Benton, Lauren e Straumann, Benjamin (Direito Romano e Imperios Europeus)

American Society for Legal History
The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice
Author(s): LAUREN BENTON and BENJAMIN STRAUMANN
Source: Law and History Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 1-38
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AcquiringEmpireby Law: FromRoman
Doctrineto EarlyModernEuropeanPractice
LAURENBENTON AND BENJAMINSTRAUMANN
WhatroledidtheRomanlegalconceptofresnullius(thingswithout owners),
ortherelatedconceptοι terranullius(landwithout owners),playinthecontext
ofearlymodernEuropeanexpansion?Scholarshaveprovidedwidelydifferent
answersto thisquestion.Some historians have arguedthatEuropeanclaims
basedon terranulliusbecamea routine partofearlymoderninterimperial poli-
tics,particularlyas a responsebytheEnglishandFrenchcrownsto expansive
Iberianclaimssupported bypapal donations.Othershavecountered thatallu-
sionsto terranulliusmarkeda temporary of
phase imperial discourse andthat
claimantsreliedmoreoftenon otherrationalesforempire,rarelymentioning
res nulliusor terranulliusand oftenexplicitlyrecognizingthe ownership
rights,and eventhesovereignty, of local politiesand indigenouspeoples.
In sorting outthesearguments and counterarguments aboutres nulliusand
terranullius,we findthatscholarsonbothsidesofthedebatehavereliedonrela-
tivelyunexamined assertions
abouttheRomanlegalconceptsandthewaythey
werebeingusedinandoutsideearlymodernEurope.A commonerror istoconfl-
ate theidea thatEuropeansweredeeplyinfluenced by Roman law withthe
that
assumption they were veryfamiliarwith Roman law concepts.Scholars'
assessments of terranulliustendalso to collapsemultifaceted arguments and
actionstakingplaceatmanylevelsofimperialactivity, assuming,forexample,
theexistence ofdirectandclearconnections betweenthewritings ofjuristsand
LaurenBentonis Professorof Historyand Affiliate

Professorof Law at New York
University<lauren.benton@nyu.edu>and BenjaminStraumann is AlbericoGentili
Fellow at New York UniversitySchool of Law <benjamin.straumann@nyu.edu>.
For helpfulcommentson earlierdrafts,the authorswould like to thankJane
Burbank,Paul Corcoran,AndrewFitzmaurice, Daniel Hulsebosch,WilliamNelson,
fouranonymousreviewersforthisjournal,and theparticipantsin theLegal History
Colloquiumat theNYU School ofLaw.
Law and HistoryReviewFebruary2010, Vol. 28, No. 1

© theAmericanSocietyforLegal History,
Inc.,2010
doi:10. 10 17/S0738248009990022

2 Law and HistoryReview,February
2010
scholarsin Europeand theactionsor pronouncements of imperialagentsin

empire. Most scholars have further failed to distinguish betweenpronounce-
mentsfordifferent audiences.Writers in
engaged intraimperial debatesabout
themoralandlegallegitimacy ofcolonialruleoftenreferred moreexplicitly to
theRomandoctrine ofresnullius.Imperialagentsattempting to support claims
againstotherEuropeanpowerstendedincontrast toinvokeresnulliusindirectly,
ifatall,inpresenting evidenceforoccupation, usuallypreferring ratherunsyste-
maticdiscussions ofproofsofpossessioninstead.Thesevariousarguments had
consistentbasesinRomanlawand,inpractice, formed of a
part singlerepertoire
fromwhichimperiallegal actorscould drawstrategically dependingon local
conditions, indigenous people'sactions, and the stateofinterimperial rivalries.
Distinguishing among differentarenas for discourse about res nulliusin
and
empire correcting confusions about its Roman law origins will allow us
to reconcilemanyof theseeminglyopposingarguments and move towards
a balancedand morenuancedinterpretation of thedoctrine'srolein empire.
Buildingthisalternative approachto understanding res nullius,terranullius,
andempirerequires twoexercises.Thefirst involvesa reconsideration ofthese
conceptsin Romanlaw and a discussionof thesourceson whichEuropeans
weredrawingas theyconstructed rationales for,andcriticism of,empire.This
analysisdependsupona consideration ofwhatconstituted international law at
thetime,whatits formalsourceswere,and whattextswereregardedas its
repositories.The exercisewill show thatearlymodernscholarsand writers
oftenreferred to resnulliusin waysthat,farfromsupporting imperialclaims,
bolsteredsophisticated criticismof empire.The secondtaskis to reassessthe
waysinwhichimperialclaimswereputforward anddefended, withparticular
emphasison thedirector indirect referencing of Romanlaw by nonscholars
activelyinvolvedin imperialventures.
Contrary totheviewsofsomehistorians, ouranalysiswillshowthatresnul-
lius was a conceptwitha firmfoundation in Romanlegal sources,butterra
nullius was merely derived from the Roman concept of res nullius
byanalogy.Itturnsoutalso tobe somewhat misleading todescribeeithercon-
ceptas constituting a "doctrineof a legalvacuum"or to conflateeitherterm
withrationalesforimperialclaimsbased on vacuumdomicilium (vacancy).1
1. On terranulliusas a "doctrineofa legalvacuum,"see BrianSlattery,"PaperEmpires:The

Legal Dimensionsof Frenchand EnglishVenturesin NorthAmerica,"Despotic Dominion:
PropertyRightsin BritishSettlerSocieties,ed. in J.McLaren,A. R. Buck and Ν. Ε. Wright
(Vancouver:University ofBritishColumbiaPress,2005), 5 1. David Armitage discussesvacuum
domiciliumand terranulliusin tandemin his The Ideological Originsof theBritishEmpire
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,2000), 97. For a discussionof theobscureorigins
of the"seductive"termvacuumdomicilium, sometimesas synonymous withterranullius,see
Paul Corcoran,"JohnLockeon thePossessionofLand:NativeTitlevs. the'Principle'ofvacuum
domicilium,'"Proceedings,AustralasianPolitical Studies Association Annual Conference

AcquiringEmpirebyLaw 3
All theseconceptswerenestedwithina largercontextofprivateRomanlaw

ideas aboutnaturalacquisitionofprivateproperty by occupatio.Not surpris-
in or
ingly, criticizing defendingimperial claims,Europeansoftendrewon
Roman law withoutinvokingtheseterms,using otherwordsto allude to
ideas similarbutnotidenticalto Romanlaw concepts.Withoutevenaddres-
singthecomplexquestionofwhether and whenwritings on res nulliuswere
availabletoEuropeansengagingindebatesaboutempireordevelopingimper-
ial claims,we can surmisethattheyinterpreted Romanlegalideasdifferently,
and at timesunderstood themimperfectly.
In additionto interpretingRoman law freely,Europeanswere invoking
elementsof it in the contextof ongoingdebatesabout law in empireand,
as a result,theyused theideas to differenteffect.The writings of Francisco
de Vitoria,Domingode Soto, AlbericoGentili,and Hugo Grotiusprovide
good illustrationsof thewaysres nulliuswas used in into-and interimperial
debatesaboutEuropeanexpansion.Some of thesewriters'use of res nullius
was sophisticated and technicallyaccurate,betraying an intimate knowledge
of the Roman sources.Such arguments oftenhad more of a vertical,or
intraimperial,audienceand weremoreoftenthannotcriticalof empire.
The Europeandiscourseon possessionand occupationdevelopedbothin
metropolitan centersand in empire.Our analysisof symbolicactsand state-
mentsaboutpossessionin the earlymodernAtlanticworldwill show that
imperial agentsengagedinandencouragedan inclusive, nottosayscattershot,
approachtolegalrationales. Theyfavoredinclusionofbothdirectandindirect
referencing of Romanlegal language,in partpreciselybecause theywanted
theiractionsand wordsto be understood by Europeanrivals.Even as they
jockeyedforpositionand patronagewithinempires,theyformulated argu-
mentsto presentand defendsovereigns'claimsbeforean interimperial, or
horizontal, audience.Theirmainobjectivewas toshowbetter titletoterritories
vis-à-viscompetingempiresratherthanto defendclaimsto absolutetitleor
morallegitimacy, andthisinterest
ledthemtofavormultiple, oftenvagueallu-
sionstopossessionoverallusionsto occupationand res nullius,a distinction
thatwill become cleareronce theRoman legal backgroundis analyzed.If
imperial agentsreferencedthedoctrineofresnulliusatall,theydidso inrather
unsophisticated in
ways,usually verynontechnical language,and oftenin
combination withotherlegalarguments.
Combiningtheanalysisof theRoman law and its interpretation in early
modernEuropewithan understanding of thevariousaudiencesand agents
involvedand thebroad-basednatureof claims makingallows us to move
beyondthe flawedalternatives of eitherviewingres nulliusas a guiding
(Melbourne: Monash University,24-26 September2007), http://arts.monash.edu.au/psi/

news-and-events/apsa/refereed-papers/index.php#political_theory.

4 2010
Law and HistoryReview,February
"doctrineof conquest"or concludingfromits nonsystematic application

thatideas about res nulliuswere ignoredin the process of earlymodern
empirebuilding.The unevenand sometimesoblique references to res nul-
lius in the contextof Europeanexpansionin turnilluminatethe place of
Roman law in the construction of ideas about a legal orderoutsideand
betweenestablishedpolitiesand aboutimperialsovereignty in thisperiod.
The Romanlaw of theCorpusiurisand especiallytheDigest increasingly
assumed the place of a source of normsbetweenthe emergingimperial
polities,graduallysupersedingothersources,such as papal grantsor cer-
taincustoms.At thesame time,Roman legal doctrinescompriseda reper-
toireratherthana blueprintfordesigningimperialclaims. Early modern
writerswere innovativein expanding the range and application of
Romansourcesto assess thelegal and moralbasis forEuropeanexpansion,
buttheycontinuedelementsof a tradition developedby latemedievalglos-
sators in theirfocuson reinterpretingdefinitions in Romanpri-
of property
vate law.2 The approach leftopen the possibility incomplete,or even
of
indefensible, claimsto sovereignty orownershipin empire,withtheconcept
ofresnulliusbeingused toundermine Europeanclaimsto sovereignty inthe
newlydiscoveredterritories, orto attackrivalempires'trademonopoliesby
questioningtheirexclusiverightto controlvast partsof the ocean. This
theoreticaldiscussionragingin universitiesand treatisesand conducted
oftenat a highlevelof abstraction was different from,butformedtheback-
groundto, theattempts of imperialagentsto supportclaims to broad and
oftenill-defined bycitingsettlements
territories andmarkers as signsofpos-
session and occupation - with"possession"and "occupation"understood
less as technicalRomanlegal termsthanas vague claimsto legitimacy.
Our aim in thisarticleis notto providea comprehensive treatment of the
sundryuses to whichthe conceptof res nulliuswas put in the contextof
earlymodernEuropeanexpansion.Rather,we seek to put forwarda view
thatmakesroomfora reconciliation of someof theseeminglycontradictory
interpretationsfoundintheresearch andtooutlinea moreflexiblefra-
literature
meworkforunderstanding themanyarenasinwhichRomanlawwas invoked,
and formultiplepurposes.We findthatwhiletheconceptof res nulliuswas
indeedwell knownand used by earlymodernscholarsand writers - and not
international -
lawyers itwas puttoverydifferent
onlybynineteenth-century
uses thanthoseusuallyimagined.We also showthatalthoughimperialagents
2. For thedoctrineof thingscommonto all, see RichardPerruso,"The Developmentof the

Doctrine of Res Communesin Medieval and Early Modern Europe," Tijdschriflvoor
Rechtsgeschiedenis70 (2002): 69-94. Perrusoemphasizestheweightof classical,especially
Stoic,philosophyforthedevelopment ofideasofrescommunesinthesixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.

busywithwardingoffotherempires'and autochthonous claimsdid notuse

Romanlegal conceptsin any technicalway,theirclaimsof possessionstill
betraya fleetingacquaintancewith ideas loosely connectedwithRoman
law.Ourapproachleavesopenthepossibility ofearlymoderntreatiseliterature
using res nulliusin thewaysconventionally or
imagined, of imperialagents
actingon detailedknowledgeof technicalRoman legal concepts.But our
assertionis thatEuropeansmainlyinvokedres nulliusexplicitlywithincri-
tiquesofthelegalbasisofempireandimplicitly andunsystematically- along-
side claims to possession- withina broad set of symbolicactions and
statements designedto establishsuperiorclaimsoverimperialterritories.
This articleproceedsin fourparts.Firstwe tryto give an assessmentof
theexistingresearchliterature.PartII discussestheRomanbackgroundof
res nullius,and PartsIII and IV will deal withthe role of res nulliusin
earlymodernpoliticaland legal thoughtand in a samplingof symbolic
acts connectedwithearlymodernimperialpractice,respectively. A final
sectionreflectsupon the lessons of our analysisforan understanding of
theinfluenceof Roman law in earlymodernimperialpracticeand theory.
I. Two Views of TerraNullius
Some historians writethattheEnglishembracedres nulliusas a mainrhe-

toricalweapon againstthe Spaniardsas if describingwidelyacceptedhis-
toricalfact.J.H. Elliott,forexample,statesthattheEnglishbothemployed
res nulliusto combatSpanishclaimsand reliedon it as "theprincipaljus-
tificationforseizingland fromtheIndians."3He notesthatundertheprin-
ciple of res nullius,thosewho firstdiscoveredlandsbecame theirowners.4
Linkinginvocationsof res nulliusto Englishperceptionsof Indian land
use, Elliottsuggeststhattheconceptwas employedmorereadilyin places
in theNew Worldthatwere only "thinlypopulated."5
For all these statements, Elliott relies on a single source: Anthony
Pagden's Lords ofAll the World.6Given Elliott'sand others'relianceon
thistext,itis perhapsusefulto surveyPagden's arguments and thesupport
he providesforthem.7Pagden'sbroadeststatement of theimportance of res
3. J.H. Elliott,Empiresof theAtlanticWorld.Britainand Spain in America,1492-1830

(New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress,2006), 12.
4. Ibid., 30.
5. Ibid., 32.
6. AnthonyPagden,Lords of All the World:Ideologies of Empirein Spain, Britainand
France, C.1500-C.1800 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1995). More specifi-
cally,Elliot citestwo pages (and sometimesone page) fromPagden's book: 76-77.
7. We will discuss Pagden's somewhatdifferent analysisof res nulliusin anotherof his
worksbelow.

6 2010
nulliusinEuropeancolonizingrunsas follows:"[T]heBritish, andto a some-

whatlesserdegreetheFrench,weredrivento legitimizetheirsettlements in
termsofone oranother varianton theRomanlaw argument knownas resnul-
lius. This maintainedthatall 'emptythings,'which includedunoccupied
lands,remainedthecommonproperty of all mankinduntiltheywereputto
some, generallyagricultural, use. The firstpersonto use the land in this
way became itsowner."8 As Pagden'sphrase"one or anothervarianton ...
resnullius"indicates, hepresents theconceptas an umbrellatermencompass-
a
ing range of rationales for, actionsintendedto secure,imperialclaims.
and
ThisapproachallowsPagdentotreatclaimsbasedon discovery, improvement
("agricultural"use), and settlement of"unoccupiedlands"as partsofa single
legaldoctrine.Italso permits Pagdentodrawa lineconnecting Europeanstate-
mentsaboutclaimsbased on resnulliusfrom Thomas Moreto LocketoVattel
and,finally,to defenders of theBritish settlementof Australia.
WhileElliottand othershave followedPagdenin usingthetermres nul-
lius to referto a bundle of strategiesformarkingand defendingclaims,
otherscholarshave also emphasizedthe continuitiesin European,and
especiallyEnglish,thinkingabout rightsto "vacant" land over centuries
of colonial expansion and rule. Like Pagden, for example, David
Armitagedrawsconnectionsacrossthecenturies:"Fromthe 1620s to the
1680s in Britain,and thenin NorthAmerica,Australiaand Africawell
intothenineteenth century, the argumentfromvacancy{vacuumdomici-
lium)or absenceof ownership{terranullius)becamea standardfoundation
forEnglishand, later,Britishdispossessionof indigenouspeoples."9Here
res nulliusbecomesterranullius^a termthatcame intouse in international
law circlesin thelate nineteenth century.Debates have arisenamonghis-
toriansaboutwhetherthetermshouldbe used to characterize rationalesfor
late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century imperialexpansion
whenthetermitselfwas rarely - if ever- citedbeforethe late nineteenth
century.10More importantis to observe that Armitage' s approach
8. Pagden,Lords ofAll the World,76.

9. Armitage,TheIdeological Originsof theBritishEmpire,97. For a cntiqueof elevating
vacuumdomiciliumto a positionof prominencein earlyEnglishdiscourse,see Corcoran,
"JohnLocke on thePossessionof Land." It is worthpointingoutthatArmitagecharacterizes
terranullius as "a standardfoundation"ratherthan"the standardfoundation"of English
dispossessionof indigenouspeoples, an importantdifferencethat,if emphasized,brings
the claim more closely into line withour approachand withthatof Pagden's laterworks
discussedbelow.
10. This debatehas been mostpointedamongAustralianhistorians.Curiously,a reexami-
nationof Roman legal ideas and theirearlymodernapplicationshas been mostlymargina-
lized fromthisdebate.For example,Michael Connoraccuses some Australianhistoriansof
elevatingterranulliusto thepositionof a centraldoctrinein the conquestof Australiaand
the dispossessionof Aborigineswhen thereis no recordof imperialagentsusing the term

effectivelymergesPagden's views with the argumentsof Tuck, whose

influentialaccount of the historyof European thoughton international
ordertracesa neatparallelbetweentwo developments:(i) the elaboration
of the naturallaw theory(runningfromMore to Gentili to Grotius),
includingthe view "thatuncultivatedland was unoccupied and might
simplybe appropriated," and (ii) the statementsby colonistsand colonial
investorsin Virginiaand Massachusettsabouttheirrightsto "unpeopled"
lands.11
These expansivecharacterizations of res nulliusas a centralprinciple
of English (and French) colonizing have recentlycome under attack.
Surveyingearly English and Frenchclaims makingin NorthAmerica,
for example, Slatterystates categoricallythat territoriesin the New
World"were not terranullius"and "could be acquiredonly by methods
applicable to occupied territories."12 For Slattery,the main evidence
against the influenceof ideas about res nullius consists in explicit
claims by Frenchand English officialsthatconquest or cession, rather
than occupationor settlement, providedthe foundationfor theiracqui-
sitionof new lands. StuartBanner,althoughacknowledgingthat some
colonistsadvocated seizures of land in NorthAmerica on the assump-
tion thatit was "vacant,"also assertsthat"by the middle of the eight-
eenthcentury,imperialpolicy in NorthAmericahad turnedaway from
terranullius"13Bannerfindsthe key to overturning the assumptionthat
Europeansreliedon terranulliusin the series of acts and statements by
Europeans indicatingtheir recognitionof Indian propertyrights,not
untilafterit surfacedin late nineteenth-centuryinternational

law cases. But he repeatsthe
errorin definingterranulliusas "land withoutsovereignty" ratherthan"land withoutown-
ers."The former definitionemergedin a latenineteenth-century internationallaw and lightly
distortsthe view thatwould have been available, by analogy,to earlierimperialagentsin
Australia and that might easily have informedtheir strategies,in the same way that
Europeans in early modernempire employed Roman legal rationaleswhile also citing
themunsystematically. Michael Connor, The Inventionof Terra Nullius: Historical and
Legal Fictionson theFoundationof Australia(Paddington,N.S.W.: Macleay, 2005).
11. RichardTuck, The Rightsof Warand Peace: Political Thoughtand theInternational
OrderfromGrotiusto Kant (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1999), 123-25.
iz. önan Mattery, Faper bmpires: lhe Legal Dimensions ot French and English
Venturesin NorthAmerica," in Despotic Dominion: PropertyRights in BritishSettler
Societies,ed. JohnMcLaren, A. R. Buck, and Nancy E. Wright(Vancouver: University
of BritishColumbia Press,2005), 72. Slattery'sis an unfortunatechoice of words,as occu-
pationis preciselythemethodof choice whenit comes to acquisitionof res or terranullius.
13. StuartBanner, "Why Terra Nullius? Anthropologyand PropertyLaw in Early
Australia,"Law and HistoryReview 23 (1) (2005): 95. See also StuartBanner,How the
Indians Lost TheirLand: Law and Power on the Frontier(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard
UniversityPress,2005).

2010
realizingthatres or terra nullius could be and were indeed used pre-

cisely in orderto recognizeIndian propertyrights - as should become
clear in the next section.In contrastto Tuck's accountof a tightlypar-
allel developmentof views by European scholars and colonial agents,
Banner perceives a sharp differencebetween theoryand practice -
some Europeanscontinuedto cast aroundforjustifications forcolonial
settlementwell aftersettlersthemselveshad affirmedthe purchase of
land fromIndians as the centralmode for legitimately acquiringterri-
tory. Locke's for
writing, example, was "an exercise in high theory"
thatboth contradicted otherviews and had scant influenceon land pol-
icy conductedby settlerswho would have "known [that]Locke was
wrong."14
Beforeturningto the questionof why researchin similarsourceshas
producedsuch different conclusions,we shouldnote thattheseopposing
approachesrepresent onlytwo variantsin a widerset of arguments about
the legal rationalesfor Atlanticempire.In this broaderhistoriography,
otherquestionsabout Europeanlegal approachesto empireare at stake.
One issue that overlaps with the res nullius and terra nullius debate
involvesthedegreeto whichEuropeanswererelyingon distinctmunicipal
legal traditions
or weredrawingon sharedRomanlegal sources.The most
extremeexampleofthefirst view is perhapstheworkof PatriciaSeed, who
has argued that the various nations involved in Atlantic colonizing
employedstrikingly differentsymbolicritualsof possessionthatwere in
many cases opaque to outsiders.Seed representsthe English common
law (mixed with some biblical sources) as the main foundationfor
English associationsof ownershipthroughimprovement.15 Againstthis
view, Ken MacMillan has arguedthatRoman legal sourceswere closely
followedin Englishdiscourseaboutdiscovery,occupation,and possession
in theNew World.AlthoughMacMillan's approachmarksthelegal frame-
workforcompetingclaimsas transnational, givenitsoriginsin a historyof
Roman law as European ius commune,it also situatesthe problemof
imperialacquisitionin the contextof what Slatteryhas referred to as "a
formof Europeanregionallaw."16This perspectiverecognizesthatdistinc-
tionsbetweenthelaw of nationsand sharedunderstandings of law across
14. Banner,How theIndians Lost TheirLand, 47-48.

15. PatriciaSeed, Ceremoniesof Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World,
1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995); Patricia Seed, American
Pentimento:The Inventionof Indians and the Pursuitof Riches (Minneapolis:University
of MinnesotaPress,2001).
16. Ken MacMillan, Sovereigntyand Possession in the English World: The Legal
Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2006);
Slattery,"Paper Empires,"52.

similarlystructured legal orderswere blurredin the sixteenthand seven-

teenthcenturies.17 The task of definingthe relationof res nulliusto acts
of possessionand occupationconnectsdirectlyto the questionof which
legal framework - municipallaw, emerginginternational law, or some
blending of the two - defineddiscourse about colonial settlement and
imperial claims.
It is worthnoting,too, thatalternative interpretationsof the importance
ofres nulliusin theseprocessesplayoutin somewhatdifferent formsin the
historiography on earlierand later periods. We can point to an emerging
consensus,forexample,aboutthelegal implications ofpapal bulls support-
ing Iberianexpansionand, specifically,the Treatyof Tordesillas.Rather
thanawardingthe Portugueseand Spanish crownstitle(or sovereignty)
to hemispheresdividedby a north-south line in the Atlantic,the Treaty
of Tordesillasmarkedoffspheresof influence.That is, further acts were
for
required Spain and Portugalto establish dominionoverparticular terri-
torieswithinthe spheres,even while each powerwas in theoryprotected
fromincursionsby otherChristianforces.18 Further,thepope's jurisdiction
over extra-European ventureswas recognizedas both limitedin practice
and expansivein certaincircumstances - authority over spiritualmatters
could extendto otherpractices,even involvingnonbelievers,thatcontra-
vened divine law.19 Recognizing these constraintson Iberian claims
based on papal donations is consistentwith the view that both the
Portugueseand Spanishcrownstriedforextendedperiodsand at particular
conjunctures to establishan interpretationof thesegrantsas awardingtitle.
It is only againstthe backdropof this positionthatEnglish and French
references to rightsbased in discoveryand occupationcan be seen as his-
toricallynovel. More broadly,theturnto Roman law sourcesformedpart
of a challengeto papal authority withininternational law and at the same
time of a move towardsa new doctrineof sources of legal obligation
17. On the idea of a global legal regimein the earlymodernperiod,see Lauren Benton,
Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in WorldHistory,1400-1900 (New York:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).
18. As Slatterystates,"thepapal grantstookeffectonlywhenthegranteeassumed 'actual
and realpossession'" ("Paper Empires,"55). In notgranting sovereignty,thepapal donations
did notconstrueextra-European lands as unoccupiedor unclaimed.Instead,thegrantseffec-
tivelyconferred therightto possess newlydiscoveredterritories and/oracquirethemby con-
quest (throughthesubjugationof non-Christians who by implicationheld sovereigntyat the
timeof discovery)or cession. See SharonKorman,The Rightof Conquest: TheAcquisition
of Territory by Force in InternationalLaw and Practice (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,
1996),44-45.
19. JamesMuldoon, Popes, Lawyers,and Infidels:The Churchand the Non-Christian
World, 1250-1550 (Philadelphia: Universityof Pennsylvania Press, 1979); see also
Benton,Law and Colonial Cultures,ch. 2.

2010
betweenpolities,a doctrinethataccordedspecial weightto Roman legal

materials.20
Fornineteenth-century empire,somehistorians pointto theimportance of
terranulliusbutdisagreeon thedetailsofhow and whenitwas invokedas a
butothersarguethatitis significant
legal doctrine, thatexplicitreferences to
terranulliusare in factabsentfromthe historicalrecordof debatesabout
colonialsovereignty.Suggesting,forexample,thatbythemiddleofthenine-
teenthcenturyBritishobserversand Australiancourtshad embracedterra
nulliusas a rationaleforsettlement in Australiawithoutcompensation to
Aborigines,John Gascoigne asserts
that thispositionwas "part of themental
furnitureofthefounders," whileKercherplaces itsemergence at theendofa
of
period legal confusion about Aborigines'legal status.21
Connor has found
no explicitreferences in and
to terranullius the late eighteenth nineteenth
centuriesin Australia.22
AndrewFitzmaurice pointsto the constructed and
indirectapplicationof terra nullius as evidence that the principlehad
neverbeen well establishedas a partof imperialdiscourse - and he denies
thatthereeverwas anything resembling a doctrineof res nulliusin Roman
law.23StuartBanneremphasizesthediversity of waysin whichterranullius
fit withinland acquisitionschemes across the Anglo-AmericanPacific:
Australiaoptedfor"terranulliusby design,"California"endedup as terra
failed,and BritishColumbia"switchedto
nullius"aftertreatyratifications
terranullius"aftera periodof landpurchases.24
20. See for this change in the doctrineof sources of law, B. Straumann,"'Ancient
Caesarian Lawyers' in a State of Nature: Roman Traditionand NaturalRightsin Hugo
Grotius'De iurepraedae" Political Theory34 (3) (2006): 330, 332.
21. John Gascoigne, The Enlightenmentand the Origins of European Australia
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2002), 8; Bruce Kercher,"Native Title in the
Shadows: The Originsof the Mythof TerraNullius in Early New South Wales Courts,"
in Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected Studies, Gregory Blue, Martin
P. Bunton, and Ralph C. Crozier (Armonk,N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 100-119.
22. Connor {Inventionof Terra Nullius) goes on to accuse otherhistoriansof political
motivesin adoptinguncritically the assumptionthatterranulliushad featuredprominently
in nineteenth-century debatesand to criticizejuristsforsuggestingthatthetermhad histori-
cal relevancein thedecisionin Mabo v. The Stateof Queensland(1992) establishingnative
title.For a commenton his position,see note 10 above. Our hope is thatConnorand his
criticsmightgain somethingfromour analysis of res nullius in early moderndiscourse
and colonial practice.
23. AndrewFitzmaurice,"A Genealogyof TerraNullius" AustralianHistoricalStudies
129 (2007): passim,6. For an extensionof his arguments, see AndrewFitzmaurice,"Moral
Uncertainty in theDispossessionofNativeAmericans,"in TheAtlanticWorldand Virginia,
1550-1624, ed. P. C. Mancall (Chapel Hill: University ofNorthCarolinaPress,2007), 383-
409, wherean excellentaccountof the Salamancan School's stanceon empireis given.
24. StuartBanner,Possessing the Pacific: Land, Settlers,and IndigenousPeople from
Australiato Alaska (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,2007), 3.

The diversityof interpretations and the languagetheyemploysuggest

thatthe termterranulliusmay be standingin fornot a single doctrine
buta legal orientationand a diversesetof practices.Curiously,afterassert-
so
ing strongly just one side of the debate,it is Pagden who rendersthe
connectionsbetweenseeminglyopposed assessmentsof the influenceof
res nulliusmostclearly.The carefulqualificationsappear in an essay on
the"struggleforlegitimacy,"in whichPagden notesthat"the res nullius
argument. . . could only be made effectiveif it requiredsome claim to
priordiscovery,sincediscoveryconstituted thenecessaryfirststeptowards
effectiveoccupation."25Pagden also acknowledgesthat the intentto
demonstrate"effectiveoccupation" motivatedattentionto agricultural
improvement: "only the continuingfact" of settlement could ultimately
conferEuropeandominium.Prescription, in otherwords,added a further
layer of legitimacyto claims. Such statementstake Pagden ratherfar
fromhis initialemphasison res nullius and naturalrights.Sovereignty
depended upon occupation,which in turnwas preceded by discovery
and also requiredprescription; these argumentsrestedupon "legal, not
naturalrights."Pagden concludesthatres nulliusand prescription "were
partof thesame essentiallyexistential juridicalargument."26 hav-
Slattery,
ing arguedforcefully againstthe importanceof res nullius,at timesdoes
not seem far fromthis perspective.He emphasizesFrenchand English
instructionsto acquireterritoryin theNew Worldby conquestor cession,
yet the languagehe reportscommandsnotjust conquestbut also occu-
pation. The Marquis de la Roche, for example, traveled to North
Americain 1577 withinstructions "to raid, seize, besiege and make his
own each and all of theselandsthathe will be able to makehimselfmaster
25. Pagden, "The StruggleforLegitimacyand the Image of Empirein the Atlantic,to

c. 1700," in The Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,1998), 34-54; itis unclear,however,whydiscoverywould constitute a necessarycon-
ditionforoccupation - obviouslyone can occupy somethingwithout
havingdiscoveredit
first.
26. Ibid., 50. Pagden continuesthis approach in a still more recent article ("Law,
Colonization,Legitimation,and the European Background,"in The Cambridge History
of Law in America, Vol. I, Early America (1580-1815), ed. Michael Grossberg and
ChristopherTomlins [Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 2008], 1-31). But here
Pagden again emphasizes the termterra nullius as a key part of the wider discourse,
while also statingthatthetermitselfwas notused untilthenineteenth century.The distinc-
tionbetweenhis presentation in thisarticleand ourunderstanding
of theinfluenceof Roman
legal ideas aboutres nulliusis subtlebut,we think,important.Pagden writesthatin Roman
law "any territory thathad not been formallyenclosed in some mannerand could not be
defended,or had once been occupied, but was now abandoned,was held to be vacant"
(200). We emphasizethatsuch an explicitdefinitionwas presentmainlywithincritiques
of empire,but its implicitformemergedonly indirectly in imperialpractice,and in some-
whatmuddledform,througha congeriesof strategiesforassertingand defendingclaims.

2010
of,providedthattheydo notbelongto our friends, allies and confederates

of the Crown." Though this language betraysa concernwith conquest,
Slatterymustalso reportthatthecommissiondirectedLa Roche to estab-
lish effectiveoccupation:"to have fortresses built,constructed, erected,
fortifiedand strengthened ... in orderto retain,preserve,occupy,hold
and possess themunderour protection,and to enjoy and use them."27
Despite his claims to the contrary, Slatteryshows thatreferences to con-
quest and occupation formed -
part to use Pagden's phrase - of a single
"juridicalargument."
We arenowinsightofthesolutiontotheproblemofseemingly starkdiffer-
encesininterpretationoftheroleofresnulliusin imperialdiscourse.The sol-
utionhas severalparts.One requiresus to clarifytherelationbetweenres
nulliusinRomanlawandothermodesforacquiring property. Doingso allows
us to weighthedegreeto whichit is accurateto foldlegal arguments about
occupation,discovery, possession, and prescriptioninto a category defined
as the applicationof a doctrineof res nullius.FollowingRoman sources,
thereverseseemsmorelogical,thatis, res nulliusis a termused to describe
thingsthatcan be owned througha mode of acquisition,occupation,that
sitswithina largerset of modes of acquisition.A clearerunderstanding of
Roman legal principlesmustbe supplemented withconsideration of their
elaborationin sourcesthatwould have been available to sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century commentators and earlycolonialactors.28Finally,it is
important to recognizethatthecoexistenceof seeminglydifferent rationales
forcolonialacquisitionswas no accident.Authorsand speakersoftenunder-
stoodthearguments to fittogetherunderthelaw,ortheyconsideredthepres-
entationofmultiplearguments itselfas a viableand important legal strategy.
II. Roman Law and the Doctrine of Res Nullius
The Roman empireowed its existencemainlyto conquest.This factren-

dered the questionof the legitimacyof the empiredependentupon the
27. Slattery,"Paper Empires,"61.

28. We will nothereengagein a discussionor thethornyquestionot therespectiveweight
of thecommentators.
of the Corpus iuris,the Glossa ordinária,and thelaterinterpretations
Whenwe speakoftheinfluenceof Romanlaw,we do notwishto denytheimportance ofthe
glossatorsand thecommentators. For thepurposesof thisarticleand the level of generality
at whichit operates,however,nothingseems to hingeon a morefine-grained renderingof
whatRoman law meantto our writersand imperialagents.On the influenceof the Roman
law on thenaturallaw ideas of theglossators,see RudolfWeigand,Die Naturrechtslehre der
Legisten und Dekretistenvon Irnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis Johannes
Teutonicus(Munich: Max Hueber, 1967).

legitimacyof theconquestsleadingup to Romanrule.The legitimacyand

authority of directRomanrulein theprovincesof theempirehingedon a
doctrineconcernedwiththe legitimatewagingof war,thedoctrineof the
just war (bellumiustum).However,war was not the only way acknowl-
edged by the Romans leadingto legal authority and rightsover territory,
people, or things,nor was the doctrine of just war the only important
Roman legacy to early modernauthorsconcernedwith empire.Cicero,
in his influentialwork on practical ethics and political thought,On
Duties {De officiis),
discussedbothpublic and privaterightsoverterritory
and thingsand explainedthe emergenceof such rights - arisingout of
some sort of a naturalcondition - thus: "Nothingis private nature,
by
but ratherby long occupation [occupatio] (as when men moved into
some emptylands in the past), or by victory(when theyacquired it in
war), or by law [lex],by settlement, by agreement,or by lot [sors]. The
resultis thatthe land of Arpinumis said to belong to the Arpinates,and
thatof Tusculumto theTusculani.The distribution of privatepossessions
[possessiones]is of a similarkind."29AlthoughOn Duties is a philosophi-
cal ratherthana legal work,Cicero's terminology showsthathe was devel-
oping his ethicalideas in close analogy with privateRoman law when
talkingabouttheways in whichrights,bothpublicand private,overterri-
toryand thingsfirstemerged.It is certainlynoteworthy thatCicero's expla-
nationencompassesboth sovereignlegal authority and privateproperty,
therebyforeshadowing and effectivelyanticipatingthe analogy between
domesticprivatelaw and public international law with which the early
modernwriterson the law of nationsare so oftencredited.Cicero's list
of ways of acquisitionof public rightsseems fairlyexhaustive.30 Of the
variousmethodsby whichtherightsin questioncould be acquired,three
arepotentially relevantforwhatwe would nowadaysconsiderinternational
or externalsovereignty, namely,occupation{occupatio), victoryin war,
and, possibly,acquisitionof territory throughinterstate agreement{pac-
tio). Only acquisitionof emptylands by occupationis original,ab initio,
withoutany conveyance,be it voluntaryor not (such as in the case of
victoryin war).
29. Cic. de off.1,21: Suntautemprivata nulla natura,sed aut vetereoccupatione,ut qui

quondamin vacua venerunt, aut victoria,ut qui hellopotitisunt,aut lege,pactione,condi-
cione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas Arpinatiumdicatur,Tusculanus Tusculanorum;
similisqueestprivatarumpossessionumdiscriptio.The translations are takenfromCicero,
On Duties, ed. M. T. Griffinand E. M. Atkins(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1991) and have on occasion been modified.
30. See A. R. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Ojficiis(Ann Arbor:Universityof
MichiganPress, 1996), 110.

2010
Cicero's choiceof theterm"occupation"warrants theconclusionthathe
is thinkinghereof something analogousto theprivateRomanlaw doctrine
of theacquisitionof unownedthings{res nullius).However,the factthat
he is usingthetermoccupatioin conjunctionwiththequalifyingadjective
"long" (vetus occupatio) makes it probable thathe is also drawingan
analogy to a different privateRoman law doctrine,namely,acquisition
of ownershipby possessingthe thingfora certainperiod (usucapio). In
what follows,we will tryand give a briefsurveyover both doctrines.
Note thatwe will focus not on the law of Cicero's time,but on Roman
law as it appearsin Gaius and especiallyin Justinian's
Digest, since it is
in thislattershape thattheearlymodernauthorsknewit.31A further prin-
ciple fromRoman law, closely relatedto the doctrineof res nulliusbut
distinct,deservesmentioninghere because it was to have an impacton
theway earlymodernwriterson thelaw of nationsformulated theirargu-
ments:theprincipleof thesauriinventio,underwhicha treasurewithno
traceableowner goes to the finder.We shall discuss it in conjunction
withres nullius.
Res nulliusare thingsbelongingto no one. In the Roman sourcesthey
are discussedin thecontextof modes of acquisitionof ownership{domin-
ium). Thingsthatbelong to no one are susceptibleto being acquiredby
taking{occupatio),a mode of acquisitionunderstoodby theRomanjurists
to be natural,based on naturalreasonand the ius gentium,and therefore
open to Roman citizens and noncitizens{peregrini) alike- an aspect
thatis obviouslyofno smallimportance whenitcomesto theearlymodern
use of this doctrine.Here is Gaius on the acquisitionof ownershipof
unownedthings:
Of somethings we acquireownership [dominium] underthelaw ofnations
[iusgentium] whichis observed, bynatural reason,amongall mengenerally,
of othersunderthecivillaw [iuscivile]whichis peculiarto ourcity.And
sincethelaw of nationsis older,beingtheproduct of humannatureitself,
it is necessaryto treatof it first.So all animalstakenon land,sea, or in
theair,thatis, wildbeasts,birds,and fish,becometheproperty of those
who takethem.. . . Whatpresently belongsto no one [quod nulliusest]
becomesbynatural reasontheproperty ofthefirst taker[occupans].So far
as wild animalsand birdsare concerned, it mattersnotwhether theybe
takenon one's own or on someoneelse's land.. . . Anyof thesethings
whichwetake,however, areregarded as oursforso longas theyaregoverned
byourcontrol [custodia].Butwhentheyescapefrom ourcustodyandreturn
law of thelaterepublicanperiod,see A. Watson,TheLaw ofProperty

3 1. For theproperty
in theLater RomanRepublic(Oxford:Clarendon,1968), 7 1 and passim.

totheirnatural
stateoffreedom,
theyceaseto be oursandareagainopento
thefirst
taker.32
Unownedthingscan thusbe acquiredby anybody,Romancitizenor not,
underthelaw of nations{ius gentium)by takingthem(i.e., by occupatio).
The effectiveseizureof an unownedthingwas sufficient forestablishing
ownership,occupatio being an instant of
conveyer ownership;however,
withloss of actualcontrol,ownershipwould be losttoo, so thatownership
(dominium)was limitedby factualpossession{possessio). It does notseem
as if Gaius had meantto establisha numerusclausus of unownedthings
herewithhis listof "wild beasts,birds,and fish,"but had offeredmerely
a fewexamples.However,itis important to notethattitleto certainclasses
of thingscould not be gained by occupatio. Things thatwere open to
everyone{res communes),for example, such as the high seas or air,
could not be acquiredby capture.Such thingswere not susceptibleto
beingin anybody'sprivateproperty, norcould theypossiblybecome pub-
lic property{respublica), a rulethatwas to become veryimportant forthe
earlymodernwriterson thelaw of nationsin theirquarrelsover the free-
dom of theseas. For ourpurposesa further class of thingsnot susceptible
to acquisitionby occupatio should be mentioned:land. Provincialland
could not be acquiredby capturebecause it was in the propertyof the
Roman state,while Italic land belonged,to the degree thatit was not
also in the public domain,to the categoryof res mancipi,thingsthat
could only be acquired accordingto rules of the civil law {ius civile)
and notundertheius gentium(withoccupatiobeing,as discussed,an insti-
tutionof the latter).It mustbe kept in mind,however,thatthese rules
relatedto the acquisitionof land wentthrougha considerableprocess of
change and thatwhat the early modernwriterson the law of nations
were drawing upon was often Justinian'spostclassical Roman law,
whichhad given up the strictdistinction betweenres mancipiand other
thingsand which accordinglymade it seem possible to apply occupatio
to land.33
Anothercategoryof thingsthatcould be acquired by simple seizure
{occupatio) and was similar to the categoryof unowned things was
thatof res derelictae,that is, intentionally abandoned property,which
was held- by the more influentialstrandof Roman legal thoughtat
least- to be unowned {res nullius) fromthe time of abandonment.It
seems thattherewas a requirement in place thatthe occupier actually
32. Gai. Dig. 41, 1, 1-3: the translationis taken fromA. Watson,ed., The Digest of
Justinian,2 vols. (Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress, 1985).
33. See Max Käser, RömischesPrivatrecht,16thed. (Munich: Beck, 1992), 122.

16 2010
know thatthe thinghad been intentionally abandoned by its previous

owner.34
An interestingprinciplethatwas influential in earlymodernlegal writing
on thelaw ofnationsis acquisitionof ownershipoftreasure by thefinderof
thetreasure{thesauriinventio),a treasurebeing somethingvaluable with-
outa traceableowner.Like occupationthesauriinventiois a mode of acqui-
sitionsaid to be based on naturalequity(naturalisaequitas)35and noton
thecivillaw. Yet, itrestedon EmperorHadrian'slegislation,36 and itmight
very well be thatoccupatio was held by the Roman jurists be thelegal
to
basis of thismode of acquisition,too, as it is notsimplythefirstpersonto
see thetreasure to becometheowner,butthefirst personeffectively to con-
trolthe treasure.37 Still, discovery seems to be important in the Roman
sourcesand adds a key elementnot containedin therulesunderlying the
doctrineof res nullius,one thatwas to be of greatsignificanceforearly
modernlawyerswritingin theage of discoveries.
In case a thingdid have an owner,therewas stilla way in Romanlaw of
acquiringownershipover it otherthanfromthe existingowner,namely,
usucapio,theacquisitionof ownership(dominium)by possession(posses-
sio) fora certaintime.38Importantly, thismode of acquisition,goingback
is
to the Twelve Tables,39 part of the civil law (ius civile) and hence not
thoughtof as a "natural"way acquiringa thing(unlikeacquisitionby
of
occupatio). For the same reason, usucapio was at least originallynot
open to noncitizensand was restricted to thingsthat could be owned
underthe rules of the ius civile, such as land in Italy. There are two
main requirements forthismode of acquisitionof ownership.First,there
musthave been uninterrupted possession of the thingin question,two
yearsforland and one yearformovables.Possession in Roman law was
distinctfromownershipin thatit was based on factratherthanon entitle-
ment40 - a "personwho had a thingand intendedto possess itwas itspos-
sessor."41The secondrequirement forusucapio is thatthepossessionmust
have startedin good faithand witha good cause; so somebodyacquiring
real estatein good faithfroma personotherthanthe ownerof the thing
ofRomanLawfrom
A Text-Book
34. See Dig. 41, 7, 2pr.See also W. W. Buckland,
AugustustoJustinian, 2nded. (Cambridge:
Cambridge Press,1932),206.
University
35. Inst.2, 1,39.
36. Ibid.
37. See Buckland, Text-Booh, 219.
38. Forusucapio,see Dig. 41, 3, 1.
39. See Cic. top.4, 23.
40. David Johnston, RomanLaw in Context Cambridge
(Cambridge: UniversityPress,
1999),56.
41. Ibid.

EmpirebyLaw
Acquiring 17
undera contract of sale couldbecometheownerby usucapioby posses-
sing it without interruption fortwo years,exceptif thereal estatehad
beenpreviously stolen, inwhich caseusucapiowouldnotwork.Itis plaus-
iblethatusucapio,notbeingpartoftheiusgentium, seemedlessattractive
a doctrine totheearlymodern writers on thelawofnations. However, the
of
concept possession(possessio), understood as based on fact ratherthan
legalentitlement, provedtobe quiteimportant forthepractice ofimperial
agents, as we shall see in section four below. Possession, albeit a
originally
concept of thecivil, not the natural, law,was verypractical in thatitcould
be established andprotected muchmoreeasilythantitletoproperty; absent
theuse of force or stealth or a permission given somebodyelse,the
to
actualpossessor ofa thing wasgivenpossession ofthething bythepraetor.
Thismeantthatthepossessordidnothavetoprovetitle, whichwas absol-
ute,in ordertokeeppossession - he merely hadto showthathisclaimto
thethinginquestion was better thanhiscontestant's claim,thatis,thathe
hadnotgainedpossessionby forceor stealth fromtheotherlitigant and
thathehadnotgivenpermission totheotherlitigant. Thismadepossession
attractivetoearlymodern empires intheir dealingsandarguments vis-à-vis
competing empires;rather thanhavingto establishtitletoutcourt,they
simply couldaimto showthattheyhada better claimthanthecompeting
powerinquestion, without havingtopayattention tothelegitimacy oftitle
andhowthethingin questionhadbeenacquired.
We cantakeawayseveralpointsfrom thissummary toinform an under-
standing of earlymodernEuropeans'uses of Romanlaw in asserting
claimsto imperial territories.The firstis thatRomanlaw regarding the
acquisition ofunowned thingsconsisted at leastsinceJustinian ofa com-
plexblending ofseverallegaldoctrines. Although thesedoctrines seemed
tolendthemselves tobeingusedwithregard tothepublicorprivate acqui-
sitionof territory, theapplication of occupatioto landand,moreimpor-
tantly,to thepublicacquisition of territory required theuse of analogy,
given the narrow of
range things that could at least originally be acquired
undertheiusgentium andgiventheprivatelaw nature ofthedoctrine of
resnullius. As we haveseenabove,Cicerohadalready drawnsuchan ana-
logyin hisworkon ethicsandpoliticaltheory, On Duties.Thispointis
important because it underscores that when Europeansin the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries drewon Romanlaw, theydid not have the
optionof simplyseekingto applya unifieddoctrine to new conditions.
A related pointis that although classicalRoman law clearlydistinguished
between dominium andImperium - thelatter beinglegitimately wieldedby
Rome'smagistrates and extended through (just) wars - analogiesdrawn
fromtherealmofprivatelaw wereappliedto publicsovereignty already
in contemporary Romanpoliticaltheory. No matter how clearlyRoman

18 2010
juristsdistinguished betweenprivateand public law principles,some con-

cepts and principleswere bound to be applied across categories- occu-
pation is a key example. Later European writerswere thus not simply
misinterpreting Roman sourceswhentheyrepresented signsof occupation
in empireas symbolsof sovereignty and as markersof privateor corporate
claims or jurisdictions.Finally,Roman law underwentchange.The post-
classical Justiniansourcesthatwould have been mostreadilyavailable to
early modern Europeanshad introducedcertainchanges and simplifica-
tions, particularconflatingcategoriesof thingsthatcould be owned.
in
This was important because by shiftingthe emphasis fromdistinctions
betweenkinds of propertyit createda more generalcategoryof modes
of acquisitionthatmightbe applied in combination.Res nulliushad firm
foundations in Romanlaw, to be sure.But applyingthisconceptto imper-
and determining
ial territories a recipeof actionsto establishlegal acqui-
sitionremainedentirelyopen-endedproblemsof law.
III. Res Nullius in Early Modern Legal and Political Thought
We can now turnto thewaystheearlymodernwriterson thelaw ofnations

drewon theconceptof res nullius,and to whatuses theconceptwas put.
We will highlightespeciallythe followingimportant aspects,whichhave
been touchedupon infrequently in the recentresearchliterature: (i) the
use of res nulliusto support,or deny,claims of privateproperty;(ii) the
but (iii)
applicationof res nulliusto issues of public rule or sovereignty,
in orderto show the insufficiency of Europeanclaims to sovereignty in
the newly discoveredterritories;42 and, finally,(iv) the concept's appli-
cationto the highseas, as opposed to land. First,though,we will need
to discussbrieflytheremarkable development thatbroughtabouta necess-
ary condition for the use of the concept of res nulliusin the firstplace,
namely,therevolutionin thedoctrineofsources of law thataccompanied
theemergenceof politiesseeminglyoutsideof theuniversalpapal power's
reach.Untilat leastthelatesixteenth or eventheearlyseventeenth century,
the applicationof res nullius,a conceptof the body of privateRoman
law containedmainly in Justinian'sDigest, to mattersbeyond private
legal disputesand beyondpapal and imperialclaims of sovereignty was
by no meansself-evident. Theologyin generaland canon law in particular
were assumedto providethebases fora translocallegal order.As late as
1613, the ScottishjuristWilliam Welwod could attackGrotius'suse of
42. For a similar argument,see Fitzmaurice,"Genealogy of Terra NulliusΓ 6-9;
in the Dispossession of Native Americans."
Fitzmaurice,"Moral Uncertainty

Roman law in the latter' s Mare Liberum(1609) as outsidethe domestic

realmof privatelaw and exhortjuriststo pay heed to a "simpleand orderly
recitingof thewordsof theHoly Spirit"instead.43
Titleto bothterritoriesand thehighseas was bestowedin themiddleof
thefifteenth century by papal bulls,and thenincreasingly by bilateraltrea-
tiesbetweenSpain and Portugal.The 1455 papal edictRomanusPontifex,
forexample,bestowedtitleof possession over lands and the ocean.44In
contrastto those older papal edicts, however,neitherthe edict Inter
Caetera (1493) nor the Treatyof Tordesillas(1494) explicitlymentioned
any specifickind of legal authority, such as possession,over territories
or the ocean anymore.Rather, Inter Caetera stateda generalprohibition
on sailingwithouttheking's permissionto any of theoverseasterritories
bestowed to the Spanish crown, and the Tordesillas treatypermitted
Spanishshipsto sail throughthePortuguesezone, yetestablishedrestric-
tionson theircourse.In theTreatyof Saragossa(1529), Spain and Portugal
establishedexclusivezones of navigationand tradein theEast.45All three
instruments thusstatedtheSpanishand Portugueseclaimsto some sortof
exclusiveauthority overspheresof influenceand thehighseas butwithout
givingthe claims any legal specification, be it jurisdiction,property,or
possession.46To be sure,the reciprocalclaims became obsoletewiththe
unification of Spain and Portugalin 1580, but the monopolyon access
to and tradewiththeSpanishand Portuguesespheresof colonialinfluence,
based on papal donation,discovery,and possession,remainedin place and
was reflected in custom.Whilethelegal powerof thepapal bulls was con-
testedfroman early stage, both the bulls themselvesand the empires
favoredby thesepapal bestowalsassertedtheirbindingcharacter.47
43. The comment was madein 1613.See Straumann, "'AncientCaesarianLawyers,'"

329.
44. The bullRomanusPontifex can be foundin FrancesG. Davenport, ed.,European
Treatiesbearingon the Historyof the UnitedStatesand its Dependencies, 4 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: CarnegieInstitution
of Washington,1917),1:20-26.The original
text
in Latinis in thesamevolume,at pages 13-20. See also WilhelmG. Grewe,Epochen
der Völkerrechtsgeschichte,
2nded. (Baden-Baden:Nomos,1988),301nl.
45. Forthetreaty ofSaragossa,
see GundolfFahl,Der Grundsatz derFreiheitderMeere
in der Staatenpraxisvon 1493-1649.Eine rechtsgeschichtliche
Untersuchung (Cologne:
Heymann, 1969),26-33.
46. Grewe,Epochen,301: "Der ausschliessliche Herrschaftsanspruchder iberischen
Nationenüberdie Weltmeere kam demnachin beidenDokumenten unmissverständlich
zum Ausdruck, wenngleich man davonabsah,ihnjuristisch zu qualifizieren."
For the
edictandthetreaty, see Davenport,
EuropeanTreaties, 1:72.
47. Mostmodernscholarsagreethatthesepapalbestowalsdid nothavethepowerto
createbindingnormsof international law. The bulls,however,succeededin givingthe
supported claimsmoreweight, whichwas important, forexample,withregardto treaty
negotiations.See JörgFisch,Die europäischeExpansionund das Völkerrecht. Die

20 2010
Thiswas thetraditional doctrine of sourcesthathad underpinned the

Iberianimperial claimsandbecamethetarget ofsomeofthemostinfluen-
onthelawofnations
tialwriters inthesixteenth andseventeenth centuries.
Especially custom and the papal bulls were attacked from the 1530s
onwards, by both some Spanish scholasticsand Northern European protes-
tantscholars,infavorofan alternative doctrineofsourcesrelying increas-
inglyon Romanlegalsources.Thiswas an original meansofconfronting
theIberianlegalclaimsat theirrootsbywayof establishing a freshdoc-
trineof sourcesof law.The newdoctrine formally declared "nature" the
sourceofthelawgoverning thecontested highseas and thenewly discov-
whilesubstantively
eredterritories, itgavelegalweight tocertainrulesand
principlescontained in Gaius'sInstitutesand Justinian's Digest.
Resnulliuswas oneofthoseprinciples. Letus nowturntothewaysthe
earlymodern writersonthelawofnations drewon theconcept, beginning
withtheapplication of res nulliusto support or denyclaimsof private
property or otherclaimsshortof sovereignty, in orderto look thenat
someapplications of res nulliusto sovereigntyclaims. Usingtheconcept
to support or denyprivateproperty claims was important in thecontext
of imperial the
expansionin twoways.First, question arose whether all
things inthenewworldhad,uponthearrival the
of Europeans, thestatus
ofresnullius,orwhether theindigenous population in thenewlydiscov-
eredterritorieshadanyprivate property claimsinthethings inthoseterri-
-
tories theimplication ofcoursebeingthatiftherewereanysuchclaims,
thentheobjectscoveredbythoseclaimscouldnotqualifyas resnullius.
Second,intheeventthatsomeoftheNew Worldthings didhaverightful
owners, whataboutthings thatwerenotpartofanybody's property?Could
at leastthosethingsbe claimedas res nullius,or weretheresovereign
rightsof indigenous politiesstanding in theway of such claims?The
secondquestionrequired thatonefindoutwhether theindigenous people
had anything in thewayof sovereign polities,and,if so, whether their
sovereignty couldbartheapplication ofresnullius.
VitoriainhisRelectiode Indis(1539) hadfamously posedthequestion
whether these"barbarians, beforethearrivalof theSpaniards, had true
dominion, publicand private."48 Withregardto bothprivateand public
Auseinandersetzungen um den Statusder überseeischenGebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis

zur Gegenwart(Stuttgart:Steiner, 1984), 46-54; the book by Fisch is an invaluable
as thefor-
resource.Fahl, Grundsatz,129, concludesthatthepapal bulls wereless important
mal legal foundationof the Iberianclaims thancommonlyassumed,yet he acknowledges
thattheywere instrumental as a sourceof legal arguments.
48. Vitoria,"On theAmericanIndians,"in Political Writings,ed. withtrans,by Anthony
Pagden and JeremyLawrance(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1991), 239f.,q. 1,
art. 1.

ownership(or sovereignty), Vitoriadismissesseveralarguments thatwould

establishthatthe Indians had not qualifiedforhavingprivateor public
ownershiprights.The argumentfromnaturalslaveryreceivesespecially
shortshrift:Vitoria interprets Aristotleinterestingly as using the term
"slave" merelyin a metaphorical way, and not in order to referto slavery
in any technicallegal sense. Entirelyin accordance with Roman law,
Vitoriastatesthat"no man can belong by nature"to the "civil and legal
condition"of slavery.49Dismissing five other argumentsthat would
denythe Indiansany privateor public propertyrights,Vitoriaarrivesat
the conclusionthateven if one were to grantthat"these barbariansare
as foolishand slow-wittedas people say theyare, it is stillwrongto use
thisas grounds"to denythemownershiprights.The Indiansdid therefore
accordingto Vitoriapossess "truedominion,both in public and private
affairs"beforethearrivalof the Spaniards.50
Vitoriagoes on to dismissquicklytheSpanishtitleto thenew territories
by rightof discovery(iure inventionis),arguingexplicitlyfromres nullius:
"The law of nations. . . expresslystatesthatgoods which belong to no
owner pass to the occupier. Since the goods in question here had an
owner,theydo notfallunderthistitle.Therefore, . . . thistitle. . . provides
no supportforpossessionoftheselands,anymorethanitwould iftheyhad
discoveredus."51 Vitoria thus did not acknowledgetitleby discovery,
acceptinginsteadthe principleof res nullius,which of course did not
lenda scrapof supportto theSpanishclaimto title,giventheIndians'pos-
session of "truedominion,both in privateand public affairs"previously
established.Here we have an earlymodernexampleof the applicationof
the privatelaw conceptsof res nullius and occupatio to the acquisition
of public ownershipor sovereignty by way of analogy.52
Whataboutthethingsthatwere no one's property when the Spaniards
arrived?Could such thingsbe claimed as res nullius?And if so, under
what authority? This is a questionVitoriatreatsunderthe rubricof the
"firstjust titleby which the barbariansof the New World passed under
the rule of the Spaniards,"namely,the titleof "naturalpartnership and
communication,"53 he
whereby puts forward the proposition that in case
the Indians were alreadysharingcertainthingswith strangers, it would
be unlawfulforthemto prohibitthe Spaniardsfromsharingand enjoying
49. Ibid., 251, q. 1, concl.

MJ.Ibid.
51. Ibid.,264f.,q. 2, art.3. See theexcellentcommentsby Fisch,EuropäischeExpansion,
214.
52. Vitoria's argumentclearly applies to both sovereignty("public ownership")and
privateownership;pace Fitzmaurice,"Genealogyof TerraNullius'' 12.
53. Ibid., 278ÍT.,q. 3, art. 1.

2010
them.Vitoriaillustrates hisproposition withthefollowingexample:"If tra-
velersare allowedto dig forgold in commonland or in riversor to fishfor
pearlsin thesea or in rivers,thebarbariansmaynotprohibittheSpaniards
fromdoingso."54This rightof theSpaniards,however,goes onlyas faras
otherstrangers are allowed to participatein therichesof theIndians,too;
hereVitoriaseems to allow forcertainsovereignrightsof the indigenous
people's polity,as long as theserightsare not exertedin a discriminatory
way. This is not altogetherclear,however,since Vitoriainfershis prop-
ositionexplicitlyfromhis earlierpropositions, whichprohibittheindigen-
ous people frominterfering with the Spanish rightsto tradeand travel
freely,withoutany qualifications - such a prohibition,Vitoria holds,
would run counterto the law of nations(ius gentium),period. At the
same time,Vitoria also establishesthe unlawfulnessof the indigenous
polityprohibiting the Spaniardsfromsharingcommon thingsindepen-
dentlyby reference to the ius gentiumprincipleof res nullius,and in
this case sovereignindigenousinterference with the Spaniards' right
seems to be excluded: "[I]n the law of nations [ius gentium],a thing
which does not belong to anyone [res nullius]becomes the propertyof
thefirsttaker,accordingto thelaw Ferae bestiae(Institutes 2, 1, 12); there-
fore,ifgold in thegroundor pearlsin thesea or anything else in therivers
has notbeen appropriated, theywill belongby thelaw ofnationsto thefirst
taker,just like thelittlefishesof thesea."55This principleVitoriatakesto
be derivedfromnaturallaw, makingit sufficient to be binding.Even if it
werenotpartof naturallaw, itwould stillbe binding,however,sinceeven
in cases wheretheius gentiumas containedin theInstitutes and theDigest
is notderivedfromnaturallaw,"theconsentofthegreaterpartoftheworld
is enoughto make it binding,"accordingto Vitoria,"even if a minority
disagree."56
Vitoria,then,holds that the principleof res nullius is binding for
Spaniardsand Indiansalike, and thatit cannotbe interfered withby any
54. Ibid.. 280.

55. Ibid. Cf.Inst.2, 1, 12: Ferae igiturbestiaeet volucresetpisces, id estomniaanimalia,
quae in terramaricaelo nascuntur,simulatqueab aliquo captafuerint,iuregentiumstatim
Uhus esse incipiunt:quod enimante nulliusest, id naturalirationeoccupanticonceditur.
"Wild beasts, birds,fish,thatis, all animals,which live eitherin the sea, the air, or on
theearth,so soon as theyare takenby any one, immediately become by the law of nations
the property of the captor;fornaturalreasongives to the firstoccupantthatwhichhad no
previousowner."Translatedby Thomas CollettSandars, The Institutesof Justinian,with
intr.,trans.,and notes (London, 1922; repr. Westport,Conn., 1970), 95. Pagden and
Lawrancemistakenly hold thattherelevanceofthatpassage fromtheInstitutes withrespect
to dominiumrerumis deniedby Vitoriain De Indis,q. 2, art.3; butthere,Vitoriaaims quite
clearlynot primarily at dominiumrerum,but at sovereignty.
56. Ibid., 281.

sovereignIndianrights(nor by any othersovereignpower,forthatmat-

ter).Threefacetsof thisargumentare worthkeepingin mindhere.Note
thatVitoriais usingprivateRoman law as a legal sourceforthe dealings
of Spaniardsin the Indies,labelingit "law of nations,"a label of course
derivedfromRoman law as well. Second, thismove allows him to limit
any sovereignencroachment on rightsof privatepropertyderivedfrom
res nullius. Third, Vitoria acknowledges sovereign rights on the
Indians' part. These rightsdeserve some discussion,since theybarred
the Spaniardsfromtreatingsovereigntyover the indigenouspeople as
some sort of unowned thing that could potentiallybe claimed and
exerted.
The applicationof the privatelaw conceptof res nulliusto the public
realm by way of analogy was somethingthat Vitoria's understudied
pupil and fellowDominican Domingo de Soto had alreadydone in his
earlyRelectio de Domínio, deliveredin the springof 1535 when Soto
was professorof theologyat Salamanca.57Afterdrawinga distinction
betweendominiumin thesense of publicruleon theone hand (dominium
and in thesense of privateproperty
iurisdictionis) on theother{dominium
rerum),Soto went on to ask "by what rightdo we retainthe overseas
empirethathas just been discovered?"His answer: "I actuallydo not
know. [Re vera ego néscio.]"5*Therewas in particularone potentialtitle
to empirewhose legitimacySoto discussed and thatowed its soundness
to both factualand normativeclaims about the ancientRoman empire -
the titleof the Roman emperorto world dominion.This point became
important forthe SpanishHabsburgsafterCharlesI receivedthe imperial
crownin 1519 and thusbecame Holy Roman EmperorCharlesV. Charles
V's titleto thenewlydiscoveredterritories by virtueof being lord of the
world (dominusmundi)restedon an interpretation of the statusof the
ancientRoman emperorand on a theoryabout how thatstatuscame to
be transferredvalidlyto the Spanishking. Soto, unlikeotherparticipants
in the controversy of the Indies such as Vitoria,doubtedthe legitimacy
57. For Domingode Soto's lifeand works,see JuanBelda Plans,La Escuela de

Salamanca(Madrid,2000),399-500.Forthetextof theRelectio,see thefirst editionby
J. BrufauPrats,with an introduction and Spanishtranslation; Domingode Soto,
Relección"De Domínio" editedby JaimeBrufauPrats(Granada:Universidadde
Granada, 1964).ForSoto'sroleintheSpanishcontroversy
oftheIndies,andforanexcellent
accountoftherelianceofthat onclassicalmodels,see DavidLupher,
controversy Romansin
a New World:Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century SpanishAmerica(Ann Arbor:
Universityof MichiganPress,2003), 43-102; our Englishtranslationsare takenfrom
Lupher, Romansina New World, 61.
58. Soto,Relección"De Domínio"162: Quo ergoiureretinemus Imperium quodmodo
reperiturultramarinum?Re veraego néscio.

2010
of thelattertransfer of theimperialtitle,59 butmostof thedebateoverthe
validityof Charles'sclaim to theAmericas centeredon whethertheancient
Roman emperorhad been, de iure or de facto, lord of theworld,a claim
discussedon thebasis of a passage fromtheDigest in whichtheRoman
emperorAntoninusPius declared:"I am masterof the world [egô men
toukosmoukurios]."60Soto did notdoubttheuniversalaspirationsimplicit
in thisphrase,northattheRomanshad indeedsubjectedmostof theworld
knownto them.His argument was ratherthatas a matterof historicalfact,
the"Romansneverhad theempireofthewholeworld,forithas neverbeen
recordedthatRomanscame to theantipodesor to theselandsthathavejust
been discovered.Therefore, the Romans could not hand over the sover-
eignty[imperium] over these nationsto anyone,because they did not
have it,anymorethantheFrenchcan createa kingof Spain."61This argu-
mentof Soto's provedinfluential in the farther
historyof thedebateover
the Indies. The civil lawyerVazquez de Menchaca, forexample,was to
cite this argumentof Soto's in his ControversiaeIllustres(1564),62 and
Vitoria,whilenotdiscussingin detailthepassage fromtheDigest,denied
thatthe Holy Roman emperorhad dominiumover the entireworld and
hence did not accept titleto the Spanish overseas empireby virtueof
theHoly Roman emperor'salleged status.
Soto used theprivateRoman law argumentfromres nul·
Interestingly,
lius to counterthe public Roman law argumentbased on the Digest
59. Soto in factfoundJuliusCaesar to have usurpedhis imperiumunlawfully;see Soto,

Relección "De Domínio" 150: dato quod romani ius haberentsupra aliquas nationes,
tarnenIulius Caesar, ut in ipsius Commentariis compertum est,tyranniceetper discordiam
civilemobtinuitImperium.For themedievaltheoryof translatioimperil,see WernerGoez,
Translatioimperii:ein Beitragzur Geschichtedes Geschichtsdenkens und der politischen
Theorienim Mittelalterund in der Neuzeit(Tübingen:Mohr, 1958).
60. Dig. 14, 2, 9; in Mommsen'stranslation: Ego orbis terrarumdominussum. See Soto,
Relección "De Domínio" 154. For the use of thispassage (lex Rhodia) in medieval legal
writings,see W. Ullmann,Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introductionto the
Sources of Medieval Political Ideas (Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress, 1975), 57f.
61. Soto, Relección"De Domínio" 152: Nam romaninonpotueruntdare Imperatorinisi
quod habebant; sed romaninumquamhabueruntImperiumtotiusorbis, numquamenim
memoriaetraditum estpervenisseromanosad antípodasvel ad has terrasquae modo inve-
niuntur;ergo, non potueruntromanitradereImperiumharumnationumalicui, quia non
habebantillud,non magis quam galli possuntfacere regemHispaniae.
62. Nom utSotusubi supra recteait,non eis concessitimperium universiorbis,sed tantum
partis eius. We have used the followingedition,whichis transcribed fromthe 1564 editio
princeps:F. Vazquez de Menchaca,Controversiarum illustrium aliarumqueusufrequentium
libritrès,ed. F. RodriguezAlcalde,vol. 2 (Valladolid,1931), c. 20, 31. See also c. 20, 37 For
an excellentdiscussionof Vazquez de Menchaca's politicalthoughtand its relationto the
School of Salamanca, see Annabel Brett,Liberty,Rightand Nature: IndividualRightsin
Later ScholasticThought(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997), 165-204.

EmpirebyLaw
Acquiring 25
passagemadeby theadvocatesoftheimperial claimto worlddominion.

By invoking the maxim from the Digestthat"no one can transfergreater
rightsto someone else than he has himself'63as the basicrule ofthe argu-
ment,Sotoundermined theclaimmadebyemperor Antoninus Piusinthe
Digestpassagementioned. Theanalogybetween Spainandthe"landsthat
havejustbeendiscovered" makesit obviousthatSoto conceivesof the
Americas as anything butresnullius.He usestheconceptin determining
whether sovereignty {dominium overtheAmericascould
iurisdictionis)
havevalidlybeen acquiredby theancientRomansin thefirstplace in
orderto be transferred to theSpanishemperor, accepting theconditions
laid outby theDigestforthelawfulab initioacquisition of ownership
{dominium) over an unowned thing,res nullius.Soto here clearlyrelies
on occupationnamely, as we haveseentheacquisition of an unowned
thingaccording to theius gentium, wherethething,afterhavingbeen
seized,must also constantly be heldin orderto be owned - ownership of
suchres nulliuswas thus limited by control{custodia), a condition the
Romansas a matter of historical factcouldsimplynotmeetwithregard
to theoverseas"landsthathavejustbeendiscovered."
AlbericoGentili(1552-1608),an ItalianProtestant in exilein England
anda consummate RomanlawscholarintheBartolist tradition,discussing
titleto territorythrough occupationand discovery followedessentially
Vitoria's argument concerning theSpanishclaimto titleby virtueof the
rightof discovery. Gentili,as Vitoriabeforehim,acceptedoccupation
of res nulliusas legitimate butdid notthinkthattheterritory claimed
by the Spanishhad in factbeen res nullius.He shrewdly reproaches
theSpanishwithconfounding discovery and res nullius:"Andthey[the
Spanish]regarded itas beyonddisputethatitwas lawfulto occupy[occu-
pare] thoselandswhichwerenotpreviously knownto us; justas ifto be
knownto noneofus werethesamethingas to be ownedby no one [in
nullius]"65As forVitoria,res nulliusforGentiliwas a conceptapt to
undermine theSpanishclaimtotitleofthenewterritories - merediscovery
ofterritoriesdidnotbestowtitle,andtheterritories theSpanishoccupied
hadnotin factbeennullius,hencetheoccupation was notlawful.
Itseems,then,thatitwasnotuntilthesecondhalfoftheeighteenth cen-
tury thatwritersonthelawofnations developed a theory ofoccupation and
63. Ulp. Dig. 50, 17, 54: nemoplus iurisad alium transferre
potestquam ipse habet.
64. For this mode of acquisitionof ownershipiure gentium,see above, and Inst. 2, 1,
'2ii.'Dig. 41, 1,3-6.
65. Gentili,De iure belli libri très 1. 19, 144; the followingedition has been used:
Alberico Gentili,De iure belli libri très,The Classics of InternationalLaw 16, 2 vols.
(Oxford:Clarendon,1933). We slightlymodifiedthetranslation by JohnC. Rolfecontained
in the second volume.

2010
res nulliusmoreamenableto theneeds of expandingempires.The Swiss

writerEmer de Vattel(1714-1767) in his Le droitdes gens (1758) was
instrumental in craftinga doctrinethatdifferentiated betweeneffective
occupation on the one hand and indigenous nomads' claims on the
other,pushingterritories inhabitedby "roaming"peoples ratherthanfarm-
ing settlersintotherealmof res nullius.66The earlymodernwritersbefore
Vattelwho were drawingon res nulliusand applyingthe conceptto land
wereusingtheidea mainlyto ends criticalof empire.67
Having consideredthe applicationof res nulliusto claims of private
propertyand the concept's use to show the insufficiency of European
claims to sovereignty in the newlydiscoveredterritories, we now finally
turnto the concept's applicationto the high seas, as opposed to land, a
use whichperhapsprovedto be itsmostwidelyinfluential. The distinction
betweenland and sea was a fundamental principleof Roman propertylaw,
withthe sea being qualifiedas belongingnaturally, thatis, accordingto
naturallaw, in common to all men.68An upshot of this was thatthe
municipallaw of Rome (ius civile) providedforlegal remediesagainst
violationsof this naturallaw principle.69This was to prove important
forGrotius,who, defendingthe UnitedProvinces'rightof navigationto
the East Indies againstthe monopolistclaims of the Portuguese,triedto
prove in his Mare Liberum(1609) that"neitherthe Indian Ocean nor
the rightof navigationthereonbelongs to the Portugueseby title of
66. Vattel,Le droitdes gens, 1,18, 208. Emerde Vattel,Le droitdes gens ou principesde
la loi naturelleappliqués à la conduiteet aux affairesdes nationset des souverains,éd.
Albert de Lapradelle, 3 vols. (Washington,D.C.: Carnegie Institutionof Washington,
1916). Cf. Fisch, Europäische Expansion, 275ff; Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace,
191ff.It is worthmentioning thatwithregardto theearlierSpanishexpansion,Vattel's argu-
mentswere equally criticalof empire,since the autochthonouscivilizationsof Middle and
SouthAmericawere believed to have lived up to Vattel's civilizationalstandards.
67. Withthe exceptionof JohnLocke, and the possible exceptionof RichardZouche,
althoughbothLocke and Zouche seem to thinkin termsof privatelaw occupation,notoccu-
pationwitheffectson sovereignty; see Fisch,EuropäischeExpansion,248. Our view runs
counterto thatof scholarssuch as AntonyAnghieand RobertWilliamsand is moreclosely
alignedwithAndrewFitzmaurice'sposition.See A. Anghie,Imperialism,Sovereignty, and
theMaking of InternationalLaw (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005), 13-31;
R. Williams, The American Indian in WesternLegal Thought (New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1990), 105ff.;Fitzmaurice,"Moral Uncertainty in the Dispossession of
Native Americans,"386f.
68. See Inst. 2, 1, 1; Dig. 1, 8, 2, forthe qualificationof the sea as res communis.Cf.
Perruso,"The Development,"who suggestsplausiblythattheearlymodernnaturallawyers
dependedforthisidea not solely on theDigest but also and more importantly on philoso-
phical worksby Cicero and Seneca.
69. See Ulp. Dig. 47, 10, 13, 7, grantingan actionforinsult(actio iniuriarum)forbeing
prohibitedfromfishingin the sea.

occupation."70The Portuguesepositionwas said to relyon the idea that

the highseas were res nullius,susceptibleto being occupied by the first
taker.Yet Grotiuswas intenton showingthatthe body of law thathad
given rise to the veryconceptof res nullius,the Roman law contained
in the Institutesand the Digest, did not supportthe characterization of
the high seas as res nullius. Grotius argued in accordance with the
Romanjuriststhatquiteto thecontrary, thehighseas werenot unowned,
butcommonto all (res communis),and as such not.open to occupationby
anyone.
Grotiusmakesitclearthatthesea is different fromland. Land, although
originallya res communis as well, can be occupiedand acquiredunderthe
law of nature.71 The sea, by contrast,can neverbe made theprivatepro-
pertyof anybody,"for naturedoes not merelypermit,but rathercom-
mands,thatthe sea shall be held in common."72Grotiusseems to take
this to be a consequenceboth of the empiricalfactthatthe sea cannot
be occupied,and thenormative secondreasonthatnatureseems,according
to Grotius,to have made the sea vast and unsusceptibleto occupationin
orderforit to be held in common.Grotiusthuswould notallow exclusive
property rightsundernaturallaw even if the sea could be occupied. Such
an occupationwouldnot,as in thecase of res nullius,createownership, but
merelythe "semblance of ownership"producedby unjust confiscation
70. HugoGrotius, Mareliberum, Thefreedom oftheseas,or,Therightwhichbelongsto

theDutchtotakepartintheEastindiantrade,trans, witha revision
oftheLatintextof1633
by RalphvanDemanMagoffin, ed. withan introductory noteby J.B. Scott(New York,
1916),22 (henceforth ML): Mare ad Indos aut ius eo navigandinon esse proprium
Lusitanorum titulooccupationis.
71. See Grotius' s descriptionof the rightfuloriginaloccupationof the emptyarea
Holland - a res nullius
- by theBataviin his historical workDe antiquitate reipublicae
Batavicae,2, 1: eaque loca, ut Tacitusnarrât,cultoribus vacua occupantibus cessisse,
aequissimanaturaelege,qua rerum sinedominoiacentium dominifiunt quiprimieas pos-
sident.("[A]ndthatthisareawasempty [as Tacitusrecords]whentheytookpossession ofit
touse itas farmland, on thebasisofthisveryjustlawofnature, whichsaysthatthosewho
first
takepossession ofunoccupied becomeitslords.")HugoGrotius,
territory TheAntiquity
oftheBatavianRepublic, ed. andtrans.J.Waszink(Assen:Van Gorcum, 2000),56f.
II. urotius,De lurefraedae lz, toi.1U3{=ML 5, 30): Mareigitur proprium omnino ali-
cuiusfierinonpotest, quia naturacommune hocessenonpermittit, sed iubet.Thefollowing
facsimile edition
ofDe lurePraedaeCommentarius citedas IPC) hasbeenused:
(hereafter
HugoGrotius, De lurePraedaeCommentarius. A Collotype Reproduction oftheOriginal
Manuscript of 1604 in theHandwriting of Grotiusbelonging to theStateUniversity of
Leyden,The Classicsof International Law 22, vol. 2 (Oxford:Clarendon, 1950).Forthe
Englishtranslation we usedthefollowing recentedition(whichreproduces thetranslation
prepared by GwladysL. Williamsin 1950 fortheClassicsof International Law series):
Commentary on theLaw of Prize and Booty,ed. and withan introduction by Martine
JuliavanIttersum Ind.:Liberty
(Indianapolis, Fund,2006).

2010
(iniustadetentio).73 The Portuguese,however,could in Grotius'sview not

even claim unjustconfiscation of thehighseas leadingto theEast Indies,
since Portugueseshipswerenotable to hold theseas and effectively con-
trolthem.
Grotiusexplainsthedistinction betweenland and sea in termsof a the-
ory of thestate of nature,74 with the highseas havingremainedin theorig-
inal naturalstate.He developedthisidea of thesea as an enduringstateof
natureoutof Romanlaw and Ciceronianpoliticaltheory.Alongwithother
goods such as air, the sea belongs to the class of thingscommonto all.
These goods, Grotiuswrites,"proceededoriginallyfromnatureand have
notyetbeen placed undertheownershipof anyone(as [theRomanjurist]
Neratiuspoints out); and in the second place, it is evident(as Cicero
observes)thatnatureproducedthemforour commonuse."75 Not only
has thesea notyetbeen placed undertheownershipof anyoneand there-
foreremainedin "thatprimevalstatein whichall thingshad been held in
common,"76 it is also notsusceptibleto be made subjectto ownership,for
two reasonsto be foundin Roman propertylaw. First,it is empirically
impossibleto be occupied, and second, as a matterof naturallaw, it
mustbe used in commonby all men.77Withthisframework in place, it
remainedforGrotiusto justifyhis choice of privateRoman legal rules
to governrelationsbetweenboth privatesubjectsand public entitiesin
the stateof nature,thatis, on the high seas. Grotius,well aware of the
momentousimportanceof this move, explicitlyaddressedthe extension
of privateRoman law to therelationsbetweenpolitiesand, afterapplying
a discussionof servitudes(servitus,i.e., rightsin theproperty of another)
by theRomanjuristUlpianto thehighseas,justifieditthus:"It is truethat
Ulpian was referring ... to privatelaw; but the same principleis equally
applicable to the presentdiscussionconcerningthe territories and laws
of peoples, since peoples in relationto thewhole of mankindoccupythe
73. IPC 12, fol. 106 (=ML 5, 39): Quia enimprima, ut diximus,occupatio res proprias
fecit,idcircoimaginemquandam dominiipraefertquamvis iniustadetentio.
74. For Grotius as an early exponentof a theoryof a naturalstate, see Benjamin
Straumann,Hugo Grotius und die Antike.Römisches Recht und römische Ethik im
frühneuzeitlichen Naturrecht(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 32-58; Straumann,"'Ancient
Caesarian Lawyers,'"337ff.
75. IPC 12, fol. 102' (=ML 5, 28).
76. IPC 12, fol. 104 (=ML 5, 34).
77. IPC 12, fol. 102' (=ML 5, 29): Haec igitursuntilla quae Romani vocantcommunia
omniumiure naturali.Threepassages adduced fromtheDigest stemfromthediscussionin
book 41 of the acquisitionof ownership:Dig. 41, 1, 14; 41, 1, 50; 41, 3, 45. One is taken
frombook 43, dealingwithinterdicts preventinganythingfrombeing done in publicplaces
(Dig. 43, 8, 3f), and one frombook 47 which deals withobligationsarisingfromdelicts
(Dig. 47, 10, 13, 7). The restare fromDig. 1, 8, 10; 8, 4, 13.

positionof privateindividuals."78 It is thisanalogybetweenthe domestic

and internationalrealmsthatestablishesthevalidityof Roman legal prin-
ciples forprivatesubjectsand sovereignpolitiesalike and thatfurthermore
justifiestheapplicationof theres nulliusdoctrineto territories
and waters
beyond the reach of Roman civil law as conventionallyconceived. The
possible application of res nullius to as
territories, opposed to the high
seas, however,was onlya secondaryaspectforGrotius,who was primarily
arguingagainsttheapplicationof res nulliusto thesea and exclusiverights
ofnavigationand did notmakea positiveclaimtojustifytheimperialtake-
overof land.
To conclude:The doctrineof res nullius,farfromservingsimplyas an
imperialistargumentfortheacquisitionof sovereignrightsoverseas,was
used in many more ways in the normativediscussions surrounding
Europeancolonial expansionin the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies.
First,res nulliusservedin its originalpurposeto governacquisitionof
privateownership,with Vitoria insistingon its validityuniversallyand
even againstsovereignclaims to the contrary.Second, res nullius was
put forward, mostsuccinctlyby Domingo de Soto, in orderto undermine
Spanish claims to sovereignty in the New World. Third,res nulliuswas
used by Grotiuson behalfof thenascentUnitedProvincesand itstrading
companiesto countermonopolistIberianclaimsto rightsof navigationon
the high seas and to defendthe doctrineof the freesea. All threeappli-
cationsinvolved,in different ways, the purposefulconfusionof private
and public law. They responded,too, to concreteproblemsposed by
Europeanimperialencounters, includingrelationswithindigenouspolities
and shifting conditionsof interimperial competition.
IV. Imperial Claims
Our accountof Europeanwriters'and scholars'views on res nulliusmust

be separatedanalytically froman understanding of references
to res nullius
by imperialagents,manyoperatingfarfromEurope and withpartialor
indirectlyacquired understandings of Roman law. It seems clear that
Europeanstrategies did notfollowa clear scriptabouttheactionsrequired
to establishsovereignty.Assertingand defendingclaimsinsteadinvolveda
scattershotlegal approach,withmultiple,overlapping, and even conflicting
argumentsbeing addressedto various, sometimesimagined,audiences.
78. IPC 12,fol.105(=ML 5, p. 36): Verum estloquiIurisconsultum
[Ulpianum]de . . .
legeprivata,sed in território
et legepopulorum eademhicestratio,quiapopulirespectu
totiusgenerishumani privatorum locumobtinent.

30 2010
While the recordaffirmsthe influenceof Roman law, includingsome

tracesof res nullius,in some claims of acquisition,it also reflectsthe
unevendissemination and receptionof Roman legal ideas in the cultures
of earlymodernEurope and its outpostsand colonies. To the extentthat
voyage chroniclesreveal the influenceof the ideas of Europeanjurists
about the applicationof Roman law to imperialrule,theymainlystand
as testimony to the imaginativeand analogy-driven approachfavoredby
early scholars of international law. If there was a single identifiable
Roman legal idea thatwas moreprominentin empirethanany other,it
would seem to have been possession,ratherthanres nullius.In Roman
law, possession,based on brutefactratherthanentitlement, could poten-
tiallylead to of
ownershipby way usucapio. But more importantly, posses-
sion constituted a claim to a thingthatcould easily be evaluated,much
moreeasilythantheclaimto actualtitle,sinceitwas onlyeverputforward
againsta specificcontender - and thenthequestionconcernedwho of the
two contendershad the betterclaim, ratherthanwho had absolutetitle.
Inquiringaboutpossessiondid notinvolveinquiringabouttherightiulness
of acquisition.How thecontestedthingin questionhad been acquiredonly
played a role when the specificcontendercould claim thatit had been
obtainedfrom him by force or stealth - initialacquisitionby conquest
froma thirdparty,say fromautochthonous peoples, would simplyhave
no role in the contextof competingclaims betweenempires.Obviously
thismade claims of possession veryattractive to imperialagentson the
ground,who weremostlyconcernedwithwardingoffclaimsof competing
empires,notwithjustifying an absoluteclaim to dominionagainstevery-
body,includingthosewho mighthave even betterrights(such as indigen-
ous peoples).
Claims about possession were combinedcreativelywithreportsabout
acts or ritualsconfirming the subordinationof local inhabitants.Such
reportswere meant to show thata transferof sovereigntyhad already
takenplace, makingtheargumentfrompossessionof a secondarycharac-
ter.In otherwords,Europeaninterpretations of local conditionsmattered:
In case the sovereignty of local Indianleaderswas acknowledged,sover-
eigntywas understoodto have been acquiredderivatively;in case their
sovereignty was not acknowledged,an original,nonderivative claim had
to be establishedby way of modes of acquisitionthatcould secure res
nullius,thoughpossession would have been sufficient in the contextof
argumentsvis-à-vis a competingempire. There is littleevidence that
thoseadvancingsucharguments pausedto considertheapparentcontradic-
tion betweena claim based on derivativeacquisition,with the Indians
being the originalclaimants,and a claim based on ab initioacquisition,
with the thinghaving been in nobody's possession. Indeed, in many

cases the same act was supposed to serve in supportof both arguments.
Actionsshowingauthority over indigenousinhabitants or theirincorpor-
ationintocolonial politicalcommunitiesas subjectscould be interpreted
as showingthata transfer of sovereigntyhad takenplace,withimpliedcon-
sent,even if no formalceremonyhad occurred.
We cannotofferan exhaustivetreatment of theseaspects of European
claims makingbut will insteadhighlightexamples that illustratethree
points:(i) thecreativecombinationof legal arguments by imperialagents
drawing,oftenindirectly and in impreciseways, on Roman law; (ii) the
importanceof possession over title as the basis for assertingclaims
superiorto thoseof otherpowers;and (iii) thecontinuedefforts to provide
ample rather than for in
specificsupport claims, partby emphasizingthe
foundation of politicalcommunities as an act thatcould standas evidence
foreitherpossessionor thepeacefulacquisitionof sovereignty. Illustrating
thesepointsdoes not depend upon showingthatagents in empirewere
especiallyfamiliarwithRoman law. If anything, an impreciseunderstand-
ing of modes of acquisition and theirlegal relation
was probablykeyto the
combinationof symbolsand argumentsin supportof claims.
It would be helpfulfirstto dispose of the notion that Europeans
employeddifferent sets of ritualsof acquisition,even on the local level
in the peripheryof empire. Patricia Seed's argumentthat Europeans
adopteddifferent "national"approachesto "ceremoniesof possession"-
with,forexample,the English favoringa "turfand twig" ceremonyin
which a piece of the land was the centralprop,the Spaniardsenacting
ritualsto claim suzeraintyover people, and the Portuguesepreferring
stonemarkerscoordinatedwithastronomicalprojections - does not hold
up.79In additionto observing,as Ken MacMillan shows forthe English,
that Europeans relied heavily on widely circulatingnotions about the
acquisitionof territory as proscribedin Roman privatelaw, particularly
as expressedin Justinian'sCorpus iuris,we finda commonrepertoire of
ceremoniesof acquisitionand possession across European empires.The
explicitpurpose of the acts was to mark and communicateclaims to
otherEuropeans.Spaniardsengaged in earlyreconnaissanceand in New
Worldconquestenacteda variedarrayof ceremonies,sometimesin com-
binationor quick succession.They even used chunksof earthat timesin
79. Thereis more- the Frenchsupposedlyenactedpossession by observingtheiraccep-

tance by inhabitantsand the Dutch throughmapping. Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of
Possession.For an oldertreatment
of acts of possessionthatshowsthevarietyand flexibility
of ceremoniesand theirsharedsymbols,see ArtherKeller,Oliver Lissitzyn,and Frederick
Mann, Creationof Rightsof SovereigntythroughSymbolicActs 1400-1800 (New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1938). Also compareMacMillan, Sovereigntyand Possession
in theEnglish World.

32 2010
waysthatresembledthe"turfand twig"ceremoniessaid to be theexclusive

preserveof the Englishin empire.80For theirpart,Englishsettlersoften
followedwhatseemedto be- absentCatholicrituals - a scriptverysimilar
to thatof theIberians.It made no sense,afterall, fortheEnglishto draw
narrowlyon insularcustomarypracticesor to relysolely or even princi-
pally on commonlaw traditions, when the sharedreferences to civil law
for
procedures makingownership claims were widely available and far
moreusefulin communicating claims across empires.
The stock-in-tradeforearlyvoyagesof theEnglish,French,Portuguese,
and Dutch was to place markers - stone columns,wooden
Spaniards,
pillars,and, especially, -
crosses at strategicspots,such as on islands in
estuariesor at thejoiningof two rivers,wheretheymightbe bothvisible
to otherEuropeantravelers.Such markersundoubtedlysignifiedinchoate
claims to areas of undetermineddimensions.Their location near the
mouthsof riversindicatedan intention to traveland settleriverineregions
and even vast watershed areas. This strategycut across empires.The
PortuguesecaptainDiogo Cão erected padrão, or stonecolumn,at the
a
mouthof the Congo Riveron his firstvoyage in 1483; whenhe returned
threeyears laterand traveledto the fall line, his men made carvingsin
the cliffface to mark theirprogress.Cartierset up a thirty-foot-high
cross in Gaspé Harbour in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1534, and
Ribaulterecteda column in Florida "in a high place of the entrieof a
greatriver."81On the firstexpeditionto Jamestown, Newporterecteda
crossat Cape Henryneartheentranceto theChesapeakeBay, and another
upriverat thefallsthatboretheinscription "JacobusRex. 1607."82On La
Salle's voyage down the Mississippi in 1682, his pronouncement at a
ceremonyto erecta markerexplicitlyoutlinedFrenchdesignson the full
lengthof theriverand all its tributaries.83
The foundingof fortsor settlements, as MacMillan also notes forthe
English, could also signal inchoate, though slightlymore advanced
proof,of legitimateclaims. This symbolismalso carriedacross empires.
When SpaniardsheardrumorsthatLa Salle had foundeda settlement in
an estuarysomewherealong the Gulf of Mexico, theysent out multiple
80. See, forexample J. H. Elliott,Empiresof theAtlanticWorld:Britainand Spain in

America,1492-1830 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress,2006), 31.
81. Keller et al., Creationof Rightsof Sovereignty.
82. JamesHorn,"The Conquestof Eden: Possessionand Dominionin EarlyVirginia, in
Environingan EnglishEmpire:Jamestownand theMakingof theNorthAtlanticWorld,ed.
RobertAppelbaumand JohnWood Sweet (Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress,
2005), 31 and 33.
83. The documentwas drawnup on the spot and was signed by a notaryand eleven
129.
witnesses.Keller et al., Creationof Rightsof Sovereignty,

expeditionsto findand destroythesettlement between1685 and 1689 pre-

cisely because of its as a
potentialimportance markerof possession.84The
same symboliclink explains Spanish anxietyabout the fledglingsettle-
mentsand simple fortifications erectedby the English and Dutch at the
mouthof theAmazon in thefirstdecades of the seventeenth century;the
Spanish noted the of
danger allowing such footholds since "this river
and itsbranchescrossthewhole mainlandincludingPeru."Estuarysettle-
mentsannouncedtheintention to extenddominioninland.85It seems logi-
cal to assumethatthesignificance attachedto estuaryfortsand settlements
reflected thewide circulationof analogiesfromtheRomanprivatelaw for
theacquisitionof property throughoccupation.
Yet thisfunctioncould easily have been attachedto claims of posses-
sion ratherthanto titleoverunownedterritory. Further,acts of settlement
were symbolicallyveryversatilebecause theywere connectedwithfunc-
tionsof governancethatcould be associatedin turnwiththe exerciseof
sovereignty. Establishingpoliticalcommunities, or enactingritualsshow-
ing theactivepresenceof delegatedlegal authority, could simultaneously
reinforce claimsto possessionand implythata peacefultransfer of sover-
eigntyhad takenplace. Combiningthereporting of markersof possession
withaccountsof ritualsof thetransfer of sovereignty was a familiarstrat-
egy froman earlydate. We findDrake, forexample,enactinga "turfand
twig"ceremonyon his 1577 voyage and then,on the coast of California
in 1579, markingpossession by a feast with local Indians and a cer-
emonyin whichthe Indian "king" was said to have handed the captain
his "crown"and "scepter."This symbolicsurrender of sovereignty was
significantly consideredinsufficient - probablybecause Drake understood
thatit was doubtfulthatthe Indian "king" would be regardedby other
Europeansas possessingsovereignty to begin with- and Drake followed
it by a muchmorecommonact of possession: the erectionof a wooden
pillar,in this case with a brass plate engravedwith the queen's name,
Drake's name, and a date, with a silver coin insertedbeneath it.86
Similarly,at the same time that they belittledSpanish settlementsin
the Orinocobasin as unsubstantial and set up theirown fledglingsettle-
mentsand fortifications, the English also claimed thatlocals had ceded
territory to them.Raleigh reportedthaton his firstvisit to the region
"the Guianians ... did willingly resigne all that territoryto her
84. William Edward Dunn, "The Spanish Search forLa Salle's Colony on the Bay of
Espiritu Santu, 1685-1689," SouthwesternHistorical QuarterlyOnline 19 (4) (April
19/n4/article_
1916): 323-69, http://www.tshaonline.org/publications/journals/shq/online/vO
l_print.html (accessed December 27, 2008).
85. Tyacke,"EnglishChartingof the RiverAmazon," 75.
86. Keller et al., Creationof Rightsof Sovereignty,
59.

34 2010
Majesty,who by me promisedto receivethem,and defendthemagainst

the Spaniards."87
It is easy to imaginehow accountsof serial ceremoniesof possession
and ritualsmarkingthetransfer of sovereignty mightencouragea creative
shorthand whereby acts demonstrating elements of sovereignty- holding
trials,punishingcriminals,installingsubordinateroyalofficials,or recog-
nizinglocal leadersas vassals- mightbe seen as signalingbothpossession
and theacquisitionof sovereignty by othermeans.This observationhelps
us to understand, forexample,theroyalinstructions carriedby JuanDiaz
de Solís on an expeditionof reconnaissanceand settlement in the River
Plate regionin theearlysixteenthcentury.Solís was orderedto takepos-
session of new lands by makinga show of legal authority: "[Y]ou shall
make a gallows there,and have somebodybringa complaintbeforeyou,
and as our captainand judge you shall pronounceupon and determine
it, so that,in all you shall take the said possession."88The punishment
of indigenouspeople beforeSpanish courtsextendedthis symbolismby
implyingthata voluntary and peacefultransfer of sovereignty was already
complete. We findCabeza de in
Vaca, trying to shore up his authority in
overbothSpaniards and Indiansin Asuncion in the 1530s,ordering a local
Indianleaderto be hangedas a traitor a shorttimeaftertheleaderhad for-
mallysubmitted to the Spaniardsas a vassal.89Expeditionleadersacross
regionsseemed to have realizedthe value of stagingtrialsbothto signal
theintentto settleand to affirm theextensionof sovereignlegal authority
to remoteplaces. In 1609 on his voyage up the St. Lawrence River,
Champlaintriedand hangeda locksmith, JeanDuval, accused of plotting
to takeoverthetinygarrisonat Quebec and handit overto Basques in the
region.90Duval's head was placed on a pike at a highpointin thefort,an
act thatprobablydramatizedmoreeffectively thanmarkersor proclama-
tionstheFrenchclaimto thesiteof thefortand theregionbeyond,before
an audience of Frenchmen,Spanish rivals, and Indians. Such rituals
suggest that European sojournersand settlerswere not making rigid
87. Sir WalterRaleigh,TheDiscoveryof theLarge,Rich,and Beautiful Empireof

Guiana,62, 53.
forSolísbeganbyordering
88. Theinstructions himtomakea clearing anderect"some
smallbuilding"in thepresenceof an escribanoand "thegreatest possiblenumberof
witnesses."Kelleretal., Creation
ofRightsofSovereignty, 3f.
89. For furtheranalysisof thecontextof thiscase, see LaurenBenton,A Searchfor
Sovereignty:Law and Geographyin European Empires,1400-1900 (Cambridge:
Cambridge UniversityPress,2010),ch.2.
90. HenryBiggar,ed.,TheWorks ofSamuelde Champlain, vol.2 (Toronto:Champlain
Society,1922-1936),30.

distinctionsbetweenacts as signs of takingpossession,potentialmarkers

of occupation,or symbolsof sovereignty over new subjects.
Recognizing this provides witha clearerunderstanding
flexibility us of
an association long noted by intellectualhistoriansbetween European
rationalesforempireand European ideas about civility.One variantof
thisaccountemphasizesthe noveltyof Locke's pairingof Englishrights
to settle"vacant" lands with English capacity for civil society.91Yet
since Locke wroteafterthe earlycolonial pronouncements thatare said
to reflecthis blendingof rightsto property withthe capacityforcivility,
we mightsearchforbroaderand less singularrootsto thisassociation.92
We see thatthe constitution of political communitiesoperatedfroman
earlydate as a marker of both civilityand possessionand thatdepending
on the degreeto whichcivilitywas takento be a criterionof ownership,
it mightalso be used to justifyacquisitionof res nullius.The founding
of municipalitiesas a routineearlystep in establishingdominionin the
Spanish empirewas always potentiallymorethana move to consolidate
authority and patronage.The emphasison conquestas a dominantearly
mode of acquiringempire,particularly fortheSpaniards,who are assumed
to have receivedauthorizationfor conquest of non-Christians fromthe
pope, has probably led us to underestimatethe degree to which
Spaniardsalso amassedevidencein supportof claimsto particular regions
withinwhatwas afterall a sphereof influence.93
Thispointbringsus back to thepeculiarbasis on whichthedebateabout
the role of res nulliusor terranulliusin earlyempireshas been waged.
Because claims were advanced throughan unsystematic assemblingof
signs and arguments, historianson one side or the otherof the debate
mustnecessarilyengage in selectivereadingof available texts.Consider,
forexample,interpretations of writingsabout Englishdominionin early
Virginia. Tuck cites a 1622 sermon of John Donne to the Virginia
Company as an illustration of the English embraceof the doctrineof
91. Thisis a feature

ofPagden'searlierdiscussions
ofterranulliusandoftheapproach of
Tuck,bothdiscussedinthesecondsectionabove.
92. Corcoran, "JohnLockeon thePossessionofLand."
93. We knowthatmanySpaniardswereveryfamiliar witha privatelaw doctrine of
possessionthrough theSietePartidas,thethirteenth-century
law code adoptedin Castile,
whichreliedheavilyon Romanlaw sources.Owensbyshowsthatritualactosde posesión
(actsof possession)wereroutinely usedby bothSpaniards and Indiansin sixteenth-
and
seventeenth-century New Spainto announceclaimsin land,whichmightthenbe further
supported or challenged throughdocumentation and evidenceof continuous occupation
andproductive use.Owensby describesactsofpossessionas "thepublictouchstone ofpro-
pertyrelations in colonialMexico."BrianOwensby, Empireof Law and IndianJustice
in ColonialMexico(Stanford, Calif: StanfordUniversityPress,2008), 91, and therest
ofch.4.

2010
terranullius.He is certainlynot misreadingDonne, who could not be
clearerin statingthattherightto settlein Virginiawas based on thenatural
law principlethat"a Land neverinhabited, by any,or utterlyderelictedand
immemorially abandoned by the former Inhabitants,becomes theirsthat
will possesse it."94But Banner,too, quotes fromothersermonsand tracts
fromearlyVirginiato arguethatdespitethe"theorizing aboutitsrightsto
taketheland,in theend theCompanypurchasedit fromtheIndians."95In
a more nuanced reading of English pronouncementson Virginia,
Fitzmauricenotices that even a single author - the projectorWilliam
Strachey - could shiftin the same work from an argumentbased on the
acquisition of res nullius to an implicit contradiction of the argumentin
an emphasis on trade as the foundation of sociability between
Englishmenand Indians,a view extrapolated fromthepremiseof a natural
law rightto trade.96Add to thisconfusingarrayof utterances a panoplyof
visual and political markersanalyzed by other historians,fromJohn
Smith'smap to the situatingof settlements and the ceremonyto "crown"
Powhatan, and the collection of symbols and statements could be arranged
in supportof nearlyany positionabout the essentialelementsof English
claimsto theregionand the intendedaudienceforthoseclaims.97
Yet we need not give up entirelyon the search for a compelling
interpretationof Europeanstrategies. It is helpfulto place thewillingness
"to employwhateverarguments suit[ed]theoccasion" in thecontextof a
broaderlegal culturefeaturing inventivereferencing of oftenimprecisely
remembered legal principles.98 We stillknow too littleabout the connec-
tionsbetweenlegal discoursein Europe and imperiallegal practice.We
knowthatmoreoftenthannot,voyagersappearto have based theirlegal
pronouncements on whateverknowledgetheypossessed about the law,
howeverhaphazardlyobtained.99 Theyreportedlegal actionsand conflicts
fora varietyofreasons:in supportofpersonalgain or theinterests of spon-
sors,as a meansof influencing ongoinglegal proceedings,in orderto gain
or shoreup patronage,and withtheintentofundermining rivals.These and
othergoals oftencrowdedthesame tracts,butby consideringthepurpose
of legal posturingin particularcontexts,we beginto see patterns.
94. RichardTuck,Rightsof Warand Peace, 124.

95. Banner,How theIndians Lost TheirLand, 21.
96. Fitzmaurice,Humanismand America,144-45.
97. See, forexample,JamesHorn,"The Conquestof Eden: Possession and Dominionin
EarlyVirginia."
98. Fitzmaurice,Humanismand America,146.
99. On this legal posturing,see Benton,A Searchfor Sovereignty,
ch. 1; cf.JohnPhillip
Reid, Law for the Elephant: Propertyand Social Behavior on the Overland Trail (San
Marino,Calif.: Huntington LibraryPress, 1980).

Ideas about res nullius, combined with but also eclipsed by more
prominentideas about possession, circulatedwidely withoutgaining
precision- in fact,the reversewas trueas flexibleways of invokingand
blendingargumentsto strengthen still incompleteand tenuous claims
fostered not
more, less, innovation. The use of thesearguments was mean-
while reinforced by awareness at all levels of the need to defend claims
againstimperial rivals.Pragmaticresponses to local in
conditions, particu-
lar therelativestrength of indigenouscommunities thatmightrupturethe
illusionof a peacefultransfer of sovereignty and encouragea relianceon
physical markers of possession, also mattered. Historiansfindmuddled
and apparentlyconflicting evidence of the natureof claims in large part
because imperialrepresentatives were drawingnot on a single playbook
but on circulatingnotionsof legitimizingactionsderivedfrommultiple
sources.Perhapsthe clearestconclusionwe can draw is thatagents"on
the ground" seem to have been mainly concernedwith strengthening
theirrelativepositionwithregardto empires,and therefore withestablish-
ing a claim to possessionthatwould at least be judged betterthanother
empires'claims.Absolutetitlebased on thedoctrineofres nulliusreceived
less importancein thiscontext,but it also made no sense strategically to
banishsuch arguments whentheexerciseof claimsmakingrequiredrecit-
ing anyand all arguments, includingpromoting of
multipleinterpretations
thesame symbolicacts. Whereasthetheoristsanalyzedin the last section
were moreconcerned,and morefamiliarwith,the res nulliusdoctrinein
the strictertechnicalsense, imperialagents learnedquickly to advance
theirown interests by repeatingelementsfroma widelyrecognizedsym-
bolic vocabularywitha looserrelationto Roman legal doctrine.
V. Conclusion
The debateaboutwhetheror notEuropeansreliedon res nulliusand terra

nulliusas rationalesforempirerespondsto thewrongquestions.In relying
on an overlysimpleunderstanding ofhow thesedoctrinessitwithinRoman
law, thedebateimaginesa straightforward applicationto new conditions.
Europeansin empirehad no clear-cutreadingof the doctrinesto draw
on, as earlymodernwriterswerethemselvesproposinginnovativeconnec-
tionsbetweenpublicinternational and Romanprivatelaw. Imperialagents
also had ample incentiveto combine Roman, canon, and theological
sources with circulatingideas about naturallaw in makingbroad and
flexiblearguments in supportof imperialclaims.Nor shouldwe be guided
in evaluatingthe importanceof ideas about res nulliusby simplyculling
pronouncements about "emptylands" or the absence of explicitmention

38 2010
of terranulliusbeforethenineteenth century.Legal ideas abouthow best

to establishclaimscirculatedin a wide varietyof formsand recommended
versatileand expansiveinterpretations of repeatingsymbolsand acts.
These findings takeus back to Pagden's (and Elliott's)assertionswitha
freshperspectivein mind.The generalization thattheEnglishand French
promoted terra nullius and, also, rights to land in responseto a Spanish
preoccupation with to
rights people diverts attentionfromthe sharedpro-
ject of a new discourse of international law developingbothwithinEurope
and at sites of imperialcompetitionoutsideit. The suggestionof a rela-
tivelysimple intellectualthreadconnectingsixteenth-century claims and
nineteenth-century references to terra nullius also requiresmodification.
A morehelpfulstartingplace is providedby Pagden's laterobservation
thatres nulliuswas partofa broadsetof ideas and practicesaboutattaining
international recognitionforthe acquisitionof territory. Thoughpointing
sovereigns and theirrepresentatives towardspracticesdesignedto make
inchoateclaims,establishpossession,and markoccupation,theinvocation
of Romanlaw stillleftopen important questionsaboutthearrayof actsand
utterances thatcould signal these steps. The indeterminacy encouraged
broader strategies to claims making,includingsimultaneousreporting
about transfersof sovereignty,treaties,land purchases, and trade.
Equally importantly, the Roman law doctrineof res nulliuswas by no
means simplya tool forestablishingclaims to imperialexpansion;quite
to the contrary, moreoftenthannot it was used on the level of political
and legal thoughtto criticizeand undermineimperialistarguments.On
the level of imperialpractice,possession,ratherthanres nullius,seems
to have been theRomanlegal idea mostoftenresortedto- albeitin rather
intuitive,vague waysin order to defend claims against competing
empires.Roman law was moreresourcethanroad map, in otherwords.
Ratherthanapplyinga portabledoctrine,directand indirectreferences to
discovery,possession,res nulliusand terranulliusfitwithina method-
ologyof legal analogyand recommended a setof weaklydefinedpractices
foracquiringsovereignty.


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LAURENBENTON AND BENJAMINSTRAUMANN

LaurenBentonis Professorof Historyand Affiliate

Law and HistoryReviewFebruary2010, Vol. 28, No. 1

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scholarsin Europeand theactionsor pronouncements of imperialagentsin

1. On terranulliusas a "doctrineofa legalvacuum,"see BrianSlattery,"PaperEmpires:The

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All theseconceptswerenestedwithina largercontextofprivateRomanlaw

(Melbourne: Monash University,24-26 September2007), http://arts.monash.edu.au/psi/

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"doctrineof conquest"or concludingfromits nonsystematic application

2. For thedoctrineof thingscommonto all, see RichardPerruso,"The Developmentof the

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busywithwardingoffotherempires'and autochthonous claimsdid notuse

I. Two Views of TerraNullius

Some historians writethattheEnglishembracedres nulliusas a mainrhe-

3. J.H. Elliott,Empiresof theAtlanticWorld.Britainand Spain in America,1492-1830

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nulliusinEuropeancolonizingrunsas follows:"[T]heBritish, andto a some-

8. Pagden,Lords ofAll the World,76.

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effectivelymergesPagden's views with the argumentsof Tuck, whose

untilafterit surfacedin late nineteenth-centuryinternational

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realizingthatres or terra nullius could be and were indeed used pre-

14. Banner,How theIndians Lost TheirLand, 47-48.

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similarlystructured legal orderswere blurredin the sixteenthand seven-

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betweenpolities,a doctrinethataccordedspecial weightto Roman legal

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The diversityof interpretations and the languagetheyemploysuggest

25. Pagden, "The StruggleforLegitimacyand the Image of Empirein the Atlantic,to

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of,providedthattheydo notbelongto our friends, allies and confederates

II. Roman Law and the Doctrine of Res Nullius

The Roman empireowed its existencemainlyto conquest.This factren-

27. Slattery,"Paper Empires,"61.

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legitimacyof theconquestsleadingup to Romanrule.The legitimacyand

29. Cic. de off.1,21: Suntautemprivata nulla natura,sed aut vetereoccupatione,ut qui

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law of thelaterepublicanperiod,see A. Watson,TheLaw ofProperty

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know thatthe thinghad been intentionally abandoned by its previous

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juristsdistinguished betweenprivateand public law principles,some con-

III. Res Nullius in Early Modern Legal and Political Thought

We can now turnto thewaystheearlymodernwriterson thelaw ofnations

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Roman law in the latter' s Mare Liberum(1609) as outsidethe domestic

43. The comment was madein 1613.See Straumann, "'AncientCaesarianLawyers,'"

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Thiswas thetraditional doctrine of sourcesthathad underpinned the

Auseinandersetzungen um den Statusder überseeischenGebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis

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ownership(or sovereignty), Vitoriadismissesseveralarguments thatwould

49. Ibid., 251, q. 1, concl.