The Hindu Editorial

Discussion
 01-June-2021

caste-based
Traceabili violence
ty of the against
originator women

Traceability
of the
originator
Recognising caste-
based violence against
women

GS PAPER II
Mechanisms, laws,
institutions and Bodies
constituted for the
protection and
betterment of these
vulnerable sections.
 Recognising caste-based violence against women

• By repeatedly setting aside convictions under the PoA Act, courts bolster
allegations that the law is misused
• The horror of the gang rape of a 19-year-old Dalit woman in Hathras in 2020 is
still fresh in our minds.
• Activists, academics and lawyers argued that the sexual violence took place on
account of the woman’s gender and caste and that the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (PoA Act) must be
invoked.
 Recognising caste-based violence against women

• On the heels of the Hathras crime came a new judgment of the Supreme Court
(Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh) addressing the intersectionality
of caste, gender and disability.
• In this case, the victim of sexual assault was a blind 22-year-old Dalit woman.
• The trial court and the High Court had convicted the accused for rape under
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and under Section 3(2)(v) of the
PoA Act, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
• The Supreme Court, in its judgment delivered by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and
Justice M.R. Shah, confirmed the conviction and the punishment for rape
under the IPC but set aside the conviction under the PoA Act.
• On the one hand, this judgment is a huge step forward as the court used the
opportunity to bring recognition to intersectional discrimination faced by
women on the grounds of sex, caste and disability.
 Recognising caste-based violence against women

• However, by setting aside the conviction under the PoA Act, it is like many
other previous judgments of the Supreme Court.
 The intersectional approach

• Let us focus on the positive aspects first.

• The Supreme Court, in a first, elaborated on the need for an intersectional
approach, to take into account the multiple marginalities that the victim faced.
• It relied on well-known intersectional theorists such as Kimberlé Crenshaw
who first coined the term ‘intersectionality’ and on the statement of the
Combahee River Collective which addressed the intersectional discrimination
faced by black women in the U.S.
• Using these sources, the court recognised that when the identity of a woman
intersects with her caste, class, religion, disability and sexual orientation, she
may face violence and discrimination due to two or more grounds.
• It said we need to understand how multiple sources of oppression operated
cumulatively to produce a specific experience of subordination for the blind
Dalit woman.
 The intersectional approach

• Placing special emphasis on making the criminal justice system more

responsive to women with disabilities facing sexual assault, the court also laid
down directions to train judges, the police and prosecutors to be sensitised in
such cases.
 The intersectional approach

• But despite using an intersectional lens, the court set aside conviction under
the PoA Act.
• The PoA Act was enacted to address atrocities against persons from SC and ST
communities and was amended in 2015 to specifically recognise more
atrocities against Dalit and Adivasi women including sexual assault, sexual
harassment and Devadasi dedication.
• Section 3(2)(v) states that if any person not being an SC/ST member commits
any offence under the IPC punishable with imprisonment of 10 years or more
against a person on the ground that such a person is from an SC/ST
community, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine.
• This was amended in 2015, to change the phrase “on the ground that such
person is a member of SC/ST” to “knowing that such person is a member of
SC/ST”.
 The intersectional approach

• In cases of sexual violence against Dalit and Adivasi women, courts have
almost consistently set aside convictions under the PoA Act.
• In 2006 in Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra, where a Dalit minor girl
was raped, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction under the PoA Act
stating that the mere fact that the victim happened to be a woman who was
member of an SC community would not attract the PoA Act.
• In Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan (2006), the Supreme Court held:
“It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim
since she was a member of Scheduled Caste.”
• In Asharfi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2017), the court held that the evidence and
materials on record did not show that the appellant had committed rape on
the ground that the victim was member of an SC community.
 The intersectional approach

• In 2019, in Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, a case of murder, again

the court held that the fact that the deceased was a member of an SC
community was not disputed but there was no evidence to show that the
offence was committed only on that ground; conviction under the PoA Act was
set aside.
• There are several precedents insisting on an unrealistic burden of proof.
• This issue needs to be referred to a larger bench to take a different view.
 Burden of proof

• In all these judgments, the court held that there was no evidence to show that
the accused committed sexual assault on the ground that the victim was
member of an SC/ST community.
• One is tempted to ask: what kind of evidence would that be?
• How would the prosecution prove in any given case that the accused had
sexually assaulted the victim because she was Dalit/ Adivasi?
• The only evidence that can be led is that the victim was from an SC/ST
community and that the accused was aware of that.
• When a woman is from a marginalised caste and is disabled, she faces
discrimination due to her sex, caste/tribe and disability, all of which render her
vulnerable to sexual violence.
• This is what intersectionality theory requires us to recognise.
 Burden of proof

• In the Patan Jamal Vali case, the court using the intersectional lens recognises
that evidence of discrimination or violence on a specific ground may be absent
or difficult to prove.
• It agreed with the finding of the sessions judge that the prosecution’s case
would not fail merely because the victim’s mother did not mention in her
statement to the police that the offence was committed against her daughter
because she was from an SC community.
• It also confirmed that it would be reasonable to presume that the accused
knew the victim’s caste as he was known to the victim’s family.
• Despite such a nuanced understanding, the court held that there was no
separate evidence led by the prosecution to show that the accused committed
the offence on the basis of the victim’s caste.
 Burden of proof

• It is unfortunate that intersectionality, which seeks to recognise the multiple

grounds of marginalisation faced by women, was used by the court to state
that it becomes difficult to establish whether it was caste, gender or disability
that led to the commission of the offence.
 Burden of proof

• Why would this matter, one might ask, if the punishment of life imprisonment
was upheld?
• It matters because the repeated setting aside of convictions under the PoA Act
bolsters the allegations that the law is misused and amounts to the erasure of
caste-based violence faced by women.
• Further, as stated in the recent Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on
Atrocities and Crimes against Women and Children, the “high acquittal rate
motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant and powerful communities
for continued perpetration”.
• This judgment was a missed opportunity for the court to use intersectionality
to uphold the conviction under the PoA Act or refer the matter to a larger
bench if needed.
• We need to stop hiding behind smokescreens of hyper-technicality of evidence
and recognise caste-based violence against women when it stares us in the
face.
 Burden of proof

• Else, our caste discrimination laws will be rendered toothless.

• If intersectionality theory mattered in this case, it should have influenced an
interpretation of the PoA Act that reflects the lived experiences of women
facing sexual violence.
 Power play to bring the
digital ecosystem to
heel

GS PAPER II

Government policies and

interventions for
development in various
sectors and issues arising
out of their design and
implementation.
 Power play to bring the digital ecosystem to heel

• While there are problems in the system, ill-considered regulation such as the
new IT Rules is not the way forward
• Rule 4(2) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital
Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 imposes an obligation on significant social
media intermediaries providing a messaging function, to ensure traceability of
the originator of information on their platforms.
• A failure to implement this obligation can lead to intermediaries being held
responsible for illicit content on their platforms.
• These rules have recently come into effect.
• Consequently, WhatsApp has filed a petition in the Delhi High Court alleging
that the mandate for traceability violates the privacy rights of Indian citizens,
by rendering WhatsApp unable to provide encrypted services.
 Power play to bring the digital ecosystem to heel

• In response, the Government has, through a press release, sought to question

the substance and timing of WhatsApp’s petition.
• On scrutiny, however, it appears that the response is misconceived.

• The Government primarily relies on the argument that: privacy is not an

absolute right, and that the traceability obligation is proportionate, and
sufficiently restricted.
• Notably, the new Rules mandate traceability only in the case of significant
social media intermediaries that provide messaging services (i.e. those that
meet a user threshold of 50 lakh users, which WhatsApp does), subject to an
order being passed by a court or government agency and only in the absence
of any alternatives.
 Power play to bring the digital ecosystem to heel

• While it is indeed true that privacy is not an absolute right, the Supreme Court
of India in the two K.S. Puttaswamy decisions (of 2017 and 2018) has clarified
that any restriction on this right must be necessary, proportionate and include
safeguards against abuse.
 On traceability as a feature

• However, as we argue in a recent paper, a general obligation to enable

traceability as a systemic feature across certain types of digital services is
neither suitable nor proportionate.
• Additionally, the Rules lack effective safeguards in that they fail to provide any
system of independent oversight over tracing requests made by the executive.
• This allows government agencies the ability to seek any messaging user’s
identity, virtually at will.
• However, anonymity from the government can be important, particularly in
contexts of journalistic source protection and for whistle-blowers.
• Therefore, deciding whether to remove anonymity requires application of an
independent judicial mind.
 On traceability as a feature

• In applying the Puttaswamy tests to the Rules, one must examine not just
whether the weakening of encryption systems will lead to some law
enforcement gains, but whether these are worth the costs involved.
• Thus, one must consider the impacts of such a measure on the general digital
ecosystem in terms of the overall cybersecurity and privacy problems such an
obligation could create.
• There is near universal consensus that mandating the presence of backdoors or
weakening encryption generally — which a traceability mandate would do —
would compromise the privacy and security of all individuals at all times,
despite no illegal activity on their part, and would create a presumption of
criminality.
 Other means exist

• In any event, the Government already has numerous alternative means of

securing relevant information to investigate online offences including by
accessing unencrypted data such as metadata, and other digital trails from
intermediaries.
• Therefore, the present Rules attempt to shorten the investigative process, even
though, as we argue in our paper, law enforcement is not supposed to be an
entirely frictionless process.
• Frictionless processes lacking sufficient checks will merely incentivise fishing
expeditions by government agencies.
 Other means exist

• Further, the surveillance powers of the Government are in any case vast and
overreaching, recognised even by the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee report
of 2018.
• Importantly, the Government already has the ability to access encrypted data
under the IT Act.
• Notably, Section 69(3) of the Information Technology Act and Rules 17 and 13
of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception,
Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 require intermediaries
to assist with decryption where they have the technical ability to do so, and
where law enforcement has no alternatives.
• The newly notified Rules go well beyond current provisions in the law by
seeking to punish relevant intermediaries for failing to adequately weaken
encryption systems.
 Other means exist

• The Government’s press release appears to be well aware that this is in effect
what would happen if the traceability mandate were to be imposed.
• However, it notes that it is the responsibility of intermediaries to find an
alternative method to protect user privacy, with or without the use of
encryption.
 Scrutiny is a must

• The press release also claims that the new Rules were introduced pursuant to
consultation. However, this does not reveal the entire story.
• The traceability related provision in the draft version of the Rules released in
2018 faced significant opposition from numerous stakeholders, ranging from
service providers, academia, and civil society organisations.
• The new traceability provisions are substantially similar, and carrying out a
consultation merely to reject all the views that go against state interests is far
from best practice.
• Ideally, and given the substantive changes made to the 2018 draft (including
the addition of several entirely new parts such as those pertaining to
regulation of digital news), the new Rules should also have been put through a
period of consultation before being notified. .
• Ideally, the rules should also be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum
explaining the rationale for regulation.
 Scrutiny is a must

• Of course, this entire discussion is notwithstanding the fact that the

intermediary rules are not the manner or place to go about putting in place
new substantive regulation to solve the myriad problems caused by the digital
ecosystem.
• Indeed, the ability of the government to issue progressively more onerous
obligations under the guise of “due diligence” requirements under Section 79
of the IT Act (which in essence, deals with the issue of take-down of illegal
content) must be subject to judicial scrutiny.
 Scrutiny is a must

• Overall, however, it is clear that the move by the Government is part of a

broader power play against foreign-based technology companies, and to
generally bring the digital ecosystem to heel.
• While, undoubtedly, there are numerous problems in the digital ecosystem
that are often exacerbated or indeed created by the way intermediaries
function, ill-considered regulation of the sort represented by the new
intermediary rules — which appear to have little basis in evidence or care for
consequences –— is not the way forward.
• Indeed, the only truly democratic and relatively long-term solution would be
for legislative change along multiple avenues, including in the form of revising
and reforming the now antiquated IT Act, 2000.
 Ending
encryption

GS PAPER II

Government policies and

interventions for
development in various
sectors and issues arising
out of their design and
implementation.
 Ending encryption

• Enforcing traceability on popular messaging apps will encroach into user

privacy
• Barely a day before the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and
Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 came into force, WhatsApp moved the
Delhi High Court against the rules — specifically the one that mandates that a
“significant social media intermediary providing services primarily in the
nature of messaging shall enable the identification of the first originator of the
information on its computer resource as may be required by a judicial order”.
• Given the specification that a “significant social media intermediary” is one
with more than 50 lakh registered users, WhatsApp’s messenger service would
clearly be affected.
• WhatsApp’s contention is that for compliance and traceability, it would have to
break its end-to-end encryption service that allows messages to be read only
by the sender and the receiver.
 Ending encryption

• Its argument is that the encryption feature allows for privacy protections and
breaking it would mean a violation of privacy.
• The question to be asked is whether the traceability guidelines (by breaking
encryption) are vital to law enforcement in cases of harmful content.
• A release by the Ministry of Electronics and IT has said that the traceability
measure will be used by law enforcement as the “last resort” and will come by
only in specific situations, such as “for the purposes of prevention, detection,
investigation, prosecution or punishment of an offence related to the
sovereignty and integrity of India... or child sexual abuse material, punishable
with imprisonment ”
• The assertion suggests that this requirement is in line with the Puttaswamy
judgment that clarified that any restriction to the right of privacy must be
necessary, proportionate and include safeguards against abuse.
 Ending encryption

• But the Government, as the law stands now, can already seek access to
encrypted data under Section 69(3) of the IT Act, and Rules 17 and 13 of the
2009 Surveillance Rules that require intermediaries to assist with decryption
when they have the technical ability to do so and when law enforcement has
no other alternative.
• Besides, it can still seek unencrypted data, metadata and digital trails from
intermediaries such as WhatsApp.
• The trouble with enforcing traceability is that without safeguards such as
having any independent or judicial oversight, government agencies could seek
any user’s identity on vague grounds and this could compromise the
anonymity of whistle-blowers and journalistic sources, who can claim to be
acting in the public interest.
• WhatsApp’s contention that “requiring messaging apps to ‘trace’ chats is the
equivalent of asking us to keep a fingerprint of every single message sent...
and fundamentally undermines right to privacy” is, therefore, not hyperbole.
 Ending encryption

• If anything, the Government needs to revisit its position on traceability

commitments of intermediaries and instead revise the IT Act, 2000 in line with
existing global best practices besides legislating the long-pending Data
Protection Bill.
Lessons from
Pakistan: how to
win friends

GS PAPER II
India and its
neighbourhood-
relations.

Written by C. Raja Mohan

 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• It is widely assumed that the pursuit of “strategic autonomy” is a unique

attribute of Indian foreign policy.
• The fact, however, is that all countries, big or small, try and maximise their
room for manoeuvre within the constraints that they find themselves in.
• Let us consider the case of Pakistan.

• During the Cold War, Pakistan’s diplomacy was brilliant in pursuing a special
relationship with Mao’s China even as it signed onto America’s anti-communist
alliances.
• It became a bridge between the US and China when they did not have relations
with each other, by facilitating secret diplomacy between Washington and
Beijing in 1971.
• It was India that found itself at odds with both the US and China in the 1970s
and had to turn to the Soviet Union to rebalance the region.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• As a new era of Sino-US confrontation unfolds and as India warms up to the US

amidst the deepening schism with China, Pakistan has some tricky terrain to
negotiate.
• Pakistan can’t abandon China, its “iron brother”, which has been its most
reliable external partner.
• Yet, Rawalpindi does not want to be totally alienated from Washington in the
new geopolitical jousting between the US and China.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• As the US withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan is eager to build a

relationship with Washington that is not tied to US stakes in Kabul.
• A flurry of high-level contacts between Pakistan and the Biden administration
in the last few days has generated much excitement about a reset in bilateral
relations.

• How Pakistan copes with the new dynamic between the US and China as well
as manages the deepening crisis in Afghanistan would be of great interest to
Delhi.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• But, first, a word on autonomy and alliances.

• Autonomy is about the basic impulse for enhancing the degree of one’s
freedom; alliances are about coping with real or perceived threats to one’s
security.
• Both are natural trends in international politics.
• How a nation finds the balance between the two imperatives depends on the
circumstances.
• Joining an alliance does not mean ceding one’s sovereignty.
• Within every alliance, there is a perennial tension between seeking more
commitments from the partner in return for limiting one’s own.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• There were good reasons for India and Pakistan to choose different foreign
policy paths after independence.
• Nehru’s India believed that it had no external threats and was utterly confident
about its ability to navigate the world on its own.
• Pakistan’s insecurities in relation to India meant it was eager for alliances.
• And as the Anglo-Americans scouted for partners in the crusade against global
communism, Pakistan signed a bilateral security treaty with the US and joined
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation in the
mid-1950s.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• Although SEATO and CENTO did not last long, they generated much goodwill
for the Pakistan Army in the West.
• Pakistan might have been in the same bed as the West, but its dream was not
about fighting communism in Asia but balancing India. Communist China was
quick to grasp this.
• Rather than target Pakistan’s alliance with a West that was intensely hostile to
Beijing in the 1950s, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai saw room to exploit Pakistan’s
insecurities on India.

• At the Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian solidarity in 1955, Zhou charmed the

Pakistani premier, Mohammed Ali Bogra.
• Pakistan, which denounced Communist China at the beginning of the
conference, was much more conciliatory towards Beijing by the end of it.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• While Pakistan’s ties with the US went up and down, its relationship with
China has seen steady expansion.
• Pakistan had reasons to be deeply disappointed with the US that could not
prevent India from liberating Bangladesh in 1971, despite the security
partnership between the two countries.

• That anger did not prevent Pakistan from embracing the US again after the
Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan at the end of 1979.
• As the Pakistan army worked with the US to promote a jihad against Russian
occupation, it used the renewed partnership with Washington to protect its
clandestine nuclear weapon programme — built with generous Chinese
assistance — from the American laws on non-proliferation.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• The US and Pakistan reconnected in 2001 as Washington sought physical access

and intelligence support to sustain its intervention in Afghanistan following the
attacks on New York and Washington on September 11.
• Even as it offered support to the US in Afghanistan, it managed to keep alive
the Taliban that was undermining American efforts to stabilise Afghanistan.
• Now the US wants Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to accept a peaceful
transition to a new political order in Afghanistan.
• In other words, for all the billions of dollars of assistance to Pakistan in the last
two decades, the US could not dictate terms to Rawalpindi.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• Pakistan army, however, worries that its leverage in Washington will diminish
once the US turns its back on Afghanistan and towards the Indo-Pacific.
• Pakistan does not want to get in the Indo-Pacific crossfire between the US and
China.
• It would also like to dent India’s growing importance in America’s Indo-Pacific
strategy.

• Delhi should not underestimate Pakistan’s agency in adapting to the shifting

global currents.
• Contrary to its image in India as a client state, Pakistan has been good at using
its great power alliances to its own benefit.
• But there are three big problems that now complicate Pakistan’s strategic
autonomy.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• One is its relative economic decline; Pakistan’s expected aggregate GDP at

around $300 billion in 2021 is 10 times smaller than India’s.
• The per capita GDP of Pakistan at around $1,260 is just a little over half of
Bangladesh’s.
• Second is Pakistan’s enduring obsessions with separating Kashmir from India,
and extending its political sway over Afghanistan; both look elusive despite
massive political investments by the Pakistan army.

• Unsurprisingly, there is a recognition in Rawalpindi that Pakistan needs

reorientation — from geopolitics to geoeconomics and permanent war with
neighbours to peace of some sorts.
• That was the message from Pakistan army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa in
March.
• But translating that into policy is proving hard.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends
• Meanwhile, a third and less discussed element complicates Pakistan’s
international politics.
• Turning Islam into a political instrument and empowering religious extremism
seemed fiendishly clever a few decades ago, but today those forces have
acquired a life of their own and severely constrain the capacity of the Pakistani
state to build internal coherence and widen international options.

• In the 1950s, Pakistan’s prospects seemed much better than many nations in
East Asia and the Middle East.
• By neglecting economic development, letting magnificent obsessions cloud
common sense, and privileging feudal and pre-modern ideologies, Pakistan has
fallen rapidly behind its peers.
 Lessons from Pakistan: how to win friends

• It will be unwise to rule out Pakistan’s positive reinvention; no country has a

bigger stake in it than India.
• For now, though, Pakistan offers a cautionary tale on the dangers of
squandering a nation’s strategic advantages — including a critical geopolitical
location that it had inherited and the powerful partnerships that came its way.
The Hindu Editorial
Discussion
 02-June-2021

China's
three child policy

Child labour
Breaking the cycle of
child labour is in
India’s hands

GS PAPER II
Mechanisms, laws,
institutions and Bodies
constituted for the
protection and
betterment of these
vulnerable sections.
 CONTENTS
 In Context of child labour
 Relevant data
 Positive & Negative Trends of Child Labour in India
 Impact of Pandemic
 Way Forward
 Conclusion
 In Context of child labour

• The true extent of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on child labour is yet
to be measured but all indications show that it would be significant as children
are unable to attend school and parents are unable to find work.
• However, not all the factors that contribute to child labour were created by
the pandemic; most of them were pre-existing and have been exposed or
amplified by it.
 Relevant data

• As the world enters the third decade of the 21st century, 152 million children
around the world are still in child labour, 73 million of them in hazardous work.
• A Government of India survey (NSS Report No. 585, 2017-18, Statement 3.12,
p.35) suggests that 95% of the children in the age group of 6-13 years are
attending educational institutions (formal and informal) while the
corresponding figures for those in the age group of 14-17 years is 79.6%.
• The Census of India 2011 reports 10.1 million working children in the age group
of 5-14 years, out of whom 8.1 million are in rural areas mainly engaged as
cultivators (26%) and agricultural labourers (32.9%).
• While multiple data vary widely on enrolment/attendance ratios in India,
UNESCO estimates based on the 2011 Census record 38.1 million children as
“out of school” (18.3% of total children in the age group of 6-13 years).
 Relevant data

• Work performed may not appear to be

immediately dangerous, but it may produce
long-term and devastating consequences for
their education, their skills acquisition, and
hence their future possibilities to overcome the
vicious circle of poverty, incomplete education
and poor quality jobs.
• A Rapid Survey on Children (2013-14), jointly
undertaken by the Ministry of Women and Child
Development and UNICEF, found that less than
half of children in the age group of 10-14 years
have completed primary education. These
remain challenges we must overcome.
• Hence, a large number of children in India
remain vulnerable, facing physical and
psychological risks to a healthy development.
 Positive & Negative Trends of Child Labour in India

• Positive 
• Child labour in India decreased in the decade 2001 to 2011, and this
demonstrates that the right combination of policy and programmatic
interventions can make a difference.
I. Policy interventions such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 2005, the Right to Education Act
2009 and the Mid Day Meal Scheme have paved the way for children to
be in schools along with guaranteed wage employment (unskilled) for
rural families.
II. Concerted efforts towards convergence of government schemes is also
the focus of the implementation of the National Child Labour Project.
III. Ratifying International Labour Organization Conventions Nos. 138 and
182 in 2017, the Indian government further demonstrated its
commitment to the elimination of child labour including those engaged
in hazardous occupations.
 Positive & Negative Trends of Child Labour in India

IV. The Ministry of Labour and Employment-operated online portal allows

government officials, law enforcement agencies and non-governmental
organisations to share information and coordinate on child labour cases
at the national, State and local levels for effective enforcement of child
labour laws.

• Negative 
I. While child labour has declined during the past decade globally,
estimates indicate that the rate of reduction has slowed by two-thirds in
the most recent four-year period.

• These positive and negative trends have to be taken into account when
developing India’s policy and programmatic response during and after the
novel coronavirus pandemic.
 Impact of Pandemic

• Effect of Economic Insecurity 

• The economic contraction and lockdowns ensuing from the pandemic have
affected all countries in Asia, leading to income reductions for enterprises and
workers, many of them in the informal economy.
a) The large number of returned migrant workers has compounded the
socio-economic challenges.
b) India experienced slower economic growth and rising unemployment
even before the pandemic.
c) Subsequent lockdowns have worsened the situation, posing a real risk of
backtracking the gains made in eliminating child labour.
d) With increased economic insecurity, lack of social protection and reduced
household income, children from poor households are being pushed to
contribute to the family income with the risk of exposure to exploitative
work.
 Impact of Pandemic

• Effect of Closure of Schools and Distance Learning 

• With closure of schools and challenges of distance learning, children may drop
out leaving little scope for return unless affirmative and immediate actions are
taken.
a) As many schools and educational institutions are moving to online
platforms for continuation of learning, the ‘digital divide’ is a challenge
that India has to reconcile within the next several years.
b) The NSS Report No. 585 titled ‘Household Social Consumption on
Education in India’ suggests that in 2017-18, only 24% of Indian
households had access to an Internet facility, proportions were 15%
among rural households and 42% among urban households.
c) The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2020 survey highlights that
a third of the total enrolled children received some kind of learning
materials from their teachers during the reference period (October 2020)
as digital mode of education was opted for.
 Way Forward

• The challenges are significant and manifold but it is not impossible to meet
them if the right level of commitment among all the relevant stakeholders and
the right mix of policy and programmatic interventions are present.
a) It is through strategic partnerships and collaborations involving
government, employers, trade unions, community-based organisations
and child labour families that we could make a difference building back
better and sooner.
• As we reinforce the commitment to protect children from
unacceptable forms of work, our focus to mitigate the aftermath of
the pandemic also remains.
b) We need a strong alliance paving our way towards ending child labour in
all its forms by 2025 as countries around the world have agreed to in
Sustainable Development Goal 8.7.
 Conclusion

• We — governments, employers, unions, civil society organisations and even

individuals — must rise and pledge to ‘Take Action against Child Labour’ as a
part of the UN’s declaration of 2021 as the International Year for the
Elimination of Child Labour.
• Our actions today will determine the future of children tomorrow.
It’s time to define
limits of sedition

GS PAPER II

Issues arising out of design &

implementation of Policies;
Government Policies &
Interventions; Fundamental
Rights; Judgements & cases;
Indian Constitution
 CONTENTS
 About Sedition
Why in news ?
 Background of the Case
 Key Points from SC’s Ruling
 Way Forward
 About Sedition

Historical Background of Sedition Law

• Sedition laws were enacted in

17th century England when
lawmakers believed that only good
opinions of the government should
survive, as bad opinions were
detrimental to the government and
monarchy.
• The law was originally drafted in
1837 by Thomas Macaulay, the
British historian-politician, but
was inexplicably omitted when
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was
enacted in 1860.
 About Sedition

• Section 124A was inserted in 1870 by

an amendment introduced by Sir
James Stephen when it felt the need
for a specific section to deal with the
offence.
• It was one of the many draconian
laws enacted to stifle any voices
of dissent at that time.
 About Sedition

Sedition Law Today

• Sedition is a crime under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
• Section 124A IPC 
• It defines sedition as an offence committed when "any person by words,
either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites
or attempts to excite disaffection towards the government established by
law in India".
• Disaffection includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.
• However, comments without exciting or attempting to excite hatred,
contempt or disaffection, will not constitute an offence under this section.
 About Sedition
• Punishment for the Offence of Sedition


• Sedition is a non-bailable offence.

• Punishment under the Section 124A
ranges from imprisonment up to
three years to a life term, to which
fine may be added.
• A person charged under this law
is barred from a government job.
• They have to live without their
passport and must produce
themselves in the court at all
times as and when required.
 About Sedition

Relevant Supreme Court judgements

• The Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar case (1962) 

• While dealing with offences under Section 124A of the IPC, a five-judge
Supreme Court constitutional bench had, in the Kedar Nath Singh vs State
of Bihar case (1962), laid down some guiding principles.
• The court ruled that comments-however strongly worded-expressing
disapprobation of the actions of the government without causing public
disorder by acts of violence would not be penal.
 About Sedition

• The Balwant Singh vs State of

Punjab (1995) case 
• In this case, the Supreme Court
had clarified that merely
shouting slogans, in this case
Khalistan Zindabad, does not
amount to sedition.
• Evidently, the sedition law is
being both misunderstood and
misused to muzzle dissent.
 Why in News ?

• Recently, the Supreme Court

(SC) while protecting two Telugu
(language) news channels from
coercive action by the Andhra
Pradesh government noted that it is
time to define the limits of sedition.
• Presently, the Committee for
Reforms in Criminal
Laws constituted by the Union
Home Ministry to suggest reforms
to the British-era Indian Penal
Code (IPC), is attempting for the
first time to define Hate speech.
 Background of the Case

1. Channels blamed the state government for suppressing the right to freedom
of speech by obstructing the media coverage and reportage of the Covid-19
pandemic in the State.
• Article 19 guarantees freedom of expressing one’s own views, opinions,
beliefs and convictions freely by word of mouth, writing, printing,
picturing or in any other manner.

2. Channels urged the SC to initiate contempt proceedings against the senior

officials of the State government for violating its previous order.
• The previous order of SC directed the state government to immediately
cease any direct and indirect threats of prosecution and arrest to citizens,
who air their grievances.
 Key Points from SC’s Ruling

1. Indiscriminate Use of Sedition 

• SC flagged indiscriminate use of the sedition law against
critics, journalists, social media users, activists and citizens for airing
their grievances about the government's Covid-19 management.
• Even for seeking help to gain medical access, equipment, drugs and
oxygen cylinders, especially during the second wave of the pandemic.

2. Rights of Media 
• Acknowledged the argument that the media was well within its rights to
air critical programmes about a prevailing regime without attracting
sedition.
 Key Points from SC’s Ruling

3. Interpretation of ‘Sedition’ 
• The ambit and parameters of the provisions of Sections
124A (sedition), 153A and 505 of the IPC would require
interpretation.
• IPC Section 153 A  Punishes acts promoting enmity
between different groups on ground of religion,
race, place of birth, residence, language, etc, and
doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.
• IPC Section 505  Makes the publication and
circulation of content which may cause ill-will or
hatred between different groups an offence.
• Particularly in the context of the right of the electronic
and print media to communicate news, information and
the rights, even those that may be critical of
the prevailing regime in any part of the nation.
 Way Forward

1. Section 124A of the IPC has its utility in combating anti-national, secessionist
and terrorist elements.
• However, Dissent and criticism of the government are essential
ingredients of robust public debate in a vibrant democracy. They should
not be constructed as sedition.
2. The higher judiciary should use its supervisory powers to sensitize the
magistracy and police to the constitutional provisions protecting free speech.
3. The definition of sedition should be narrowed down, to include only the
issues pertaining to the territorial integrity of India as well as the sovereignty
of the country.
4. Civil society must take the lead to raise awareness about the arbitrary use of
Sedition law.
China's
three child
policy

GS PAPER II
Effect of policies
and politics of
developed and
developing
countries on India’s
interests.
CONTENTS
Why in news ?

Why was one-child policy

implemented ?
Criticisms associated
with One-child policy
Did relaxing the One-
Child Policy help ?
Why China opted for
three child policy ?

Challenges ahead

Conclusion
 Why in News ?

• Six years after abandoning the “one

child policy” of 1979, China’s
Communist Party has now
introduced a “three child policy”.
• The move is to “improve China’s
population structure, actively
respond to the ageing
population, and preserve the
country’s human resource
advantages”, the party’s
Politburo said on May 31.
 Why was one-child policy implemented
?
• China embarked upon its one-child policy
in 1980, when the Communist Party
was concerned that the country’s growing
population, which at the time was
approaching one billion, would impede
economic progress.
• It was enforced through several
means, including incentivising families
financially to have one child, making
contraceptives widely available, and
imposing sanctions against those who
violated the policy.
• After the one child policy, China’s fertility
rate fell from 2.75 in 1979 to 1.69 in 2018.
 Criticisms associated with One-child policy

The state used brutal tactics such as forced abortions and sterilisations.

an rights, and was unfair to poorer Chinese since the richer ones could afford to pay economic sanctions if they

It gave way for enforcing reproductive limits as a tool for social control.

It affected the sex ratio- skewed towards males.

It led to abortion of female foetuses rose and so did the number of girls who were placed in orphanag

It made China’s population age faster than other countries, impacting the country’s growth
potential.
 Did relaxing the One-Child Policy help ?
From 2016, the Chinese government finally allowed two children per couple to arrest the rapid
rapid
fall in population growth
fall in population growth
However, the policy change that did little. China’s 2020 census data, released earlier this month,
month,
shows the country’s rate of population growth falling rapidly despite the 2016 relaxation.
shows the country’s rate of population growth falling rapidly despite the 2016 relaxation.
Last year, 1.2 crore babies were born in China, down from 1.465 crore in 2019 — a fall of 18% in
in
one year.
one year.
1.3, far below the replacement level of 2.1
The country’s fertility rate has now dropped to 1.3,
2.1
necessary for each generation to be fully replenished.
necessary for each generation to be fully replenished.
The United Nations expects China’s population to begin declining after 2030,
2030, but some experts
experts
say this could happen as early as in the next one or two years.
say this could happen as early as in the next one or two years.
India, which in 2020 had an
By 2025, the country is set to lose its ‘most populous’ tag to India,
an
estimated 138 crore people, 1.5 per cent behind China.
estimated 138 crore people, 1.5 per cent behind China.
 Why was One-child policy discontinued ?

In 2013, China allowed couples

to have a second child if either
parent was an only child, with
the two child policy
introduced in 2015.

Fears of a rapidly ageing

population undermining
economic growth forced the
ruling Communist Party to allow
two children per married
couple.
 Why China opted for three child policy ?

• What necessitated Three Child Policy ?

a) While the relaxation did result in some improvement in the proportion of
young people in the country, the policy change was deemed insufficient
in averting an impending demographic crisis.
b) The once-in-a-decade population census, released on May 11, may have
prompted the latest change, recording 12 million births in 2020, the
lowest since 1961.
c) The census said there were 264 million in the 60 and over age group, up
5.44% since 2010 and accounting for 18.70% of the population.
 Challenges ahead

• Experts say relaxing limits on reproductive rights alone cannot go a long way in
averting an unwanted demographic shift.

1) Economic Factors 
• The main factors behind fewer children being born, they say, are rising
costs of living, education and supporting ageing parents.
• The problem is made worse by the country’s pervasive culture of long
working hours.

2) Cultural Shift 
• There has also been a cultural shift during the decades in which the one-
child policy remained in force, with many couples believing that one child
is enough, and some expressing no interest in having children.
 Conclusion

• The median age in China today is 38.8 which will rise to 55-56 by 2050; for
India, it is 29 now and will go up to 38; and for the US, it is 38 now and will be
44-45 by 2050.
• Engineering a baby boom after a history of Malthusian family planning will be
no easy task.
• There is a lesson for India.
• At a time when there are calls to impose restrictions of family size as a way
of addressing the population “problem”, China’s experience shows that it
doesn’t work in the long-run.
The Hindu
Editorial
Discussion
 03-June-2021

Global minimum corporate tax

Adverse changes, federalism imperilled

dren orphaned by COVID- 19

 Adverse changes,
federalism
imperilled

GS PAPER II

Issues and
challenges
pertaining to the
federal
structure.
 Adverse changes, federalism imperilled

• There needs to be a federal coalition to preserve the idea of a plural India, in

terms of culture and politics
• When Dr. Vinod K. Paul, NITI Aayog Member (Health), asserted last week that
it was the lack of centralisation that has led to poor management of the
ongoing COVID-19 vaccination drive, States joined issue with this statement.
• Going by the response to this assertion from State governments, it was clear
that this claim was not backed by good evidence.
• Not many could have misread the subtext of this claim for centralisation.
• It lies within, and simultaneously contributes to, a narrative and practice of the
growing centralisation of power by the current government.
• This sits well with the growing incursions of the Union government into sectors
where State governments have a primary responsibility to govern such as
health, education and agriculture.
 Adverse changes, federalism imperilled

• Slogans such as ‘one nation-one tax, one market and one ration’ are again part
of such appeals to a narrative of a strong nation state rather than one of
governance.
 Union encroachment

• To be sure, such moves to erode the powers of State governments are not new.
• In post-independent India, the Centre, on several occasions, has used its
powers to dismiss or use the Governor to intimidate democratically elected
governments.
• During the Emergency, education was moved to the Concurrent list which was
until then a State subject under the constitutional division of responsibilities.
• However, the adverse changes to federal relations at present are more
systemic.
 Union encroachment

• To understand what has changed, at the risk of repetition, there has been
increasing centralisation in resource allocations and welfare interventions.
• The gap between the revenue that State governments are allowed to generate
and the expenditure that they are expected to incur has been widening,
particularly with the implementation of Goods and Services Tax (GST).
• The shortfall of GST this year and the Centre’s lackadaisical response to
demands for compensation by State governments are again known.
 Union encroachment

• On the other hand, the Centre has been encroaching into domains under State
government control through centrally sponsored schemes in sectors such as
education and health where States are required to spend about 85% and 82%
of public expenditure, respectively (https://bit.ly/3z734Ai).
• Though some of these have been initiated and supported by previous
governments, the intensification of this process is aligned strongly with the rise
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) since 2014.
• This is particularly visible across the following three domains.
• While we identify these domains based on Tamil Nadu’s experience, they are
equally relevant to States such as Assam, Kerala, Punjab and West Bengal.
 State-capital relations

• While coalition governments in the past enabled the rise and the visibility of
regional businesses in post-reform India, the current dispensation is working
towards centralising economic power in conjunction with political
centralisation.
• It is becoming clear that aligning politically with the BJP is critical to do
business.
• While the rise of yoga guru Baba Ramdev’s business empire is indicative of
this, the decline of business groups from southern India over these last few
years suggest the reverse of this process.
 State-capital relations

• We can also see the consolidation and expansion of a few big business groups
seen to be close to the BJP, probably at the expense of smaller players.
• On the one hand, the Centre has sought to insulate Indian big business from
global competition by choosing not to enter into the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), but has eroded the power of small businesses
through support for GST and the call for a single national market.
• Clearly, bigger players are more likely to benefit from a removal of State-level
barriers to trade at the expense of smaller regional players.
• This re-calibration of State-capital relations works against smaller
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship.
 State-capital relations

• The BJP also seeks to centralise rent-seeking in parallel to restrict the political
financing of regional parties.
• Regional parties tend to rely on region-specific rent-thick sectors for political
funding such as mining and real estate.
• The BJP has sought to curtail this through a levelling of corruption allegations
and the use of central agencies to keep them in check.
• The reduced avenues for accumulation among regional capital weaken the
ability of regional parties to compete with the BJP electorally.
 Institutional transgression

• The second challenge is in the use of executive and legislative aggression.

• Central institutions are increasingly weakening the policy levers of State
institutions.
• Institutions such as the Income Tax Department, the Enforcement Directorate
and the National Investigation Agency are being used to intimidate opponents.
• Appointments are not untouched either.
 Institutional transgression

• For instance, the Centre has been meddling with the appointments of vice-
chancellors in universities funded and run by State governments.
• Direct transfers to beneficiaries of welfare schemes bypassing States are also
contributing to this dynamic.
• Further, as recent events suggest, the Centre is increasingly ignoring elected
representatives of State governments, holding meetings with State secretaries
and district collectors on issues that are primarily under State control.
• An example was a recent meeting by Minister of Education Ramesh Pokhriyal
Nishank with State Education Secretaries on implementation of the New
Education Policy.
 Institutional transgression

• Such transgressions, often with the help of Governors, allow the BJP to actively
control administrative decisions including faculty recruitments to align with a
majoritarian agenda.
• Governors perform active administrative roles instead of their signatory roles.
• Importantly, such moves are also meant to ensure national uniformity in
educational institutions.
• One such example is NEET, or the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test in
medical education, which subverts the affirmative action policies developed at
the regional level in response to local political demands.
 Institutional transgression

• This is evident in the domain of health as well.

• Apart from imposing a national lockdown during the first wave of the novel
coronavirus pandemic without consulting State governments, the Centre has
now put State governments at a disadvantage in vaccine usage by fixing
differential pricing for procuring vaccines for them.
• This forces State governments to pay more even as they are deprived of their
revenue shares.
 Socio-cultural foundation

• The third and crucial challenge lies in the social-cultural foundations of

federalism.
• As Partha Chatterjee argues, beside the legal-constitutional aspects of
federalism, it is diversity in cultural foundation of regions that sustains Indian
federalism.
• Regional identities and cultural traditions have worked against the
homogenisation agenda of the BJP.
• However, this diversity is being challenged at present.
• Markers of regional identities and regional socio-cultural practices are now
interpreted as belonging to a pan-Indian Hindu tradition.
• Tamil, which has stood as a symbol of an anti-Vedic tradition, is now seen as a
segment of that Hindu past, with Tamil Muslims and Christians becoming
outsiders.
 Socio-cultural foundation

• ‘Dravidian’ is attacked as a creation of the British with support from Christian

missionaries, emptying the term of its anti-caste politics.
• Tamils, therefore, need to be mainstreamed by reuniting them with their
‘Hindu’ past.
• A similar narrative is being built in other regions — Muslims and Christians
become less Malayalee, less Bengali and less Assamese.
• In Bengal, the BJP tried a strategy of linking “Sonar Bangla” to a Hindu past.
 Key variables

• This erosion of federal relations is often countered through appeals to restore

the constitutional powers of States.
• However, history tells us that such calls may not amount to much in the
absence of regional political assertion.
• Constitutional powers including fiscal relations are inherently biased towards
the Centre.
• Vesting of all residuary powers with the Centre and giving over-ruling powers
to the Centre on matters in the Concurrent list are the primary sources of this
bias.
• What is seldom recognised is that the degree of federalism in India has
depended largely on two variables: the nature of political coalitions at the
Centre and role of States in such coalitions (the period 1996 to 2014 for
example), and the cultural diversity of regions.
 Key variables

• Hence, what is needed is a federal coalition that looks beyond the legal-
constitutional aspects of federalism to preserve the idea of a plural India in
terms of both culture and politics.
On children
orphaned by
COVID-19

GS PAPER II

Welfare schemes for

vulnerable sections of the
population by the Centre
and States and the
performance of these
schemes.
 On children orphaned by COVID-19

• Speedy implementation of relief schemes for children orphaned by COVID-19 is

essential
• Well begun is not always half done, and, in any case, half done is never good
enough.
• The Centre’s response to the Supreme Court that the modalities of the
expansive assistance programme for children orphaned by COVID-19,
announced by the Prime Minister, were yet to be formulated comes as a
disappointment.
• While rightly feted for its announcement of a comprehensive programme for
the most vulnerable section of the population during this COVID-19 pandemic,
children, the Centre did not lay down procedural formalities for
implementation.
 On children orphaned by COVID-19

• It is clear from the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights’

submission in the Supreme Court that nearly 10,000 children are in need of
immediate care and protection.
• They include children aged between zero and 17 years orphaned or abandoned
during the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020.
• The total was 9,346 children who have been affected, including 1,742 children
who lost both parents, 7,464 who have lost one parent, and 140 who have
been abandoned from March 2020 to May 29, 2021.
• It further told the apex court that these children run a high risk of being
pushed into trafficking and the flesh trade. There is thus no doubt that time is
of the essence here.
 On children orphaned by COVID-19

• Given the urgency of rescuing these children, the Government cannot dawdle
over figuring out implementation strategies.
• A swift laying down of processes and monitoring mechanisms to kick start
rescue and relief, besides undertaking the continuing process of estimating
beneficiaries is needed.
• Children have little or no agency of their own and are still dependent on adults
to get by, and the disruption that COVID-19 has wrought on their lives is
devastating.
• The experience of States that sprang to the assistance of children orphaned by
the Indian Ocean tsunami can be factored in — they were embraced into the
safety net of the social security system, and funds were placed in a trust for
them for use when they reach a certain age.
 On children orphaned by COVID-19

• While the plans announced under the PM CARES Fund include this, and are far
more expansive looking at funding schooling, higher education, even health
insurance, a promise is nothing if not fulfilled.
• The responsibility of the Government now is to go the full mile to ensure that
these benefits reach every child fitting the criteria, besides making sure that
the children are not exploited with an eye on the eventual bounty.
• Several States have announced their child-care packages on similar lines too,
with some setting up monitoring committees to ensure implementation.
• Sincere implementation through committed staff, and using existing systems
such as 1098 for periodic identification of children in need would be the
cornerstones of such a project, especially at a time when the onslaught of
COVID-19 is far from over.
A far-
reaching tax
measure

GS PAPER II
Indian Economy
and issues relating
to planning,
mobilization of
resources, growth.
 A far-reaching tax measure

• The U.S. push for a global minimum corporate tax may help India, but it can
also cause international disagreements
• The Pillar Two proposal was the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD) plan to plug the remaining Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) issues and provide jurisdictions the right to “tax back” where
other jurisdictions have either not exercised their primary taxing right or have
exercised it at low levels of effective taxation.
• The move intends to achieve minimum effective taxation of more than 10%,
possibly up to 15%, given the latest proposal put forward by the United States.
• The objective is to minimise tax incentives and ensure that companies choose
to be situated in a particular country based on other commercial benefits.
 A far-reaching tax measure

• In its recent proposal, the U.S. sought to impose a global minimum tax on
foreign income earned by U.S. corporations.
• The proposal is perhaps intended to disincentivise American companies from
inverting their structures due to the increase in the U.S. corporate tax rate.
• The proposal is similar to Pillar Two, except for the rate of the effective
minimum tax.
• While the OECD was considering a 10-12% rate, the U.S. proposed a 21% rate.
• This caused pushback from countries such as Ireland, which made a case for
fiscal autonomy for smaller jurisdictions to compete with larger economies.
• The U.S. is now discussing a floor of 15% for the minimum tax rate despite the
fact that it may have difficulty securing Congress support if the floor is too low.
• Even at 15%, it is unclear whether Ireland would agree, given its 12.5%
marginal rate, thereby impacting a European Union-wide adoption of the 15%
rate.
 A far-reaching tax measure

• India has been part of the Pillar Two discussions and has not objected in
principle to the proposal.
• The proposal, along with the increased tax bill for U.S. companies, may benefit
the Indian revenue department.
• The tax department might benefit even at a 10% rate since the proposal would
cover offshore structures set up by Indian companies.
 A far-reaching tax measure

• Pillar Two acts as a set of controlled foreign corporation rules, where, for
instance, if an Indian-headquartered multinational corporation (MNC) has an
entity in Singapore or the Netherlands through which global operations are
run, and its income from global operations is not taxed at an effective rate of
10% or 15%, then it can be taxed in India.
• The State of Tax Justice report of 2020 notes that India loses over $10 billion in
tax revenue due to the use of offshore structures, particularly through
investments made by Indian residents through Mauritius, Singapore and the
Netherlands.
• This is supported by the overseas direct investment (ODI) data from 2000 to
2021 published by the Reserve Bank of India, where the cumulative ODI for the
period primarily went through Singapore, Mauritius, the U.S., the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom.
 A far-reaching tax measure

• Start-ups and large Indian conglomerates commonly use offshore structures for
conducting global operations.
• Revenue from such operations is often retained offshore and not repatriated to
India.
• Tax advantages incentivise such structures, due to which taxes on such income
are not paid in India.
• Once these proposals are implemented, Indian companies would have to pay
additional taxes on their offshore structures to the extent that the effective
rate of tax is lower than the global minimum tax rate.
 Other major factors

• With tax incentives neutralised, countries may have to compete on other

factors like better regulatory regimes, ease of doing business, access to global
talent, among others.
• The U.S. proposal indicates that the country is pushing the OECD to swiftly
achieve consensus on the global minimum tax rate, in the absence of which the
U.S. proposes to apply its domestic law version of Pillar Two at a rate of 21%
(which may now be 15%).
 Other major factors

• Several countries have taken a different approach to the rate of global

minimum tax.
• While France and Germany have expressed support, the EU has raised
concerns regarding the high rate proposed by the United States.
• Countries have stated that the proposal infringes upon their tax sovereignty
and that the fight against unfair tax competition should not become a fight
against competitive tax systems.
• Given that the U.S. is now pushing for a 15% rate, the fate of Pillar Two will
depend on whether this proposal is acceptable to other countries.
 Other major factors

• The U.S. appears keen on closing the negotiations around the 15% floor, which
should also benefit India.
• Presumably, the remaining obstacles to gaining a consensus are the issues with
Pillar One.
• As economies struggle amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the necessity of
encouraging trade and economic activity should be prioritised over
disagreements on tax allocations.
• A tax-related trade war or entrenchment of unilateral levies may further harm
both global and national economies.
Conduct the decadal
Census of India, 2021

GS PAPER I

Population and
associated
issues.
 Conduct the decadal Census of India, 2021

• The census shapes political structures, economic decisions, development goals.

Delaying it has costs.
• “Per capita GDP growth slows to ‘x’%”; “Risks of surge persist in ‘y’% of the
population in 18-44 segment”; “Rural electrification in Uttar Pradesh still
eludes ‘z’ million village dwellers”.
• You read headlines such as these in your newspaper every day. Have you ever
paused to wonder how the writers know the exact values of “x”, “y” or “z”, for
nobody conducted a headcount of people to arrive at the numbers cited?
• These numbers are estimates arrived at by projecting information from a
relatively small, primary data-gathering exercise correlated to the population
of a region, a state or the country.
• And what data set was used to project from the small, or sample, data to the
population?
• The decadal Census of India.
 Conduct the decadal Census of India, 2021

• By the middle of the 19th century, the East India Company had taken near-
absolute control of India.
• In 1858, the Government of India Act 1858 was passed in the British
parliament, the company was liquidated, and its authorities were transferred
to the British Crown.
• But to administer the dominion, the British government needed detailed,
reliable data on the people and where they lived.
• After all, how could the sovereign be sure that the extortionate taxes Her
Majesty was imposing on her dominion of India, had been collected from every
unfortunate resident of the land?
 Conduct the decadal Census of India, 2021

• The colonisers knew what to do.

• They had been doing it at home since 1801.
• The exercise was called census, from the Latin censere, to assess.
• The newly established office of the registrar general and census commissioner
launched and completed the first Census of India in 1881.
 Conduct the decadal Census of India, 2021

• While the original objective of the Census was unapologetically extortionate,

once the data became available, it found traction among a diverse range of
user groups.
• Education departments used the data to plan for primary education. Public
works departments used it to plan road networks.
• Planners used it to locate electric power plants and trunk lines on the grid.
• Railway systems used it to plan routes.
• As the data began to impact infrastructure, it facilitated large-scale population
movements.
• The rapid growth of port cities, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, was made
possible because major railway systems linked them with the proximate and
distant hinterland.
 Conduct the decadal Census of India, 2021

• Many legacies of the colonial raj continued after 1947. The Census of India,
fortunately, is one.

• Population censuses, typically with a semi-decadal (five-year) or decadal

frequency are recognised as indispensable to national resource planning.
• The United States conducts a decade-end census, the latest round of which
was completed, in spite of Covid-19, in 2020.
• China too completed its decadal census last year. After decadal census rounds
from 1871 to 1961, Canada switched to a semi-decadal cycle.
 Conduct the decadal Census of India, 2021

• India’s last Census exercise began in 2010 and concluded in 2011.

• The primary exercise, a household survey, is an enumeration of all residential
premises.
• The census count uses this household survey as the framework for population
enumeration in the following year.
• The household exercise appears to have been stillborn in 2020. We are midway
into 2021, and there is no sign of the Census.
 Why should we care about the Census in 2021?

• One, we now know that the quantity of Covid-19 vaccines ordered by the
government did not take into account the scale of the population.
• Not only do we know how many people live in India, we know their
distribution by age, gender, place of domicile, family structure and education
level.
• With the granular detail available in the 2011 Census, projected to 2021, these
numbers were on tap.

• Two, the political balance in the Lok Sabha is about to transform when the
next delimitation exercise concludes in 2026.
• If the population is the basis for representation, states with the poorest record
of population management, largely in the Hindi belt, will increase their relative
presence massively. South and West India will be disadvantaged. We need a
wider palette of demographic variables to inform the exercise.
 Why should we care about the Census in 2021?

• Three, finance commissions provide guidance on the distribution of tax

revenues between the Union and the states.
• The Goods and Services Tax makes deciding the basis of distribution more
controversial.
• Population plays a key role in routing revenue and like in delimitation,
disadvantages success and rewards failure.
 Why should we care about the Census in 2021?

• Four, sectarian politics continues its ascendance in India.

• Many arguments made by majoritarian politicians are about what they allege
to be a shrinking majority and explosive growth of minorities.
• The Census is the objective, all-India process for determining the situation on
the ground.
• Not only does this give us population data, we can also use various statistical
measures such as birth and death rates, fertility rates, gross and net birth
rates, infant mortality and child mortality rates to determine what it will be
over the decade ahead, thus bringing facts to a polarised discourse.
 Why should we care about the Census in 2021?

• Five, there is talk of large-scale investments in infrastructure to restart the

economic cycle.
• Where will these investments be directed?
• This includes questions such as: Is the bullet train from Ahmedabad to Mumbai
a good idea?
• What railway routes need to be strengthened?
• Where should road, riverine, maritime and air transport infrastructure be
directed? How will farmers make adequate returns on their produce?
• What is the best welfare model and how should it be targeted?
• The Census helps answer these questions by giving planners a sense of who
benefits, how much, and at what cost.
 Why should we care about the Census in 2021?

• Six, given the centrality of television in the public sphere and its impact on
politics, do the Broadcasting Audience Research Council (BARC) ratings
accurately represent the viewing patterns of genres, channel or shows?
• Do rural viewers really outnumber urban viewers in 2021?
• BARC gathers data based on a continuously monitored viewing panel, then
projected to the population based on the Census.
• If population data is inaccurate, so will the ratings be.
 Why should we care about the Census in 2021?

• The decadal census was meant to take place in 2021.

• If we fail to do it now, irrespective of the pandemic, we will be getting into the
rest of the decade flying blind.
 04-June-2021

Rural
health care

Digital tax
tussles
• Some people argue that inequality is natural while others
maintain that it is equality which is natural and inequalities which
we notice around us are created by society. Which view do you
support? Give reasons.
 Adverse changes,
federalism
imperilled

GS PAPER II

Issues and
challenges
pertaining to the
federal
structure.