What is Historical Imagination? by Vivienne Little, University of Warwick “We welcome originality in the history department.” said the Professor, ‘valid onginality.” He could have meant onginahty of argument, interpretation, even style: but when he added that it must be ‘valid’ originality, he was, of course, thinking of that characteristic of history hich unites i, inescapably, with evidence. Constructions made of ignorance or fancy may be built with the detritus ofthe pase, but they will not be history. An historical ‘statement i only acceptable if it can ’be justified by an appeal to evidence. Yer, G.R. Elton, among the more hhard-headed of reputable historians, ‘undertaking an analysis of the practice ‘of the subject, based on many years’ experience, observes: ‘imagination controlled by learning and ‘scholarship, learning and scholarship rendered meaningful by imagination-these are the tools of ‘enquiry possessed by the historian’ * Imagination—Part of the Historian's Equipment “That imagination is considered patt of the equipment of historians is a source of surprise to many, although Elon is right, it would be among the qualities sought by the Professor ‘before labelling 4 student's work ‘original. For imagination is popularly supposed to have only tenuous links with reality. While grumbling sbout the boredom and uncreativeness of aesimilating large-quanciies of information for school exsminations in history. most people cling stubbornly to the belief thar what they feared so painflly were hard faces, and that History is about something which did happen, and not to be confused with make-believe. Men and women whose activities are recorded in history books once had 2 flesh and blood existence, such that Scrooge ot Miss Elza Bennett never ‘rem They ar nt produce of he istorian’s imagination In a fundamental sense, however, ‘ey are just that. The past is recoverable, Those men and women sanot be brought back to if. Theie ‘experiences cannot occur again, or Copyright © 2013 Pica LIC. Al igh reserved. Copright © Hisorical Axvciotion. ‘even be reproduced in the way that oof ar phenomena can be exhibited over and over in 2 laboratory experiment. “The objects of historical chought are cveats which ished happening and conditions no longer in existence, dlrs Coligwoods As ar present experience is concerned, the past is non-existent, and the physical find mental elements of pst events ‘ean only be constructed in imagination by the operation of the histortan's mind upon what he takes to be evidence for the past. therefore his picrae of ic (which isthe subject of examinations), i “imagiaary in every detail!’ Moreover, the picture ‘whichis history cannot come 5 near to the past 2¢ photograph ro its coriginl, because the storizn's Iikeness is drawn from unorganised and mostly incomplete features. Iaphazardly surviving. Nevertheless, historians are “captive to the truth ofa foolish world” and though itis 2 pat world whose living realty they can never recover, they claim thar theie scatements abour it ‘may be taken as constituting a faichful representation of that past reality. Collingwood, who demonstrated that the historian’s pictare of the past is imaginary, also insisted that history ie 2 form af knowledge, autonomous, selfjustfying, and 2 least as worthy of respect as a micans to truth as att, science or philosophy. The notion that history and imagination are incompatible aise: from a ‘misconception of imaginative activity 28 solely concerned with the fictitious. Thar itis, on the contrary. 2 major means of apprehending and communicating reality, and that both Elton's obscrvation and the fuith of school consumers can be vindicated, ‘may be revealed in an examination of the nature of historical imagination. “The very act of perception by which Sistorians ace even of the past is in tel, a work of imagination. Appraising the arguments of Fhime and Kare, and taking account of those of Ryle, Surtce, Wittgenstein, Mary Warnock* insists that perception of objects in the present sworld depends pon 2 function which can be best described, if only metaphorically. as ‘image-making’, and which enables recognition of what we see, heat, taste a ofa particular kind. A telling, if rare, illustration of this is provided by Sheila Hocker, « woman sho cntiely lost her mininal vision 26 2 teenager and had sight restored many years ler. Descnibing her 2mazement J the array of colours in 2 greengrocer’s display, during her first Shopping trip after the operation, she ‘Apatt from this, there were a lot of things in the window that I could mot identify a all. Once agsin, L was coming up against the problem of nor bemg zble to refete ‘ny previous tcl impressions 10 my present vision {my emphasis Perhaps Uhad already that day given my brain enough to cope with, Seeing was miraculous, but 1 hhad, fr a way. t0 eam to see 25 vwel. In the shop ... they didn't ‘mind my touching things I could not recognise. ‘There was something on the counter that 1 could not, try as I would, put a name ld om dad green, and 6 shape. That was al it Imeant ome (my emphasis. fe ‘would not fit any description coal think of. Then I touched it I ralised I was seeing leaves and owers. It was 2 plant. | could not tundetstand why Uhad noe immediately known what it was. This shows clearly how images formed fron sense pressions in turn fctaterecognicon of objets (his Hocken, whose enabling images wweie denved fom vouch, had Create new ones in expanse to sight Kvovcndon othe teae procs of irmage-making, farther tngocs Mary ‘Wammock, enable interpretation of what ne sense os Senne omething beyond sel, pera Something otlce than the kind of hich tember Inj se wave an historian peraves some {arved wood, an arrangement of Stones, Black marks on parchment dnd coucsves of them not only 262 tow), « building, document, but sho ar evidence ofthe pas