Good Samaritanism

Author(s): John Kleinig

Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs , Summer, 1976, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer, 1976), pp.
382-407
Published by: Wiley

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 JOHN KLEINIG Good Samaritanism

The parable of the Good Samaritan was originally told in part-answer

to the question, What shall I do to inherit eternal life?1 But the Sa-
maritan's example has now been absorbed into the general moral
traditions of our culture. Over the past 130 years it has increasingly
been made a legal requirement. In the Russian Criminal Code of I845
and, since then, in almost every continental European country, the
failure to be a Good Samaritan has been declared a criminal offense.2
The glaring exceptions to this trend have been those countries within
the Anglo-American legal tradition. This has been no mere oversight,
but a matter of policy. In the words of C. J. Carpenter:

With purely moral obligations, the law does not deal. For example,
the priest and the Levite who passed by on the other side were not,
it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man
who fell among thieves, which they might and morally ought to have
prevented or relieved. Suppose A, standing close by a railroad, sees a

A longer version of Sections II and III of this paper was read to the Tuesday
Evening Club in New York, and was much improved as a result. In addition, I
have greatly benefited from the comments of Michael Bayles, Joel Feinberg, Harry
Frankfurt, Samuel Shuman, John Taurek, Andrew von Hirsch, Robert Young and
the editors of this journal.
i. Luke 10: 25-37.
2. For surveys, see Note, "The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Survey,"
Columbia Law Review 52 (1952): pp. 63I-647; A. W. Rudzinski, "The Duty to
Rescue: A Comparative Analysis," in The Good Samaritan and the Law, ed. J. M.
Ratcliffe (New York, I966), pp. 91-134; F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "Good and Bad Sa-
maritans: A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure
to Rescue," American Journal of Comparative Law I4 (I966): pp. 630-657.

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 383 Good Samaritanism

two-year old babe on the track and a car approaching. He can easily
rescue the child with entire safety to himself. And the instincts of
humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may perhaps justly
be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster, but he is not liable
in damages for the child's injury or indictable under the statute
for its death.3

Though the position is slowly changing in torts, the criminal law

situation remains substantially the same. "The law does not compel
active benevolence between man and man. It is left to one's conscience
whether he shall be the Good Samaritan or not."4
The refusal of Anglo-American law to proscribe Bad Samaritanism
needs to be distinguished (for the time being) from its growing willing-
ness to allow actions against "Bad Levitism." Certain institutionalized
relationships are recognized in torts as giving rise to special duties to
care for others.5 Doctors, nurses, policemen, firemen, and lifeguards
are committed by their vocational skills to render aid. Even so, such
obligations are less than clear-cut. A doctor who commences but then

3. Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co., 69 N.H. 257; 44 Atl. 809 (I897). For a
partial catalogue of the grisly possibilities of such a policy, see W. L. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn. 1971), chap. 9, #56, and
references.
4. J. B. Ames, "Law and Morals," reprinted in The Good Samaritan and the
Law, p. I9.
5. What follows is to be taken as a very general statement of the present situa-
tion. There is a good deal of variation between states and countries within the
Anglo-American tradition. In England and Australia one may now be held guilty
of misprision of felony-"the concealment of any information about a felony from
the law-enforcement authorities by one who has a reasonable opportunity to make
such disclosure." See the discussion and notes in L. Waller, "Rescue and the
Common Law: England and Australia," in The Good Samaritan and the Law,
pp. 148-152. In Hahn v. Conley (I97I) 45 ALJR 631, C. J. Barwick held that
even in the case of a parent any duty to the child springs out of the particular
situation, parenthood as such not being the source of the duty. This represents an
important development, and reflects the judgment of Lord Atkin in the celebrated
case of Donohue v. Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562: "The rule that you are to love
your neighbor becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbor; and the
lawyer's question, Who is my neighbor? receives a restricted reply. . . . The
answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when
I am directing my mind to acts or omissions which are called in question."
Though a significant advance in torts, this represents only a small step towards
the criminalization of Bad Samaritanism.

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 384 Philosophy & Public Affairs

abandons the treatment of a patient is held liable in tort, but one who
ignores a call for help is not always held liable. Duties to render aid also
devolve upon those bearing certain contractual relationships to each
other. Employers and employees, carriers and passengers, innkeepers
and guests, fall into this category. Where the harm occurs in the con-
text of such a relationship, the employer or carrier or innkeeper is
bound to render assistance. The same is becoming true where there
are institutionally recognized personal relationships, such as those be-
tween husband and wife, parent and child. Here the failure to aid has
been made criminally indictable as well. In R. v. Russell, the defendant
was found guilty of the manslaughter of his wife, who had drowned
(herself?), when he could have easily rendered aid.6 Finally, a duty to
render aid is now upheld in cases where a person has accidentally
caused another's peril. If my car stalls just below the brow of a hill, I
am required to take steps (by moving the car, or signaling to other
travelers) to ensure that it does not constitute a hazard. In addition, a
person may be held criminally liable for failure to stop and assist at the
scene of an accident in which he has been involved, whether or not he
was negligent. Bad Levites, unlike Bad Samaritans, are not complete
strangers to a victim. By virtue of professional, contractual, or other
circumstances, they stand in some kind of antecedently determinable
relationship with those whose welfare is imperiled, even though they
may never have met. But the Samaritan's appearance on the scene or
knowledge of the peril may be entirely fortuitous. That is more or less
how Anglo-American law stands and in this respect it reflects the
tradition of Roman law.
Two obvious questions are raised by the foregoing: (a) whether the
Anglo-American rejection of Good Samaritan legislation is justified;
and (b) whether this rejection is consistent with the proscription of
Bad Levitism. I propose to explore some aspects of these questions in
this paper.

The moral principle of Good Samaritanism can be stated (somewhat

clumsily) as follows.

6. R. v. Russell, [I933] V.L.R. 59.

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 385 Good Samaritanism

One ought, out of sympathy, to help (or at least offer to help)

those whose welfare is endangered without adequate justification.7

Like most general moral requirements, this principle is not absolute,

and circumstances may arise in which its observance would be either
supererogatory or even unjustifiable.
(a) Most obviously, consideration must be given to the costs to each
of the parties. These costs relate to the magnitude and imminence of
damage to the imperiled person and the potential Good Samaritan. In
considering magnitude, two factors are relevant: the importance to be
attached to whatever is damaged, and the irreversibility of the damage.
It is clear that a potential Good Samaritan could not be morally re-
quired to give his life in order to save the little toe of another. Indeed,
the praise or encouragement of such behavior would be evidence of a
severely distorted sense of values. But neither could a potential Good
Samaritan be morally required to risk (and probably lose) his life in
order to save that of another. Heroism is admirable, but supererogatory.
There is an asymmetry in the balancing of costs: the potential Good
Samaritan and the imperiled person are not expected to face equivalent
risks. On the other hand, we do expect a potential Good Samaritan to
inconvenience himself to some extent. The measure would seem to be
this: ceteris paribus, in cases of serious peril, a Good Samaritan ought
to be prepared to set aside the pursuit of his nonwelf are interests, and,
provided the sacrifice is only temporary (that is, relatively easily
reversible), his welfare interests as well. Thus mere inconvenience
and out-of-pocket expenses are not sufficient to excuse a Bad Samari-
tan. The Good Samaritan of the parable does not fight the robbers and
risk his welfare. On the other hand, he does go to considerable trouble
to see that the beaten man is well cared-for.
(b) Consideration must also be given to the costs which accrue to

7. Three brief comments on this formulation are in order. (I ) In specifying

sympathy as the morally appropriate motivation, I have deliberately sided against
Kant. (2) The parenthetical qualification is intended to defuse a possible offi-
ciously paternalistic interpretation of the principle. (3) By "welfare" I understand
(in part) those interests which are basic to the pursuit of our ulterior interests,
whatever those ulterior interests might be (I have endeavored to provide an ex-
plication of the concept of welfare in "Crime and the Concept of Harm," forth-
coming).

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 386 Philosophy & Public Affairs

third parties. The aid given by a Good Samaritan might prevent him
from fulfilling a stronger prior obligation to others. If the money he
gives is necessary for housekeeping, and his young family will suffer
if he gives it away, it may be unjustifiable for him to do so. However,
it would be a rare case in which the Samaritan would be justified in not
doing anything at all. Even if he is not justified in giving direct aid, he
might be required to attempt to procure it. Conversely, the requirement
to be a Good Samaritan is made more stringent if the imperiled person
has obligations (say, to his family) which will not be able to be met if
he is not helped.
(c) In balancing the costs of aid, a potential Good Samaritan may
also take into account the likelihood that his intervention will alleviate
the situation. "There was nothing I could do for her," constitutes a
defense against the charge of Bad Samaritanism. It is not, however, an
impregnable defense. "You don't know what you can do until you have
tried," is in many circumstances a reasonable counter-claim. A Sa-
maritan does not have to be successful to be Good. It may be enough
that he tried.
(d) Finally, some account needs to be taken of the indispensability
of a Good Samaritan. On the side of the imperiled person, if he knows
of his predicament and can easily extricate himself from it, little if
anything is demanded of the Samaritan. More often than not, however,
the imperiled person is ignorant or helpless. But what if there are
several potentially Good Samaritans? They may be standing on the
shore while someone shouts for help. There is a sense in which no one
of them is indispensable. If any one of them helps the drowning man,
the others will generally be redundant. On the other hand, there is a
sense in which each one is indispensable. Unless one of them helps the
man, he will drown. In cases of this kind we might say that each of
them is morally required to help while help still remains to be given.
Thus, if the man drowns without anybody going to his aid, each is as
responsible for his death as the other. None has any ground for dis-
claiming responsibility.

II

Bad Samaritanism is a failure in humanitarian concern. But this is not

sufficient to justify its criminalization. Lack of consideration, apathy,

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 387 Good Samaritanism

failure to lend assistance, unwillingness to extend friendship and

selfishness are also failures of this kind, yet only when they constitute
substantial harms to others does the law take cognizance of them.
That might appear to hold equally for Bad Samaritanism in those
systems which proscribe it. It is not legally required that help be given
in every case of unfortunate circumstance or harm, but only where
there is "great danger" or "grave peril of life, person or health."

History of the Discussion

In attempting to understand the current Anglo-American position with

regard to Good Samaritan legislation, it is instructive to look at some
of the debate which has led to it, since it has not come about without
opposition.
Even in the eighteenth century, before Russia became the first
continental European country to incorporate Good Samaritanism into
its criminal code, there was some effort made to persuade the legisla-
tures of England and the United States of the propriety of requiring
Good Samaritanism. Bentham, for example, in his Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, asked the question: "In cases
where the person is in danger, why should it not be.made the duty of
every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without
prejudicing himself, as well as abstain from bringing it on him?"8
Undoubtedly, he felt that no satisfactory answer could be given:

A woman's head-dress catches fire, water is at hand: a man, instead

of assisting to quench the fire, looks on, and laughs at it. A drunken
man, falling with his face downwards into a puddle, is in danger of
suffocation: lifting his head a little to one side would save him:
another man sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of gunpowder lies
scattered about a room: a man is going into it with a lighted candle:
another, knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is there
that in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?

Later developments were to wipe the rhetorical confidence from Ben-

tham's question. He does not make it clear why the law should interfere
in such cases, though his earlier discussion of the ability of negative

8. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed.

J. H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (London, 1970), p. 293.

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388 Philosophy & Public Affairs

acts to be "productive of material consequences" probably provides the

clue. Whatever it was, he felt strongly enough about it to include Good
Samaritanism in his Specimen of a Penal Code:

Every man is bound to assist those who have need of assistance, if

he can do it without exposing himself to sensible inconvenience.
This obligation is stronger, in proportion as the danger is the greater
for the one, and the trouble of preserving him the less for the other.9

Mill, who on matters of social policy remained close to Bentham, was

more explicit about the rationale for Good Samaritan legislation. Soon
after enunciating his harm principle in On Liberty, Mill points out that
there are also "many positive acts for the benefit of others" which a
person may "rightly be compelled to perform." Among these he includes

certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow

creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-
usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he
may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person
may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction,
and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury.10

On Mill's view, it is our duty to render aid because, by not doing so, we
harm another.
The same view is taken by Bentham's American disciple, Edward
Livingston. In his (draft) Code of Crimes and Punishments, certain
cases of Bad Samaritanism in which death occurred were proscribed as
"homicides by omission."'" If I see a blind man walking towards a
precipice and do not warn him; if I see someone about to drink from a
glass which I know to contain poison and make no attempt to prevent
him; if I leave an infant or other helpless person in a forest on a
winter's night; if I know that an infant is on a busy highway, and do
not do anything about it; and if in any of these cases death results,
though I could have intervened "without personal danger or pecuniary
loss," I am guilty of homicide by omission.

9. Bentham, Specimen of a Penal Code, in Works, ed. J. Bowring (Edinburgh,

I843), vol. I, p. I64.
io. J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism, . . ., ed. M. Warnock (London,
I962), pp. 136-137.
ii. E. Livingston, Code of Crime and Punishments, in Complete Works (New
York: National Prison Association of U.S.A., I873), vol. 2, pp. 126-127.

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 389 Good Samaritanism

The most influential reaction came from Lord Macaulay et al. In

their Notes on the Indian Penal Code, a Code heavily indebted to
Livingston, Macaulay criticized the proposal of an offense of homicide
by omission. His criticism is of the practicability of such legislation,
though towards the end of his discussion he seems, somewhat incon-
sistently, to hint at a theoretical objection. For a start, Macaulay makes
no attempt to deny that harm may be caused by omissions:

When acts are made punishable on the ground that those acts pro-
duce, or are intended to produce, or are known to be likely to
produce, certain evil effects, to what extent ought omissions which
produce, which are intended to produce, or which are known to be
likely to produce, the same evil effects to be made punishable?12

The problem as Macaulay sees it is to draw the line between harm-

producing omissions which ought to be legally proscribed, and those
which ought not. He has no doubt that there are cases of each, even
where the imperiled person dies. If a gaoler omits to supply a prisoner
with food; if an official omits to warn travelers that the river is too high
to ford; if the owner of a dog which is attacking someone omits to call
it off; and death results, the person who failed to act is guilty of mur-
der. But, if a man omits to give alms to a starving beggar; if a surgeon
refuses to go from Calcutta to Meerut to perform a life-saving opera-
tion; if one traveler omits to warn others that the river is too high to
ford; if a passer-by omits to call off the attacking dog; and death re-
sults, the person who failed to act is not guilty of murder. Macaulay
remained, as well he might have, somewhat uneasy about the division
of cases: "We are sensible that in some of the cases which we have put,
our rule may appear too lenient; but we do not think it can be made
more severe without disturbing the whole order of society."
He is even prepared to grant that a rich man who lets a beggar die
at his feet is morally worse than some for whom severe punishment
was prescribed. "But we are unable to see where, if we make such a
man legally punishable, we can draw the line." How rich is rich enough,
and how much can be required? If it takes a thousand rupees to save
the beggar's life, should the rich man be required to provide it? If not,

12. Lord (T.B.) Macaulay et al., Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in Works, ed.
Lady Trevelyan (London, I879), vol. 7. The quotations are taken from Note
(M), pp. 493-497.

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390 Philosophy & Public Affairs

where is the line to be drawn? And if the potential Good Samaritan is

not a rich man, how much should he be required to give? Macaulay
therefore proposes that omissions which cause or threaten harm be
punishable only where they are, "on other grounds, illegal." In other
words, only where there are already existing legal duties to aid should
the failure to aid be indictable!
The bulk of Macaulay's argument seems to be directed to the im-
practicability of Good Samaritan legislation. But in his final remarks
new considerations are smuggled in:

It is, indeed, most highly desirable that men should not merely
abstain from doing harm to their neighbours, but should render
active services to their neighbours. In general, however, the penal
law must content itself with keeping men from doing positive harm,
and must leave to public opinion, and to the teachers of morality
and religion, the office of furnishing men with motives for doing
positive good. It is evident that to attempt to punish men by law
for not rendering to others all the services which it is their duty to
render others would be preposterous. We must grant impunity to
the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality
would pronounce reprehensible, and must content ourselves with
punishing such omissions only when they are distinguished from
the rest by some circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly
fit objects of penal legislation.

There is a suggestion here, contrary to earlier statements, that Bad

Samaritanism does not constitute the causing of harm, but only the
withholding of a positive good. And therefore, since the function of law
is to prevent harm and not to enforce benevolence, it would be im-
proper for the law to require Good Samaritanism.13 The point was put
with force and sophistication by Stephen, whose support firmly estab-
lished it in English legal opinion:

The idea of killing by an omission implies, in the first place, the

presence of an opportunity of doing the act the omission of which
causes death. It would be extravagant to say that a man who having

13. In torts this has frequently been couched in terms of the notorious distinc-
tion between misfeasance and nonfeasance.

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 391 Good Samaritanism

food in London omits to give it to a person starving to death in

China has killed the man in China by omitting to feed him; but it
would be natural to say that a nurse who being supplied with food
for a sick person under her care omits to give it, and thereby causes
the sick person's death, has killed that person. Whether a person,
who being able to save the life of another without inconvenience or
risk refuses to do so, even in order that he may die, can be said to
have killed him is a question of words, and also a question of degree.
A man who caused another to be drowned by refusing to hold out his
hand to save him probably would in common language be said to
have killed him, and many similar cases might be put, but the limit
of responsibility is soon reached. It would hardly be said that a rich
man who allowed a poor man to die rather than give, say ?5, which
the rich man would not miss, in order to save his life, had killed him,
and though it might be cowardly not to run some degree of risk for
the purpose of saving the life of another, the omission to do it could
hardly be described as homicide. A number of people who stand
around a shallow pond in which a child is drowning, and let it drown
without taking the trouble to ascertain the depth of the pond, are
no doubt, shameful cowards, but they can hardly be said to have
killed the child.14

Several arguments are embedded in this debate, but undoubtedly the

most important concerns the causal relevance of not rendering aid.
This is the issue upon which I wish to concentrate attention.

III

I shall assume that, within a given causal matrix, causally relevant

conditions are to be distinguished as, minimally, those which, were
they not to have occurred, would have meant the nonoccurrence of the
effect.15

14. J. F. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law in England (London, I883),

vol. 3, pp. 9-10.
I5. This account will need supplementation to distinguish causal conditions
from logical and other noncausal conditions, and to accommodate the problems
generated by causal overdetermination. On this, see L. Loeb, "Causal Theories and
Causal Overdetermination," Journal of Philosophy 7I (5 September I974):
525-544-

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392 Philosophy & Public Affairs

In statements of the form "X was the cause of Y," X normally refers
to a single or select number of the causal conditions of Y's occurrence.
Which one we select normally depends on whether our interest is in
explaining or regulating Y or events similar to Y. In both explanatory
and regulatory contexts, the adequacy of a causal citation,16 that is,
the denomination of some causally relevant factor as the cause, is
in part person- or role-relative. What will satisfy one person may not
satisfy another, since people confront causal complexes with different
expectations, different quantities of information, and different pur-
poses. However, in each case what is citable as the cause is limited by
the set of causal conditions which obtain in the situation.
Explanatory and regulatory contexts are not the only ones in which
causal questions arise. They arise also where the apportioning of
moral (or legal) responsibility, if any, is at issue. In this context,
generally condemnatory, a causal citation may serve to indicate that
no one is to be held responsible, or it may take us a step towards hold-
ing someone responsible. If the latter, there will need to be an addi-
tional judgment to the effect that X was at fault in causing Y. The
causal citation itself is straightforwardly explanatory or regulatory.
However, causal citations are not necessary for apportioning responsi-
bility. It is necessary only that conduct be a causal factor and faulty.17
If, for example, I leave a loaded pistol lying around and my young
child picks it up and shoots someone with it, some, perhaps all, of the
blame will fall on me, even though I was not the cause of the injury.
Discussions of the causal relevance of not rendering aid are fre-
quently vitiated by the failure to differentiate different kinds of non-
doing. Stroud, for example, claims that "an omission is not like an act,
a real event, but is merely an artificial conception consisting of the
negation of a particular act."18 If Stroud is right, then omitting to
render aid could not be a causal factor in someone's distress. However,
this position cannot be sustained.
First of all, there is a confusion between nondoing simpliciter and
active nondoing. At any point of time there are innumerable things

i6. The phrase is Joel Feinberg's.

17. In the case of tortious responsibility, not even that may be necessary.
I8. A. Stroud, Mens Rea: or, Imputability under the Law of England (London,
1914), p. 4.

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 393 Good Samaritanism

which I can be said not to do simpliciter. At the present moment, for

example, I am not walking a tightrope in Moscow or ringbarking a
tree. However, though truly said of me, to assert that I am not doing
these things is somewhat misleading, since it suggests that my not
doing them is something I have failed, omitted or neglected to do. It
is the latter which form part of the class of active nondoings. Failures,
omissions and neglects can be said to be things that are done. They
are acts, attributable to particular agents, and not mere act-descrip-
tions.
Active nondoings, as acts (albeit negative) can figure in causal
explanations. The pharmacist who fails to check his labels does some-
thing which, given someone's death, might be cited as its cause. My
omitting to turn off the tap is a candidate for citation if the house
floods. Likewise my withholding of aid may be the difference between
someone's life and death. If F is floundering in the water, and I can
see and help him, but do nothing, my withholding of aid is a causal
factor in his drowning.
However, this last case does raise certain problems. It is claimed
that even though my failure to help F is a causal condition of his death,
it cannot be said to cause it. F would have survived if I had thrown
him the lifebuoy, but it was not my failure that killed him. I do not
want to dispute these claims. What I would dispute is the suggestion
sometimes made that because my failure to render aid is not citable as
the cause of F's death, it is morally or causally irrelevant to it. That
is, I dispute the view that my act constituted only the withholding of a
benefit. On the contrary, I have already indicated that it is necessary
only that some act be a causal factor in another's harmful situation
for it to be eligible as a bearer of responsibility for it. The failure to
render aid is unlikely to be cited as the cause of someone's harm, not
because it is an omission, but because it allows an already operative
peril (or harm) to continue. It presupposes peril (at least), and we
are more likely to be interested in the factor which initiated the peril
when we seek its cause. Citing the failure to render aid does not illumi-
nate the coming into being of that peril, and is uneconomical as a way
of regulating it ("prevention is better than cure"). Where the failure
to aid is a causal condition of harm, it is harm-exacerbating rather
than harm-initiating. It is harm-exacerbating, because in a situation

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394 Philosophy & Public Affairs

in which aid to F was readily available, my not rendering it has effec-

tively made F worse off. Even if the gravity of F's situation is not in-
creased, I have prolonged it.
But there is another reason why the failure to render aid is unlikely
to be cited as the cause. The description of human acts is not an en-
tirely empirical matter, but reflects certain normative considerations.
There is a normative distinction between "causing harm" and "failing
to render aid," and it is not fortuitous that the failure to render aid is
not cited as the cause of harm. There are normative considerations
which make it conceptually unusual to do so. Were we to allow that
"failing to render aid" could be as readily cited as the cause of some-
one's damaged welfare, then we would find ourselves committed to
treating them equally seriously. That might be so in particular cases.
But in general we wish to view causing harm as less excusable than
failing to render aid. Indeed, where something like failure to render aid
is the most illuminating causal factor in someone's damaged welfare,
we may be tempted to describe what is done not as the failure to
render aid but as the causing of harm. Something like this seems to
have been behind the decision in R. v. Russell to convict the defendant
of manslaughter. The suggestion there was that Russell's wife, in
jumping into the water, found herself in peril because the attention
from Russell that she had anticipated (and, presumably, had reason to
anticipate) was not forthcoming. Russell's unresponsiveness turned a
striking demand for attention into a perilous situation.
What I am claiming is that although omissions, failures, neglects,
and so on may be cited as the cause of some harm, where the causal
factor is the failure to render aid we have characterized it in such a
way that it is to be normatively differentiated from the cause of harm.
The claim about a normative differentiation between "causing
harm" and "failing to render aid" needs some justification in this in-
stance. In traditional terms we express it by saying that our obligation
not to cause harm is more stringent than our obligation to render aid.
Though I find this intuitively acceptable, it has been challenged by a
number of recent writers.19 I shall therefore suggest two reasons why I
believe this intuition to be correct.

ig. See M. Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy & Public Affairs 2,
no. i (Fall 1972): 58-60; J. J. Thomson, "Rights and Deaths," Philosophy &

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 395 Good Samaritanism

The stringency of moral requirements seems to depend on a variety

of factors which need to be weighed against each other. I mention
just three. The most obvious one is the magnitude of the harm or
damage proscribed by the requirement. Thus we would see the moral
requirement that we refrain from stealing as in general less stringent
than the moral requirement that we refrain from killing; and this part-
ly because the resultant harms differ in magnitude. A second factor
affecting stringency concerns the imminence or remoteness of a partic-
ular harm to the proscribed conduct. Thus the moral requirement that
we exercise care is in general less stringent than the moral require-
ment that we refrain from willful damage: though if the harm made
imminent by carelessness is considerably more serious than the harm
involved in willful damage, a careless act may be more reprehensible.
But given parity in other respects, the imminence of a particular harm
will make a difference. This is reflected in our practice of viewing
manslaughter as a less serious offense than murder. The third factor
concerns the costs of carrying out the requirement. Given parity in
other respects, there is a more stringent requirement that we refrain
from causing harm and the requirement that we render aid.20
The second and third of these factors seem to me to be relevant to
the different stringencies attaching to the requirement that we refrain
from causing harm and the requirement that we render aid.20
In general, where harms of equivalent magnitude are in view, the
harm is less likely to eventuate if aid is not given. There is generally
a greater chance of a certain harm occurring if we set out to cause it
than if we fail to intervene in a situation in which it is likely. Setting
out to cause harm usually brings more of the situation under our con-

Public Affairs 2, no. 2 (Winter 1973): 158-159; J. Harris, "The Survival Lottery,"
Philosophy 50 (January I975): 8I-87.
20. It needs to be remembered that we are here considering the relative strin-
gencies of general moral requirements, and not the wickedness (or otherwise) of
individuals in respect of particular cases. I have no doubt that in particular cases,
"causing harm" may be as reprehensible as "failing to render aid." Moreover, the
distinction we are considering is not reducible to that between positive and
negative acts. I may cause harm by omission as well as commission. What we are
considering is the distinction between "causing harm" (whether by some positive
or negative act) and a particular class of negative acts, which may be character-
ized as "failing to render aid."

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396 Philosophy & Public Affairs

trol than simply standing to one side when harm is imminent. We

cannot normally "make sure" of a certain harmful outcome simply by
allowing a perilous situation to take its course. Moreover, stated as a
distinction between "causing harm" and "failing to render aid," the harm
could not be more likely. I cannot kill F without his dying, but my
failure to render aid may not be followed by his death. Someone else
may intervene to save him. If he dies, it will be true that my failure to
render aid was a causal factor in his death. But this does not gainsay
the fact that in cases of failure to render aid the harm is less immi-
nent. And partly because this is so, the requirement is less stringent.
Even more important is the third factor. There are two strands to the
assessment of costs. First of all, the requirement that we refrain from
causing harm to others is not impossible of fulfillment, and where the
harm is of considerable magnitude it generally requires little effort to
fulfill it. No great personal resources are normally required to refrain
from killing others. However, immeasurably more effort would be
required were the requirement that we render aid accorded equal
stringency. We are constantly surrounded by need, great need at that,
and though the cost in any particular case might not be very great, it
would become prohibitive were the same cost required in every rele-
vantly similar case. If I am walking down a Bombay street, the require-
ment that I render aid may be fulfilled fairly easily if there is only one
beggar. But if there are 250, then what is easy for one becomes impos-
sible if extended to all. And so it is generally. Even though our aid in
a particular case might mean the difference between life and death, if
it is as stringently required in all relevantly similar cases then we will
require of ourselves an impossible moral herculeanism. But secondly,
if we view the general requirement to render aid as stringently as we
view the requirement not to cause harm, we commit ourselves not
merely to moral herculeanism, but also to the destruction of our-
selves as autonomous agents. We become not the initiators of projects
and life-styles, but the creatures of circumstance. If my failure to aid
the starving in Bombay is to be put on a par with my killing them (or
almost on a par, if we take into account the imminence condition),
then almost nothing I do with my life can take precedence over the
requirement that I render aid. Given the stringency of the requirement
not to kill, nearly all I have and hold dear will need to be sacrificed.
Now I do not think this is any reason for denying that we are moral-

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 397 Good Samaritanism

ly required to render aid; nor do I think that we should place an

absolute value on autonomy. Indeed, I should want to claim that we
generally place too much weight on it-that we are far too unresponsive
to the needs of others, and that if we have developed life-styles which
leave little room for rendering aid to others (when we could), we
stand condemned. Nevertheless, it remains true that if we are to be
productively engaged in other valuable pursuits, we cannot be expected
to make them conditional upon the prior satisfaction of the welfare
interests of others. What is required is that our hierarchy of interests
reflect the worth of our projects and not simply their self-regarding
value. As a foil to the parable of the Good Samaritan, we can con-
trast the alleged "wastefulness" of Mary's anointing of Jesus' feet
with the precious ointment. To Judas' complaint that it ought to have
been sold, and the proceeds given to the poor, Jesus replies: "Let her
alone, let her keep it for the day of my burial. The poor you always
have with you, but you do not always have me.21 On this particular
occasion, Mary's act, wasteful as it might have seemed on some
utilitarian calculation of values, displays a moral depth and integrity
which outweighs the alternative. Jesus' reflection that the poor are al-
ways with us was not a sign of unconcern, but a recognition that that
which we initiate sometimes has a value which may override even the
requirement that we alleviate the dire needs of others.
I have argued that there is nothing to prevent active nondoings from
being causal conditions. Since opponents of Good Samaritan legislation
are generally willing to allow that the nondoing involved in Bad
Samaritan acts may be characterized as omission, it is instructive to
consider why it should be so regarded. What is it about the rendering of
aid that makes it a (moral) requirement, and thus failure to render it
an omission? Surely it is because without aid the harm threatened or
already suffered is exacerbated, when it need not have been. In other
words, it is precisely because of the causal character of not rendering
aid that not rendering it constitutes an omission. Thus, that which
constitutes not rendering aid an omission also undermines the stand-
ard objection to its legal proscription. Were it never possible to al-
leviate harm once it had been initiated, there would be no require-
ment to render aid. We might feel sorry for those who suffer, and
breathe a sigh of relief that we are not suffering. But that is all.
21. John 12:3-7; cf. Matt. 26:6-13; Mark 14:3-9.

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398 Philosophy & Public Affairs

At the heart of the Good Samaritan principle lies the same general
consideration which constitutes the badness of assault, murder, rape,
and maltreatment-namely harm. And it is for this reason that Bad
Samaritanism, no less than assault and murder, should come within
the purview of criminal law. We shall now consider whether additional
considerations differentiate it sufficiently from these other offenses.

IV

The inconsistency of the present legal situation can be seen by com-

paring the following four sketch-cases:

(ii) A father purposely omits to feed his child, which dies. Here
we would cite starvation or the father's willful neglect as the
cause of the child's death, depending on the nature of the ex-
planation we are looking for. The father's neglect manifests
itself in the child's starvation. His omission may be said to be
harm-causing.
(2) A child catches pneumonia. The father knows this, but care-
lessly neglects to do anything about it, and the child dies. What
has caused the child's death? Pneumonia is the obvious candi-
date. However, a good deal of responsibility for the death would
fall on the child's father. We may even go so far as to say that
he is to blame for its death. Nevertheless, the father's neglect
functions more as a causal factor than as the cause. It is harm-
exacerbating rather than harm-initiating.
(3) A child catches pneumonia. The child's father takes it to the
doctor, who refuses to see it or find out what is wrong; and
the child dies. Again, we would cite pneumonia as the cause
of the child's death. But a fair measure of blame would attach
to the doctor. As a professional healer, we may feel that he had
some special responsibility to render aid. His refusal is a causal
factor in the child's death, since (we presume), had he acted,
the child would not have died.
(4) A stranger comes across a lightly-clad child, huddled in the
snow. He does nothing, and the child subsequently catches
pneumonia and dies. The cause of the child's death is pneu-
monia, yet the stranger's failure to act is a causal factor. Had
he taken the child in or procured help for it, it would not have

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399 Good Samaritanism

caught pneumonia. Perhaps we do not go so far as to blame him

for the child's death. Nevertheless, in leaving it, he was at fault.

Whatever distinctions exist between these four cases (depending

in part on how we fill in the details), they do not include that in some
the omission has causal relevance, but in others not. In each case, the
omission is a causal factor in the death of the child. That is to say,
given those circumstances, had the blameworthy person not omitted
to act, the child would probably have lived. This is not to deny that the
cases may differ in their gravity. If we utilize the traditional legal
classifications, (i) would probably be a case of murder, (2) a case
of manslaughter, and (3) a case of negligent homicide. In Anglo-
American criminal law, there is no provision for case (4), which is
an example of Bad Samaritanism. Yet there is no obvious reason why
we should not think that the stranger has acted negligently or reckless-
ly, and be charged accordingly. If there is a relevant difference, it is
that in cases (i), (2), and (3) responsibility has been assumed,
whereas in (4) it is thrust upon the unsuspecting stranger. A father,
in choosing to have and keep his child, commits himself thereby to
its support. A doctor, in choosing to enter the medical profession, as-
sumes some measure of responsibility for the sick who are brought to
him. However, we should not make too much of this difference. The
special responsibilities only accentuate a responsibility they already
have to prevent harm or its exacerbation.
Even where the failure to render aid is not followed by any actual
prolongation or intensification of peril, criminalization would seem to
be justifiable. If, for example, ten yards behind the stranger, there is
another person who stops and takes the child in, no additional damage
to the child has occurred as a result of the first person's omission.
However, if attempted crimes are properly subject to punishment, then
omissions which could have but did not become harm-exacerbating
also ought to be subject to punishment. Apart from the threat of harm
there is a criminatory harm involved even if the imperiled person is
not its victim. It is the harm of eroding those fundamental social
relations on which our individual welfare ultimately depends.22

22. I have discussed this in more detail in "Crime and the Concept of Harm."
Cf. Lawrence C. Becker, "Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes,"
Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, no. 3 (Spring 1974): 262-294.

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400 Philosophy & Public Affairs

To tie some of the foregoing points together, and to consider more

generally the question of Good Samaritan legislation, I turn finally to
some of the arguments deployed against the introduction of such
legislation.
(i) In the judgment of C. J. Carpenter and in Macaulay's summing
up, there is an argument which runs as follows. It is not the law's
province to "enforce" all moral requirements. In particular, it is not
the function of law to require that people act benevolently toward
each other. The proper scope of law is restricted to those acts which
cause or threaten harm to others. The moral requirement to be a Good
Samaritan falls into the category of precepts of benevolence. Therefore
Good Samaritanism ought not to be required.
The whole argument turns on the claim that Good Samaritanism
constitutes the expression of benevolence, and thus falls outside the
scope of criminal law. That Good Samaritanism is an expression of
benevolence is I think correct (unless benevolence is thought of as, by
definition, supererogatory). But it does not follow from this that the
failure to be benevolent falls outside the scope of criminal law. We
need to distinguish two kinds of failures to be benevolent. In the first
kind, the final result is simply that someone fails to benefit. He is not
made worse off, but neither is he any better off. In the second kind,
the final result is an impairment of welfare interests. Those who em-
ploy argument (i) seem to think that all failures to be benevolent are
of the first kind. But this is not so, particularly where someone's wel-
fare depends on the potential benefactor. That is the case in Bad
Samaritanism. The Bad Samaritan not only fails to be benevolent, but
his failure is a causal factor in the total harm which befalls another.
(ii) Mill's suggestion that by failing to save someone's life, or by
failing to interpose to protect the helpless against being ill-used, "we
cause evil to them," may leave us feeling a bit uneasy. And rightly so,
according to Stephen. The reason may be put as follows: Only where
we cause harm to others is there a case for legal interference. It is
absurd to say that the Bad Samaritan causes the death of the person
whose life he fails to save. Therefore Bad Samaritanism ought not to
be legally proscribed.
I have agreed that it is improper to say that the Bad Samaritan
causes, say, the death of the person he neglects to rescue. But just how

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 40I Good Samaritanism

much mileage can we get from this? His act is still a causal factor in
that person's death. And even if it is for normative reasons that his
failure to aid cannot be characterized as the cause of death, the norma-
tive difference is not so great as to make criminalization appropriate
in the one case but never in the other. Rather than adhere strictly to
the view that legal intervention is justifiable only where what we do
can be said to "cause harm" to others-a view which cannot properly
account for our punishment of attempts-we should rephrase the first
premise of argument (ii) as: where what we do is a causal factor in
the harm suffered by another, there is a case for legal interference.
(iii) As we saw earlier, Macaulay's general position is that omis-
sions, no less than commissions, can cause harm to others. Neverthe-
less, he wishes to restrict legal interference with harmful omissions
to those cases in which they constitute a breach of some legal duty.
In this remarkable claim, Macaulay seems to be doing little more than
reiterating the important legal doctrine of nulla poena sine lege, here
interpreted as: only illegal omissions are punishable by law. But the
prior and pressing question is: Which omissions should be made
illegal, and on what basis?
If Macaulay's criterion is so vacuous, why has it been so influential
in giving shape to the Anglo-American tradition on criminal omis-
sions? I think the answer is to be found largely in the fear which
Macaulay and others have felt concerning the possible consequences
of Good Samaritan legislation. Even though they approve of Good Sa-
maritanism, they think that enforcing it would do immeasurable social
damage (to be considered later). On the other hand, no interference at
all with "harmful" omissions seems to them equally obnoxious. There-
fore some middle path has to be found.

It is difficult to say whether a penal code which should put no omis-

sions on the same footing with acts, or a penal code which should
put all omissions on the same footing with acts, would produce con-
sequences more absurd or revolting. There is no country in which
either of these principles is adopted. Indeed, it is hard to conceive
how, if either were adopted, society could be held together. It is
plain, therefore, that a middle course must be taken....

23. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, p. 494.

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 402 Philosophy & Public Affairs

For Macaulay, the existing law seems to provide a convenient way

out. As it stands, it incorporates a number of provisions concerning
certain established relationships in which one of the parties is in some
measure dependent on the other-relationships such as those between
parent and child, husband and wife, employer and employee, doctor
and patient, warder and prisoner, and so on. In such relationships,
certain positive duties are imposed on the former party for the pro-
tection of the latter. Omitting to perform them is punishable. This,
Macaulay thinks, provides a convenient, even if not wholly satisfac-
tory, limitation on criminal omissions. It is even lent a modicum of
moral attractiveness by the fact that the preexisting special relation-
ships which hold in such cases may aggravate the reprehensibility of
omissions. They therefore frequently seem to be morally distinguish-
able from acts of Bad Samaritanism. But whatever may be said for
the convenience of Macaulay's position, its allowance for justifiable
legal interference with omissions is much too limited. The Bad Samari-
tan, no less than the Bad Levite, acts in a way that is causally relevant
to another's peril. Perhaps the Bad Levite should be punished more
severely; nevertheless, it seems perverse that the Bad Samaritan should
not be punished at all.
(iv) What are the consequences of Good Samaritan legislation so
feared by Macaulay and other opponents? On the surface it looks like
a problem of legal draftsmanship. Such are the differences between
men and circumstances that no workable formula for specifying those
occasions on which a Samaritan ought to be legally required to render
aid can be produced-therefore it is safer to punish only Bad Levites.
Livingston's criterion, that aid ought to be mandatory when it can be
given "without personal danger or pecuniary loss," is considered to be
open to serious objection. The surgeon summoned from Calcutta to
Meerut might profit financially, and the trip might present no greater
dangers than staying in Bengal, but it might still be extremely incon-
venient for him: "He is about to proceed to Europe immediately, or he
expects some members of his family by the next ship, and wishes to
be at the presidency to receive them." If he refuses to go, he is no
"murderer," and a good sight better than another who, "enjoying ample
wealth, should refuse to disburse an anna to save the life of another."
On Livingston's criterion, the latter but not the former should go free.

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 403 Good Samaritanism

About the best that could be said for this argument is that it shows
the inadequacy of Livingston's criterion. But it does not do much more.
It does nothing to show that if Good Samaritan legislation is intro-
duced, unreasonable sacrifices of welfare and interests will be de-
manded of Samaritans. As is the case with Good Samaritan provisions
in those countries that already have them, the Samaritan will be re-
quired only to take reasonable steps to give or procure aid for the
imperiled person. Judgments of reasonableness are not impossible of
determination, and are the bread and butter of the courts. Good
Samaritan legislation would be no exception in this respect. More-
over, if Good Samaritan laws are restricted to cases in which someone
is in grave danger, the argument that the courts are already over-
burdened with cases will count more readily against certain other
existing legislation than Good Samaritan legislation.
(v) However, I think another, rather different fear underlies
Macaulay's opposition to Good Samaritan legislation. Made explicit by
later writers,24 it is basically the fear that Good Samaritan legislation
will substantially diminish freedom. In a culture steeped in individual-
ism, nothing produces more hysteria than measures which encroach
on individual liberty. "You owe me nothing; I owe you nothing. You
stay out of my way, and I'll stay out of yours." That is an extreme
expression, but it constitutes an important thread within the Anglo-
American sociomoral fabric. And Good Samaritan legislation threatens
to snap it. Critics of such legislation are quick to point out that in
France, Good Samaritan legislation was first introduced during the
Vichy regime, and in Germany under Nazism. Others see Good Samari-
tanism as emanating not from the Right but from the Left. Commu-
nist-bloc countries have well-developed Good Samaritan legislation,
and this is sometimes seen as a natural outworking of socialism.
Bohlen, who early in the century, argued that Bad Samaritanism
should be made a tort, saw hope for this "more humane" stance in
the "tendency of modern judicial decision towards collectivism." Others
have sneeringly referred to it as "an exalted form of socialism."
There is more sound than good sense in some of these arguments.
However Good Samaritan legislation came to be introduced in France
and Germany, it has been retained by subsequent governments with-

24. See Columbia Law Review 52 (1952): 64I-642 and references.

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404 Philosophy & Public Affairs

out inconsistency. The seed is not to be reduced to the soil in which it

grew. The same goes for Good Samaritan legislation in Communist
countries. There is an additional confusion here. The immediate goal
of Good Samaritan legislation is the relief of another. It may or may
not also protect "the Soviet social and state system." Such argumenta-
tion by contamination is a product of ideological hysteria.
The freedom to pursue one's interests is not, as Mill and Bentham
clearly saw, unlimited. Where the pursuit of one's interests is a causal
factor in another's harm, or threatens additional harm, as in Bad
Samaritanism, we have the important beginnings of a case for justifi-
able state interference.
(vi) Stephen thinks it unreasonable to hold responsible a whole
crowd of Bad Samaritans. If a dozen people know that someone is
drowning and any one of them could easily render aid and none of
them does, it is absurd, he thinks, to hold all of them liable. Ergo, Bad
Samaritanism ought not to be made an offense.
But why should we think it absurd to hold each of them liable? So
long as nobody else renders aid, each is a causal factor in the person's
continuing peril. Not until one of them competently aids the drowning
person are the others relieved of their responsibility to help. Should it
be objected that it will often be difficult if not impossible to track down
all the Bad Samaritans, it can be replied that this is no reason why
those who can be traced should not be punished. The problem is not
substantially different to that encountered in the cases of rioting, illegal
mass demonstrations or gangland activities. Where only some of the
offenders can be apprehended, their punishment does not constitute
decimation (which is a matter of deliberate policy or choice).
(vii) Another practical problem can be posed as follows. Omis-
sions, unlike positive actions, are characterized by nondoing. They
thus pose special difficulties with respect to detection. How are we to
tell whether somebody who does not render aid is a Bad Samaritan
or just (nonculpably) ignorant of the other's perilous situation? In
view of this, it is sometimes claimed that unless we restrict ourselves
to something like the Macaulayan doctrine, we shall find prosecutions
faced with insuperable problems of evidence.
There is a problem here, but it is a problem for particular cases, not
for Bad Samaritan acts in general. In many cases it will not be diffi-

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 405 Good Samaritanism

cult for a prosecution to show that there is every reason to believe

that the defendant was aware of the plight of the imperiled person:
for example, he was traveling along the road on which the injured
person was lying or he was told of the peril. If ignorantia facti can be
shown (as indeed the law allows), so too can scientia facti.
(viii) Those who believe Good Samaritan legislation to be an un-
warranted encroachment on freedom frequently think that it also en-
courages gross intrusion into private affairs. If people believe that
failure to render aid will make them liable to punishment, they will
intervene where they ought not and otherwise might not. "There
might be no end of officious meddling in other homes because of a
disagreement between parents and neighbors as to what children
should eat."25
While this sort of meddling is theoretically possible, there is no evi-
dence that it actually occurs in countries which have Good Samaritan
legislation, or that it results from the threat of legal sanctions. Good
Samaritan laws are sufficiently precise to minimize meddling. Aid is
required only in cases of grave peril or serious danger; laws can easily
be formulated so as to make the legitimacy of the aid conditional upon
the likelihood of its being welcomed by the imperiled person; and in
some cases, such as those involving the relations between parents and
children, potential Samaritans may be advised to procure aid through
social welfare agencies rather than take it upon themselves to inter-
vene (except in emergency situations).
(ix) Good Samaritan legislation, it is sometimes said, constitutes
an attempt to enforce morality. This is then subjected to various
criticisms. According to some, it is not the proper function of law to
enforce morality. Only acts which are harmful fall within its legiti-
mate purview. According to others, it is impossible to enforce Good
Samaritanism, since law cannot guarantee the motivation which
makes Good Samaritanism morally praiseworthy. It is argued further,
that legislating Good Samaritanism de-moralizes it, since people are
motivated to help out of fear of the legal consequences if they do not,
rather than out of sympathetic concern.
There is, first of all, a false contrast between "the prevention of

25. R. M. Perkins, "Negative Acts in Criminal Law," Iowa Law Review 22

(1937): 670.

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406 Philosophy & Public Affairs

harm" and "the enforcement of morality" as functions of criminal law.

No doubt there are serious objections to the enforcement of morality
as such, particularly when it is simply the prevailing morality, but
there can be no objection to the contemplated interference with acts
whose immorality largely consists in their harm-causing or harm-
threatening character. And since Bad Samaritanism is a causal factor
in the continuation or aggravation of harm to others, it falls into the
category of acts which are rightly proscribed by law.
It can also be accepted that the threat of legal sanctions is not great-
ly conducive to morally praiseworthy motivation (though it could pos-
sibly have the effect of making people act more reflectively than
otherwise). However, criminal law is not meant for the moral, but for
those who lack sufficient moral motivation. It is not a substitute for
morality, but a safeguard when the bonds of social morality threaten
to break. There is therefore no good reason for thinking that the legal
requirement of Good Samaritanism will cause those who would nor-
mally have been Good Samaritans to continue to be so only or primarily
because it is legally required of them.
(x) It is sometimes suggested that Good Samaritan legislation is
ineffective in those countries where it is enforced, and therefore ought
not to be introduced into those countries which do not have it.
Whether or not Good Samaritan legislation is ineffective is a matter
for detailed sociological investigation.26 I do not know of any com-
pelling evidence for thinking this to be so. However, even if it were a
correct claim, it would not by itself disqualify Good Samaritan legisla-
tion. For one thing, it would need to be established why the legislation
was ineffective-whether it was simply because its provisions were
unknown, or because Bad Samaritans were rarely if ever prosecuted or
convicted, or because the Good Samaritan law was too stringent in its
demands, and so on. But these are not reasons for abandoning or not
introducing Good Samaritan legislation so much as for renovating the
legal structure in other ways. However, even though the effectiveness
of legislation is an important legal consideration, one ought not to
overlook the function of the legal system as a maintainer of justice-
26. See H. Zeisel, "An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good
Samaritan Law," in The Good Samaritan and the Law, pp. 209-2I2.

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 407 Good Samaritanism

particularly in cases where the acts of one person are causally con-
nected with the impairment of another's welfare.
(xi) A related argument concerns the costs of being a Good Samari-
tan. As the law of torts stands in many jurisdictions, a Good Samaritan
may be sued if his help is less than successful or if it serves to aggra-
vate an injury. Even if he successfully defends himself against a claim
for negligence, he still has to go through all the agonies attaching to
litigation. Suits for medical malpractice are a particularly striking
example.27 Another source of concern for Good Samaritans concerns
the frequently suspicious and unhelpful attitudes of police, and, in
cases where the intervention has taken place during a felony, the
possibility of reprisals by those involved or associated.
These are all serious problems in the operation of the law, and
cannot be overlooked when considering the introduction of Good Sa-
maritan legislation. Good Samaritans ought to be indemnified against
unreasonable actions; forms of compensation ought to be made
available to Good Samaritans; and the law should be operated in such
a way that Samaritans are not deterred from being Good.

27. See Note, "Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice," Colum-
bia Law Review 64 (I964): 1301-1322.

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