Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and Development
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1, 2015
q ︎
7 8 9 10 11
Log GDP per Capita in 2005
10%
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Log GDP per capita in 2000 5 year averages of log GDP per capita
such tax allocations may encourage smuggling, this is a much easier propo-
sition than collecting income taxes. The latter requires major investments
in enforcement and compliance structures throughout the entire economy.
1.
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A. Country-level income and trade taxes by GDP B. Global-level income and trade taxes by time period
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Share of trade taxes (1999) 5 year averages of share of trade tax
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80
Top Statutory Income Tax Rate in 1990s
0 20 40 60
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Share of Taxes in GDP (1999)
(2012)
Figure 6: Top statutory income tax rate and total tax take
progressivity into account. With this qualification, the fact that high-income
countries raise much more tax revenue than low-income countries suggests
that narrower tax bases driven by compliance di culties are much bigger
issues among low-income countries. This reinforces the earlier observation
that fiscal capacity is considerably less developed in poor countries.
1.
1990
2000
q 21
19
q . ( 17
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13
q
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q 2008 7
5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2.
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Source: Singhal (2014)
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( : 50%)
.5
DENMARK
SW EDEN
NORWAY Italy
.4
Germany
Tax / GDP ratio
United Kingdom
Brazil
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United States
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.1
Mexico
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Fraction self-employed
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•
300
millions of receip
Phase-in ends
200 100
Phase-in begins
0
2007m1 2007m7 2008m1 2008m7 2009m1 2009m7 2010m1 2010m7 2011m1 2011m7
Notes: The figure shows the total number of receipts (millions of receipts) – with and without a SSN – electronically reported to
the tax authority by month by establishments in Sao Paulo. The vertical lines highlight the key dates for the implementation of
the NFP program. Between Oct.07 (Phase-in begins line) and May.08 (Phase-in ends line) 8 groups of sectors were phased-in in
the policy of submitting receipts electronically to the tax authority. The possibility of inserting a SSN in the receipt for tax rebate
purposes was introduced along with the electronic submission of receipts. The first lottery based on the purchases with SSN
receipts was introduced in Dec.2008.
1.2
600
th
20
1.15
500
15
millions of consumers
1.1
400
10
1.05
300
5
1
0
200
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
2009m1 2010m1 2011m1 2012m1 day of the month
Consumers with online accounts Consumers that ask for SSN receipts Nota Fiscal Paulista Futebol (soccer)
2009m1 2010m1 2011m1 2012m1
and Dec. 2011. Monthly expenditure is the sum of the total value of SSN receipts by individual. The spikes of expenditure around
December of each year follows the seasonal variation in consumption due to Christmas shopping.
80
39
(millions US$)
20 40 60 0
Notes: Figure 4a displays the search volume from Google Trends website for Google searches with terms related to ”nfp” or ”nota
fiscal paulista” or ”nota paulista” pooled by day of the month from IPs addresses in the state of Sao Paulo between Oct. 2007
and Dec. 2011. It also displays searches for “futebol” (soccer in Portuguese) pooled by day of the month from IPs addresses in the
state of Sao Paulo for the same time period. The lottery results are released around the 15th of each month marked by the solid
vertical line. In Figure 4b each data point is the total amount in millions of US$ requested for direct deposit in consumer’s bank
accounts. As described in section II.B, the tax authority does a biannual disbursement of the tax rebates: every April and October.
Figure 5: Compliance Effect – Retail vs. Wholesale
a. Raw data: reported revenue changes
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
.5
0
Retail Wholesale
b. Difference coefficients for 6-month time bins - Log reported revenue by sector
17.6
eported Revenue
DD coef. = 0.22***
[0.042]
17.4
.2
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07_Connerley_Ch6.qxd
144
Table 6.1 Median Levels of Decentralization Measures by Geographic Region, 1995 (percentage)
4/19/10
Number of tiers 164 4 4 4 3 3.5 3 4 3
Percent elected 155 33.3 35.4 33.3 62.5 0.0 83.3 33.3 69.0
Subnational share
3:21 PM
of public
expenditure 67 4.7 10.8 37.6 9.6 8.4 16.9 27.6 24.1
Subnational share
of total tax
Page 144
revenue 53 4.0 6.5 N/A 6.7 6.3 7.3 24.2 13.4
Subnational share
of public
employment 90 23.1 41.0 50.0 20.8 35.8 26.4 35.4 48.4
Stipulated
autonomy 133 6.9 11.8 20.0 23.5 0.0 8.3 15.4 33.0
Residual authority 133 3.8 5.9 20.0 22.2 0.0 16.7 7.7 23.8
Federal 164 4.8 5.2 28.6 14.8 5.3 9.1 7.1 23.8
Sources: Daniel Treisman, Defining and Measuring Decentralization: A Global Perspective (Los Angeles: University of California, 2002);
D. Elazar, Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1994);
S. Saideman, D. Lanoue, M. Campenni, and S. Stanton, “Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series
Analysis, 1985–1998,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (1) (2002): 103–129.
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