide direct and efficacious solutions to these
problems. This is effected by the promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as the K to 12
IRR jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint Guidelines issued in
coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor and management rights relevant to
implementation of the K to 12 Law. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

[Note: Petitioners also claim that DO No. 31 is a usurpation of legislative authority as it creates a
law without delegation of power. xxx. DO No. 31 did not add two (2) years to basic education nor did it
impose additional obligations to parents and children. DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation
addressed to DepEd personnel providing for general guidelines on the implementation of a new
curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the K to 12 basic education. DO No. 31 was issued in
accordance with the DepEd's mandate to establish and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated

6
system of education relevant to the goals of national development, formulate, plan, implement, and
coordinate and ensure access to, promote equity in, and improve the quality of basic education; and
pursuant to the Secretary's authority to formulate and promulgate national educational policies, under
existing laws. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)]

Local Governments

Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao
(Davao City Charter), enacted on June 19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with
the legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and
maintenance of billboards and similar structures. With the aforementioned law, Congress
expressly granted the Davao City government, through the Sangguniang Panlungsod, police
power to regulate billboard structures within its territorial jurisdiction. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R.
No. 199172, February 21, 2018)

[Note: As stated earlier, the power to regulate billboards within its territorial jurisdiction has been
delegated by Congress to the city government via the Davao City Charter. This direct and specific grant
takes precedence over requirements set forth in another law of general application, in this case the
National Building Code. Stated differently, the city government does not need to refer to the procedures
laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power. Thus, the consistency between Ordinance
No. 092-2000 with the National Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the former. To be clear, even
if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements as to the construction and regulation of
billboards, the city government may impose stricter limitations because its police power to do so
originates from its charter and not from the National Building Code. The ordinance specifically governs
billboards and other similar structures situated within Davao City, independent of the provisions of the
National Building Code. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)]

Administrative Bodies

The Court has consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are
not exact replicas of those in administrative investigations. Recourse to discovery procedures as
sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for the OGCLS-BSP. Hence, We cannot
subscribe to Norlina's tenacious insistence for the OGCLS-BSP to strictly adhere to the Rules of
Court so as not to purportedly defeat her rights. (Sibayan v. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, January 17,
2018)

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a

court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it cannot be waived. (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17,
2018)

[Note: However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled
that failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of
laches. (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018)]

[The] CIAC (Construction Industry Arbitration Commission) is a quasi-judicial body

exercising quasi-judicial powers. (Metro Rail Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018)

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 [Note: CIAC was created under Executive Order No. 1008 to establish an arbitral machinery that
will settle expeditiously problems arising from, or connected with, contracts in the construction industry.
Its jurisdiction includes construction disputes between or among parties to an arbitration agreement, or
those who are otherwise bound by the latter, directly or by reference. Thus, any project owner, contractor,
subcontractor, fabricator, or project manager of a construction project who is bound by an arbitration
agreement in a construction contract is under CIAC's jurisdiction in case of any dispute. (Metro Rail
Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018)]

[Note: A quasi-judicial agency is a government body, not part of the judiciary or the legislative
branch, which adjudicates disputes and creates rules which affect private parties' rights. It is created by
an enabling statute, and thus, its existence continues beyond the resolution of a dispute and is
independent from the will of the parties. Its powers are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied in the enabling law. (Metro Rail Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
200401, January 17, 2018)]

[Note: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power has been defined as the power: "(1) to
hear and determine questions of fact to which legislative policy is to apply, and (2) to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." (Metro
Rail Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018)]

[Note: Arbitration under a quasi-judicial body is similar to commercial arbitration in that its
factual findings are generally accorded respect and finality. However, commercial arbitration is conducted
by ad-hoc bodies created by stipulation of parties for the purpose of settling disputes concerning their
private or proprietary interests. In general, the findings in commercial arbitration are respected to uphold
the autonomy of arbitral awards. On the other hand, quasi-judicial agencies were created for a speedier
resolution of controversies on matters of state interest that require specialized knowledge and expertise.
(Metro Rail Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018)]

[Note: Initially, CIAC decisions are appealable only to this Court. However, when the Rules of
Court were enacted, appeals from CIAC decisions became appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43. (Metro Rail Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018)]

The SSS (through the SSC) is empowered to issue the necessary rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of R.A. No. 9903. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines
of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the
branches of the government. (H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No.
228087, January 24, 2018)

… until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the basic formulas contained in
DAR administrative orders partake of the nature of statutes; xxx (Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Alcantara, G.R. No. 187423, February 28, 2018)

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the
NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and
authority to decide on a controversy involving rights of non-ICCs/IPs which should be brought
before the courts of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Plainly,
contrary to the court a quo's conclusion, this case cannot be subjected to the NCIP's jurisdiction
as respondents are clearly non-ICCs/IPs. (Heirs of Tunged v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
Inc., G.R. No. 231737, March 6, 2018)

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 Bangko Sentral's Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency. Its decisions, resolutions,
and orders are the decisions, resolutions, and orders of a quasi-judicial agency. Any action filed
against the Monetary Board is an action against a quasi-judicial agency. This does not mean,
however, that Bangko Sentral only exercises quasi-judicial functions. As an administrative
agency, it likewise exercises "powers and/or functions which may be characterized as
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of these
five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute." (Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 200678, June 4, 2018)

[Note: As previously discussed, respondent Bangko Sentral exercises a myriad of functions,

including those that may not be necessarily exercised by a quasi-judicial agency. It is settled, however,
that it exercises its quasi-judicial functions through respondent Monetary Board. Any petition for
certiorari against an act or omission of Bangko Sentral, when it acts through the Monetary Board, must be
filed with the Court of Appeals. (Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
G.R. No. 200678, June 4, 2018)]

In City Government of Baguio, it was recognized that the NCIP is empowered to issue
TROs and writs of injunction. (The Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng, G.R. No. 195905, July
4, 2018, citing The City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng, 597 Phil. 668 [2009])

[Note: Nevertheless, the said case ruled that therein respondents were not entitled to an
injunctive relief because they failed to prove their definite right over the properties they claimed. The
circumstances in City Government of Baguio and the present case are similar. In both cases, the claimants
principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest
Reserve. Unfortunately, it was ruled that the said proclamation is not a definitive recognition of their
ancestral land claims as it only identifies their predecessors-in-interest as claimants. Thus, it is quite
unfortunate that the CA found that the actions of the NCIP were in accordance with law. A cursory
reading of the decision indicates that it merely relied on the applicable statute without regard to the
doctrines and principles settled by the Court. The pronouncements in City Government of Baguio should
have put the appellate court on notice that the actions of the NCIP were baseless because it settled that
claimants of lands in the Busol Water Reserve cannot rely on anticipatory claims for the issuance of the
preventive writ. It befuddles the Court why the CA did not bother to address the said ruling in its
discussions and perfunctorily relied on the statute alone. (The Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng, G.R.
No. 195905, July 4, 2018, citing The City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng, 597 Phil. 668 [2009])
Administrative actions reviewable by this Court, therefore, may either be
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. As the name implies, quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power of an administrative agency to make rules and regulations that have the force and
effect of law so long as they are issued "within the confines of the granting statute." The
enabling law must be complete, with sufficient standards to guide the administrative agency in
exercising its rule-making power. As an exception to the rule on non-delegation of legislative
power, administrative rules and regulations must be "germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law."
xxx.

On the other hand, quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is "the power to

hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law." The constitutional permissibility of the grant of quasi-judicial powers to
administrative agencies has been likewise recognized by this Court. (The Provincial Bus Operators

9
Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018)

Usually contrasted with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Though both concepts aim to maximize the special technical
knowledge of administrative agencies, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
requires courts to not resolve or "determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal." The issue is jurisdictional and the court, when
confronted with a case under the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, has no option but to
dismiss it.

In contrast, exhaustion of administrative remedies requires parties to exhaust all the

remedies in the administrative machinery before resorting to judicial remedies. The doctrine of
exhaustion presupposes that the court and the administrative agency have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a matter. However, in deference to the special and technical
expertise of the administrative agency, courts must yield to the administrative agency by
suspending the proceedings. As such, parties must exhaust all the remedies within the
administrative machinery before resort to courts is allowed. (The Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018)

[Note: Discussion of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative

remedies aside, the present case does not require the application of either doctrine. Department Order
No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 were issued in the exercise of the DOLE's and the
LTFRB's quasi-legislative powers and, as discussed, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion
of administrative remedies may only be invoked in matters involving the exercise of quasi-judicial power.
Specifically, Department Order No. 118-12 enforces the application of labor standards provisions, i.e.,
payment of minimum wage and grant of social welfare benefits in the public bus transportation industry.
For its part, Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 was issued by the LTFRB in the exercise of its power to
prescribe the terms and conditions for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and its power to
promulgate and enforce rules and regulations on land transportation public utilities. (The Provincial Bus
Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018)]
The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of tax
offenses is a discretionary quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus.
It is not a legally mandated ministerial duty. (Lihaylihay v. The Treasurer of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 192223, July 23, 2018)

The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution

and the law. Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008 provides that the CIAC shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, construction contracts, which may
involve government or private contracts, provided that the parties to a dispute agree to submit
the dispute to voluntary arbitration. In LICOMCEN, Inc. v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., the Court
held that the text of Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008 is broad enough to cover any dispute arising
from, or connected with, construction contracts, whether these involve mere contractual money
claims or execution of the works. What is only excluded from the coverage of E.O. No. 1008 are
disputes arising from employer-employee relationships, which shall continue to be covered by
the Labor Code of the Philippines. (Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority v.
Global-V Builders Co., G.R. No. 219708, October 3, 2018)

10
 Further, the Arbitral Tribunal found that Global-V has complied with the condition of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, correctly citing Vigilar, et al. v. Aquino. xxx. It correctly
ruled that considering the amount of claim involved in this case, the period of almost five years
of non-payment can already be considered as unreasonable delay, which would exempt
Global-V from the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Tourism Infrastructure and
Enterprise Zone Authority v. Global-V Builders Co., G.R. No. 219708, October 3, 2018)

There is also no merit in petitioners' claim that publication is necessary for DO No. 31 to
be effective. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, including the rules
and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties are not
required to be published. At any rate, the Court notes that DO No. 31 was already forwarded to
the University of the Philippines Law Center for filing in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and took effect pursuant to said provisions. (Council of Teachers and
Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October
9, 2018)

Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate business is broad
enough to include jurisdiction over a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and mortgage
and the grant of incidental reliefs such as a cease and desist order. (Concorde Condominium, Inc. v.
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 228354, November 26, 2018)

National Territory

The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of Brgy.
San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2(a) of PD 532,
"Philippine waters''' is defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs,
bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its
depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or Iegal
title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered
part of Philippine waters. (People v. dela Peña, G.R. No. 219581, January 31, 2018)

Fundamental Principles and State Policies

Treaties

Petitioners also contend that the expansion of compulsory education to include

kindergarten and secondary education violates the UDHR, the ICESCR and the CRC. xxx. There
is absolutely nothing in Article 26 that would show that the State is prohibited from making
kindergarten and high school compulsory. The UDHR provided a minimum standard for States
to follow. Congress complied with this minimum standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the
minimum by making kindergarten and high school compulsory. This action of Congress is, in
turn, consistent with Article 41 of the CRC which provides that "[n]othing in the present
Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights
of the child and which may be contained in: (a) [t]he law of a State party; or (b) [i]nternational

11
law in force for that State.'' (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

The Republic was correct in arguing that the concept of continental shelf under the
UNCLOS does not, by the doctrine of transformation, automatically apply to the LGUs.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December 4, 2018)

Separation of Church and State

The totality of evidence in this case does not justify the dismissal of Dagdag from her
employment considering that there was no legal impediment to marry between Dagdag and the
father of her child at the time of the conception. To reiterate the ruling of this Court in Leus and
Capin-Cadiz, pregnancy of a school teacher out of wedlock is not a just cause for termination of
an employment absent any showing that the pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently,
pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral. (Union School
International v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 234186, November 21, 2018)

Here, it is evident that PhilPost - under the express orders of then President Benigno Aquino III
(President Aquino III), through Proclamation No. 815 - printed, issued and sold the INC commemorative
stamps. PhilPost's act gave rise to petitioner's injunction suit in which he made the following allegations:
(1) the printing of the INC commemorative stamps violated Sec. 29(2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) the purpose of the stamp as indicated in the MOA is "tantamount to sponsorship" of a religious
activity, violative of the non-establishment clause. These assertions are no longer hypothetical in nature,
but already amount to a legal claim susceptible for adjudication.

It is at once apparent that petitioner has summarily equated religion to

unconstitutionality. Certainly, examination of jurisprudence, both here and in the United States,
as well as the context over which this stamp has been issued, inevitably leads this Court to agree
with the CA, and uphold the issuance of the INC commemorative stamp. (Peralta v. Philippine
Postal Corporation, G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018)

[Note: It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance of the aforesaid 50,000 stamps were
all paid for by INC. Any perceived use of government property, machines or otherwise, is de minimis and
certainly do not amount to a sponsorship of a specific religion. (Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation, G.R.
No. 223395, December 4, 2018)]

[Note: Also, We see no violation of the Constitutional prohibition on establishment of religion,

insofar as the remaining 1,150,000 pieces of stamps printed and distributed by PhilPost. First, there is no
law mandating anyone to avail of the INC commemorative stamps, nor is there any law purporting to
require anyone to adopt the INC's teachings. Arguably, while then President Aquino issued Proclamation
No.815, s. 2014, authorizing the issuance of the INC commemorative stamp, the same did not contain any
legal mandate endorsing or requiring people to conform to the INC's teachings. The secular purpose
behind the printing of the INC commemorative stamp is obvious from the MOA between INC and
Philpost xxx. The centennial celebration of the Iglesia ni Cristo, though arguably involves a religious
institution, has a secular aspect. xxx. It is simply an acknowledgment of INC's existence for a hundred
years. It does not necessarily equate to the State sponsoring the INC. xxx. As to the use of the
government's machinery in printing and distribution of the 1.2 million stamps, this Court does not find
that the same amounted to sponsorship of INC as a religion considering that the same is no different from
other stamps issued by PhilPost acknowledging persons and events of significance to the country, such as
those printed celebrating National Artists, past Philippine Presidents, and events of organizations,

12
religious or not. We note that PhilPost has also issued stamps for the Catholic Church such as those
featuring Heritage Churches, 15th International Eucharistic Congress, and Pope Francis. In the past, the
Bureau of Posts also printed stamps celebrating 300 years of Islam in the 1980s. Likewise, our review of
the records does not disclose that PhilPost has exclusively or primarily used its resources to benefit INC,
to the prejudice of other religions. Finally, other than this single transaction with INC, this Court did not
find PhilPost to have been unneccesarily involved in INC's affairs. (Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation,
G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018)]

Based on the foregoing, this Court is not convinced that PhilPost has actually used its
resources to endorse, nor encourage Filipinos to join INC or observe the latter's doctrines. On
the contrary, this Court agrees with respondents that the printing of the INC commemorative
stamp was endeavored merely as part of PhilPost's ordinary business. (Peralta v. Philippine Postal
Corporation, G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018)

Adopting the stance of benevolent neutrality, this Court deems the design of the INC
commemorative stamp constitutionally permissible. As correctly held by the CA, there is an
intrinsic historical value in the fact that Felix Y. Manalo is a Filipino and that the INC is a
Filipino institution. xxx. Thus, this Court sees no religious overtones surrounding the
commemorative stamps, as insisted upon by the petitioner. (Peralta v. Philippine Postal
Corporation, G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018)

[Note: Indeed, the design depicted in the INC commemorative stamp is merely a recognition of
the continuous existence of a group that is strictly Filipino. (Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation, G.R.
No. 223395, December 4, 2018)]

Social Justice

To this end, the Court upholds and abides by this canon of interpretation against
applicants of the benefits of R.A. No. 9903 as a recognition to the constitutional policies of
freeing the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services and
affording full protection to labor. It is consistent with the congressional intent of placing a
primary importance in helping the SSS increase its funds through stimulating cash inflows by
encouraging delinquent employers to settle their accountabilities. Thus, R.A. No. 9903 shall be
understood as not to include a refund of penalties paid before its effectivity. (H. Villarica
Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018)

The Court has reiterated that the policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best, it may mitigate the
penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative
of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be (a) refuge of scoundrels any more than can
equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may
do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those
who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor

13
with the blemishes of their own character. (Central Azucarera de Bais v. Heirs of Zuelo Apostol, G.R.
No. 215314, March 14, 2018)

Youth

Necessarily, herein minor appellants shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under

Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child, and
provides for the confinement of convicted children. (People v. Sisracon, G.R. No. 226494,
February 14, 2018)

We note, however, that FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense,
should benefit from a suspended sentence pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344, or the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. (People v. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, June 6, 2018)

While Section 12, Article II grants parents the primary right to rear and educate their
children, the State, as parens patriae, has the inherent right and duty to support parents in the
exercise of this constitutional right. In other words, parents' authority and the State's duty are
not mutually exclusive but complement each other. In the matter of education, a parent is
always the first teacher. The language first learned by the child or his "mother tongue", which
the child understands best and hence, an effective tool for further learning, is first and foremost
taught by the parent. The inclusion in the K to 12 Program of the MT as a medium of instruction
and a subject in the early years of learning is, therefore, not intended to curtail the parents' right
but to complement and enhance the same. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities
of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised
Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute
that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and
exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child
traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but
includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development[."] (Araneta v. People, 578 Phil. 876 [2008], cited in
Fernandez v. People, G.R. No. 217542, November 21, 2018)

Women

By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State has committed to
ensure and to promote gender equality. In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the
Magna Carta for Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family

14
relations." This necessarily includes the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is
the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce
becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should
be given to the Filipino spouse. The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse
from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a
Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law
may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce
proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals. (Racho v. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25,
2018)

Ecology

Our legislators saw the need for a concerted effort of the government and society to
abate, control, and prevent the pollution of our country's water resources. Hence, the Clean
Water Act was enacted in the hope that "this vital measure will offer the future generation an
abundant supply of potable water, clean rivers to swim [in], and a better access to safe water for
their daily use." (Republic v. N. de la Merced & Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 201501, January 22, 2018)

Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct
action to this Court and the CA where it is dictated by public welfare, this Court is of the view
that the prior 30-day notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749 is
inapplicable. It is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions
brought directly before it. (Osmeña v. Garganera, G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018)

Labor

When the evidence in labor cases is in equipoise, doubt is resolved in favor of the
employee. (Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., G.R. No. 207354, January 10, 2018)

[Note: Where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial evidence to prove their
allegations, the evidence is considered to be in equipoise. In such a case, the scales of justice are tilted in
favor of labor. Thus, petitioners are hereby considered to have been illegally dismissed. (Hubilla v. HSY
Marketing Ltd., Co., G.R. No. 207354, January 10, 2018)]

The Legislative Department

Laws

In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that
the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar.
Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700
merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a
clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites
therein stated. Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of
the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation

15
to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all
actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. (Chailese Development Company, Inc.
v. Dizon, G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018)

Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive
application. It is well known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect
only governs rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law. However, if a right
be declared for the first time by a subsequent law, it shall take effect from that time even though
it has arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another
acquired right of the same origin. (Felisa Agricultural Corporation v. National Transmission
Corporation, G.R. No. 231655, July 2, 2018)

[Note: In this case, the government had long entered the subject land and constructed the
transmission towers and lines. However, petitioner initiated inverse condemnation proceedings after the
effectivity of RA 8974 on November 26, 2000; hence, procedurally and substantially, the said law should
govern. (Felisa Agricultural Corporation v. National Transmission Corporation, G.R. No. 231655, July 2, 2018)]

xxx. petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the nationwide regional
consultations conducted by DepEd pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38 and 98, series of
2011. xxx. The Philippine Congress, in the course of drafting the K to 12 Law, also conducted
regional public hearings between March 2011 to February 2012, wherein representatives from
parents-teachers' organizations, business, public/private school heads, civil society
groups/non-government organizations/private organizations and local government officials
and staffs were among the participants. And even assuming that no consultations had been
made prior to the adoption of the K to 12, it has been held that the "[p]enalty for failure on the
part of the government to consult could only be reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify
government action." (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Titles of Bills

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court has repeatedly laid down the
rule that - Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index
of the act. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R. No.
230107, July 24, 2018, citing Giron v. Commission on Elections, 702 Phil. 30 [2013])

[Note: We find that Section 22 is not a rider but is an essential provision to attain the purpose of
RA 9483. (Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R. No. 230107,
July 24, 2018)]

Enrolled Bills

Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine,"
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of

16
the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its
provisions but also as to its due enactment. The rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests
on the consideration that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments requires
the [Judiciary] to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly
arises, [as in the instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution." (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

[Note: Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the enrolled bill
doctrine. Claims that the required three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment has not been obtained,
that irregularities attended the passage of the law, that the tenor of the bill approved in Congress was
different from that signed by the President, that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the
bill, and even claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to the President contained provisions which
had been "surreptitiously" inserted by the conference committee, had all failed to convince the Court to
look beyond the four corners of the enrolled copy of the bill. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)]

[Note: As correctly pointed out by private respondent Miriam College, petitioners' reliance on
Astorga is quite misplaced. They overlooked that in Astorga, the Senate President himself, who
authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no
longer an enrolled bill to consider. Without such attestation, and consequently there being no enrolled bill
to speak of, the Court was constrained to consult the entries in the journal to determine whether the text
of the bill signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. In stark
contrast to Astorga, this case presents no exceptional circumstance to justify the departure from the
salutary rule. The K to 12 Law was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives on January 20,
2013, approved by the President on May 15, 2013, and, after publication, took effect on June 8, 2013. Thus,
there is no doubt as to the formal validity of the K to 12 Law. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)]

Parliamentary Immunity

Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private

respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda
Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee
hearings in the Senate. With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's remarks fall
outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its
committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot
likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance
of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative
process. (Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018, citing Jimenez v.
Cabangbang, 124 Phil. 196 [1966])

[Note: To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of any

lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws.
Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to
communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is
"political in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in
the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary
immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because the

17
statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation. (Trillanes v.
Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018)]

Legislative Inquiries

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that
obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation
before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
called relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then
the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the
said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and
there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. (Balag v. Senate, G.R. No.
234608, July 3, 2018)

[Note: “Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances: First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. xxx. Second, the legislative
inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all
pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate
are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of
the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry
ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.” (Balag v. Senate,
G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)]

Even before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the Court in Arnault v. Nazareno
recognized that the power of inquiry is an "essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function." In Senate of the Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, the Court categorically pronounced that
the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch, as in the instant
case. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Although expansive, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not without limitations. Foremost, the inquiry must be in furtherance of a
legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation, and as such, "investigations conducted solely to
gather incriminatory evidence and punish those investigated" should necessarily be struck
down. Further, the exercise of the power of inquiry is circumscribed by the above-quoted
Constitutional provision, such that the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It is jurisprudentially settled that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3,
2018)

It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the events surrounding the filing of the
present Omnibus Petition bear the unsavory impression that a display of force between the CA
and the Congress is impending. Truth be told, the letter of the CA Justices to the Court En Banc
betrays the struggle these CA Justices encountered in view of the Congressional power to cite in
contempt and consequently, to arrest and detain. These Congressional powers are indeed

18
awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the Court of its Constitutional duty to
supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of their official duties. The fact remains that
the CA Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over them primarily belongs to
this Court and to no other. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

HRET

In this petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes challenges the
constitutionality of several provisions of the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). In particular, petitioner questions (1) the rule which requires the presence of at least one Justice of the
Supreme Court to constitute a quorum; (2) the rule on constitution of a quorum; and (3) the requisites to be
considered a member of the House of Representatives.

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but
rather maintains the balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative
departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of
the three Justices is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved and do away
with the impression that party interests play a part in the decision-making process. (Reyes v.
HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)

[Note: Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four
members of the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices are present, at
least two members of the House of Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without
this rule, it would be possible for five members of the House of Representatives to convene and have a
quorum even when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the
framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions for placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed,
petitioner is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly favors the Justices because under the same rule,
it is possible for four members of the House of Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a
quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not make the Justices indispensable members to
constitute a quorum but ensures that representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative departments
are present to constitute a quorum. Members from both the Judicial and Legislative departments become
indispensable to constitute a quorum. The situation cited by petitioner, that it is possible for all the
Justice-members to exercise denial or veto power over the proceedings simply by absenting themselves, is
speculative. As pointed out by the HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad faith, without any basis, on the
part of the Justices. (Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)]

The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides that
"[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that only a
Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should always be one member of the
Tribunal who is a Justice. If all three Justice-members inhibit themselves in a case, the Supreme
Court will designate another Justice to chair the Electoral Tribunal in accordance with Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. (Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)

[Note: Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. xxx. In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction
between the Justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are
only three Justice-members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid
classification. The classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the presence of members from
both the Judicial and Legislative branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)]

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 [Note: The Rules clearly state that any action or resolution of the Executive Committee "shall be
included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its
confirmation." Hence, even if only three members of the HRET acted as an Executive Committee, and
even if all these three members are Justices of the Supreme Court, their actions are subject to the
confirmation by the entire Tribunal or at least five of its members who constitute a quorum. The
confirmation required by the Rules should bar any apprehension that the Executive Committee would
commit any action arbitrarily or in bad faith. In addition, the Rules enumerated the matters, requiring
immediate action, that may be acted upon by the Executive Committee. Any other matter that may be
delegated to the Executive Committee under Rule 6(c)(3) has to be decided by the entire Tribunal. (Reyes
v. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)]

As pointed out by the HRET in its Comment, a member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is
disqualified from participating in the deliberations cannot be considered present for the
purpose of having a quorum. In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme Court and the
House of Representatives have the authority to designate a Special Member or Members who
could act as temporary replacement or replacements in cases where one or some of the Members
of the Tribunal inhibit from a case or are disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a
particular election contest when the required quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to
petitioner's claim that a member who inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit in the
deliberations to achieve the required quorum. (Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)

Under the 2015 HRET Rules, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This is
clear under the first paragraph of Rule 15.

Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.
HRET's jurisdiction is provided under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that "[t]he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members." There is no room for the COMELEC to assume
jurisdiction because HRET's jurisdiction is constitutionally mandated. (Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No.
221103, October 16, 2018)

The reckoning event under Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules, being dependent on the
taking of oath and the assumption of office of the winning candidate, is indeterminable. It is
difficult, if not impossible, for the losing candidate who intends to file an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to keep track when the winning candidate took his oath of office or
when he assumed office. The date, time, and place of the taking of oath depend entirely upon
the winning candidate. The winning candidate may or may not publicize his taking of oath and
thus any candidate intending to file a protest will be in a dilemma when to file the protest. The
taking of oath can happen any day and any time after the proclamation. As to the assumption of
office, it is possible that, for one reason or another, the winning candidate will not assume office
at the end of the term of his predecessor but on a later date that is unknown to the losing
candidate.

However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, dated

20
20 September 2018, the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules. As amended,
Rules 17 and 18 now read:

RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting the election or returns of any Member of
the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the
election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if the
winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a verified election protest
shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation.

xxx.

RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility may be
filed by any registered voter of the congressional district concerned, or any registered voter in the
case of party-list representatives, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if the
winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if the winning candidate was
proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a verified petition for quo warranto shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation. The party filing the petition shall be
designated as the petitioner, while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with respect to
the reckoning point within which to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto,
respectively, in order to further promote a just and expeditious determination and disposition of
every election contest brought before the Tribunal[.]" The recent amendments, which were
published in The Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and took effect on 11 October 2018,
clarified and removed any doubt as to the reckoning date for the filing of an election protest. The
losing candidate can determine with certainty when to file his election protest. (Reyes v. HRET,
G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018)

Appropriations

The petitioners contended that the implementation of the MVPSP using the funds allocated under the item
MF02: Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services was unconstitutional because the
item constituted a lump-sum appropriation that undermined the exercise by the President of his veto power under
Article VI, Section 27(2) of the Constitution.

Under the system of Performance Informed Budgeting, the PAPS are grouped or aligned
into the Major Final Outputs (MFOs). However, the groupings do not mean that there are no
longer any line-items. As explained in Belgica v. Executive Secretary, line-items under
appropriations should be "specific appropriations of money" that will enable the President to
discernibly veto the same, to wit:

An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

"An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill."

21
 On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may
be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only
"general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized
by singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified
singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be
consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President
may discernibly veto the same. (Dela Cruz v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683, January 23, 2018)

[Note: In Araullo v. Aquino III, the Court has expounded the term item as the last and indivisible
purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment
class. (Dela Cruz v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683, January 23, 2018)]

The petitioners' contention that the MF02 constituted a lump-sum appropriation had no
basis. The specific appropriations of money were still found under Details of the FY 2014 Budget
which was attached to the 2014 GAA. They specified and contained the authorized budgetary
programs and projects under the GAA xxx. As gleaned from the Details of the FY 2014 Budget,
the MFOs constituted the expense category or class; while the last and indivisible purpose of
each program under the MFOs were enumerated under the Details of the FY 2014 Budget. In
particular, the specific purpose provided under the MF02 was an appropriation for a motor
vehicle registration system. Such specific purpose satisfied the requirement of a valid line-item
that the President could discernibly veto. (Dela Cruz v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683, January 23, 2018)

[Note: In Jacomille v. Abaya, the Court, upholding the legality of the procurement of the MVPSP,
opined that whatever defects had attended its procurement were "cured" by the appropriation for the full
amount of the project under the 2014 GAA. (Dela Cruz v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683, January 23, 2018)]

To explain, Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution ordains that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The
only exception is found in Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, by which the
President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Philippines, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for
their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The
CESB is definitely not among the officials or agencies authorized to transfer their savings in
other items of its appropriation. The CESB came into being by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
1 on September 1, 1974. The CESB, although intended to be an autonomous entity, is
administratively attached to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and does not wield the power
to authorize the augmentation of items of its appropriations from savings in other items of its
appropriations. With the CSC being the office vested with fiscal autonomy by the 1987
Constitution, the CESB's use of its savings to cover the CNA benefits for its employees had no
legal basis. (Career Executive Service Board v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 212348, June 19, 2018)

The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With Congress having
established the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the inclusion of
the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not superfluous. Hence, the just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be released to them without need of yearly
appropriation. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

22
 In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the United States
Supreme Court defined an "item of appropriation" as "a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law which happens to be put in an appropriation bill." In Araullo, et
al. v. President Aquino III, et al., the Court reiterated that a line-item is "the last and indivisible
purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or
allotment class."

In Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al., through the ponencia of Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe, this Court further elaborated on this definition by stating that "an item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence-meaning an allocation
of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a
'line-item.'"
By this standard, the Court, in Belgica, considered the "Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
and the Intelligence Fund" as line-items as they are "appropriations which state a specified
amount for a specific purpose." Further, in discussing the veto power of the President for
line-items, Belgica ruled that "a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that
are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance
and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed
sufficiently specific xxx." (Germar v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 232532, October 1, 2018)

Tax Exemptions

Lastly, while tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer, the government
should not misuse technicalities to keep money it is not entitled to. (Philippine Air Lines v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 206079-80, January 17, 2018)

While tax amnesty is in the nature of a tax exemption, which is strictly construed against
the taxpayer, the Court cannot disregard the plain text of R.A. No. 9480. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Covanta Energy Philippine Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 203160, January 24, 2018)

[Note: Considering that CEPHI completed the requirements and paid the corresponding amnesty
tax, it is considered to have totally complied with the tax amnesty program. As a matter of course, CEPHI
is entitled to the immediate enjoyment of the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty program.
Nonetheless, the Court emphasizes that the immunities and privileges granted to taxpayers under R.A.
No. 9480 is not absolute. It is subject to a resolutory condition insofar as the taxpayers' enjoyment of the
immunities and privileges of the law is concerned. These immunities cease upon proof that they
underdeclared their net worth by 30%. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Covanta Energy Philippine
Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 203160, January 24, 2018)]

Particularly on the RPT, Section 234 enumerates the persons and real property exempt
therefrom. The tax exemption of real property owned by the Republic, its political subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities carries, however, ceases if the beneficial use of the real property
has been granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. In such case, the
corresponding liability for the payment of the RPT devolves on the taxable beneficial user.
(Herarc Realty Corporation v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas,, G.R. No. 210736, September 5,
2018)

23
 A tax refund or credit is in the nature of a tax exemption, construed strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Claimants of a tax refund
must prove the factual basis of their claims with sufficient evidence. (International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 185622, October 17, 2018)

A government instrumentality exercising corporate powers is not liable for the payment
of real property taxes on its properties unless it is alleged and proven that the beneficial use of
its properties been extended to a taxable person. (Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System v. The
Local Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018)

[Note: Thus, according to the parameters set by Manila International Airport Authority, a
government instrumentality is exempt from the local government unit's levy of real property tax. The
government instrumentality must not have been organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, even
though it exercises corporate powers, administers special funds, and enjoys operational autonomy,
usually through its charter. Its properties are exempt from real property tax because they are properties of
the public dominion: held in trust for the Republic, intended for public use, and cannot be the subject of
levy, encumbrance, or disposition. A government-owned and controlled corporation, on the other hand,
is not exempt from real property taxes due to the passage of the Local Government Code, which now
provides: Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or
presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or - controlled corporations
are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System v. The Local
Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018)]

[Note: Held against the parameters of Manila International Airport Authority, this Court cannot but
conclude that petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation. Under the Local Government
Code, only its machinery and equipment actually, directly, and exclusively used in the supply and
distribution of water can be exempt from the levy of real property taxes. xxx. Be that as it may, this
Court's categorization cannot supplant that which was previously made by the Executive and Legislative
Branches. After the promulgation of Manila International Airport Authority, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 596, which recognized this Court's categorization of
"government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers." xxx. Under this provision (Section 1),
petitioner is categorized with other government agencies that were found to be exempt from the payment
of real property taxes. xxx. In 2011, Congress passed Republic Act No. 10149 or the GOCC Governance
Act of 2011, which adopted the same categorization and explicitly lists petitioner together with the other
government agencies that were previously held by this Court to be exempt from the payment of real
property taxes xxx. The Executive and Legislative Branches, therefore, have already categorized petitioner
not as a government-owned and controlled corporation but as a Government Instrumentality with
Corporate Powers/Government Corporate Entity like the Manila International Airport Authority and the
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority. Privileges enjoyed by these Government Instrumentalities
with Corporate Powers/Government Corporate Entities should necessarily also extend to petitioner.
Hence, petitioner's real property tax exemption under Republic Act No. 6234 is still valid as the proviso of
Section 234 of the Local Government Code is only applicable to government-owned and -controlled
corporations. Thus, petitioner is not liable to respondent Local Government of Quezon City for real
property taxes, except if the beneficial use of its properties has been extended to a taxable person.
Respondents have not alleged that the beneficial use of any of petitioner's properties was extended to a
taxable person. In the absence of any allegation to the contrary, petitioner's properties in Quezon City are
not subject to the levy of real property taxes. (Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System v. The Local
Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018)]

Executive Department

24
Presidential Immunity

Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-settled doctrine in our

jurisprudence. The President may not be sued during his tenure or actual incumbency, and there
is no need to expressly grant such privilege in the Constitution or law. This privilege stems from
the recognition of the President's vast and significant functions which can be disrupted by court
litigations. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

[Note: It is, thus, clear that petitioners in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145 committed a procedural
misstep in including the President as a respondent in their petitions. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No.
235935, February 6, 2018)]

Military Powers

The determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers should
be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court's
power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article VII, does not empower the Court to
advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military
powers should be exercised. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

[Note: Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension powers thus consists
of: First. The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The review is "automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is
made." The Congress' decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the
President. Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the
President's initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public
safety requires it. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)]

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as

described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a "joint executive and
legislative act" or a "collective judgment" between the President and the Congress xxx. (Lagman
v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the
initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or
deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is
allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension
should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the
invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's
review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. (Lagman v. Senate
President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation
and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration;
thus, the provision states that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress."

25
If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the extension to sixty (60) days,
as petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 theorize, they would not have expressly vested in the Congress
the power to fix its duration. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

[Note: The information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of
the Executive Department. Thus, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the
[E]xecutive [D]epartment; in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny
of the Court." (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)]

[Note: The requirement of the Constitution is therefore adequately met when there is sufficient
factual basis to hold that the present and past acts constituting the actual rebellion are of such character
that endanger and will endanger public safety. This permissive approach is sanctioned not only by an
acknowledgment that the Congress is and should be allowed flexibility but also because the Court is
without the luxury of time to determine accuracy and precision. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No.
235935, February 6, 2018)]

Martial law is a law of necessity. "Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and at
the same time limits the scope of martial law." Thus, when the need for which Proclamation No.
216 was further extended no longer exists, the President can lift the martial law imposition even
before the end of the one-year period. Under the same circumstances, the Congress itself may
pass a resolution pre-terminating the extension. This power emanates from Congress’ authority,
granted under the Constitution, to approve the extension and to fix its duration. The power to
determine the period of the extension necessarily includes the power to shorten it. Furthermore,
considering that this Court's judgment on the constitutionality of an extension is "transitory," or
"valid at that certain point of time," any citizen may petition the Court to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis for its continued implementation should the President and the Congress fail
or refuse to lift the imposition of martial law. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935,
February 6, 2018)

Judicial Department

Judicial Power

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The first part is
to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter part, an innovation of
the 1987 Constitution, became known as the court's expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded
jurisdiction, courts can now delve into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
traditionally considered as political if such act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
(Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section
5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. We
held that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court's

26
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an
additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

[Note: With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the same special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. Necessarily, and
by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction is not the proper
remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress' extension of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935,
February 6, 2018)]

Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of

martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the
Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is limited only to a determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution provides such
scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority under Section 18, Article VII,
which is principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing) the power vested by the Constitution in
the Congress to determine whether to extend such proclamation or suspension. (Lagman v.
Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

A.C. No. 58-2003 is an implementation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, or the basic
provision on longevity pay granted by law to justices and judges in the judiciary. Section 42 of
B.P. Big. 129 is intended to recompense justices and judges for each five-year period of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary. The purpose of the law
is to reward long service, from the lowest to the highest court in the land. xxx. On the other
hand, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to
interpret laws and, as such, has the force and effect of law. In crafting the circular, the Court
duly considered the long-standing policy of according liberal construction to retirement laws
covering government personnel.. (Re: Application for Optional Retirement under Republic Act No.
910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 and Republic Act No. 9946, of Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr., A.M.  No. 15-11-01-SC, March 6, 2018)

To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances, respondents should have

invoked the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. The adverted section defines judicial power as the power not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Department of
Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018)

[Note: Thus, there is no actual case involved in a Petition for Declaratory Relief. It cannot, therefore,
be the proper vehicle to invoke the judicial review powers to declare a statute unconstitutional.
(Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R. No. 230107, July 24,
2018)]

As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. However, if the
factual findings of the government agency and the CA are conflicting, or the evidence that was
misapprehended was of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated,

27
the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.
Here, considering the disparity between the findings of fact of the OP, on the one hand, and that
of the DAR Secretary and the CA on the other hand, with respect to the following issues on
whether the petitioners' subject lands were used for livestock raising on or before June 15, 1988;
and, whether there were still livestock grazing in the subject lands up to the present, We are
constrained to re-examine the facts of this case based on the evidence presented by both parties.
(Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 228503, July 25, 2018)

Jurisdiction

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. Relatedly,
Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto,
when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of
Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018)

The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This authority
is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII
xxx. Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain
public officials or that excludes impeachable officials therefrom. xxx. The Constitution defines
judicial power as a "duty" to be performed by the courts of justice. Thus, for the Court to
repudiate its own jurisdiction over this case would be to abdicate a constitutionally imposed
responsibility (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
June 19, 2018)

[Note: The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in
paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the
qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With this
authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
June 19, 2018)]

With the enactment of R.A. No. 1125, the CTA (Court of Tax Appeals) was granted the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal all cases involving disputed assessments of
internal revenue taxes, customs duties, and real property taxes. In general, it has jurisdiction
over cases involving liability for payment of money to the Government or the administration of
the laws on national internal revenue, customs, and real property. (Steel Corporation of the
Philippines v. Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 220502, February 12, 2018)

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3)
of R.A. No. 6770. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)

[Note: Clear from his petition was that the petitioner beseeches the Court for a declaration
primarily as to the unconstitutionality of Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770, and as a
consequence thereof, a pronouncement that the incumbent Ombudsman and the deputies are de facto
officers and whose offices are vacant. The petition does not task the Court to scrutinize the qualifications

28
of the respondents to hold office as Ombudsman and deputies but rather to determine the
constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in so far as their term of office is concerned. (Ifurung v.
Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)]

(I)n Matting Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Caras (647 Phil. 324 [2010]), this
Court stated that jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving the illegal dismissal of
corporate officers was with the Regional Trial Court, not with the Labor Arbiter. (Malcaba v.
Prohealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. 209085, June 6, 2018)

When a tax case is pending on appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Tax
Appeals has the exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin the levy of taxes and the auction of a taxpayer's
properties in relation to that case. (Philippine Ports Authority v. The City of Davao, G.R. No. 190324,
June 6, 2018)

[Note: In this case, the Court of Tax Appeals had jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal to resolve
the question of whether or not it was liable for real property tax. To recall, the real property tax liability
was the very reason for the acts which petitioner wanted to have enjoined. It was, thus, the Court of Tax
Appeals, and not the Court of Appeals, that had the power to preserve the subject of the appeal, to give
effect to its final determination, and, when necessary, to control auxiliary and incidental matters and to
prohibit or restrain acts which might interfere with its exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal.
Thus, respondents' acts carried out pursuant to the imposition of the real property tax were also within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. (Philippine Ports Authority v. The City of Davao, G.R. No.
190324, June 6, 2018)]

[Note: Even if the law had vested the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief
in real property tax cases such as this, the Court of Appeals was still correct in dismissing the petition
before it. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it also has the power to issue all auxiliary writs
necessary to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. Thus, once the
Court of Tax Appeals acquired jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals would have
been precluded from taking cognizance of the case. (Philippine Ports Authority v. The City of Davao, G.R.
No. 190324, June 6, 2018)]

It is clear from the foregoing that this Court, the CA and the RTC enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by
petitioners with the CA, the latter has acquired jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of
all others, including this Court. This must be so considering the basic postulate that jurisdiction
once acquired by a court is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case
is terminated. A departure from this established rule is to run the risk of having conflicting
decisions from courts of concurrent jurisdiction and would unwittingly promote judicial
interference and instability. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Complaints for illegal dismissal filed by a cooperative officer constitute an

intra-cooperative controversy, jurisdiction over which belongs to the regional trial courts. (Dela
Vega v. Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. 209166, July 9, 2018)

[Note: Thus, organization under P.D. 269 sufficiently vests upon electric cooperatives' juridical
personality enjoying corporate powers. Registration with the SEC becomes relevant only when a
non-stock, non-profit electric cooperative decides to convert into and register as a stock corporation. As
such, and even without choosing to convert and register as a stock corporation, electric cooperatives
already enjoy powers and corporate existence akin to a corporation. (Dela Vega v. Batangas I Electric
Cooperative, Inc., G.R. 209166, July 9, 2018)]

29
 When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court; and if the procedure to
be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these
rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable
to the spirit of the said law or rules. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan acted within its
jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in ordering the commitment of Revilla and Cambe
in the PNP Custodial Center. (Revilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018)

Under Section 7 (a) (3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, the appellate jurisdiction of the
CTA over decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTC becomes operative when the latter has
ruled on a local tax case, i.e., one which is in the nature of a tax case or which primarily involves
a tax issue. (Herarc Realty Corporation v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 210736,
September 5, 2018)

[Note: Petitioner's direct recourse to the RTC is warranted since the issue of the legality or validity
of the assessment is a question of law. However, as a taxpayer not satisfied with the RTC decision, it
should have filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The decision, ruling or
resolution of the CTA, sitting as Division, may further be reviewed by the CTA En Banc. It is only after
this procedure has been exhausted that the case may be elevated to this Court. Under Section 7 (a) (3) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA over decisions, orders, or resolutions of
the RTC becomes operative when the latter has ruled on a local tax case, i.e., one which is in the nature of
a tax case or which primarily involves a tax issue. Local tax cases include those involving RPT, which is
governed by Book II, Title II of R.A No. 7160, or Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. Among the possible
issues are the legality or validity of the RPT assessment; protests of assessments; disputed assessments,
surcharges, or penalties; legality or validity of a tax ordinance; claims for tax refund/credit; claims for tax
exemption; actions to collect the tax due; and even prescription of assessments. (Herarc Corporation Realty
v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 210736, September 5, 2018)]

As it now stands, jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A,
collectively known as intra-corporate controversies or disputes, now falls under the jurisdiction
of the RTCs. (Ku v. RCBC Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 219491, October 17, 2018)

In discussing the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to court-martial

proceedings insofar as those not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for
Courts-Martial, this Court had clarified that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an
accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Mislang, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)

[Note: Article 96 of the Articles of War provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. - Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet,
flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect
to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as
military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed

30
 for the same–dismissal from the service–imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the
stringent standard of military discipline. (Emphasis in the original).

The peculiarity and import of court-martial proceedings was explained thus:

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate
from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms
and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military
organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable
to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier
cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to
another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

Being sui generis, court-martial proceedings contemplate both the penal and administrative
disciplinary nature of military justice. In view of its administrative disciplinary aspect which
court-martial proceedings share with the petitioner, both have the concurrent authority to dismiss
respondent from the service. "In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance
of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction."
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Mislang, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)]

We start by reminding the respondent about the inflexible policy that taxes, being the
lifeblood of the Government, should be collected promptly and without hindrance or delay.
Obeisance to this policy is unquestionably dictated by law itself. Indeed, Section 218 of the
NIRC expressly provides that "[n]o court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain
the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by th[e] [NIRC]." Also,
pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended, the decisions or rulings of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, assessing any tax, or levying, or distraining,
or selling any property of taxpayers for the satisfaction of their tax liabilities are immediately
executory, and their enforcement is not to be suspended by any appeals thereof to the Court of
Tax Appeals unless "in the opinion of the Court [of Tax Appeals] the collection by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the
taxpayer," in which case the Court of Tax Appeals "at any stage of the proceeding may suspend the
said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for
not more than double the amount." (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 219340, November 7, 2018)

As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when invoked
permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the legislative and the
executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.” In
Pedro Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. The Honorable Representative Rodolfo C. Fariñas, et al., we affirmed the
availability of the extraordinary writs for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive branches
following Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council xxx. Accordingly, we held as proper

31
remedies the writs of certiorari and prohibition in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, as represented by Mayor Herbert Bautista, et al., assailing the
constitutionality of curfew ordinances and in Agcaoili questioning the contempt powers of the
Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Following this trend in
jurisprudence, petitioner therefore correctly availed of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932 and enjoin its enforcement,
notwithstanding that these governmental actions do not involve the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. (Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018)

Requisites for Judicial Inquiry

We note at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the constitutionality of
Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 constitutes a collateral attack. This is contrary to the rule that issues of
constitutionality must be pleaded directly. Unless a law is annulled in a direct proceeding, the
legal presumption of the law's validity remains. (Republic v. N. dela Merced & Sons, Inc., G.R. No.
201501, January 22, 2018)

[Note: Nevertheless, even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced &
Sons still failed to satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial review. Specifically, the
issue of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case. The lis mota requirement
means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality of a law must show that the case cannot be
resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question is unavoidable. Consequently, if there is
some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course should
be adopted and the question of constitutionality avoided. In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show
that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the
presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 stands. (Republic v. N. dela Merced & Sons, Inc., G.R.
No. 201501, January 22, 2018)]

In these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a

congressional act, specifically the approval of the President's request to extend martial law in
Mindanao. Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 and 236155 have also put in issue the manner in
which the Congress deliberated upon the President's request for extension. Clearly, therefore, it
is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of
these cases. Consequently, it was procedurally incorrect for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935,
236061 and 236155 to implead only the Senate President and the House Speaker among the
respondents. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)

While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action,
nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because
the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. (Specified Contractors and
Development, Inc. v. Pobocan, G.R. No. 212472, January 11, 2018)

Operative Fact Doctrine

It is true that with our declaration today that the IRA is not in accordance with the
constitutional determination of the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes, logic demands
that the LGUs should receive the difference between the just share they should have received

32
had the LGC properly reckoned such just share from all national taxes, on the one hand, and the
share - represented by the IRA- the LGUs have actually received since the effectivity of the IRA
under the LGC, on the other. This puts the National Government in arrears as to the just share
of the LGUs. A legislative or executive act declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give
rise to any right or obligation. xxx. Conformably with the foregoing pronouncements in Araullo
v. Aquino, the effect of our declaration through this decision of the unconstitutionality of Section
284 of LGC and its related laws as far as they limited the source of the just share of the LGUs to
the NIRTs is prospective. It cannot be otherwise. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3,
2018)

[Note: As a final point, the Court cannot tum a blind eye to the adverse effects of this Decision on
ordinary government employees, including petitioners herein, who relied in good faith on the belief that
the appropriate taxes on all the income they receive from their respective employers are withheld and
paid. Nor does the Court ignore the situation of the relevant officers of the different departments of
government that had believed, in good faith, that there was no need to withhold the taxes due on the
compensation received by said ordinary government employees. Thus, as a measure of equity and
compassionate social justice, the Court deems it proper to clarify and declare, pro hac vice, that its ruling
on the validity of Sections III and IV of the assailed RMO is to be given only prospective effect.
(Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees v. Commissioner, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 213446 and 213658, July 3, 2018)]

Hierarchy of Courts

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is
justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a
Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes
special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. xxx. Nonetheless,
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several
exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being
litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which
should not be the case when the initial dispute - an ejectment case - is, by nature and design, a
summary procedure and should have been resolved with expediency. (Intramuros Administration
v. Offshore Construction Development Company, G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018)

[Note: Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this
case. (Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Company, G.R. No. 196795, March 7,
2018)]

While resort to courts may directly be availed of in questioning the constitutionality of

an administrative rule, parties may not proceed directly before this Court, regardless of its
original jurisdiction over certain matters. This Court's original jurisdiction over petitions for

33
certiorari and prohibition may only be invoked for special reasons under the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts requires that recourse must first be
obtained from lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. This is to ensure
that this Court remains a court of last resort so as to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition." (The Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018)

[Note: The alleged "far-reaching consequences" and wide "area of coverage" of Department Order
No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are not special reasons. With these justifications,
petitioners could have very well filed their Petition before the Court of Appeals whose writs, as
discussed, are likewise nationwide in scope. The issues raised are not even of first impression. Petitioners,
therefore, failed to respect the hierarchy of courts. (The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines
v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018)]

Jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition are shared by this Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts. Since the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are available to assail the constitutionality of a law, the question as to
which court should the petition be properly filed consequently arises given that the hierarchy of
courts "also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs." (Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
234448, November 6, 2018)

[Note: Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, "recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court." As a rule, "direct recourse to
this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and
attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket."
(Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018)]

[Note: Nevertheless, we cautioned in The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., that the
Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when
these become exigent is never meant to be emasculated by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. As such,
this Court possesses full discretionary authority to assume jurisdiction over extraordinary actions for
certiorari filed directly before it for exceptionally compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. (Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018)]

[Note: As developed by case law, the instances when direct resort to this Court is allowed are
enumerated in The Diocese of Bacolod as follows: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (c) in cases of first impression; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the
Supreme Court; (e) the time element or exigency in certain situations; (f) the filed petition reviews an act
of a constitutional organ; (g) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. (Private Hospitals
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018)]

[Note: The present petition, while directed against an act of a co-equal branch of the government
and concerns a legislative measure directly affecting the health and well-being of the people, actually

34
presents no prima facie challenge, as hereunder expounded, as to be so exceptionally compelling to justify
direct resort to this Court. (Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448,
November 6, 2018)]

Fiscal Autonomy

The foregoing constitutional provisions (Article VII, Section 3, on the Judiciary; Article
IX-A, Section 5, on the Constitutional Commissions; Article XI, Section 14, on the Office of the
Ombudsman; Article XIII, Section 17(4), on the Commission on Human Rights) share two aspects.
The first relates to the grant of fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the automatic release of
funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the automatic release of the
appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of the annual appropriations of the offices
or agencies concerned. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

Moreover, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, Ombudsman, and

Constitutional Commissions, as envisioned in the Constitution, does not grant immunity or
exemption from the common burden of paying taxes imposed by law. To borrow former Chief
Justice Corona's words in his Separate Opinion in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, "fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by
law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.” (Confederation
for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees v. Commissioner, Bureau of Internal
Revenue, G.R. Nos. 213446 and 213658, July 3, 2018)

[Note: It bears to emphasize the Court's ruling in Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
the imposition of taxes on salaries of Judges does not result in diminution of benefits. This applies to all
government employees because the intent of the framers of the Organic Law and of the people adopting
it is "that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably." (Confederation for Unity, Recognition and
Advancement of Government Employees v. Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 213446 and
213658, July 3, 2018)]

The Court, albeit fiscally autonomous, could not simply authorize and justify the
release of funds to pay Artes' demand in view of the many questions that were raised against
the contracts entered into with Artes by Ms. Dumdum as the PMO Administrator. To decide
on whether to pay or not, the Court had to be guided by the law on the proper
disbursement of public funds, whether emanating from the National Treasury or sourced
from loans or credits extended by foreign funding partners. (Re: Contracts with Artes
International, Inc., A.M. No. 12-6-18-SC, August 7, 2018)

[Note: Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio: In the Loan Agreement, dated 2 October 2003, between the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by then Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro N. Camacho, and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Bank has agreed to extend a Loan to the
Philippine government in an amount equal to $21,900,000 to assist in the financing of the Judicial Reform
Support Project (the Project or JRSP).

There is no question that the Loan Agreement in this case is in the nature of an executive
agreement. It was entered into by the Philippine government, as a subject of international law possessed
of a treaty-making capacity, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which, as
an international lending institution organized by world governments to provide loans conditioned upon

35
the guarantee of repayment by the borrowing government, is also regarded a subject of international law
and possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states.

Considering that the Loan Agreement is an executive agreement, Republic Act No. 9184 (RA
9184), or the "Government Procurement Reform Act" does not apply. Section 4 of RA 9184 provides:

SEC. 4. Scope and Application. This Act shall apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure
Projects, Goods and Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local
or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of government, its departments,
offices and agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations
and local government units, subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.138.
Any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of
this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed. xxx.

Being an executive agreement, the Loan Agreement subject of this case is governed by
inte1national law. As the Court has consistently ruled in numerous cases, the Philippine government,
particularly the implementing agency, in this case the Supreme Court, is therefore obligated to comply
with the terms and conditions of the Loan Agreement under the international law principle of pacta sunt
servanda which is embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184. xxx.

To repeat, under Section 4 of RA 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act does not
apply to executive agreements such as the Loan Agreement in this case. Consequently, RA 9184 does
not apply in the procurement of goods and services pursuant to the Loan Agreement between the
Philippine government and the IBRD for the Judicial Reform Support Project. (Re: Contracts with Artes
International, Inc., A.M. No. 12-6-18-SC, August 7, 2018)]

Rule-Making Authority

It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors that were beyond the
purview of the rule. (Republic v. Tipay, G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018)

[Note: R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to the understanding. It was
further amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 10172 was passed to expand the authority of local civil registrars
and the Consul General to make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the
recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the
entry. Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with the RTC in 2009, R.A. No.
10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth
certificate, the proper remedy was to commence the appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The changes in the entries pertaining to the gender and date of
birth are indisputably substantial corrections, outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical
error that may be corrected administratively. (Republic v. Tipay, G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018)]

To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law is that which
declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished. Based on the above, it may be gleaned that the chain of
custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is therefore the Court who has
the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. (People v. Teng Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206,
March 5, 2018)

36
 [Note: The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is
a traditional power of this Court. This includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence. On the
other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of Court issued by the Supreme Court.
However, the chain of custody rule is not found in the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
was passed by the legislative department and its implementing rules were promulgated by PDEA, in
consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies under and within the executive
department. (People v. Teng Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018)]

[Note: xxx. … the Court's power to promulgate judicial rules, including rules of evidence, is no
longer shared by the Court with Congress. xxx. …the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a
rule of procedure, and that the Court has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Evidentiary
matters are indeed well within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the courts
find appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may warrant the conviction of the accused.
(People v. Teng Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018, cited in People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June
11, 2018)]

[Note: Jurisprudence dictates that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. (People v. Baptista, G.R. No. 225783,
August 20, 2018, citing People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, 820 SCRA 204, 215, further
citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil 1024 (2012), at 1038)]

Foremost, the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts is vested by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Hence, being
plenary in nature, the Court cannot be called upon by a private citizen to exercise such power in
a particular manner, especially through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari or prohibition,
which is intended for an entirely different purpose. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6,
2018)

[Note: The concept of SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) was first introduced to
this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). As defined
therein, a SLAPP refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person,
institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to
harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has
taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of
environmental rights. In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to
have been filed merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions. xxx. Transposed to this case,
the Court finds no occasion to apply the foregoing rules as the Petition has no relation at all to "the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights."
R.A. No. 9262, which involves cases of violence against women and their children, is not among those
laws included under the scope of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC xxx. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6,
2018)]

[Note: SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may
only be exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body.
Here, petitioners cannot, under the guise of substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not
available to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making power in their Petition, petitioners have
admitted that the instant action has no basis under any of the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court
takes this occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size-fits-all" tool that may
be invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly
administration of justice. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018)]

37
 In short, jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies is transferred by law (RA 8799)
from the SEC to the RTCs in general, but the authority to exercise such jurisdiction is given by
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution, to RTCs
which are specifically designated as Special Commercial Courts. On the other hand, the cases
enumerated under Section 19 of BP 129, as amended, are taken cognizance of by the RTCs in the
exercise of their general jurisdiction. (Ku v. RCBC Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 219491, October 17,
2018)

Administrative Supervision

This Resolution partially resolves the points raised in the July 10, 2017 Memorandum of
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Associate Justice Leonardo-de-De Castro) concerning:
(1) the extent of the power of appointment of the Court En Banc; and (2) the appointment of Atty. Brenda
Jay A. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) to the position of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) Chief of
Office for the Philippine Mediation Center.

This matter invokes the administrative powers of the Supreme Court En Banc. It does not
call for the exercise of this Court's adjudicative powers. Thus, the purpose of this Resolution is
to resolve pending questions as to the interpretation of this Court's power as contained in the
Constitution, relevant laws, and this Court's administrative orders. Resolutions of this nature
may also suggest not only clarifications but also changes in policy when necessary. (Re:
Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No.
17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)

The 1987 Constitution vests the power of appointment within the judiciary in the
Supreme Court. (Article VIII, Section 5[6]) xxx. The "Supreme Court" in which this appointing
power is conferred is the Court En Banc xxx. This Court's nature as a collegial body requires that
the appointing power be exercised by the Court En Banc, consistent with Article VIII, Section 1
of the Constitution xxx. (Re: Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from Associate Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)

[Note: A collegial body or court is one in which each member has approximately equal power
and authority. Moreover, its members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. xxx. Since this Court
is a collegial court, each Justice has equal power and authority, and all Justices must act on the basis of
consensus or majority rule. Even if this Court has a Chief Justice and does much of its work in divisions,
it still remains that this Court must exercise its powers as one (1) body xxx. The only exception is when
the Court En Banc itself delegates the exercise of some of its powers. (Re: Memorandum dated July 10, 2017
from Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)]

"The three powers of government - executive, legislative, and judicial - have been
generally viewed as non-delegable." Nonetheless, the delegation of these powers has been
found necessary owing to the complexity of modern governments. This Court, which is
conferred with not only the power of judicial review but also the role of administrator over all
courts and their personnel, has found it necessary to delegate some matters to dispense justice
effectively and efficiently. Being the source of authority, every act in relation to a delegated
power may, however, be reviewed by the delegating authority. This is to ensure that the act of
the delegate does not go beyond its intended scope. (Re: Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)

38
 [Note: This Court has resolved to delegate the disposition of certain matters to its three (3)
divisions, to their chairpersons, or to the Chief Justice alone. (Re: Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)]

Here, the delegation of the power of appointment by this Court to the Chairpersons of
the Divisions in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised), while seemingly broad as to encompass all
appointments of personnel in the judiciary, is contradicted by this Court's Resolutions and
practices, both prior to and following its adoption. Several third-level positions within the
Judiciary, such as the Court Administrator, Deputy Court Administrators, and Assistant Court
Administrators, as well as third-level PHILJA officials, continue to be appointed by the Court
En Banc, and not by the Chairpersons of the Divisions.

The extent of the delegation of the appointive power to the Chairpersons of the
Divisions should be determined by the Court En Banc because of the contradictions between the
text of A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) and this Court's own practices. Its resolution should not
be left to the discretion of those to whom the power has been delegated, including the Chief
Justice and the Chairpersons of the Divisions. At the very least, the Court En Banc should be
given the opportunity to correct or resolve the ambiguity in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised).

To ensure consistency in the extent of the delegation of the appointing power, all
positions with salary grades 29 and higher, and those with judicial rank, in this Court, Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, the Lower Courts including the Sharia'h courts,
PHILJA, and the Judicial and Bar Council, shall be filled only by the Court En Banc, subject to
any other requirement in law or Court Resolution. This shall be without prejudice to any
exceptions or qualifications that may hereafter be made by the Court En Banc for the delegation
of its appointing power to the Chairpersons of the Divisions. (Re: Memorandum dated July 10,
2017 from Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)

At the very least, considering that contrary interpretations may arise over this Court's
previous practice of appointing the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center,
any changes to the appointing process should have been referred to the Court En Banc for
consultation. The power of appointment in the judiciary being vested by the Constitution in the
Court En Banc, any delegation or diminution thereof must be resolved by the Court En Banc. (Re:
Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, A.M. No.
17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018)

Neither can the Court assume jurisdiction over the then pending Habeas Corpus Petition
by invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of A.M. No.
10-4-20-SC which both refer to the Court's exercise of administrative supervision over all courts.
(Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Thus, administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the operations of agencies

to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically, but without
interference with day-to-day activities. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

The fact remains that the CA Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority
over them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395,
July 3, 2018)

39
 Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively
liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar and to
the practice of law. Even if they are not "public officers" in the context of their employment
relationship with the government, they are still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law"
who are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars
worthy of emulation by others. Most importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution
placed them under the Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may
be held administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers - not as
government officials. (Tabuzo v. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018)

Judges

According to the Republic, because respondent failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete
SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The Republic posits that the JBC's ostensible nomination of respondent
does not extinguish the fact that the latter failed to comply with the SALN requirement as the filing thereof remains
to be a constitutional and statutory requirement.

If a candidate appointed despite being unable to comply with the requirements of the
JBC and despite the lack of the aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the
appointment may be the subject of a quo warranto provided it is filed within one year from the
appointment or discovery of the defect. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

[Note: When the Solicitor General files a quo warranto petition in behalf of the people and where
the interests of the public is [sic] involved, the lapse of time presents no effective bar. A quo warranto
action is a governmental function and not a proprietary function, and therefore the doctrine of laches
does not apply. Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to
assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R.
No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]

[Note: The Republic cannot be faulted for questioning respondent’s qualification for office only
upon discovery of the cause of ouster. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]

[Note: As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright as to whether or not
she filed her SALNs covering the period of her employment in U.P. xxx. Even up to the present,
respondent has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. xxx. Hence, until
recently, when respondent’s qualification for office was questioned during the hearings conducted by the
House Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint against the respondent, there was no
indication that would have prompted the Republic to assail respondent’s appointment, much less
question the wisdom or reason behind the said recommending and appointing authorities’ actions. The
defect on respondent’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]

[Note: On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was necessary for the government to be
immediately informed if any person claims title to an office so that the government may not be faced with
the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding it albeit illegally, and
another to the person not rendering service although entitled to do so. It would thus be absurd to require
the filing of a petition for quo warranto within the one-year period for such purpose when it is the State
itself which files the same not for the purpose of determining who among two private individuals are
entitled to the office. Stated in a different manner, the purpose of the instant petition is not to inform the
government that it is facing a predicament of having to pay two salaries; rather, the government, having

40
learned of the predicament that it might be paying an unqualified person, is acting upon it head-on.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]

[Note: Most importantly, urgency to resolve the controversy on the title to a public office to
prevent a hiatus or disruption in the delivery of public service is the ultimate consideration in prescribing
a limitation on when an action for quo warranto may be instituted. However, it is this very same concern
that precludes the application of the prescriptive period when it is the State which questions the eligibility
of the person holding a public office and not merely the personal interest of a private individual claiming
title thereto. Again, as We have stated in the assailed Decision, when the government is the real party in
interest and asserts its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation; otherwise, it
would be injurious to public interest if this Court will not act upon the case presented before it by the
Republic and merely allow the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the Chief Justice position to
continue. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)]

The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in Section
7, Article VIII of the Constitution. xxx. Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional
qualifications, our fundamental law is clear that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. xxx. Emphatically, integrity is not only
a prerequisite for an aspiring Member of the Court but is likewise a continuing requirement
common to judges and lawyers alike. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character
and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards
the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a
public official who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said
to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public
office. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC is a clear violation not only of the
JBC rules, but also of the law and the Constitution. The discordance between respondent's
non-filing and non-submission of the SALNs and her claimed integrity as a person is too patent
to ignore. For lack of proven integrity, respondent ought to have been disqualified by the JBC
and ought to have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the President. As the
qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution
to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the
position will not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of
respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the
minimum Constitutional qualifications. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

[Note: The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto
officer. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]

Respondent insists that the filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional qualification
of integrity. For her, the measure of integrity should be as what the JBC sets it to be and that in any case,
the SALN laws, being malum prohibitum, do not concern adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Respondent's argument, however, dangerously disregards that the filing of SALN is not
only a requirement under the law, but a positive duty required from every public officer or
employee, first and foremost by the Constitution. The SALN laws were passed in aid of the

41
enforcement of the Constitutional duty to submit a declaration under oath of one's assets,
liabilities, and net worth. This positive Constitutional duty of filing one's SALN is so sensitive
and important that it even shares the same category as the Constitutional duty imposed upon
public officers and employees to owe allegiance to the State and the Constitution. As such,
offenses against the SALN laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every
public officer and employee owes to the State and the Constitution. In other words, the violation
of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any claim of integrity as it is inherently immoral to violate the
will of the legislature and to violate the Constitution. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

For lack of a Constitutional qualification, respondent is ineligible to hold the position of

Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent has
never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than
by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State
is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice. (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No.237428, May 11, 2018)

The present is the exigent and opportune time for the Court to establish well-defined
guidelines that would serve as guide posts for the bench, the bar and the JBC, as well, in the
discharge of its Constitutionally-mandated functions. In sum, this Court holds:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present, when the subject act or omission was committed
prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty, probity, competence, and
integrity. In ascertaining whether a candidate possesses such qualifications, the JBC in the exercise of its
Constitutional mandate, set certain requirements which should be complied with by the candidates to be
able to qualify. These requirements, as well as subsequent changes thereto, are announced and published
to notify not only the applicants but the public as well. Changes to such set of requirements, as agreed
upon by the JBC En Banc through a proper deliberation, such as in this case when the JBC decided to
allow substantial compliance with the SALN submission requirement, should also be announced and
published for the same purpose of apprising the candidates and the public of such changes. At any rate, if
a candidate appointed despite being unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the
lack of the aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the appointment may be the subject of
a quo warranto provided it is filed within one year from the appointment or discovery of the defect. Only
the Solicitor General may institute the quo warranto petition.

The willful non-filing of a SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of probity and lack of
integrity. More so if the non-filing is repeated in complete disregard of the mandatory requirements of the
Constitution and the law.

Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be retained after more than ten
years by the receiving office or custodian or repository unless these are the subject of investigation
pursuant to the law. Thus, to be in keeping with the spirit of the law requiring public officers to file
SALNs—to manifest transparency and accountability in public office—if public officers cannot produce

42
their SALNs from their personal files, they must obtain a certification from the office where they filed
and/or the custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that said offices
certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, said offices must certify the valid and
legal reason of their non-availability, such as by reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or
earthquake, or by reason of the allowed destruction after ten years under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

[Note: Accordingly, the Court, on the basis of an 8-6 vote, ruled that the respondent is “found
DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY OF UNLAWFULLY HOLDING AND
EXERCISING THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno is OUSTED AND EXCLUDED therefrom.” (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]

Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts
and special courts as we11 as justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by
the Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records
of indubitable integrity. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

[Note: The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the
judiciary must be accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy
and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them. This is consistent with the rule that, in administrative
proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by
substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are
based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense. (Re: Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA,
March 13, 2018)]

[Note: In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable
decisions, having a mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of
dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming
conduct. These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported
by any evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption
and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and
immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint
against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]

[Note: With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that
the Court finds them inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances that the
prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior courts and court
personnel. Stated differently, the aforesaid issuances do not cover justices of collegial courts for the simple
reason that they are neither judges of the inferior courts nor can they be described as personnel of the
court. Although the term "judge" has been held to comprehend all kinds of judges, the same is true only if
the said term is not modified by any word or phrase. In the case of Circular No. 4 and Administrative
Matter No. 1544- 0, the term "judge" has been qualified by the phrase "inferior courts." Thus, absurd as it
may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable under Circular No. 4 and Administrative
Matter No. 1544-0. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of
Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]

[Note: From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to
the operation of the government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government

43
whose tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or
any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a
"government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" is a
government officer who performs the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion -
essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint
against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]

[Note: Applying the above definition to the present case, it is clear that Justice Pizarro is covered
by the term "government official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one of
the functions of the government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial
jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official directly involved in
the administration of justice; and in the performance of such function, he exercises discretion. Thus, by
gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under
Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]

Notwithstanding respondent's dismissal from the service, the case remains justiciable
because other penalties, such as a fine, may still be imposed if he is found guilty of an
administrative offense. (See v. Judge Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454, June 6, 2018)

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the OCA did not make any explicit
finding/recommendation on the administrative charge against respondent in connection with
the issuance of the Temporary Release Order in Misc. Case No. 3957. This notwithstanding, the
Court is not without power and authority to directly act on the matter. Section 6, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof. Consistent with this authority, the Court has the discretion to directly rule on
the administrative charge against respondent relative to Misc. Case No. 3957, even in the
absence of prior action from the OCA. (Rodriguez v. Noel, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525, June 25, 2018)

Judicial and Bar Council

Thus, in interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is
consistently held that the Court's supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. As when the policies of the JBC are being attacked,
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the
matter and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own rules. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. 237428,
May 11, 2018)

JBC's absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper actions
beyond the latter's reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

What is more, the JBC's duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the
exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11, 2018)

In fine, the Court has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC,
to insure that the JBC faithfully executes its duties as the Constitution requires of it. Wearing its
hat of supervision, the Court is thus empowered to inquire into the processes leading to

44
respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's contention
that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin with. (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

[Note: As an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court has the authority to
insure that the JBC performs its duties under the Constitution and complies with its own rules and
standards. Indeed, supervision is an active power and implies the authority to inquire into facts and
conditions that renders the power of supervision real and effective. Under its power of supervision, the
Court has ample authority to look into the processes leading to respondent's nomination for the position
of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to
the position to begin with. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
June 19, 2018)]

[Note: The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is
determined based on facts and, as such, generates no exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating
body. Thus, whether a nominee is of the requisite age, is a natural-born citizen, has met the years of law
practice, and is of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence are to be determined based on
facts and cannot be made dependent on inference or discretion, much less concessions, which the
recommending authority may make or extend. To say that the determination of whether a nominee is of
"proven integrity" is a task absolutely contingent upon the discretion of the JBC is to place the integrity
requirement on a plateau different from the rest of the Constitutional requirements, when no such
distinction is assigned by the Constitution. As well, to treat as discretionary on the part of the JBC the
question of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is to render the Court impotent to nullify an
otherwise unconstitutional nomination unless the Court's jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. Such severely limiting course of action would effectively diminish the Court's
collegial power of supervision over the JBC. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion
for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)]

[Note: To re-align the issue in this petition, the Republic charges respondent of unlawfully
holding or exercising the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The contents of the petition pose
an attack to respondent's authority to hold or exercise the position. Unmoving is the rule that title to a
public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. As it cannot be assailed
collaterally, certiorari is an infirm remedy for this purpose. It is for this reason that the Court previously
denied a certiorari and prohibition petition which sought to annul appointment to the Judiciary of an
alleged naturalized citizen. Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al., settles that when it is the qualification for the
position that is in issue, the proper remedy is quo warranto, pursuant to Topacio. But when it is the act of
the appointing power that is placed under scrutiny and not any disqualification on the part of the
appointee, a petition for certiorari challenging the appointment for being unconstitutional or for having
been done in grave abuse of discretion is the apt legal course. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)]

Practice of Law

The practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory
power of the Supreme Court. (Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, 631 Phil. 139 [2010], cited in Tan v.
Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018)

“A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another
ground prior to his eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose
its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable act or actuation committed while he was still
a member of the Law Profession.” (Domingo v. Revilla, A.C. No. 5473, January 23, 2018)

45
 A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of
a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices. (Zarcilla v. Quesada,
A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018)

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate government
lawyers charged with administrative offenses involving the performance of their official duties.
(Trovela v. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018)

[Note: The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or
discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline
respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary of
Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either
case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises
disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of respondents as officials performing or
discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from their
accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such
lawyers. (Trovela v. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018)]

Presently [sic], the IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers coming from
both the public and private sectors who are authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
However, Section 4 of the IBP's By-Laws allows only private practitioners to occupy any
position in its organization. This means that only individuals engaged in the private practice are
authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP. Hence,
the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private practitioners performing public
functions delegated to them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate
the practice of law. (Tabuzo v. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018)

Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively
liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar and to
the practice of law. Even if they are not "public officers" in the context of their employment
relationship with the government, they are still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law"
who are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars
worthy of emulation by others. Most importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution
placed them under the Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may
be held administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers - not as
government officials. (Tabuzo v. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018)

It must also be pointed out that the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is
not absolute. It is not to be applied, under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. The
confidentiality rule requires only that proceedings against attorneys be kept private and
confidential. The rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of
disciplinary actions. Thus, Atty. Dojillo, in attaching the subject documents to his client's
Answer, did not per se violate the confidentiality rule as the purpose was to inform the court of
its existence. (Guanzon, v. Dojillo, A.C. No. 9850, August 6, 2018)

46
 In Ladim v. Ramirez (A.C. No. 10372, August 1, 2016), the Court explained that the lifting
of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the expiration of the suspension period. The
lawyer must still file before the Court the necessary motion to lift suspension and other
pertinent documents, which include certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the
court where he practices his legal profession and from the IBP's Local Chapter where he is
affiliated affirming that he ceased and desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in
court as counsel during the period of his suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and
upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of
suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. Prior thereto, the "suspension
stands until he has satisfactorily shown to the Court his compliance therewith." (Miranda v.
Alvarez, A.C. No. 12196, September 3, 2018)

Decisions

The doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents are set by
pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless whether the
decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as only decisions issued by this Court
become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions of lower courts only have a persuasive
effect. (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Sps. Uy, G.R. No. 204039, January 10, 2018)

Ideally, the same trial judge should preside over all the stages of the proceedings,
especially in cases where the conviction or acquittal of the accused mainly relies on the
credibility of the witnesses. xxx. However, inevitable circumstances - the judge's death,
retirement, resignation, transfer, or removal from office - may intervene during the pendency of
the case. An example is the present case, where the trial judge who heard the witnesses, Judge
Francisco D. Calingin (Judge Calingin), compulsorily retired pending trial. Judge Calingin was
then replaced by Judge Mordeno, who proceeded with hearing the other witnesses and writing
the decision. Udang's argument cannot be accepted as this would mean that every case where
the judge had to be replaced pending decision would have to be refiled and retried so that the
judge who hears the witnesses testify and the judge who writes the decision would be the same.
What Udang proposes is impracticable. xxx. Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision
convicting Udang is valid, regardless of the fact that the judge who heard the witnesses and the
judge who wrote the decision are different. With no showing of any irregularity in the transcript
of records, it is presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of everything that transpire[d]
during the trial," sufficient for Judge Mordeno to have evaluated the credibility of the witnesses,
specifically, of AAA. (People v. Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018)

The Court, too, issued Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 which
required all judges to make ''complete findings of facts in their decisions, scrutinize closely the
legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to
generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced.” (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19,
2018)

[Note: The Constitution (Article VIII, Section 14) expressly provides that "'[n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused

47
due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.” (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance
Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19, 2018)]

[Note: See Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that: Sec l. Rendition of judgments
and final orders. - A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court. (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance
Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19, 2018)]

Likewise, his failure to cite in the Decision his factual and legal bases for finding the
presence of the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not a mere matter of
judicial ethics. No less than the Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The
Court cannot simply accept the lame excuse that Judge Dumayas failed to cite said bases due to
a mere oversight on his part that was made in good faith. (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 6, 2018)

[Note: In this case, a review of the records shows that the RTC had failed to clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it based its ruling insofar as Go's civil liability to East Oceanic is
concerned. There is absolutely no discussion at all in the assailed Decision as to the RTC's ruling in the
collection case, particularly, on how it arrived at its conclusion finding Go liable to pay East Oceanic "'the
sum of 112,814,054.86 plus 6% interest to be computed from the time of the filing of the complaint.'' (Go v.
East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19, 2018)]

The constitutional provision clearly indicates that it contemplates only a decision, which
is the judgment or order that adjudicates on the merits of a case. This is clear from the text and
tenor of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court xxx. The October 4, 2011 resolution did not
adjudicate on the merits of G.R. No. 178083. We explicitly stated so in the resolution of March
13, 2012. What we thereby did was instead to exercise the Court's inherent power to recall
orders and resolutions before they attain finality. In so doing, the Court only exercised prudence
in order to ensure that the Second Division was vested with the appropriate legal competence in
accordance with and under the Court's prevailing internal rules to review and resolve the
pending motion for reconsideration. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)

As we see it, the dissent must have inadvertently ignored the procedural effect that a
second motion for reconsideration based on an allowable ground suspended the running of the
period for appeal from the date of the filing of the motion until such time that the same was
acted upon and granted. Correspondingly, granting the motion for leave to file a second motion
for reconsideration has the effect of preventing the challenged decision from attaining finality.
This is the reason why the second motion for reconsideration should present extraordinarily
persuasive reasons. Indeed, allowing pro forma motions would indefinitely avoid the assailed
judgment from attaining finality. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)

[Note: By granting PAL’s motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, the Court
effectively averted the July 22, 2008 decision and the October 2, 2009 resolution from attaining finality.
Worthy of reiteration, too, is that the March 13, 2012 resolution expressly recalled the September 7, 2011
resolution. Given the foregoing, the conclusion stated in the dissent that the Banc was divested of the
jurisdiction to entertain the second motion for reconsideration for being a "third motion for

48
reconsideration;" and the unfair remark in the dissent that "[t]he basis of the supposed residual power of the
Court En Banc to, take on its own, take cognizance of Division cases is therefore suspect" are immediately
rejected as absolutely legally and factually unfounded. To start with, there was no "third motion for
reconsideration" to speak of. The September 11, 2011 resolution denying PAL’s second motion for
reconsideration had been recalled by the October 4, 2011 resolution. Hence, PAL’s motion for
reconsideration remained unresolved, negating the assertion of the dissent that the Court was resolving
the second motion for reconsideration "for the second time." (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)]

[Note: Nonetheless, we should stress that the rule prohibiting the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration is by no means absolute. Although Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court disallows the
filing of a second motion for reconsideration, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) allows an
exception, to wit:

Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en
banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of
justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of
law or by the Court's declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to
the Court en banc. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No.
178083, March 13, 2018)]

[Note: The conditions that must concur in order for the Court to entertain a second motion for
reconsideration are the following, namely: 1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same
would be in the higher interest of justice; 2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered
attains finality; 3. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at
least three members of the Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and 4. The favorable vote of
at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc’s actual membership must be mustered for the second motion for
reconsideration to be granted. Under the IRSC, a second motion for reconsideration may be allowed to
prosper upon a showing by the movant that a reconsideration of the previous ruling is necessary in the
higher interest of justice. There is higher interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)]

Preliminarily, the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who
rendered the judgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his
judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity
to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or observed their deportment
and manner of testifying. Hence, the Court generally will not find any misapprehension of facts
as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public
officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by
the judge himself. (People v. Villalobos, G.R. No. 228960, June 11, 2018)

Periods for Decision

All persons have the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. To this end, the
Constitution specifies specific time periods when courts may resolve cases:

49
 Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all other lower courts.

Under this provision, the Court of Appeals is given a 12-month period to resolve any case
that has already been submitted for decision. Any case still pending 12 months after submission
for decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary action, such as a
petition for mandamus, to protect their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

In this case, however, petitioners' invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is
misplaced since the Court of Appeals has resolved the petition in a timely manner within the
period provided by law. (Pagdanganan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 202678, September 5, 2018)
En Banc

To reiterate, the Court, whether sitting En Banc or in Division, acts as a collegial body. By
virtue of the collegiality, the Chief Justice alone cannot promulgate or issue any decisions or
orders. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No.
178083, March 13, 2018)

[Note: In Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda Against SC Justices Puna, Kapunan, Pardo,
Ynares Santiago (A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 1), the Court has elucidated on the collegial
nature of the Court in relation to the role of the Chief Justice, viz.: The complainant’s vituperation against the
Chief Justice on account of what he perceived was the latter's refusal "to take a direct positive and favorable action"
on his letters of appeal overstepped the limits of proper conduct. It betrayed his lack of understanding of a
fundamental principle in our system of laws. Although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally decide
a case on his own because of the Court's nature as a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself, overturn
the decision of the Court, whether of a division or the en banc. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions
all other courts are required to take their bearings. While most of the Court's work is performed by its three divisions,
the Court remains one court-single, unitary, complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while
individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only
one voice. Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court may be modified or reversed only by the Court en
banc. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083,
March 13, 2018)]

Fortich v. Corona, which has expounded on the authority of the Banc to accept cases from
the Divisions, is still the prevailing jurisprudence regarding the construction of Section 4(3),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. However, Fortich v. Corona does not apply herein. It is
notable that Fortich v. Corona sprung from the results of the voting on the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Sumilao Farmers. The vote ended in an equally divided Division
("two-two"). From there, the Sumilao Farmers sought to elevate the matter to the Banc based on
Section 4(3), Article VIII because the required three-member majority vote was not reached.
However, the factual milieu in Fortich v. Corona is not on all fours with that in this case. (Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083,
March 13, 2018)

[Note: It is well to stress that the Banc could not have assumed jurisdiction were it not for the
initiative of Justice Arturo V. Brion who consulted the Members of the ruling Division as well as Chief
Justice Corona regarding the jurisdictional implications of the successive retirements, transfers, and
inhibitions by the Members of the ruling Division. This move by Justice Brion led to the referral of the
case to the Banc in accordance with Section 3(1), Rule 2 of the IRSC that provided, among others, that any

50
Member of the Division could request the Court En Banc to take cognizance of cases that fell under
paragraph (m). This referral by the ruling Division became the basis for the Banc to issue its October 4,
2011 resolution. For sure, the Banc, by assuming jurisdiction over the case, did not seek to act as appellate
body in relation to the acts of the ruling Division, contrary to the dissent's position. The Banc's recall of
the resolution of September 7, 2011 should not be so characterized, considering that the Banc did not
thereby rule on the merits of the case, and did not thereby reverse the July 22, 2008 decision and the
October 2, 2009 resolution. The referral of the case to the Banc was done to address the conflict among the
provisions of the IRSC that had potential jurisdictional implications on the ruling made by the Second
Division. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No.
178083, March 13, 2018)]

All the decisions promulgated and actions taken in Division cases rest upon the
concurrence of at least three Members of the Division who actually take part in the deliberations
and vote. The decisions or resolutions of each Division are not any less the decisions or
resolutions of the Court itself. In short, the Court En Banc is not appellate in respect of the
Divisions, for each Division is like the Court En Banc itself, not the inferior to the Court En Banc.
(Sps. Chua v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 215999, December 17, 2018)

Appeals

In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority
to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power is expressly
provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal
cases. (People v. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018)

Appeal is not a matter of right. Courts and tribunals have the discretion whether to give due
course to an appeal or to dismiss it outright. The perfection of an appeal is, thus, jurisdictional.
Non-compliance with the manner in which to file an appeal renders the judgment final and
executory. (Malcaba v. Prohealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 209085, June 6, 2018)

Contempt of Court

In any event, what is relevant and essential in this contempt case is the fact that, by
virtue of petitioner's reliance upon the said lawful and binding SEC Decision in the use of its
corporate name in lieu of the proscribed "Big Mak" mark to comply with the subject injunction
order, petitioner's good faith is clearly manifest. Petitioner's justification of its questioned action
is not at all implausible. This Court finds no reason to reject petitioner's explanation or doubt its
good faith as certainly; the use of its corporate name was warranted by the SEC Decision. It was
also not unreasonable for the petitioner, through its officers, to think that the stalls and products
bearing its corporate name would send the message to the public that the products were the
petitioner's and not those of respondent's, the very evil sought to be prevented and/or
eradicated by the decision in the infringement/unfair competition case. Considering that
condemnation for contempt should not be made lightly, and that the power to punish contempt
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, the Court finds no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that there was no willful disregard or defiance of its order/
decision. We are, therefore, one with the Contempt Court in dismissing the contempt case. (L.C.
Big Mak Burger, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corporation, G.R. No. 233073, February, 14, 2018)

51
 “All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s reckless behavior of
imputing ill motives and malice to the Court’s process is plainly evident in the present case. Her
public statements covered by different media organizations incontrovertibly brings [sic] the
Court in a position of disrepute and disrespect, a patent transgression of the very ethics that
members of the Bar are sworn to uphold. This, the Court cannot countenance.” (Re: Show Cause
Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018 in G.R. No. 237428 [Republic v. Sereno], A.M. 18-06-01-SC,
July 17, 2018)

Judicial Privilege

Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic
postulates for exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding
the Judiciary's privileged and confidential documents and information from any compulsory
processes which very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Such
exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the
exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one Supreme Court and lower courts created by
law. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The
invocation of the Court's judicial privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are part of
the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory
functions and duties. xxx. By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters
external to the Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas,
G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is

principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which Members
of the Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations, are called to
appear and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative adjudicatory
judicial power, then judicial privilege may not be successfully invoked. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R.
No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Civil Service Commission

Government Agencies

Anent whether PVB was a government or a private entity, therefore, we declare that it is
the latter. The foregoing jurisprudential pronouncement remains to be good law, and should be
doctrinal and controlling. (Laya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018, citing
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. The Philippine Veterans Bank (G.R. Nos. 67125,
82337, August 24, 1990, 189 SCRA 14 – Note: This point is important because the Constitution
provides in its Article IX-B, Section 2(1) that "the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters." As the Bank is not owned or controlled by the Government although
it does have an original charter in the form of R.A. No. 3518, it clearly does not fall under the Civil Service

52
and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides.
The consequence is that the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed by the labor
laws, under which in fact they have already been paid some of their claims.)

[Note: We also note that Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169, whereby it acknowledged the
Filipino veterans of World War II as the owners of PVB, but their ownership had not been fully realized
despite the implementation of Republic Act No. 3518. xxx. It is hereby provided that the Board of Trustees
of the Veterans of World War II (BTVWW II) created under Republic Act No. 3518 is hereby designated as
trustee of all issued but undelivered shares of stock. With the Government having no more stake in PVB,
there is no justification for the insistence of the petitioner that PVB "is a public corporation masquerading
as a private corporation." (Laya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018)]

In this regard, Section 2(1) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 or the Administrative Code
of 1987 defines "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as "the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government." The term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine
Government" is broad enough to include the local governments and the central or national
government which, in turn, consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well as
constitutional bodies and other bodies created in accordance with the constitution.

Section 2(4) of E.O. No. 292 further states that "Agency of the Government" refers to any
of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality,
or government-owned or -controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of
Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

BCDA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. (Bases Conversion

and Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 205925, June 20, 2018)

[Note: As such, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees required under Section 21, Rule 141
of the Rules or Court xxx. (Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 205925, June 20, 2018)]

[Note: … it is clear that a government instrumentality may be endowed with corporate powers
and at the same time retain its classification as a government "instrumentality" for all other purposes.
(Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 205925, June 20,
2018)]

[Note: …it is clear that BCDA has an authorized capital of Php100 Billion; however, it is not
divided into shares of stock. BCDA has no voting shares. There is likewise no provision which authorizes
the distribution of dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to BCDA's stockholders. Hence, BCDA
is not a stock corporation. xxx. BCDA also does not qualify as a non-stock corporation because it is not
organized for any of the purposes mentioned under Section 88 of the Corporation Code xxx. …it is clear
that BCDA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. (Bases Conversion and Development Authority v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 205925, June 20, 2018)]

Civil servants

53
 Section 5 (3-b)(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-B and Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No.
1869, which consolidated P.D. No. 1067-B with other presidential decrees issued relative to the
franchise and powers of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, did not define
the meaning of the term "government officials connected directly with the operation of the
government or any of its agencies" as well as the words used therein. The same is true with
respect to the presidential issuances relative to such prohibition. Considering, however, that the
obvious purpose of the subject prohibition is the regulation of conduct of government officials,
reference may be made to pertinent administrative laws and jurisprudence pertaining thereto to
comprehend the meaning of the term under scrutiny. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against
Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

[Note: Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292 also defines an "officer" as distinguished from a "clerk" or
"employee" as "a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of the government." On the other hand, when used with
reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the
exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function. As regards the qualifying phrase "connected directly with
the operation," its definition could not be found in the Administrative Code and other similarly
applicable statutes and rules. It is settled, however, that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most
obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle
construction. Indeed, the lawmaker is presumed to have employed the words in the statute in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation. Thus, the words "connected," "directly," and "operation" must
be given their ordinary meaning in relation to their ordinary use in organizations or institutions such as
the government. Hence, the term "connected" may mean "involved" "associated" or "related;" "directly"
may mean "immediately" "without any intervening agency or instrumentality or determining influence"
or "without any intermediate step;" and "operation" may mean "doing or performing action" or
"administration." Additionally, "to operate" is synonymous to the terms "to exercise" and "to act." (Re:
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No.
17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]

[Note: From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to
the operation of the government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government
whose tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or
any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a
"government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" is a
government officer who performs the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion -
essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint
against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]

Career and Non-Career Service

The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil service into career and
non-career, to wit:

The career service is characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of
tenure; while a non-career position is characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of
the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited

54
 to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was extended.

There are also three levels of positions in the career service, namely: (a) the first level
shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which involve
non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring less than four years of collegiate studies; (b) the second level shall include
professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical or scientific
work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work
up to Division Chief level; and (c) the third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive
Service.

Under the third level, such positions in the Career Executive Service are further
classified into Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
196890, January 11, 2018)

As to employment status and security of tenure, appointment in the career service shall
be either permanent or temporary. Lack of civil service eligibility makes an appointment a
temporary one and without a fixed and definite term and dependent entirely upon the pleasure
of the appointing power. On the other hand, the acquisition of security of tenure is governed by
the rules and regulations promulgated by the CESB. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018, citing Sections 2 and 3, Article I, Circular No. 2
Series of 2003)

Only a CES Eligible assigned to a CES position may be appointed by the President to a
CES Rank. The Entry Rank in the CES shall be CESO Rank VI regardless of the position to which
a CES Eligible is assigned. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
196890, January 11, 2018, citing Sections 2 and 3, Article I, Circular No. 2 Series of 2003)

In sum, for an employee to attain a permanent status in his employment, he must first be
a CES eligible. Such eligibility can be acquired by passing the requisite civil service
examinations and obtaining passing grade to the same. "At present, the CES eligibility
examination process has four stages, namely: (1) Written Examination; (2) Assessment Center;
(3) Performance Validation; and (4) Board Interview." After completing and passing the
examination process, said employee is entitled to conferment of a CES eligibility and the
inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Such conferment of eligibility is done by the
CESB through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation is done of the employee's
performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. (Career Executive Service Board
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018)

Conferment of a CES eligibility does not complete one's membership in the CES nor
does it confer security of tenure. It is also necessary that an individual who was conferred CES
eligibility be appointed to a CES rank. Such appointment is made by the President upon the
recommendation of the CESB. Only after such process will the employee’s appointment in the

55
service be considered as a permanent one, entitling him to security of tenure. (Career Executive
Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018)

[Note: Here, Lodevico was appointed as Director III as evidenced by a Letter dated May 14, 2008.
The position of Director III, equivalent to Assistant Bureau Director, is considered as a Career Executive
Service position, belonging to the third-level. Lodevico met the first requisite as she is a CES eligible,
evidenced by a Certificate of Eligibility. However, the second requisite is wanting because there was no
evidence which proves that Lodevico was appointed to a CES rank. Guilty of repetition, being CES
eligible alone does not qualify her appointment as a permanent one, for there is a necessity for her
appointment to an appropriate CES rank to attain security of tenure. That being said, We consider
Lodevico's appointment as mere temporary. Such being the case, her services may be terminated with or
without cause as she merely serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. "[T]he temporary
appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall surrender the office when called upon to
do so by the appointing authority." Consequently, her removal from service based on MC Nos. 1 and 2,
which discharged all non-CESO occupying CES positions in all agencies, was proper. (Career Executive
Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018)]

Salaries and Benefits

BCDA v. COA (599 Phil. 455 [2009]) declared that the BCDA Charter does not state that
Board members may receive benefits other than per diems. Had its Charter intended the Board to
receive other such benefits, then it would have expressly provided it. Similarly, in the present
case, Section 8 of the DBP Charter only mentions per diem as the Board's compensation, hence,
all other compensations are excluded. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 221706, March 13, 2018)

Applying the rationale in this case, Section 8 of the DBP Charter, which expressly states
that Board members will receive per diems, would be rendered inoperative if the Board, with the
approval of the President, would grant additional benefits not cited under the law. Further,
limitations on the increase of the per diems would also be rendered futile because the Board
could disregard the same in allowing additional and higher benefits. (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 221706, March 13, 2018)

[Note: Likewise, to adopt the view of the DBP would result in unbridled grant of benefits to the
Board members. There are no limitations in the law that would restrain the benefits which could be
readily created by the Board. The grant of additional compensation of the Board members would rest
solely in the hands of the executive branch, through the authority of the DBP and with the approval of the
President; and the legislative branch would have no prerogative in determining the limits of such
compensation. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 221706, March 13,
2018)]

[Note: The COA doubts the alleged approval of President Arroyo of the DBP Memorandum
because it was placed in a separate note; in contrast, DBP insists on the said approval being authentic.
Nevertheless, considering that the Board cannot grant additional benefits to its members, other than per
diems, then the President's approval of the DBP Memorandum is immaterial. Again, under the DBP
Charter, only the per diems of its members may be increased by the Board with the approval of the
President. Notably, in BCDA v. COA, the compensation and benefit scheme was approved by then
President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), but the Court affirmed the disallowance of additional benefits
because the BCDA Charter only allowed per diems as compensation of the Board members. (Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 221706, March 13, 2018)]

56
 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Section 3-A of R.A. No. 910, as amended,
buttressed by the Resolution in A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA, prescribes a duty under the law upon the
DBM to pay to the petitioners the increases in salary granted by law during the 5 year period
after date of retirement. Mandamus will lie to compel respondent DBM to fulfill its duty under
the law. (Association of Retired Court of Appeals Justices, Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 210204, July 10, 2018)

We hold that Section 8(g) of RA. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children
Act of 2004), being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the
general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
“notwithstanding other laws to the contrary.” (Republic v. Yahon, 738 Phil. 397 [2014], cited in
Pension and Gratuity Management Center v. AAA, G.R. No. 201292, August 1, 2018)

Thus, Philhealth CARAGA's power to fix the compensation of its personnel as granted
by its charter, does not necessarily mean that it has unbridled discretion to issue any and all
kinds of allowances and other forms of benefits or compensation package, limited only by the
provisions of its charter. The power of GOCCs or its board to fix the salaries, allowances and
bonuses must still conform to compensation and position classification standards laid down by
applicable laws, as discussed above. To sustain Philhealth CARAGA's claim that it has
unbridled authority to unilaterally fix its compensation package will result in an invalid
delegation of legislative power. (Philippine Health Insurance Corporation Regional Office-CARAGA
v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 230218, August 14, 2018)

Appointments

Appointment, by its very nature, is a highly discretionary act. As an exercise of political

discretion, the appointing authority is afforded a wide latitude in the selection of personnel in
his department or agency and seldom questioned, the same being a matter of wisdom and
personal preference. In certain occasions, however, the selection of the appointing authority is
subject to review by respondent CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government. In this
regard, while there appears to be a conflict between the two interests, i.e., the discretion of the
appointing authority and the reviewing authority of the CSC, this issue is hardly a novel one.
In countless occasions, the Court has ruled that the only function of the CSC is merely to
ascertain whether the appointee possesses the minimum requirements under the law; if it is so,
then the CSC has no choice but to attest to such appointment. (Cerilles v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 180845, June 6, 2018)

As early as Gayatao v. Civil Service Commission (285 Phil. 652 [1992]), which is analogous
to this case, the Court already ruled that in instances of reorganization, there is no encroachment
on the discretion of the appointing authority when the CSC revokes an appointment on the
ground that the removal of the employee was done in bad faith. In such instance, the CSC is not
actually directing the appointment of another but simply ordering the reinstatement of the
illegally removed employee xxx. (Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845, June 6,
2018)

Discipline

57
 A civil servant is considered habitually absent when “he or she incurs 'unauthorized
absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the law for at least three
(3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during the year.” To stress,
mere failure to file leave of absence does not by itself result in any administrative liability.
However, unauthorized absence is punishable if the same becomes frequent or habitual. In turn,
absences become habitual when an officer or employee in the civil service exceeds the allowable
monthly leave credit (2.5 days) within the given time frame. (Balloguing v. Dagan, A.M. No.
P-17-3645, January 30, 2018)

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal
from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and
not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,

willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act
of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.

Dishonesty, on the other hand, is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray;
unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of
fairness and straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the
Judiciary.

Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service pertains to any conduct that is
detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to
acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish - or tend to
diminish - the people’s faith in the Judiciary.

Insubordination, meanwhile, is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior

officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of
the lawful and reasonable instruction of the employer. (Zarate-Fernandez v. Lovendino, A.M.  No.
P-16-3530 [Formerly A.M. No. 16-08-306-RTC], March 6, 2018)

Nevertheless, as the OCA correctly pointed out, dropping from the rolls is
non-disciplinary in nature, and thus, Sumangil's separation from the service shall neither result
in the forfeiture of his benefits nor disqualification from reemployment in the government. (Re:
Dropping from the Rolls of Mr. Florante B. Sumangil, A.M. No. 18-04-79-RTC, June 20, 2018)

Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific
acts constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
However, jurisprudence is instructive on this point that for an act to constitute such an
administrative offense, the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer's
official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his or
her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or

58
employee. This Court has considered the following acts or omissions, among others, as conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of
office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records and
property; making false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders. (Villanueva
v. Reodique, G.R. No. 221647, November 27, 2018)

Nepotism

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. Macandile, being the sister of Dator, is clearly within the scope
of the prohibition from being hired under a contract of services and job order.

A reading of the Job Order, that was approved and signed by Dator, would reveal that
these prohibitions are actually written on it as well:

The said job order shall automatically cease upon expiration as stipulated above, unless
renewed. However, services of any or all of the above-named can be terminated prior to the
expiration of this Job Order for lack of funds or when their services are no longer needed. The
above-named hereby attests that he/she is not related within the third degree (fourth degree in
case of LGUs) of consanguinity or affinity to the: 1) hiring authority and/or 2) representatives of
the hiring agency; that he/she has not been previously dismissed from government service by
reason of an administrative offense; that he/she has not already reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65). Furthermore, the service rendered hereunder is not considered or will never
be accredited as government service.51

Given the foregoing, We agree with the OMB that Macandile's designation as Chief
Administrative Officer was irregular as it was in clear violation of CSC Resolution No. 020790.
Dator was thus properly held liable for simple misconduct. (Dator v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No.
237742, October 8, 2018)

Dropping from the Rolls

The Court also notes that separation from the service for unauthorized absences is
non-disciplinary in nature in accordance with Section 110, Rule 20 of the 2017 RACCS, to wit:

Section 110. Dropping From the Rolls; Non-disciplinary in Nature. This mode of separation from the
service for unauthorized absences or unsatisfactory or poor performance or physical or mental
disorder is non-disciplinary in nature and shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefit on the part
of the official or employee or in disqualification from reemployment in the government. (Re:
Dropping from the Rolls of Noel C. Lindo, A.M. No. 18-07-131-RTC, September 3, 2018)

Reorganizations

The following may be derived from the cited provisions - First, an officer or employee
may be validly removed from service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization; in such case, there
is no violation of security of tenure and the aggrieved employee has no cause of action against
the appointing authority. Second, if, on the other hand, the reorganization is done in bad faith, as

59
when the enumerated circumstances in Section 2 are present, the aggrieved employee, having
been removed without valid cause, may demand for his reinstatement or reappointment. Third,
officers and employees holding permanent appointments in the old staffing pattern shall be
given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern, which
shall be comparable to their former position or in case there are not enough comparable
positions, to positions next lower in rank. Lastly, no new employees shall be taken in until all
permanent officers and employees have been appointed unless such positions are
policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature. (Cerilles v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 180845, June 6, 2018, citing Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 6656)

[Note: Applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, the Court finds that Respondents were able
to prove bad faith in the reorganization of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur. xxx. First, the sheer
number of appointments found to be violative of RA 6656 is astounding. As initially observed by the
CSCRO, no less than ninety-six (96) of the appointments made by Gov. Cerilles violated the rule on
preference and non-hiring of new employees embodied in Sections 4 and 5 of the said law. While the
relative scale of invalidated appointments does not conclusively rule out good faith, there is, at the very
least, a strong indication that the reorganization was motivated not solely by the interest of economy and
efficiency, but as a systematic means to circumvent the security of tenure of the ninety-six (96) employees
affected. Second, Respondents were replaced by either new employees or those holding lower positions
in the old staffing pattern - circumstances that may be properly appreciated as evidence of bad faith
pursuant to Section 2 and Section 4 of RA 6656. Significantly, Gov. Cerilles plainly admitted that new
employees were indeed hired after the reorganization. xxx. Moreover, the Court notes that the positions
of Respondents were not even abolished. However, instead of giving life to the clear mandate of RA 6656
on preference, Gov. Cerilles terminated Respondents from the service and forthwith appointed other
employees in their stead. Neither did Gov. Cerilles, at the very least, demote them to lesser positions if
indeed there was a reduction in the number of positions corresponding to Respondents' previous
positions. (Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845, June 6, 2018)]

All told, the Court finds that the totality of the circumstances gathered from the records
reasonably lead to the conclusion that the reorganization of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur
was tainted with bad faith. For this reason, following the ruling in Larin, Respondents are
entitled to no less than reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights
and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of their separation until actual
reinstatement; or, in the alternative, in case they have already compulsorily retired during the
pendency of this case, they shall be awarded the corresponding retirement benefits during the
period for which they have been retired. (Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845,
June 6, 2018)

[Note: The Court is not unmindful of the plight of the incumbents who were appointed after the
reorganization in place of Respondents. However, as a result of the illegal termination of Respondents,
there was technically no vacancy to which the incumbents could have been appointed. Cerilles v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845, June 6, 2018)]

Appeals

While no decision on the appeals was ever rendered by Gov. Cerilles, it would be unjust
to require Respondents to first await an issuance before elevating the matter to the CSC, given
Gov. Cerilles' delay in resolving the same. In such case, an appointing authority could easily
eliminate all opportunities of appeal by the aggrieved employees by mere inaction. It is
well-settled that procedural rules must not be applied with unreasonable rigidity if substantial

60
rights stand to be marginalized; here, no less than Respondents' means of livelihood are at stake.
Proceeding therefrom, the Court cannot therefore ascribe any fault to the CSCRO in resolving
the appeals of Respondents due to Gov. Cerilles' refusal to act, especially since the CSC is, in any
case, vested with jurisdiction to review the decision of the appointing authority. (Cerilles v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845, June 6, 2018)

Retirement

Severance of employment is a condition sine qua non for the release of retirement
benefits. Retirement benefits are not meant to recompense employees who are still in the
employ of the government; that is the function of salaries and emoluments. Retirement benefits
are in the nature of a reward granted by the State to a government employee who has given the
best years of his life to the service of his country." (Government Service Insurance System Board of
Trustees v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018)

[Note: While Demonteverde met the two conditions for entitlement to benefits under R.A. No.
8291 in 2001, i.e., she had rendered at least fifteen (15) years in government service as a regular member,
and she turned sixty (60) years of age, she continued to serve the government and did not, at that time,
sever her employment with the government. Thus, not having retired from service when she turned 60 on
February 22, 2001, she cannot claim that her right to retirement benefits had already accrued then.
(Government Service Insurance System Board of Trustees v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018)]

In fine, this Court finds it proper to emphasize that Demonteverde's filing of separate
retirement claims for her government service outside of the Judiciary and in the Judiciary was
unnecessary and unwarranted. Apart from the fact that she continued to serve the government
as a trial court judge after serving the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO for a total of 32 years, her
service in these government agencies is creditable as part of her overall government service for
retirement purposes under R.A. No. 910, as amended. (Government Service Insurance System
Board of Trustees v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018)

Considering the express wordings of R.A. No. 910, which include service "in any other
branch of the Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of
a justice or judge, Demonteverde's years of service as in the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO were
already correctly credited by the OCA as part of her government service when it granted her
retirement application for her service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on
February 22, 2011. (Government Service Insurance System Board of Trustees v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 230953, June 20, 2018)

Commission on Elections

Petitioner is correct in his contention that a prior judgment is not a precondition to filing
a Petition for Disqualification. Nevertheless, the petition must necessarily fail for lack of
substantial evidence to establish that private respondent committed an election offense.
(Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

As enunciated, the COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is

quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that
is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with

61
resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered
but is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature. This is simply in congruence with the concept of due process that
all administrative adjudicatory bodies are enjoined to observe. (Francisco v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in
relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of
constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body,
whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election
laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate,
jurisdiction over election contests. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April
24, 2018)

Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares that the
polling body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election contests outside the jurisdiction of
the electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of regression, contrary to the intent
behind the constitutional innovations creating and further strengthening the Commission. There
is no novelty in this pronouncement, but merely a reinstatement of Our consistent jurisprudence
prior to Poe. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

[Note: In the landmark case of Aratea v. COMELEC, for instance, the COC of Romeo D. Lonzanida
was cancelled and declared void ab initio because of his misrepresentation as to his eligibility. He knew
fully well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than
three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding
term, thus constituting false material representation. No prior judgment recognizing Lonzanida's service
for three terms was necessary to effect the cancellation of his COC. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)]

[Note: In Maquiling v. COMELEC, Linog G. Balua, through a petition treated as one for
cancellation and/or denial of due course of COC, contended that Rommel Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that the latter is a foreigner based on a certification by the Bureau of
Immigration indicating that Arnado is American. The Court did not find issue in the COMELEC's
authority to make a factual determination as to Arnado's citizenship and residence, though We eventually
reversed the COMELEC En Banc's ruling and reinstated that of its First Division based on Our own
appreciation of the evidence on record. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24,
2018)]

[Note: And in Cerafica v. COMELEC, the Court reversed the COMELEC's ruling not because of
any alleged lack of authority to make factual determinations as to the eligibility of a candidate, but, quite
the contrary, because it did not make use of the same authority. To reiterate, the COMELEC, as an adjunct
to its adjudicatory power, may investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action. (Francisco v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)]

It may be true that the sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC is
false material representation compounded by intent to deceive on the part of the candidate; and
that the intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain absent an
established fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the Court categorically rules

62
herein that the COMELEC can be the proper body to make the pronouncement against which
the truth or falsity of a material representation in a COC can be measured. But lest it be
misunderstood, these disquisitions will not by any means alter the outcome of Poe, for even if
We dispense the requirement of a predicate judgment therein and uphold the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, the Court's conclusion would still find mooring on the factual findings on Poe's
Filipino blood relation and residency. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249,
April 24, 2018)

The essence of a disqualification proceeding that invokes Sec. 68 of the OEC is to bar an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office based
not on the candidate's lack of qualification, but on his possession of a disqualification as
declared by a final decision of a competent court, or as found by the Commission. The
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section
68 of the OEC. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC under Sec. 78 of the OEC to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or
qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age,
citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for elective office enumerated under
Sec. 74 of the OEC. Moreover, the false representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. The relief is granted not because of the candidate's lack of eligibility per se, but
because of his or her false misrepresentation of possessing the statutory qualifications. (Francisco
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

The doctrine in Poe was never meant to apply to Petitions for Disqualification. A prior
court judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC can prosper. This is
highlighted by the provision itself, which contemplates of two scenarios: first, there is a final
decision by a competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense and second, it is
the Commission itself that found that the candidate committed any of the enumerated
prohibited acts. Noteworthy is that in the second scenario, it is not required that there be a prior
final judgment; it is sufficient that the Commission itself made the determination. The
conjunction "or" separating "competent court" and "the Commission" could only mean that the
legislative intent was for both bodies to be clothed with authority to ascertain whether or not
there is evidence that the respondent candidate ought to be disqualified. (Francisco v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

Furthermore, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is, as in all administrative
cases, substantial evidence. This is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. To impose prior conviction of an election offense as
a condition sine qua non before a Petition for Disqualification can be launched would be
tantamount to requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is significantly beyond what our
laws require. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

The distinction between the electoral aspect from the criminal one was further amplified
in Ejercito. There, the Court rebuked therein petitioner's assertion that the conduct of
preliminary investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated under Section 68 of the
OEC were indeed committed is a requirement prior to actual disqualification. Resultantly, the
Court upheld the COMELEC's disqualification of petitioner Emilio Ramon Ejercito even though

63
there has yet to be any finding of probable cause, let alone guilt, that he spent more than the
threshold amount prescribed under Sections 100-103 of the OEC, an election offense under
Section 262 of the same code. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24,
2018)

Neither a prior conviction nor even a determination of probable cause is then a

requirement before a Petition for Disqualification can be lodged. Credit must be given to
petitioner for his apt observation that to rule otherwise would render inutile the remedy under
Section 68 of the OEC insofar as the specific ground raised herein is concerned. (Francisco v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018)

[Note: We are, therefore, constrained to rule that the COMELEC erred when, relying on Poe, it
imposed the requirement of a prior court judgment before resolving the current controversy. (Francisco v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018]

"Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc
ruling is prohibited except in a case involving an election offense." xxx. In Angelia vs.
Commission on Elections (388 Phil. 560 [2000]), the Court stressed that the resolution of Comelec
En Banc "is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it had
only one recourse, and that is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure." Even supposing that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the concerned party
need not wait for the resolution of the same and may nonetheless proceed to file a petition for
certiorari with this Court within the reglementary period. (Chua v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 236573, August 14, 2018)

By their very nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt

disposition. The declaration of a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate results in the
cancellation of his COC. The law mandates the COMELEC and the courts to give priority to
cases of disqualification to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought. In many instances, however,
proceedings against nuisance candidates remained pending and undecided until election day
and even after canvassing of votes had been completed. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 235058, September 4, 2018)

The Court has resolved several petitions involving cases where the COMELEC declared a
nuisance candidate before and after the elections. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
235058, September 4, 2018)

[Note: In Bautista v. COMELEC (Bautista), the case involved the disqualification of Edwin "Efren"
Bautista as a nuisance candidate for the position of mayor in Navotas because his name was confusingly
similar to Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and he had no financial means to support a campaign. Several days
before the election or on April 30, 1998, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring Edwin Bautista as a
nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his COC. A motion for reconsideration was filed and
it was only resolved by COMELEC on May 13, 1998, or after the elections. Thus, a separate tally for
"EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA" were made by the municipal board of
canvassers. Cipriano Bautista filed a petition to declare illegal the proceedings of the municipal board of
canvassers, but, it was denied by the COMELEC stating that the separate tallies should be considered as
stray votes.

On appeal, the Court reversed the COMELEC. It ruled that the separate tallies were made to

64
remedy any prejudice that may be caused by the inclusion of a potential nuisance candidate. Such
inclusion was brought about by technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which prevented the April 30, 1998 resolution from becoming final at that time. Ideally,
the matter should have been resolved with finality prior to election day. Its pendency on election day
exposed the evils brought about by the inclusion of a nuisance candidate.

The Court further held therein that the votes separately tallied were not stray votes. It emphasized
that a stray vote is invalid because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. In that
case, however, it was clear that the votes for Edwin "Efren" Bautista were actually intended by the
electorate for Cipriano "Efren" Bautista, thus, the votes for Edwin "Efren" Bautista should be credited in
favor of Cipriano "Efren" Bautista. The Court also underscored that:

As we said earlier, the instant petition is laden with an issue which involves several ramifications. Matters
tend to get complicated when technical rules are strictly applied. True it is, the disqualification of Edwin
Bautista was not yet final on election day. However, it is also true that the electorate of Navotas was informed
of such disqualification. The voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the
COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat
the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case.
(emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (Martinez III) involved a petition
to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate for the position of representative in the fourth
legislative district of Cebu because his name was confusingly similar with Celestino A. Martinez III. The
COMELEC rendered a decision declaring Edilito Martinez as a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007,
or almost one (1) month after the elections. Thus, the jurisdiction regarding the election was transferred to
the House of Representatives· Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Celestino Martinez III filed an election
protest therein against the winning candidate Benhur Salimbangon. The HRET ruled that the ballots
containing "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" should not be counted in favor of Celestino Martinez III
because Edilito Martinez was not yet declared a nuisance candidate at the time of the elections.

The Court reversed the HRET and held that the votes for "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ"
should have been counted in favor of Celestino Martinez III because such votes could not have been
intended for Edilito C. Martinez, who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. It
emphasized that the candidacy of Edilito C. Martinez was obviously meant to confuse the electorate. The
Court also stated that Celestino Martinez III should not have been prejudiced by the COMELEC's
lethargy in resolving the nuisance case. It was explained therein:

Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with
public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and
confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final
judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by
such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral
process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any
petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Recently, in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC (Dela Cruz), a petition to declare Aurelio Dela Cruz a nuisance
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Bugasong, Antique was filed because his name was
confusingly similar with the name of Casimir Dela Cruz and the former did not have the financial
capacity to campaign for the elections. On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC declared Aurelio Dela Cruz a
nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the certified list of candidates and he still

65
received votes during the automated elections. In its Resolution No. 8844, the COMELEC stated that the
votes for Aurelio Dela Cruz, a nuisance candidate, should be considered stray. Thus, Casimir Dela Cruz
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court to annul and set aside the said resolution.

In reversing the COMELEC, the Court ruled that even in the automated elections, the votes for the
nuisance candidate should still be credited to the legitimate candidate. It held that the previous
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 – declaring that the vote cast for a nuisance candidate, who had the same
surname as the legitimate candidate, should be counted in favor of the latter – remains good law. The
Court underscored that:

xxx the possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on
the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system
especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate
instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same.

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in
our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and
delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots
only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during
elections. (emphases supplied)

Accordingly, the Court consistently declared that the votes cast for the nuisance candidate must be
credited in favor of the legitimate candidate with a similar name to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the
will of the voters, even if the declaration of the nuisance candidate became final only after the elections.
(Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the COMELEC may declare a person
as a nuisance candidate motu proprio or through a verified petition. In Dela Cruz, the Court
discussed that the said petition to declare a person as a nuisance candidate is akin to a petition
to cancel or deny due course a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. (Santos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)

A cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, much less to valid votes. Said
votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he or she is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he or she never filed a COC. Thus, a petition to declare a
person a nuisance candidate or a petition for disqualification of a nuisance candidate is
already sufficient to cancel the COC of the said candidate and to credit the garnered votes to
the legitimate candidate because it is as if the nuisance candidate was never a candidate to be
voted for. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)

[Note: Evidently, as seen in Bautista, Martinez III and Dela Cruz, the Court does not require a specific
or special proceeding before the votes of the nuisance candidate is credited to the legitimate candidate. As
long as there is a final and executory judgment declaring a person a nuisance candidate, the votes
received by the nuisance candidate shall be credited to the legitimate candidate. (Santos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

[Note: When a candidate is declared a nuisance candidate, it certainly follows that he or she
cannot be voted for as he or she is not a candidate, consequently, the votes shall be credited to the
legitimate candidate. Evidently, the crediting of the votes is a logical consequence of the final decision in
the nuisance case because the vote for the nuisance candidate is considered a vote for the legitimate

66
candidate. It would be the height of injustice to require the legitimate candidate to initiate a separate
proceeding for the crediting of votes when it was already declared that there was indeed a nuisance
candidate, which confused the electorate regarding their votes for the legitimate candidate. (Santos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

[Note: Here, the crediting of the votes of the nuisance candidate to respondent as a legitimate
candidate, whose names are similar, is a necessary consequence of the COMELEC's declaration that
Rosalie is a nuisance candidate. Consequently, the transfer of votes of the nuisance candidate to the
legitimate candidate can be validly accomplished in the execution proceedings of the nuisance case.
(Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

[Note: The Court finds that in a petition for disqualification of a nuisance candidate, the only real
parties in interest are the alleged nuisance candidate, the affected legitimate candidate, whose names are
similarly confusing. A real [party-in-interest] is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

[Note: In Timbol v. COMELEC (Timbol), it was stated that to minimize the logistical confusion caused
by nuisance candidates, their COC may be denied due course or cancelled by the petition of a legitimate
candidate or by the COMELEC. This denial or cancellation may be motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, subject to an opportunity to be heard. It was emphasized therein that the
COMELEC should balance its duty to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and
peaceful with the right of an alleged nuisance candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for
public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate. Thus, when a verified petition for
disqualification of a nuisance candidate is filed, the real parties-in-interest are the alleged nuisance
candidate and the interested party, particularly, the legitimate candidate. Evidently, the alleged nuisance
candidate and the legitimate candidate stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. The
outcome of the nuisance case shall directly affect the number of votes of the legitimate candidate,
specifically, whether the votes of the nuisance candidate should be credited in the former's favor. (Santos
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

[Note: Glaringly, there was nothing discussed in Timbol that other candidates, who do not have
any similarity with the name of the alleged nuisance candidate, are real parties-in-interest or have the
opportunity to be heard in a nuisance petition. Obviously, these other candidates are not affected by the
nuisance case because their names are not related with the alleged nuisance candidate. Regardless of
whether the nuisance petition is granted or not, the votes of the unaffected candidates shall be
completely the same. Thus, they are mere silent observers in the nuisance case. (Santos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

In a multi-slot office, such as membership of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter may
vote for more than one candidate. Hence, it is possible that the legitimate candidate and
nuisance candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes in one ballot. The Court
agrees with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance candidate should no
longer be credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall receive two votes from
one voter. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)

Therefore, in a multi-slot office, the COMELEC must not merely apply a simple
mathematical formula of adding the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate
with the similar name. To apply such simple arithmetic might lead to the double counting of
votes because there may be ballots containing votes for both nuisance and legitimate
candidates. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)

67
 As properly discussed by the OSG, a legitimate candidate may seek another person with
the same surname to file a candidacy for the same position and the latter will opt to be declared
a nuisance candidate. In that scenario, the legitimate candidate shall receive all the votes of the
nuisance candidate and may even receive double votes, thereby, drastically increasing his odds.
(Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)

At the same time, it is also possible that a voter may be confused when he reads the ballot
containing the similar names of the nuisance candidate and the legitimate candidate. In his
eagerness to vote, he may shade both ovals for the two candidates to ensure that the legitimate
candidate is voted for. Similarly, in that case, the legitimate candidate may receive two (2) votes
from one voter by applying the simple arithmetic formula adopted by the COMELEC when the
nuisance candidate's COC is cancelled.

Thus, to ascertain that the votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor
of the legitimate candidate with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the ballots.
In those ballots that contain both votes for nuisance and legitimate candidate, only one count of
vote must be credited to the legitimate candidate. (Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
235058, September 4, 2018)

[Note: In this case, the certificate of canvass stated that Rosalie received 13,328 votes; while
respondent received 33,738 votes. In the first writ of execution, the COMELEC applied the simple
arithmetic formula of counting the 13,328 votes cast for Rosalie in favor of respondent, thus, the total
number of votes garnered by respondent was 47,066. Similarly, in the second writ of execution, the
COMELEC applied the same simple arithmetic formula and stated that respondent had 47,066 votes. As
discussed-above, the simple arithmetic formula of the COMELEC in a multi-slot office, where there is a
nuisance candidate, is inaccurate. Thus, the ballots containing the votes for nuisance candidate Rosalie
must be credited in favor of respondent. However, if there are ballots which contain both votes in favor of
Rosalie and respondent, only one vote shall be credited in favor of respondent. (Santos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 235058, September 4, 2018)]

[Note: Petitioner alleges that the ballot marked as Exhibit "R-4" should have been appreciated in
his favor, because such was accomplished by only one person. The applicable rule, with respect to the
contested ballot, is the Written by Two Rule. According to the aforesaid rule, ballots which clearly
appeared to have been filled by two persons before being deposited in the ballot box are null and void, in
the absence of evidence aliunde that the second handwriting was placed on the ballot after it was
deposited in the ballot box, since the presumption is that the entries on the ballot were made prior to the
casting of the vote. It further holds that, where it appears that there is a marked disparity or dissimilarity
between the handwriting in one part of the ballot and the handwriting in another part and that the votes
had clearly not been written by the same hand, the ballot will be rejected. Contrary to the stand of
petitioner, a review of the contested ballot clearly shows that such was written by two different persons.
As properly held by the COMELEC En Banc, the penmanship for Punong Barangay was distinctly different
from the penmanship of those written for Barangay Kagawad. The COMELEC En Banc rightly ruled that
such glaring dissimilarity can be seen by the fact that the name of the candidate for Punong Barangay was
in all caps and straightly written, except for the last name, while those for Barangay Kagawad was written
in italics and not in all caps. Hence, the COMELEC En Banc rightly did not credit the subject ballot in
favor of petitioner. (Sevilla v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227797, November 13, 2018)]

Commission on Audit

68
 The issues raised by petitioner Transco have been resolved in the similar case of National
Transmission Corporation v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 223625, November 22, 2016), where the
Court sustained the disallowance of a portion of the separation benefits of an employee
corresponding to the period when he was still a contractual employee. In that case, the Court
ruled that, under the EPIRA Law, contractual employees are entitled to separation benefits only
if their appointments have been approved or attested to by the CSC. (National Transmission
Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 227796, February 20, 2018)

[Note: In this case, since there was no proof that Agulto's appointment was duly approved or
attested to by the CSC, the disallowance of the amount of P22,965.81 was valid and proper. Thus, the
Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COA-CP in sustaining the
disallowance. The disallowed amount, however, need not be refunded by the members of petitioner
Transco's Board of Directors as well as by Agulto, following the ruling of the Court in National
Transmission Corporation xxx. (National Transmission Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 227796,
February 20, 2018)]

… the COA was correct in holding that the benefits given under the CNA were not
allowed under Executive Order (EO) 180 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
because the benefits given by the CESB to its employees and officers were not subject to
negotiation. xxx. The validity of the disallowance notwithstanding, we note that the CESB's
officials who authorized and caused the payment of the CNA benefits to covered officers and
employees, and the latter as the recipients of the disallowed payments enjoyed the benefit of
good faith and should be absolved from the liability to refund. (Career Executive Service Board v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 212348, June 19, 2018)

It appears that DBP misconstrued its authority to compromise. Sec. 9 (e) of its charter
authorizes its BOD to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to or against the bank.
To interpret the provision as including contested benefits that are demanded by employees of a
chartered GFI such as the DBP is a wide stretch. To reiterate, its officers and employees'
remunerations may only be granted in the manner provided under Sec. 13 of its charter and
conformably with the SSL. The COA's insistence that industrial peace is not a determining
factor under the principles of the SSL in fixing the compensation of DBP's employees, is correct.
xxx. All told, the grant of GFPA was indeed an ultra vires act or beyond the authority of DBP's
BOD. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA when it disallowed the GFPA
on the basis of a compromise agreement to settle a labor dispute. We thus sustain the
disallowance. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210838, July 3,
2018)

It is settled that Government officials and employees who received benefits or

allowances, which were disallowed, may keep the amounts received if there is no finding of bad
faith and the disbursement was made in good faith. On the other hand, officers who
participated in the approval of the disallowed allowances or benefits are required to refund only
the amounts received when they are found to be in bad faith or grossly negligent amounting to
bad faith. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210838, July 3,
2018; see also Montejo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 232272, July 24, 2018)

To begin with, the COA is correct that the Compromise Agreement is null and void
because the power to compromise the claims in this case is lodged with Congress. (Binga
Hydroelectric Plant, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218721, July 10, 2018)

69
 COA's interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations, as enunciated in its
decisions, should be accorded great weight and respect xxx. (Montejo v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 232272, July 24, 2018, citing Espinas v. Commission on Audit, 73 Phil. 67 [2014])

The limitation of the Court's power of review over COA rulings merely complements its
nature as an independent constitutional body to: (i) determine whether the government entities
comply with the law and the rules in disbursing public funds; and (ii) disallow legal
disbursements of these funds. On this note, we find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of COA in disallowing the various benefits granted to
Philhealth CARAGA officers, employees and contractors, as a constitutional office which has
the power to review or disallow disbursement of public funds. (Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation Regional Office-CARAGA v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 230218, August 14, 2018)

Further, Philhealth CARAGA's fiscal autonomy does not automatically preclude the
COA's power to disallow the grant of allowances in cases of irregular, excessive, unnecessary, or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. (Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
Regional Office-CARAGA v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 230218, August 14, 2018)

Petitioner contends that the COA has no jurisdiction over the Executive Committee of the MMFF, an
organization composed of private individuals from the movie industry, and whose funds come from
non-tax revenues and private donations.

xxx the COA's audit jurisdiction generally covers public entities. However, its authority to
audit extends even to non-governmental entities insofar as the latter receives financial aid from
the government. Thus, 'it is clear that the determination of COA's jurisdiction over a specific
entity does not merely require an examination of the nature of the entity. Should the entity be
found to be non-governmental, further determination must be had as to the source of its funds
or the nature of the account sought to be audited by the COA. xxx. Considering the
establishment and mechanism of the Executive Committee of the MMFF, it is at once apparent
that it is not a government-owned and controlled corporation. xxx. Such finding
notwithstanding, We find that the Executive Committee is subject to COA jurisdiction,
considering its administrative relationship to the Metro Manila Development Authority, a
government agency tasked· to perform administrative, coordinating and policy-setting
functions for the local government units in the Metropolitan Manila area. (Fernando v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 237938 and 237944-45, December 4, 2018)

Quantum meruit literally means "as much as he deserves." Under this principle, a person
may recover a reasonable value of the thing he delivered or the service he rendered. The
principle also acts as a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate
that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. The principle of quantum
meruit is predicated on equity.

At the risk of being repetitious, it must be stressed that Geronimo sufficiently established
his right to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. Thus, to deny him of this
compensation for the services he rendered despite the clear benefit which resulted to the
government would be the height of injustice. It is in this context that the Court finds itself in
awe with the conclusion reached by the COA in its assailed decision. By denying Geronimo's

70
petition for money claim - which it, itself, found to have been clearly established - the
Commission allowed itself to be the vehicle of the very injustice which it sought to prevent.
(Geronimo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224163, December 4, 2018)

Local Government

Incidentally, in People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al. (600 Phil. 186 [2009]), the Court held that a
municipal mayor, being the chief executive of his respective municipality, is deemed an
accountable officer, and is thus responsible for all the government funds within his jurisdiction.
(Venezuela v. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018)

It is settled that an ordinance's validity shall be upheld if the following requisites are
present: First, the local government unit must possess the power to enact an ordinance covering
a particular subject matter and according to the procedure prescribed by law. Second, the
ordinance must not contravene the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or
must not be against public policy or must not be unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172,
February 21, 2018)

Under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, a municipality is bereft of authority to
levy and impose franchise tax on franchise holders within its territorial jurisdiction. That
authority belongs to provinces and cities only. A franchise tax levied by a municipality is, thus,
null and void. The nullity is not cured by the subsequent conversion of the municipality into a
city. (City of Pasig v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 181710, March 7, 2018)

[Note: The doctrinal rule on the matter still rings true to this day - that the conversion of the
municipality into a city does not remove the original infirmity of the subject ordinance. Such doctrine,
evoked in Arabay and SMC, is squarely relevant in the case at bar. In these two separate cases, the sales
taxes were paid by the petitioners pursuant to ordinances enacted prior to the conversion of the
respondents into cities, or at which time, the latter were without authority to levy the said taxes. Finding
the municipal ordinances to be void, the Court minced no words in declaring the payments of taxes
under the ordinances to be without basis even if subsequently the respondents became cities. Fittingly,
the Court ordered the refund of the said taxes to the petitioners.

We find the instant case no different from Arabay and SMC. As in those cases, the cityhood law
(R.A. No. 7829) of Pasig cannot breathe life into Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, ostensibly by
bringing it within the ambit of Section 151 of the LGC that authorizes cities to levy the franchise tax under
Section 137 of the same law. It is beyond cavil that Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is an act that
is null and void ab initio. It is even of little consequence that Pasig sought to collect only those taxes after
its conversion into a city. A void ordinance, or provision thereof, is what it is - a nullity that produces no
legal effect. It cannot be enforced; and no right could spring forth from it. The cityhood of Pasig
notwithstanding, it has no right to collect franchise tax under the assailed ordinance.

Besides, the City of Pasig had apparently misunderstood Arabay. In that case, the taxes subject of
the refund claim included those paid after the conversion of Dipolog into a city. Thus, while the creation
of the City of Dipolog was effective on 1 January 1970, the petitioner, Arabay, Inc., applied for the refund
of taxes paid under the questioned ordinance for the period from December 1969 to July 1972. (City of
Pasig v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 181710, March 7, 2018)]

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 [Note: As we see it, the cited law does not lend any help to the City of Pasig's cause. It is crystal
clear from the said law that what shall continue to be in force after the conversion of Pasig into a city are
the municipal ordinances existing as of the time of the approval of R.A. No. 7829. The provision
contemplates ordinances that are valid and legal from their inception; that upon the approval of R.A. No.
7829, their effectivity and enforcement shall continue. To 'continue' means (1) to be steadfast or constant
in a course or activity; (2) to keep going: maintain a course, direction, or progress; or (3) to remain in a
place or condition. It presupposes something already existing. A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it
cannot have binding force and effect. Such is Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 and, being so, is
outside the comprehension of Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829. (City of Pasig v. Manila Electric Company, G.R.
No. 181710, March 7, 2018)]

[Note: Neither can the bare invocation of the principle of local autonomy provide succor to settle
any ambiguity in Section 42 of R.A. No. 7829 if doubt as to its meaning may even be supposed. While we
can agree that an ambiguity in the law concerning local taxing powers must be resolved in favor of fiscal
autonomy, we are hampered by the nullity of Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25. At the risk of
being repetitive, the said ordinance cannot be given legal effect. It must be borne in mind that the
constitutionally ordained policy of local fiscal autonomy was not intended by the framers to be absolute.
It does not provide unfettered authority to tax objects of any kind. The very source of local governments'
authority to tax also empowered Congress to provide limitations on the exercise of such taxing powers.
Precisely, Congress' act of withdrawing from municipalities the power to levy franchise tax by virtue of
Section 142 of the LGC is a valid exercise of its constitutional authority In this case, the validity of the
municipal ordinance imposing a franchise tax cannot be made to rest upon the ambiguity of a provision
of law (Section 42, R.A. No. 7829) operating supposedly, albeit mistakenly, under the context of promoting
local autonomy. Regard, too, must be made for the equally important doctrine that a doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting the power of taxation must be resolved against the local
government unit. (City of Pasig v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 181710, March 7, 2018)]

One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards decentralization of
government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two facets, the administrative and the
fiscal. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities. Such autonomy is as indispensable to the viability of the policy of
decentralization as the other. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

Municipal corporations are now commonly known as local governments. They are the
bodies politic established by law partly as agencies of the State to assist in the civil governance
of the country. Their chief purpose has been to regulate and administer the local and internal
affairs of the cities, municipalities or districts. They are legal institutions formed by charters
from the sovereign power, whereby the populations within communities living within
prescribed areas have formed themselves into bodies politic and corporate, and assumed their
corporate names with the right of continuous succession and for the purposes and with the
authority of subordinate self-government and improvement and the local administration of the
affairs of the State. Municipal corporations, being the mere creatures of the State, are subject to
the will of Congress, their creator. Their continued existence and the grant of their powers are
dependent on the discretion of Congress. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

[Note: [A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation - not simply convenient but indispensible; fourth, any fair doubt as to the existence of a power

72
is resolved by the courts against the corporation - against the existence of the powers. (Merriam v. Moody’s
Executors, 25 Iowa 163 (1868) [Judge John F. Dillon] [Dillon’s Rule], cited in (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
199802, July 3, 2018)]

[Note: “Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned.” (Local Government Code, Section 5(a), cited in Mandanas v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)]

The 1987 Constitution limits Congress' control over the LGUs by ordaining in Section 25
of its Article II that: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments." The autonomy
of the LGUs as thereby ensured does not contemplate the fragmentation of the Philippines into
a collection of mini-states, or the creation of imperium in imperio. The grant of autonomy simply
means that Congress will allow the LGUs to perform certain functions and exercise certain
powers in order not for them to be overly dependent on the National Government subject to the
limitations that the 1987 Constitution or Congress may impose. Local autonomy recognizes the
wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethno-linguistic, cultural, and even religious
diversities. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

The constitutional mandate to ensure local autonomy refers to decentralization. In its

broad or general sense, decentralization has two forms in the Philippine setting, namely: the
decentralization of power and the decentralization of administration. The decentralization of
power involves the abdication of political power in favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant
them the freedom to chart their own destinies and to shape their futures with minimum
intervention from the central government. This amounts to self-immolation because the
autonomous LGUs thereby become accountable not to the central authorities but to their
constituencies. On the other hand, the decentralization of administration occurs when the
central government delegates administrative powers to the LGUs as the means of broadening
the base of governmental powers and of making the LGUs more responsive and accountable in
the process, and thereby ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and more
effective partners in the pursuit of the goals of national development and social progress. This
form of decentralization further relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs so that it can concentrate on national concerns. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802,
July 3, 2018)

Two groups of LGUs enjoy decentralization in distinct ways. The decentralization of

power has been given to the regional units (namely, the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao [ARMM] and the constitutionally-mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region [CAR]).
The other group of LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) enjoy the
decentralization of administration. The distinction can be reasonably understood. The
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are given decentralized administration to make
governance at the local levels more directly responsive and effective. In turn, the economic,
political and social developments of the smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. In contrast, the regional autonomy of the ARMM and the
CAR aims to permit determinate groups with common traditions and shared social-cultural
characteristics to freely develop their ways of life and heritage, to exercise their rights, and to be
in charge of their own affairs through the establishment of a special governance regime for
certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within themselves, and
exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide their internal community
affairs. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

73
 It is to be underscored, however, that the decentralization of power in favor of the
regional units is not unlimited but involves only the powers enumerated by Section 20, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution and by the acts of Congress. For, with various powers being devolved
to the regional units, the grant and exercise of such powers should always be consistent with
and limited by the 1987 Constitution and the national laws. In other words, the powers are
guardedly, not absolutely, abdicated by the National Government. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
199802, July 3, 2018)

As a system of transferring authority and power from the National Government to the
LGUs, decentralization in the Philippines may be categorized into four, namely: (1) political
decentralization or devolution; (2) administrative decentralization or deconcentration; (3) fiscal
decentralization; and (4) policy or decision-making decentralization. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

[Note: Political decentralization or devolution occurs when there is a transfer of powers,

responsibilities, and resources from the central government to the LGUs for the performance of certain
functions. It is a more liberal form of decentralization because there is an actual transfer of powers and
responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to the LGUs in cognizance of their right to
self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities.
It is an act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to
perform specific functions and responsibilities. It encompasses reforms to open sub-national
representation and policies to "devolve political authority or electoral capacities to subnational actors."
Section 16 to Section 19 of the LGC characterize political decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs
empowered to address the different needs of their constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of the
regional units is more expansive because they are given the authority to regulate a wider array of
subjects, including personal, family and property relations. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3,
2018)]

[Note: Administrative decentralization or deconcentration involves the transfer of functions or

the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices.
Consistent with this concept, the LGC has created the Local School Boards, the Local Health Boards and
the Local Development Councils, and has transferred some of the authority from the agencies of the
National Government, like the Department of Education and the Department of Health, to such bodies to
better cope up with the needs of particular localities. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)]

[Note: Fiscal decentralization means that the LGUs have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their just share in the national taxes released by the National Government. It
includes the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It thus extends to
the preparation of their budgets, so that the local officials have to work within the constraints of their
budgets. The budgets are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments, without
regard as to whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. Hence, the necessity of a
balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials, who in
any case are partners in the attainment of national goals, is recognized and addressed. Fiscal
decentralization emanates from a specific constitutional mandate that is expressed in several provisions
of Article X (Local Government) of the 1987 Constitution, specifically: Section 5; Section 6; and Section 7.

The constitutional authority extended to each and every LGU to create its own sources of income
and revenue has been formalized from Section 128 to Section 133 of the LGC. To implement the LGUs'
entitlement to the just share in the national taxes, Congress has enacted Section 284 to Section 288 of the
LGC. Congress has further enacted Section 289 to Section 294 of the LGC to define the share of the LGUs

74
in the national wealth. Indeed, the requirement for the automatic release to the LGUs of their just share in
the national taxes is but the consequence of the constitutional mandate for fiscal decentralization.

For sure, fiscal decentralization does not signify the absolute freedom of the LGUs to create their
own sources of revenue and to spend their revenues unrestrictedly or upon their individual whims and
caprices. Congress has subjected the LGUs' power to tax to the guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC
and to the limitations stated in Section 133 of the LGC. The concept of local fiscal autonomy does not
exclude any manner of intervention by the National Government in the form of supervision if only to
ensure that the local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. (Mandanas v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)]

[Note: Lastly, policy- or decision-making decentralization exists if at least one sub-national tier of
government has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one policy issue. (Mandanas v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)]

In fine, certain limitations are and can be imposed by Congress in all the forms of
decentralization, for local autonomy, whether as to power or as to administration, is not
absolute. The LGUs remain to be the tenants of the will of Congress subject to the guarantees
that the Constitution itself imposes. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional

lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national
internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term
national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the
1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of the
LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. xxx. Equally impermissible is that Congress has
also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987
Constitution. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)
[Note: In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes,
Section 284 has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national taxes,
like the customs duties. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)]

[Note: It is clear from the foregoing clarification that the exclusion of other national taxes like
customs duties from the base for determining the just share of the LGUs contravened the express
constitutional edict in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July
3, 2018)]

The exclusion of the share of the different LGUs in the excise taxes imposed on mineral
products pursuant to Section 287 of the NIRC in relation to Section 290 of the LGC is premised
on a different constitutional provision. Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution allows
affected LGUs to have an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization of the nation's
national wealth "within their respective areas," xxx. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3,
2018)

Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands that the just share of the LGUs in
national taxes shall be automatically released to them. The term automatic connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the context of this case, the LGUs are not
required to perform any act or thing in order to receive their just share in the national taxes.
(Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

75
 The foregoing constitutional provisions (Article VII, Section 3, on the Judiciary; Article
IX-A, Section 5, on the Constitutional Commissions; Article XI, Section 14, on the Office of the
Ombudsman; Article XIII, Section 17(4), on the Commission on Human Rights) share two aspects.
The first relates to the grant of fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the automatic release of
funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the automatic release of the
appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of the annual appropriations of the offices
or agencies concerned. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

Directly contrasting with the foregoing provisions is Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution because the latter provision forthrightly ordains that the "(l)ocal government units
shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them." Section 6 does not mention of appropriation as a condition for the automatic
release of the just share to the LGUs. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

In the 1991 White Plains case, this Court held that subdivision owners and developers are
compelled to donate, among others, the subdivision's open spaces to the local government or to
the homeowners association, in accordance with Section 31. However, this Court overturned the
1991 White Plains Decision and held in the subsequent 1998 White Plains Decision that open
spaces belong to the subdivision owners and developers primarily, meaning they have the
freedom to retain or dispose of the open space in whatever manner they desire. (Casa Milan
Homeowners Association v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No. 220042, September 5,
2018)

In this case, petitioner's allegation that the Deed of Donation is invalid must have been
based on the confusing wording of Section 31. However, jurisprudential law is clear. The
transfer of ownership from the subdivision owner or developer to the local government is not
automatic, but requires a positive act from the owner or developer before the city, municipality,
or homeowners association can acquire dominion over the subdivision open spaces. Therefore,
the donation made by Regalado in favor of RCAM is valid and legal because no positive act of
donation has yet been made in favor of the local government or the homeowners association.
The title to the open space is validly registered in the name of RCAM; thus, the disputed lot
remains privately-owned by RCAM. RCAM was not in bad faith when it built a parish church
on the open space because of its valid title over the subject property. (Casa Milan Homeowners
Association v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No. 220042, September 5, 2018)

In the case of Quisumbing v. Garcia (593 Phil. 655, 663-664 [2008]), the Court had the
occasion to rule on whether a Sangguniang Bayan authorization, which is separate from the
appropriation ordinance, is still required if the appropriation ordinance itself already provided
for the transactions, bonds, contracts, documents, and other obligations that the local chief
executive would enter into in behalf of the municipality. To answer this query, Quisumbing made
a general delineation depending on the particular circumstances of the case. According to
Quisumbing, if the project is already provided for in the appropriation ordinance in sufficient
detail, then no separate authorization is necessary. On the other hand, if the project is couched
in general terms, then a separate approval by the Sangguniang Bayan is required. (Germar v.
Legaspi, G.R. No. 232532, October 1, 2018)

[Note: This delineation first enunciated in Quisumbing is further elaborated by the Court in the
recent case of Verceles, Jr. v. Commission on Audit. (794 Phil. 629 [2016]) In Verceles, the Court agreed that

76
the prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the municipality
may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance, for as long as the same specifically covers the project,
cost, or contract to be entered into by the local government unit. (Germar v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 232532,
October 1, 2018)]

By the foregoing discourse, it remains apparent that an authorization from the

Sangguniang Bayan, which is separate from the appropriations ordinance for the fiscal year
2013, is not warranted. Germar's action of entering into contracts of professional service with
the six (6) consultants could not be considered as a transgression of an established and definite
rule of action, nor could it be considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or an unlawful
behavior. Neither is there any willful intent to violate the law or any willful intent to disregard
established rules for clearly, Germar's action is within the parameters of the law as established by
the Court in the cases of Quisumbing and Verceles. (Germar v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 232532, October 1,
2018)

[Note: Consequently, it is the Court's considered opinion that Germar should not have been found
guilty of Simple Misconduct, let alone Grave Misconduct, on the basis of his lawful action as the mayor of
the Municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan. Ruling contrary thereto is a grave injustice to a
sitting local chief executive who merely executed the contracts of professional service pursuant to a
specific line-item found in an approved appropriation ordinance. (Germar v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 232532,
October 1, 2018)]

Local governments are allowed wide discretion in determining the rates of imposable fees.
In the absence of proof of unreasonableness, courts are bound to respect the judgment of the
local authorities. Any undue interference with their sound discretion will imperatively warrant
review and correction. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No.
185941, December 4, 2018)

[Note: In this case, as the party assailing the ordinance, it was CEPALCO's responsibility to prove
the amount's excessiveness; it had the burden to show that the fee was not commensurate with the cost of
regulation, inspection, and licensing. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above, it failed to dismantle
the presumption of validity because it never established that the city council abused its discretion in
setting the amount of the fee at P500.00. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R.
No. 185941, December 4, 2018)]

On a final note, the Court deems it appropriate to reiterate its ruling in Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, to wit:

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness

though is open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal
authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the
amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. xxx. (City of Cagayan de Oro v. Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. G.R. No.
224825, October 17, 2018)

That "territorial jurisdiction" refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries is a construction

reflective of the discussion of the framers of the 1987 Constitution who referred to the local
government as the "locality" that is "hosting" the national resources and a "place where God
chose to locate His bounty." It is also consistent with the language ultimately used by the
Constitutional Commission when they referred to the national wealth as those found within

77
(the LGU's) respective areas. By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface
or a geographic region. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No.
185941, December 4, 2018)

An LGU's territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or

assertion of powers. To hold otherwise may result in condoning acts that are clearly ultra vires. It
may lead to, in the words of the Republic, LGUs "rush[ing] to exercise its powers and functions
in areas rich in natural resources (even if outside its boundaries) with the intention of seeking a
share in the proceeds of its exploration" - a situation that "would sow conflict not only among
the local government units and the national government but worse, between and among local
government units." (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No.
185941, December 4, 2018)

In fine, an LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction over an area simply because its
government has exercised a certain degree of authority over it. Territorial jurisdiction is defined,
not by the local government, but by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of
the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. (Republic v.
Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December 4, 2018)

[Note: Since it refers to a demarcated area, the term "territorial jurisdiction" is evidently
synonymous with the term "territory." In fact, "territorial jurisdiction" is defined as the limits or territory
within which authority may be exercised. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R.
No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December 4, 2018)]

[Note: The word "contiguous" signifies two solid masses being in actual contact. (Republic v.
Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December 4, 2018)]

P.D. No. 1596, which constituted Kalayaan as a separate municipality of the Province of
Palawan, cannot be the basis for holding that the Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of
Palawan's territory. xxx. The delineation of territory in P.D. No. 1596 refers to Kalayaan alone.
The inclusion of the seabed, subsoil and continental margin in Kalayaan's territory cannot, by
simple analogy, be applied to the Province of Palawan. To hold otherwise is to expand the
province's territory, as presently defined by law, without the requisite legislation and plebiscite.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December 4, 2018)

To recapitulate, an LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers to its territorial boundaries or to its

territory. The territory of LGUs, in turn, refers to their land area, unless expanded by law to
include the maritime area. Accordingly, only the utilization of natural resources found within
the land area as delimited by law is subject to the LGU's equitable share under Sections 290 and
291 of the Local Government Code. This conclusion finds support in the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission which cited, as examples of national wealth the proceeds from
which the LGU may share, the Tiwi Geothermal Plant in Albay, the geothermal plant in Macban,
Makiling-Banahaw area in Laguna, the Maria Cristina area in Central Mindanao, the great rivers
and sources of hydroelectric power in Iligan, in Central Mindanao, the geothermal resources in
the area of Palimpiñon, Municipality of Valencia and mountainous areas, which are all situated
inland. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December
4, 2018)

78
 The foregoing considered, the Court finds that the Province of Palawan's remedy is not
judicial adjudication based on equity but legislation that clearly entitles it to share in the
proceeds of the utilization of the Camago-Malampaya reservoir. Mariano instructs that the
territorial boundaries must be clearly defined "with precise strokes." Defining those boundaries
is a legislative, not a judicial function. The Court cannot, on the basis of equity, engage in
judicial legislation and alter the boundaries of the Province of Palawan to include the
continental shelf where the subject natural resource lies. (Republic v. Provincial Government of
Palawan, G.R. No170867/G.R. No. 185941, December 4, 2018)

Accountability of Public Officers

Accountability

The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government springs exclusively from the
trust reposed by the public means that continuance in office is contingent upon the extent to
which one is able to maintain that trust. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Regalado, G.R. Nos.
208481-82, February 7, 2018)

As a final note, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a
"[p]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives." This high constitutional
standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public
service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative
sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. Thus,
public officers, as recipients of public trust, are under obligation to perform the duties of their
offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. (Sabio v. Field Investigation Office [FIO],
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229882, February 13, 2018)

It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are independent

from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge
is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences in the quantum
of evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as the
objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other. Hence, the exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint
or vice versa. (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018)

[Note: In the case at bar, the administrative case for grave misconduct filed against petitioner and
the present case for simple robbery are separate and distinct cases, and are independent from each other.
The administrative and criminal proceedings may involve similar facts but each requires a different
quantum of evidence. In addition, the administrative proceeding conducted was before the PNP-IAS and
was summary in nature. In contrast, in the instant criminal case, the RTC conducted a full blown trial and
the prosecution was required to proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure petitioner's conviction.
Furthermore, the proceedings included witnesses who were key figures in the events leading to
petitioner's arrest. Witnesses of both parties were cross-examined by their respective counsels creating a
clearer picture of what transpired, which allowed the trial judge to have a better appreciation of the

79
attendant facts and determination of whether the prosecution proved the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt. (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018)]

Clearly, whether or not a person is a director or an officer of a corporation, so long as he

or she is the party responsible for the offense, he or she is the party that ought to be charged.
Thus, while the Board of Directors is primarily responsible for the sale, respondents may still be
held liable for offenses if they knowingly entered into, facilitated, or participated in their
execution and ensured their implementation. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations was filed only on October 28,
2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1990, and
12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1991. With the
offenses charged against the petitioner having already prescribed after eight years in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the informations filed against the petitioner were validly
quashed. (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018)

This Court's ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan cannot exonerate petitioners from criminal
liability. Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely to a certain
extent on the acts of their subordinates "who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations." This is based upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot be expected to
examine every single document relative to government transactions. xxx. The application of the
doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no foreknowledge of any facts
or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate or exercise a greater degree of
care. In a number of cases, this Court refused to apply the Arias doctrine considering that there
were circumstances that should have prompted the government official to inquire further.
(Abubakar v. People, G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409, and 202412, June 27, 2018)

[Note: In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, or
Guiani from criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have prompted them to make further
inquiries on the transactions subject of this case. (Abubakar v. People, G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409, and 202412,
June 27, 2018)]

Here, respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino held the following
positions in the BAC of DARPO-Occidental Mindoro: respondent Barrera as Chairman,
respondent Quijano as Vice-Chairman, respondent Vicedo as Member, and respondent
Constantino as part of the Technical Working Group. Further, respondents Barrera and
Constantino were the heads of the Inspection and Canvass Committees, respectively. By law,
respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino were bound, not only to know, but also
to ensure compliance by the procuring entity with the prescribed procedure on government
procurement. However, they chose not to, as found by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon and the Court of Appeals. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Blor, G.R. No. 227405, September 5,
2018)

In the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) v.
P/Inp. John A. Mamauag, this Court held that Section 45 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended, provides
that a disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory, and
disciplinary actions are appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal from the
service. The second proviso which renders disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal
from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP qualifies the general statement that

80
disciplinary actions imposed upon a member of the PNP is final and executory. (Marquez v.
Mayo, G.R. No. 218534, September 17, 2018)

[Note: Petitioner's contention that only a motion for reconsideration can stay the execution of a
disciplinary action is misplaced. As correctly held by the RTC, the wording of Rule 17, Section 23 of
NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001 that "the filing of a motion for reconsideration shall stay the execution of
the disciplinary action sought to be reconsidered", does not foreclose other modes of staying the
execution of a disciplinary action. As a general rule, only judgments which have become final can be
executed. Executions pending appeal are exceptions to the general rule, and as such, must be strictly
construed. While these principles are applicable to execution of judgments under the Rules of Court, this
Court finds the same applicable to the present case considering that the Rules of Court are suppletorily
applicable by express provision of NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001. Thus, the fact that disciplinary actions
imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the NAB, which
only renders the same not immediately final, but also not immediately executory when an appeal has
been seasonably filed with the NAB. (Marquez v. Mayo, G.R. No. 218534, September 17, 2018)]

[Note: This Court is aware of its pronouncement in Jenny Zacarias v. National Police
Commission that summary dismissals from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP under
Section 42 of R.A. 6975, as amended, are immediately executory. The ruling in Zacarias, however,
was based on NAPOLCOM MC No. 92-006, which expressly provided for the immediately
executory nature of the decisions of the PNP summary dismissal authorities which includes the
Chief of the PNP. NAPOLCOM MC No. 92-006 was amended by NAPOLCOM MC No. 94-021,
and both MCs were repealed by NAPOLCOM MC No. 96-010. NAPOLCOM MC No. 96-010
was, in turn, repealed by NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001. Unlike the previous MCs,
NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001 and the subsequent NAPOLCOM MC No. 2016-002 do not
expressly provide for immediately executory nature of the decisions of the PNP summary
dismissal authorities. (Marquez v. Mayo, G.R. No. 218534, September 17, 2018)]

[Note: By dismissing respondent's PO2 Mayo's appeal, the Secretary of the DILG, in effect,
confirmed respondent's PO2 Mayo's dismissal from the service. Such dismissal from the service is
executory, pursuant to Section 47 of Book V, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, or the Administrative Code
of 1987. This provision of the Civil Service laws is also applicable to the PNP, which states:

Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -

xxx

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when
the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned.

xxx

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or
removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

81
 With respondent PO2 Mayo's appeal already resolved unfavorably, and such resolution being
executory, this Court finds no impediment in reversing the Decision and the Resolution of the RTC and
lifting the injunction that it issued. (Marquez v. Mayo, G.R. No. 218534, September 17, 2018)]

Impeachment

Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may
even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not
prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018)

“The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto,
the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a
public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in a
different manner, the crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be
considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for
respondent's prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being
prosecuted herein for such impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment.
Instead, the resolution of this case shall be based on established facts and related laws. Simply
put, while respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus,
is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable
offenses to warrant her removal from office.” (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules on quo
warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising a public office, xxx, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be
ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, xxx.” In short, respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to
hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses
shall result to [sic] the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in
the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018)

Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by
impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Fernan, In Re Gonzales,
Jarque v. Desierto and Marcoleta v. Borra. It should be stressed, however, that none of these cases
concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's appointment. Lecaroz involved a criminal
charge against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed
against impeachable officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public office.
Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was
void was not an issue raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the
effect that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an
offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar, to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The
proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he
or she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action

82
can never be filed against an impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is
presumed to have been aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto
petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and
Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo
warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein prayed for
judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath and
to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity. In fact, in the said cases,
there was not even a claim that respondent therein was disqualified from holding office and
accordingly challenged respondent's status as de jure 14th President of the Republic. By
entertaining the quo warranto petition, the Court in fact determined whether then President
Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of resignation. (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have consistently held that
the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of
that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option
to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal. (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the
institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto
petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the
validity of a public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called
impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R.
No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only
those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying
that the enumeration likewise purport [sic] to be a complete statement of the causes of removal
from office. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment
of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification,
when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer
commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue
discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such
would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key
positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from
office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

83
 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or
title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire
into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or
exercise of the office.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to

determine whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or
election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the
impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office. (Republic
v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)
Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions may be filed against the
President and Vice-President under the PET Rules "only because the Constitution specifically
permits" them under Section 4, Article VII. According to respondent, no counterpart provision
exists in the Constitution giving the same authority to the Court over the Chief Justice, the
members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman. Respondent, thus, asserts
that the Constitution made a distinction between elected and appointive impeachable officials,
and limited quo warranto to elected impeachable officials. For these reasons, respondent
concludes that by constitutional design, the Court is denied power to remove any of its
members.

The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges that the
Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers, albeit respondent
limits them to the President and Vice-President. This admission refutes the very position taken
by respondent that all impeachable officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they
belong to a "privileged class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment. To be
sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish between elected and appointed impeachable officers.

Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart provision to paragraph
7 of Section 4, Article VII for members of this Court or the Constitutional Commissions does not
mean that quo warranto cannot extend to non-elected impeachable officers. The authority to hear
quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of
Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the
class of public officers over whom the same may be exercised. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo warranto
action questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These qualifications
include age, citizenship and professional experience - matters which are manifestly outside the
purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.

Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from Section 5(1) of

Article VIII of the Constitution which gives this Court its quo warranto jurisdiction, or from
Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Constitution which designates the Court as the sole

84
judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

Section 2 of Article XI provides that the impeachable officers may be removed from
office on impeachment for and conviction of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Lack of
qualifications for appointment or election is evidently not among the stated grounds for
impeachment. It is, however, a ground for a quo warranto action over which this Court was given
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. The grant of jurisdiction was not confined
to unimpeachable officers. In fact, under Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII, this Court was
expressly authorized to pass upon the qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Thus,
the proscription against the removal of public officers other than by impeachment does not
apply to quo warranto actions assailing the impeachable officer's eligibility for appointment or
election. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19,
2018)

Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's qualifications is the
function of quo warranto. For this reason, impeachment cannot be treated as a substitute for quo
warranto. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19,
2018)

To disabuse wandering minds, there is nothing violative or intrusive of the Senate's

power to remove impeachable officials in the main Decision. In fact, in the said assailed
Decision, We recognized that the Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. We have extensively discussed therein that the Court merely exercised its
Constitutional duty to resolve a legal question referring to respondent's qualification as a Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. We also emphasized that this Court's action never intends to
deprive the Congress of its mandate to make a determination on impeachable officials'
culpability for acts committed while in office. We even explained that impeachment and quo
warranto may proceed independently and simultaneously, albeit a ruling of removal or ouster of
the respondent in one case will preclude the same ruling in the other due to legal impossibility
and mootness. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
June 19, 2018)

Nevertheless, the traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat

a positive Constitutional duty. Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis, is a Constitutional
process designed to ensure accountability of impeachable officers, the seriousness and
exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial privilege. To be certain, the
Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment proceedings even as against its own
Members, recognizes not the superiority of the power of the House of Representatives to initiate
impeachment cases and the power of the Senate to try and decide the same, but the superiority
of the impeachment proceedings as a Constitutional process intended to safeguard public office
from culpable abuses. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Sandiganbayan

It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer having a salary grade

below 27, whose appeal from the RTC's ruling convicting him of six (6) counts of Malversation

85
of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents falls within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 8249 (prior to its amendment
by RA 10660) xxx. Thus, since petitioner's case properly falls within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, his appeal was erroneously taken to the CA. (Dizon v. People, G.R. No.
227577, January 24, 2018)

[Note: This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the foregoing error is not primarily attributable
to petitioner, since the duty to transmit the records to the proper court devolves upon the RTC. xxx.
Hence, all things considered, the Court finds that petitioner's filing of the Motion to Endorse beyond the
original fifteen (15)-day period - much more the erroneous transmittal of the case to the CA by the RTC -
should not be taken against him, else it result in the injudicious dismissal of his appeal. (Dizon v. People,
G.R. No. 227577, January 24, 2018)]
It must be noted at the outset that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over the
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. (Venezuela v.
People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018)

Nevertheless, in as early as 1959, forfeiture in favor of the State of any property in an

amount found to have been manifestly out of proportion to a public officer or employee's salary
or to the latter's other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, has
been sanctioned under Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379). Forfeiture proceedings under R.A.
1379 are civil in nature and actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and
damages for ill-gotten wealth, as in this case, are also called civil forfeiture proceedings. Similar
to civil cases, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. (Republic v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 198393, April 4, 2018)

[Note: To recover the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
No. l and thereby gave birth to the PCGG with the task of recovering "all ill-gotten wealth accumulated
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship." The recovery of the reputed ill-gotten wealth was both a matter of
urgency and necessity and the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties eventually
found flesh under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution. (Republic v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 198393, April 4,
2018)]

Former President Corazon C. Aquino created the PCGG through Executive Order No. 1.
Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-gotten wealth amassed
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, the Marcos family, their
relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or by using their powers, authority, influence, connections,
or relationships. Executive Order No. 2, issued on 12 March 1986, states that ill-gotten wealth
includes assets and properties in the form of estates and real properties in the Philippines and
abroad. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 2nd Division, G.R. No. 222364, September 5, 2018)

The PCGG Rules, which took effect on 11 April 1986, followed suit after Executive Order
Nos. 1 and 2 were issued. Section 1 of the PCGG Rules defines "ill-gotten wealth" as any asset,
property, business enterprise, or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive

86
Order Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates, and/or business associates by any of the following means or similar schemes
listed down in Section 1(A). (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 2nd Division, G.R. No. 222364, September
5, 2018)

In the present case, petitioner filed a civil case to recover two parcels of land, which are
allegedly "ill-gotten wealth" and owned by a close associate of President Marcos. In the course
of the said civil case, PCGG issued a notice, denominated as a "Notice of Lis Pendens" and
addressed to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Register of Deeds, in the Memorandum
of Encumbrances, annotated the said notice of the PCGG as a Notice of Sequestration stating
that the properties in the name of Asian Bank are deemed sequestered and are the subject of
Civil Case No. 0004. The issue now lies on whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the
notice annotated in the Memorandum of Encumbrances placed at the back of the TCTs of the
subject parcels of land was one of sequestration and not lis pendens. We agree with the
Sandiganbayan. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 2nd Division, G.R. No. 222364, September 5, 2018)

[Note: The Notice mentions "the properties hereunder are deemed sequestered" and pertains to
Civil Case No. 0004 filed by PCGG against the former president and his associates. It also states that this
"serve[s] as sufficient notice to the whole world, particularly your office, not to entertain any transaction
that may cause the sale, transfer, conveyance, encumbrance or any other acts of disposition over said
properties" and this "lien" should be annotated at the back of the titles. Clearly, this is not a simple case
involving a notice of lis pendens. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 2nd Division, G.R. No. 222364, September 5,
2018)]

[Note: Also, the notice uses the wording that "the properties are deemed sequestered." "Deemed
sequestered" involves a more serious undertaking on a pending litigation concerning "ill-gotten wealth"
between the government and the former president and his known allies as opposed to a mere civil case
filed in court. The notice states further "not to entertain any transaction that may cause the sale, transfer,
conveyance, encumbrance or any other acts of disposition over said properties." This is a command or
directive by the PCGG akin to a sequestration or freeze order directed at the Register of Deeds to prevent
any act which may affect the title or disposition of the properties. In Executive Order No. 2, the PCGG,
under its mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, has the power to "prohibit all persons from transferring,
conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets and properties or from
assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation under pain of such
penalties as are prescribed by law." (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 2nd Division, G.R. No. 222364, September 5,
2018)]

[Note: In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, we held that sequestration is an extraordinary,

harsh, and severe remedy. Since sequestration tends to impede or limit the exercise of proprietary rights
by private citizens, it should be construed strictly against the State, pursuant to the legal maxim that
statutes in derogation of common rights are in general strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases
clearly within their scope and purpose. Thus, being a notice of sequestration despite the title given to it
by the PCGG, such order or notice must comply with the requirements provided by the law on
sequestration. We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the notice sent by the PCGG to the
Register of Deeds suffers from fatal defects and is therefore void. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 2nd Division,
G.R. No. 222364, September 5, 2018)]

[Note: The PCGG promulgated its own rules and regulations pursuant to Executive Order No. 1
stating that a writ of sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be issued by the PCGG only upon the
authority of at least two Commissioners when there are reasonable grounds to believe that such issuance
is warranted. Here, the Notice of Lis Pendens was issued by the PCGG through its Legal Department

87
Director Manuel Parras. Clearly, Director Parras, not being a PCGG Commissioner, has no authority to
issue the sequestration notice without the concurrence of at least two PCGG Commissioners. In PCGG v.
Judge Peña, we held that the powers, functions, and duties of the PCGG amount to the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions, and the exercise of such functions cannot be delegated by the Commission to its
representatives or subordinates or task forces because of the well- established principle that judicial or
quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated. Also, the annotation in the Memorandum of Encumbrances
indicated at the back of the two certificates of title states "Notice of Sequestration" and not "Notice of Lis
Pendens." Such annotation was placed there by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City since February 2001.
If indeed there had been a mistake in the annotation made, the PCGG should have asked the Register of
Deeds to amend the annotation at a reasonable time after the annotation was placed. However, the PCGG
failed to do so. While it is true that the PCGG may still avail of other ancillary writs, other than
sequestration, hold or freeze orders, as mentioned in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, the PCGG
still has to abide by its own rules and the Constitution to ensure the principles of fair play, justice, and
due process. Thus, due to the PCGG's failure to comply with the requirements laid down by the
Constitution and its own rules on sequestration, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolutions
ordering the cancellation and/or removal of the Notice of Sequestration annotated in the Memorandum
of Encumbrances on TCT Nos. 004-2013010452 and 004-2013010453 registered under BVI. (Republic v.
Sandiganbayan 2nd Division, G.R. No. 222364, September 5, 2018)]

Ombudsman

Jurisprudence has so far settled that dismissal based on the grounds provided under
Section 20 is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the evaluating Ombudsman or
Deputy Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint. Clearly, as the law, its
implementing rules, and interpretative jurisprudence stand, the dismissal by the Ombudsman
on grounds provided under Section 20 is applicable only to administrative complaints. Its
invocation in the present criminal case is therefore misplaced. (Espaldon v. Buban, G.R. No.
202784, April 18, 2018)

[Note: Sec. 4. Evaluation. - Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to
determine whether the same may be dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be
discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned; xxx. (Note
Administrative Order No. 17, amending Administrative Order No. 7, clarifying Section 20 of RA 6770,
which, provides: The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that: (1) The complainant has an adequate
remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body; (2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in
bad faith; (4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.) (See
Espaldon v. Buban, G.R. No. 202784, April 18, 2018)]

Contrariwise, the procedure in criminal cases requires that the Ombudsman evaluate the
complaint and after evaluation, to make its recommendations in accordance with Section 2, Rule
II of the Administrative Order No. 07 xxx. Thus, the only instance when an outright dismissal of
a criminal complaint is warranted is when Orders would show that the Ombudsman found the
complaint to have suffered from utter lack of merit. In fact, the assailed Orders are empty except
for the citation of Section 20 as basis for outright dismissal. It is thus inaccurate and misleading
for the Ombudsman to profess that the criminal complaint was dismissed only after the conduct
of a preliminary investigation, when the complaint never reached that stage to begin with.

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Clearly, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it evaluated and
consequently dismissed a criminal complaint based on grounds peculiar to administrative cases
and in an unexplained deviation from its own rules of procedure. (Espaldon v. Buban, G.R. No.
202784, April 18, 2018)

It must be stressed that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission.
(Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)

To the point of being monotonous, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution refers exclusively to
the constitutional commissions; thus, such proscription as to the appointment or designation in
a temporary or acting capacity of a member applies only to the constitutional commissions and
cannot extend to the Ombudsman and the deputies. Indeed, Art. XI of the Constitution does not
provide for such a prohibition. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)

In our review of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case of death, resignation,
removal or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman shall be appointed
for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with sec. 11, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution in so far as it provides to the Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve for a
term of seven years. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)

In Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman (528 Phil. 42, 51 [2006]), we held that the Office of
the Ombudsman may, for every particular investigation, decide how best to pursue each
investigation. This power gives the Office of the Ombudsman the discretion to dismiss without
prejudice a preliminary investigation if it finds that the final decision of the COA is necessary
for its investigation and future prosecution of the case. It may also pursue the investigation
because it realizes that the decision of the COA is irrelevant or unnecessary to the investigation
and prosecution of the case. Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its
varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be considered a violation
of any of the parties' rights to the equal protection of the laws. Nor in the present case, can it be
considered a violation of petitioner's right to due process. (Pasok v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 218413, June 6, 2018)

Thus, no matter the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the matter.
Moreover, it may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of public officials, which may be
discovered from any source. xxx. However, if the "the complainant has no sufficient personal
interest in the subject matter of the grievance," the Ombudsman may choose not to investigate
the administrative act complained of. xxx. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770 uses the word
"may" which signifies that it is permissive and not imperative. The power of the Ombudsman to
act on an administrative complaint by a person without any personal interest in the case is, thus,
discretionary. xxx. Thus, the Ombudsman may prosecute or investigate the complaint with or
without the complainant's personal interest in the outcome of the case. xxx. Thus, the law allows
the filing of cases to the Ombudsman against public officers by any complainant. The
Ombudsman is a tool to maintain this faith. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

… not all may appeal to question a decision of the Ombudsman. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R.
No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

89
 [Note: In administrative cases filed under the Civil Service Law, an allowed appeal may only be
brought by the party adversely affected by the decision. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6,
2018)]

Thus, the Ombudsman's decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the complaint or
imposes the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1)
month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month salary. Otherwise, it may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
(Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

[Note: In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision exonerated
respondents. Thus, Canlas has no right to appeal this Decision. He has no other recourse. “The right to
appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law expressly granting such right." (Canlas v.
Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)]

[Note: Generally, a decision by the Ombudsman absolving respondents is unappealable.

However, if it is shown that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, then the complainant
may file a Rule 65 Petition with the proper court. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)]

The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office of the

Ombudsman does not stay the immediate execution of the penalty of dismissal imposed upon a
public office. (Lee v. Sales, G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018, citing Administrative Order No. 17 and
Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006 of the Ombudsman)

Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal, it
follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive writ. (Lee v. Sales, G.R. No.
205294, July 4, 2018)

The Ombudsman has the power to formulate its own rules on pleading and procedure. It
has in fact laid down its rules on preliminary investigation. All these controversies surrounding
inordinate delay can easily be avoided had it prescribed a rule on the disposition period for the
investigating graft officer to resolve the preliminary investigation of the formal complaints. Like
the Department of Justice with respect to preliminary investigations by its prosecutors, it should
provide a disposition period from the date of the filing of the formal complaint within which
the graft prosecutor should determine the existence of probable cause. This will potentially
solve all the motions and petitions that raise the defense of inordinate delay, putting the
perennial issue to rest. (Magante v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 230950-51, July 23, 2018)

The Court agrees that the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in
administrative cases resolved by it. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Bongais, G.R. No. 226405, July 23,
2018)

[Note: Hence, while the Ombudsman had legal interest to intervene in the proceeding in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139835, the period for the filing of its motion to intervene had already lapsed as it was filed after
the CA had promulgated its Decision. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Bongais, G.R. No. 226405, July 23, 2018)]

In administrative proceedings, complainants carry the burden of proving their allegations

with substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as

90
adequate to support a conclusion." (Office of the Ombudsman v. Fetalvero, G.R. No. 211450, July 23,
2018)
On the question of jurisdiction, it is beyond dispute that the Ombudsman and the
General Court Martial of the AFP have concurring or coordinate jurisdiction over
administrative disciplinary cases involving erring military personnel, particularly over
violations of the Articles of War that are service-connected. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Mislang,
G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)

When the January 28, 2004 MOA provided that non-graft cases against military
personnel shall be endorsed by petitioner to the disciplinary authority of the AFP, it had done so
as a matter of efficiency and in recognition of the latter's concurrent jurisdiction over the same
offenses and its vast resources for the conduct of investigations, including military intelligence.
[C]oncurrence of jurisdiction does not allow concurrent exercise of jurisdiction. This is the
reason why we have the rule that excludes any other concurrently authorized body from the
body first exercising jurisdiction. This is the reason why forum shopping is malpractice of law.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Mislang, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)

The records disclose that the AFP had first acquired jurisdiction and that petitioner
should have taken notice of such fact after having been apprised of it on June 16, 2009. This
would not have been an abrogation of its jurisdiction, but adherence to the principle of
concurrence of jurisdiction that was operationally recognized by the January 28, 2004 MOA.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Mislang, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)

We find that in this case, the AFP General Court Martial's exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the Ombudsman exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Necessarily, the present
petition must be denied. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Mislang, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)

[Note: Even assuming that petitioner validly exercised its jurisdiction, this Court cannot agree
that petitioner's Joint Decision was grounded on substantial evidence. We note that petitioner failed to
accord respondent administrative due process. There is nothing on the record to show that respondent
was furnished with, or had otherwise received a copy of the complaint-affidavits on which petitioner's
Joint Decision was based. Thus, it cannot be said that respondent had a fair opportunity to squarely and
intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Mislang, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018)]

Thus, as a quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in

administrative disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule
43 petition. (Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 214312, September 5,
2018, citing Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787, 804 (1998) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; Namuhe v.
The Ombudsman, 358 Phil. 781, 788-789 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]; Nava v. National
Bureau of Investigation, 495 Phil. 354, 365-366 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Dr. Pia v. Hon.
Gervacio, Jr.,  et al., 710 Phil. 196,203 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division])

This Court has repeatedly pronounced (Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario, 376 Phil. 115, 122 (1999) [Per
J. Pardo, Jr., First Division]; Kuizon v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 611, 625-626 (2001) [Per J. Puno, First
Division]; Baviera v. Zoleta, 535 Phil 292, 312-314 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division]) that
the Office of the Ombudsman's orders and decisions in criminal cases may be elevated to this
Court in a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases
may be raised on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in

91
denying the petition questioning public respondent's finding of probable cause for lack of
jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners' failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the
criminal case renders public respondent's decision final. (Ornales v. Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 214312, September 5, 2018)
Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016) explained that
this Court generally does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable
cause out of respect for its investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution.
Dichaves pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman's power to determine probable cause is
executive in nature, and with its power to investigate, it is in a better position than this Court to
assess the evidence on hand to substantiate a finding of probable cause or lack of it. Thus, for
their petition to prosper, petitioners would have to prove that public respondent "conducted the
preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
under the law." (Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 214312, September
5, 2018)

In an En Banc Resolution promulgated on October 5, 20 10 in Samaniego, the Court upheld

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, and ruled that a decision of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case is immediately executory and that an appeal shall not
stop such decision from being executed as a matter of course. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Pacuribot, G.R. No. 193336, September 26, 2018, citing Ombudsman v. Samaniego, 586 Phil. 497
[2008]; see also Ombudsman-Mindanao v: Ibrahim, 786 Phil. 221 (2 016); Department of the Interior
and Local  Government v. Gatuz, 771 Phil. 153 [2015]; Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina, 739
Phil. 11 [2014]; Office of the Ombudsman v. De Leon, 705 Phil. 26 [2013]; Office of the Ombudsman v.
Court of Appeals , 655 Phil. 541 [2011])

Indeed, appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the OMB should be
taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule 43 prescribes
the manner of appeal from quasi-judicial agencies, such as the OMB, and was formulated
precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. (Dator
v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 237742, October 8, 2018)

[Note: Although Dator filed a petition for injunction, a close scrutiny of the petition, its
allegations and discussion would clearly disclose that it questioned the decision in its entirety. The CA
should not have been quick to dismiss the said petition on procedural grounds alone. Given the peculiar
circumstances of the case, where Dator is unsure of whether the suspension that is immediately executory
is one month and one day or six months, and the resolution of his motion for clarification is still
forthcoming, Dator understandably sought relief. Without further belaboring the point, We find it very
clear that the extreme urgency of the situation required an equally urgent resolution, and due to the
public interest involved, the petitioner is justified in straightforwardly seeking the intervention of this
Court. (Dator v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 237742, October 8, 2018)]

Contrary to the position of Dator, the condonation principle is not applicable to him.

The case of the Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara (G.R. No. 216871,
December 6, 2017) made a succinct discussion on the said principle and its prospective
application, thus:

92
 The above ruling, however, was explicit in its pronouncement that the abandonment of
the doctrine of condonation is prospective in application, hence, the same doctrine is still
applicable in cases that transpired prior to the ruling of this Court in Carpio Morales v. CA and
Jejomar Binay, Jr. thus:

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret
what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As
explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but
also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,
wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA, it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while
our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from
hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a
doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a
considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and
now abandons the condonation doctrine.

Considering that the present case was instituted prior to the abovecited ruling of this
Court, the doctrine of condonation may still be applied. (Emphasis Ours)

Unlike in the said case, however, the case against Dator was instituted on May 2, 2016, or
AFTER the ruling of this Court in the seminal case of Conchita Carpio Morales vs. CA and Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr. Clearly then, the condonation principle is no longer applicable to him. (Dator
v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 237742, October 8, 2018)
Behest Loans

93
 In the 1999 and 2011cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, et
al. v. Hon. Desierto, et al., the Court ruled that the prescriptive period began to ran from the date
of discovery of the subject transactions and not from the time the behest loans were transacted.
In the 2011 Desierto case, the Court ruled that the "blameless ignorance" doctrine applies
considering that the plaintiff at that time had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a
cause of action xxx. (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Gutierrez, G. R. No. 189800,
July 9, 2018)

[Note: The loan transactions subject of this case were granted by the PNB to BISUDECO from
1977-1985. Applying this Court's pronouncement in Pacificador, the period of prescription for offenses
committed prior to the passage of B.P. Blg. 195 is ten (10) years. The new 15-year period cannot be applied
to acts done prior to its effectivity in 1982 because to do so would violate the prohibition against ex post
facto laws. (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Gutierrez, G. R. No. 189800, July 9, 2018)]

National Economy and Patrimony

Section 3, Article XII applies only to lands of the public domain. Private lands are,
therefore, outside of the prohibitions and limitations stated therein. Thus, the appellate court
correctly declared that the 12-hectare limitation on the acquisition of lands under Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution has no application to private lands. (Republic v. Rovency
Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 190817, January 10, 2018)

[Note: A case in point is the absolute prohibition on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain. This prohibition could be traced to the 1973 Constitution which
limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines.
This constitutional prohibition, however, does not necessarily mean that corporations may not apply for
original registration of title to lands. In fact, the Court, in several instances, affirmed the grant of
applications for original registration filed by corporations, for as long as the lands were already converted
to private ownership by operation of law as a result of satisfying the requisite possession required by the
Public Land Act. (Republic v. Rovency Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 190817, January 10,
2018)]

[Note: In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (230 Phil. 590, 597 [1986]) (Director of
Lands), the Court granted the application for original registration of parcels of land filed by a corporation
which acquired the lands by purchase from members of the Dumagat tribe. The Court ratiocinated that
the lands applied for registration were already private lands even before the corporation acquired them.
The Court observed that the sellers, being members of the national cultural minorities, had by themselves
and through their predecessors, possessed and occupied the lands since time immemorial. As a
consequence of their open, exclusive, and undisputed possession over the said lands for the period
required by law for the acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain, said lands ceased to become
part of the public land and were converted, by operation of law, into private ownership. As such, the
sellers, if not for their conveyance of the lands in question to the corporation, were entitled to exercise the
right granted to them by the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Considering further
that the lands in question were already private in character at the time the corporation acquired them, the
constitutional prohibition does not apply to the corporation.

In Republic v. TA.N. Properties (578 Phil. 441, 461 [2008]) (TA.N. Properties), the Court stressed that
what is determinative for the application of the doctrine in Director of Lands is for the corporate applicant

94
for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by
operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed.

The pronouncements in Director of Lands and TA.N. Properties apply with equal force to the
12-hectare limitation, considering that both the limitation and the prohibition on corporations to acquire
lands do not cover ownership of private lands. Stated differently, whether RRDC can acquire the subject
land and to what extent depends on whether the pieces of evidence it presented before the trial court
sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
that the nature and duration of the possession of its individual predecessors-in-interest converted the
subject land to private land by operation of law. (Republic v. Rovency Realty and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 190817, January 10, 2018)]

[Note: The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that all things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. Nonetheless,
this does not necessarily mean that when a piece of land is declared alienable and disposable part of the
public domain, it can already be acquired by prescription. In Malabanan, this Court ruled that declaration
of alienability and disposability is not enough - there must be an express declaration that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial, xxx. The classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. As such, said land, although classified as alienable and disposable, is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. (Republic v. Rovency Realty and Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 190817, January 10, 2018, citing Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, 605 Phil. 244, 274 (2009)]

Forest land of the public domain in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution is a classification descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land looks like. (Republic v. Saromo, G.R. No. 189803, March 14, 2018,
citing The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 589 Phil. 156 [2008]) It
is well-settled that a CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to establish that a land is
alienable and disposable. It should be "accompanied by an official publication of the DENR
Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable." (Republic v. Malijan-Javier, G.R.
No. 214367, April 4, 2018)

The subject property was originally an unregistered land, meaning it is public land
owned by the State. It is presumed to belong to the State, and not privately owned by Gabriel.
Thus, any sale made by Gabriel covering the subject property – whether to petitioners or
respondent – is considered null and void unless the contrary is proved, on the principle that one
cannot sell or dispose what he does not own. This is underscored by the fact that petitioners
were able to obtain a CLOA over the subject property – and, later on, an original certificate of
title in their favor. (Spouse Ybiosa v. Drilon, G.R. No. 212866, April 23, 2018)

The general rule prevailing over claims of land is the Regalian Doctrine, which, as
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, declares that the State owns all lands of the public domain.
In other words, land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant,
or any other mode recognized by law, belongs to the State as part of the public domain. In turn,
The Public Land Act governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain,
except for timber and mineral lands. The law also entitles possessors of public lands to judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles xxx. (Republic v. Jabson, G.R. No. 200223, June 6, 2018)

95
 (A)ny applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant must
sufficiently establish three things: (a) the subject land's alienable and disposable nature; (b) his
or her predecessors' adverse possession thereof, and (c) the reckoning date from which such
adverse possession was under a bona fide claim of ownership, that is, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. (Republic v. Jabson, G.R. No. 200223, June 6, 2018, citing Section 48 of the Public Land Act
and Section 14 of PD No. 1529)

That land has been removed from the scope of the Regalian Doctrine and reclassified as
part of the public domain's alienable and disposable portion cannot be assumed or implied. The
prevailing rule is that the applicant must clearly establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute to
prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land. (Republic v. Jabson, G.R. No.
200223, June 6, 2018)

The 1987 Philippine Constitution also provides that "agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the classification of lands of the public domain is first and
foremost provided by the Constitution itself. Of the classifications of lands of the public domain,
agricultural lands may further be classified by law, according to the uses it may be devoted to.

The classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural lands, as well as their
further classification into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, is a legislative
prerogative which may be exercised only through the enactment of a valid law. This prerogative
has long been exercised by the legislative department through the enactment of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (CA No. 141) or the Public Land Act of 1936. Section 6 of CA No. 141 remains to this
day the existing general law governing the classification of lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. (Dumo v. Republic, G.R. No. 218269, June 6,
2018)

As a rule, forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve cannot be a
subject of private appropriation and registration. Respondent, however, was able to prove that
the subject land was an ancestral land, and had been openly and continuously occupied by him
and his predecessors in-interest, who were members of the ICCs/IPs. (Republic v. Cosalan, G.R.
No. 216999, July 4, 2018)

Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-conquest
rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a
claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." To
reiterate, they are considered to have never been public lands and are thus indisputably
presumed to have been held that way. (Republic v. Cosalan, G.R. No. 216999, July 4, 2018)

Preliminarily, we deal with the notion, espoused by respondent, that in registration

proceedings the Republic has a burden of proving that a piece of land is inalienable,
indisposable, hence incapable of registration. There is no such burden of proof. The Regalian
Doctrine, embodied in our Constitution, decrees that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. Corollary to the doctrine,

96
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Hence, while a burden of proof in registration proceedings exists, it is this: that of overcoming
the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain. Logically, such burden lies
on the person applying for registration. Stated differently, and as we held in Republic v. Roche,
the onus of proving that the land is alienable and disposable lies with the applicant in an
original registration proceeding; the government, in opposing the purported nature of the land,
need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise. (Republic v. Alaminos Ice Plant and Cold Storage,
Inc., G.R. 189723, July 11, 2018)

A homestead patent is a gratuitous grant from the government "designed to distribute

disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation."
Being a gratuitous grant, a homestead patent applicant must strictly comply with the
requirements laid down by the law. (Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, G.R. No. 193657,
September 4, 2018)

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in classifying lands of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, there must be a positive act from the government declaring them as
open for alienation and disposition. In Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap: A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes ... (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) A
positive act is an act which clearly and positively manifests the intention to declassify lands of
the public domain into alienable and disposable. (Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, G.R. No.
193657, September 4, 2018)

[Note: In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that the land has been classified
as alienable and disposable. Respondents presented no proof to show that a law or official proclamation
had been issued declaring the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-67820 to be alienable and
disposable. (Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, G.R. No. 193657, September 4, 2018)]

Lands of the public domain can only be classified as alienable and disposable through a
positive act of the government. The State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or error
of its officials or agents. It may revert the land at any time, where the concession or disposition
is void ab initio. (Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, G.R. No. 193657, September 4, 2018)

On the issue of land classification, this Court held that foreshore and submerged areas
belong to the public domain. Mere reclamation by PEA "does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession." (Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio
Daquer, G.R. No. 193657, September 4, 2018)

[Note: Nonetheless, this Court considered the issuance of a presidential decree and a special
patent proclaiming the land as alienable and disposable as a positive act of the Executive Department that
converted the reclaimed areas into alienable and disposable agricultural lands xxx. (Republic v. Heirs of
Ignacio Daquer, G.R. No. 193657, September 4, 2018)]

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 [Note: In other words, Presidential Decree No. 1085 provides for the express and direct transfer of
ownership of the reclaimed lands located in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay. On the other
hand, Act No. 2874 merely outlines the procedure for the administration and disposition of alienable
lands of the public domain. Clearly, the lack of any qualifying words that explicitly declare the lands as
alienable and disposable, or convey ownership over them proves that Act No. 2874 was enacted merely to
serve as a guideline for the proper administration and disposition of alienable lands. Act No. 2874,
Section 8 provides that only lands which have been officially delimited and classified as alienable may be
disposed of through any of the authorized methods. Therefore, the issuance of Homestead Patent No.
V-67820 in favor of Daquer, pursuant to the Public Land Act, did not, by itself, reclassify Lot No. H-19731
into alienable and disposable public agricultural land. (Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, G.R. No.
193657, September 4, 2018)]

Thus, as things stand, the present rule is that an application for original registration must
be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. (Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 211664, November 12, 2018)

[Note: In this case, it is undisputed that respondent failed to present a copy of the original land
classification covering the subject land; and that she relied solely on the CENRO Certification dated May
7, 2002 to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Clearly, the evidence presented by
respondent would not suffice to entitle her to a registration of the subject land. This is true even if the
Republic failed to refute the contents of the said certification during the trial of the case. After all, it is the
applicant who bears the burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable and
disposable. (Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 211664, November 12, 2018)]

While the 1987 Constitution retained the prohibition on the sale of mineral lands, there
was a conspicuous absence of the State's previous authority in the 1943 and 1973 Constitutions
to administer inalienable natural resources through "license, concession or lease xxx.” Under the
1987 Constitution, the State is expected to take on a more hands-on approach or "a more
dynamic role in the exploration, development[,] and utilization of the natural resources of the
country" as a consequence of its full control and supervision over natural resources. It exercises
control and supervision through the following modes: 1. The State may directly undertake such
activities; or 2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations; 3. Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens; 4. For the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may
enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance. (Naredico, Inc. v. Krominco, Inc., G.R. No. 196892, December 5, 2018)

Social Justice and Human Rights

Preliminarily, it is crucial to stress that no less than the basic law of the land guarantees
the rights of workers to collective bargaining and negotiations as well as to participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits. (Hongkong Bank Independent
Labor Union v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 218390, February 28, 2018,
citing Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution)

We deem it necessary to remind HSBC of the basic and well-entrenched rule that
although jurisprudence recognizes the validity of the exercise by an employer of its

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management prerogative and will ordinarily not interfere with such, this prerogative is not
absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective bargaining agreement, and
general principles of fair play and justice. Indeed, being a product of said
constitutionally-guaranteed right to participate, the CBA is, therefore, the law between the
parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. (Hongkong Bank Independent Labor
Union v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 218390, February 28, 2018)

The CARP shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, including other lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced. Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land" as land devoted to agricultural activity
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. In Luz Farms v.
The Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, (270 Phil. 151 [1990]) the Court
declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under
the coverage of the CARP. (Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
228503, July 25, 2018)

Reiterating our ruling in the Luz Farms case, we held in Natalia Realty and Estate Developers
and Investors Corp. Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform Sec. Benjamin T. Leong and Dir. Wilfredo
Leana, DAR-REGION IV (296-A Phil. 271 [1993]) that industrial, commercial and residential
lands are not covered by the CARL. In the same case, We stressed that while Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term
"agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Guided by the foregoing, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus, exempted from agrarian reform.
(Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 228503, July 25, 2018)

[Note: A thorough review of the records reveals that there is substantial evidence to show that the
entirety of the petitioners' subject lands were devoted to livestock production since the 1950s, i.e., even
before the enactment of the CARL on June 15, 1988. No less than the DAR, who has the competence to
determine the status of the land, acknowledged this xxx. Indeed, the subject lands are utilized for
livestock raising, and as such, classified as industrial, and not agricultural lands. Thus, they are exempted
from agrarian reform. (Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 228503, July 25,
2018)]

[Note: We stress that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for
non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. Here, there was no showing that the subject
lands which were devoted for livestock raising prior to the CARL, had been converted to an agricultural
land, after its passage. Thus, the petitioners' subject lands remained to be non-agricultural, i.e., devoted to
livestock raising, and thus, excluded from the coverage of the CARP. (Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. v.
Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 228503, July 25, 2018)]

The Decision adjudged Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as ultra vires for providing terms which appear to expand or modify
some provisions of the CARL. The DAR argues that this ruling sets back the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program by upsetting its established substantive and procedural components. Particularly, the DAR contends that
the nullification of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 disregarded the long-standing procedure where the DAR treats a sale
(without its clearance) as valid based on the doctrine of estoppel, and that the sold portion is treated as the
landowner's retained area.

AO 05-06 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, which has been held to be the
property concept in Section 6, Article II of the 1973 Constitution. Under this concept, private

99
property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general,
who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the
property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community
or nation. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The
State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits. It has been held that Presidential Decree No. 27, one of the precursors of the CARL,
embodies this policy and concept. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549,
October 10, 2018)

[Note: The Decision adjudged Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as ultra vires for providing terms which
appear to expand or modify some provisions of the CARL. The DAR argues that this ruling sets back the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program by upsetting its established substantive and procedural
components. Particularly, the DAR contends that the nullification of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 disregarded
the long-standing procedure where the DAR treats a sale (without its clearance) as valid based on the
doctrine of estoppel, and that the sold portion is treated as the landowner's retained area. Applying Item
No. 4 of AO 05-06 to the facts of this case, the DAR submits that the subject landholding cannot be
considered as the retained area of Carriedo anymore because he has already exercised his right of
retention when he previously sold his landholdings without DAR clearance. The DAR specifies that
sometime in June 1990, Carriedo unilaterally sold to PLFI his agricultural landholdings with
approximately 58.3723 hectares. The DAR, therefore, argues that Carriedo's act of disposing his
landholdings is tantamount to the exercise of his right of retention under the law. xxx. The DAR's
argument has merit. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018)]

Education

In University of the East v. Pepanio (702 Phil. 191 [2013]), the requirement of a masteral
degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with
the public interest. (Son v. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018)

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the Constitution
when it made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. The Constitution is clear in
making elementary education compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and related issuances did not
change this as, in fact, they affirmed it. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

The Constitution did not curtail the legislature's power to determine the extent of basic
education. It only provided a minimum standard: that elementary education be compulsory. By
no means did the Constitution foreclose the possibility that the legislature provides beyond the
minimum set by the Constitution. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied because only
those currently enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took effect and future students will be
subject to the K to 12 BEC and the additional two (2) years of senior high school. Students who
already graduated from high school under the old curriculum are not required by the K to 12
Law to complete the additional two (2) years of senior high school. (Council of Teachers and Staff of
Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9,
2018)

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 More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four (4) years of high
school education. Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must
be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy
of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of
existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the rights of
students under Section 9 of BP Blg. 232 are not absolute. These are subject to limitations
prescribed by law and regulations. In fact, while Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 232 states that students
have the right to continue their course up to graduation, Section 20 of the same law does not
restrict elementary and high school education to only six (6) and four (4) years. Even RA No.
9155 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, which was enacted under the 1987
Philippine Constitution, does not specify the number of years in elementary and high school. In
other words, BP Blg. 232 or RA No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on the
duration of elementary and high school education. In adding two (2) years of secondary
education to students who have not yet graduated from high school, Congress was merely
exercising its police power and legislative wisdom in imposing reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education, in compliance with its constitutional duty to promote
quality education for all. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right of the senior high
school students to choose their profession or course of study. The senior high school curriculum
is designed in such a way that students have core subjects and thereafter, they may choose
among four strands: 1) Accountancy, Business and Management (ABM) Strand; 2) Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities and Social Sciences
(HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General Academic (GA) Strand.

Petitioners have failed to show that the State has imposed unfair and inequitable
conditions for senior high schools to enroll in their chosen path. The K to 12 Program is
precisely designed in such a way that students may choose to enroll in public or private senior
high schools which offer the strands of their choice. For eligible students, the voucher program
also allows indigent senior high school students to enroll in private institutions that offer the
strands of their choice. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Petitioners further contend that the MTB-MLE is counter-productive,

anti-developmental and does not serve the people's right to quality of education, which the
State, under the Constitution, is mandated to promote. Moreover, in contrast to the benefits of
the MTB-MLE that respondents assert, petitioners claim that comparative international and
domestic data have shown MT monolingualism to be inferior; while high literacy and
proficiency in English indicates human development, makes people more globally competitive
and relatively happier.

Petitioners' arguments are again misplaced. While the Constitution indeed mandates the
State to provide quality education, the determination of what constitutes quality education is
best left with the political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and

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resources to determine the same. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Without question, petitioners, who are faculty members in HEIs, indeed possess the
academic freedom granted by Constitution. This Court, in its previous decisions, has defined
academic freedom for the individual member of the academe as "the right of a faculty member
to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the
result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that
his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the
political, economic, or academic establishments." (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

[Note: However, the Court does not agree with petitioners that their transfer to the secondary
level, as provided by the K to 12 Law and the assailed issuances, constitutes a violation of their academic
freedom. While the Court agrees, in principle, that security of tenure is an important aspect of academic
freedom — that the freedom is only meaningful if the faculty members are assured that they are free to
pursue their academic endeavors without fear of reprisals — it is likewise equally true that convergence
of security of tenure and academic freedom does not preclude the termination of a faculty member for a
valid cause. Civil servants, like petitioners, may be removed from service for a valid cause, such as when
there is a bona fide reorganization, or a position has been abolished or rendered redundant, or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service. Hence,
petitioners' contention that the law is unconstitutional based on this ground is specious. (Council of
Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930,
October 9, 2018)]

The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is the State's way of tapping the
resources of the private educational system in order to give Filipinos equal access to quality
education. The Court finds that this manner of implementing the grant of equal access to
education is not constitutionally infirm. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

As previously discussed, however, Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution is a non-self-executing provision of the Constitution. Again, as the Court already
held in Basco, "Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 [Philippine] Constitution
xxx are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not
self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate
such principles." The K to 12 Law is one such law passed by the Legislature to bring the said
guiding principle to life. The question of what is 'relevant to the needs of the people and society'
is, in turn, within the sole purview of legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.
(Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education,
G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Another assertion against the constitutionality of the K to 12 Law is that it allegedly violates the constitutional
State duty to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of educational institutions mandated by Section 4,
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 allege that DepEd's Basic Education Sector
Transformation Program (BEST) is supported by Australian Aid and managed by CardNo, a foreign corporation
listed in the Australian Securities Exchange. CardNo allegedly hires specialists for the implementation of the K to 12
curriculum. xxx. Petitioners point to Section 4(1) and Section 4(2), paragraph 2, as legal basis for the supposed
unconstitutionality of the partnership between DepEd and CardNo in the implementation of the K to 12
curriculum.

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 Petitioners' reading of the above Constitutional provisions is erroneous. Sections 4(1)
and 4(2) deal with two separate matters that the Framers of the Constitution sought to address.
Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of the
importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education
system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the second portion of Section 4(2) to
emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still possesses the power of
supervision over private schools. xxx. In stark contrast, Section 4(2), Article XIV, which was
copied from the 1973 Philippine Constitution, refers to ownership and administration of
individual schools. xxx. Thus, petitioners are mistaken in applying Section 4(2), Article XIV to
Section 4(1), Article XIV as they deal with completely different matters. The restrictions
expressed in Section 4(2), Article XIV only refer to ownership, control, and administration of
individual schools, and these do not apply to the State's exercise of reasonable supervision and
regulation of educational institutions under Section 4(1), Article XIV. Hence, there is nothing
under the provisions of the Constitution which prohibits the State to forge a partnership with a
foreign entity, like CardNo, in the exercise of this supervision and regulation of educational
institutions. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Further, it is asserted that the K to 12 Law violates the constitutional duty of the State to
provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational
efficiency, and other skills as commanded by Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Petitioners decry the supposed lack of mechanisms in the K to 12 Law to
accommodate groups with special needs. As previously discussed, Section 2, Article XIV of the
1987 Philippine Constitution is not a self-executing provision. Furthermore, petitioners'
argument has no factual basis because DepEd has already put in place programs to address the
needs of indigenous peoples, Muslim children, adult learners, PWDs, out of school youth and
other sectors of society in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional provisions, in line with the K
to 12 Law. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

It is thus clear from the deliberations that it was never the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to use only Filipino and English as the exclusive media of instruction. It is evident
that Congress has the power to enact a law that designates Filipino as the primary medium of
instruction even in the regions but, in the absence of such law, the regional languages may be
used as primary media of instruction. The Congress, however, opted not to enact such law. On
the contrary, the Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom, provided that the regional languages
shall be the primary media of instruction in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this act of
Congress was not only Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an
exclusive prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with. (Council of Teachers and Staff of
Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9,
2018)

Moreover, despite the provision on the use of MT as primary medium of instruction for
kindergarten and Grades 1 to 3, Filipino and English remain as subjects in the curriculum
during the earlier stages of schooling and will later on be used as primary medium of
instruction from Grade 4 onwards. In other words, in addition to the MT, the basics of Filipino
and English will still be taught at the early stages of formal schooling; and should the parents, in

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the exercise of their primary right and duty to rear their children, so desire to give additional
Filipino and English lessons to their children, they have the absolute right to do so. Nothing in
the K to 12 Law prohibits the parents from doing so. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Petitioners assert that CMO No. 20 is violative of the Constitution because the study of
Filipino, Panitikan and the Philippine Constitution are not included as core subjects.

The Court disagrees.

First, the constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to be violated are

non-self-executing provisions. As discussed above, the framers of the Constitution, in
discussing Section 6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of Filipino as a medium of official
communication is still subject to provisions of law.

In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., the Court held that Section 15 on arts and culture
of Article XIV is not self-executory because Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation
and conservation of our cultural heritage. The Court was of the view that all sections in Article
XIV pertaining to arts and culture are all non-self-executing, which includes Section 14 on
Filipino national culture and Section 18 on access to cultural opportunities. The Court in Basco
also ruled that Section 17, Article II on giving priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports, and Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are non-self-executing.

Thus, the Court reiterates that these constitutional provisions are only policies that may
be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and
by the legislature in its enactment of laws." The Court reiterates that they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

Second, it is misleading for petitioners to allege that there is a violation of the

constitutional provisions for the simple reason that the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the
Constitution are actually found in the basic education curriculum from Grade 1 to 10 and senior
high school. To be sure, the changes in the GE curriculum were implemented to ensure that
there would be no duplication of subjects in Grade 1 to 10, senior high school and college. Thus,
the allegation of petitioners that CMO No. 20 "removed" the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the
Constitution in the GE curriculum is incorrect.

As regards Section 3(1), Article XIV on the requirement that all educational institutions
shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm that the intention was for it to be constitutionally
mandated. The Court agrees that there is indeed a constitutional mandate that the study of the
Constitution should be part of the curriculum of educational institutions. However, the mandate
was general and did not specify the educational level in which it must be taught. Hence, the
inclusion of the study of the Constitution in the basic education curriculum satisfies the
constitutional requirement.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that CMO No. 20 only provides for the minimum
standards for the GE component of all degree programs. Under Section 13 of RA No. 7722 or the
Higher Education Act of 1994, the CHED is authorized to determine the (a) minimum unit

104
requirements for specific academic programs; (b) general education distribution requirements
as may be determined by the Commission; and (c) specific professional subjects as may be
stipulated by the various licensing entities. The provision further provides that this authority
shall not be construed as limiting the academic freedom of universities and colleges. Therefore,
HEIs are given the freedom to require additional Filipino or Panitikan courses to these minimum
requirements if they wish to.

Third, petitioners aver that non-inclusion of these subjects in the GE curriculum will
result to job displacement of teachers and professors, which contravenes the constitutional
provisions on protection of labor and security of tenure. Once more, Section 3, Article XIII and
Section 18, Article II do not automatically confer judicially demandable and enforceable rights
and cannot, on their own, be a basis for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Further, the Court
finds that, in fact, teachers and professors were given the opportunity to participate in the
various consultations and decision-making processes affecting their rights as workers. (Council
of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No.
216930, October 9, 2018)

The Family

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in
our Constitution and statutory laws; hence, any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in
favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity
of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties." (Singson v. Singson, G.R. No. 210766, January 8,
2018)

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature. On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval
of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No.
141 ("New Divorce Law”), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for
absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year
prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other
to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity. When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. From August 30,
1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce
obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. (Republic v.
Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018; see Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 224015, July 23,
2018)

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first,
Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the
same; second, consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two

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(2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an
absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. (Morisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018)

CARLO L. CRUZ

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