Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,

Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred
to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-
legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao,

practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had
left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his
return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary
to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao
never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application
for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation

of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that
he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys,
the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his
lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 516 June 27, 1967

TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ESTEBAN DEGAMO, respondent.

Teodoro O. Calo, Jr. for complainant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Pedro A,.
Ramirez for investigators.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo1 upon a

verified letter-complaint of the petitioner, Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr.,
filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the former with
"having committed false statement under oath or perjury" in connection
with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.

On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer
(not a motion to dismiss.) After interposing an unsuccessful motion for a
bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court
accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation,
report and recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General referred the
case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. The fiscal conducted an
investigation. The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the respondent,
because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several
postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for
which reason the investigating fiscal considered the respondent as having
waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded
the record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis
thereof, the Solicitor General filed his report and a complaint with this
Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for gross
misconduct.

No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts

are either unrebutted or admitted:

On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the

position of Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a
filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose Malimit of the same
municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal
circumstances, educational attainment, civil service eligibility and so
forth. One item required to be filled out reads:

Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not

reach the Court. (State the details of case and the final outcome.)"
—

to which respondent answered, "None."

Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor
to the position applied for. However, on the day the respondent swore to
the information sheet, there was pending against him, and two (2) other
co-accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No.
2646) for illegal possession of explosive powder.2

Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was

also charged in an information, dated 23 September 1960, for perjury, in
the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as Criminal Case No.
2194, on the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as a
member of the Philippine bar.

In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the
aforequoted questionnaire was made in good faith, it being his honest
interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted) that it
referred to a final judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No.
2646 was not a criminal or police record.1äwphï1.ñët

The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched

in ordinary terms and devoid of legalism hence, it needed no
interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it asked for
records "which did not reach the Court" entirely disproves respondent's
technical twist to the question as referring to final judgments or
convictions.

Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of

the respondent complained of was committed on 17 January 1959. Without
explaining how and upon what authority, respondent invokes the defense of
prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that —

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to

disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set
up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for
which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the
disbarment proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434).

Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial
question, since the ground for disbarment in the present proceeding is
not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but for gross
misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6
Moran 242, 1963 Ed., citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3
Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the
lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399).

Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him

because the information sheet is not required by law but only by the
Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the point. The issue is
whether or not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence
against him of any criminal or police record, including those that did
not reach the court. In this, he did not tell the truth. He deliberately
concealed it in order to secure an appointment in his own favor. He,
therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27
April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar
vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966 **), and he has violated his
oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the
ethical standards applicable to a member of the bar, who thereby
automatically becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one higher
than that of the market place.

The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent
technical excuses disentitle him to leniency from his Court.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred,

and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and

Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*
The "Resolution of the Court on the " Motion for Reconsideration"
was promulgated on August 30, 1967 and is printed in this volume.
1
Admitted to the Bar on 7 February 1965.
2
The information bears data of 3 July 1958 (Exh. "B-1").
**
16 Supreme Court Reports Annotated 623.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

VILLASANTA April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,

vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.

Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.

PARAS, C. J.:

G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case
originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was found
guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed.
The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was
dismissed for lack of merit.

The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar

candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same
as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or
before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with
him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the
preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document.
He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was
brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice
of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two
witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together
as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a
religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the
corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of
said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a
marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him.
After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband
and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered
that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon,
she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the
present complaint for immorality in this court..
Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint,
this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude.
The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in
making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and
their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency, and morality.

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the
respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the
bar. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula

against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with
Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula]

seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand
Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the
concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato,

Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against
Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as
demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while
she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and
kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met
respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to
finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the
meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time
they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so
sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along
Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco
Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped
his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the
other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked
(sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage
(sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent
informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and
needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications
transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to

At 5:33:46 pm refer it with other lawyer
replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u
at 6:16:11 pm anymore"
(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that
at 6:17:59 pm u will take advantage of the
situation.
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially
Sent by complainant in the lips if you don’t have
At 6:29:30 pm relationship with her.
Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking
At 6:32:43 pm advantage of the situation, 2 put
it rightly it s an expression of
feeling. S sri" (I’m very sorry.
Its not taking advantage of the
situation, to put it rightly it is
an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again.
by respondent Wil u stil c me s I can show u my
at 6:42:25 pm sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not
do it again. Will you still see me
so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to

complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me.
"Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may
forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message

was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls.
Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time
behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal

services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February
2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the
case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of
Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both
occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that
the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off
the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would
have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a

criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against
respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon
City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since
she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for
the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order
dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao,
Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her
husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s
fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time
they met and ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa

submitted his Report and Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of
the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March

2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct
required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty.
Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed

acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity
that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with
respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard
norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in
our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must
handle their personal affairs with greater caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

x x x x

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility

forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the
Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is
a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino
v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that,
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4)
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you
goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left
hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on
the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.

x x x x

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left
cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her
right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There
was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No
breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no
reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building,
Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the
following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere

along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we
are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of
Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she
arrived. And so I said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I
said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes,
okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we
were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a
little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine?
She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after
discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond
that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s go so I
stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she
followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told
me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the
last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and
Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you
goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight
use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and
when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I
said good night. She went down the car, that’s it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

x x x x

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an

appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to?
Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down
, before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left
cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:

Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and
then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then
kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases
supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard

as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as
a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral

conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as
to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must
be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of

grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law,

when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who
had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant

proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit

relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his
marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of

respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his
position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a
student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all her
subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he

abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman
into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages

and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that
"[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions
of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of
our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits
respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married

woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty
years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and
only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first

wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held
that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the
good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was
disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a

simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that
respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity
which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore,
disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-

beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms
of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in
turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips
are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage
of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations
with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the
complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free
from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must
prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the
party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui
negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the
case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of
proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not
suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the

lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion
because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being
kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message,
respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via
cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were
several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a
major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious
designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a
more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not
grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a

lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of
factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to
protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve
the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the
administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important
function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the Court
to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the
bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the
court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the
public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the

preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and
only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause
loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while
those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such
nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to
continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged
as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of
the offense should also be considered.36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of

misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor
infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client.37 In the
Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a
female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that

this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly

believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and
agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of
gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is
highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or
supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto

Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However,
respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his
dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future.

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 13-20.
4
Id. at 149-155.
5
Id. at 148.
6
Mortel v. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956); Cordova v.
Cordova, A.C. No. 3249, 29 November 1989, 179 SCRA 680, 683.
7
A.C. No. 5082, 17 February 2004, 423 SCRA 135, 140-141.
8
Ui v. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 708 (2000).
9
A.C. No. 1512, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 30, 40.
10
Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001).
11
In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as
Member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar, B.M. No. 1154, 8 June 2004,
431 SCRA 146.
12
Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582,
589.
13
Rollo, pp. 27, 35.
14
TSN, 26 July 2005, pp.18-24.
15
Ui v. Bonifacio, supra note 8.
16
446 Phil. 861, 867 (2003).
17
117 Phil. 768, 776 (1963).
18
213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).
19
Supra note 12 at 588.
20
A.C. No. 1334, 28 November 1989, 179 SCRA 653, 659.
21
A.C. No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 315.
22
A.C. No. 6148, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 42, 54-55.
23
A.C. No. 5170, 17 November 1999, 318 SCRA 229, 231.
24
101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).
25
106 Phil. 256, 259 (1960).
26
Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr., 375 Phil. 1, 17 (1999); Alfonso v.
Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-904, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 239, 255-
256, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990), p. 751.
27
Atty. Aquino v. Judge Acosta, 429 Phil. 498, 510 (2002).
28
Angeles v. Figueroa, A.C. No. 5050, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA
186, 195.
29
Reyes v. Wong, Adm. Case No. 547, 29 January 1975, 63 SCRA 667,
673.
30
Angeles v. Figueroa, supra note 28.
31
Uytengsu III v. Baduel, Adm. Case No. 5134, 14 December 2005, 477
SCRA 621, 632.
32
Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr., A.C. No. 5225, 29 April 2003,401 SCRA 622,
627.
33
Agpalo, LEGAL ETHICS (4th Ed., 1989), p. 445.
34
In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of
Delaware Joel D. Tenenbaum, 6 February 2007.
35
Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 108,
119.
36
Id. at 445-446.
37
Id.
38
428 N.E. 2 d 786 (Ind. 1981).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of

Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar

Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar
Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment;

Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar
Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to

the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971
Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968
and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact
that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This
was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results.
Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say
that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades
were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination?
Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into
these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the

records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five
subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however,
were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner
concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate
with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar
candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with
which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar

Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which
the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn

statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal

investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973,
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on
March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-
63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to,
and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required
by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not

respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination
booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise,
who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the
deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this
development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as
respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded
as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation
and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to
be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation
and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law
resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing
Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's
father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon

request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as
Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias
Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon
University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino
F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32,
rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol.
VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations,

did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to
do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and
was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were
required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent

residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who

offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the
affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same
became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as

their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was

correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the
policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds
that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one
subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the
latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change
of grade;
 3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is
on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75%
the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in
the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me

for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that
the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the

answers were based on the same standard used in the correction
and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original
grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%;
No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations
in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not

reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of
these answers because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at
10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination

booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until
I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor
the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and

under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about

October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had developed to the point that with
 respect to the correction of the examination booklets
of bar candidates I have always followed him and
considered his instructions as reflecting the rules
and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with
respect to the same; that I have no alternative but
to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering

his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real
and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and permission of
the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that
time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar
Committee for fear that I might be identified as a
bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in

return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner
in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit
of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to

obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing
examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my
record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at
about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme
Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with
him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after
the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me
to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears
that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to
the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-

examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand,
and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same
 was still within my control and authority as long as the
particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the
code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The
Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given
a particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's

representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the
examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known,
... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and
the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the
same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to
item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",

respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference
the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged
that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political

and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name
of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon
receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his
name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and
that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was

authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the
Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision
and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee
had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar
Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless
called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal
contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner.
...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30

o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate
to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to
me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious.
Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of
the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular
visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review
the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee
pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to
have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing
irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade

obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was
57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a
final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the
examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had
passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar

Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in
said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we
still did not know the names of the candidates.
 10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It
had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant
or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his

affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and

collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction

of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction
of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would
make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%,

that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark
and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee

concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I
accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up
to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I
derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit

dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

 2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law
which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed
me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and
possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that
I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short
of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of
being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo
particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough
English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would
reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was
entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority

as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the
said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the
paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the
answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions
in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items.
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the
new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total
grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing
mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo

reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in

increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in
good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo.
 Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such
omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first

time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary
nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the
request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee

concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in
view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only
in that particular subject that the said examine
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the
said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not deserve,
in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given
the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned
that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by
the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his

affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'

Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed
that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be

willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.
 That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the

answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase
his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the

changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the
contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby

state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar
Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and
in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the
deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned
should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate
concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I

made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in

the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I
was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of
the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to
the effect that
 ... in the correction of the papers, substantial
weight should then be given to clarify of language
and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective

examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after

the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually
swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them
checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file
motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation.
Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we
are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the
same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances

that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners

concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that
neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter
of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to
the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that
he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee
during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who
obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50%
in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
 Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act
would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his
integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent

Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners

concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only
in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that
the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that
they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum
(identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the

notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the

early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the
office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying
a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point
that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number
from any object and the first number that comes into
my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy.
At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura
street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-
eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as
Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain
such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I
then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number that is so significant to
me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to
1971, I either started with the number "27" (or
"227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is
identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the
figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-
a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-
a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh.
8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born

out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On
November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at
the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As
will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese
planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27,
1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having
been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to
get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and
(c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since
then we begot children the youngest of whom was born
on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after

buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the
time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the
 office code number "954". As the number was still
fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting
me to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language
and the apparent soundness of the answers and,
thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of
the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-
Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them
back to the respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum
but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion
and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have

reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the
attention of the committee during the meeting and which the
Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines,
namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing

general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as
Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original
grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as
Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline

general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was
Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of
57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-
a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
 4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter,
under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee
and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of
the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even

volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in
his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very
little time left and that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the

fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of
April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record
of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the
number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of
the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among

others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former

BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except
once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted
certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court

not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release
thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire

situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable
Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant

Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein
respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation
of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who
are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it
must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination
and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the
fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having
caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in
former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar
themselves and the result of their work that year, as also
unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible
from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would

make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and
it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance
of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo

systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to
the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang
by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to
make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court
after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the
respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in
behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December,
1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law
examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of
the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily
high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change
of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4,
rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought

back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the
particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in
said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a
passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's
word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office
Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time
he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4,
rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in

seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang
still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of
75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of

February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-
examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider
the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the
said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of
said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the
remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of
being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called
the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph
4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,

knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the

matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion.
Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant,
had the authority to make such request and further believing that such
request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in
the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade
in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by
him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him
in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp.
50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could
not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when

respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in
the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out
a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that
particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in
all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law;
and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations.
After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the
Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject —
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar
Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter
re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of
10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general

average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks
in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent

Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping
in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International
Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in
his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting
the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because
he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and
thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in
the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner
Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-
evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one
subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but
this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as
the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p.
61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general
average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more
subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's
notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase
of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar
Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate
said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8,

1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only
one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted
the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent

Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during
the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-
evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to
respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the
final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially
brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34,
rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information

that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all
the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the
said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added
that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by
his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee
after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613
and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent
Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this
was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that
occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent
Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because,
according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his
authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the
answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from
57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,

alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own

initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in
the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that
enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of
the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang
thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he
had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that

respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on
the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 &
1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in
good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the
said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to
guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never
as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of
the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and

Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and
deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as
well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-

examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-
examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases
show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It
is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue
advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust
and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with
the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades
therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the
Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized

respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before
the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5)
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average
was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be
honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was
referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-
evaluation are as follows:

B A I
 1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

B A I

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the

answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and
prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg
and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each
of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for
Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely

nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a
comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the
Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions
of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not
the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee
and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly
act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of
the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang

without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact
of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-
evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees
with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of
Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the
original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted
on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of
the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and
increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were
far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz
violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3)
subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number
given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as
to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration.
It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the
wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for
the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-
thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO

RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back

the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were
officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them
back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the
case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further
claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of
paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of
every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI,
p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees
and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave
after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It
appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court
in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such
sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp.
11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was
only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him
and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp.
34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile
Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the
initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code
number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by
the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII,
p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to
their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers

a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer
back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject,
but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below
50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17,
rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code
Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and
the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day
following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number
1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code
Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was

Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of
any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo
declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of
Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by
respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8,

1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject
the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-
63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a

grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other
failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation
of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

B A

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was
removed are as follows:

B A
 Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the

answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to
the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in

Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by
the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time
of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation
and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was
considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in
the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by
Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having

betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant,
thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining
public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be

disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.

A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should
likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5)
major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal
Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the

legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and
(3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar
-- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate
has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar

Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as
Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the
eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a
sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the
Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise
of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must
be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always
be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation
indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be
strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers

of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority
from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation
or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And
whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy
thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or
incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in
accordance with the rules.
B

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in

connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates
for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as
a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both
rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to
enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral
character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for
the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or
informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending
— becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965
require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other
criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that
the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for
the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit
in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably,
with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case,
whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal
or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission
to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the
Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare
under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by
any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that
there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application
form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant
to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or
not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to
declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal,
Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163,
p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold
or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries
which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of

fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969
and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By
falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in
court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar

examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,
an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice
law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the

respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and
from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners,

or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of
the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of
the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of
Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him,
and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the

discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The
 finding of indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any

criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of
some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of
the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued
failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case
up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming
a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early
as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his
pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman

E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly
irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative
but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe
del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted

every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or
withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It
would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose
integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe
him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit
him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar
(citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in

this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE
had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of
successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds,
among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative
to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs.
Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb.
23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good
moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent
passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and
Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo

Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty.
Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-
evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned
the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration
or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are
of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners
made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of

admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the
circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should
have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent
Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme
Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent
Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of
the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in
their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain
on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so
declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved
or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in
connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in
Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would
appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper
and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in
my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average
and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing
his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4,
Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And
respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to
have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can
re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least
75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe
I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice
used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with
me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did
was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I
did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be
more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete
I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was
to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol.
V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-

evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave
were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent
influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent
Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-

evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own

accord in the absence of such information?
 A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report
at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of
April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2,
Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he

brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is
on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75%
the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so
and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and

under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them
is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,

herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria
laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation
that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given
him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,

because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
 Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law,
if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent

Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted
to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by
them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the

increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the

respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang
in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners
that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one
impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute
purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest
or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative
thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November

14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this
unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured
into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971
Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the
records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor
and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when
Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge
against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before
the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent
or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went
to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking
his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release
of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected
of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations
and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal

machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately

after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February,
1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and
Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired

from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374
square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The
deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on
April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo
and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house
and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date
of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of
instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to
him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price
of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the
P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00
came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in
dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00

savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets

a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972
statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the
amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under
Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII,
pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent

from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In
the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed
on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the
$200 was not even presented by respondent during the
investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself,
while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the
address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there
is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to
give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of
respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared
income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
 On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged
their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of
P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February
28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or
on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol.
III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains
as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS
mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was
unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90.
Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and

Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November,
1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any
car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of
1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however,
that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November,
1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the
house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW
car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of

the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-
mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent
Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from
respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar
examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact,
after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement
on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly
filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view
of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to
show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the

results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation
and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the
case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which
he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under

Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer

to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or

removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep.
Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned

Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up
during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the
records of this Court.
B

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between

respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights

educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school
days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans
Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm.
Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo
had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16,
1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also
the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who

all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits
and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was
already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-
87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was
the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13,
rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June
28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the
first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo,
Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the

Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits
and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office.
He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board
every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely
across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine

Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does
not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon
E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st

Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly
before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla
movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while

working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's
father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in

Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He
is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn
statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal

Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was
given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served
into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US
army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the
enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV,
A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn
for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.

LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL
OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E.
GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and

Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.