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Handout No. 10
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is
but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.

As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were
employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this
crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a
technical term– in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization
of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both "the
designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense." Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it
presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing. People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No.
171222, February 18, 2015

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The first is made by the
public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in
court. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused.

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an

investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is
an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.

The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. Judicial determination of probable
cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. At this stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence
submitted, and on the strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public
prosecutor, determines the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. While a judge's determination of probable cause is generally
confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under

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Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. People of the Philippines
vs. Desmond, G.R. No. 179079, June 26, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe; Ong vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 213910, February 03, 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe

Information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) of Makati City is void if there was no
prior written authority from the City Prosecutor, even if the information contained a
certification that the ACP had prior written authority from the CP.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz
was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are
bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so
by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor
of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the
approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office
Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz
was able to have the Pasiya approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to
have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the OCP-
Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the
Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly
showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek
the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before
the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the
Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the
same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner. Quisay vs. People, G.R. No.
216920, January 13, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

ARREST

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just

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committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph
(b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the appellant had committed it.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by Villareal. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had
reasonable ground to believe that Villareal had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have
been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice
to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful
warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just
been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s
reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on
knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites
laid out under Section 5.

In fine, Villareal’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they
appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not
by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough
to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. Specifically, with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in
Villareal’s case. People vs. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013

BAIL

It is basic that bail hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not interpose any objection
or leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court.

Thus, in Villuanueva vs. Judge Buaya, therein respondent judge was held administratively liable
for gross ignorance of the law for granting an ex parte motion for bail without conducting a
hearing. Stressing the necessity of bail hearing, this Court pronounced that:

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The court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether
or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong is matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge. In order for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in
the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the
accused. In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for
bail is required in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.

A fortiriori, respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex
parte motions to allow Adama’s temporary liberty without setting the same for hearing. If
hearing is indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions for the
temporary liberty of Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he
be released on recognizance. Balanay vs. Judge White, Br. 5 RTC - Eastern Samar, AM No. RTJ-
16-2443, January 11, 2016

The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition
for bail.

A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender (Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCAD 369). An accused need not
wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In Lavides vs. CA, 324 SCRA 321, it was
held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.

This pronouncement should be understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case
filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the information filed against him. It was
explained that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place
him in a position where he has to choose between: (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be
held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail.

This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint
or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not
necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for

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bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior
to arraignment Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468-69, 149116, January 28, 2003

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

A dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of
acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.

In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against Yerro for the denial of their right to
speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of
the accused’s right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held that where after such
dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court
re-set the case for trial, the accused can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was
actually an acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered. Bonsubre vs. Yerro, G.R. No. 205952,
February 11, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe

The right to speedy trial applies only in criminal cases while the right to speedy disposition of
cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-
judicial hearings.

Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that, all persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in
all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.

It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition
of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy

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disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory. Escobar vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228349,
September 19, 2018

What are the determinations in order to conclude that there is a violation of the right to speedy
disposition?

In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this
Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused
by the delay. Bonsubre vs. Yerro, G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe

When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing
must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. The application
for bail should not outrightly be granted by the judge even if the Prosecutor did not object to
such application.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail
applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge
has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity
with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising
judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is
the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."

Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the
prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to
the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct
a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial
apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether

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such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is
considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion
and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him. Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No.
134504, March 17, 2000

A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a bank is not an uncounseled

confession.

The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed
with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under
Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that is admissible against her. Such rule provides that
the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to
presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the
admission does not. (US v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of its being made by the party himself,
an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter. The letter was not a
confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft.
Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused
acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.
People vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011

If it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced the accused, his right
to confront the Prosecution’s witnesses is not impaired. Still and all, the important thing is that
petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and
test their credibility.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an
interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced
him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-
examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is
essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.

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In this case, the petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the
witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire
an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should
have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was
nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices
as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him. Ho Wai Pang vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011

To be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search
was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the
enforcement of customs laws; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.

Here, the facts revealed that the search was part of routine port security measures. The search
was not conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs code or other customs laws. Although customs searches
usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the
enforcement of customs laws. Libo-on Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

When the accused abuses its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to
have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. This can be characterized by
patent postponements and changes of counsel.

The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a basic, fundamental human right vested
inalienably to an accused. This right ensures that courts can confidently ferret out the facts on
the basis of which they can determine whether a crime occurred and the level of culpability of
the accused. It is a basic requirement of criminal justice.

However, this right does not exist in isolation. The State, representing the people that may have
been wronged by a crime, also has the right to due process. This means that the prosecution
must not be denied unreasonably of its ability to be able to prove its case through machinations
by the accused.

When the accused abuses its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to
have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of postponements
and changes of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent. Petitioner should have been
dissuaded by any of the lawyers, unless they, too, connived in such an amateurish strategy, which
wastes the time and resources of our judicial system.

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All told, Presiding Judge Morallos did not gravely abuse his discretion in deeming as waived
petitioner's right to cross-examine prosecution witness Dela Rama. The Court of Appeals
correctly denied petitioner's Petition for Certiorari. Dela Rama's testimony given during direct
examination shall remain on record. We sustain both courts. Kim Lion vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018

MOTION TO QUASH

If a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However,
the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall
be granted.

Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash
that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the
motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash
would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already
attached. People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015

JUDGEMENT

The term “reasonable doubt” is not equivalent to the phrase “the act from which criminal
responsibility may arise did not at all exist.” Although both have the force of acquittal, the
latter provides connotes that the accused have not committed the offense.

A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was
the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the
MeTC declared that “the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details
and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged
against him.” Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting

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Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that “the prosecution was not able to establish
that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva” and that
“there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person
responsible for the death of Marina Oliva.”

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC,
that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a
remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil aspect.
Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that “the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist” in view of the failure of the prosecution to
sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his
civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal. Daluraya vs.
Olivia, G.R. No. 210148, December 08, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe

When respondent did not appear despite notice, and without offering any justification for his
absence during the promulgation of judgment, the trial court should have immediately
promulgated its Decision. The promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to
the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 6 of Rule 120 (Promulgation of judgment) provides: In case the, accused fails to appear at
the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made
by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the
promulgation of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition
of the situation in the past when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by
jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. The only essential elements for its
validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy
thereof was served upon the accused or counsel. Javier vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 193150, January
23, 2017

The Special Prosecutor cannot move for the discharge of the budget officer to become a State
witness since his testimony is only corroborative to the testimony of the treasurer.

Under Section 17, Rule 119, the Court upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be

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witnesses for the State, provided the following requisites are satisfied: (a) there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of the said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he or
she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not present when
the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.
The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on the
circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the participating conspirators. Jimenez,
Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there

are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct.

In 2004, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that where a government agencies computer
use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly
provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the
agency information systems and technology, the government employee had no legitimate
expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence
found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child
pornography. In that case, the defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely
examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he
was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout
the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the
prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower
and floppy disks were taken and examined.

A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the
police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well
as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception
and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.

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Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its
inception and scope. Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must
necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence
under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the
recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the
government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his
contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve
a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s
computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein
would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. Pollo vs. David,
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal
only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), of Rule
122, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the
case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the
appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence,
the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the
memorandum on appeal.

RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of Court in its dismissal of the
appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that he did not
file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once the appellant fails to file the
memorandum on appeal, to wit :

Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which
shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file
a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

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 2019 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW
Handout No. 10
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in
criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122 are the following:

Section 3. How appeal taken.—

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

xxx

Section 8. Transmission of papers to appellate court upon appeal.—Within five (5) days from the
filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the court with whom the notice of appeal was filed must
transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the complete record of the case, together
with said notice. The original and three copies of the transcript of stenographic notes, together
with the records, shall also be transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court without undue
delay. The other copy of the transcript shall remain in the lower court.

Section 9. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts.—

(a) Within five (5) days from perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the original
record to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.

(b) Upon receipt of the complete record of the case, transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(c) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said notice, the parties may submit memoranda or
briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court to do so. After the submission of such
memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the Regional Trial
Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda
or briefs as may have been filed. Sanico vs. Son-Tenio, G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015

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