PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Case Digests #1

Agujetas vs. CA
261 SCRA 17 (1996)

FACTS: Criminal charges were filed against three board members of the provincial board of canvassers for the
Province of Davao Oriental for violation of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and R.A. No. 6646 (The Electoral
Reform Law of 1987), specifically for failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate. After preliminary investigation,
criminal charges against them were filed for violation of 2nd paragraph of Sec. 231 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. One of the defenses offered by the accused was that such crime no longer exists because
Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reform Law of 1987) and 7166 (Electoral Reform Law of 1991) amended the
Omnibus Election Code and that among those amended was Section 231, which was modified by Sec. 28 of R.A. No.
7166 by removing the specific manner by which the proclamation of winning candidates by the Board of Canvassers
should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the second paragraph of Section 231 of the old Omnibus Election
Code. The SC ruled:

“Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by
R.A. No. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. No.
7166 which we quote:
‘Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. –– Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the Omnibus Election
Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code of
the violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 as among election offenses is
also hereby repealed. This repeal shall have retroactive effect.
‘Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Execu-tive Order Nos. 144 and 157 all and other
laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other issuances, or any part thereof, incon-sistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or re-pealed accordingly.’
The statement “All laws or parts thereof which are inconsist-ent with this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly,” cer-tainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify
or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. If re-peal of particular or specific law
or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it.
Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subse-quent enactment of R.A. No. 6646 and
R.A. No. 7166.
While Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) pertains
to the Canvassing by the Board of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the prior act. The provision of the subject laws are quoted below for comparison:

While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In
order to effect a repeal by impli-cation, the latter statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent
and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to recon-cile and stand together.
The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for
inconsist-ency is never presumed. It is necessary, says the court in a case, before such repeal is
deemed to exist that it be shown that the stat-utes or statutory provisions deal with the same
subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a show-ing of
repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such
as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice. For it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that
repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency or
repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For the legislature is pre-sumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
In the case at bar, the needed manifestation indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not
present. Neither is there any inconsistency between the two subject provisions. xxx. (pp. 31-35)
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Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA

251 SCRA 421 (1995)

FACTS: Section 4(k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions
of P.D. No. 813 and Sec. 2 of E.O. No. 927, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Author-ity shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting
the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the
like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities
the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. Now, the question is, did R.A. No. 160 repeal
the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Au-thority? The Supreme Court said no. The Court
explained:

“The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the
part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws
should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a
special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic
in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legisla-tion which is a general law cannot
be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that “a spe-
cial statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, al-
though the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law.”
When there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legis-lative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special
law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing
a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible,
effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991.”

Tenchavez vs. Escano

15 SCRA 355 (1965)

FACTS: On February 28, 1948, Vicenta Escario and Pastor Tenchavez got married in Cebu City before a Catholic
chaplain. They did not, however, live under the same roof after their marriage. On June 24, 1950, Vicenta went to the
United States and obtained a decree of divorce in Nevada on October 21, 1950. On September 13, 1954, Vicenta
married an American and thereafter acquired American citizenship. On July 30, 1955, Pastor filed a complaint for
legal separation and damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage with her
American husband. On the question of the validity of the decree of absolute divorce obtained by Vicenta, the Supreme
Court ruled:
“It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor. Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escario remained subsist-ing and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the de-cree
of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character.” At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escario, like her husband, was
still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rep. Act-No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
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‘Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.’
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).

Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book I, Arts.
97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that ‘the mar-riage bonds shall not be
severed’ (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the
state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:

‘Prohibitive laws cornering persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.’

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.”

Unciano Paramedical College vs. Court Of Appeals

FACTS: Some nursing students were not admitted for the second semester for organizing a studentbody council
which was not allowed by the school which was allegedly a violation of the schoolregulations. The school argued
that under the ALCUAZ DOCTRINE, schools have the discretionto admit students for the second semester because
upon enrolment of a student in the first semester, the contract was for that semester only. However a new doctrine
was later on promulgated which abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is now the NON doctrine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new Non doctrine be applied retroactively to the case.

HELD: No. The new doctrine shall be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties whorelied on the old
doctrine and acted on faith thereof.

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS: Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs.
Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
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ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in
Mapa.

RULING: Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to
the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to
his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.

FACTS: Alice Reyes, a Filipino citizen was married in Hongkong to Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen, but established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. The couple acquired conjugal properties in the Philip-pines.
The couple went to Nevada to obtain a divorce. Thereafter, Alice Reyes remarried with Theodore Van Dorn. Richard
Upton filed a suit against Alice Reyes Van Dorn for an accounting of their conjugal property and for a declara-tion
that he should manage said property. Alice Van Dorn moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada. In said divorce proceeding, Upton acknowl-edged
that he and Alice had no community property. Upton contended that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada Court
is contrary to the public policy and has no legal validity in the Philippines because the Nevada Court proceedings
divested the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree is valid insofar
as Upton is concerned. The Court explained:

“There is no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorces dissolves the marriage. Xxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercise jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of the heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
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Ando vs. Department of Foreign Affairs

FACTS: On 16 September 2001, petitioner Edelina married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil
wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. Thereafter, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted
under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with Edelina. Believing in good faith that said divorce
capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status; Edelina married Masatomi Y. Ando in
a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. However, when Edelina applied for the renewal of her Philippine
passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi she was told by the DFA that the same cannot be
issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi is
valid. Edelina then filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief praying that her marriage with
Masatomi be declared as valid and to order the DFA to issue a Philippine passport to Edelinander the name of
“Edelina Ando y Tungol. For failure to comply with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is
obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country the RTC dismissed the
petition. The RTC further held that since the divorce allegedly obtained by her first husband was never recognized
in the Philippines, Edelina is still considered as married to Kobayashi, her first husband. Accordingly, the second
marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered as valid at this time. Hence, this petition. Edelina argues that
assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code,
noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license. She contends that any
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall not affect the
legality of the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s second marriage should be recognized. (NO)

RULING: Edelina’s second marriage should not be recognized. With respect to her prayer for the recognitionof her
second marriage as valid, Edelina should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven and like any other fact. While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry
filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, the Court is still unable to grant the
prayer of Edelina. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both
the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law.
Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence
proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

Catalan vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter,
they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando
married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope
had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on
the merits ensued.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the petition for nullity of marriage between Orlando and
Merope

RULING:

Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same. The case was remanded to the trial court for its proper disposition.

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interestand must be based
on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition
to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights. Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides: a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will,
which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter
LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento from
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that
he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his
death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
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The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term “national law”
is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code,
a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person
of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal
law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman,
its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each
in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal
law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one
for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law
of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile.
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The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity
of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by
the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
“national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to
any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he had made two
wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflict rules governing successional rights.
Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children
opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to apply.
RULING: Said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law (which is the national law of the
deceased), there are no legitimes. The renvoi doctrine cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where
the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in ac-cordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

In the Matter of Testate Estate of the Deceased Edward E. Christensen

FACTS: Edward Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided for a period of nine years.
In 1913 he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary till the time of his death. However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will
executed in the Philippines, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, as his only
heir, but left a legacy of a sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the SC
was declared another acknowledged daughter of his). Counsel for Helen claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is re-ferred back to the law of the
domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ulti-mately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in
view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the child
Mary Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Art. 16, par. 2 of our Civil Code, the national law of the
de-ceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of Cali-fornia on the matter; that under
California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose off any property possessed
by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California
law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the property to Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.,

RULING: Since the conflicts rule of California refers back the matter to the Philippines (the place of domicile), our
courts have no alternative but to accept the referring back to us. If our courts will to do otherwise and throw back
the matter to California, the problem would be tossed back and forth be-tween states concerned, resulting in
“international football.”
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Llorente vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married
in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with
Ceferino Llorente, a brother of Lorenzo and the two even have a son.

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula
agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the she will agree to waive all monetary support
from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the US.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an American
counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their children and left
nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo went to the court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix
of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition
for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.

RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente
is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January
16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.

The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.

HELD:

YES. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained
the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.

Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no longer
applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce
as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

Regarding on the issue of Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected because he is an alien and is not
covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for probate, then the case
was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Case Digests #1

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon

Facts:
American citizens, spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey, were residents in the Philippines for 30 years.
They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979 leaving a will wherein she bequeathed
her entire estate to Richard consisting of her conjugal share in real estate in Forbes Park, a bank account, cash
balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors.

Two years later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will
wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted
daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties.
Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife’s estate. The will was also admitted in a court in
her native land (Maryland).

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of
partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of
partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria,
while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of
the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator
in the property subject to the legacy.

Issue:
1) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated
2) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled.

Ruling:
1) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since the first
wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the
person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property
and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife’s properties may be found
in the Philippines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the
testator.

2) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and
as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Case Digests #1

Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of
legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated
such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge
sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting
pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her
state of unemployment Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill
his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was
bearing, and pay her for support and damages.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21
of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction.

Issue:

WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her.

Held:

No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again yielded to his
embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would
have cut all relationship upon finding that the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held
liable for a breach of promise to marry.

In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature
in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals
failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That
definition of seduction is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access
to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited
mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Case Digests #1

Diaz vs. Encanto

FACTS: A professor at the University of the Philippines applied for a sabbatical leave with pay, but it was denied.
This issue was brought to court where there was a finding that the grant or denial of such leave is not a matter of
right as it is subject to the exigencies of the service, like acute shortage of teaching staff. Even the Office of the
Ombudsman has similar findings with the CA that the grant of leave is not a matter of right and that there was no
bad faith on the part of the officials of the UP in denying it. Yet, before the SC, the applicant insisted that the concerned
officials acted in bad faith. Sustaining the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman, the SC.

ISSUES: Whether the denial of the sabbatical leave was attended by bad faith?

HELD: No. There are no traces of bad faith or malice in denying the application for sabbatical leave. They
processed the application in accordance with their usual procedure. While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz
should have been granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz
merely for the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application. It is an
elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon
the party alleging the same.