In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005

PROVISIONS​:
● Article 365 of the Civil Code: An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
● Article 189 of the Family Code: The adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and shall have the right to use the surname of the adopters.

FACTS: The petitioner's application to adopt his illegitimate child was granted by the
trial court who also ordered that the child's name be changed to reflect the petitioner's
surname. Before the adoption, the child had been using her natural mother's middle
name and surname. The petitioner wanted to change the child's name such that the
child would keep her natural mother's surname as her middle name and the petitioner's
surname as her surname. The trial court denied the petitioner's request as there was no
law that allowed an adopted child to use the surname of the child's biological mother as
the child's middle name.
The petitioner appealed and argued that the trial court had erred in its decision.
While there is no law providing that an adopted child can use the natural mother's
surname as a middle name, there is no law prohibiting it either. It is also customary for
every Filipino to have the surname of the mother as a middle name and the use in this
instance is customary, not opposed by any interested party or prohibited by any laws.
The petitioner argued that adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence the child's right to bear a proper name should not be violated. In
addition, permitting the child to use her mother's surname as her middle name avoids
the stigma of her illegitimacy.

ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The Court held that it was
permissible, reversed the trial court's decision and granted the petitioner's appeal.

RULING: ​The Court held that there is no law expressly prohibiting the child to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name and what is not prohibited by law, is
allowed. It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. While not set out in law this custom has been recognized during
the lawmaking process. In fact, the Family Law Committees had agreed that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to preserve and maintain the child’s
relationship with her natural mother because under the law, she remains an intestate
heir of the mother. The underlying intent of adoption law is in favour of the child and the
effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes under the law. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption by the petitioner, it follows that the child is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother.
 Adoption law should be interpreted and construed liberally to carry out the
beneficial purposes of adoption with the interests and welfare of the adopted child being
the primary and paramount consideration.

Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-8639, March 23, 1956

FACTS: Leopoldo Prasnik was seeking to adopt four children– Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto
Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik—minor children whom he
claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ biological children minus the benefit of marriage.
However, the Solicitor General opposed this stating citing the following provision
in Article 338 of the Civil Code which provides the allowing of a natural child to be
adopted by his father and which refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged
as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his
natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the
natural child. Otherwise, it will go against Article 335.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural
children of either parents.

RULING: If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children then
Article 338 would be devoid of purpose. The law intends to allow adoption whether the
child be recognized or not. The law provides that the rights of an acknowledged
natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child and going against the fact
that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these
rights. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which
when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a
natural child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.

LAZATIN v. CAMPOS
G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979

FACTS:
1. Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of
support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to
Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin.
2. During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the bank which
either she or respondent Nora de Leon (adopted daughter) could open. 5 days
after her death, Nora opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents:
(a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent
Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Nora claims
that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held
jointly by her and her deceased mother.
3. Respondents filed a petition to probate (establish the validity) the will. After
having learned that the safety box was opened, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta.
 Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had
executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its
production.
4. Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in
the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit
executed by Benjamin Lazatin (brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin),
the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him. This affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
5. During the hearing, Renato presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead,
he attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had
recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by
them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses
refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his
wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few
months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila,
owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the
present.
6. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph
of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of
deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document
showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin."
7. Respondent court first reserved its ruling when petitioner could not present
evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court
discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the
question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioner.

ISSUE:​ Whether Renato has established his status as an adopted child.

RULING:
1. NO. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding which creates between two persons
a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid
down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person
claiming its existence.
2. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. The absence of proof of such order of adoption
by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence
that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a
child to establish such adoption.
3. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such
 secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument.
4. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents;
although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
5. As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the
adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only
be introduced if it has first been established that such adoption paper really
existed and was lost.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES​ ​v.​ ​HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA,

in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and
ROSALINA D. DYE
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997

FACTS: The spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages
13 and 12 years old, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the
United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American.

ISSUE:​ Whether the spouses Dye may legally adopt Maricel and Alvin Due

RULING: No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is
proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

xxx xxx xxx
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt

Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is

disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall
under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to
adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives
by consanguinity, he is not married to a ​Filipino citizen​, for Rosalina was already a
naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the
coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to
a​ former Filipino citizen​ seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law
mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code
provision that husband and wife ​may​ jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule
by scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory.
Article 185 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 185. ​Husband and wife must adopt​, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did
not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly situated alien
husband with a former Filipino wife seeking to adopt the latter's nephews and niece in
the case of ​Republic v​. ​Court of Appeals​. Although the wife in said case was qualified to
adopt under Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband under
Article 185 because he was an alien ineligible to adopt here in the Philippines.