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International Economics: Tenth Edition
International Economics: Tenth Edition
9International Economics
Tenth Edition
Nontariff Trade Barriers and New Protectionism
Dominick Salvatore
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Presented by: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Thuong Lang
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Import Quotas
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Import Quotas
– Import tariff:
• Higher consumption than quota
• Higher imports than quota
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
FIGURE 9-1 Partial Equilibrium Effects of an Import Quota.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th
Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Import Quotas
• Import Quota vs. Equivalent Import
Tariff
– Import quota involves distribution of import
licenses, while tariff does not.
• If not auctioned by government in competitive markets,
receiving firms will reap monopoly profits.
• Allocation decision often based on arbitrary judgments
rather than efficiency concerns.
• Monopoly profits lead firms to lobby for licenses in rent-
seeking activities.
• Thus, import quotas replace market mechanism , resulting
in waste, and possible corruption.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Import Quotas
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Import Quotas
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the New
Protectionism
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the New
Protectionism
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the
New Protectionism
• International Cartels
– Organization of suppliers from different nations
that agrees to restrict output and exports of a
commodity with the aim of maximizing or
increasing total profits.
– For example, OPEC (the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries) quadrupled the
price of crude oil between 1973 and 1974 by
restricting production and exports.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the New
Protectionism
• Dumping
– The export of a commodity at below cost, or the
sale of a commodity at a lower price abroad than
domestically.
– Three types of dumping:
1. Persistent dumping is the continuous tendency of a
domestic monopolist to maximize total profits by
selling the commodity at a higher price in the domestic
market.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the
New Protectionism
• Dumping
– The export of a commodity at below cost, or the
sale of a commodity at a lower price abroad than
domestically.
– Three types of dumping:
1. Persistent dumping
2. Predatory dumping is the temporary sale of a
commodity at below cost or a lower price abroad to
drive foreign producers out of business.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the New
Protectionism
• Dumping
– The export of a commodity at below cost, or the
sale of a commodity at a lower price abroad than
domestically.
– Three types of dumping:
1. Persistent dumping
2. Predatory dumping
3. Sporadic dumping is the occasional sale of a
commodity at below cost or lower price abroad to
unload surplus of the commodity without reducing
domestic prices.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Other Nontariff Barriers and the New
Protectionism
• Export Subsidies
– The granting of tax relief to exporters or
subsidized loans to foreign buyers to stimulate a
nation’s exports.
– Can be regarded as a form of dumping.
– Export subsidies are illegal by international
agreement, but often used in disguised form.
– Example: Export-Import Bank
• U.S. government agency that extends subsidized loans
to foreigners to finance U.S. exports.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
FIGURE 9-2 Partial Equilibrium Effect of an Export Subsidy.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th
Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Political Economy of
Protectionism
Fallacious Arguments for Protection
1. Trade restrictions are needed to protect domestic
labor against cheap foreign labor.
– Even if domestic wages are higher than wages abroad,
domestic labor costs can still be lower if the
productivity of labor is sufficiently higher domestically
than abroad.
– Mutually beneficial trade could be based on
comparative advantage, with cheap labor nation
specializing in labor-intensive commodities.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Political Economy of
Protectionism
Fallacious Arguments for Protection
2. Scientific tariffs are needed so that domestic
producers can compete.
– A scientific tariff raises the price of imports to the
domestic price.
– This would eliminate price differences and trade in all
commodities subject to such “scientific” tariffs.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Political Economy of
Protectionism
Questionable Arguments for Protection
– Protection is needed to:
1. Reduce domestic unemployment, and
2. To cure a deficit in the nation’s balance of
payments
• Protection would lead to substitution of imports with
domestic production.
• These are beggar-thy-neighbor arguments for protection
because they come at the expense of other nations.
• Other nations retaliate; all nations lose in the end.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Political Economy of
Protectionism
A Qualified Argument for Protection
– Infant-industry Argument
• Temporary trade protection is justified to establish
and protect a domestic industry during its “infancy”
until it can meet foreign competition, achieve
economies of scale, and reflect the nation’s
comparative advantage.
• To be valid, the return in the grown-up industry must
be high enough to offset the higher prices paid by
domestic consumers of the commodity during infancy.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Political Economy of
Protectionism
A Qualified Argument for Protection
– Infant-industry Argument
• Requires several qualifications which, together,
take away most of its significance:
1. More justified for developing nations than
industrial nations.
2. May be difficult to identify which industry
qualifies for protection, which, once given, is
difficult to remove.
3. What trade protection can do, an equivalent
production subsidy to the infant industry can do
better.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Strategic Trade and Industrial
Policies
• According to the strategic trade policy argument, a
nation can create a comparative advantage in industries
deemed crucial to future growth in the nation.
• Nation may use temporary trade protection, subsidies, tax
benefits and cooperative government-industry programs.
• Similar to infant-industry argument in developing nations.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Strategic Trade and Industrial
Policies
Concerns
Difficult to pick winners and devise appropriate
policies to nurture them.
Efforts largely neutralized when leading nations
undertake strategic trade policies at the same time.
Retaliation in other markets may eliminate any
gains.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding
Trade Problems, and the Doha Round
• Outstanding Trade Problems
– Trade disputes between the United States and the
European Union.
• EU subsidies to Airbus
• EU ban on US exports of hormone-raised beef and
genetically modified food
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The Uruguay Round, Outstanding Trade
Problems, and the Doha Round
• Doha Round
– Developing nations reluctant to make concessions because of
feeling that Uruguay Round failed to deliver on promises.
– Developing nations insisted on making Doha Round a true
“development round”.
– Intended to conclude by end of 2004, all but collapsed in
2006 over disagreements over agricultural subsidies between
developed and developing nations.
– As of beginning of 2009, still not concluded.
Salvatore: International Economics, 10th Edition © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.