General overview:

The Regia Marina was the navy of the Kingdom of Italy from 1861-1946. At the beginning of World
War II, it was the 5th biggest navy in the world, far bigger than Germany and much more comparable
in size to France. It included 6 battleships, 19 cruisers, 59 destroyers and 116 submarines. Mussolini
saw control of the Mediterranean as central for expanding his new roman republic, and
consequently massively accelerated naval ship building.

Before the War

Many of the Italian ships were beautiful and built for speed but tended to be under armoured and
had inexperienced crews as a result of limited sailing time. This made them weaker one on one
versus an equivalent British warship, but the surrender of the French forces still made them the
most potent naval force in the Mediterranean.

Italian control of Libya, which had been consolidated in the 1930s, gave Italy a dominant position
over the Sicilian strait and this added to Mussolini’s intention to turn the Mediterranean into Mare
Nostrum. In addition, almost the entire Mediterranean was within range of land-based aircraft, and
this weighed heavily into Italian naval planning. Italian naval high command, the Supermarina, relied
heavily on aircraft based in the Italian boot, as well as Sardinia, Sicily and Libya to provide protection
for its surface fleet; the main reason Italy had not invested into building aircraft carriers.

The most important British air bases to exert control over the Mediterranean were at Gibraltar,
Alexandria and Malta. The last of these bases was just 80 km south of Sicily and was considered by
British high command to be indefensible. However, Malta would prove to be the most important
island strategically for Britain. Air and sea forces based there could attack Italian convoys carrying
supplies and reinforcements to both Europe and North Africa. Churchill called the island an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier" while Rommel noted that Without Malta the Axis will end by losing
control of North Africa.”

The final important factor to consider was air support differences between the RN and the Regia
Marina. The Royal Navy possessed several large aircraft carriers with effective, if obsolete, torpedo
bombers. The other key difference was that the reorganisation of the British MOD returned control
of naval aviation from the RAF to the Royal Navy. This ensured more seamless coordination between
British forces, while in Italy the institutions remained completely separate.

First engagements

Italy declared war on June 10 1940, waiting until after the fall of Paris to do so in order to share in
the spoils of victory. In order to resupply important outposts in Libya, including Benghazi and Tripoli,
Italy had to run regular convoys through contested seas. Even though the distance travelled was only
several hundred kilometres, the effectiveness of Italian convoys was low. Firstly, a full third of Italy’s
merchant marine had been seized on the day the war began as a result of Mussolini’s failure to
notify them of his intention to declare war. Secondly, the limited port facilities in Tunisia and Libya
meant that Italian convoys could only be at most three or four vessels. Finally, Italy’s persistent fuel
problem meant that there were often no escorts available for the convoys as a result of no petrol to
power them.

Italy’s first naval engagement of the war was the Battle of Calabria which proved indecisive.
Escorting a vital reinforcement to Benghazi, Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni’s 2 battleships, 14 cruisers
and 16 destroyers were met by Admiral Andrew Cunningham’s aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, 5
cruisers and 16 destroyers, who were also escorting a convoy, albeit from Malta. This first
engagement, although indecisive, demonstrated major issues, especially with air support, on the
behalf of the Italians. Mussolini believed Italy’s superior land-based aircraft would offer him a critical
advantage in any Mediterranean battles. This belief would be misplaced for two reasons. Firstly,
Italian pilots were trained primarily for land combat and proved devastating against targets in
Ethiopia, but attacking warships was far more difficult. Italian doctrine called for bombers at high
altitude to fly in a tight formation and drop their bombs altogether with the expectation that
something must hit. The futility of this action was demonstrated by the fact that even though 72
bombers ran 2 sorties, only one hit was scored. Furthermore, the bureaucratic independence of the
Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica meant that when an Italian naval officer required air
support, he had to pass this request up the chain of command until it got to navy headquarters,
known as the Supermarina. Officials then contacted the headquarters of the air force, which then
sent orders down its separate chain of command to the operational air commanders. The
dysfunction was so bad that Mussolini’s son in law noted that “the real controversy in naval conflicts
is not between us and the British, but between our air force and navy.”
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