+2008 - Coding and Quiantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religiou Concepts - Barrett

METHOD
&THEORY in the
STUDY OF
RELIGION
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 20 (2008) 308-338 www.brill.nl/mtsr
Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in

Religious Concepts: Theoretical and
Methodological Reflections1
Justin L. Barrett
Centre for Anthropology & Mind, Institute of Cognitive & Evolutionary Anthropology,
University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6PN United Kingdom
justin.barrett@anthro.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
Boyer’s theory of counterintuitive cultural concept transmission claims that concepts that ideas
that violate naturally occurring intuitive knowledge structures enough to be attention-demand-
ing but not so much to undermine conceptual coherence have a transmission advantage over
other concepts (Boyer et al. 2001: 535-64). Because of the prominence of these counterintuitive
concepts in religious belief systems, Boyer’s theory features prominently in many cognitive treat-
ments of religion. Difficulties in identifying what are and are not counterintuitive concepts in
this technical sense, however, has made empirical treatment of Boyer’s theory irregular and dif-
ficult to evaluate. Further, inability to quantify just how counterintuitive a given concept is has
made ambiguous specifying where the alleged cognitive optimum lies. The present project
attempts to clarify Boyer’s theory and presents a formal system for coding and quantifying the
“counterintuitiveness” of a concept, and hence, facilitates empirical scrutiny of the theory.
Keywords
cognitive science of religion, religious concepts, counterintuitive, cultural transmission
Exploring regular human cognitive capacities and conceptual systems contin-

ues to produce helpful explanatory insights into both the regularity and vari-
ability of cultural expression (Sperber et al. 2004: 40-46). For ideas to be
“cultural” or “religious” (as opposed to idiosyncratic) they must successfully
spread within a group, and for ideas to spread they must be readily represented
by human minds in ways that produce identifiably similar public expressions
(Sperber 1996). Hence, understanding how cognitive systems support or
1
The author thanks Pascal Boyer, Emma Cohen, Joe Henrich, Nicola Knight, Anders Lis-
dorf, Brian Malley, Bob McCauley, Tenelle Porter, and Rich Sosis for comments and suggestions.
This work was supported in part by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/157006808X371806
J. L. Barrett / Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 20 (2008) 308-338 309
discourage certain types of ideas is a critical component in understanding what

is and isn’t “religious.”
As a central theory in the cognitive science of religion, Pascal Boyer’s theory
of the transmission of counterintuitive ideas has generated considerable theo-
retical and empirical attention (e.g., Barrett, 2000, 2004a, 2004b; Barrett &
Nyhof, 2001; Boyer, 2003; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Gonce et al. 2006; Noren-
zayan et al. 2006; Pyysiäinen, Lindeman & Honkela, 2003; Tremlin, 2006;
Tweney et al. 2006; Upal, et al., 2007). In brief, Boyer hypothesizes that con-
cepts with a small number of counterintuitive features are (generally) better
remembered and more faithfully communicated than extremely counterintui-
tive concepts or comparable ordinary or even unusual concepts. Boyer argues
that cross-culturally many religious concepts are counterintuitive in this tech-
nical sense, facilitating their successful transmission, and hence, partly explain-
ing their existence.2 In this way, cognitive architecture informs and constrains
the scope of candidates for successful religious concepts.
Empirical support for this hypothesis (variously termed the cognitive opti-
mum theory and the Minimal Counterintuitiveness (MCI) theory, as described
more fully below) has been mixed, with three articles reporting series of exper-
iments in support of the theory’s predictions (Barrett et al. 2001: 69-100;
Boyer et al. 2001: 535-64; Upal et al. 2007: 1-25), and three reporting results
either inconsistent with the theory’s predictions or requiring substantive mod-
ification (Gonce et al. 2006: 521-47; Norenzayan et al. 2006: 531-53; Tweney
et al. 2006: 483-98). Just as notable as the differences in results are the differ-
ences in how ‘counterintuitive’ was operationalized for the different experi-
ments. These empirical studies reflect only modest agreement concerning what
does and does not constitute a public representation of a counterintuitive idea.
Perhaps these differences alone account for the differences in results.
For the MCI theory (as I call it) to continue to be fruitful in the study of
religious concepts, this ambiguity regarding how to identify (or generate) pub-
lic representations of counterintuitive concepts must be resolved. After pro-
viding more theoretical grounding for the project, I attempt to create a scheme
for identifying and coding counterintuitive concepts. Further, I suggest a heu-
ristic for quantifying just how counterintuitive an idea is. Developing the for-
malism of a coding and quantification scheme clarifies the scope and predictions
of a defensible MCI theory. My hope is that this formalism will add more
precision and uniformity to hypothesis testing relevant to the MCI theory.
2
Boyer (2001, 2003) has identified other features of many religious concepts in addition to
their counterintuitiveness, and does not regard counterintuitiveness as either necessary or suffi-
cient for a concept to be regarded as “religious.”
310 J. L. Barrett / Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 20 (2008) 308-338
I. Intuitive Knowledge and Cultural Expression
For quite some time, cognitive developmental psychologists have talked about
intuitive knowledge, assumptions, or expectations of children. By “intuitive”
they refer to cognition that does not require or does not allow for conscious
inspection of the principles involved. Further, intuitive expectations are
assumed to be largely invariable across cultural contexts, arising through the
course of normal development through the interaction of human biology and
typically human natural and social environments. Whether some of this intu-
itive knowledge is innate or rather the product of learning remains an open
question for empirical inquiry and debate. But both the empiricists and nativ-
ists seem to agree that by early childhood, a certain set of intuitive knowledge
is present in children. For instance, there is little doubt that sometime in early
development, children acquire the intuitive expectation that bounded physical
objects cannot pass directly through other bounded physical objects. That
infants ‘know’ this property of physical objects does not entail that they can
consciously reflect on it or verbally articulate it. Rather, they know it intui-
tively in the sense that it is assumed without conscious reflection.
Recently, philosopher Robert McCauley (forthcoming) has usefully
described this intuitive knowledge as maturationally natural. That is, as a natu-
ral product of human maturation in ordinary human environments, certain
motor and conceptual competencies are acquired with great fluency and auto-
maticity. Walking is maturationally natural in this sense, as is knowing that
physical objects require support, or else they fall. Maturationally natural
cognition—or intuitive knowledge—does not require great conscious resources
but readily springs into action whenever needed. In addition to this automa-
ticity and fluency, maturationally natural competencies, according to McCau-
ley, are generally (but not always) marked by developing so early that by
adulthood we do not remember a time that we did not possess the compe-
tency. Further, acquiring these competencies occurs without special artefacts
or explicit tuition. Maturationally natural competencies show relatively little
variation within or across groups.
McCauley contrasts maturational naturalness with practiced naturalness.3
He notes that with the right sort of training or practice one can acquire auto-
maticity and fluency in motor and conceptual capacities that seem to rival that
which is characteristic of the maturationally natural. Consider the cognitive
skills of a chess master or the performance of a concert violinist. Nevertheless,
3
This labeling should not lead one to assume that maturationally natural competencies do
not require practice whereas practiced naturalness does. It isn’t the practice that distinguishes
these two types of natural cognition but their inevitability.
this sort of naturalness requires special artefacts (e.g., a chess set or violin),
typically involves explicit instruction, and varies considerably both within
groups (few become chess masters) and across groups (some cultures have
more chess masters than others). Cultural schemata and scripts (e.g., how one
orders food in a restaurant) may acquire this practiced naturalness in people.
I raise McCauley’s distinction because it emphasizes that what I refer to
here as intuitive cognition (what he would call maturationally natural) is not
the product of particular cultural conditions, but may be regarded as pan-
human. Hence, it plays a role in all thought and communication regardless of
cultural particulars. Further, intuitive cognition occurs early in development.
Hence, it plays a role in shaping thought and communication from the early
years of life.
This notion of intuitive cognition has been imported quite successfully into
explanations of recurrent cultural patterns. Simply put, ideas that match intu-
itive cognition are likely to appear widely within and across cultures. And why
not? Largely intuitive ideas are not only likely to spontaneously appear in
individual minds (in part because somewhere in our minds, their elements
already lurk), but also to spread readily from person to person (because, again,
somewhere in our minds, their elements already lurk). For instance, learning
about a previously unfamiliar animal that meets all intuitive expectations for
animals is easy because a host of presumed features need not be explicitly com-
municated. When explaining the features of a large South American rodent, I
need not mention that it moves in goal-directed ways, that it seeks nourish-
ment to survive, that it may die, that its parents and offspring will be of the
same species, that it has internal parts that serve the animal’s survival needs,
that it is composed of natural materials, that it exists continually in space and
time, that it cannot pass through solid walls, that it is subject to gravity, and
so forth. All of these intuitive expectations come for free.
The reason intuitive cognition plays such a powerful role in explaining var-
ious cultural phenomena is that whether or not an idea or practice is intuitive
(in the sense of being the product of maturationally natural systems) is not
anchored to a particular cultural context. Such considerations are not cultur-
ally variable. Intuitive cognition is regarded as part of basic human nature and
thereby can be appealed to for explaining cross-cultural recurrence.
II. Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts
A particularly productive application of these insights concerning the ability

for intuitive knowledge to inform and constrain cultural expression has been
in the area of fictional, mythical, and especially religious ideas, championed
most prominently by Boyer (Boyer 1994; 2001; 2003:119-24). Boyer has

argued that ideas or concepts that largely conform to intuitive expectations are
readily acquired, remembered, and communicated from person to person. As
such, they have the potential to spread within and across cultures (Boyer 1994;
2001; see also Sperber 1996; Sperber et al. 2004: 40-46). These connections
with intuitive cognition, then, form the backbone of an epidemiology of rep-
resentations (Sperber 1996). Significantly, what Boyer has added to this
emphasis on successful concepts having to be largely intuitive is that an idea
that is a slightly counterintuitive idea might actually spread better than a com-
parable idea that does not violate any intuitive expectations. That is, if an idea
or concept explicitly violates an intuitive expectation (but otherwise affirms
relevant intuitive cognition, at least tacitly), the idea may combine ease of
understanding with something striking that catches attention and makes the
concept more interesting, more memorable, and worth talking about.
Consider the idea of a ‘statue that rusts’ with the idea of a ‘statue that cries’
As much as one might be interested in a description of an oxidizing sculpture,
hearing about a statue crying is much more striking and worthy of retelling.
Why? Boyer suggests that it is because one version is wholly intuitive and the
other counterintuitive. Even three-year-old children know that artefacts do
not cry, but that crying is a behavior in the domain of living things. Hence, a
statue that cries is counterintuitive.
This technical sense of “counterintuitive” allows for an idea or concept to be
intuitive in two ways. First, an idea may be specified by maturationally natural
cognitive systems. For instance, that solid objects cannot pass through other
solid objects appears to be a default assumption or expectation of maturation-
ally natural cognitive systems. The idea of a rock that cannot pass through a
wall is intuitive because it conforms to default assumptions. A second way in
which an idea may be intuitive is by simply not violating expectations. The
idea of a 500 pound cucumber is intuitive (even if surprising) because matu-
rationally natural systems do not specify how much cucumbers can or cannot
weigh.4
Boyer’s proposed advantage for counterintuitive ideas is not without limits.
Rather, he suggests an optimum. Ideas that are mundanely intuitive are accept-
able candidates for being successfully spread within a population, those with
4
At least, we have no evidence that boundaries on weight or size are specified beyond, per-
haps, the general sense that they should be ‘medium-size’ objects—not microscopic, and not on
the scale of planets or galaxies. In keeping with Boyer’s and others’ previous research in this area,
I reserve the term counterintuitive for ideas that violate maturationally natural expectations. Nev-
ertheless, just as one may acquire practiced naturalness, ideas may run counter to practiced
natural expectations. I term ideas that violate these practiced natural expectations countersche-
matic.
just a minor counterintuitive tweak are better, and those with too many coun-
terintuitive features are disastrous. Consider a statue that cries tears made of
pine sap whenever it reads someone’s mind and finds that the person intends
to do something that would please the statute only if the act happened exactly
ten years from next Friday at noon. Such a statue concept (if indeed it can be
called a concept) so greatly violates intuitive conceptual structure that it would
be hard to understand and communicate effectively without distortion. Fur-
thermore, its counterintuitive structure renders it cumbersome for generating
predictions, explanations, or inferences. A large, slightly-oxidized bronze
statue of a muscular bearded man with one hand raised and the other holding
a book that cries real tears does not present the same conceptual challenges for
its communication or for its ability to generate predictions, explanations, or
inferences.
To summarize, largely (but not entirely) intuitive concepts are “good” for
transmission, and massively counterintuitive ones are “bad” (but not impos-
sible). But this formulation raises a problem. How does one quantify counter-
intuitiveness? If Boyer has proposed an optimum, how many counterintuitive
properties must it incorporate? Can we be more precise than somewhere
between wholly intuitive and ridiculous? Below I attempt to clarify matters.
Before sketching what I take to be a means of more precisely specifying the
counterintuitive character of a given concept or idea, let me make an impor-
tant qualification. Boyer and others’ sense of what is and is not intuitive is
dependent on ongoing empirical and theoretical research in developmental
and cross-cultural psychology. What falls within or outside the body of intui-
tive, maturationally natural, pan-cultural knowledge continues to prompt
disagreement. For my analysis below, I appeal to what I take to be the likely
range of intuitive knowledge based on current relevant evidence, but I am
certain that as the relevant science progresses, this range will require revision.
What counts as intuitive knowledge is an empirical issue, however confident
we may be about most of what counts. Because the scope of what properly
counts as intuitive is a work in progress, gray cases in any classification scheme
will appear. One area of possible modification may be that fewer or more areas
of cognitive naturalness (in McCauley’s sense) may prove to be the product of
practiced naturalness rather than maturational naturalness.
I also restrict my discussion to objects (broadly construed), thereby avoid-
ing whether events (e.g., a collision, a sunrise, a competition, an examination),
substances (e.g., oxygen, water, metal), or abstractions (e.g., goodness, law,
brightness, a poem, an idea) might properly be considered intuitive or coun-
terintuitive in the technical sense that Boyer has developed. Indeed, we have
little reason to believe that abstract concepts activate pan-human cognitive
systems in the same way as objects or intentional agents, given that they do
not constitute a domain for causal cognition. Not surprisingly, then, Boyer’s
examples of counterintuitive concepts avoid abstractions or events and instead
focus on ‘persons’ (meaning humans); ‘artefacts’ or ‘tools’; and ‘plants’, ‘ani-
mals’, or ‘living things’ (Boyer 1994; 2001; Boyer et al. 2001: 535-64). Without
more relevant evidence, describing abstractions in terms of counterintuitiveness
would be inappropriate.
I propose six ‘steps’ for coding a concept, and determining the degree of
‘counterintuitiveness’ from that coding. This degree of counterintuitiveness
may be used to make a number of empirical predictions described near the
end of this essay.
I leave aside another sense in which something might be considered “coun-
terintuitive.” If an entity brings about counterintuitive events, it is “counter-
intuitive” in its causability but does not have any ontologically counterintuitive
properties. Consider a relic considered that heals those that touch it in compari-
son to a relic that is invisible. The first can be used to bring about an event that
may be counterintuitive (e.g. instantaneous restoration of sight), whereas the
second has a property that is counterintuitive in Boyer’s sense. It may be that
these two senses of being “counterintuitive” have different representational
properties and different transmissive potential. Because Boyer’s theory only
directly addresses the second sort (the invisible relic), I leave aside those objects
that are counterintuitive by virtue of causability and focus instead on ontologi-
cally counterintuitive entities for the present discussion and coding scheme.
III. Coding Counterintuitiveness
When discussing how to construct or how to identify and code counterintui-

tive concepts/ideas/representations, it is critically important to recognize that
such a project actually entails coding public representations for their likely pri-
vate representational structure. Dan Sperber (1996) distinguishes between pub-
lic and private representations, noting that it is through public representations
(e.g., actions, speech acts, artifacts, writings) that we try to recreate in others
particular private representations (e.g., ideas, emotions, mental states). Tech-
nically, then, “a mountain that thinks” is a public representation that has a
relationship to particular private representations in a reader. An unambiguous
public representation prompts similar private representations in other indi-
vidual conceptual systems. Hence, if the utterance “a mountain that thinks”
(a public representation) tends to activate similar private representations across
individual hearers of the utterance, it is a relatively unambiguous public rep-
resentation. For ease of communication, I will assume that my examples of
concepts/ideas/representations have a transparent relationship between the
public representation and private representations. Hence, I will write as if “a

mountain that thinks” is a minimally counterintuitive concept (or representa-
tion). What I mean by this language is that I regard the expression “a moun-
tain that thinks” as likely to evoke in all fluent, English speakers with normal
conceptual systems a similar minimally counterintuitive private representa-
tion. By calling “an immortal human” a MCI idea, I mean that I regard the
public representation “an immortal human” as likely to consistently evoke a
private representation that violates an intuitive assumption about humans,
that is, a MCI concept.
The importance of this distinction between private and public representa-
tions can be seen by examining an example from the empirical literature on
MCI theory. Norenzayan, et al.’s example of the “thirsty door” is regarded as
transferring “a folkbiological property (thirst) from its proper category (ani-
mal or plant) to an improper category (inert object/substance)” (2006: 537).
For the “thirsty door” item to be a successful stimulus in the experiment,
Norenzayan, et al. must be confident that the public representation “thirsty
door” evokes in their participants a similar private representation that indeed
includes transferring a folk biological property to an improper ontological
category. If, on the other hand, “thirsty door” evokes in many readers a private
representation that has something to do with the dryness of a wooden door or
how readily the door absorbs paint or no clear, consistent private representa-
tions across individuals, then “thirsty door” cannot be confidently called a
MCI concept. Perhaps “thirsty door” is, instead, a metaphor that activates dif-
ferent representations in different audiences.5
One other observation is required before turning to the six steps for coding
counterintuitive concepts and quantifying their degree of counterintuitive-
ness. Human cognitive systems generally strive for representational and com-
putational efficiency and simplicity (Sperber et al. 1995). Given the option of
a complex representation or a simple one, human minds generally prefer that
which is more simple. For instance, a chair with both the biology and the
mind of a human is more simply represented as a human in the form of a
chair. Though a given individual might insist that the counterintuitive chair
(with human biology and psychology) is more a chair than a human, through
many iterations and transmissions, and when used to generate predictions,
explanations, and other inferences in real time, the conceptually simpler ver-
sion would emerge. This Simplicity Principle has many implications for how
people are likely to represent counterintuitive concepts, and some of these
implications are noted in the following discussion.
5
It is worth noting that MCI concepts in folktales, films, and religions are not typically
understood as metaphors.
The Simplicity Principle also motivates a rule for the proposed coding
scheme that operates throughout the steps. Let’s call this rule the Simplicity
Rule. The Simplicity Rule states that when coding concepts, assume the simplest
(i.e., least counterintuitive) conceptual representation that captures the object’s
properties. Assume that the proper interpretation of an utterance or verbal
representation is the one that requires less suspension of intuitive expectations
and is, therefore, less effortful (Sperber and Wilson 1995).
The contexts I have in mind for coding public representations for counter-
intuitiveness are single communicative episodes such as a folktale, a conversa-
tion, a ritual, or on-line, real-time interactions with ideas or items. The unit of
analysis I am attempting to capture is the structure of a single individual’s
private representation of any given public representation. What is not intended
is, for instance, a tabulation of all of the different ways in which people gener-
ally use the term ‘God’ and what could be meant by it, as if the universal
semantic scope of the term is indicative of any given individual’s private rep-
resentation in any real-time episode. Coding how the Ghost of Christmas
Present in Dickens’ A Christmas Carol would likely be privately represented by
the audience members is the sort of problem imagined here, not coding for
how people use the term ‘ghost’ in the English speaking world generally. For
the sake of brevity, my examples below do not offer contexts that might help
to clarify (or muddy) the coding of likely private representations.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, please consider the six steps
for coding counterintuitives.
Step One: Identify the Basic Level Membership
The basic level category is the level of object categorization that minimizes
differences within members of the category while maximizing differences
between categories (Rosch et al. 1976: 573-605). The basic level is typically
the category membership first learned for any given object in the course of
development and usually the first category to be linguistically marked.
Fortunately, an easy and reliable heuristic exists for identifying something’s
basic level. Simply answer the question, “In one word, what is it called?” The
one-word, common, first-learned label for an object is almost always its basic
level (in English). Examples include “apple,” “cat,” “chair,” “shoe,” “cup,”
“rock,” and “shadow.” More precisely, the shortest, one word, common label
for an object usually picks out its basic level category membership. Hence, in
identifying basic level category membership, a golden retriever is classed as a
dog, not as a golden retriever (a subordinate category) or as a mammal, an
animal, or a living thing (superordinate categories). A recliner is classed as a
chair, not as a recliner, as furniture, or as an artefact (for the sake of coding, I

will use all-capitals to designate a basic level word). If the basic level cannot be
identified, it may be possible to move on to Step 2 anyway, but gathering more
information (e.g., from the text or informant, depending on the source of the
public representation, or additional contextual information) is prudent.6
Step Two: Identify the Ontological Category or Categories
For this discussion, objects may be thought of as falling in one or more of five
ontological categories: Spatial Entities, Solid Objects, Living Things that do not
appear to be self-propelled, Animates, and Persons. These are intuitive onto-
logical categories and do not necessarily map onto genuine ontological dis-
tinctions.
These five ontological categories arise from differential activation of five dif-
ferent intuitive expectation sets I am calling Spatiality, Physicality, Biology, Ani-
macy, and Mentality. These expectation sets are not ontological categories but,
as specified below, different combinations of their activation characterize intu-
itive ontological categories. Table One (see Appendices) summarizes these
intuitive expectation sets and their characteristic implicit assumptions.
By Spatiality, I mean those intuitions that govern objects, substances, and
other entities that might be located in space. I am hazarding that the primary
assumptions here are that all objects (and substances) have a specifiable loca-
tion in space and time. Further, Spatiality is distinguishable as a specific
domain of reasoning from object Physicality (described below), because some
things such as clouds and shadows (and perhaps minds, as discussed below)
are not intuitively regarded as having all the same properties as bounded phys-
ical objects but yet have spatial properties. A cloud is in one place. If you
divide a cloud you get two clouds, each with their own location. Spatiality
assumptions apply to clouds, other Spatial Entities, and all five categories of
object under discussion here. But clouds do not meet the intuitive assump-
tions I refer to as Physicality.
Physicality includes at least the intuitive expectations of cohesion, solidity,
continuity, and contact (Spelke 1990: 49-56; Spelke et al. 2007: 89-96). Cohe-
sion refers to objects moving as connected wholes. Solidity entails that solid
objects do not readily pass directly through each other or occupy the same
space and at the same time as each other. That objects have continuity means
6
It may be that the basic kind is a class you suspect is counterintuitive such as ‘ghost’ or ‘god.’
If so, an ontologically similar basic kind label may be selected or the step skipped and returned
to after further consideration using the subsequent steps.
that for them to move from point A to point B, they must traverse the inter-
mediate space (as opposed to teleporting). Finally, objects move based on con-
tact. For an object at rest to begin moving, it must be launched through
contact. For it to change course or stop abruptly, contact is necessary. This set
of intuitive expectations are sometimes called folk or naïve physics and appear
to be part of a human’s reasoning during infancy (Spelke 1990: 49-56; Spelke
et al. 2007: 89-96). We can add to these properties two perceptible features
presumed by these studies in early infancy: being visible and tangible.
Biology (more typically called folk biology) includes the intuitive expecta-
tions of growth and development (Rosengren et al 1991: 1302-20; Hatano et
al. 1994: 171-88), internal parts that sustain life or ‘vital force’ (Inagaki et al.
2002; Inagaki et al. 2006: 177-81; Keil 1992: 103-38), vulnerability to death
(meaning cessation of biological processes) (Slaughter 2005:179-86), and
reproduction of like kinds (Hatano et al. 1994: 171-88; Springer et al. 1989:
637-84). Further, Biology assumes composition of natural substances and not
manufactured materials (Simons et al. 1995: 129-63). All of these properties
arise out of a single, unseen, kind-specific “essence” that generates and accounts
for the physically observable features (Keil 1989).
Animacy adds to Biology the expectation that a thing is “self-propelled”
(Premack 1990: 1-16) or has “Force” (Leslie 1995: 121-149). That is, it can
act in or on its environment and not merely be acted upon. Being able to
move oneself from one location to another in space is “self-propelledness,” but
the concept also captures instances of animacy such as changing appearance
(e.g., by size or shape change or illumination), or by making noise (e.g., a cry
or utterance). Further, in animacy, this self-propelledness is perceived as con-
stituting goal-directed action; for instance, to communicate, avoiding some-
thing, threaten, or move to a particular location (not just moving aimlessly).
Mentality (often called folk psychology or Theory of Mind ) extends Animacy
to include assumptions that a thing’s activity is guided and shaped by percepts,
beliefs, desires, emotions, and perhaps personality. For instance, a mental
being will act to satisfy desires, satisfied desires result in positive emotions,
percepts inform beliefs about desired objects, and so forth.
Though some might disagree and wish to add to these five expectation sets,
collapse them (e.g., combining Animacy with Mentality, or Spatiality with
Physicality), or reduce their number (e.g., omit Biology), I suggest these five
because of their general support in the cognitive developmental literature,
their apparent independence in developmental course, and their general map-
ping onto what appear to be reasonable proper domains of the natural world
throughout human existence. Clear evidence for Physicality in humans exists
within the first few months of life and appears robust in adult non-human
primates. Hence, it has been dubbed part of ‘core knowledge’ (Spelke &
Knizler 2007: 89-96). What I demarcate as Spatiality is often collapsed into

Physicality (because research has primarily concerned physical objects), but I
give it independence because of its relevance for reasoning about a distinct
domain: non-massive but Spatial Entities such as shadows, clouds, conglomer-
ates (e.g., pile of leaves), and flames. These Spatial Entities have locations but
do not activate all the Physicality expectations of a Solid Object. I am further
motivated to divide Spatiality and Physicality into distinct expectation sets by
Paul Bloom’s work on “intuitive dualism” that suggests minds are intuitively
represented as non-physical things that may, nevertheless, have spatial proper-
ties such as a specifiable location (Bloom 2004; see also Cohen 2007). Evi-
dence for Animacy expectations, too, appears in early infancy (Gergely et al.
2003: 287-92) and might be considered core knowledge (Spelke et al. 2007:
89-96). That it is readily applied years before a folk biology clearly emerges,
before clear evidence of mentalistic reasoning, and has a ready proper domain
of application in simple, non-social animals (e.g., snails, worms, etc.), moti-
vates me to leave Animacy independent of both Mentality and Biology. I am
certainly not claiming that animals and humans do not activate Biology expec-
tations. I am claiming that Animacy and Mentality might be activated with-
out Biology. Hence, some “Animates” could be represented without Biology.
It may be that by the time a robust theory of mind or Mentality develops,
all animate objects are intuitively expected to be mentalistic agents (Persons).
If so, a snail with mental states would be intuitive; suggesting that it has no
mental states would be counterintuitive. On the other hand, it may be that
humans intuitively restrict mentalistic agency to only a small number of mam-
mals or even only to other humans. If so, the attribution to animals of rich
mental states that seems so common among pet owners, for example, might
be minimally counterintuitive (though perhaps with great practiced natural-
ness). These matters deserve more experimental attention.
Folk biology may be the latest developing intuitive expectation set with
most of its expectations emerging around age four or five (Inagaki et al. 2002;
Keil1989). Late developing or not, folk biology certainly adds a number of
expectations relevant to reasoning about living things not captured by the
other intuitive expectation sets.
The final expectation set, Universals, is tacit in essentially all research on the
other reasoning systems. Universals are expectations that apply to all reasoning
in any domain. They include such assumptions as time moves in one direc-
tion, laws and regularities are constant from moment to moment, and causes
precede effects.
Differential activation of these five intuitive expectation sets carve the
world’s objects into the classes of Spatial Entities, Solid Objects, Living Things,
Animates, and Persons—an intuitive ontology (Keil 1979). If a thing activates
Universals and Spatiality but no other expectation set, its intuitive ontological
category is Spatial Entities. If a thing activates Universals, Spatiality, and Phys-
icality but no other expectation sets, its intuitive ontological category is Solid
Objects. The complete set of relationships among expectation set activation
and ontological category membership is represented in Table Two (see Appen-
dices). As intuitive, usually implicit categorizations, they do not necessarily
map onto scientific or philosophically defensible divides, or even how ordi-
nary people would categorize the same objects across all contexts. People treat
clouds and shadows as Spatial Entities—entities with specifiable locations and
even, perhaps, identifiable boundaries, but not Solidity. Solid Objects includes
both artefacts (e.g., chairs, shoes, pencils) and natural non-living objects (e.g.,
stones, icebergs). People classify trees, mushrooms, sea sponges, and many
other (apparently) non-moving biological kinds into Living Things. The cate-
gory Animates may typically include animals that appear to propel themselves
such as sharks, earthworms, crickets, and bunnies, but in some situations may
include non-animals such as complex machines. Persons captures human
beings, and perhaps (depending upon how they are conceptualized) some ani-
mals such as chimpanzees and the family dog. (Exactly which animals are
intuitively granted full-blown minds, albeit slightly different than humans’, is
unknown and likely quite variable.) Note that contrary to how I understand
Boyer’s use of the term ‘person’ (Boyer 1994; Boyer 2001) here ‘Person’ is not
synonymous with ‘human.’
Spatiality, Physicality, Biology, Animacy, and Mentality do not exhaust the
different sets of intuitive expectations applied to things in the world. Some
evidence exists that artefacts may be discriminated from other Solid Objects
by virtue of their activation of a set of functional expectations (Casler et al.
2007: 120-30; Keil 1995: 234-67). As this is an area of rapid development and
does not change my general analysis, I leave artefacts and natural non-living
objects together in one group. Further, I assume all entities are intuitively
subject to the set of intuitive expectations I call Universals.
As displayed in Table One, the relationship between expectation sets and
ontological categories is not strictly hierarchical. By virtue of activating the
same expectation sets, Solid Objects assume and extend the properties of Spa-
tial Entities, and Living Things also assume and extend the properties of Solid
Objects and Spatial Entities. But evidence suggests that things which are intu-
itively categorized as Animates do not necessarily activate the same expecta-
tions as Living Things. For instance, complex machines including computers
may be conceptualized using the kind of goal-directed or teleological agency
reasoning without assuming Biology. Indeed, this type of reasoning about
Animates arises during infancy and is evident in other species (Gergely et al.
2003: 287-92), presumably before folk biological reasoning emerges, suggest-
ing its independence from the Biology expectation set that marks Living
Things off from Solid Objects. Though the vast majority of Animates that we
represent (i.e., animals) do activate Biology, the differences in developmental
and probably evolutionary courses suggests the relative independence of the
Animacy and Biology expectation sets.
The observation that Persons and Animates (as opposed to humans) do not
automatically assume the biological and physical properties of animals is a
departure from previous discussions of counterintuitives (Boyer 1994). Nev-
ertheless, I find support for this departure in the recent research on the devel-
opment of Theory of Mind and teleological agency reasoning in children. We
now have a growing body of evidence that from infancy children distinguish
the causal properties relevant to agents and minds and those relevant to phys-
ical objects (Bloom 2004; Gergely et al. 2003: 287-92). For instance, Ani-
mates are presumed to be free from the contact principle that requires physical
objects to be contacted in order to begin moving (Spelke et al. 1995). Infants
expect objects that propel themselves in an apparently purposeful or goal-
directed fashion to continue to behave in a purposeful fashion even if violating
basic expectations of mechanical movement (Gergely et al. 2003: 287-92;
Gergely et al. 1995: 165-93; Leslie 1995: 121-149; Premack 1990: 1-16).
Importantly, these expectations may be triggered from infancy with stimuli
that do not resemble three-dimensional objects (but two-dimensional spots)
let alone human beings (Rochat et al. 1997: 537-61; Scholl et al. 2000: 299-
308). These findings suggest that reasoning about Animacy and Mentality
does not presume later-developing Biology—as spots are unlikely to be
construed as Living Things—or perhaps even standard object Physicality.
Suggestively Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn (2004: 95-103) have offered pre-
liminary experimental evidence suggesting that infants that demonstrate
awareness of the continuity principle for Solid Objects (part of the Physicality
expectation set) do not demonstrate awareness that human beings must move
according to the continuity principle. Together with research demonstrating
how readily preschool-aged children reason with disembodied imaginary
friends (Taylor 1999), these data hint that Mentality and perhaps even Ani-
macy expectations may operate without a solid, bounded physical object as
the target. For young children, minds do not need physical bodies, a sugges-
tion captured by the term ‘intuitive dualism’ (Bloom 2004). Though I find the
available data suggestive, I concede that what I am offering amounts to a
speculation in need of further, direct empirical support.
The proposed expectation sets are not a class-inclusion hierarchy, but
the sets are not wholly independent either. Some expectation sets automati-
cally activate others; to have one active in a conceptual structure is to have
another present. If a concept activates Biology, it likewise activates Physicality,
Spatiality, and Universals. If Physicality is not activated, neither is Biology. To

illustrate, the Biology assumption that like begets like (e.g., dogs have puppies
and not kittens), is wholly deactivated if Physicality is not assumed. What
would it mean (beyond metaphor) for a wisp of vapour to beget? Similarly,
what would it mean to have natural internal parts if a thing is not a physical
object? (I return to this observation below in discussing ghosts.)
Step Two requires ontological categorization. Candidate categories include
Persons, Animates, Living Things, Solid Objects, and Spatial Entities. If the
item in question does not obviously fall into one or more of these five catego-
ries (e.g., abstractions, events) do not proceed. Items not falling into one of
these five categories cannot be coded in terms of counterintuitiveness using
this scheme. As described below, it may be that after apparently counterintui-
tive concepts are considered, ontological category membership will require
revision.
Step Three: Code Transfers as Superscript, Capitalized Prefixes, Joined by + if

Necessary
Once basic kind and ontological category have been determined, it can be
determined whether a concept, as used in the communicative context under
examination, includes properties from a ‘non-native’ set of intuitive expecta-
tions. As a Solid Object, a rock should (intuitively) only include expectations
generated by Spatiality and Object Physics. If the rock is attributed the ability
to reproduce, then folk Biology properties have been transferred. It would be
represented thus, BROCK with the superscript ‘B’ representing Biology. Simi-
larly, a tree that can verbally communicate has had Mentality transferred. It
would be coded, MTREE. A rock that eats passersby and talks would have both
Animacy and Mentality transferred. To represent both of these transferred
properties, + is used: A+MROCK.
Following the Simplicity Rule (that the least counterintuitive or “simplest”
representation should be assumed), a TREE that both listens empathetically
(a property from Mentality) and verbally communicates (another Mentality
property) would still be coded MTREE. The assumption is that the entire set
of Mentality expectations have been transferred, not just the one named men-
tal ability. What would it mean for a tree to be able to talk to you but not
think, remember, perceive, and so forth? Unless the concept explicitly
renounces other properties from the same set of expectations, we assume the
entire set has been transferred.7
7
Lindeman & Aarino (2006: 585-602) identify transferring intuitive expectations from one
causal domain to another as the hallmark of “paranormal” thought.
The Simplicity Principle in conjunction with the non-independence of

expectation sets limits the number of transfers each ontological category can
have. Re-examining Table One, a member of an ontological category can have
transfers limited to only the number of ‘NO’s listed. Persons (not humans)
can have no transfers as they already assume or tolerate all of the sets of expec-
tations. The specific case of humans illustrates this point. Intuitively humans
activate all six expectation sets. In the scheme presented here, however, Per-
sons can have no transfers. If the preponderance of evidence led cognitive
scientists to agree that the category of ‘artefacts’ naturally and intuitively gen-
erates a unique set of expectations and that artefacts cannot be persons, then
perhaps persons could have a property transferred. For instance, if artefacts are
assumed to be constructed with non-organic materials, then a metal person
might be represented as having the transferred property of being composed of
metal. As it is, a person made of metal would be a breach of the Biology expec-
tation for Living Things to be composed of natural, organic materials. Ani-
mates, however, can have one transfer, namely Mentality. An earthworm that
ponders Shakespeare might be an example. On the other end, a Spatial Entity
such as a shadow might have three transfers: Physicality, Animacy, and Men-
tality (e.g., a tangible shadow that eats rats and enjoys poetry). However, the
Simplicity Principle would likely drive this thrice-transferred shadow to be
represented more simply as an intangible Person—a concept with a single
breach. I turn to breaches below.
Step Four: Code Breaches as Superscript Lowercase Suffixes, Joined by + if

Necessary 8
In addition to the transfer of a ‘non-native’ property to an object, an object

may be counterintuitive by the violation or breach of native expectations. For
instance, as a rock is a Solid Object, intuitively we presume that it exemplifies
all of the expectations of Universals, Spatiality, and Physicality. A rock that
does not satisfy all of these expectations (e.g., an invisible brick) would be
counterintuitive by virtue of a breach (of Physicality in the case of an invisible
rock).9 An invisible brick would be coded ROCKp .
8
Steps Three and Four may be reversed as there is no necessary priority of transfers over
breaches. I thank Joe Henrich for helpful suggestions regarding the formalization of the coding
scheme.
9
I suggest capital letters to represent transfers but lowercase for breaches for two reasons.
First, such a strategy redundantly discriminates between transfers and breaches. Second, it also
symbolizes that, in the case of transfers, the whole expectation set has been transferred, but for
breaches only a single expectation from the designated set has been violated.
Unlike transfers, a breach does not necessarily presume that the entire intu-
itive expectation set has been violated. When hearing about an invisible rock,
people need not presume that it must be intangible as well. Consequently, an
invisible rock that can pass through other solid objects could be represented
with two Physicality breaches but presume all other Physicality expectations
such as being tangible, requiring contact to move, requiring support, and
moving as a continuous unit. The invisible rock that can pass through other
solid objects would be coded as ROCKp+p . Note, however, that with increas-
ing breaches of an expectation set, the Simplicity Principle is increasingly
likely to find a more parsimonious representation by assuming the entire set is
violated and hence, revise the ontological category membership (Step Two). A
brick that is intangible, invisible, and need not move as a coherent whole
begins to look like something other than a Solid Object, and so it seems
unlikely to really be anything we would normally regard as a brick. With that
many Physicality violations, I am unsure that any Physicality expectations
apply and so rather than code it as a rock with three breaches (ROCKp+p+p), I
may intuitively represent it as a substance or cloud that happens to have a
brick-like shape with no breaches or transfers (VAPOR) or as a vapor that has
rock-like boundaries, a transferred property from Physicality (PVAPOR).
As with transfers, multiple breaches from separate intuitive expectation sets
would be joined with +. For instance, a rock that is invisible (Physicality
breach) and ceases to exist on Wednesdays (Universals breach) would be coded,
ROCKp+u .
Combining Steps Three and Four, we have a method for coding even more
complex concepts that include both breaches and transfers. Consider an invis-
ible chair that eats underpants ACHAIRp . Or consider a singing rosebush that
experiences time backwards MBUSHu.
It is possible to conceptualize a transferred property that itself has been
breached. For instance, ‘a chair that swallows people only when it is not hun-
gry,’ would likely be understood as an inanimate Solid Object that has been
transferred a Biology property (nutritional needs and activity to satisfy those
needs) that have been violated (by acting contrary to the Biology assumption).
In cases such as this, I suggest using the same coding notation as with any
other breach/transfer combination. For instance, with BCHAIRb, the prefix ‘B’
signifies the transfer of Biology to the chair, and the suffix, lower-case ‘b’ signi-
fies a breach of that transferred Biology. Another example might be ‘a statue
that can hear your thoughts,’ coded as MSTATUEm. The statue has been trans-
ferred Mentality that has been breached (thoughts are not within the scope of
hearing). If necessary, use ‘+’ to represent multiple breaches of the same trans-
ferred expectation set. A ‘statue that can hear your thoughts and has x-ray
vision’ could be symbolized as: MSTATUEm+m.
Step Five: Code Breaches within Breaches Using Parentheses
A final way to complicate a concept is to breach a breach. To illustrate: ‘a cow

that becomes invisible on Mondays’ would have a breach of its Physicality
assumptions (visibility) and that breach would break the Universal expecta-
tion of consistency (properties are continuously applicable). These breaches of
breaches always include a violation of Universals. I suggest coding them with
parentheses around the breached concept: (COWp)u . If a single breach of
multiple breaches is then breached, it may be necessary to enclose just the
breached property symbolic letter for the sake of clarity. ‘A cow that becomes
invisible on Mondays and can pass through walls’ would be: COWp+(p)u.
Whereas ‘a cow that is invisible and can pass through walls on Mondays’ would
be: (COWp+p)u. However, ‘A cow that is invisible and can pass through walls
but fails to exist on Mondays’ would be COWp+p+u. No parentheses are used
because the breaches are not being breached.
Step Six: Quantify Counterintuitiveness by Totalling the Number of Symbolic Letters
The final step in this coding process is to simply count up the superscript let-
ters employed. A concept that can be represented with nothing more than the
basic level, all-caps word, scores zero on counterintuitiveness. Each breach or
transfer adds one point. Table Three (see Appendices) gives examples.
IV. Illustrative Applications: Ghosts and God
How might commonly-held folk concepts be treated under the proposed sys-
tem? Allow me two examples: ghosts (whether ancestors or spirits), and God.
To make these illustrative codings I am relying on my own folk knowledge of
these concepts in English-speaking North America to speculate about how a
representative individual might privately represent these public representa-
tions in a single representative episode. I do not regard my knowledge on these
matters as authoritative and acknowledge the potential for great individual
variation. I only offer these analyses for the sake of illustration and to raise
empirical questions. Recall, too, that in actual instances of coding, particular
communicative episodes should be considered such as a story about a ghost
and not the folk concept ‘ghost,’ or what a person says about God in conversa-
tion and neither the entire corpus of God-related folklore or theology, nor the
entire semantic scope of ‘God.’
First, let’s deal with ghosts. A complaint frequently raised against the MCI
theory as originally formulated has been that some very successful cultural
concepts appear to be much more than minimally counterintuitive. Ghosts

and God arise in this regard. In early versions of the MCI theory it was assumed
that the structuring expectation sets were related in a fully nested hierarchy. If
an object activated folk Biology, the Physicality and Spatiality likewise applied.
If an object was a Person with Mentality, then it likewise activated Animacy,
Biology, Physicality, and Spatiality. Consequently, by virtue of having a mind,
a ghost had to be classed as a Person (and a HUMAN for its basic level) that
had breaches of object physics (intangibility, the ability to pass through solid
objects, and to be invisible), and had at least one breach of folk biology (is
immortal). Hence, using the present coding scheme, a ghost would have been
represented HUMANp+p+p+b and have a counterintuitiveness score of 4 (plus or
minus one depending on the particulars of the ghost concept). Clearly such a
concept is more than minimally counterintuitive.
Similarly, God in the Abrahamic traditions has a mind (and so is a Person)
with fully breached Biology, Physicality, and Spatiality expectations along
with a smattering of Mentality breaches (e.g., mind reading ability, unre-
stricted perception, etc.). God might then be represented something like
HUMANs+p+p+p+b+b+b+m+m+m and have a counterintuitiveness score of 10 or more.
Though the MCI theory never maintained that widespread more-than-
minimally-counterintuitive concepts were not possible, their existence does
demand additional explanation. For instance, Whitehouse has suggested that
these more counterintuitive concepts require special cultural supports such as
rituals or other transmissive technologies to aid their successful communica-
tion (2004).10 It might also be that the whole slate of counterintuitive features
is not represented in any given on-line context or communicative episode
(Barrett et al. 1996: 219-47; Barrett 1999: 325-339). Perhaps cultural scaf-
folding does help account for widespread belief in many of God’s counterin-
tuitive properties, but what about ghosts? It is not obvious that rituals or study
or any other special cultural practices are necessary for a ghost concept to be
successfully learned or communicated. Further, if MCI theory cannot account
for God or ghosts of various sorts, then it seems to have a very limited utility.
Maybe it is fine for explaining elements of folk tales or legends, but then it
makes only a small contribution to understanding the kinds of entities in
which people actually believe.
Under the proposed scheme for operationalizing and coding counterintui-
tive concepts, these concerns about ghosts and God appear less grave for the
MCI theory. The two substantive differences that come to MCI theory’s aid
10
McCauley & Lawson previously made a similar point about the need for special cultural
scaffolding to support religious rituals that too greatly deviate from intuitive cognitive con-
straints (2002).
are that expectation sets are non-independent but also non-hierarchical, and
the Simplicity Principle. For a spirit/ghost concept these observations mean
that ghosts might not actually be intuitively represented as humans with mul-
tiple Physicality breaches and additional Biology breaches. Rather, because
Biology presumes natural intuitive Physicality, multiple Physicality breaches
automatically deactivate Biology expectations. Consequently, Biology expec-
tation breaches need not be represented in the conceptual structure. Perhaps
then ghosts are represented as, HUMANp+p+p instead of HUMANp+p+p+b.
Because Biology requires Physicality and Physicality has been breached, Biol-
ogy is not presumed relevant. The counterintuitiveness score of the ghost con-
cept drops from 4 or more to 3.
Further still, the Simplicity Principle suggests that when several breaches
from a single expectation set are violated, the human conceptual tendency
toward less complex representations will find a different representation that
captures the same properties but with fewer violations of intuitive expecta-
tions. It could be, then, that the three proposed breaches of Physicality (invis-
ibility, intangibility, and being able to pass through solid objects in violation
of Solidity) disqualify the ghost as a Solid Object outright. Perhaps ghosts and
spirits are represented as Spatial Entities with transferred Mentality. Indeed,
the idea of a ghost or spirit being the formless, shapeless agency of a human
that is recurrent in ethnography and comparative religion, suggests that spa-
tial-entity-with-mentality is true to how people represent ghosts and spirits.
For lack of a better basic level label, I use SUBSTANCE for the non-specified
Spatial Entities. In the coding scheme presented, a ghost might be, MSUB-
STANCE. Because Mentality presumes Animacy (to purposefully act in or on
the environment), coding the transfer of Animacy is unnecessary. The coun-
terintuitiveness score for ghost/spirit is then 1; the epitome of a minimally
counterintuitive concept. In different cultural contexts, however, especially
where ghosts motivate rituals and other collective behaviours because they are
part of the local religious system, ghosts may have additional counterintuitive
features joined to them. The prediction is that concepts with a counterintui-
tiveness score of more than 2 would likely require additional cultural scaffold-
ing (e.g., recurrent formalized teaching on the matter, development of
theology, rituals, etc.) to successfully transmit the concept. Even still, it may
be that in a single on-line episode or communicative act (e.g., a single story),
only one or two counterintuitive features would be represented (Barrett 1999:
325-339).
If, as suggested in the discussion of “intuitive dualism” above, Animacy
and Mentality do not presume object Physicality but only require a location
that can change or a spatial form that can otherwise act, a ghost is not a
Solid Object that has breaches of Physicality but, instead, a bodiless Person.
Therefore, it is not counterintuitive, as Mentality does not assume Physicality.

This could be represented as MIND and have a counterintuitiveness score of
0 before any further elaboration. Perhaps the only counterintuitive property
concerns a non-physical entity being able to manipulate Solid Objects, but
this would be counterintuitive efficacy and not necessarily a property intrinsic
to the ghost concept.
But what about the Abrahamic God (especially as represented in real-time
by non-specialists)? Similar to ghosts, it may be inappropriate to think that
God is represented as a human with numerous breaches, but rather as Mental-
ity in the form of a Spatial Entity, or more simply still as disembodied Mental-
ity. As a Person, Biology and Physicality are not activated, but Mentality,
Animacy, and Spatiality are. Hence, a disembodied mentality might be repre-
sented MIND. What a folk God concept commonly adds to this representa-
tion is breaches of the transferred Mentality (e.g. being able to hear or see
anything, being able to read minds), MINDm+m. Note, however, that if God is
represented as omnipresent (a breach of Spatiality), then being able to hear or
see anything is not a breach of Mentality. The omnipresent God may be rep-
resented with only a single breach of Mentality (mind reading), and a breach
of Spatiality. The resulting coding would yield a counterintuitiveness score of
2 and look like this: MINDs+m. If, on the other hand, God is not commonly
(intuitively) represented as omnipresent, but is conceptualized as having a sin-
gle location (Barrett 1998: 608-619; Barrett et al. 1996: 219-47; Barrett &
VanOrman 1996: 38-45) that is well-distributed (such as an enormous cloud
or unbounded substance), then perhaps God is better coded, MINDm .
I have not yet discussed another common divine attribute, omniscience,
because its status in terms of counterintuitiveness is unclear. Simulating what
it would mean to know everything is beyond human capacity and hence cre-
ates the impression that the notion of an all-knowing being is counterintui-
tive. If it is impossible to understand, I suspect that people do not actually
include ‘omniscience’ in their folk notion of God but something more func-
tional such as ‘knowing anything of which I can think.’ We might, after Boy-
er’s “full-access agents” (2001), call this alternative representation a full
informational access God. Is a full informational access mind counterintuitive?
The answer is unclear. Developmental evidence suggests that before around
age four, children do not understand the limits on human knowledge (Barrett
et al. 2003: 91-108; Wellman et al. 2001: 655-84). Indeed, even in adulthood
tracking who-might-know-what is a difficult and imprecise calculation. A
much simpler calculation is what two- and three-year-olds do: assume that
minds know anything known. It could be that the default expectation about
Mentality is full informational access; hence, such minds are intuitive. Learn-
ing just which minds are likely to have access to what kind of information
may constitute practiced naturalness instead of maturational naturalness.

Another alternative is that the Mentality expectation set has nothing in par-
ticular to say about how much or how little a person can and does know. If
either of these alternatives is right, then perhaps God (as privately represented
by individuals) is not terribly counterintuitive after all. These are, however,
empirical questions.
V. Summary: Clarifications, Predictions, and Conclusion
To summarize, in identifying concepts’ relative counterintuitiveness in any

given communicative context, I propose a six-step system for coding and scor-
ing. Starting with the Simplicity Principle, which states that human cognitive
systems generally strive for representational and computational efficiency and
simplicity, I have derived the Simplicity Rule and then suggested six steps for
coding and quantifying concepts in terms of their counterintuitive features
and total degree of counterintuitiveness. Table Four lists these steps.
A primary aim of specifying this six-step process is to clarify what does and
does not count as ‘counterintuitive’ in its technical sense; thus, disambiguat-
ing experimental evidence that is and is not relevant to falsifying the cognitive
optimum or MCI theory. To illustrate, in Upal et al. (2007: 415-439), Exper-
iment 2B appears to yield mixed support for the MCI theory. Upal et al. pre-
sented participants with a mix of intuitive and counterintuitive concepts
embedded in two stories, dubbed “Adventures of Mr. Wurg” and the other
“The Journey Home.” The between-subjects manipulation was a modified
introduction of the stories to lead participants to expect counterintuitive con-
cepts versus intuitive ones. In the condition intended to create the expectation
of counterintuitive concepts in the stories, participants continued to recall
counterintuitive concepts significantly more than intuitive ones in “The Jour-
ney Home” story (consistent with the MCI theory) but not in “Adventures of
Mr. Wurg.” The authors speculate that “This may mean that the counterintui-
tive concepts we embedded in that story were not as ‘counterintuitive’ as those
used by Barrett and Nyhof (2001) and Boyer and Ramble (2001)” (2007:
432). Applying the coding steps suggested above could help address Upal et
al.’s speculation.
Clarifications: Counterintuitiveness is not Inferential Potential
One modification to the MCI theory from its earlier form (Boyer 1994)
has been the addition of Inferential Potential (Boyer 2001). Inferential Poten-
tial refers to the ability for a concept or idea to readily generate explanations,
predictions, and other inferences in a broad range of personally relevant con-

texts. Boyer notes that not all MCI ideas hold the same inferential potential.
The relative degree of inferential potential modulates the general prediction
that MCI concepts are more readily remembered and communicated than
other concepts. People would have less motivation to remember a MCI idea
with low inferential potential. Consider a stop sign that eats cars. This sets the
imagination racing, doesn’t it? Compare this to an intangible stop sign. Or,
compare an invisible rock (weak inferential potential) to a rock that listens to
you (stronger inferential potential). A rock that listens more readily generates
predictions, explanations, and other inferences in a broad range of contexts
than the invisible rock. If a rock can listen to me, what does it know about me?
What does it know about others? Can it act on that information? Can it share
what it knows? An invisible rock is hard to find and although it may be a trip-
ping hazard, not much else follows beyond what might follow from learning
about an ordinary rock.
We might also distinguish between reflective or off-line inferential potential
and non-reflective or on-line inferential potential. It may be that an idea with
great inferential potential in off-line processing (e.g., relativity theory for a
physicist in the lab) may have rather poor on-line inferential potential (e.g.,
relativity theory for a physicist driving in rush hour traffic). Research on the
use of God concepts in real time suggests that while arguably holding tremen-
dous off-line inferential potential, their on-line inferential potential is poor
enough to be temporarily discarded for more anthropomorphic and less theo-
logically correct versions (Barrett 1998: 608-619; Barrett 1999: 325-339; Bar-
rett & Keil 1996: 219-47; Barrett et al. 1996: 38-45).
That inferential potential and counterintuitiveness are different does not
entail that they are unrelated. Concepts with high counterintuitiveness scores
are likely to be too conceptually cumbersome to be useful in real time. Hence,
we would expect on-line inferential potential to drop precipitously in con-
cepts with several counterintuitive features. Perhaps counterintuitiveness and
inferential potential are inversely related, or it could be that inferential poten-
tial first increases with modest counterintuitiveness and then plummets.
Without relevant data, we can only speculate.
Predictions
One aim of this paper was to clarify the predictions of a MCI theory defensi-
ble in terms of current thought regarding early-developing pan-human con-
ceptual systems. Using the proposed coding scheme and re-analysis of the
MCI theory, I can make a number of preliminary predictions. Only the first is
critical for the general utility of the theory. If the first can be demonstrated to
be false, the MCI theory must be amended or rejected. I offer the subsequent
predictions to illustrate ways in which the theory could be further developed
and made useful.
I hope it is clear that the version of the MCI theory presented here does
not apply to concepts falling outside of the intuitive ontological categories
presented.
(1) First, following Boyer, I predict that MCI concepts, that is, ideas with
a score of 1 for counterintuitiveness, are more readily remembered and com-
municated faithfully than other concepts (all else being equal). For example, a
book that thinks would be better remembered and communicated than a
book about thought or a book that thinks and has babies.
(2) More than two breaches from the same expectation set will tend to get
re-represented in a simpler (i.e., less counterintuitive) form.
(3) A single transferred property from an expectation set will tend to
prompt the assumption that the entire set of properties is transferred.
(4) A concept with a score higher than three will be unlikely to possess on-
line inferential potential and will be discarded in favour of a simpler form. A
cut-off score of three is derived from an analysis of the counterintuitiveness of
folktales from Africa, the Indian Subcontinent, and Native America (Barrett
1997), and Lisdorf ’s analysis (2001) of Roman prodigies from the first and
second centuries B.C.E. Both projects found essentially no counterintuitive
concepts with more than two counterintuitive features (at least in a single nar-
rative context). For the same reason, I offer a related prediction that on-line
inferential potential peaks with a counterintuitiveness score of 1 or 2 and then
drops with increasing counterintuitiveness.
Boyer’s theory and my re-formulation make no distinction in terms of pro-
cessing burden or mnemonic advantage for ideas that are counterintuitive by
virtue of a breach versus counterintuitive by virtue of a transfer. Nevertheless,
such differences might be subjected to empirical investigation.
Conclusion
In sum, for the MCI theory to be fruitful in the study of cognition and culture
and to be rigorously tested and either modified or rejected based on that
testing, more precision and uniformity is needed regarding the scope and pre-
dictions of the theory. I hope that the presented sketch of the theoretical
grounds for the theory and the introduction of a formal coding and quantifi-
cation scheme contribute to this need for precision and uniformity. Using the
presented coding scheme, researchers might be better able to identify public

representations for concepts likely to be privately represented as counterintui-
tive. Further, this scheme could be used as a tool to develop experimental
stimuli that different scholars in the field recognize as relevant to testing pre-
dictions of the theory.
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Appendices
Table One
Intuitive Expectation Set Properties Assumed a
Spatiality Specifiable location in space and time
Physicality Cohesion (move as connected whole)
Contact (physical contact required for launching
or changing direction of movement)
Continuity (movement is continuous in space)
Solidity (cannot pass through or be passed
through by other solid objects)
Tangibility
Visibility
Biology Growth & development
Like begets like
Natural composition
Nourishment needs and processes to satisfy those
needs (if animate, actively seeks to satisfy these
needs)
Parts serve the whole to sustain life
Vulnerability to injury & death (if animate, seeks
to avoid injury & death)
Kind-specific essence
Animacy Goals
“Self-propelled” (including moving in space,
changing appearance, emitting sounds, etc.)
Mentality Reflective & representational mental states (e.g.,
beliefs, desires) and standard relationships
among them and limitations of them (e.g.,
limited perceptual access)
Self-awareness (including emotions and epis-
temic states)
Understand language & communication
Universals Consistency (assumptions apply continuously;
past was like present, future will be like present)
Time (and hence, causation) is unidirectional
a
This summary of intuitive expectation sets and entailed implicit assumptions
may be expanded as more assumptions are discovered.
Table Two
Spatial Solid Living Animates Persons
Entities Objects Things
Expectation Sets:b
(with coding
abbreviation)
Universals (u) YES YES YES YES YES
Spatiality (s) YES YES YES YES YES
Physicality (o) NO YES YES YES YESc
Biology (b) NO NO YES --- ---
Animacy (a) NO NO NO YES YES
Mentality (m) NO NO NO NO YES
b
Table Two depicts expectation sets and their relationship to intuitive ontological
categories. ‘YES’ indicates that an ontological category (listed across the top) intu-
itively assumes a particular expectation set (listed in the left-hand column). ‘NO’
indicates that an ontological category does not allow a particular expectation set.
‘---’ indicates that the ontological category does not intuitively assume or disallow
an expectation set but may intuitively include members that do or do not activate
the expectation set.
c
It may be that minds are intuitively represented as having Spatiality without
Physicality, more akin to an unbounded substance, and are intuitively separable
from physical bodies as suggested by Bloom (2004). If so, a disembodied mind is
a Person and Persons need not automatically activate Physicality. Such a finding
would have implications for the discussion of ghost and God concepts toward the
end of this paper. A disembodied mind in a particular location would not, by
itself, be counterintuitive.
Table Three
Concept (public representation) Coding Counterintuitiveness
Score
A ferret with four legs and fur FERRET 0
A bright green ferret FERRET 0
An invisible ferret FERRETp 1
A ferret that is invisible weekly (FERRETp)u 2
A ferret that is invisible and immortal FERRETp+b 2
A red, leather, dusty, smelly book BOOK 0

with gold lettering on the cover that
has been read by only three people
and serves as a doorstopd
A book that thinks
M
A book that thinks and has babies BOOK 1
M+B
A book that thinks and has babies BOOK 2
M+B
and can pass through solid objects BOOKp 3
A book that thinks and has babies
and can pass through solid objects
M+B
and is intangible BOOKp+p 4
A book that thinks and has babies
and can pass through solid objects
M+B
and is intangible on Thursdays BOOKp+(p)u 5
d
Note that counterintuitive ideas do not necessarily require more words to
describe them than intuitive ones.
Table Four
Simplicity Rule When coding concepts, assume the simplest (i.e., least
counterintuitive) conceptual representation that captures
the object’s properties.
Step 1 Identify the basic level membership. (Revision of
identification may be required by the Simplicity Rule
after considering Steps 3-6.)
Step 2 Identify the ontological category or categories. Candidate
categories include Persons, Animates, Living Things,
Solid Objects, and Spatial Entities. If the item in
question does not obviously fall into one or more of
these five categories (e.g., abstractions, events) do not
proceed. (Revision of categorization may be required by
the Simplicity Rule after considering Steps 3-6.)
Step 3 Code transfers as superscript prefixes with capital letters,
joined by + if necessary.
Step 4 Code breaches as superscript suffixes with lowercase
letters, joined by + if necessary.
Step 5 Code breaches within breaches with parentheses.
Step 6 Quantify counterintuitiveness by totalling the number of
symbolic letters.

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METHOD

Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 20 (2008) 308-338 www.brill.nl/mtsr

Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in

Exploring regular human cognitive capacities and conceptual systems contin-

discourage certain types of ideas is a critical component in understanding what

I. Intuitive Knowledge and Cultural Expression

II. Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts

A particularly productive application of these insights concerning the ability

most prominently by Boyer (Boyer 1994; 2001; 2003:119-24). Boyer has

III. Coding Counterintuitiveness

When discussing how to construct or how to identify and code counterintui-

public representation and private representations. Hence, I will write as if “a

Step One: Identify the Basic Level Membership

chair, not as a recliner, as furniture, or as an artefact (for the sake of coding, I

Step Two: Identify the Ontological Category or Categories

Knizler 2007: 89-96). What I demarcate as Spatiality is often collapsed into

Spatiality, and Universals. If Physicality is not activated, neither is Biology. To

Step Three: Code Transfers as Superscript, Capitalized Preﬁxes, Joined by + if

The Simplicity Principle in conjunction with the non-independence of

Step Four: Code Breaches as Superscript Lowercase Suﬃxes, Joined by + if

In addition to the transfer of a ‘non-native’ property to an object, an object

Step Five: Code Breaches within Breaches Using Parentheses

A ﬁnal way to complicate a concept is to breach a breach. To illustrate: ‘a cow

Step Six: Quantify Counterintuitiveness by Totalling the Number of Symbolic Letters

IV. Illustrative Applications: Ghosts and God

concepts appear to be much more than minimally counterintuitive. Ghosts

Therefore, it is not counterintuitive, as Mentality does not assume Physicality.

may constitute practiced naturalness instead of maturational naturalness.

V. Summary: Clariﬁcations, Predictions, and Conclusion

To summarize, in identifying concepts’ relative counterintuitiveness in any

Clariﬁcations: Counterintuitiveness is not Inferential Potential

predictions, and other inferences in a broad range of personally relevant con-

presented coding scheme, researchers might be better able to identify public

A red, leather, dusty, smelly book BOOK 0

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