The m4, ion we we Sieh PUBLICATIONS COMPANYCe ARMOR AT WAR SERIES T 2. Gat Ye The European Theatre 1942-1945 Steven J. Zaloga AI ASS A A PUBLICATIONS COMPANYMa Development The US Amy was G relative late- comer to the tank business in World War 2. The US fonk force on the eve of war in Europe In 1939 was that of second-rate power; indeed the US Aimy Nad fewer tanks than armies the ltaly of Poland. The neglect of the US ‘armored force was caused by o complicated set of conditions Including the economic stagnation of the Great Depression, and the Yendency towards isolationism in US foreign policy. By 1949, President Franklin Roosevelt had begun to commit the US Army to a major rebulding due to the perception that the United States would eventually be dragged into war. An Important element In this effort was the considerable expansion of the US defense incusty, to supply Lend Lease needs as well as the growing US Aimy. The clearest evidence of the stagnation of American tank design was the US Army's first medium tank, ‘he dreaditul M2A1 medium tank which ‘was manufactured from December 1940 through August 1941. This embarrassing design — was manufactured simply because no ‘other types were available, It is a grim cutlosity that the M2A1 entered production at exactly the same time that the 1-34 medium tank entered production in the Soviet Union. Although US tank design had suffered from a lack of funding, the US Ordnance Corps had wisely chosen to invest Its scanty budget in tank components, such as guns. transmissions, and suspensions. So when new tanks were demanded, the Ordnance Corps could respond reasonably quickly, as o¢cured in 1940, The fist modem US medium tank wos the M3, later called the Lee by the Bish Army. Ths tank used an obsolete configuration patterned atter the French Char B-1 bis with the main 75mm gun in @ hull mounting with limited traverse, and a secondary 37mm gun in a small furet. This design ‘was selected becouse US industrial focilities were not yet ready to manufacture cost turrets large enough fo accomodate the 75mm gun that INTRODUCTION was desired. Production of the M3 Lee began at the American Locomotive Works and Baldwin Locomotive Works In June 1941, the same month that German invaded the Soviet Union Production continued until December 1942 bby which time 6.258 had been built. Of these, 70% were exported, including 2,887 to Britain and 1,386 to the Soviet Union. The M3 Lee, and the modified M3 Grant mecium tanks, were fist used by Britain in the Western Desert Campaign in 1941. They were appreciated for their firepower and automotive reliability, but the outdated configuration was regarded {3s deficient. The M3 Lee was used by the US Army for training the new ‘camored divisions. Ultimately. few were used by the US Army in combat, mainly during the early stages of the 1942 Tunisian compaign Design of the Md tank was stertec In February 1941 and the first 1-6 prototype was ready by September 1941. The Ma usod essentially the some chassis. as the M3 lee, The superstructure was modified to permit use of a conventional turret, crmed with o 75mm dual-purpose gun. US Army doctrine stressed the need for a dual-purpose weapon, capoble of firing both armor piercing ond high ‘explosive ammunition. This was based in part on the advice of US licison officers serving with the British Army in the desert fighting who noted the problems that British tanks were having when armed with weapons like the 2 pounder gun that only fired armor piercing (AP) ammunition The 6 prototype wos subjected to numerous moditications, and the first production MaAl medium tank ‘emerged in February 1942 at the Lima Locometive Works in Ohio, two months after the US had entered the war. The first production model was the MAA). This employed « cast-hull which became the characteristic feature of this version. A welcied hull version was also planned which was identical automotively, sharing the same Whirlwind radi! aircraft engine. The first Ma was manufactured at the Pressed Steel Car Company In July 1942, One of the main production problems facing the US war industry 3 was the lack of suitable engines. The Whirlwind radial engine was in widespread demand by the aviation industry for worpicnes, so alternative ‘engines had to be found. The GM 6-71 diesel bus engine wos adapted but mounting two together, and this resulted in the MaA2. The M4A2 used welded hull like the M4, bul had a different engine deck configuration due to differences in the engine cooling systom. The MaA2 actually entered production before the M4 with the first being built by the Grand Blane Tank Assenal in April 1942. The US Army was opposed to using diesel Powered tanks due to the problems this created with fuel supply in the field. As result, the M4A2 was not regularly used in combat by the US ‘Aimy. It sas principally shipped fo the Sovie! Union, which preferred diese! tanks anyways, and many were also supplied to the Free French and Polish ‘armored units through Lend Lease, The only American forces to regularly use the M4A2 In combal was the US Marine Corps, which preferred desels since they shared the fuel used by ‘amphibious ianaing craft, ‘The most popular version of the M4 in US Army service was the M4A3 which employed a Ford GAA gasoline engine. Production of these began in June 1942, and except for small numbers of tials vehicles and howitzer tanks shipped through Lend Lease, early all were earmarked for the US Aimy. The lost major M4 variant wos the M44 which was powered by the unusual Chrysler A-91, an engine created by mating four automobile engines together, The MaAd entered pproctuction in July 1942, and most wore. supplied to Britain. They were used slateside by some US units for training, but there is no evidence thal any were fssued to US units in combat. The MAAS designation was reserved for the Canadian Ram tank, The M4A6 was c minor type using & new engine and composite cast/welded hull, but none ‘were used in combat. Improved M4 Medium Tanks All of these M4 vatiants underwent continual evolution, Many of the evolutionary changes in the M4 series are mentioned in the captions‘Generally, changes introduced on one model cartied through all versions. ‘One of the earliest changes was the substitution of a new suspension bogie for the M-3 type, sometimes called heavy-duty bogie, which had the elu roller mounted on a trailing arm Instead af aver the moin assembly. The welded hull M4 versions (Ma, MdA2, M4A3) wore Improved with a Rew uparmored hull with simplified Glacis plate at a 47° angle that entered production in 1944; a similor improvement was introduced on the MAA\l cast hull version around the same time. This change was accompanied by improved ammunition racks with water-filled cavitios to reduce the tisk of ammunition fires ia tank was hit Sometimes, those tanks had the designation “W' (for "Wet") added to thelr names, such os M4A3(75)W, or they were called Ma (75mm, wet); the former style s used in this book ‘One of the most important changes was the decision to up-gun the Md medium tank with o 76mm M1 gun mounted in an enlarged 1-23 turret. Nese entered production as the MAA1(76)W in January 1944, the MAA2(76)W in May 1942, the MaAX7O)WW in March 1944, Neither the Ma nor the Mad were uilt with the 7mm gun. During combat, it was found that it would be useful fo have a support tonk version of the M4 armed with a howitzer to tire larger high explosive rounds, These were built on the Md and M4A3 chassis. primanly for use by the US Aimy. These entered production in Fobruary 1944, and used the Improved hul, but without wet stowage. One of the rare versions of the Sherman to see combat was the M4436? Jumbo tank. This was a special assault tank with much heavier armor on the front and sides. Only 264 were bull beginning in May 1944, and they were issued in small numbers to most US armored divisions starting in the autumn of 1944. Although originally armed with the normal 75mm gun, most were rearmed with the 76mm gun before seeing combat. The final major evolutionary change In the Md series was HVSS (otizontal Volute Spring Suspension). The Md had long been criticised for its poor performance in mud, snow, sand ‘and other poor soll conditions. This was due to the fact that its tracks were very narrow. Expedient solutions, such as ‘duckbil” extended end-conneciois could ameliorate the situation. but a new suspension spaced further out from the hull wos needed to use wider track. In August 1944, production of the first M4A3(76)W HVSS tanks began. These are sometimes called MAA3EB after the prototype with this suspension, but this was not an official designation for the production types. The HVSS suspension was added fo M4 1a5mm howitzer tonks produced from Soptember 1944 and M4A3 105mm howitzer tanks starting in August 1924 The first tanks with HVSS suspension begon enteting combat in December 1944. HVSS suspension was not fitted 0 any other M4 variant during the war. though after he war, some other variants were rebuit with this feature, In total, 46,732 M4 medium tanks were built through June 1945, of which 22.098 (47%) were provided to allied ‘armies through Lend Lease, By way of comparison, the Germans bullt only 18,870 tanks during the same period from 1942 to 1945, The only tank manufactured in larger numbers ‘luring tne wor was the Soviet 7-34 with 64,580 bul through 1945. The Ma chassis also served as the basis for a wide range of other armored vehicles. The M10 7émm tank destroyer and M36 90mm tank destroyer were counterparts of the Ma intended specifically for anti-tank missions. The M7 105mm Howitzer Motor Corriage, M12 and M40 155mm ‘Gun Motor Cortiage were the principal self-propelled artillery weapons of the US Aimy in World War 2. Specialized types like the M32 armored recovery vehicle were also manufactured. In total, over 15,000 armored vehicles Gerived from the Ma were also built uring the war. of which over 10,000 were the MIO and M36 tank destroyers. The M-4 in Combat The 2nd Armored Division was the fist US Army unit to receive the MAA medium tank in large numbers in the summer of 1942. This advantage was shottived. os the division was ordered « to transfer its tanks to Britain for use in the forthcoming offensive at El Alamein which took place in late Setober 1942, 4 total of 318 MAA anc M4A2 medium tanks were shipped through the middle of September ‘where they were called the Sherman I ‘and Sherman Il, The British Army had adopted the policy of naming American tanks after US Civil Wat generals, and the Ma was known, appropriately enough. as the Sherman. This name was never officially adopted by the US Army, but the M4 subsequently became better known in the popular mind as the Sherman, However, the Mia tank was seldom, if ever, referred to as Sherman by US tankers during World War 2 The Sherman was first used in combat on 24 October 1942 during the battle for El Alamein with British armored units. The Sherman was immediately popular in Briish service, The layout was more modern then the MS Grant and Lee, and the sherman. had better firepower than any contemporary British tank. It was the only tank in British service during the offensive that compared favorably to the German Pzikpiw. Il or Pz.kpfw. IV tanks of the period. The US Army's 2nd Armored Division was reequigped wilh M4 and MAA tanks in the early cuturnn of 1942 In preparation for Operation Torch, the Invasion of French North Aftica, The Ist Aimored Division at the time was already equipped with the M3 medium tank, but Ma and Maat medium tanks were provided to the 2nd ond 31d Battalions, Ist Armored Regiment of the Ist Armored Division before it was shipped to Tunisia: in December 1942. The combat debut of the Ma in US service took place on 6 December 1942 when a platoon from the 6th Armored Regiment. 2nd Armored Division was sent into action against entrenched German anti-tank guns near Djebs! bou Aoukar in Tunisia. Manned! by inexperienced crews, most were quickly knocked out, The M4s unhappy debut in US Army service foreshadowed the grim battles that ‘were to follow, In Februrary 1948, the Ist Aimored Regiment of the IstArmored Division was sent into action Neer Sid ou Zid in Tunisia 10 defend against a major Afrika Korps offensive codenamed Operation Fruniingswind pring Wine), the opening phase of what would become known as the ‘oottle for Kasserine Poss. The German offensive contained the most ‘expatienced Afrika Korps tank units as well os the highly prized sP2Abt 501 with Its new Tiger | tanks. The experienced American tankers were outnumbered and severaly beaten by the veleran Geiman tankers lasing 44 Md ond M4A1s on 14 February and about as many during a failed counteraltack the next day. Nevertholoss the US tanks managed to knock out about 19 German tanks before succumbing. More training was needed. Ma and MaA1 medium fonks were Used through the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, In general, the US tankers were pleased with the M4’s performance, especially as compared to the M3 medium tank and the M3 “Stuart” light tank. American tenkers felt that they could hold their own against German Pakptw Il and Pzkpfw IV tanks. The real problem wos the M3 medium tank, ‘which suffered from limited main gun traverse nd was too large a target. The M3A1 light tank was roundly aiticied as being completely unsuited formedein tank combat due fo its thin ‘afmor and puny 37mm gun. It was acknowedged that the Ma could not fongle with the thickly armored Tiger heovy tank, but these were encountered in very small numbers. ‘The US Amy had its own heavy tanks in developement that were expected to be able to deal with this threat. The Tunisian campaign showed serious problems in the configuration of early US armored divisions, notably too many light tanks, and they were feorganized in 1943 with the M4 medium tanks predominating. The next major compaign for the Md and Mal tanks was Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, Sicly was very mountainous and not suited to fonk warfare. As ai result, there were fewer armored units committed to the Invasion than to the Tunisian campaign. The 70th Light Tank Battalion was equipped entiraly with M5 light tanks and the 753rd Tank Battalion was equipped with the MAA medium tank. The 2nd Armored Division, reorganized and reequipped after the Tunisicn fighting. was the largest US armor unit deployed on Sicily. Axis armor forces on Sicily consisted mainly of the Hermann ‘Goering Panzer Division, the sPzAbt 604 Tiger regiment and the Italian 131 Reggimenio Cartisti equipped with ‘obsolete French Renault 36.8 infantry tanks The hilly terrain of Sicily did not fovor tank actions, and the initial tank skirmishes were confused and Indecieve., The 753d Tank Ba. knocked ‘out three Tigers for the loss of 4 M4Als near Piano Lupe on 11 July 1943, and several more were lost during a firefight with 2nd Armored Division. ‘Most of the Italion Renault 36. tanks were destroyed by US infantry. The US forces enjoyed the advantage ot naval gunfire support, and several Geiman tank attacks were stopped in thelr tracks. By 16 July 1943, the German attempts to stamp out the Gola beach-head had foiled, costing 30 PKpfw lll ond IV tanks and 14 of the 17 Tigers of 2./sPzAbI 504. There was little tank fighting later in the ‘campaign, Gen, George 5. Patton, ‘commanding the US forces in the Siclly ‘campaign, ordered the 2nd Armored Division to consolidate its forces for a new mission, Patton decided that the division had been improperly used, chopped up into small sub-units to suppor the infantry. Instead, he used it to spearhead a rapid assaull to clear ‘out western Sicily and capture Palermo, This was the type of ‘exploitation mission for which the US ‘armored aivision had been designed, ‘and the 2nd Armored Division served ‘admirably in this role, This mission 100k advantage of the Mé’s excellent ‘automotive performance and reliability, characteristics which separated it from most other tanks of the period. The Md’s excellent ducl- purpose 75mm gun was very effective in routing out anti-tank gun postions. machine gun nests ond similar targets. In general, Patton and the US Atmy were very hoppy with the performance of the 2nd Armored Division and the Ma medium tank in Sicily and sew no major need for a change, The British Aimy had a different viewpoint. The experience of the North Atricon dese! campaign hod convinced British tankers of the need to continually increase the anti-tank performance of their tank guns. Brtsh tanks in the desert fighting had gone from the machine gun armament of the Light Tank Mk. VI in 1940, to the 2 pdr. on the Matiide and Valentine of 1941, fo the 6 pdr. and 75mm gun in 1942, British tank design was being pushed along by the threat of new Geiran tanks and tank guns. Gerrean tonk firepower was being pushed long by Soviet tank design. The appearance af the Tiger tank In Tunisia, and later in Sicily, convinced the Bish Aimy that something beyond the 6 pdt. and 75mm gun would be needed for the invosion of Europe in 1944, They decided fo adopt the new towed 17 pdr, anti-tank gun as a tank weapon. The question remained as 1o which tank should be armed with It Bish tank design during World War 1 wes an embarrassment, Britain concentrated its industrial efforts on Gitcrafl Gnd ship design, and the army was lefl with the scraps. A new tank had been introduced in the final phase of the North Africa battles, the sluggish, but well armored Churchill tank. It was adequate for infantry support. But a new cruiser tank to replace the arthritic, thinly ormored Gnd undergunned Crusader was Gelayed until 1944, Fortunately, the US was able fo supply large numbers of MA4Aa Sherman tanks to fill the gap. The turet of the Sherman was barely able to accomodate the big 17 pat gun inside, so a bustle had to be Gdded to the tear to reposition the radio, Nevertheless, the 17 pat. conversion worked, and the new type became known as the Firefly. It was undoubtedly the best version of the Sherman for tank fighting to oppecr ‘during the war. Bitain offered the 17 pdr. to the US Aimy. expecting the American to adopt it just os they had adopted the 6 pdt. for the US Army the 57mm anti- tank gun. Instead, the US Amy refused. There were many reasons for the lackNormandy wos not wall sulted 10 tank fighting, as the fields were criss- crossed with bocage, a deep hedgegrow developed over the centuries by Normandy farmers to limit soll erosion from the harsh coastal winds. These formed natural tank traps, cond most of the fiating in the US sector was conducted by infantry with small numbers of tanks for fire support, The June fighting lec! US fankeis to devise novel solutions to the bocage problem, notably the Cullin hedgegrow cutters, namedi atter their inventor. They were also called Culin Piongs or Rhino devices. Tankers hod found that when they tied to crash Ihvough the bocage, they could not build up enough speed to plow Infough. Instead, the tanks simply climbed the hedgegrows, thereby exposing the thin belly armor to German anti-tank teams in the neighboring hedges. he Culin device wos simply an array of girders attached to the transmission housing. When the tank struck the hedgegrow with the Cullin device, it stuck in the roots of the hedge, and allowed the tank to bulldoze through, Although Wwidely celebrated ct the time, some tankers interviewed by the author state thot it cld’t work as well as advertised ‘and was not as widely used as the popular myths would suggest. What dic! work in Normandy was alt attack, German tank forces in Noimandy had already been severely weokened by constant allied alr ‘tiack. Contrary to the popular myths of Tornados and Thunderbolts blasting tanks with rockets and machine gun tire, in tact very few German tanks were actually destroyed from the air Rather, the Anglo-American tactical ‘Ok forces managed to shoot up the logitlical support such as trucks and repait vehicles which were essential to keep the panzer divisions operational In. addition, the Panther tanks were not capable of sustained road marches, ‘and the air attacks managed to shatter the railroad network on which the Germans depended for moving thelr tank units. With the Germans fxcted on the British 21st Army around Caen, and telatively immabile dus to ‘ir attack, the US Amy prepared to ‘tosh oul of the bridgehead towards Brittany on 25 July 1944 in Operation Cobo, (Cobra was preceded by @ massive carpet bombing that devasicted what German tank forces were present in front of the US positions, and helped eliminate the tenacious German infantry anti-tank teams that had Proven such as threat in the earlier Normandy fighting. Cobra was a toaring success, and by early August, the 2nd, 3rd. 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were charging forward, With their defenses unhinged, the Germans tied to stem the American tide with a panzer attack at Mortain, including the ‘excellent 2nd Panzer Division, as well {a5 Ist and 2nd SS Panzer, and 116th Panzer divisions. The panzers gave the US infantry a rough time, but dostered by omnipresent air support and the 2nd and 3rd Armored Division. the Getrnan assault was held, With British, Canadian and Polish armored thrusts from the north, and American from the south, the German army in Noimandy was about to be encircled and fropped east of Falaise in on enormous debacle, The performance of the Mi tank in the Normandy campaign campaign was acceptable, but the number of Panther tonks came os a surprise, The fine grained terrain characteristic of the coastal area did not allow the Germans to take maximum advantage of the firepower advantage enjoyed by the Panther, Nevertheless, the main concern to Shermans about the Panther was not lis main gun. Indeed, e'ther the P2kpfw IV or the Panther could penetrate the Sherman frontally from normal combat ranges of 1,000 yards, The Panther was a problem becouse of Its thick, well sloped armor. A 75mm armed Sherman could not penetrate the ‘camor of @ Panther frontally except for {fluke shot, such as one ricecheting off the lower gun mantiet and into the thin roof armor over the driver. The 7émm gun on the new MAAl(76)W. and M4A3(76)W could penetrate the Panther (theoretically) at 600. yards Using the normal Mé2 armor piercing round. A for beter cltemative wos the new tungsten-carbide core 14 HVAP round, sometimes colled souped-up AP of hyper-shot by US tonkers. This could penetrate a Panther frontally at most nomal combat ranges, but most janks had only two or three rounds of his ammunition at any one time and i remained scarce until 1945, The thin armor and mediocre firepower of the M4 compared ta the Panther was a source of bitter complaint by US tankers. The initial resistance towards the 76mm tanks wes quickly forgotten, and battalion commanders were soon pleading tor more 76mm tank and more hyper shot. However. the technical disparity between US and German tanks did not have a significant impact on the course of the fighting in 1944, although it did lead to higher US losses. The reasons for this were many, Although the Germans hac a tough reputation atter the bloody nose suffered by US tank units in Tunisia, by 1944, the quality of German tankers wos decreasing and the quality of US tankers was increasing. The reason was training. US tankers in 1944 were far better trained in combined-atms tactics than their 1942 counterpars, and in many cases they were better trained than their German counterparts. No doubt there were many veteran German tank cctews in Normandy in 1944, but there were also many green crews to fll the enormous Gaps caused by Germany's long years of war. New German tankers got very little fleld training before entering combat due to fue! shortages, While the Gemans may have had mote exceptional veteran crews in June 1944, on average, the ‘American tankels were better trained. The situation for the German panzer forces continued to decline as ihe wor progressed, During the Lonigine campaign in September 1944, the German Sth Panzer Corps massed the largest concentration of German tanks seen since the battles at Caen and Moriain in July 1944, This counterattack force included over 300 tenks, with the majority being new Panther tanks. Unfortunately for the Wehrmacht, the crews and commancers were as new as their tanks. Thelt opponent was the ath ‘Atmoted Division, known as “Patton's Best", ¢ well trained, welkied division which had become baitis hardened since the fighting for Coutanees in July1944, From 19 to 22 September 1944, the 4th Amored Division broke the back of the German counterotfensive near Arteicourt, destroying 107 tanks ‘and 0 assault guns for the loss of only 14 M4 tanks and 7 MSA1 light tanks. Two of the new panzer brigades were wiped out in the fighting, and by the end of the fighting for Arracourt, the 4th Almored Division had destroyed 288 German tanks and armored vehicles for a loss of 25 medium tanks and 7 tank destoyers. At the same ime, the veteran French 2e Division Blindee smashed another panzer brigacie putting an end to the largest Germen aimor operation in the West ntl the Battle of the Bulge. The Md had performed well in these battles due to the quality of Its crews, and inspite of the technical shortcomings of the tank. The German tankers did not know how to exploit terrain to their best advantage because curing training they simply didn’t have enough fuel fo practice field formations. In contrast, the 4th Armored Division had developed tactics to approach closely and hit the Panthers on thelr sides where they could be penetrated by 75mm guns. The M4 would fie smoke founds at the Panthers to blind ther, and then use the terrain fo close on the Panthers before the smoke would dissapote Some Md tankers recall thot the Geiman crews were s0 inexperienced that they would cbendon their tanks ater being hit by 75mm high explosive rounds which did not penetrate. Meeting engagements of the type seen at Atracoutt were relatively uncommon in France. More often, small German armor formations would \wait in ambush fo hit unsuspecting Ma tanks ond scoot away before they could be engaged. In these ‘ambushes, many Mas were lost, their thin armor providing inadequate protection for thelr crews. On average, one crewman was lost every time an Ma was put out of action; the new vehicles with “wot” stowage being less susceptible fo deadly ammunition fires ‘than the okjer M4 tanks. Tank and ant- tank guns were the most common. cause in Notmanay, but after the summer of 1944, German Infantry ponzertaust rocket grenade launchers became the predominent source of losses, Batlle of the Bulge The last major tank-vs.tank encounters on the Western Front in World War Il came in December 1944- January 1945 during the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans obtained a strategic surprise and threw their last reserve of panzer forces against US Infantry units in the Ardennes region of Belgium. Several infantry divisions were crushed, but by the third week of December, the US Army was rushing substantial tank forces into Belgium to stem the German offensive, These tank battles were offen fought under ‘eppalling weather conaitions and at very close ranges. Both sides suffered very heavy losses in men andi tanks. Tho ciitical difference was that the US had plenty of tanks and trained crews and Germany did not, There were no mojor encounters with German poner forces after the Ardennes fighting as Germany was obliged to shift its surviving panzer divisions to the east in @ hopeless attempt to hold back the mossive Soviot January offensive. While the ultimate outcome of the ‘war was no longer in doubt after the German defeat in the Ardennes, the ‘war was far from over. The Wehimacht continued to resist, particularly once the US Amy reached German soll. The character of the fighting changed, with brutal street-by-street fighting toking part in many German towns The changing style of fighting is reflected in the photos in this book. The US tank crew began more deliberate efforts to reinforce the Ma's inadequate armor. Two approaches were taken. The most common technique was fo load sandbags on the hull front, and sometimes on the hull sides os well. This wos intended to offer a measure of stand-off protection ‘against the panzertaust rocket grenades. Sometimes the sandbags were filed with sand, sometimes with concrete. Officially. it was discouraged, since It odded @ great deal of weight leading to more frequent breakdowns and armor specialists argued that it did not offer significant additional protection ‘anyways. Whether the protection was only psychological or not, the practice 8 was popular In many units, The omer approach was to layer on more sleet ‘rmor. This was far less common, since steel armor wos far more difficult to obicin then sandbags ond concrete, Some of the armor came from knocked out US and German tanks, other armor was prepared by ordnance depots. Tanks with added ‘camor were sometimes used in the role of assault tanks, leading columns into areas likely to be protected by onzerfausts or antitank guns, This was the role for which the M@A3E2 Jumbo was desioned,, bul there were seldom enough of these available, Another improvised method was to use tanks fitted with bulldozer blades, with thelr blades elevated to offer a shield. The M4 Sherman will win few nominations for the category of the best tank of World War 2. t was not as innovative as the Sovlet 1-34 or as wel armored/aimedi as the Panther or Tiger IL Yet it deserves consideration in other cotegories. Automotively, iI was one of the most dependable and rugged tanks of World War 2, A tank Is just a hunk of useless steet if itis broken down with a bum transmission or engine as was so often the case with Geiman heavy tanks. was also well sulted for mass production. German military writers often note that the Wehymacht was overwhelmed in the west by larger numbers of tanks and other weapons. They have seldom acknowledged that this was possible because the US stuck to @ proven, Inexpensive design instead of producing small numbers of superbly crafted, but expensive heavy tanks like the Panther and Tiger. Photo Sources: Unless otherwise noted, all photos in this book are official US Army Signal Comps photographs, These have been collected by the author at several ‘archives including the Defense Audio Visual Agency offices formerly at the Pentagon and the DAVA Sill Records Depository at the Anacostia Navy Yards. This collection Is now maintained by the US National Archives. Other photos have come from personal collections, unit recorcs, and the photo collections of other services such as the US Navy.The North African Campaign When i first went ints combat in North Jean the auturin of 1942, the 1st Armored DNison was ett party equipped with the alder Noo median tank. This i @ Wid mecium tank OIE Company, 131n Armd. Regt, 1st Armored Owision at Souk el Arba, Tunisia on 26 Nofamber 1942 at reat following combat the ty bolero in support of British infanty of he 36 Dinece Group. The 1st Armored Division used ‘complicated pattern of geometric signs to ‘Monty is component unit the insignia of E Company can be seen on the hull side between Ihwtno coven an te rh [in Ma&1 maclum tank of @ Co, {tm d. Regt. tet Armored Biv. tosses 2 dried out vor Dod near Si eu Zi, Tunisia on 14 Feb 1843, Most of his unit was knocked out later in tha day during fighting with the Gorman 21.Panzor Division. The Gorman offensive, codenamed Fruhlingswind, nearly wiped out the {rd Batiaion, 18t Arm’a. Rogt. About ‘Bef the 44 MM and MaAts lost were knocked out by Tigers ofthe sPZAbI. S51, th only Tiger unit in North Avia. By the end of 1942, the M3 Loe medium tank was obsolete sehen compared to Germar tanks of the period. This MS Lee of the 13th Arm’. Regt., 181 Armored Oly. is seen advancing near Souk e! Khomis, Tunisia on 25, November 1942 during the baillos by the Eastern Task Force to capture Tunis,‘Honky-Tonk’, a NMA medium tank of H Co., fst Aim. Rag. which has suferes a catastrophie ammunition fre, blowing ofits turret during the fightng at Sil Dou Zd'on 14-15 February 1943. A total of over 80 MM and MAT tanks wore lost during the fighting whero an Amercan force was ‘overwhelmed by much laeger ano more experiences elements of Rommel’s Afrika Korps. This Is an early production MMA1 as is evident ‘om the early Ma syle of suspension, [A pair of Ma medium tanks of F Company, tst Armia. egl. knocked ‘out during the 15 February counterattack by Combat Command C Seuthwostof Sidi Salem. Ths company was vitualy wiped out in a shor fengagomont with Pz.Kptw. ll and P2.Kofw.lV tanks with tho tank in the foreground, #19, knocked out by a 75mm round from a P2 Kpfw WV, ang ‘the tank inthe background, #3, knocked out by @ SOmm round trom a Pr.kptw Ill, These are early production Ma tanks with the early suspension, earty pater armored visors forthe ever and co-diver, anc the eatly gun manta hous the srmered clans, A MAAT of & Company, 1st Arm Fgh, ist Armored Division in mid February 1943. This company lost most of its" tanks curing fighting at St bou Zi on 14-15 February fhuring bates wih the 21, Panzer Division and Tigers of SPzAb1501, Ths tank ‘s unusual in two etaile- the use of Sand skits whieh was ot particulary common’ on 1s Armored Division ‘Shermans at tis time, and secondly, thatthe Yellow star Insigria on the turret has been palntod over, probably Yo reduoe ts value as fan aiming point tai German gunces, the MAA medium tanks lost a he 72 from the Srd Battalion, 1st Armd. Rg, 1st Armored Division. A number a these tanks wore knocked out at long range by 88mm anti-alrerait gunt sugporing the German attackThe N4At tank “Hen Ill” of Lu.Col. Honty Garainer, vommander ofthe 2nd Batalon, #h Armored lsgimert, 1h Jmorod Division. Gardiner lest wo previous Mle medium tanks, including “Henry I" on 17 Februaty ai Sbeiia, out Fomme! tad called his battalion's defense of Sbeitia “clover fant hard fought. The geometric design on the forward hal ses the tactical sign 6f the HO Company of 2nd Battalion, (Col Hemy Garciner) A Maat medium lank of Capt. G, W. Meade, commander of 1G. ast Atm. Rogt., ist Armored Dw onthe approaches. 10 Kasserine Pass, Tunisia on 24 Fob 1943 shorty afer the Allies had tinally stopped the German and tallan advance, By this timo, the 1st Armoted Division had sulfered very heavy lank casualties and had very fow Shermans. lolt in The Aliod victory In North Atrios 19 falabeatod an 4 July 133 in Rabat, Herorco wah a pale of camouflaged M7 ‘05mm howitzer elo cariages inthe The M7 was a fel-propelied artilery Ueheia based on the Me tank enaasis, The sani camouflage on tre Ms and the T-30 rm howitzer motor tariages behind them vos probably applied lor the parade and 4908 not fallow the tndard patton.‘The Halian Campaign ‘A&A medium tank of the 2nd Armored Division an the beaches of Sicily on 10 July 1943. This tank belonged to “E ‘Company as is evdont by iis namo. Tha small geometric Signs bboiaw tho namo Etomity aro the tactical signs of the 2nd Armored Division on Sicily, which have still not been. {osiphered compotoy. Tha white cle painted around the US Star wae adopted at the lime of the Silly invasion duo 10 ‘expationces in Noth Affiea whore it was found thatthe sta ‘coud be mislaken for a German cress al long ranges, AM? 105mm howitzer motor carriage named "Anna? of A Battery, bath Armeted Field Artilery of the ‘Armored Owision near Nettuno, Italy on 2 February 1944, eleven days ater the Anzio landing. This particular howitzer provided extensive fire suppor for the VI Corps offensive on the provious sovoral days as is evidont fom the large number of cardboard ammunition packing cases littered ‘around the weapan, AM? 105mm howitzer mator carriage of the 2nd Armored Division In tho outskns of Soiaeca, Sicly on 20 Jy 1929, Ths fs an early production vehicle using the older M3 medium tank suspension, The large circle ‘added to the US star insignia seems too large tof the superstructure sideks ofthe 13th Arma. Rg, 1st Armored Division on 27 Apr 1946 during preparations leading tothe final broakout ‘Armorod Dwision didnot employ the elaborate geomet facta! insignia am the Avo beach-head in May 1944, During the Hakan campaign, tho 1 leet in Norn en ‘The US Army experimented ith several unusual devices prior to the bueakout trom Anaio in May 1944, including this “Battle Sied” being toned behind @ M7 HMC. developed by Brig. Gon. John O'Daniel tommander of the Src Infantry Dillon. The idea was that it wi roi prot Mackin pilooxes or other delended sbjetnas tiem known if was ever ‘sd in combat. A MAAt “Foolish Fela’ of the HO of F. Co, 12th Arma. Regt Acmmored Divsion in the Anzio beach-head on 27 pil 944, The double row of spare track links was a slandard feature of 1st Armored Divison tanks to improve thelr protection against Geman anti-tank guns. The tst Armored Division used simpilied tactical markings in aly. on bands painted turret The hal-band on the forward barre of this tank identifies Was a headquarters tankMore Mi tanks pour ashore from fan LST at Anzio on 29 May 1844 in Suppor of the drive on Rome. The 1s Armored Division was. the only armored dlvision committed to tis theatre after Sicily, but it had the separate 19181 and 75tst Tank Bns acres. Weenie One’, @ camoutlages Maat of 1st Armored Division near Gistorna on 25 May 1944 during *Oparation Buffalo, tha attack towards Rome, By now the vision was battle hardened, ane the Germans lost 15 TTigor I tanks during tho fighting that day. Two days late, the division would fencounter the list German Panther tanks io this theatre during the Fighting ear Valo, ‘A Mé medium tank of the tel Armored Division in the town of Paganica outside Rome. The division 40k part in the capture at Rome on 4 5 June 1944, and then proceeded to move against Gorman forces nor ol the oty towards the Ammo Fiver. Note the white countershading under the! tank's gun barrel, a rare use of ths! official US engineer camoutlage technique,A.Mé medium tank of an independent tank battalion sucted to Sth Army passes through Rome on S June 1984, Te wie Aled star wih a crce was the standard US insignia atts stage ofthe war. Many unis, including the 4st Armored Dison painiod it aut gine It made too clear an aiming pent forGormsn ant-tanc guns AMAA1 tank of the 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Armoted Division crosses the Amo rivet ‘oxgenied from as former “hoavy" configuration an 20 July 1944, one of te last ar-vored 15, AM? 105mm howitzer motor carriage of the 91st ‘Armored Field Arillry Battalion conducting a fre support mission on 24 August 1944 wile the commander of the US 5th Army in lay, Lt. Gen. Mark C. Clack looks on, Ths fs an arly procuction M7 HMC evident trom is M3 pattern suspension, Interestingly enough, the lower hull sides are painted white, an engineer camoullage practice Intended to breakup the apparent shape of the M7 by reducing the contrast between the hull and suspension, '8 ford near Casoina, aly on 1 August 1944, The division was ‘disions 10 do 0.“Tanks were often used for indirect fre suppor in the iter phases of the falian campaign, £0 the crews became acapied at camouflage when fing trom state posions. This M4A3(73)W of the 71s! Tank Bn. nas been camouflaged sith white paint and spun glass obtained from a loca factory naar Poretta,Htaly on 1 February 1845 16 The crow of a MAAS{76)H ofthe 4th Tank Battalion, 1st Armored Division at SI, Luca aly prepare and load ammunion inte ther tank named Somme IV prior to the attack of Bologna on 19 October 1944. The crow has added a sot ofctular sted rod hoops over an mprovsed alan Sigh! mouried in front of the guneary Staton on the ght turret 00. By th stage of the Nallan campaign, 1o¥ Gorman tanks wore encourtered and the Ma tanks were frequently used i rove incirect Fire suppor. ‘The {st Armored Dvision suffered frequent losses to German mine {and anti-tank traps during the fighting in Italy and so showed mort fenhusiagm for comet anginesr tanks than most otner US armored unit Here, an MAAT fited with an Mt buldozor blade is used to clean up bat damage in 2 town in aly on 12 September 1944. The sigiicance at te terete insignia on the ture snot ken,The} 2 Campaign ‘hate are no known photos of US tanks during the D-Day landing at Jamandy cn 6 June 1844. This photo, taken a day after te landing al Uh Beech, shows a MM medium tank, named Gannon Bal. probably of © Ga, 70m Tank Bn. that became trapped in a tidal pool while wading in | jam an LCT. sted with two deep water foing trunks, but these wore | aivusiy not sufficient duo to the depth of the water. The other two banpans ofthe 70th Tank Bn. were equipped with amphibious Dupex Dive Ws, and were the only US unit o have any succoss with this ype of luk Normandy due tothe calmer ocean conditions at Utah Beach. The Ata Tank Bn, al Omaha Beach lost 27 of 32 DD tanks due to strong save crrions, (US Navy) ‘AMT HMC of the 14th Field Artilery Bn., 2nd Armored Division Passing through the town of Garertan en 18 June 1944 during the dive towards the seaport of Brot. This M7 has had a mine storage rack added to the hl side, 2 feature not normally soen on artley vehicles, ‘A MéAT medium tank named “Derby” ofthe 2nd Armored Division passes a disablod Gorman P2kpfw IV tank during the fighting south-east ‘of Goutances in July 1844 while an 81mm mortar team walks alongsde By this stage of the war, most early production Sherman tanks in US, service had been upgraded by acing applique armor an the hul sit ‘over ther ammunition storage bins, as well asin the font of tho gunn ‘lation on te night sido ofthe tute. |, Sagi, a Met2 485mm Gun Motor Saiage (GMC) tees in support of the US ilaneo near SL_Lo on 16 July 1944. The Me '® nas based on the MA tank chassis, (Operation Cobra cubminated in the Bish and ‘anencan armies rapping most of tre Garman foxes In Normandy in the Falaise pocket in August