Global Crime

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fglc20

Street corner decisions: an empirical investigation

of extortionist choices in El Salvador

Carlos Ponce

To cite this article: Carlos Ponce (2021) Street corner decisions: an empirical
investigation of extortionist choices in El Salvador, Global Crime, 22:2, 143-165, DOI:
10.1080/17440572.2021.1875212

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2021.1875212

Published online: 26 Jan 2021.

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GLOBAL CRIME
2021, VOL. 22, NO. 2, 143–165
https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2021.1875212

Street corner decisions: an empirical investigation of

extortionist choices in El Salvador
Carlos Ponce
School of Criminology,Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper identifies offender choice patterns associated with extor­ Received 04 August 2020
tion subtypes in El Salvador, Central America. Previous research Accepted 08 January 2021
attributes the rise of extortion in the country to the evolution and KEYWORDS
propagation of Los Angeles-born street gangs Mara Salvatrucha Extortion; street gangs;
(MS-13) and Barrio 18. Data from a unique business victimisation offender choices; MS-13;
survey is used to analyse 53 decisions in 869 reported cases. The Barrio 18; El Salvador
study borrows a multidimensional scaling method used in criminal
profiling research to identify offender choice patterns. Cases are
classified into extortion subtypes based on identified choice group­
ings. Key offender choices and location features are compared
across extortion subtypes. Offender choice patterns identified in
the study are consistent with systemic and opportunistic extortion
described in previous literature. About a third of the cases are
designated as hybrid extortions due to the blend of choice structur­
ing properties they exhibit, which combines aspects of both sys­
temic and opportunistic extortion.

Introduction
Over the past decade, extortion has turned into a debilitating problem in Latin America,
attracting a variety of offenders1. Corruption, lack of confidence in authorities, high crime
rates, and powerful armed non-state actors have facilitated the instauration of protection
rackets2. This issue is particularly paralysing in Central America’s Northern Triangle3.
Authorities across the isthmus struggle to contain the problem, while researchers call for
more studies to generate insight for evidence-based approaches4. However, the granular
data needed to conduct research are not available for every country in the isthmus. This
investigation examines data from a unique business victimisation survey conducted in El
Salvador that offers a rare glimpse into the extortion business in Central America.
Extortion is El Salvador’s main obstacle for economic development5. Its rise is largely
attributed to the propagation and evolution of Los Angeles-born Mara Salvatrucha and
Barrio 18 in the country6. Both street gangs exhibit a relatively high degree of
sophistication7, have established a corrupt relationship with politicians8, and use extor­
tion as their primary source of income and to assert and maintain their territorial control9.
Their success in the extortion business has attracted other actors and created a diverse

CONTACT Carlos Ponce cponce@sfu.ca School of Criminology,Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive,
Burnaby, B.C. V5A 1S6, Canada
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
144 C. PONCE

pool of extortionists10. The identification of offender choice patterns is crucial to ade­

quately address opportunity structures associated with each offence subtype11.
This study investigates extortion in El Salvador from a rational choice perspective. It
expands on extortion classification schemes by uncovering themes in the configuration of
offender decisions. The purposive nature of extortionist choices has been well
established12, yet the choice patterns that emerge throughout extortion’s crime commis­
sion process have not been empirically investigated. The present analysis identifies
decision combinations associated with extortion subtypes described in previous typolo­
gies and, additionally, uncovers a blend of choices associated with a novel subtype that
occurs when offenders face different choice-structuring properties that force them to shift
offence-execution styles. The findings presented here have relevant implications for
future research and policies aimed at preventing extortion.

The rational choice perspective

The suitability of the rational choice perspective to study instrumental offences, such as
extortion, has been widely acknowledged13. Its unique focus on offender decisions makes
it a useful tool to dissect extortive crimes14. Victims and extortionists engage in
a prolonged chain of strategic interactions, which extends well beyond their initial
exchange and takes on multiple configurations15. The rational choice perspective facil­
itates the deconstruction of such complex crime commission processes16. It views crimes
as a collection of interrelated decisions in which offenders choose how to execute
offence-related tasks by assessing the risks, rewards, and costs associated with each
alternative17. The logic used in each assessment is bounded by the amount of information
available to offenders and their ability to process it18. Based on this assumption, offences
can be deconstructed into crime scripts to identify patterns in offender choices. Offence-
related tasks are organised into sequential scenes19. The configuration of choices across
tasks reveals patterns that shape separate tracks which correspond to distinct offence
subtypes20. Each pattern is bound by its own set of choice-structuring properties that
place task-specific requirements to perpetrators21. The identification of choice patterns
has been used to refine typologies for a wide variety of offences, from burl poaching22 to
victim crossover sexual offences23.

Subtypes of extortion for protection

Previous literature commonly classifies extortion into systemic and opportunistic sub­
types. It attributes systemic extortion to hierarchically structured groups that hold a high
degree of territorial control, and opportunistic extortion to loosely organised criminal
networks that engage in casual extortion or impostors who pretend to belong to
a criminal organisation or gang24. Subtypes differ in terms of the role played by offenders
in the community and the rewards they seek through extortion. These differences con­
strain the execution of offence-related tasks.
Systemic extortionists exploit the absence or weakness of state institutions to usurp
local governance roles, monopolise the use of force, and offer public services like
protection25. In such settings, extortion for protection functions as an unofficial tax
imposed by crime groups or street gangs in exchange of a service26. The state’s poor
 GLOBAL CRIME 145

performance creates a demand for others to fulfil its duties27. Some systemic extortionists
can improve security, reduce regular crimes, garner public support28 and even develop
partnerships with extorted businesses29. Selling protection is one of the easiest ways in
which organised crime groups and street gangs can make money, as it requires little effort
on their part30. However, these offenders also use it to increase control over local
resources (votes, services, markets, property, etc.), infiltrate legal businesses, and delimi­
tate geographical boundaries31. There is an incentive, thus, for systemic offenders to
approach extortion intending to develop and maintain long-lasting relationships with
victims through repeated victimisation32. Establishing permanent links with victims dee­
pens and extends their territorial influence and control.
Conversely, the literature describes opportunistic extortion as a more predatory, short-
lived offence. Perpetrators who engage in this extortion subtype are incapable of, and
uninterested in, targeting victims for a prolonged period33. Norza and Peñalosa, for
example, found that some Colombian offenders use extortion to supplement low salaries
from legitimate occupations34. Similarly, copycat extortionists in Central America and
Mexico pose as street gang members or organised crime affiliates to extort victims35.
Such perpetrators seek monetary rewards36. They focus only in getting as much money as
they can, as quickly as they can from victims37. Contrary to systemic extortionists, these
offenders trick victims to get them to pay. They must complete offences before victims
realise, they are being conned.
The risk of being discovered imposes harsher choice structuring properties to oppor­
tunistic offenders. The success of an extortion rests on the perpetrator’s ability to con­
vince victims to keep engaged until the offence is completed38. Victims assess the
seriousness of the threat at every contact to determine if it is safe to report the crime or
not39. They may refuse to interact with offenders or contact authorities if they do not
perceive the threat is real40. It is up to offenders to make victims believe it is in their best
interest to continue with the exchange. Systemic extortionists can achieve this more
easily. They have well established criminal reputations, wield a high level of territorial
influence and control, and can use pressure tactics to eliminate any reluctance41.
Offenders are equipped to keep the extortion going for extended periods.
Opportunistic extortionists, conversely, must execute their offences in such a way that
the danger perceived by victims does not dissipate. Once it does, it is harder and riskier for
them to rebuild.
The stricter choice structuring properties faced by opportunistic extortionists influence
the way they execute offence-related tasks. Extortion requires perpetrators to carry out
certain unavoidable actions. For instance, all extortionists must contact victims, commu­
nicate demands, negotiate payments, set a delivery procedure, and collect or forgo
payments42. Opportunistic extortionists must limit their contact with victims in each
task to protect the credibility of their threats. Therefore, interactions with victims are
not personal, direct, or abundant. Perpetrators use methods that hide their identity, like
anonymous letters43 or mobile telephones44, and ask for ransoms that limit their contact
and exposure, usually single cash payments. Once victims show any reluctance, oppor­
tunistic offenders desist and move on45. Systemic extortionists, conversely, contact vic­
tims personally and repeatedly, elicit multiple periodic payments, and may ask for various
types of ransoms46. There is also an incentive for these offenders to use pressure tactics if
victims refuse to pay. When a victim does not pay, others may doubt the credibility of the
146 C. PONCE

threat posed by systemic extortionists and, thus, also decide not to pay47. Offenders risk
losing money and, additionally, their territorial authority, influence, and control. Under
such circumstances, offenders who engage in systemic extortion turn to pressure tactics
and harsher threats to reassert their violent reputation and deter anyone else who does
not want to pay48.

Hybrid extortion
Some extortions blend choices usually not found together in the systemic and
opportunistic subtypes considered in typologies. In Central America’s Northern
Triangle, for example, convicted gang members who normally engage in systemic
extortion, select and target victims remotely to create a personal income stream while
inside prison, using smuggled mobile telephones to contact victims49. This practice
has increased so much in the isthmus that extortions committed remotely from
correctional facilities represent 80% of extortions reported in Guatemala50. In
Mexico, crime groups that conduct systemic extortions in the territories they control,
use a more predatory subtype of the offence when they target victims in areas where
they want to expand their influence51. However, when they take over the newly
conquered territory, they switch back to systemic extortion and approach victimisation
with a long-term perspective to garner local support52. Both scenarios suggest that
offenders who commonly engage in systemic extortion suddenly face circumstances
that impose a fresh set of choice structuring properties that forces them to change
the way they execute offence-related tasks.
Such situations develop very easily in Latin America’s urban landscape. A large percen­
tage of its population lives in urban marginalised communities53. These areas function
under their own set of rules. In Central America and Brazil, marginalised communities are
peppered across cities, some even embedded in the wealthier areas54. Social exclusion
and concentrated disadvantage make these communities ideal breeding grounds for
street gangs and organised crime groups55. Cities operate under plural security orders,
as competing illicit groups and official authorities all set and enforce their own rules and
regulations in the areas they control56. Groups and gangs that try to expand their
influence to neighbouring communities, which function under a different security
order, have an incentive and the resources to force extortion victims to pay. However,
they lack the territorial control needed to interact directly, so may turn to more indirect
methods to contact victims. This might lead victims and authorities to mistake these
extortionists with impostors. Threats may not be taken seriously or addressed accurately,
which could lead offenders to use violence in order to increase the danger perceived by
victims.
Current extortion typologies do not consider hybrid offences. The blend of actions
associated with this offence subtype and the potential consequences derived from
misinterpreting it, highlight the importance of gaining a better understanding of the
choices that shape each extortion subtype. Accurately identifying patterns in offender
decisions would not only help refine future research on extortion but also provide
policy makers and law enforcement officials with a more refined picture of the offence
to inform the design of crime prevention strategies.
 GLOBAL CRIME 147

Extortion and street gangs in El Salvador

In El Salvador, the surge and propagation of extortion for protection is linked to the
expansion and evolution of MS-13 and Barrio 1857. Extortion reports rose in the mid-
2000s with a sharp, sudden increase observed between 2005 and 2006. According to police
statistics, the victimisation rate jumped six-fold that year to approximately 42 per 100,000.
This trend peaked in 2009 with 74 per 100,000. Since then, the number of extortions
reported to authorities has decreased. The average rate between 2013 and 2018 was
approximately 46 per 100,000, half that of 2009. However, official statistics must be inter­
preted with caution. Previous research estimates that, in El Salvador, approximately 70% of
extortion victims do not report their victimisation to authorities58. Despite this elevated dark
figure, official data show the problem has spread across the country. Figure 1 shows the
municipal distribution of extortion victims between 2013–2015. The map reveals that
extreme high values are present across El Salvador and do not concentrate in a specific
region. Extortion, thus, affects communities and businesses around the country.
MS-13 and Barrio 18 made their way to El Salvador during the 1990s through the
deportation of Salvadorans who joined their ranks in the United States59. During the
1980s, waves of Salvadorans fled to North America to escape El Salvador’s 12-year civil
war60. Many settled in gang-ridden urban enclaves such as Los Angeles61. The difficult
circumstances in their new surroundings pushed Salvadoran immigrant youths towards
existing gangs, like Barrio 18, or to organise into MS-1362. After El Salvador’s conflict
ended in 1992, changes in the United States immigration laws resulted in the massive
deportation of Salvadorans, including those who had joined MS-13 and Barrio 1863. Post-
conflict conditions commonly associated with the aftermath of civil wars, combined with
long-standing social exclusion and a variety of other social problems, provided an amen­
able context for these gangs to germinate64.

Figure 1. Box map of extortion victims in El Salvador 2013-2015.

148 C. PONCE

MS-13 and the two competing factions of Barrio 18, Sureños and Revolucionarios,
now collectively cover almost every municipality in El Salvador65. Their growth and
progressive sophistication are attributed, at least partially, to reactive, mano dura
(iron fist) criminal justice responses66. The most recent estimates show there are
around 70,000 gang members in the country, who operate with the help of
a support network of approximately 400,000 people, comprised mainly by relatives,
partners, and other individuals who depend on gang-related illicit activities to
subsist67. Gangs and their support network represent 6.9% of El Salvador’s 2020
estimated population. Extortion rackets are run by gang cliques in their own territory,
which usually includes one or multiple adjacent neighbourhoods, where they collect
fees from local businesses and buses, taxi cabs, and delivery trucks that enter their
turf68. However, the fear generated by street gangs, combined with elevated crime
rates, rampant levels of impunity, and the accessibility to mobile telephones have
attracted others to the extortion business69. For example, gang members extort
victims from prison via mobile telephones to generate personal income while
incarcerated70. Copy-cat extortionists also use mobile telephones to pose as gang
members to target businesses, relatives, and employers71. Measures implemented by
authorities to prevent extortions being perpetrated from inside the correctional
system have proven ineffective72.
The current investigation explores extortionists’ choices during a period in which
street gangs had tightened their grip over communities. Local governance is shared
between political parties and street gangs in exchange of electoral support73. This study
examines a period in which this arrangement was well established. During Mauricio
Funes’s presidency, government officials struck the first known nationwide deal with
both gangs to reduce homicide statistics in exchange of benefits for imprisoned gang
leaders74. In the years that followed, the support of street gangs became instrumental
to all political parties during electoral events75. This dynamic carried through to the next
presidential administration, with the election of Funes’s vice-president, Salvador
Sánchez Cerén, in 201476. The current government, presided by Nayib Bukele, is also
suspected to have a deal with street gangs77. This study focuses on extortion events
that took place during Sánchez Cerén’s first year in office. There are two unprecedented
situations that evidence the uncontested authority that MS-13 and Barrio 18 achieved in
their neighbourhoods during the studied period: the rise of forced internal
displacement78 and the unaccompanied child migration crises in the southern border
of the United States79.

Aim of the study

This study identifies patterns in offender choices associated with subtypes of extortion
in El Salvador. The investigation examines data from the 2015 Micro and Small
Business Victimisation and Security Perceptions Survey conducted by the Salvadoran
Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES). Its extortion module
contains 51 items that elicit information about choices made by extortionists. The
survey was conducted among micro and small businesses, such as neighbourhood
convenience stores, diners, and independent entrepreneurs. This economic sector is
the hardest hit by extortion in the country80.
 GLOBAL CRIME 149

Data
The survey used in this study collected information from 3,977 micro and small businesses
across El Salvador81. Most surveyed establishments had two employees or less (73.1%),
were in a commercial area or main street (63.7%) and were housed in a single facility
(88.4%). Extortion victimisation was reported by 909 businesses, which represents 22.9%
of the sample. Interestingly, however, 46.4% identified extortion as a serious local pro­
blem. This suggests that a significant portion may have decided not to report their
victimisation. The final analysis dropped 40 extortion cases due to lack of information
across offence-related tasks, which reduced the sample to 869 reported extortions.

Offender choice variables

The data was recoded into 63 dichotomous variables to show the presence or absence of
extortionist choices. Multiple offender choice options capture the different procedural
permutations in the execution of 6 offence-related tasks: contacting the victim, setting
demands, establishing payment procedures, making threats, using pressure tactics, and
offering benefits for complying with demands. A small group of 9 offender decisions
occurred in less than 2% of the sample. They were dropped from the study because their
inclusion reduced the graphical solution’s goodness-of-fit indicators. The final analysis
includes 53 offender choices. The Appendix lists extortion tasks, offender decisions, and
the abbreviations used in the analysis.

Local features
The victimisation survey asked respondents about local crime problems associated with street
gangs, the criminal justice system, and responses to crime. Their answers were used to
distinguish gang-controlled locations. Systemic extortions were expected to be more com­
mon in places where respondents identified gang-related crime, such as homicide and
extortion, and the presence of gangs and gang symbols as salient problems. Data was
recoded into dichotomous variables that indicated respondents designated street gangs,
homicide, extortion, graffiti82, or crime as significant local issues. It was expected that people
in gang-controlled neighbourhoods would exhibit negative attitudes towards law enforce­
ment and favour extra-legal and harsher responses to crime. Communities that endure high
crime rates and report frequent negative interactions with the police develop legal cynicism,
which causes residents to question the legitimacy and effectiveness of formal social control
agents and motivates them to turn to other means to cope with insecurity83. The study
measured attitudes towards police, crime, and criminal justice through Likert-type survey
items that asked establishments to rate police effectiveness, trust in the police, and their
support for harsher laws, charging juveniles as adults, extra-legal justice, and youth
programmes.

Methods
This study borrows an analytical approach used in criminal profiling research to identify
patterns in extortionist decisions. Specifically, Salfati and Canter’s application of
150 C. PONCE

multidimensional scaling (MDS) methods to study homicide crime scene actions is used to
analyse offender choices84. Various studies have adopted this method to validate homicide
subtypes in a variety of countries85. MDS is an exploratory statistical technique that produces
a relatively easy to interpret graphical representation of the strength of associations between
multiple variables in complex datasets86. The graph assigns coordinates to each variable and
plots them as points in a two- or three-dimensional space according to their occurrence and
co-occurrence. Variables with the highest occurrence rates are positioned at the centre of the
plot and the rest in concentric circles with lower frequency variables placed in the periphery.
Distances between points illustrate the frequency of co-occurrence between variables.
Jaccard similarity coefficients are used to measure the strength of the associations
between extortionist choices. The MDS graphical representation of the underlying choice
structure was produced with the PROXSCAL procedure in SPSS. The thematic groupings
identified in the spatial configuration of points are consistent with extortion subtypes.
Salfati’s stringent criterion87 is used to classify cases, which requires that the number of
variables associated with the corresponding choice theme at least double the rest of
variables in the case. Extortions that do not meet this threshold are designated as hybrid
extortions. Chi-square tests and Bonferroni post-hoc tests are used to establish the
statistical significance in differences across extortion subtypes regarding key offender
choices and the identification of local problems. The statistical significance in differences
found in perceptions of police effectiveness, trust in the police, and support for harsher
laws, adolescents tried as adults, extra-legal justice, and youth programmes is estimated
with Kruskal-Wallis tests and pair-wise comparisons.

Results
Offender choice patterns
Figure 2 presents the bi-dimensional solution generated by the PROXSCAL routine in SPSS.
The normalised raw stress score for the graphical representation is 0.05 and Tucker’s con­
gruence coefficient 0.98. Both indices suggest that Figure 2 is a good representation of the
associations between offender choices. High frequency choices, identified in over 50% of
cases, depict extortion in its most basic form: perpetrators who claim to be gang members
demand money from victims under threats (see Table 1). Moderate frequency choices
gravitate towards two distinct execution styles that portray two different subtypes of
extortion.
The left area of the graph contains variables that depict an overt and prolonged
execution, consistent with the systemic extortion typically linked to gangs and organised
crime groups. Choices are anchored around multiple payment variables. Their spatial
configuration suggests that, compared to other offenders, those who retrieved periodic
payments offered protection to victims and used pressure tactics mainly to target busi­
ness owners or their families after the initial contact. The stage in which pressure tactics
were used suggests they were part of a negotiation process in which offenders sought to
recalibrate their position in the exchange. This area of the graph also holds the variable
associated with multiple sporadic payments. Its closeness to variables that show extor­
tionist demanded goods and services suggests these were the most common type of
sporadic payments.
 GLOBAL CRIME 151

Figure 2. MDS graph of extortionists’ choices.

Offender choices displayed in the right portion of the plot portray a more covert and
short-lived execution, consistent with the one described in the literature for opportunistic
extortions perpetrated by casual extortionists and impostors. It combines variables that
suggest offenders tried to hide their identity, like those that indicated the initial contact
was made via a telephone call or an anonymous letter, with choices that conveyed a lack
of territorial control. For example, the variables of single payment, no payment, payments
retrieved at a different location, and initial contact used to provide instructions are found
in this part of the plot. These choices imply perpetrators had an incentive to desist under
certain circumstances, limit contacts with victims and move the extortion to locations
where they felt safer.

Extortion subtypes
Profiling studies use Salfati’s 62% threshold as the benchmark to establish the validity of
variable groupings to distinguish between offence subtypes88. The current study classifies
 152

Table 1. Frequency of offender choices.

C. PONCE

Choice Frequency (% of total cases)

Offence tasks High Moderate Low Marginal
Initial Contact Offender gang member (80) In person (50) Owner was not contacted (28) In street (9)
Owner initially contacted (73) By telephone (35) Through anonymous letter (5)
Started negotiating (63) Instructions given (33) Offender gang associate (4)
Offender crime group associate (2)
Offender not affiliated to group (4)
Offender other (3)
Demands Money (73) Periodic Single delivery (18) Free goods or services (9)
delivery (39) Sporadic deliveries (14) Did not make any demands (9)
Demanded other things (6)
Prepaid phone cards (3)
Not allowed to make demands (3)
Went from single to periodic deliveries (2)
Payments Picked up by offender (47) No payment (27) Payments through bank deposit (2)
Periodically delivered (42) Designated place (15) Electronic transfer payments (2)
Single payment (14) Payments with other frequency (1)
Delivered sporadically (14)
Benefits No benefits were offered (62) Protection against others (17) Other benefits offered (5)
Protection against own group (15)
Threats Violent crimes (52) No threats employed (37) Property crimes (14) Against company property (7)
Against owner or family (52) Against employees or families (13) Against others (2)
During initial contact (51) During development (11)
Pressure tactics No pressure tactics employed (82) During development (11) Committed violent crimes (10)
Targeted owner or family (11) Committed property crimes (6)
Pressure tactics before initial contact (6)
Against company property (4)
Against employees or their families (3)
 GLOBAL CRIME 153

Table 2. Case classification.

Subtype of Extortion Frequency Percent
Systemic 306 35%
Opportunistic 307 35%
Hybrid 256 30%
Total 869 100%

70% of extortions as either systemic or opportunistic using choice agglomerations (see

Table 2). The remaining 30% of offences did not exhibit a dominant choice theme and,
therefore, are designated as hybrid extortions.
Non-parametric tests confirm the differences found in the MDS choice agglomerations
associated with systemic and opportunistic extortions. Opportunistic offenders contacted
victims via telephone, asked for single payments, and desisted without payments at
a statistically significantly higher proportion than systemic offenders (see Table 3). The
latter, conversely, asked for multiple payments, contacted victims personally, and used
pressure tactics more often. Tests also showed that systemic extortions occurred in areas
where gangs exhibited stronger territorial control. Victims in systemic extortion reported
gangs, extortions, and graffiti as salient local problems at a statistically significantly higher
rate than victims in opportunistic extortion. Additionally, they perceived the police to be
less effective (p = .001), distrusted the police more (p = .010), and displayed more support
towards harsher laws (p = .006), the death penalty (p = .018), charging youths as adults
(p = .009), and extra-legal justice (p = .016) (see Table 4).
Table 3 also shows hybrid extortion combines choices associated with systemic and
opportunistic extortions. Compared to offenders in opportunistic extortion, for instance,
those who perpetrated hybrid extortions asked for single payments and desisted before
receiving a payment at a statistically significantly lower proportion but demanded multi­
ple payments and used pressure tactics significantly more often. However, when con­
trasted with offenders in systemic extortion, they contacted victims via telephone at
a significantly higher rate and used personal contacts significantly less often. Street
gangs also had relatively less control over the areas where hybrid extortions were

Table 3. Key offender choices and local problems.

Extortion Subtypes (% of n)
Systemic Opportunistic Hybrid
n 306 307 256 X2 (df) p-value
Offender Choices
Single payment 5 (2)* 88 (29)* 27 (12) 94.78 00282) 0.000
No payment 4 (1)* 192 (64)* 35 (15)* 318.88 (2) 0.000
Sporadic payments 63 (21)* 7 (2)* 50 (22)* 55.73 (2) 0.000
Periodic payments 227 (76)* 12 (4)* 119 (51)* 324.73 (2) 0.000
Personal contact 222 (74)* 98 (32)* 117 (47) 109.57 (2) 0.000
Phone contact 59 (20)* 147 (48)* 93 (38) 54.59 (2) 0.000
Violent crime 47 (16)* 2 (1)* 31 (13)* 44.56 (2) 0.000
Local Features
Gangs 280 (92)* 250 (81)* 230 (90) 16.62 (2) 0.000
Homicides 141 (46) 118 (38) 119 (46) 4.93 (2) 0.085
Extortion 285 (93)* 254 (83)* 225 (88) 10.78 (2) 0.005
Graffiti 163 (53)* 130 (42) 102 (40) 11.99 (2) 0.002
Crime 239 (78)* 201 (65)* 179 (70) 14.69 (2) 0.001
*Bonferroni post-hoc test detected statistically significant difference.
154 C. PONCE

Table 4. Perceptions of the police and responses to crime.

Subtype Mean Rank
Variable Systemic Opportunistic Hybrid X2 (df) p-value
Police effectiveness 371.92 444.34 444.98 17.69(2) .000
Confidence in police 376.62 433.95 444.74 13.29(2) .001
Harsher laws 447.37 393.01 409.91 9.92(2) .007
Death penalty 441.90 392.31 402.03 8.28(2) .016
Charging adolescents as adults 447.10 398.06 409.30 9.54(2) .009
Extra-legal justice 452.95 399.89 384.11 13.35(2) .001
Youth programmes 437.35 395.13 426.66 7.08(2) .029

perpetrated compared to the places where systemic extortions occurred, but it was not as
weak as where opportunistic extortions took place. The proportion at which victims of
hybrid extortion identified gangs, extortion, graffiti, and crime was not statistically sig­
nificantly different than in systemic or opportunistic extortion. However, victims of hybrid
extortion did have better perception regarding police effectiveness (p = .001), displayed
more trust in the police (p = .003), and reported a lower support for vigilante justice
(p = .002) compared to victims of systemic extortion.

Discussion and conclusions

The current investigation provides an unusual glance into the extortion business in
Central America’s Northern Triangle, largely attributed to Los Angeles-born street gangs
MS-13 and Barrio 18. It overcomes the limitations of scarce data in the isthmus by
examining a unique victimisation survey that includes a robust extortion module. The
results expand on previous literature by identifying patterns in offender choices and
choice structuring properties associated with systemic and opportunistic extortion sub­
types. Additionally, it expands our empirical understanding of extortion by uncovering
a peculiar blend of decisions exhibited by a novel extortion subtype designated as hybrid
extortions not considered in current typologies. Choice-structuring properties for each
subtype generate stark differences in the execution of offence-related tasks, which carry
important implications for the development and implementation of crime prevention
policies aimed at curving extortion in settings such as El Salvador.
The results suggest extortionists’ territorial control and the rewards they seek through
extortion heavily influence task execution. Both are distinguishing features of systemic
and opportunistic extortion89. These choice-structuring properties regulate the fre­
quency, visibility, and persistence exhibited by offenders through their decisions.
Perpetrators who engage in opportunistic extortion, for example, lack territorial control,
so they take advantage of the fear caused by street gangs and high levels of impunity to
trick and intimidate victims. Offenders are forced to hide their identity, complete the
offence quickly, minimise interactions with victims, and move on once the credibility of
their threats is questioned. They do not have a permanent arrangement with victims, their
communities, or other key actors and90, therefore, cannot simply walk up to victims to
demand or collect payments. In El Salvador, criminal groups and otherwise law-abiding
individuals extort businesses, relatives, and employers by exploiting the fear generated by
MS-13 and Barrio 1891. Victims are conned in order to get them to pay. According to
authorities, this subtype represents between 40% to 70% of all extortions92. The
 GLOBAL CRIME 155

opportunity structures that allow the commission of opportunistic extortions emerge

from the methods offenders use to con their victims. Crime prevention policies that target
this extortion subtype should focus on these methods. If offenders, for instance, find it
difficult to hide their identity, contact victims remotely, and use their most effective
deception techniques, opportunistic extortion may lose its appeal.
The opportunity structures in systemic extortion are quite different. The analysis found
that strong gang territorial influence and control is a distinguishing choice-structuring
property. This finding is consistent with previous literature93. Offenders play an important
and visible role in the communities they control, particularly in countries like El Salvador,
where politicians and gang leaders have established corrupt partnerships based on
sharing local governance94. Victims may not view extortionists as mere criminals, but as
authority figures or even partners. This kind of status in the community allows extor­
tionists to move freely and openly without putting themselves at risk. Systemic extor­
tionists did not exhibit signs of being preoccupied about hiding their identity. The
execution of offence-related tasks was more open and blunter. Perpetrators also opted
for the repeated victimisation of businesses at a higher proportion. Previous explorations
argue that systemic extortionists have an incentive to develop long-lasting relationships
with victims to maintain and deepen their control over local resources95. In settings like El
Salvador, street gangs have arrangements in place that enhance their interest in keeping
a permanent connection with victims to tighten their grip over the territory.
MS-13 and Barrio 18 have established corrupt partnerships based on sharing local
governance96, infiltrated legal businesses and even struck partnerships with key commu­
nity figures through extortion97. The strength of street gangs’ territorial control is at the
base of these agreements. Having a tight grip over their turf is crucial to offer benefits to
specific political candidates and parties, public officials, and businesses. Systemic extor­
tion, therefore, makes up not only the primary source of income for street gangs in El
Salvador it also provides access to a variety of benefits for perpetrators and those with
whom they have struck deals98. Besides politicians and businesses, street gangs have
a wide support network, approximately six times larger than the estimated gang member­
ship in the country, that benefits from extortion. The opportunity structures that allow
systemic extortion to emerge are associated to the territorial control held by extortionists
and to the dependence of others in the commission of extortion and the benefits it
produces. Prevention policies aimed at this offence subtype should focus on weakening
offenders’ territorial control and reducing the monetary and non-monetary benefits
produced through extortion for different actors.
The choice-structuring properties in hybrid extortion combine restrictions imposed by
having a reduced level of territorial control and an incentive to establish long-lasting
relationships through repeated victimisation. The findings suggest this extortion subtype
occurred in areas that serve as buffers between neighbourhoods controlled by street
gangs and the rest of the city. The control exercised by street gangs was not as strong as
in the places in which systemic extortions were reported, but not as weak as in the areas in
which opportunistic extortion took place. Hybrid extortionists also asked for multiple
payments and use pressure tactics with significantly more frequency than opportunistic
offenders. This suggests that offenders were motivated and equipped to deal with victims
who refuse to comply with their demands but were forced to contact and interact with
victims as opportunistic offenders would.
156 C. PONCE

Such a scenario is consistent with gangs targeting businesses in neighbouring commu­

nities to expand their territorial influence, as well as extortions perpetrated by incarcerated
gang members99. Contact methods used by perpetrators may lead victims and authorities
to confuse them with opportunistic extortionists and result in a response that motivates
offenders to use pressure tactics. This is particularly noteworthy considering that a third of
reported extortions were designated as hybrid and crime prevention campaigns encourage
victims not to answer telephone calls from extortionists, which put those targeted at risk.
Offenders contact victims remotely but are able and willing to use pressure tactics to
coerce payment. Incarcerated gang members, for example, enlist the help of people
outside prison to carry out offence-related tasks100. The proximity of businesses to gang
turfs exposes them to a higher risk. The opportunity structures linked to hybrid extortion
are very similar to those of systemic extortion. Prevention policies should focus on similar
aspects. Additionally, policy makers should be cognisant of the potential risks associated
with campaigns put victims of hybrid extortion at an increased risk.
Despite the relevance of these findings, the study has notable limitations. This investiga­
tion analysed information collected exclusively from the economic sector most affected by
extortion in El Salvador. Examining the victimisation of types of businesses and individuals
would help refine and expand the current findings. This study’s results may also reflect the
unique features of extortion in a setting such as El Salvador, where a relatively reduced
number of gangs fight over control. Research should be conducted in contexts where
multiple street gangs and organised crime groups compete. The offender’s perspective and
qualitative data also need to be considered by future explorations to provide context that
helps produce a more nuanced understanding of extortion’s subtypes and evolution.
Lastly, this study’s findings highlight the importance of considering the spatial dimen­
sion and social organisation of extortion. The results suggest that extortion subtypes
differ in terms of their spatial distribution and the role played by people that benefit
indirectly from extortion. However, most research on extortion, with a few exceptions101,
neglects to examine its geography and the functioning of extortionist networks.
Conducting research that examines these features of extortion can provide useful insight
for prevention and disruption efforts.

Notes
1. Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal Culture”;
International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor”; Norza and Peñalosa, “Microextorsión en Colombia”;
and Pérez Morales et al., “Evolution of Extortion in Mexico.”
2. Ungar, “Networks of Criminality”; Cruz, “Police Misconduct and Political Legitimacy”; Pérez,
“Gang Violence and Insecurity”; and Perez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity.”
3. Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal
Culture”; International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor.”
4. Granguillhome Ochoa, ‘High Cost of Crime in the Northern Triangle’; World Bank, ‘Gasto
Público en Seguridad y Justicia.’
5. Acevedo et al., “Partnership For Growth”; FUSADES, “Extorsiones a la Pequeña y Micro
Empresa.”
6. See note 3 above.
7. Ayling, “Gang Change and Evolutionary Theory”; Sullivan, “Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third
Generation Gangs”; Farah and Babineau, “The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and
Honduras.”
 GLOBAL CRIME 157

8. Lemus, Martínez, and Martínez, “Nueva Información de La Reunión Entre Mario Durán
y Renuente de La MS-13”; Labrador and Ascencio, “Arena Prometió a Las Pandillas Una
Nueva Tregua Si Ganaba La Presidencia”; Martínez and Valencia, “El FMLN Hizo Alianza Con
Las Pandillas Para La Elección Presidencial de 2014”; and Dudley and Papadovassilakis, “Cómo
Lidia Con Las Pandillas El Presidente Bukele de El Salvador.”
9. Salguero, “¿Extorsión o Apalancamiento Operativo?”; International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the
Poor”; Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal
Culture.”
10. See note 3 above.
11. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention.
12. Bolle, Breitmoser, and Schlächter, “Extortion in the Laboratory”; Konrad and Skaperdas,
“Credible Threats in Extortion”; Konrad and Skaperdas, “Extortion”; Varese, “Protection and
Extortion”; and Campana, “Organized Crime and Protection Rackets.”
13. There is a lack of consensus regarding the fit of the rational choice perspective in the study of
expressive offence. For example Farrell, “Situational Crime Prevention and Its Discontents”;
De Hann and Vos, “A Crying Shame”; Hayward, “Rational Choice Theory Versus the “Culture of
Now”’”; Loughran et al., “Can Rational Choice Be Considered a General Theory of Crime?”; and
Coyne and Eck, ‘“Situational Choice and Crime Events.”
14. Elsenbroich and Badham, “The Extortion Relationship”; Marongiu and Clarke, “Random
Kidnapping in Sardinia”; Campana, ‘Organized Crime and Protection Rackets.”
15. Best, “Crime as Strategic Interaction.”
16. Cornish and Clarke, “Analyzing Organized Crimes.”
17. Ibid.
18. Cornish and Clarke, “Introduction.”
19. Cornish, “Crimes as Scripts”; and Cornish, “Procedural Analysis of Offending.”
20. Cornish and Clarke, “Understanding Crime Displacement.”
21. See note 18 above.
22. Marteache and Pires, “An Examination of Redwood Burl Poaching.”
23. Beauregard, Leclerc, and Lussier, “Decision Making in the Crime Commission Process.”
24. Savona and Zanella, “Extortion and Organized Crime”; Transcrime, “Study on Extortion
Racketeering”; Smith and Varese, “Payment, Protection and Punishment”; and Konrad and
Skaperdas, “Credible Threats in Extortion.”
25. Skaperdas, “The Political Economy of Organized Crime.”
26. Alexeev, Janeba, and Osborne, “Taxation and Evasion in the Presence of Extortion by
Organized Crime”; and Grossman, “Rival Kleptocrats: The Mafia versus the State.”
27. See note 20 above.
28. Arias and Barnes, “Crime and Plural Orders”; Aziani, Favarin, and Campedelli, “A Security
Paradox”; and Aziani, Favarin, and Campedelli, “Security Governance.”
29. International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor.”
30. Paoli, “The Paradoxes of Organized Crime”; Sanchez Jankowski, Islands in the Street: Gangs and
American Urban Society; International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor ”; Insight Crime and
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal Culture.”
31. Transcrime, “Study on Extortion Racketeering”; and Savona and Zanella, “Extortion and
Organized Crime.”
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Norza and Peñalosa, “Microextorsión en Colombia.”
35. See note 1 above.
36. Scaglione, “Cosa Nostra and Camorra.”
37. See note 31 above.
38. See note 15 above.
39. Ibid.
40. Konrad and Skaperdas, “Credible Threats in Extortion.”
158 C. PONCE

41. Konrad and Skaperdas, “Credible Threats in Extortion”; Savona and Zanella, “Extortion and
Organized Crime”; Smith and Varese, “Payment, Protection, and Punishment”; and
Transcrime, “Study on Extortion.”
42. See note 38 above.
43. Lombardo, “The Black Hand Terror”; and Sacco, “Black Hand Outrage.”
44. Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal
Culture.”
45. See note 36 above.
46. See note 37 above.
47. See note 40 above.
48. Transcrime, “Study on Extortion Racketeering.”
49. International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor.”
50. Ibid.
51. Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear.”
52. Ibid.
53. Jaitman, “Urban Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean.”
54. Arias and Barnes, “Crime and Plural Orders”; and FLACSO, MINEC, “Mapa de Pobreza Urbana.”
55. Arias and Barnes, “Crime and Plural Orders”; and Savenije, Maras y Barras.
56. Arias and Barnes, “Crime and Plural.”
57. FUSADES, “Extorsiones a La Pequeña y Micro Empresa”; Salguero, ‘¿Extorsión o Apalancamiento
Operativo?”; and Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A
Criminal Culture”; International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor.’
58. Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal
Culture”; and Salguero, “¿Extorsión o Apalancamiento Operativo.”
59. Cruz, “Central American Maras”; Wolf, “Maras Transnacionales”; and Wolf, “Street Gangs of El
Salvador.”
60. Cruz, “Central American Maras”; and Cruz, Fonseca, and Director, “The New Face of Street
Gangs.”
61. Wolf, “Mara Salvatrucha.”
62. Zilberg, “Fools Banished from the Kingdom”; and Dudley, MS-13: The Making of America’s Most
Notorious Gang.
63. Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador.”
64. Cruz, “Central American Maras.”
65. There are smaller and less organised street gangs in El Salvador, but their presence is
marginal. See Rosen and Cruz “Rethinking the Mechanisms of Gang.”
66. International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor”; Cruz, “Central American Maras.”
67. See note 29 above.
68. Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal Culture”;
International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor”; Salguero, “¿Extorsión o Apalancamiento
Operativo?”; Avelar, “La Ruta de Buses Que Institucionalizó La Extorsión”; Papadovassilakis and
Dudley, “El ‘Impuesto de Protección’”; and Martínez, “Los Bichos Gobiernan El Centro.”
69. See note 3 above.
70. See note 3 above.
71. See note 3 above.
72. See note 3 above.
73. See note 9 above.
74. Cruz and Durán-Martínez, “Hiding Violence to Deal with the State: Criminal Pacts in El
Salvador and Medellin”; Farah, “Central American Gangs: Changing Nature and New
Partners”; Farah and Babineau, “The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras”;
Farah, “The Transformation of El Salvador’s Gangs into Political Actors”; and Miguel Cruz,
“The Politics of Negotiating with Gangs.”
75. Córdova, “Living in Gang-Controlled Neighborhoods.”
 GLOBAL CRIME 159

76. Labrador and Ascencio, “Arena Prometió a Las Pandillas Una Nueva Tregua Si Ganaba La
Presidencia”; Martínez, “Pandillas Admiten Por Primera”; and Papadovassilakis and Dudley,
“De Depredadores a Socios.”
77. Dudley, “The El Salvador President’s Informal Pact with Gangs.”
78. Cantor, “The New Wave.”
79. Clemens, “Violence, Development, and Migration Waves”; Kennedy, “No Child Here”; United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Children on the Run.”
80. See note 5 above.
81. For details about the survey’s sampling procedures see FUSADES, “Extorsiones a la Pequeña
y Micro Empresa.”
82. Gangs use graffiti in El Salvador to claim ownership over neighbourhoods. See Cruz, “Central
American Maras.”
83. Kirk and Matsuda, “Legal Cynicism”; Kirk and Papachristos, “Cultural Mechanisms”; Sampson
and Bartusch, “Legal Cynicism”; and Sierra-Arévalo, “Legal Cynicism.”
84. Gabrielle Salfati and Canter, “Differentiating Stranger Murders.”
85. Salfati and Bateman, “Serial Homicide”; Salfati and Dupont, “Canadian Homicide”; Salfati
and Haratsis, “Greek Homicide”; Santtila et al., “Classifying Homicide Offenders”; Salfati
and Ponce, “Análisis de las Acciones”; and Salfati and Park, “An Analysis of Korean
Homicide.”
86. Borg and Groenen, Modern Multidimensional Scaling; Jaworska and Chupetlovska-Anastasova,
“A Review of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS)”; Young, Multidimensional Scaling.
87. Gabrielle Salfati, “The Nature of Expressiveness and Instrumentality.”
88. Ibid.
89. See note 37 above.
90. See note 41 above.
91. Insight Crime and Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “A Criminal
Culture.”
92. Ibid.
93. See note 37 above.
94. See note 74 above.
95. See note 37 above.
96. See note 94 above.
97. See note 67 above.
98. See note 58 above.
99. See note 67 above.
100. Ibid.
101. Estévez-Soto, Johnson, and Tilley, “Are Repeatedly Extorted Businesses Different?.”

Acknowledgments
I am extremely grateful with Dr. Martin Bouchard from the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser
University, for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Disclosure statement
I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

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 GLOBAL CRIME 165

Appendix

Task Type of Choice Choice Abbreviations

Initial Contact Contacted person Owner icv_owner
Not owner icv_notowner
Contact method Telephone icm_phone
In street icm_street
In person icm_person
Anonymous letter icm_anonymous
Offender identified as Offender gang member ico_gmem
Offender gang associate ico_gasoc
Offender crime group associate ico_cgasoc
Offender no affiliation ico_noaff
Offender other ico_other
Objective Give instructions second contact ico_instruct
Start negotiation ico_negotiate
Demanded pay Payment frequency Single delivery def_single
Periodic deliveries def_periodic
Sporadic deliveries def_sporadic
From single to periodic deliveries def_singleperiodic
Payment type Money det_money
Prepaid phone cards det_phonecard
Free goods/services det_gs
Other demands det_other
Completion Did not make demands desuc_nodem
Was not allowed to make demands desuc_fail
Received payment Payment frequency Single payment payf_single
Periodic payments payf_periodic
Sporadic payments payf_sporadic
No payments payf_nopay
Other frequency payf_other
Payment method Bank deposit payd_bank
Pick up payd_pickup
Designated place payd_place
Electronic transfer payd_etransfer
Threats Type Property crime thrtyp_pcrim
Violent crime thrtyp_vcrim
Execution During initial contact threxe_ic
During development of extortion threxe_dvlpmnt
Target Against owner or family thrtar_ownerf
Against employees or their families thrtar_employ
Against company property thrtar_coprop
Against others thrtar_other
No threats thr_nothreat
Pressure tactics Type Property crime prety_pcrim
Violent crime prety_vcrim
No pressure tactic prety_nopressure
Execution Before initial contact pree_beforeic
During development of extortion pree_dvlpment
Target Against owner or family preta_ownerf
Against employees or their families preta_employf
Against company property preta_coprop
Benefits Type Protection against own group benf_owngroup
Protection against others benf_others
No benefit offered benf_nobenefit
Other benefit benf_other