IB Extended Essay

ITGS (Information and Technology in a Global Society): What are the

risks associated with the usage of cryptocurrency for traders in the
context of security and privacy concerns?

Madiba Burks Magara

ITGS Extended Essay
Advisory: Fredrick Wagah

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Research Question 3
1.2 Bitcoin Cryptocurrency 3
1.3 Methodology 3
1.4 Transaction Structure 4
1.4.2 Blockchain Technology 4
2 Security and Privacy Concerns 4
2.1 Double Spending Attack 6
2.1.1 Countermeasures 7
2.2 Finney Attack 8

2.2.1 Countermeasures 8

2.3 Eclipse Attack 9

2.4 Sybil Attack 10

Conclusion 11

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1 Introduction

A cryptocurrency is a decentralized progressed currency that is proposed for secure and private asset
move and limit. As a currency, it should be difficult to phony and twofold spend. In this paper, used to
explore, review and examine the huge security and insurance issues of Bitcoin. In particular, we base on
its fundamental foundation, blockchain development. The critical security risks and countermeasures of
Bitcoin are investigated. investigate the risk of twofold spending assaults, evaluate the probability of
accomplishment in playing out the assaults and derive the usefulness for the attacker to perform such
assaults. These results can help Bitcoin customers to choose a tradeoff between the risk of twofold
contributing undertakings and the trade energy deferral or sureness preceding enduring trades. These
results can in like manner assist diggers with cultivating fitting frameworks to participate in the mining
association additionally, support their advantages.

1.1 Research Question

What are the risks associated with the usage of cryptocurrency for traders in the context of security
and privacy concerns?

Cryptocurrencies are digital financial assets designed as a medium of exchange using cryptography to
secure transactions, create global currencies without a centralized government or institutional system of
control. Over the past 15 years, cryptocurrencies have experienced unprecedented growth as it seeks to
become a viable world currency. This paper seeks to review and analyze the security and privacy profiles
of cryptocurrencies. An examination of Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that revolutionized digital online
currencies and challenged existing financial systems, will be used to facilitate this analysis of
cryptocurrencies security and privacy vulnerabilities. First, background information on cryptocurrency
and Bitcoin in particular will be presented. Second, two major security threats and countermeasures will
be evaluated. Finally, …. The results of this paper could help potential cryptocurrency investors and
traders make informed user decisions as they navigate this new modern-day currency.

1.2 Bitcoin

The Bitcoin cryptocurrency was first imagined by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, progressive for its
utilization of a proof-of-work chain to check exchanges in a decentralized manner (Nakamoto, 1). In this
style, Bitcoin endeavors to offer an option in contrast to customary government-upheld monetary
standards utilizing cryptographic confirmation and automatic conventions. The cash has seen a blast of
development; as of October, 2013, the complete market capitalization of Bitcoin was assessed at $1.5
billion USD (Eyal, 1). As there is no characteristic worth of Bitcoins, much examination has gone into the
security of the Bitcoin convention; generally, this has been engaged towards the practicality of History-
Revision style attacks. This kind of attack was estimated as ahead of schedule as the production of
Bitcoin itself, yet is infeasible to the place of excusal on the grounds that the attacker needs to control a
greater amount of the organization than the 'genuine faction of the organization (Nakamoto, 4). Bitcoin
shows guarantee to turn into a real option in contrast to customary monetary forms, so investigation of its
potential weaknesses is a basic of guaranteeing its future development and acknowledgment.

1.3 Methodology

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Most the current blockchain platforms give digital monetary standards (cryptographic forms of money)
for financial purposes to charge their administrations. For example, Sia-blockchain based decentralize
stockpiling platform, expects people to pay in Sia coin to lease the capacity. Besides, to purchase digital
currency (assume Sia coins) digital currency exchanges are utilized. Cryptocurrency exchanges are
organizations that permit clients to exchange cryptographic forms of money for different resources, like
regular fiat cash, or other digital monetary standards. In addition, a portion of the confirmation of-work
based-blockchain platforms like Bitcoin, Ethereum and others, need mining to verify 10 exchanges and
delivery new coins, as there is no focal position like Bank to deal with these capacities. To get to coins,
clients need their private keys. Private keys are put away in wallets, and the wallet offers the types of
assistance of holding clients' private keys and furthermore make exchanges (for client's sake) in the
blockchain frameworks. As should be obvious, the over four spaces of blockchain platforms
(cryptocurrency, exchanges, mining, and wallet) include connection with cash, and it urges foes to
perform different high-benefit hacks and robbery. Despite the fact that blockchain is considered as a
carefully designed record, still, unique security and protection dangers imply in blockchain platforms,
which makes monetary administrations industry contemplating whether blockchain innovation can be
made secure enough from criminals.

1.4 Transaction Structure

Bitcoins are exchanged transactions wherein the sender 'transfers ownership of' various Bitcoins with
his/her private key and the public key of the beneficiary, referring to past transaction(s) to demonstrate
they own the currency (Courtois, 3). This strategy for exchanging currency checks responsibility for (in
that anybody with the information on a payer's public key can confirm the cryptographic legitimacy of
their transaction), and connects transactions together so that each coin can be followed back to the
beginning of that coin, checking it as legitimate currency. Nonetheless, this framework doesn't confirm
that the payer has not effectively spent that currency, simply that it was constrained by them sooner or
later. This issue is known as the double-spending issue, in that a framework without definitive timestamps
can't ensure that one sender has not sent similar Bitcoins to two beneficiaries, bringing about
equivocalness concerning who really 'possesses' the currency (Bonadonna).

There are two kinds of transactions in Bitcoin. One is the standard transaction, made by the clients which
incorporate coins. Another unique kind of transaction is called Coinbase transaction, or Generation
transaction, which is made by the digger to grant himself. Indeed, it is the prize that miners get for
effectively mining a block. The current block reward is 12.5 Bitcoins per block, and the prize parts each
210,000 blocks, or generally at regular intervals ("Bitcoin Block Reward Halving Countdown," n.d.). On
account of Bitcoin, just the UXTO (Unspent Transaction Output Set) is put away in the memory and the
excess information is put away on the plate ("Weaknesses–Bitcoin Wiki," n.d.). When a customer needs
to deal with a transaction, prior to bringing transaction contributions from circle to memory, the customer
watches that every one of the information sources are unspent. Contingent upon the blockchain
organization's boundaries, the transaction is either checked quickly or put in a line of forthcoming
transactions (Piscini et al., 2016). For this situation, the hubs (PCs) in the organization decide whether the
transaction is substantial or not founded on a bunch of rules of the organization, whereupon members in
the organization were concurred. Block contains the transaction or set of transactions, and each block is
distinguished by a 256-bit hash esteem, made by a message digest algorithm settled upon by the

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organization. As a rule, SHA256 message digest algorithm is utilized. Ordinarily, a block contains a
header, a pointer to past block hash, and a gathering of transactions. Blocks should be approved before
added to the blockchain. The most mainstream agreement algorithm dependent on which blocks are
approved is Proof-of-Work (PoW), in which the answer for a numerical riddle is gotten from the block's
header by miners. Mining. Miners utilize Proof-of-Work or other agreement algorithms to tackle the
numerical riddle, and when the issue is settled, the block is approved.

The process of mining consists of finding an input to a cryptographic hash function which hashes below
or equal to a fixed target value. It is brute force because at every iteration the content to be hashed is
slightly changed in the hope to find a valid hash. In case of Bitcoin, a mining program essentially
performs the following simplified code:

While (nonce <max):

If sha256(sha256(block+nonce)) < target:

return nonce

nonce +=1

The task is to find a nonce which is included in the Bitcoin block header, and hashes below a certain
value.

In case of Ethereum a simplified example could be:

nonce=random int

While hashimoto(block,nonce)*difficulty> threshold

increment nonce

return nonce

Where difficulty is dynamically adjusted parameter defined originally in genesis block. If the above code,
find the nonce and return it - “return nonce” that is the solution for the puzzle. When a block is validated,
the miner who solved the mathematical puzzle is rewarded, and then the validated block is broadcasted to
the network. After validation, the block is added to the majority chain, and by this, the action is
completed. If a malicious miner tries to submit an altered block to the chain, the hash function of that
block and the hash function of all the following blocks will change, and other nodes would detect the
changes and reject the block from the majority.

1.4.2 Blockchain Technology

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The blockchain is a database or a ledger that provides a way for information to be recorded and shared by
a community. In this community, each member keeps his or her copy of the information, and all members
must validate any updates collectively. It's distributed in nature, meaning that there is no central server
holding the entire database or chain, but instead, the participating nodes have a copy of the ledger. The
new records are appended to the ledger. Typically, from a record perspective, blockchain consists of two
types of elements (Christopher
Harvey, 2017). Transactions
are the actions created by
participants in the blockchain
network. Blocks record these
transactions and make sure
they are in the right sequence
and have not been tampered.
Blocks also record the
timestamp when the
transactions were added. Each
block has one or more than one Figure 1: How blockchain works simplified
transaction.

Let’s suppose A wants to send money to B. First, a block is created online and represents the transaction.
Then this block is broadcasted to every participant in the blockchain network and a set of participants
approves the transaction and validates it. Once the block is validated, it is added to the chain which
provides a permanent, non-reputable and transparent record of the transaction. Finally, B receives the
money from A. The above steps are clarified in Figure 1.

2. Security and Privacy Concerns

Virtual currencies face severe security concerns and risks such as double-spending, the safety of wallets
and cyber-attacks. This paper will focus on just two security concerns: double-spending and cyber-
attacks. Cryptocurrencies vulnerability to selfish miners and orchestrated attacks on exchanges are
potentially destructive to cryptocurrencies as they try to navigate and establish themselves as a viable
world currency.

2.1 Double Spending Attack

A double-spending attack is an attack where a customer utilizes a similar digital money on numerous
occasions for transactions, i.e the given arrangement of coins is spent in more than one transaction.

There are different double-spending attack vectors or different approaches to play out a double spending
attack, for example, Race attack, Finney attack, Vector76 attack, Alternative history attack, 51% attack.

Race attack happens when an attacker sends two conflicting transactions in quick progression into the
Bitcoin organization. This kind of attack is somewhat simple to execute in PoW-based blockchains.
Merchants who acknowledge an installment promptly with 55 "0/unsubstantiated" are presented to the
transaction being switched.

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 In Race attack, the attacker to do double-spending,
sends a transaction paying the shipper
straightforwardly, and as the trader acknowledges
the installment quickly without hanging tight for
affirmation and boats the item to the attacker. In
the meantime, the attacker sends a conflicting
transaction (that has similar coins recently paid to
the vendor) to himself to the remainder of the
blockchain network. Almost certainly, the second
conflicting transaction will be mined into blocks
Figure 2: How blockchain works simplified and acknowledged by the Bitcoin hubs as
veritable, and the coins remembered for the transaction shipped off merchants will be viewed as invalid.
Here, the attacker can take advantage of the halfway time between two transactions' introduction and
affirmation to dispatch a double-spending attack rapidly. As the merchants will acknowledge installment
(Bitcoin) on 0/unverified, can play it safe like impair approaching associations or just interface with very
much associated hubs. However, it is as yet difficult to forestall such a sort of attack in case there is no
affirmation system accessible in the organization.

2.1.1 Counter measures

To counter these attacks there are potential countermeasures. There two or three examinations and
recommendations that could be utilized to distinguish and use as a precaution to double-spending attacks,
especially on the Bitcoin network. Ghassan et al. (Karame, Androulaki, and Capkun, 2012) examines the
double-spending attacks on quick installments in Bitcoin, and proposes an attack model that empowers
the recognition of double spending attacks in quick exchanges. The three identification strategies the
paper introduced are: (a) listening period, (b) embeddings spectators, and (c) sending double spending
endeavors. The Bitcoin daemon locally produces a blunder on the off chance that it gets an exchange
whose data sources have effectively 56 been spent, however this mistake isn't shown to the Bitcoin client.
In the "listening period", the seller connects a listening period with each got exchange, and it screens all
the getting exchanges during this period. The seller just conveys the item, or offers the assistance, if the
merchant doesn't perceive any endeavor of double-spending during the listening time frame.

Another method is designated "embeddings eyewitnesses'', in which the seller embeds a hub two or three
hubs that it controls inside the Bitcoin network called "onlooker" that would straightforwardly hand-off
every one of the exchanges that it gets to the merchant. This assists the merchant with recognizing a
double-spending endeavor inside the space of seconds without help from anyone else or by its
eyewitnesses. The third procedure is "conveying double-spending alarms among peers''. This method is
viewed as an effective countermeasure to battle double-spending on quick Bitcoin installment. In this
strategy, the Bitcoin network peers spread cautions at whatever point they get two additional exchanges
that share normal data sources and various yields (double-spending endeavor). Another countermeasure
called "Sending Double-Spending Attempts in the Network'' present in Karame, Androulaki, Roeschlin,
Gervais, and Čapkun (2015), states close by peers ought to tell the dealer about the endeavor that double-
spending similar coins in the Bitcoin network. In particular, at whatever point a friend gets another
exchange, it checks whether the exchange utilizes coins that have not been spent in whatever other

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exchange that exists in the blockchain and their memory pool. On the off chance that the exchange doesn't
have effectively spent coins in it, peers add the exchange to their memory pool and forward it in the
network.

Then again, if peers distinguish that there is another exchange in the memory pool that spends that
equivalent coin to various beneficiaries (address), then, at that point peers forward this double-spending
exchange to their neighbors (without adding it to their memory pool). The essential goal behind this
method 57 isn't to forestall the double-spending attack, however to recognize it and illuminate the
merchant so s/he can distinguish the double-spending exchange prior to sending or offering support to the
attacker. Podolanko, Ming, and Wright (n.d.) give a countermeasure against double-spending attacks on
Bitcoin Fast-Pay exchanges. They proposed an answer called Enhanced Observers (ENHOBS), a cross
breed of eyewitnesses and the friend ready framework. In this plan, the ENHOBS will accomplish more
inside and out reviews of all exchanges got and analyze their yields and information sources. When a
double-spending attack is identified, an alarm message that additionally contains the double spending
exchanges as proof through the P2P network. When the alarm is gotten and checked, any exchanges that
match similar sources of info are dropped from the memory pool right away.

2.2 Finney Attack

An attacker, pre-mined one transaction into a square and spent the very coins prior to delivering the
square to the public organization to refute that transaction. This is known as a 58 Finney attack
(Sompolinsky and Zohar, n.d.). The Finney attack is a deceitful double-spend that requires the support of
a digger once a square has been mined. A foe can just play out a double-spending within the sight of one-
affirmation merchants.

To dispatch a Finney attack, an attacker (A) secretly pre-mined a square which contains the double-
spending transaction (TAadd) that he shipped off his address (attacker address - Aadd). The attacker
makes another transaction (TMadd) which utilizes similar coins (assume same Bitcoins) and sends it to
shipper (Madd) address. Transactions in the Blockchain network are bunch by hub into a square and
broadcast the square to the organization, and transactions which are not yet in a square are considered
unverified. The attacker delays until the transaction (that he shipped off dealer) is acknowledged by the
shipper, and trader just acknowledges the transaction, when it gets affirmation from the miners
demonstrating that this transaction is substantial and remembered for the blockchain. When dealer gets
affirmation, he sends the item to the attacker. In the wake of getting the item, the attacker delivers the
secretly pre-mind block into the fundamental (public) blockchain, subsequently makes a blockchain fork
(assume Bf). Presently, if the following mined square in the organization expands the fork blockchain
(Bf) rather than the fundamental blockchain, then, at that point every one of the miners will make new
squares on the highest point of the fork blockchain (Bf). As the fork blockchain is the longest chain in the
organization, the miners will disregard the past blockchain, and the fork blockchain will be considered the
substantial blockchain forward. In this manner, the square which has a transaction (TMadd) which was
shipped off the shipper and affirmed in the past blockchain by miners will become invalid and bringing
about the vendor losing his item and the attacker getting the item and his coins back.

2.2.1 Countermeasures for Finney Attack

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 Since a Finney attack can only be performed against a one confirmation vendor. In order to avoid the
Finney attack, the vendor should wait for multiple confirmations before releasing the product or providing
a service to the client. The waiting for multiple confirmation will not prevent the double-spending attack,
but will mitigate the risk and make it harder for the attacker to spend the same coins more than once. The
countermeasures presented for Race attacks (Karame et al., 2012, 2015) can also be used to mitigate the
risk of Finney attack.

2.3 Eclipse Attack

In eclipse attack, an enemy ready to control an adequate number of IP addresses to corner all associations
with and from a casualty hub. That is the 87-attacker power network segment between the public
organization and a particular excavator. Assuming effective the attacker can, exploit the casualty for
attacks on Bitcoin's mining and agreement frameworks, including 0-affirmation and N-affirmation
twofold spending attacks, childish mining and
ill-disposed forks in the blockchain. To play
out an eclipse attack, an attacker can control
the hub with the goal that all its active
associations are to attacker IPs. For this, the
attacker needs to fill casualty hub's friend
tables with attacker IPs. When the hub is
restarted it loses its present active associations.
At last, the hub makes new associations just to
the attacker IPs. The hub restarts habitually
happen, as a result of programming refreshes,
a bundle of death/DoS attacks, and force or
organization disappointments. To comprehend
the attack situation for the eclipse attack, some
Figure 3: Bitcoin's P2P network incoming and outgoing connection
keys Bitcoin network data is fundamental. For
example, a Bitcoin hub has a limit of 8 active TCP associations, and 117 approaching TCP associations of
course. These associations structure the tattle organization to proliferate Bitcoin exchanges and squares.
The eclipse attack targets just the Bitcoin nodes that acknowledge approaching associations in light of the
fact that not all nodes acknowledge approaching associations.

With appropriate control of the P2P organization, a foe can eclipse a hub so it is just speaking with
malignant nodes. Also, in the Bitcoin organization, Public IPs are put away in a hub's "attempted" and
"new" tables. These tables are put away on plate and endure when a restart. The attempted table stores the
IP address that a hub has effectively made approaching and active TCP associations. The new table stores
IP addresses got from DNS seeders or ADDR messages. A DNS seeder is a worker that reacts to DNS
questions from Bitcoin nodes with a rundown of IP addresses for Bitcoin nodes. The greatest conceivable
number of IP addresses that can be returned by a solitary DNS inquiry is around 4000. ADDR messages,
containing up to 1000 IP addresses and their timestamps, are utilized to get network data from peers. In
the event that in excess of 1000 addresses are sent in an ADDR message, the friend who sent the message
is boycotted. Nodes acknowledge spontaneous ADDR messages, and an ADDR message is requested

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uniquely after building up an active association with a friend. At the point when a hub restarts it
haphazardly chooses an IP address from 89 either attempted or new tables. In the event that the
association is effective, add that IP address as another active association, and this is rehashed until eight
active associations are set up.

A potential an attack situation as follows; the attacker initially gets countless IP addresses, e.g., control a
dispersed botnet. Then, at that point the attacker fills the attempted table of casualty nodes with attacker-
controlled addresses. Overwrite addresses in the new table with "rubbish" IP addresses that are not piece
of the Bitcoin organization. For this, the attacker peers send spontaneous ADDR messages loaded up with
"garbage." The "junk" addresses are unallocated or as "turned around for sometime later" like 252.0.0.0/8
square ("IANA IPv4 Address Space Registry," n.d.). The attacker powers or trusts that the casualty hub
will be restarted. When the casualty hub is restarted, with high likelihood, the casualty frames every last
bit of her active associations with attacker-controlled IP addresses. Like irregular choice of addresses
from the attempted and new tables. In addition, differentiate approaching associations, that is, a hub ought
to acknowledge just a predetermined number of associations from a similar IP address. As these days, a
bitcoin hub can have the entirety of its approaching associations structure a similar IP address.
Additionally, boycott spontaneous ADDR messages. A hub could decide not to acknowledge huge
spontaneous ADDR messages (with >10 addresses) from approaching companions, and possibly request
ADDR messages from active associations when its new table is excessively unfilled.

2.4 Sybil Attack

The Sybil assault is an assault wherein a standing framework is debilitated by producing recognizes in
P2P networks. That is, one assailant with numerous personalities. In a Sybil assault, the assailant
undercuts the standing
arrangement of a P2P network
by making an enormous
number of pseudonymous
characters and afterward use
them to acquire a dubiously
huge impact. A Sybil assault in
Bitcoin network is an assault
where a solitary enemy is
controlling numerous hubs in
the Bitcoin organization. The Figure 4: Sybil Attack on honest node of Bitcoin network
paper by Douceur (n.d.) shows that, without a coherently 85 incorporated position, Sybil assaults are
consistently conceivable besides under outrageous and unreasonable suppositions of assets and
coordination among substances. Consequently, Proof of Work doesn't forestall a Sybil assault from
happening. Be that as it may, Bitcoin utilizes PoW to make it infeasible for an effective Sybil assault to
take care of bogus data to the person in question. Additionally, Bitcoin hubs starting various haphazardly
outbound associations with different companions in the organization. Assault situation. To Sybil assault a
Bitcoin hub, the aggressor needs to initially recognize the casualty's hub and afterward supplant that the
entirety of that hub's companions with the assailant hubs. Then, at that point the assailant attempts to
segregate the client and separate the exchanges started by the client or a client will be made to pick just

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those squares that are represented by the aggressor. On the off chance that no hubs in the organization
affirm an exchange that info can be utilized for twofold spending assault. Potential countermeasures.
Bitcoin convention is viewed as Sybil opposition, since it believes the genuine chain to be the one with
most total evidence of work (not the longest chain as is frequently erroneously expressed), the outcome is
that another friend joining the organization just necessities to interface with a solitary legit companion to
track down the genuine chain. This is otherwise called Sybil obstruction, which implies that it's unrealistic
for somebody to dispatch an assault against a hub by making numerous untrustworthy friends that give
the bogus data.

A most dire outcome imaginable is when legit hub is as a rule greatly Sybil assaulted yet at the same time
has a solitary association with a genuine hub that is associated with the genuine Bitcoin organization. Up
to a solitary legitimate hub is passing the genuine information to the fair full hub (which is being
assaulted), it will disregard every one of the endeavors from the Sybil aggressor's hubs. The paper by
Bissias, Ozisik, Levine, and Liberatore (2014), proposed a two-party blending convention called Xim. It
is decentralized convention to all the while address Sybil assault, refusal of administration assaults, and
timing-based surmising assaults. It is a multi-round convention that incorporates a decentralized
framework for namelessly discovering blend accomplices dependent on advertisements put in the
blockchain. Xim's plan expands assailant cost directly with the complete number of members, and by
expanding the expense, it can relieve the Sybil-based DoS assault impacts. Generally, in other blending
conventions, for example, DarkWallet, SharedCoin, and CoinShuffle members pay just standard
exchange expenses. The exchange expenses are for all intents and purposes unimportant; in light of the
fact that the expense for the assailant is only the amount of the occurrences where they are effective,
instead of to the quantity of personalities they made. Thus, if Sybil assailants wishing to keep a decent
achievement rate should pay for each taking an interest address, thus their expenses develop straightly
with the complete number of blend members, while genuine member's expenses are fixed and steady with
the quantity of members.

Conclusion

In conclusion, present Bitcoin network protocols still present a risk to a myriad of attacks. The concerns
as previously stated throughout the essay have several countermeasures that help mitigate profit loss from
traders. Through several interviews several traders also stated that finding a sufficient blockchain
faciliatory is of prime importance. This helps make sure to maximize profitability and avoid threats from
hackers. Typical peer-to-peer network attacks and privacy concerns such as the ones discussed in this
paper can be used to disrupt the stability of blockchain systems. Currently, all the evolving solutions may
enhance the security and/or privacy slightly, but it usually comes with a price keeping the users skeptical
about using such systems. However, as research advances in these fields, cryptocurrencies may help
revolutionize the payment system as we know it today

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