Some Problems of Perception in Navya-Nyāya

SOME PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN NAVYA-NYĀYA
Author(s): PRADYOT KR. MANDAL

Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy , JUNE 1987, Vol. 15, No. 2 (JUNE 1987), pp. 125-
148
Published by: Springer
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PRADYOT KR. MANDAL
SOME PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN
NAVYA-NYÀYA
The linguistic expression1 (better, linguistic identification) according

to the Bhàsyakàra and other older Naiyàyikas is not essential for a
cognitive state. The relation between a certain linguistic mark and the
corresponding entity that is so marked is neither identity (tàdâtmya)
nor causality, (Kârana) nor characterization (visesatia). The relation
between a certain linguistic mark and the corresponding entity that is
so marked is a special relation of arbitrary reference established by
convention (Samketa). This Nyàya thesis rejects as much the Sàbdika
view as the Buddhist view of perception and emphatically upholds that
neither nirvikalpaka pratyaksa nor savikalpaka pratyaksa as such is
due to any association with linguistic marks.
In this paper we shall try to show that the same view (perhaps
without any change or at best with a minor change) is upheld by the
Navya-Naiyàyikas also.
Navya-Nyàya is mainly after putting greater precision in the
thoughts of the older school. This new era begins formally indeed,
with Gañges'a Upàdhyàya's Tattvacintàmani, the classic of that great
logician of the thirteenth century; but it has actually flourished at the
hands of the scholars of Bengal from the sixteenth century onward. It
lays more emphasis on the (Nyàya) theory of knowledge and infinitely
more on systematization and precision of statements. In Navya-Nyàya
we come across subtlest possible precision at every step and the
implicit arguments always developed in exact forms and cleared of all
ambiguity of ordinary language. This Navya-Nyàya method heavily
influenced the other philosophical schools of India. Prof. Matilal
rightly observes that 'Navya-Nyàya may be said to resemble in this
respect the age of analysis in the western tradition'.2 But we must keep
in mind that in Indian tradition, thinkers do not take part in logical
discussion for the sake of logic only. Their logical discussions are
Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987) 125—148.

© 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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126 PRADYOT KR. MANDAL
based on their firm-founded metaphysics. T

is often described as 'new school of logic of
full-fledged philosophical school with a part
epistemology and logic,3 the ontology bein
ment of epistemology and logic being at its
II
Let us now turn to the theory of perceptio

Navya-Nyàya literature.4 Gañgesa puts grea
immediacy of perceptual cognition. He desc
immediate awareness.5 Gañgesa does not acc
perceptual cognition as it is given in the sùt
open to the charge of being too wide (ativy
of recollection (smrti) and the inference of
too narrow (avydpti) as regards the percept
Some thinkers like Prof. S. C. Chatteijee, h
opinion that Gañgesa's motive behind puttin
of perceptual cognition is not only to exclu
the inference of the soul and to include per
God but also to cover extraordinary human
sàmànyalaksana etc. as well as perceptions l
delusion etc. The ground of his contention a
following statement of Tàrkikaraksà: "Apar
pratyaksam anyathà laukikapratyaksamàtrav
pramâsàdhakatamam pratyaksamIn such cas
Chatteijee argues, our sense-organs do not h
the objects; the contact here depends on som
So the resulting knowledge here cannot be s
the perceptual character of such cognitions
such cognitions come into being people havi
have perceived such and such things.
We, however, cannot accept Prof. Chatterj
does not seem to be sound enough. It seems
not be altered just to cover the cases of ext
admitted in Nyâya. We cannot deny the inst
in cases of such perceptions.8 It is true that

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PERCEPTION IN NAVYA-NYÀYA 127
instrumentality of the senses depends on some oth

Sâmânya-jnàna or jûâyamàna sâmànya etc.). But the
act only as the intermediary operatives in sense-pe
has Gañgesa ever actually denied that perceptual co
the senses? As we shall presently see, he has regar
etc. as a type of judgemental perceptual cognition
pratyaksa) on the ground that it is due to the oper
So it is needless to think that Gañgesa defines perc
immediacy to cover extraordinary human percepti
Again to say that ordinary perception (laukika Pr
the senses (as the extract from Tàrkikaraksâ point
that extraordinary human perceptions (alaukika Pr
due to the senses. Gañgesa also in a like manner of
definition for ordinary perception excluding sâmân
he did not deny the operation of the senses in extr
perceptions.11 If he did so, he would have given th
laukika Pratyaksa in terms of the senses rather tha
immediacy which he actually did. Moreover, it is cl
extract of Tàrkikaraksâ that the definition was aimed to cover the
entire field of immediate cognition including the cases of God's
perception (aparoksa pramâvyàptam). Another instance from
Tarkabhâsà may be cited in this context. In Tarkabhâsà, Kesava Misra
defines perception as the source of valid immediate cognition.12 By
'valid immediate cognition' he means that cognition which is brought
about by the sense. Whatever might be the intention of Kesava Misra
in his definition of pratyaksa, for him valid immediate cognition is the
same thing as the knowledge that is produced by sensory stimulation
(except, of course in the case of perception on the part of God). So
the Naiyâyika's extraordinary perceptions are caused by the senses
and are yet immediate, and 'other things' that are required for such
perceptions cannot be a bar to the instrumentality of the senses. The
instrumentality of the senses does not, however, apply to the cases of
perception on the part of God. So if Gañgesa's definition has any
special relevance as regards avoiding avyàptidosa, it would only be in
the cases where God is said to perceive something. The charge of
ativyàptidosa may be avoided by regarding the function of the mind in
cases of recollection and inference of the soul etc. as mind and not as

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sense-organ (Smrtyanumityâdau ca manaso n

kintu manastvena T.C.P. 550).
Gañgesa does not even deny the causality (K
cognitions in the production of perceptual co
instrumentality (Karanatva) of previous cogn
cognition. All these points have been reflect
presented by him, viz. that perceptual cognit
cognition the instrumental cause of which is
Inference is based on the cognition of invari
(vyáptjñána), comparison on the cognition of
verbal comprehension on the cognition of w
recollection on previous experience (pùrvân
invariable concomitance, the cognition of sim
words and the previous experience in questi
instrumental agencies (Karana) of inference
testimony and recollection respectively. But
be the instrumental agency (karana) of a per
That is, however, only a negative way of s
provide any positive description of the instr
perceptual cognition. The question what is th
cognition can be answered only by pointing
organ (except, of course, in the case of God
Whatever be the case, it is clear from the
Gañgesa does not recognise the instrumental
bringing out perceptual cognition. As a resul
the knowledge of words {padajñána) in the p
cognition has been automatically rejected.15
reveal that even no causality of the knowled
perceptual cognition. There are so many cas
where the question of the knowledge of wor
(i.e., the cognition of the deaf-and-dumb). E
knowledge of words does not add anything t
cognition of objects. It is only in the case of
(Érâvana Pratyaksa) that a word may have s
the object of such perception. But it has litt
in question. The word as the object of audit
serve the purpose of a linguistic mark which

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PERCEPTION IN NAVYA-NYÁYA 129
The Naiyàyikas have emphatically pointed out that wh

are directly presented to the senses, if the senses bec
with the mind and the mind with the self, perceptual
spontaneously. It need not wait for the apprehension
any linguistic mark. These points may be further clarifie
in some detail the nature of nirvikalpaka and savikalp
stated by the Navya-Naiyâyikas.
Ill
In 'nirvikalpakavàda of his Tattvacintâmani Gañgesa clearly classified

perceptual cognition into 'nirvikalpaka' and 'savikalpakaNirvikalpaka
pratyaksa is the first stage of a developed perceptual cognition. In this
stage of perceptual cognition we just perceive a thing and do not
perceive it as related to anything in any way. The developed and more
developed stages of perceptual cognition are known as judgmental or
savikalpaka. For the Navya-Naiyâyikas nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is
logically and factually the first stage indispensible for the developed
perceptual cognition.
Gañgesa defines nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as follows: "It is a kind of
cognition which is not conjoined with a name, a universal etc.; which
does not apprehend anything as qualified and which is devoid of any
qualifier whatsoever."16
The definition given by Gañgesa is, in fact, a combination of three
definitions meaning virtually the same thing and being differently
presented in the different texts of the later Naiyàyikas.17 For
convenience let us discuss the definition in its three phases separately.
The first part of the definition i.e., nàmajàtyâdiyojanàrahitam,
conveys a more literal sense of the term 'nirvikalpaka'8 Literally,
'Nirvikalpaka' means that which has no 'vikalpa\ ' Vikalpa' is a
characteristic of an apprehension which characterises it when its object
is conjoined with a feature like a name, a universal etc. In Nyâya
system of thought such features like a name, a universal etc. are real
and not mental construction. When we apprehend an object with such
a feature, our apprehension is called savikalpaka. So nirvikalpaka
pratyaksa is that type of cognition the object of which has no such
features as a name, a universal etc.

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Perhaps this part of the definition has som

is meant by saying that a type of cognition
etc., is only that this type of cognition canno
point requires some clarification. As we have
particular cognition gets any name (linguistic
of the object of that particular cognition. W
as qualified or characterised by some of its f
only we may name that object.19 The mere u
apprehension cannot be referred to by the n
'unqualified' object itself of that awareness is
its name. It is only through the name of its o
cognition becomes communicable.20 Unqualif
name or a linguistic mark makes the corresp
uncommunicable. So what is denied in nirvik
complex thing as its object and as a result its
The second part of the definition, i.e. vaisis
above contention in a clearer perspective. Th
this part of the definition is that no relation
this stage of perceptual cognition. Here, the
such and not as something related with any c
In the savikalpaka pratyaksa of a pot as a pot
(a pot) as having some character (potness). T
savikalpaka pratyaksa comprises three elemen
pot), the visesana (the potness) and their sarh
between the pot and the potness). As at the
not apprehend any relational tie, so we, at th
anything as visesana nor anything as visesya.
absence of apprehension of a relational tie, a
apprehension of some unrelated parts and no
The third part of the definition i.e., 'nispra
substantially the same thing. It means that n
devoid of any prakàra whatsoever. The object
simply as something and not as such-and-suc
features, however, are not non-existent in th
They are very much there in the object but
either as features or as featured. They are ap
something (as mere being) but not as feature

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of fact, objects) of such cognition is undoubtedly sim

necessarily a single entity. It is, in fact, a plurality of s
simples. A cognition can be said to be saprakàraka w
a visesyaprakàra complex. As nirvikalpaka pratyaksa
visesya-prakàra complex as its object, it is called nis
IV
From the foregoing discussion, we can say that nirvikalpaka pratyaksa

is the first and the primary stage of perceptual cognition. This
rudimentary stage does not regulate our everyday behaviour or our
linguistic usage (vyavahâràyogya). A piece of cognition can be used
(whether linguistically or not) only by the knowledge of that cognition
(which is perceptual in character). Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa cannot be
known (atindriya).21 Such cognition cannot be used. As we are not
directly aware of that type of cognition, its existence can only be
inferred. The non-perceptibility of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is not,
however, equally accepted by the different thinkers of different ages of
the Nyàya-Vaisesika system.22
As far as the Nyàya system is concerned, it is Tàtparyatïkâ that first
categorically distinguishes the two types of perceptual cognition.
Vacaspati Mis'ra holds that at the nirvikalpaka stage we apprehend
both the individual and its universal, but at this stage we apprehend
them as such and not as related as substantive and adjective.23
Udayana also does not clearly mention nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as
atindriya. Jayanta Bhatta holds that the distinction between nirvikalpaka
and savikalpaka lies in fact that the former is not expressible in words
whereas the latter is.24 In these interpretations of the older thinkers
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is nowhere explicitly stated as atindriya. All
these interpretations have some affinity with the views of Diñnága and
Kumàrila.25
Although in the Nyáya system it is Tàtparyatïkâ that first categorically
distinguished the two types of perceptual cognition, it is Tattvacintàmani
that first elaborately explained the nature of and the mutual distinction
between these two types in a definite form. Like Vacaspati, Gañgesa
and other later Naiyâyikas also hold that at the nirvikalpaka stage we
apprehend both the individual and the universal although they stand

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unrelated then. But this stage is not so muc

it is a logically necessary condition for the
scheme of thought of the later Naiyàyikas i
of knowledge which is ultimately based on a
simples. This awareness of unrelated simple
This is also evident from their unwillingnes
such cognition either as pramâ or as apramâ
foreign to the older Naiyàyikas.27 As Keith
development of this view definitely severs i
{Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) from all other form
root of which it lies, and thus approaches t
of sensation as opposed to perception." Ath
of Annambhatta says: "we may very well ca
sensation and savikalpaka pratyaksa percepti
But we must not forget that of whatever rud
stage it may be, nirvikalpaka is never taken
'sensation' in the Kantian sense or as 'simpl
Hobhouse.30 Such an awareness is as much
and is clearly a form of knowledge rather than
experience only. The Thing, the qualifying a
between the two (if it is not samavâya) are
nirvikalpaka stage though at that stage we d
them in a judgemental form (i.e., as a relate
whole).
GaAgesa defines savikalpaka pratyaksa as "savikalpakañca visistajñánam

yathâ gaurayamiti."31 It is a kind of perceptual cognition, which is
relational or judgemental like "This is a cow."32 In such an awareness
we apprehend a relational tie between a thing and its appropriate
universal etc. Universal etc. being objectively real in the Nyàya system,
if such cognition is due to sense-object contact, it is to be regarded as
perceptual.33 Such perceptual cognition of a relational whole may be
sometimes assisted by a past impression (samskâra).34 In such cases
memory-element of 'thatness' being combined with the sensory-element
of 'thisness' and their mutual distinction being unexposed gives rise to a

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single unitary qualificative awareness. As a sense-org

in the production of such an awareness, it is regard
perceptual cognition (savikalpaka pratyaksa). Such
perceptual cognition which follows some nirvikalpa
the visesya with the visesana. Thus tied, they consti
form in which their positions become distinct.
Gañgesa draws our attention to some special featu
pratyaksa. One of those features is the role played b
in perceptual cognition. As we have already pointed
holds that recognition (Pratyabhijñá) is a kind of sav
In recognition though the present state directly com
the senses, the past state does not come so. But the r
cognition is one unitary cognition of the object as r
states, past and present. It is not, as the Buddhists
two parts, viz., (a) sense-perception of the present st
of the past. According to the Naiyàyikas this cognit
unitary event. Like William James they reject any poss
mode of consciousness. A state of savikalpaka praty
cognitions is the simple awareness revealing some o
the combination of two or three prior cognitions ta
is rather a single unitary cognition of two or more
visesya-visesana. The nirvikalpaka state of conscious
savikalpaka is also a single state revealing the object
Nyàya-epistemology, there is no scope of any comp
consciousness which is an intermixture of two hete
being pratyaksâtmaka and the other being smaranât
recognition is a single unitary presentative consciou
regarded as perceptual.35
Now the question is what type of memory-elemen
what role it plays in savikalpaka pratyaksa. By 'mem
may refer either to the smarana (memory) itself or
(impression) that causes smarana. Although Vàcaspa
smarana and samskâra as alternative aids to the senses in case of
recognition, Gañgesa, for the sake of parsimony, holds that it is
smarana and not the samskâra that helps the senses in such cases.37
Some later Naiyàyikas, however, have given up smarana and accepted
only samskâra as an aid to the senses in case of recognition.38

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We may at this stage refer to Professor D.

on this point. He writes: "Vàcaspatimisra sug
as an alternative with the past impression for
later Nyàya-Vaisesika writers discarded reme
only impressions as aiding the sense in the ca
Professor Shastri did not clearly mention the
whom he referred to as 'later Nyàya-Vaisesika
our discussion that Gañgesa cannot be referr
writers because Gañgesa instead of accepting
the sense has argued against it. But in gener
be the founder of the later Nyàya-Vaisesika s
Gañgesa particularly should have been explic
the limitation of the statement. However, Vi
thinker of the later Nyàya-Vaisesika school, s
samskâra and not smarana that acts in recogn
sense (vide note 38).
As to the role of the memory element, all the
of older or later, are unanimous on the point
acts only as an aid to the sense but it does no
the perceptual cognition; otherwise the result
said to be perceptual.40 Though the sense-org
produce the cognition of a past object, yet in
impressions of past experience, they can prod
of an object as qualified by the past time.41 B
composite cognition of sense-perception of th
memory impression referring to the past state.
Vàcaspati goes a step further and holds that
every ordinary qualificative perception there
condition of the object.42 The later Naiyàyika
this view and hold that apprehension of a pas
case of recognition and not in each and every
perception, àrîdhara, on the other hand, hold
perception there is a reference to other objec
is the basis of the cognition of a universal.43
Vàcaspati and of árídhara, however, find a pla
contacts known as jñánalaksana and sâmànya
the later Naiyàyikas. But, according to the lat

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two types of contact there arise two special types o

perceptual cognition known as jmnalaksana pratya
sámányalaksana pratyaksa and not qualificative perc
general.
Another important feature of savikalpaka pratyaksa to which
Gañgesa draws our attention is that although the content of a
savikalpaka pratyaksa is a relational whole, some of its elements
remain always unqualified.44 For example, in the qualificative perceptual
cognition of the form, "This is a jar," an individual jar is only qualified
by the universal jarness, but the universal itself remains unqualified.
Similarly, in the negative form of a qualificative perceptual cognition
viz., "There is no jar on this spot," the spot qualifies the negation of a
jar, and that jar is also qualified by the universal 'jarness' but that
'jarness' itself remains unqualified.45 Thus every savikalpaka pratyaksa
is partly qualified and partly unqualified.
VI
So far as Tattvacintàmani is concerned, it is safer to call the two stages

of perceptual cognition non-qualified (avisista) and qualified (visista).
It is to be noted here that Gañgesa did not use expressibility or
word-element to differentiate nirvikalpaka from savikalpaka. Nor did
he directly touch the question whether word-element is or is not in
any way involved in perceptual cognition. Though while defining
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa he pointed out that it is devoid of 'name' etc., it
is to be noted that in defining savikalpaka pratyaksa he never said that
it is conjoined with a name etc., he never even asked the question
whether it is so conjoined or not45 To say that nirvikalpaka pratyaksa
is devoid of name etc., however is not to say that savikalpaka pratyaksa
is conjoined with a name. Gañges'a puts emphasis on the relational tie
which according to him makes all the difference between nirvikalpaka
and savikalpaka. It is, no doubt, a departure from Jayanta Bhatta's
interpretation according to which as we have already pointed out (vide
note 24), the expressibility in words is the only mark of difference
between nirvikalpaka, and savikalpaka. Karl H. Potter, however,
observes:47 "whereas in the early writers up to Jayanta a judgment's
being propositional was connected to its expressibility, in later times a

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136 PRADVOT KR. MANDAL
propositional judgment was thought of as an

content a qualified entity." The term 'judgm
the sense of 'knowledge' and the term 'prop
the sense of 'qualificative' cognition (savika
such usage is correct is a different question
that as far as our interpretation is concerne
cannot be justified without some limitations
out that the sütrakára, the bhâsyakâra and t
explicitly mention the two stages of percept
tâtparyatïkâkàra Vàcaspati mentioned it he d
as the only mark of difference between them
(some others like Bhásarvajña may also be i
early writers up to Jayanta, held that a judg
was connected with its expressibility.
Even for Jayanta Bhatta the savikalpaka pr
is a single whole and sense-dependent. If it
there would be no meaning in including suc
body of perceptual cognition which Jayanta
older Naiyáyikas have actually done. Jayanta
Naiyàyikas, also admits the possibility of sa
case of the deaf-and-dumb person, though su
expressed in words.49
VII
Let us now turn to our original problem of perceptual cognition and

the role of language in it. The main question is: Does savikalpaka
pratyaksa involve language? In modern Western philosophy it is almost
an accepted view that thought essentially involves language.50 In India
the áábdikas hold a similar view. But the Naiyàyikas at large have
opposed such a view. Though not systematically, the Naiyàyikas on
different occasions have expressed their views about reality, thought
and language. Their discussions might not be aimed at this question
and their expositions might not be completely free from obscurity
everywhere. The contemporary interpreters also are not always
unanimous in interpreting those traditional thoughts. But whatever
obscurity there might be, the Naiyàyikas would not regard thought as
essentially linguistic.51 They rather challenged and convincingly proved

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the inadequacy of such a theory. This is evident

doctrine of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa but also from
towards a state of cognition and its corresponding l
Raghunâtha Siromani, the great logician of Beng
several occassions that one should depend on on
consciousness (anuvyavasàya) as to the trustwort
anubhava than on any expression conveying such
Navya-Nyàya being a logic of cognition is main
the analysis of cognitive states. A cognitive state
pointed to as a physical thing can be. Being form
can be analysed only by conveying it through so
serves as that medium. Navya-Naiyàyikas think t
cognitive state can be somehow conveyed throug
assertion and that by analysing that statement o
logically analyse the corresponding cognitive stat
of privacy can also be solved.54 But this analysis,
cannot be called linguistic. The main concern of
not the language but the actual cognitive states.
be expressed or conveyed through language is no
involve language. To say that savikalpaka pratyak
conveyable through language is one thing and to
pratyaksa involves language is another thing. The
no way imply the second. The difference between
is fundamental. This difference cannot be denied
out that we have no alternative way to express o
and through language.54 So however forceful the
trend might be, it requires further evaluation.
In this regard let us quote here some observati
thinkers who have valuable contributions in som
Nyáya logic. Ingalls in introduction to his Materi
Navya-nyàya Logic writes:
Its realism [realism of Nyâya] may be seen in its dissatisfac

of words. The Naiyàyika always tries to push further back,
the things themselves. Thus his logic deals very little with p
with 'knowledges', which when valid are said to represent f
(§7). Again, Navya-nyàya does not distinguish names from d
the entities that describe from the entities described (§20).
Ingalls D. H. H., Materials for the study of Navy

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Professor B. K. Matilal in his the Navya-ny

writes: "An instance of cognition, it is true,
ultimately related to some verbal form, nam
sentence. In the case of a determinate or qu
(savikalpa or visistajñáná), with which Navy
concerned, the relation is very close. But the
of language . . N.D.N. p. 6.
Again, on some other occassion he writes:
western logic a proposition or a statement i
be significantly said to be true or false. In a
say that a qualificative (visista) cognition can
or false. But one should note that the Naiyà
characteristic as a definition. A qualificative
discursively formulated as a declarative sent
formulation is felt by the Naiyàyikas to be
particular. One and the same cognition may
natural languages." Ibid., p. 12.
In a long footnote in his Gamgesa's theory
Mohanty presents his observation in the fol
In the light of what I have said above, I should like to

distinguish between proposition and sentence on the o
proposition on the other. It does distinguish between
analyses then is as much a knowledge as a proposition
proposition. More accurately, therefore, it analyses k
in character if they are of the savikalpa sort. Whethe
according to the Nyàya, necessarily linguistic or not i
seems certain that, in the first place, it can be expre
that it admits of a logical analysis (and so may be said
In a later page he says:
. . . for the Nyàya, analysis of knowledge goes beyond

linguistic expression and that we have to install oursel
introspection and recall the exact anubhava i.e. the ph
p. 35.
Again, on another occassion he writes:
There seems to be disagreement amongst the Naiyàyikas on one vital issue, namely

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whether variation in the form of expression necessarily points

knowledge. Some say it does, others say it does not. But we m
and contend that perception of all knowledges being entirely o
difference in expression does not mean a variation in knowled
is concerned. The same perceptual knowledge for example, ma
as 'ghatavisistabhutala' or as 'bhutalavrttitvavisistaghata'. ... In
test in these issues is one's subjective report and not the object
Ibid., p. 37.
Professor Sivajiban Bhattacharyya in a lengthy article under the

name 'Some principles and concepts of Navya-Nyàya Logic and
ontology' have dealt with many important issues concerning cognition
and language. He clearly rejects the view that savikalpaka pratyaksa of
the Naiyàyikas involves language. He says:
Navya-Nyàya holds that an act of perceiving, inferring is not the same as speaking or
whispering, that two types of acts cannot be even simultaneous, that language is
necessary only for expressing an act of cognition which is subsequent and different
type of act.
O.H. Vol. XXV, 1977, p. 30
Now to sum up the whole proceedings we can say that for the
Naiyàyikas perceptual cognition is a unique type of cognition and is
completely independent of all sorts of linguistic element. In a perceptual
cognitive state we are directly aware of individuals, universals and
unanalysable common properties. Our consciousness directly refers to
objects lying outside the cognitive state itself. Even our erroneous
consciousness refers to objects which are not mental. According to
them the facts of the world are neither subjective construction nor as
such are stamped as true or false. Whenever our senses come in contact
with an object, the senses being conjoined with the mind and the mind
with the self, a perceptual cognition instantly arises referring to the
object as something. Gradually the objective constituents are presented
to us as combined into a concrete object. In this way the initial non
relational consciousness is replaced by a relational consciousness.
Whatever memory-elements might be involved in this process, they are
in no way subjectively determined; they are determined objectively.
Navya-Nyàya holds that in relational consciousness the subject
apprehends the objects in a certain mode or in a certain order (the
order being very much there in the world of reals).56 Such relational

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consciousness alone can be judged as either

constituents and the order or mode do tally
order of the corresponding reality then it is
The Sàmkhya holds that in the first stage
senses, in the second stage mind connects th
and in the third stage this connection as a w
level of reflection (buddhi).57 Perhaps, till th
element is involved. For the Naiyàyikas the l
of a relational consciousness is completely an
identification can neither determine the truth
nor can it contribute anything to the state o
has taken place beforehand. The Naiyàyikas
view that linguistic expression is always a su
They have explicitly admitted the role of un
relation in savikalpaka pratyaksa (i.e. of un
and samsarga). Even a mis-identification du
language (which often happens among child
apprehension itself. It is not the apprehensio
is to be regarded as wrong in case of such a
other hand, each and every unexpressed sta
be regarded as nirvikalpaka. Even an inferen
be explicitly stated. But an inferential cogni
called indeterminate. A judgment may not b
statement. Judgment involves a complicated
clarification occurring only at a high level o
nothing to do with statement. Thus the entir
cognition as such is free from linguistic elem
successful communication we have to depend
and that linguistic formulation must be harm
cognitive state. How such required harmony
linguistic formulation which is not identical
state can successfully convey that state, are
which require much careful research and inv
Nyàya epistemology.59 The problem as had b
Mukheijee is that in a savikalpaka pratyaksa
that we apprehend is the qualificand-qualifie
visesanabhàvàkàra) but in case of sentential

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we apprehend is identity (abhinnàkàra). Now how th

identity that a hearer apprehends can give him the kn
relation of qualificand-qualifier which actually holds b
objective constituents and can be apprehended by som
than sabdapramâna is a great problem to deal with.60
hope to undertake this problem later on, in another p
time being we are leaving it at this point. Our aim he
the epistemic event that leads us to a linguistic formu
different from and logically prior to that formulation. T
however does not pose any problem in the way of int
communication of our thoughts and cognitions.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
' The Sanskrit term for linguistic expression (mark) is 'nàma' or

sabda does not, however, stand in Sanskrit for mere words or nam
understood in English. It stands equally for sentences — simple, co
complex. Hence, whenever they speak of nàma or sabda as having
cognition, they mean by it linguistic expression, as much words an
are understood in English) as also sentences (and even paragraphs
2 Matilal, B. K., The Navya-Nyáya Doctrine of Negation — p. 21.
3 "In the Nyâya-Vaisesika system of thought there are no water-tig
for epistemology, logic, psychology, ethics, theology metaphysics e
expected that these different sciences would therefore be harmonio
together into one integrated system of thought." — Bhattacharyya
Nyàya" — The Cultural Heritage of India, 1953.
4 Our discussion of Navya-Nyáya is mainly based on Gañgesa's Tatt
Pratyaksakhanda.
5 "pratyaksasya sàksàtkàritvam laksanam". T. C. p. 543.
6 "Atmánumiti-smrtyorjñánamatre câtivyàpteh atmáno'rthasya man
samyogad utpatteh Isvarapratyaksâvyaptesca." Ibid., p. 540.
Recollection is the revival of some cognition of objects acquired
the case of the self, the recollection depends on the contact of the
organ and the self as the object. In the same way, the inference of
depends on the contact of the mind and the self. As each and ever
depends on the contact of the mind and the self (not as the object
cognitive event but as an artha in a general sense), the traditional d
perception even aplies to all sorts of cognition. Having covered all
becomes victim of over-coverage. Again, perception on the part of
perception proper, is not due to any sense-object contact: for God
possesses no sense-organ. Gangesa modifies the definition of perce
be saved from all these charges.
7 Chatterjee, S. C., 'Nyàya theory of knowledge', pp. 128—29.

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8 "Trividhamapídam pratyaksam savikalpakameva iti."

"Jivapratyaksasya cendriyameva karanam." Ibid., p. 4
"sense-contact is still regarded by him [Gangesa] as th
should not be included in the definition." — Dasgupta,
Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 342.
9 "Indriyajanyatvenaparoksatva niyamât" — T. C., p. 8
10 "Janyapatyaksasya laksanamanâgatagocara sâksâtkàra
janyajanyasâksâtkaratvam." — Ibid., p. 546.
11 "Tathàca visesanatàpratyasatter vihitattvena tadanta
na vyâghâta iti bhâvah." — Sàmànyalaksanamayukha,
"àsattiràsrayânàn tu sàmànyajflànam isyate /
tadindriyajataddharmavodhasàmagryapeksate." // — B
12 sâksàtkaripramàkaranam pratyaksam sàksatkarinica
T. B. p. 31.
13 The word 'cause' (kârana) is generally used in Indian Philosophy in the sense of
necessary condition. It is not necessarily the instrumental agency or the instrument,
the special cause (karana) which produces the relevant effect with the help of some
other conditions. Although nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is not the instrument {karana), it is
no doubt the cause (karana) of savikalpaka pratyaksa. Every savikalpaka awareness of
some object (cognition of samavâya, perhaps, being excepted) is preceded by some
nirvikalpaka awareness of its unrelated parts. The relation of samavâya is always
apprehended as a relation between two relata one of which is inseparably connected
with the other. So the nirvikalpaka awareness of such a relation cannot be
convincingly proved. It is also worth noting (as Prof. Matilal told me when I had the
proud privilege to meet him at Santiniketan) that it is only the nirvikalpaka awareness
of visesana which may be said to be a necessary prerequisite for a complex relational
awareness (visistajñána). This thesis has a sound basis in Gañgesa's 'nirvikalpakaváda'
(T. C. p. 822) where he rejects the knowledge of visesya as essential prerequisite for
the savikalpaka pratyaksa of abhâva.
"visistavaisistyajñánam prati hi visesanatâvacchedaka prakàram jñánam hetuh."
- T. C.'p. 812.'
"visistapratyakse ca visesanajñánam na karanam vyâpàràbhàvàt." — Ibid., p. 552.
14 "jñánákaranakam jñánam tu vayam." — Ibid., p. 552.
15 This is, however, not the peculiar position of the Nyàya alone. Perhaps no serious
thinker either of the East or of the West holds that the knowledge of words is the
instrument of perceptual cognition. The knowledge of words according to the
Naiyàyikas is the instrument of verbal comprehension (sábda jñána): Padajñánam tu
karanam. The knowledge of words is to be understood here as operated through the
recollection of the meaning of words (dvàram tatra padàrthadhih). That recollection is
also to be understood as being produced by words through their significatory function
(vrtti). It is that type of the knowledge of words and not any and every type of word
or knowledge of it that forms the basis of verbal comprehension. According to the
Naiyàyikas such knowledge of words should be understood from the hearer's point of
view and not from the speaker's. No such knowledge of words is necessary in the case
of perceptual cognition, otherwise a man having knowledge of the meaning of a word
may have verbal comprehension, if he so desires, even when he actually perceives the
thing and does not hear from anyone else.

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PERCEPTION IN NAVYA-NYÂYA 143
16 "nàmajâtyàdiyojanàrahitam vaisistyànavagàhi nisprakârakam nir

T.C. p. 809.
17 "Nâmayojanàrahitam-ity asya vaisistyànavagàhi . .. tadeva vivrnoti nisprakàra
kamityarthah." — T. C. Prakàsah, p. 857.
The second part of the definition has been presented in Visvanàtha's Bhâsâparice
heda (vaisistyànavagàhi jñánam). Practically the same second part of the definition has
also been presented in Annambhatta's Dïpikà on Tarkasamgraha (visesya-visesana
samsargànavagâhi). The third part of the definition has been presented in
Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha (nisprakârakam jñánam). So it seems that the definition
given by Gangesa comprises three alternative definitions.
18 This way of defining nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is not, however, peculiar to Gangesa.
Diñnága, the great Buddhist logician has also defined nirvikalpaka pratyaksa in an
almost similar way long before Gangesa (he did it in the fifth century A.D.). His
definition is: "pratyaksam kalpanàpodham nàmajàtyàdyasarhjutamVàcaspati Misra
also interpreted Vàtsyâyana's Bhásya on pratyaksa so as to suit such a definition of
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa.
19 "na hi arthe sabdàh santi" ... — M.V.T. p. 134.
20 According to the Naiyàikas 'name' or 'word' is the basic unit of communication.
They think that the language (sabda) is the medium of communication and the main
function of language is referring. This function of language begins only when we try
to name the discriminated parts of a relational whole. They take Lpada' as unit of
referring (Saktam padam) and build a theory of language causally based on it. The
understanding of a sentence, however, depends upon four auxiliary factors besides the
denotative or significatory meaning of those words occurring in that sentence. These
four factors are akàrhksà, yogyatà, âsatti or sannidhi and tátparya. Akámksá is the
syntactical expectancies of some words in the absence of which a sentence is
unintelligible. An ungrammatical combination of words like "I the pot fire" cannot
have any syntactical expectancy. Without this syntactical expectancy, a sentence lacks
cognitive meaning. Yogyatà is the ability of a word to bear a continued meaning being
united with other words of a sentence. The sentence "fire is cold" lacks the yogyatà or
semantical competency and is thus meaningless. Asatti is the proximity of words used
in a sentence in space and time. Unnecessary interval between the words in a sentence
makes the whole sentence meaningless. Tátparya is the intention of the speaker to use
a word in a particular context.
21 "Nanu jñánatvam savikalpaka-bhinnavrtti ityatra kim mnànam na pratyaksam
asiddheh atïndriyatvàbhyupagamàcca." — T. C. p. 809.
It is not the thing but the resulting cognition that is not perceived. According to
the Naiyàyikas though a cognition manifests an object (paraprakdsaka), it can never
manifest itself in that same state of consciousness (svaprakásaka). That cognition can
at most be manifested in another state of consciousness. Such an apprehension of a
state of cognition is technically known as 'anuvyavasàya\ The sense-object relation
(sannikarsa) of such an apprehension is called samyukta-samavàya: the mind as sense
organ being in contact with the self and the cognition having inhered in the self. Such
a contact can reveal only a qualified or related object and not an unqualified or
unrelated object. In case of knowledge of other objects the mind is operative not as a
sense-organ but as a substance (as manastva). The Naiyàyikas, whether older or later,
always admit the possibility of an apprehension without itself being apprehended. We

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may, in general, be satisfied with apprehension and n

apprehending that apprehension.
22 "It appears that at the time of Vàcaspati Misra . . .
century when Sridhara and Udayana wrote their com
nature of nirvikalpaka was not definitely established.
the close of the twelfth century by Gañgesa from wh
less in a fixed form." — Sàstri D. N., P.N.V.B.S. p. 4
23 "jâtyàdi-svarùpàvagàhi na tu jâtyâdïnàm mitho-vis
p. 108.
24 "tasmàd ya eva vastvàtmà savikalpasya gocarah / sa eva nirvikalpakasya
sabdollekha-vivarjjitah." — N.M., p. 144.
25 "asti hyàlocanam jñánarn . . . vyaktir evàvasïyate." — S. V. Sloka pp. 112—113.
26 "nirvikalpakañca pramàpramâbahirbhûtam eva vyavahàrahgatvàt" — T.C. p. 402.
The question of right and wrong or truth and error does arise only in cases of
knowledge of complex objects. If the object is an unqualified simple then we have
some awareness of that object but that awareness cannot be classified as right or
wrong. This Navya-Nyâya position is in sharp contrast with the Buddhist position.
27 According to the most of the older Naiyàyikas nirvikalpaka jñána is always valid.
Jayanta Bhatta, however, is of the opinion that even nirvikalpaka jñána may be either
valid or invalid. Àthalye, however, is of the opinion that nirvikalpaka in Navya-Nyâya
ought not to be considered a subdivision of Pratyaksa-, it ought rather to be considered
as a subdivision of anubhava above pramá.
28 Keith, A. B. Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 74.
29 Àthalye and Bodes, Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta, pp. 219—220.
30 Some thinkers like Àthalye are of the opinion that the distinction between
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa and savikalpaka pratyaksa is in accordance with Kant's division
of apprehension into perception proper and sensation proper. Having held this view
he regards 'nirvikalpaka' as a type of jñána or anubhava and prefers not to call it
pratyaksa. But this contention is hardly justified. To Kant 'sensation' is subjective and
has no objective reference. But the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa of the Naiyàyikas being a
state of cognition must have an objective reference. Again the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa
of the Naiyàyikas cannot be identical with the 'simple apprehension' of Hobhouse.
Although the 'simple apprehension' of Hobhouse has some objective reference, the
referent here is not an unqualified or uncharacterised simple or plurality of such
simples. Perhaps, the same difference also holds between nirvikalpaka pratyaksa of the
Naiyàyikas and 'knowledge by acquintance' of Russell.
31 T.C. p. 839.
32 The term 'judgmental' is used here to denote the qualified or character
characterised type of cognition.
33 "tacca sàmànyàdînàm paramârthasattvenàrthajatvàdindriyaja tvâcca, pratyaksam
kvacit samskârasahakàrivasena tattàvisistasyedantàvisistàbhedollekhyaindriyoko
vikalpah." T.C. p. 839.
34 The term 'samskâra' has been used in the Nyáya system in three different senses.
Sometimes it is used in the sense of velocity (vega), sometimes it is used in the sense
of elasticity (sthitisthàpakatva); and sometimes it is used in the sense of past impression
(bhàvanà). In the present discussion this term has been used in the sense of past
impression only. Past impression when revived (udbuddha samskâra) causes memory
(Smrti).

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PERCEPTION IN NAVYA-NYÂYA 145
35 In Nyàya-epistemology when a past impression works as an aid

role of sense being dominant produces recognition. But in the abs
contact, awakening of a past impression produces memory and no
36 "ma bhud arthasya purvakâlavartitendriyagocarah. Tathâpi sma
samskârasahakârinâ vendriyena-yajjanitarh jñánam tena tadvisaylkr
N.V.T., p. 139.
37 Although Gangesa at the beginning of his Savikalpakavàda (vi
admitted the aid of samskàra in savikalpaka pratyaksa he refused
in pratyabhijñá. He, instead, accepted the aid of smrti in pratyabh
"pratyabhijñáyantu tattâsmrtih kâranam na tu samskàradvàrà an
- T.C. p. 554.
38 "Asan-samskàro yatah smaranam pratyabhijñánam ca janayatah
- N.S.M. p. 540.
39 Sàstri, D. N, P.N.V.B.D.S., p. 466. The emphasis is mine.
40 Jayanta Bhatta thinks that pratyavijñá is internal like a jñánala
"Manasameva . . . iti manasi pratyavijñá".
41 Vide note 35.
42 . . according to Vàcaspatimis'ra every determinate perception has always a
reference to the past state of the object cognised, because it is the cause of calling
forth the name of the object." — Sastri, D. N., P.N.V.B.D.S., p. 458.
43 "pindàntarànuvrtti-grahanâd dhi sàmànyam grhyate." — N.K. p. 189.
44 "nanu narasimhàkâram jñánamityasiddham" "Aloka" on Nirvikalpakaváda, T.C.
p. 809.
45 According to the Naiyàyikas in so far as a jàti or an akhandopádhi is unexpressed
or unmentioned it is apprehended not as qualified or characterised by any qualifier
(nisprakdraka). But when it is expressed or mentioned in language, then and there it
becomes qualified by some features. So when we say that 'jarness' itself remains
unqualified, that 'jarness' should be understood not as 'jarness' in an expressed form,
but in its unexpressed state of consciousness. That is to say it should be understood
by meta-attitude and not by ordinary attitude.
"jâter akhandopâdhes ca pratitàvanullekhe (sabda anuccàrena) niravacchinnà
(tayorvisesanapratïtirahità) pratîtir bhavati." — Navya-Nyâya Bhàsâpradïpa, p. 7.
46 Annambhatta, in his Dïpikà includes the word 'náma' in the definition of
savikalpaka pratyaksa (námajátyádivisesanavisesyasambandhávgahi jMnamityarthah).
Kesava Misra also holds a similar view in his Tarkabhàsà (Savikalpakam nâmajàtyâdi
yojanàtmakam, T.B. p. 5). But it is highly doubtful whether 'náma' can be a visesana
from the Nyàya point of view. As Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya observes: "It is
to be remarked here that the inclusion of 'name' (nàma) under 'vikalpa' seems to be
unauthorised from the standpoint of the Nyàya school (vide Nyàyabhâsya etc. for the
relevant discussion). In including 'name' is not Annambhatta involved in some
confusion? The sàbdikas, no doubt, take 'name' to be inevitably a part of every
cognition. But do the adherents of the Nyàya school accept this position?" —
Bhattacharyya Gopinath, Tarkasamgrapa Dïpikà on Tarkasarhgraha, p. 176.
47 Potter Karl H., The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, p. 164.
48 "anyathâ vàlamukàdïnàm nendriyajah syàdvikalpah sabdasmaranàbhàvàt." N.V.T.
p. 138.
Although Vàcaspati Misra in so many words has justified the contention that the
sütrakára by the term 'avyapadesya' has intended nirvikalpaka pratyaksa, in protecting

202.116.81.148 on Thu, 11 Mar 2021 08:05:39 UTC
savikalpaka pratyaksa he has argued against the Buddh

need not be necessarily expressed in words. The above
unexpressed savikalpaka pratyaksa.
49 For Jayanta also, expressibility does not mean an a
and not an actual expression constitutes the differenc
savikalpaka pratyaksa then for him also the admission
pratyaksa becomes obvious. Pañcánan Sàstri in his cr
Nyáya-Mañjari clearly upholds this interpretation. —
50 .. modern logic, or analytic philosophy in general
logic tends to formulate its questions in linguistic or q
statements or propositions rather than in terms of ps
entities." — Matilal B. K., N.D.N., p. 9.
51 "Even if thinking be regarded as a sub-vocal speech
without understanding the meaning of expressions use
understanding the meaning of expressions and other fo
inferring, however complex they be, is fundamental."
Bhattacharyya Sivajiban, "Some Principles and concep
ontology" - O.H. XXV, 1977, p. 30.
52 'The technique of referring constantly to mental s
two alternative hypotheses is due to Raghunàtha in the
been used very widely ever since." — Ibid., p. 19.
53 The Naiyâyikas, however, do admit that a cognitive
to point in ordinary language. This is because in ordin
object is meant by a word, that word cannot express t
presentation. That is why the Naiyâyikas take the hel
language to express a cognitive state.
54 "The problem of privacy is thus avoided, for what
(to use a highly provocative term) by the sentence can
subjective." — Matilal B. K., N.D.N., p. 11.
55 'The point is that even though the cognition has to
language does not enter essentially into the cognitive s
— Bhattacharyya, Sivajiban, "Some principles and co
and ontology" - O.H. XXV, 1977, p. 42.
56 "According to Navya-Nyâya no act of cognition is a
A cognition merely refers to its object but in no way
unify the elements a, R and b which are the factual e
unity is the work strictly of the relation R which binds
— Bhattacharyya Sivajiban, ... pp. 38—39.
57 "yathà arthálocana samkalpàbhimânâsca .. . budha
Tattakaumuditikà on Sàmkhya-Kàrikà No. 37.
58 "Nyâya too recognises a similar limitation to the cl
be an index of experience ..." — Mohanty J. N., "Ref
avayavipratyaksá", J.I.A.P. vol. I, 1962, p. 35.
59 "How such vâkyas succeed in communicating jñána
Shri Madhusudan Nyâyâcârya, to be an unsolved probl
language." — Mukheijee P. K., "Is jñána belief?" p. 10
University, 1982.

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60 Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya has told me when I had

with this problem that this is one of the most important pr
interesting function of language which the Sâbdika philosop
and to which the Nyáya has paid little attention. The act of
in cognition on the part of the speaker requires much atten
explanation from the standpoint of the Nyàya.
N.B. The page numbers noted above are in accordance with t

mentioned in the bibliography.
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Some Problems of Perception in Navya-Nyāya

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Some Problems of Perception in Navya-Nyāya

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SOME PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN NAVYA-NYĀYA

Author(s): PRADYOT KR. MANDAL

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