1NC

T Protection---1NC
‘Protect’ means the Aff must directly regulate a source of pollution.
J. Sercombe 10 – Judge, Oregon Court of Appeals (IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
OREGON COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER, COLUMBIA RIVER BUSINESS ALLIANCE, OREGON CHAPTER SIERRA
CLUB, COLUMBIA RIVER CLEAN ENERGY COALITION, JACK MARINCOVICH, and PETER HUHTALA,
Respondents, v. CLATSOP COUNTY, Respondent below, and NORTHERNSTAR ENERGY, LLC; and
BRADWOOD LANDING, LLC, 6/15, https://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/court-of-
appeals/2010/a145336.html //DH

As used in the statewide planning goals, "protect" means to "[s]ave or shield from loss, destruction, or injury or for future intended use."(6)
LUBA concluded that to "protect" an estuarine resource, as "protect" is used in Goal 16, means to regulate or prevent
conflicting uses from affecting the resource in a significant way:
"Goal 16 requires protection of the environmental, economic, and social values, diversity and benefits of estuaries, and allows estuarine development and restoration only 'where appropriate.'
The goal sets out a hierarchy of priorities for management and use of estuarine resources, placing in first priority '[u]ses which maintain the integrity of the estuarine ecosystem.' Within the
remaining text of Goal 16, the word 'protect' appears almost exclusively in the Goal text describing the 'natural management unit' designation. That designation is the most protective
classification of Goal 16 resources, and includes 'areas * * * designated to assure the protection of significant fish and wildlife habitats * * *.' The natural management unit allows uses and
activities that allow the resources of the estuary to 'continue to function in a manner to protect significant wildlife habitats, natural biological productivity, and values for scientific research and
education.' Thus, the most protective classification in Goal 16, the natural management unit designation, allows only activities that are sufficient to protect the identified resources.

"The Goal language describing the other designations also provides context for the meaning of 'protect.' The description of the 'conservation management unit,' which is the current
management designation of the subject property, does not include the word 'protect.' The description of the 'development management unit,' the proposed designation of the property, also
does not use the word 'protect.' Taken together, the uses of the word 'protect' within Goal 16 itself indicate that the definition is not equivocal in requiring that identified resources are 'saved'
or 'shielded' from more than de minimis damaging impacts.

"Although we agree with the county that the Goal definition of 'protect' does not require that estuarine resources identified for protection be completely or absolutely protected from any
'loss, destruction, or injury' whatsoever, the county has made a planning decision under the CCCP policies at issue that implement Goal 16 and the scheme set forth in the second paragraph of
Goal 16, quoted above, to 'protect' as opposed to a decision to 'maintain,' 'develop,' or 'restore' traditional fishing areas and endangered or threatened species habitat. Having made that
'protect' planning decision, the local program to protect those estuarine resources must not allow 'loss, destruction, or injury' beyond a de minimis level. Thus, the development that is to be
allowed by the disputed rezone is not consistent with the Goal definition of 'protect' unless the measures proposed in seeking to rezone the property are sufficient to reduce harm to such a
degree that there is at most a de minimis or insignificant impact on the resources that those policies require to be protected."

Bradwood II, ___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 17-18) (emphases in original; footnote omitted).

Intervenors complain that LUBA's construction of "protect" is inconsistent with the practical operation of Goal 16 to allow development within estuaries and with the particular industrial
designation of the Bradwood area. We fail to see the inconsistency. The protection policies apply to particular development, wherever located within an estuary, that could affect fisheries or
wildlife habitat. CCCP Section P20.2 states the ambit of Policy 20.2(1), as "apply[ing] to all projects that could conceivably affect fisheries (either commercial or recreational) or aquaculture in
the Columbia River Estuary." Section P20.8 frames the scope of Policy 20.8(1) as applying "to uses and activities with potential adverse impacts on fish or wildlife habitat, both in Columbia
River estuarine aquatic areas and in estuarine shorelands." Thus, the plan expressly provides that the policies apply throughout the estuary, based on the nature of a proposed use or activity
and irrespective of management unit designation or zoning allowances.

Moreover, under Goal 16, the overall classification of an estuary as one in which development is allowed does not inhibit the designation of natural management units within that estuary in
order to protect specific land resources. The Land Conservation and Development Commission adopted rules to implement Goal 16 that are codified at OAR chapter 660, division 17. Under
those rules, estuaries are classified as "natural estuaries," "conservation estuaries," "shallow-draft development estuaries," and "deep-draft development estuaries," in much the same way as
management units of an estuary are classified under Goal 16. See OAR 660-017-0010. The Columbia River is a deep-draft development estuary. OAR 660-017-0015(4). OAR 660-017-0025(3)(b)
provides that "[s]hallow and deep-draft development estuaries shall have natural, conservation, and development management units as provided in the Estuarine Resources Goal." Thus, the
overall character of an estuary as suitable for development is not inconsistent with the protection of discrete areas (natural management units) from the effects of particular development. It is
consistent with the structure of Goals 16 and 17 in general, and with the plan allowance of industrial uses at Bradwood in particular, that the protection policies might inhibit intervenors'
planned dredging uses and not other types of development.

We agree with LUBA's analysis of the meaning of "protect" under Goal 16. "Protect" is used in the policies relating to natural management
units, which are designated, in part, to "assure the protection of significant fish and wildlife habitats." A use in those units must be "consistent
with the resource capabilities of the area" which is defined to mean that the impacts of the use are not "significant" or that significant wildlife
habitats can continue to be "protect[ed]." In other management units, where resource values are conserved or not immunized from
development effects, alterations of the estuary that produce significant impacts are allowed. " Protect," in this context, means more
than minimizing the adverse impacts of conflicting development through mitigation. It means
inhibiting development that causes significant adverse impacts on the protected resource.(7)
That excludes tradeable permits, subsidies, and incentives.
Helmer ’97 [Richard and Invanildo; 1997; Publishing in collaboration with area experts and on behalf
of the United Nations Environmental Program, the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council,
and the World Health Organization; WHO, “Water Pollution Control - A Guide to the Use of Water
Quality Management Principles,”
https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/resourcesquality/watpolcontrol.pdf]

In contrast to regulatory instruments, economic instruments have the potential to make pollution control
economically advantageous to commercial organisations and to lower pollution abatement costs. They can be applied to a wide
range of environmental problems and can involve varying degrees of incentives, information, and administrative capacity for effective
implementation and enforcement. The principal types of economic instruments used for controlling pollution are:

Pricing. Marginal cost pricing can reduce excessive water use and consequent pollution as well as ensure the sustainability of
water treatment programmes. Water tariffs or charges set at a level that covers the costs for collection and treatment can induce commercial
organisations to adopt water-saving technologies, including water recycling and reuse systems, and to minimise or eliminate waste products
that would otherwise be discharged into the effluent stream. In Thailand, for example, many hotels along the country's eastern coast are
treating and recycling their water for landscape irrigation because the cost of freshwater now exceeds the cost of treatment (Foster, 1992).
Before considering the use of other instruments in environmental policy, it is advisable for countries to evaluate their water pricing policies
because such policies can encourage over-use and water degradation.

Pollution charges. A pollution charge or tax can be defined as a "price" to be paid on the use of the
environment. The four main types of charges used for controlling pollution are: (i) effluent charges, i.e. charges which are based on the
quantity and/or quality of the discharged pollutants, (ii) user charges, i.e. fees paid for the use of collective treatment facilities, (hi) product
charges, i.e. charges levied on products that are harmful to the environment when used as an input to the production process, consumed, or
disposed of, and (iv) administrative charges, i.e. fees paid to authorities for such purposes as chemical registration or financing licensing and
pollution control activities.

Marketable permits. Under this approach, a responsible authority sets maximum limits on the total
allowable emissions of a pollutant. It then allocates this total amount among the sources of the pollutant by issuing permits
that authorise industrial plants or other sources to emit a stipulated amount of pollutant over a specified period of time. After
their initial distribution, permits can be bought and sold. The trades can be external (between different enterprises) or internal
(between different plants within the same organisations).

Subsidies. These include tax incentives (accelerated depreciation, partial expensing, investment tax credits, tax
exemptions/deferrals), grants and low interest loans designed to induce polluters to reduce the quantity of their discharges by
investing in various types of pollution control measures. The removal of a subsidy is another effective tool for controlling pollution. In many
countries, for example, irrigation water is provided free of charge, which encourages farmers to over-irrigate, resulting in salinisation and/or
water logging.

Deposit-refund systems. Under this approach, consumers pay a surcharge when purchasing a potentially
polluting product. When the consumers or users of the product return it to an approved centre for recycling or proper disposal, their
deposit is refunded. This instrument is applied to products that are either durable and reusable or not consumed or dissipated during
consumption, such as drink containers, automobile batteries and pesticide containers.

Enforcement incentives. These instruments are penalties designed to induce polluters to comply with
environmental standards and regulations. They include non-compliance fees (i.e. fines) charged to polluters when their
discharges exceed accepted levels, performance bonds (payments made to regulatory authorities before a potentially polluting activity is
undertaken, and then returned when the environmental performance is proven to be acceptable), and liability assignment, which provides
incentives to actual or potential polluters to protect the environment by making them liable for any damage they cause. This chapter only
addresses fines because they are the most commonly used enforcement incentives, particularly in the area of water pollution control.
Limits and ground---allowing market mechanisms blows the lid off potential
affirmatives---independently, regulation ensures a set of unified generics like
Incentives CPs and Confidence DAs.
 States CP---1NC
The fifty states and all relevant territories should direct substantial U.S. agricultural
subsidies toward that are greater in magnitude then federal subsidies towards
meeting water quality goals and fund it through a Millionaires’ Tax, decoupling from
the federal tax code when necessary.
Net benefit is that it doesn’t solve advantage 2.
CP solves---existing policies prove states can facilitate the transition, but more funding
and technical assistance is key.
Fiona McBride 20, Research Fellow at the Berkley Food Institute and Center for Law, Energy, and the
Environment, December 2020, "Redefining Value and Risk in Agriculture: Policy and Investment
Solutions to Scale the Transition to Regenerative Agriculture," Center for Law, Energy, and the
Environment at UC Berkley Law School, https://food.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/12/BFI_ValueRisk_in_Ag_120920_Digital.pdf - MBA AM
IV. Advance State-Level Policies

Additional investment in state-level

policies that ease the transition to regenerative agriculture is as important as
crop insurance reform, innovations in lending, and direct payments. State programs focused on
regenerative farmers open up additional funding opportunities and also create opportunities for access to
infrastructure, technical assistance, and information networks.

In California alone, the Sustainable Agricultural Lands Conservation Program (SALC), State Water Efficiency and Enhancement Program
(SWEEP),37 Biologically Integrated Farming Systems Program (BIFS),38 and Healthy Soils Program (HSP)39 have demonstrated success

and are over-subscribed. SALC has been effective at protecting land and preventing development , which is
critical in a state where 40,000 acres of farmland are lost every year to urban sprawl.40 State leaders could expand SALC to include

regenerative farming practices on preserved land. BIFS, which has an existing farmer network set up to share pest management
systems, could be expanded and used to exchange other smart agriculture techniques. In addition, bridging

these programs and other state-level initiatives could benefit the regenerative agriculture sector.

For instance, Local Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCOs), local regulatory and planning bodies in all 58 California counties, could
include
farmland preservation and the promotion of regenerative agriculture in their plans to meet the
greenhouse gas reduction targets set by the California Air Resources Board. CalRecycle could improve systems for
farmers to access commercial compost, while creating new jobs to implement these efforts. The California Department of
Food and Agriculture could offer grants through existing programs that cover the cost of equipment
needed to transition to regenerative agriculture.

Efforts outside of California run the gamut depending on the agricultural and political realities in each state. Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois are
engaged in efforts to incentivize cover cropping through legislation. New Mexico and Colorado introduced state advisory
councils to look at regenerative agriculture policies. Other states established healthy soils departments within their food and

agriculture departments or hired researchers to measure the impacts of investment in farmers building better

soil. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, but wherever a state may stand on the spectrum of reform, they should consider dedicating
additional resources to these efforts. Finally, the National Healthy Soils Policy Network connects
organizations across the country to institute policies that support regenerative farming. Outreach by this coalition
to states with weaker policies could be especially effective in moving the needle on regenerative agriculture.
While state policy offers more flexibility and specificity than federal approaches, funding is a challenge, especially given the pandemic. As of July 2020, COVID-19
created a $650 billion loss across state legislatures, which means scant resources to allocate in the next legislative session.41 States
legislators could
think creatively to fill existing gaps in funding and direct additional support to these programs. One salient
opportunity is via existing Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) funds. USDA directs NRCS funding to states through state

conservationists, who coordinate natural resource conservation projects in their states. To determine fund allocation, state conservationists convene a
technical advisory committee and identify ecosystems that need support. State legislatures could direct conservationists to invest

this funding in degraded farmlands that would benefit from regenerative practices. Another opportunity
lies in public-private partnerships. For example, the nonprofit Zero Foodprint’s Restore California program works with restaurants and other food
industry stakeholders to direct funds to healthy soils practices in partnership with the California Department of Food and Agriculture and the California Air
Resources Board.42

In addition, Western states with fire risk could direct firemanagement funding to pay farmers to graze high-
risk regions, as they might pay for conventional mitigation measures like cutting brush to decrease fuels. As the State Innovation Exchange’s agriculture
director notes, this model is a “win for ranchers, ecosystems, and states” and a “great opportunity to protect communities from fire.”43 In the absence of surplus
funds to support grant programs, state governments could offer tax incentives to growers. Private funders have an
important role to play as well. Philanthropists and investors can support farmers directly through grants, loans, and credittrading payments, and they can also

fund state-level infrastructure that aids regenerative growers . For instance, regenerative farmers are in dire need of regional
processing facilities to get products to market more efficiently, and private funders can help fill that gap . States could also issue tax incentives

to help fund regional processing infrastructure development. Creative solutions like these can offer substantial opportunities for
funding at the state level to put towards producers who are growing food while responding to climate change.

Finally, state-level economic recovery task forces could recognize the opportunity for regenerative agriculture to act as an economic stimulus that also builds
regional resiliency, offers environmental benefits, and improves public health during a time of global recession and crisis. Each task force could include farmers and
policymakers who can drive recovery efforts that include resources for farmers transitioning to regenerative agriculture. COVID relief monies from the federal
government can also support farmers offering this service to the community. However, agriculture, forestry, and fishing combined have only received 1.5 percent of
Paycheck Protection Program monies as of July 2020.44 Farming advocates and state policymakers should fight for farmers to receive a fair share of stimulus
support, especially given the essential nature of their work.

Millionaire’s tax solves – it generates enough to fund policy while avoiding short term
economic slowdown
Tharpe 19 – Deputy Director of State Policy Research at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Wesley
helps lead a team of analysts in the Center’s State Fiscal Project and conducts research on a range of state tax,
budget, and economic policies. Prior to joining the Center in 2018, Tharpe served as Research Director at the
Georgia Budget and Policy Institute, where he coordinated the organization’s research agenda and for seven years
analyzed a diverse set of issues including tax reform, jobs and wages, immigrant inclusion, and state budget trends.
Tharpe holds a B.A. in political science and international affairs from the University of Georgia and an M.A. in
public policy from the Johns Hopkins University. (Wesley, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Raising State
Income Tax Rates at the Top a Sensible Way to Fund Key Investments”, 2-7-2019,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/raising-state-income-tax-rates-at-the-top-a-sensible-way-
to-fund-key)//mj

Policymakers in several states are reviewing options to strengthen support for public investments crucial
to state economies and residents’ well-being, such as quality early education, affordable college, and modern infrastructure. One
way to raise the necessary funds is to raise personal income tax rates on the highest incomes, a policy choice
sometimes referred to as a “millionaires’ tax.” This approach makes sense: evidence indicates it can generate
substantial revenue for public investments that boost a state’s productivity in the long run, without
harming economic growth in the short term.
High-income tax increases can generate substantial revenues for investments in people and communities that
provide economic and social benefits over the long term. Raising personal income tax rates has allowed
states to prevent or minimize harmful budget cuts or invest in ambitious new initiatives such as expanding
early education, boosting access to college, improving infrastructure, and strengthening “rainy day” funds to prepare for the next recession.
Evidence indicates that sustained support for public building blocks of growth can help states improve
their residents’ well-being, expand opportunity and racial equity, and build more prosperous
economies over time.

Real-world experience suggests that raising top income tax rates is unlikely to harm state economies in
the short run, contrary to some claims. In six of eight states (including the District of Columbia) that enacted
millionaires’ taxes since 2000, private-sector economic growth met or exceeded that of neighboring states
since enacting the tax increases.[1] Seven of the eight states had per capita growth in personal incomes
at least as strong as nearby states, and five of the eight added jobs at least as quickly as their neighbors. Only
one state that raised its state income tax rates, Connecticut, has seen markedly weaker growth than its neighbors, likely for reasons other than
state tax levels.

The bulk of mainstream academic research finds that interstate differences in taxes, including differences in top
personal income tax rates, have minimal effects on state economic growth. Fifteen of the 20 major studies
published in academic journals since 2000 that examined the broad economic effect of state personal
income tax levels found no significant effects and one of the others produced internally inconsistent results.[2] As a pair of
university researchers described in a comprehensive literature review in 2018, “The vast majority of the academic studies that
examined the relationship between state and local taxes and economic growth found little or no
effect.”[3]
Millionaires’ Taxes Increasingly Common

The personal income tax is a major source of revenue for 41 states. Although some states apply a flat rate to all taxable
income, most states with a personal income tax maintain a graduated structure that applies increasing
rates to increasing levels of income. Prior to the 2000s, however, special brackets or rates targeted specifically to the
highest incomes were relatively uncommon. California levied a temporary 11 percent rate on incomes above about $200,000
from 1991 to 1996,[4] and in 1992 Ohio created a new bracket on incomes above that same level.[5] But as of 2000, only five states had
top rates kicking in above $100,000.[6]
In the early 2000s, policymakers began looking at targeted rate increases for affluent households to help close stubborn budget shortfalls
stemming from the 2001 recession, as well as to respond to the increasingly skewed concentration of wealth and income at the top. The
top
1 percent of households accounted for 21.5 percent of income in 2017, compared to only 9 percent in
1970.[7] (See Figure 1.)
(CHART OMMITTED)

In 2003, New York launched the trend by enacting a three-year surcharge on incomes above $500,000; California and New Jersey followed suit
with millionaires’ taxes in 2004.[8] Overall, 12 states (including the District of Columbia) have enacted rate increases targeted to affluent
taxpayers since 2000. Nine of them — California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and
Oregon — either still have some form of the policy today or maintained it over a span of several years. The other three (Maine, North Carolina,
and Wisconsin) either repealed the policy before implementing it, kept the higher rates for only a short span, or undermined them through
later income tax cuts. [9]

In some cases, a so-called “millionaire’s tax” only applies to people with annual incomes of at least $1 million.
But the term can also refer to a range of personal income tax increases on the highest incomes, generally
starting at about $100,000 or more. For example, California levies top personal income tax rates of 10.3, 11.3, and 12.3 percent
on annual individual incomes over $250,000, $300,000, and $500,000, respectively, as well as an additional 1 percent surtax on incomes over $1
million, for a top rate of 13.3 percent on the state’s wealthiest residents. People subject to these top rates still pay the same rates as other
state residents on their income below these thresholds, since graduated income tax systems apply different marginal rates to different
increments of income, rather than taxing all income at the same rate.[10]

In most cases, states created a new bracket or set of brackets above a higher threshold of income, rather than raise existing tax rates.
Minnesota, for example, created a new 9.85 percent bracket for top earners, 2 percentage points above its prior top rate, which applied to
incomes over about $250,000 for married couples and $150,000 for single filers (adjusted annually for inflation). Hawaii created three new
brackets with rates of 9, 10, and 11 percent — a policy that expired in 2015 but was reauthorized in 2018.[11]

Even modest rate increases on high incomes can generate significant revenue from a relatively small
number of taxpayers — namely, the narrow sliver of households at the top of the income distribution, who are
most able to afford the cost. In California, just 0.3 percent of taxpayers reported more than $1 million in
income when the state’s 2005 millionaires’ tax took effect, yet they accounted for more than 21 percent of all income
in the state.[12] When Oregon approved an increase on high-income earners in 2009, the state’s legislative office projected that it would
raise nearly $472 million over two years from 2.5 percent of tax filers.[13] And in Maine, a 3 percent surcharge on household
incomes above $200,000 that voters approved in 2016 but the legislature repealed and was never implemented would
have raised over $320 million a year from fewer than 1 in 40 state taxpayers , according to one estimate.[14]
 Settler Colonialism K---1NC
Viewing water as a resource is not benign protection, it’s a way to exploit more
sustainably.
Nicole J. Wilson 19 PhD, Resource Management and Environmental Studies, University of British
Columbia MS, Natural Resources, Cornell University BA, Development Studies, University of Calgary;
2019; ““Seeing Water Like a State?”: Indigenous water governance through Yukon First Nation Self-
Government Agreements,” Geoforum, 104 - BS

Engaging state-like forms of governancehas several potential consequences for Indigenous water governance. James
C. Scott (1998) addressed the intersections of state power and expertise, territory, and control and management of “natures.”
Among other concerns, Scott stressed that states regularly pursue programs that advance the goal of ecological and cultural simplification and
achieved through the creation of ‘management units’ that considers
legibility. This simplification is
“resources” outside of the broader ecological, socio-cultural and political realities they are a part of (Stevenson,
2006). State programs extend state power over Indigenous peoples, a process that often entails considerable physical,
epistemic and ontological violence as they seek to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their lands and waters, political structures,
ontologies and epistemologies (Coulthard, 2014, Harris, 2004, Hunt, 2014, Sundberg, 2014, Todd, 2016, Watts, 2013, Wolfe, 2006). In the book
What is water?: the history of a modern abstraction, Jamie Linton (2010) describes the history of Modern
Water – defined as
understandings of water as a resource that can be known, owned and exploited (Groenfeldt, 2013, Linton, 2010,
Strang, 2004) – as a history of abstraction, meaning that water has become increasingly separated from its social
and political contexts (see also Linton and Budds, 2014). The development of the hydrologic sciences played an important role in the
production of Modern Water. Overall, the conceptualization of water as a material substance, H2O, which circulates through the physical
processes of the hydrologic cycle (e.g., precipitation, evapotranspiration, etc.) ignores socio-cultural and political relations to water and the
ways that these are shaped through interactions among water users, including relations infused with power differences and the cultural politics
that follow (Boelens, 2013). The abstraction of water is closely connected to state-formation as hydrologic science make water increasingly
“legible” and amenable to control by state agencies (Linton, 2010). In the United States, for example, Robert E. Horton’s (1931) visualization of
the “hydrologic cycle” was easily adapted to the needs of the state by rendering the nation’s water visible to central governing agencies and “by
institutionalizing the quantification of stocks and flows of water on a national scale, the state took a major step in making water available for,
and amenable to, management by state agencies” (Linton, 2010, p. 149). In the 20th century,
in colonial states such as the United
States, Canada and Australia, the “legibility” of water and the hydraulic construction this enabled (e.g., the development of hydro-
power) has been closely related to the development of national identity and state expansion (Dunlap, 1999,
Harris and Alatout, 2010, Swyngedouw, 2015, Worster, 1986). At the same time, these processes frequently contributed to the
colonial dispossession of Indigenous peoples (e.g. Feit, 1979, Lawson, 1994, Martin et al., 2008).

Settler colonial expansion culminates in extinction.

Audra Mitchell 17, CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics, Balsillie School of International Affairs,
and Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, former Senior Lecturer in International Relations,
department of Politics, University of York, Ph.D. Queen’s University of Belfast; 2017; “Decolonizing
against extinction part II: Extinction is not a metaphor – it is literally genocide,” Worldly,
https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2017/09/27/decolonizing-against-extinction-part-ii-extinction-is-not-a-
metaphor-it-is-literally-genocide/ - BS

Extinction has become an emblem of Western, and white-dominated, fears about ‘the end of the(ir) world’. This
scientific term is saturated with emotional potency, stretched and contorted to embody almost any nightmare,
from climate change to asteroid strikes. In academic and public contexts alike, it is regularly interchanged with
other terms and concepts – for instance, ‘species death’, global warming or ecological collapse. Diffused into
sublime scales – mass extinctions measured in millions of (Gregorian calendar) years, a planet totalized by the threat of nuclear
destruction – ‘extinction’has become an empty superlative, one that gestures to an abstract form of
unthinkability. It teases Western subjects with images of generalized demise that might, if it gets bad enough, even
threaten us, or the figure of ‘humanity’ that we enshrine as a universal. This figure of ‘humanity’, derived from Western
European enlightenment ideals, emphasizes individual, autonomous actors who are fully integrated into the global market system; who are
responsible citizens of nation-states; who conform to Western ideas of health and well-being; who partake of ‘culture’; who participate in
democratic state-based politics; who refrain from physical violence; and who manage their ‘resources’ responsibly (Mitchell 2014).

Oddly, exposure to the fear of extinction contributes to the formation and bolstering of contemporary Western subjects. Contemplating
the sublime destruction of ‘humanity’ offers the thrill of abjection: the perverse pleasure derived from
exposure to something by which one is revolted. Claire Colebrook detects this thrill-seeking impulse in the
profusion of Western blockbuster films and TV shows that imagine and envision the destruction of earth, or at least of
‘humanity’. It also throbs through a flurry of recent best-selling books – both fiction and speculative non-fiction (see Oreskes and Conway
2014; Newitz 2013; Weisman 2008). In a forthcoming intervention, Noah Theriault and I (2018) argue that these imaginaries are a form of porn
that normalizes the profound violences driving extinction, while cocooning its viewers in the secure space of the voyeur. Certainly, there are
many Western scientists, conservationists and policy-makers who are genuinely committed to stopping the extinction of others, perhaps out of
fear for their own futures. Yet extinction is not quite real for Western, and especially white, subjects; it is a fantasy of negation that evokes
thrill, melancholy, anger and existential purpose. It is a metaphor that expresses the destructive desires of these beings, and the negativity
against which we define our subjectivity.

But extinction is not a metaphor: it isa very real expression of violence that systematically destroys particular
beings, worlds, life forms and the relations that enable them to flourish. These are real, unique beings, worlds and
relations – as well as somebody’s family, Ancestors, siblings, future generations – who are violently destroyed.
Extinction can only be used unironically as a metaphor by people who have never been threatened with
it, told it is their inevitable fate, or lost their relatives and Ancestors to it – and who assume that they probably never will.
This argument is directly inspired by the call to arms issued in 2012 by Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang and more recently by Cutcha Risling-Baldy.
The first, seminal piece demonstrates how settler
cultures use the violence of metaphorical abstraction to excuse
themselves from the real work of decolonization: ensuring that land and power is in Indigenous hands. Risling-Baldy’s
brilliant follow-up extends this logic to explain how First People like Coyote have been reduced to metaphors through settler appropriation. In
both cases, engagement with Indigenous peoples and their relations masks moves to innocence: acts that make it appear as if settlers are
engaging in decolonization, while in fact we are consolidating the power structures that privilege us.

In this series, want to show how Western, and white-dominated, discourses on ‘extinction’ appear to address the systematic destruction of
peoples and other beings while enacting moves to innocence that mask their culpability and perpetuate structures of violence. As I argued in
Part I of this series, extinction is an expression of colonial violence. As such, it needs to be addressed through
direct decolonization, including the dismantling of settler colonial structures of violence, and the
resurgence of Indigenous worlds. Following Tuck, Yang and Risling-Baldy’s lead, I want to show how and why the violences that drive extinction
have come to be invisible within mainstream discourses. Salient amongst these is the practice of genocide against Indigenous peoples other
than humans.

…it is literally genocide.

What Western science calls ‘extinction’ is not an unfortunate, unintended consequence of desirable ‘human’
activities. It is an embodiment of particular patterns of structural violence that disproportionately affect
specific racialized groups. In some cases, ‘extinction’ is directly, deliberately and systematically inflicted in order
to create space for aggressors, including settler states. For this reason, it has rightly been framed as an aspect or
tool of colonial genocides against Indigenous human peoples. Indeed, many theorists have shown that the
‘extirpation’ of life forms (their total removal from a particular place) is an instrument for enacting genocide upon
Indigenous humans (see Mazis 2008; Laduke 1999; Stannard 1994). Specifically, the removal of key sources of food,
clothing and other basic materials makes survival on the land impossible for the people targeted.

Nehiyaw thinker Tasha Hubbard (2014) makes a qualitatively distinct argument. She points out that the Buffalo are First People, the elder
brothers of the Nehiyaw people (and other Indigenous nations – see Benton-Banai 2010). Starting in the mid-1800s, the tens of millions of
buffalo that ranged across Turtle Island were nearly eliminated through strategic patterns of killing carried out by settler-state-sponsored
military and commercial forces. Their killing was linked to governmental imperatives to clear and territorially annex the Great Plains by
removing its Indigenous peoples. As Hubbard points out, methods of destroying buffalo herds included large-scale killing, but also the
disruption of their social structures, the destruction of the ecosystems on which they rely, and the removal of calves. These acts involve each of
the components of the definition of genocide enshrined in the UN Genocide Convention:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

From Hubbard’s viewpoint, rooted in Nehiyaw philosophy and ethical-legal principles, the systematic destruction of the buffalo is not like
genocide, nor is it exclusively a tool for carrying out genocide against human peoples. It is genocide in its own right: an attempt to destroy a
particular First People and the possibilities of its continuity. In other words, the deliberate and systematic attempt to eliminate the buffalo,
enacted by settler states, simultaneously enacted genocide against Indigenous peoples and their nonhuman relatives.

Genocides of Indigenous peoples (human and otherwise) continue apace in contemporary settler states,
transformed into multiple manifestations. For instance, they are integral to ‘biosecurity’ strategies
designed to police the biological boundaries of these states and their citizens. Laced with racializing and xenophobic
rhetoric (Subramaniam 2001), strategies such as culling or planned eradications are intended to remove ‘invasive’ or ‘foreign’ life forms in order
to protect ‘Native’ ones. Many of the ‘invasive’ life forms targeted for destruction were transported to unfamiliar lands through colonial
patterns of settlement and global trade flows.

However, this logic of elimination (Wolfe 2006) is often perverted, turned against Indigenous* beings whose flourishing impedes the expansion
or consolidation of the colonial state. For instance, Deborah Bird Rose (2011 a, 2011 b) shows how this form of violence is continually waged
against flying foxes, who are framed by the settler state as “pest[s] whose extinction is [deliberately] sought”. This act of elimination involves
explicit genocidal ideation, or the imagination of the destruction of a people. Rose characterizes it as a “matter of imagining a world without
[dingoes or flying foxes], then setting out to create it” (Rose 2011a). The Australian settler state has used multiple tactics to induce terror and
preclude flourishing amongst flying foxes, from the emission of high-pitched electronic signals to smearing trees with python excrement (Rose
2011b). Indeed, in 2014, I lived near to the roosting site of a group of flying foxes in Turrbal and Jagera Country (suburban Brisbane to settlers).
Such nesting places are called ‘colonies’ , reflecting a Western scientific rhetoric that frames Indigenous peoples as ‘invaders’ of the settler
state. The trees that housed the nesting site backed onto a municipal facility, whose fence had been covered with barbed wire, in which many
of the bats snared their wings and starved to death. This ‘security’ measure – designed to protect the facilities relied upon by urban settlers
from the intrusion of flying foxes – is a powerful weapon for precluding ongoing flourishing of Indigenous other-than-human peoples. I learned
from neighbours that this ‘colony’ had previously been ‘moved’ from several other sites around the city, suffering significant declines in
population each time. Indeed, despite reported declines of 95% in flying fox communities in Queensland and neighbouring New South Wales,
the Queensland settler state legalized the shooting of the bats in 2012 by fruitgrowers.

Of course, in some cases, the elimination of life forms is not as targeted or intentional – it may take the form of land-based extractive violence,
the creep of ocean acidification, the decimation of rainforests by climate change. Proponents of a Eurocentric definition of genocide could
argue that these events lack intention. Indeed, within international law, intention to commit genocide is a necessary criteria for conviction.
However, theorists of critical genocide studies have long argued that this definition is inadequate: it brackets out a great many of the acts,
logics and structures that produce the destruction of unique peoples. According to Tony Barta, definitions of genocide that focus on ‘purposeful
annihilation’, and in particular on physical killing, have “devalu[ed] all other concepts of less planned destruction, even if the effects are the
same” (Barta 2000, 238). For this reason, he shifts the focus from ‘genocidal intention’ to ‘genocidal outcome’ – that is, from the abstract
assignation of genocidal agency to the felt and embodied effects of eliminative violence. It is the focus on intent, he contends, that allows white
Australians to imagine that their relationship with Aboriginal people is non-genocidal despite overwhelming evidence of systematic and
deliberate racialized destruction over several centuries. In contrast, an approach based on ‘genocidal outcomes’ makes it possible to account
for complex causality and weak intentionality – that is, for myriad acts mediated by subtle, normalized structures that, together, work to
eliminate a people. I want to argue that the same logic applies to nonhuman peoples: the destruction of a life form, its relations with other
beings and its possible futures is a genocidal outcome, whether or not intention can be identified.

Similarly, Christopher Powell (2007) argues that, since a ‘genos’ is a

“network of practical social relations, destruction of a genos means the forcible breaking down of those relationships…these effects could be
produced without a coherent intent to destroy. They could result from sporadic and uncoordinated actions whose underlying connection is the
production of a new society in which there is simply no room for the genos in question to exist. They might even result from well-meaning
attempts to do good” (Powell 2007, 538)
As I have argued elsewhere, extinction is defined by the breaking of relations and the systematic destruction of the conditions of plurality that
nurture co-flourishing worlds. Whether inflicted out as a deliberate act of extirpation, or as the convergent effect of eliminative logics
expressed over centuries and enormous spatial scales, extinction is the destruction of relations and the heterogenous societies they nurture.

Understood in this way, ‘extinction’ is not a metaphor for genocide or other forms of large-scale violence: it is a distinct manifestation of
genocide. Masking the genocidal logics that drive extinction involves several moves to innocence (Tuck and Yang 2012). Treating extinction as
something short of genocide entrenches Eurocentric understandings of personhood that are limited to homo sapiens, which is itself an act of
violence against these peoples. Ironically, the entrenchment of this dichotomy also enables the logic of ‘dehumanization’, in which human
communities are likened to reviled nonhumans (for instance, cockroaches) in order to motivate violence against them. As I have argued
elsewhere (Mitchell 2014), the logic of generalised ‘dehumanisation’ is uniquely effective in Western frameworks in which the lack of ethical
status for beings other than humans removes obstacles to their mass destruction. Within worlds in which human and nonhuman persons are
linked through complex systems of law, treaties, protocols and long-standing relations, this claim is illogical. Within Western settler states,
however, it functions as a means of justifying ongoing violence against Indigenous peoples and their relations.

In addition, by framing extinction as a problem for a universal figure of ‘humanity’ (more on this to follow…) mainstream discourses of
extinction obscure its profound entwinement with race and racializing structures. These examples make it clear that eliminative violence is
targeted on specific groups of people and their other-than-human relations, as defined by the aggressors. Indeed, patterns of genocidal
violence extend racializing categories, hierarchies and eliminative impulses to other-than-human peoples. Just as approaching gender violence
separately from race effaces their intersection, understanding extinction as distinct from race is deeply misleading. This is not only because
racialized people are more likely to suffer from the effects of ‘extinction’ and other forms of environmental racism (which they are). It is also
because the eliminative violence that drives extinction extend and enact race beyond the category of homo sapiens by defining particular
groups against white settler norms and as threats to the settler society. To approach extinction separately from issues of race is, therefore, to
miss one of its most defining features.

Extinction is not a metaphor – in many cases, it is quite literally genocide enacted against Indigenous peoples and their other-
than-human relations. To treat it as a metaphor is to obscure and participate in the structures of violence that
drive it. From this perspective, in addition to active decolonisation efforts, and the resurgence of Indigenous
peoples, addressing extinction also requires attacking the genocidal, racializing, eliminative logics that
are diffused throughout settler (and other) states. It also requires honouring the unique relations, worlds and peoples that are
targeted by these discourses and practices.

The alternative is a decolonial paradigm that results in land repatriation. It’s

incommensurable with the Affs strategy of legal recognition.
Shaun Stevenson 18 Research professor in the University Studies Program at Northern Lakes College
Doctor of Philosophy In English Language and Literature Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario; 2018;
(Re)Making Indigenous Water Worlds: Settler Colonialism, Indigenous Rights, and Hydrosocial Relations
in the Settler Nation State; https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/eaabce01-b8fc-4f56-9a2f-
ff021030ed3f/etd_pdf/5b25eacdaec3752421984fd2f2b8df69/stevenson-
remakingindigenouswaterworldssettlercolonialism.pdf – BS

My inquiry is premised on two fundamental and interrelated questions: I ask, how can Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights, and
specifically their inherent rights to water, be made legible in the context of the settler state—that is within the
state powers, legal, political, educational, and cultural institutions, and the worldviews and discursive structures that it encompasses? By
extension, how might thinking of Indigenous rights issues through water shift the terrain , the terms of negotiation, and
the social relations that structure the readability of Indigenous rights in Canada? What kind of pressures does thinking with and through water
put on taken for granted discourses of land tenure and what alternatives does this thinking offer in highlighting the impetus for the legibility
Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights? Here, I mean legible, in terms of that which is “comprehensible,” intelligible,” and has a “readily
discernable nature or significance”— that which can be read (Oxford English Dictionary). I do not intend to imply, however, that this legibility
necessarily come easily or naturally to the settler state, its institutions, and actors. Further, my use of legible here is also not synonymous with
that which is inevitably translatable into the dominant settler language or order. Speaking on translation and its function in relation to
differently positioned worldviews, John Law suggests that “to translate is to make two worlds equivalent”; however, he notes that “since no
two worlds are equivalent, translation also implies betrayal” (2009, y144). In other words, a translation always implies an uneven relation
wherein attempts are made to translate one language into the language of the other. But because translation is premised on the relationality
between the different sites of translation—because it is “about making equivalent” but also “about shifting . . . about moving terms around,
about linking and changing them” (144)—Law importantly notes, “translation is always insecure, a process susceptible to failure. Disorder – or
other orders – are only precariously kept at bay” (145). To
make Indigenous rights legible on their own terms is thus to
encounter, unsettle, and undermine the translative coercion of the settler state, revealing its insecurities and
failures.
Legibility implies a committed reading, rather than a simple translation. The question of legibility pivots on the related question of how the
inherent rights of Indigenous peoples can be read and understood on their own terms in the settler state— and in ways which
are often incommensurable with or irreconcilable to a Western liberal interpretation of rights. This means
making legible the very incongruences between Western rights discourse and Indigenous peoples’
interpretation of their inherent rights. It also means making legible the potential illegibility of inherent rights under
state judicial constraints, as inherent rights flow from Indigenous peoples’ distinct worldviews and legal orders that often exist
in opposition to state rights discourse. Legibility—to learn to read, and to recognize the limits of one’s own reading practice—implies a
commitment to unlearning and relearning, to reconceptualising, respecting boundaries, and seeing the limits of one’s own epistemology and
ontology.

Legibility, however, is not only about misreading, or misunderstanding; it is also about power and legitimacy, and the settler state’s power to
make Indigenous rights illegible and thus illegitimate. As I will explore through my sites of conflict below, to render Indigenous rights and
relations to water as illegible is to contain them or negate them; it is to re-interpret them or romanticize them as mere cultural expression; it is
to subordinate them, construct them as inferior, to make them illegal, or actively disavow and destroy them. Significantly then, to
engage
with the problem of legibility in the settler state also means reading and reckoning with the necessity of
the jurisdictional powers of Indigenous law and governance over their waters and also over waters that are
necessarily shared; it means reckoning with what the settler state and settler subjects must give up or
relinquish in order to decolonize water on Turtle Island.3 Engagement with the problem of legibility
moves us away from a liberal politics of recognition, wherein Indigenous rights must be made recognizable,
or translatable to Canadian common law, and instead calls for the readability of Indigenous rights as they have
emerged through “their own legal traditions, land tenure systems, and governance structures” (Askew, Kung, and Smith
2016, 230). What could be called the problem of legibility thus becomes a task for the settler state, and for
non-Indigenous people in Canada as they reckon with the nature and significance of Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights, reconciling
themselves, their worldviews, and their own legal orders with the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples.

My concern with legibility here is closely aligned with Eve Tuck and Edward Yang’s notion of incommensurability in their pivotal essay,
“Decolonization is Not a Metaphor”; however, my use of legibility marks, perhaps, a different kind of project than that outlined by Tuck and
Yang. Tuck and Yang write, “To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means
relinquishing settler futurity,
abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing
the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate
decolonization and underwrite settler innocence” (2012, 36). The authors further write, drawing on Fanon,
“Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world” (36). For Tuck and Yang,
“decolonization is not a metaphor . . . it is not a metonym for social justice, but a change in the material conditions that undergird the settler
state and their ongoing colonization of Indigenous people’s lands, waters, and ways of life” (21).

I follow Tuck and Yang’s emphasis on the importance of incommensurability within decolonizing projects—on “what is
irreconcilable within settler colonial relations” rather than on that which is reconcilable (4). Like Tuck and Yang, I am
interested in a break in the organizing logics and material conditions of settler colonialism, rather than a
kind of compromise. But where water demands a consideration of that which is relational between Indigenous and settler worlds, I
remain committed to understanding how this relation itself might be decolonized. While I do not intend to affirm a “settler futurity,” which
Tuck and Yang assert is incommensurable with Indigenous decolonial projects, I undertake here what I identify as a decolonial thought
experiment in order to consider how to live relationally with water now within lands where we are already “living within Indigenous
sovereignty,” but which are overdetermined by the jurisdictional constraints of the settler state (Nicoll 2004, qtd. in Mackey 2016, 129).
Legibility returns me to the demand of the relation, what Dorries and Ruddick, drawing on Bignall, call “the problematic unity of coexistence”
(2018, 6). While incommensurability remains an important consideration for this relation, it is the relation itself where I ultimately aim to locate
decolonial potential. Where legibility is produced and delimited through systems of power, water forces a reckoning with legibility across settler
and Indigenous water worlds—its relational presence demands the readability of Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights, their hydrosocial
relations and legal orders, and the pressures they put on waters that necessarily flow in relation between Indigenous and settler worlds.

My second and related question, then, is what it has meant and what it could mean to live relationally with water in a settler colonial nation
state such as Canada? At the heart of both of these questions is what it means to exist relationally in a settler state, in law, and with rights when
worldviews are incommensurable in ways that often lead to violence and dispossession. What does it mean to exist relationally in a place where
legibility is confined to a matter of cultural difference, and at worst violently erased? While I will expand on the concept of “worlding” below,
my research questions prompt me to consider the distinct worlds—the complex ontological perspectives—that are comprised by and through
our different engagements with water and the system of rights that arise through these engagements. How do certain interpretations of rights
around water and the laws that uphold them construct material worlds in their image? How have they limited, and in many instances, actively
worked to undermine and even destroy the possibility for the enactment, making, and remaking of Indigenous worlds? What worlds have been
and could be possible through reckoning with the legibility of the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous legal orders, and assertions
of sovereignty, particularly as they pertain to water? In raising these questions about legibility and relationality, I am fundamentally concerned
with the question of what is and what could be legible as law on lands that are both overdetermined by settler colonialism, and where
enactments of Indigenous land and water tenure are actively being remade within and against these constraints.

Through an interdisciplinary analysis of selected discursive articulations of land, water, law, and Indigenous rights in Canada, I explore the
production of and relationship between Indigenous and settler water worlds as they are made and remade within and against the confines of
the settler colonial nation state. As land and its settlement continues to play such a fundamental role in the development of the nation, I
explore how water has been figured within the settler state and its settler subjectifications. I ask, what are the ways in which water has been
relegated to a simplified extension of land-based discourse within Canadian Indigenous rights policy and what are the effects of this? What are
the ways that settler subjects have enacted and amplified these land-based limitations? Subjective dynamics, the logics of settler possession
and their corresponding elements of settler desire and self-delusion are integral in understanding the subjective processes underpinning the
enactment and perpetuation of settler colonial water worlds—for understanding how settler colonial water worlds are embodied and projected
on the ground by settler subjects in distinct historical moments. In this project’s commitment to critique, I attempt to account for the structural,
institutional, the large-scale historical processes, as well as their extension into the waters of Turtle at the subjective level—the subjective
dimensions that are often complicit in their well-meaning intentions, and which make settler colonial water worlds so hard to alter or unmake.
Alternatively, by exploring the historical, political, and legal perspectives of specific Indigenous nations, communities, and writers, I examine
how water has been figured in Indigenous cultural, political, and legal thought, practice, and community action. How do Indigenous legal orders
and sovereignty claims frame water rights for Indigenous peoples and what kind of material worlds does this reframing aim to construct?

Cree/Gitxsan legal scholar Val Napoleon asserts that we “cannot assume that there are fully functioning Indigenous laws around us that will
spring to life by mere recognition. Instead, what is required is rebuilding” (Napoleon 2013). Following Napoleon’s comments here, my aim in
this dissertation is ultimately to explore some of the conditions required to begin rebuilding or remaking Indigenous water worlds in the settler
colonial context. Put another way, if
state interpretations of Indigenous rights discourse, those which are rooted
in Western property regimes, and colonial common law have actively unmade Indigenous water worlds,
correspondingly limiting the legibility of Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights and the legal orders from
which these inherent rights are derived, what kinds of conditions are required for their remaking? What are the ways in which
Indigenous peoples have resisted the imposition of settler colonial water worlds? And what is the potential to constitute these distinct, often
oppositional worlds relationally? While I do not intend to circumscribe what this remaking has and will look like, as each of my sites of analysis
show, it involves the fostering of the conditions for the assertion and resurgence of the Indigenous legal orders and hydrosocial relations that
give meaning to Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights to and self-determination over their waters. Tuck and Yang assert that
“decolonization inthe settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the
recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and
enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically” (7). To be clear, my focus on a decolonial relationality in this project is
not simply a call for the recognition and respect of an ontological plurality on colonized lands. Rather, my project is concerned with
what this repatriation is up against under the jurisdictional powers of the settler state, the concrete
and material shift in power that it would require, and what this might look like in relation to the waters that flow between
Indigenous and settler understandings and enactments.
 Infrastructure DA---1NC
Infrastructure will pass but there is no margin for error.
Tony Romm, 9/7/21, Washington Post, “with bulk of their agenda on the line, Democrats gird for
battle over $3.5 trillion budget package,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-
policy/2021/09/07/democrats-reconciliation-bill-budget/, mm

The fate of President Biden’s $3.5 trillion economic agenda hinges on work that’s slated to resume on Capitol Hill this
week, as Democrats attempt to overcome their internal divisions and craft what could be the largest spending package in U.S. history. The next
few days could prove daunting for top lawmakers in the party tasked with assembling a bill that can satisfy their past promises to remake broad
swaths of the American economy. The work is set to unfold primarily in the House beginning Thursday, when the chamber has scheduled a
series of grueling marathon legislative sessions to toil over the finer details of its plans. Biden and his Democratic allies have pledged to expand
Medicare, commit new sums to combat climate change, raise taxes on the wealthy, and boost federal programs that aid low-income families
and children. In doing so, they have made grand proclamations about the need for historic investments, especially in the penumbra of a
coronavirus pandemic that has left millions of Americans facing financial ruin. But significant political
quarrels already have plagued
the party, complicating its attempts to adopt a proposal as large as $3.5 trillion before the end of the month. Chief among their headaches is
Sen. Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.), who said last week that he would not support a package with that price tag and called on
Congress to hit “pause” on its breakneck legislative pace. Manchin’s threat created political complications even beyond the Senate, where
Democrats possess only a tiebreaking majority and require his support to proceed. With
no room for error, Democrats have
been forced to confront the reality that they may have to compromise some of their own ambitions, not to overcome
opposition from Republicans but rather to quiet dissent among their own ranks. “If [Manchin] just wants to tank the whole effort, he just ought
to say so,” said Rep. John Yarmuth (D-Ky.), the leader of the House Budget Committee , which oversees the spending process.
“He’s playing this game that conceivably gives other members who might be on the fence some cover. That’s not helpful. I’m worried about it.”
But Yarmuth insisted he is optimistic about the road ahead, given polling he cited that shows Democrats’ plans are popular with
the public. “It would be the largest single piece of legislation in history,” he said. The precarious dynamic only underscores a tough political
reality in Democrat-dominated Washington: Even with control of Congress and the White House, there are still limits to what the party can
accomplish on its own. Since the 2020 campaign that catapulted Biden and his allies to power, Democrats have rallied behind his oft-repeated
promise to “build back better,” hoping to expand government to a level not seen in a generation. Their $3.5 trillion spending plan is a central
part of that vision, which also includes a separate roughly $1.2 trillion measure to improve the country’s roads, bridges, pipes, ports and
Internet connections. Republicans joined Democrats in the Senate to adopt the infrastructure proposal in a rare overwhelming bipartisan vote
last month. Some Republican lawmakers are expected to do the same when the House takes up the package later in September. But they have
rejected the rest of Biden’s agenda, arguing another round of trillion-dollar spending could worsen the country’s fiscal troubles and intensify
inflation. GOP leaders also have fought vigorously against its proposed tax increases, which would reverse the cuts they secured four years ago
under former president Donald Trump. To sidestep that Republican opposition, especially in the narrowly divided Senate, Democrats plan to
advance their economic package through a legislative move known as reconciliation. Biden has described both spending plans in equally urgent
terms, stressing last week they would help ensure future prosperity. “It’s about investing in America’s future, not about short-term stimulus.
That’s not what we’re talking about,” the president said in a speech at the White House on the heels of a disappointing jobs report Friday. First,
though, Democrats actually need to agree on a bill. At the center of the fight is the package’s price tag, since the final figure
ultimately determines the policies that lawmakers can adopt. Moderates including Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) already have
sounded public skepticism about shelling out as much as $3.5 trillion on reconciliation, while others, such as Manchin, have raised fears
that too much spending would worsen the deficit at a time when prices are on the rise. Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.), center, is joined from left
by Sens. Bill Cassidy (R-La.), Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), Susan Collins (R-Maine), and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), as they speak at a news conference
on Capitol Hill after the vote to start working on the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure package in July. (J. Scott Applewhite/AP) Adding to the
trouble, Democrats also remain unsettled over exactly how to pay for the package, no matter its final size. Hoping to cover its costs in full, Biden
has proposed a series of tax increases, including raising the corporate rate from 21 percent to 28 percent, while newly seeking to extract more
revenue from wealthy families and investments. Senate Democrats have explored additional elements, including new taxes targeting executive
compensation and carbon emissions, according a plan circulated among lawmakers last week and obtained by The Washington Post. Some in
the party see in the spoils of the 2020 election a mandate to rethink the tax code so that those who earn more ultimately pay the government
more. But Democrats are not united on how to accomplish these aims, creating the potential for public sparring between party members as key
legislative committees convene for a series of debates and votes starting Thursday. One Democratic lawmaker, speaking on the condition of
anonymity to describe the party’s internal deliberations, said they are already resigned to a corporate tax increase that is closer to 25 percent
— and have yet to build enough support for other tax hikes targeting investments or corporate income earned abroad. “The money is just not
there,” the lawmaker said, expressing a belief that the package is likely to come down closer to $2 trillion. For now, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
(D-Calif.) has tasked each of the key panels to complete its work by Sept. 15, with the hopes of adopting the final reconciliation bill before the
end of the month. Hoping to quicken the process, House Democrats also have huddled with their Senate counterparts over video and phone
calls in recent days, aiming to try to address potential policy hurdles before they erupt in public view. “We need 218 votes in the House, and we
need a bill that can be passed in the Senate and signed by the president,” said Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.), the leader of the moderate-
leaning New Democrat Coalition. She added that voting on policies that have the support of one chamber, but not the other, “doesn’t help
anyone if we don’t get it across the finish line.” But the tensions around taxes and spending for now have put centrists in direct conflict with
Democrats’ more liberal wing, which had spent months encouraging Biden to go bigger. Many of these progressive Democrats see $3.5 trillion
as their compromise, especially after recommending as much as double that amount for reconciliation earlier this year. The dynamic flashed in
a hearing last week, when a key climate-focused House panel led by Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.) began its work to consider how to spend
roughly $30 billion to stem the deadly consequences of global warming. Democrats have said they hope to reverse years of underinvestment in
the environment, but their new reconciliation efforts have raised some early concerns among panel moderates, especially about the cost. “I
have to ask, where are the revenues to support that spending coming from? We just borrowed over $5 trillion for covid-19 emergency
assistance in the last 18 months,” said Rep. Ed Case (D-Hawaii), a centrist-leaning lawmaker on the panel. Noting his interest to address the
threat of climate change, he added, “We cannot afford to continue these borrowings in reconciliation.” Many liberal lawmakers contend that a
smaller package forces Democrats to make improper trade-offs, sacrificing programs that families need in a way that threatens the party with
lasting political harm. “There is no flexibility on the price tag, and it’s not because I care about what the top line is,” said Rep. Pramila Jayapal
(D-Wash.), the leader of the roughly 100-member strong Congressional Progressive Caucus. “It’s because I care about delivering on these
benefits.” Jayapal added the stakes are high for Democrats, given the package’s potential for “transforming lives” as well as the party’s own
prospects entering what could be a tough midterm election cycle next year. “If we don’t deliver, then I think all of the people who came out and
voted for Democrats to take control of the House, the Senate and the White House, are going to come out and say, ‘that’s it,’” she said.
Behind the scenes, though, the work already has started to slim down some of the Democrats’ ambitions.
Some party leaders have eyed scaling back some of their tax benefits, for instance, including a popular poverty-fighting credit program that aids
low-income families with children. Increasingly, Democrats believe they should authorize these tax credits for a limited number of years, rather
than making the spending permanent. The move could lessen the price tag of the reconciliation bill, but would require Democrats
to reauthorize some of their work later. The same cost concerns also threaten to hamstring a revived campaign on the part of nearly 130
Democrats to lower the Medicare eligibility age. Progressives and moderates alike introduced a new bill on the issue last week, hoping a
reduction in enrollment age to 60 from 65 might become part of the reconciliation law. Democrats also have sought to expand Medicare to
cover dental, vision and hearing benefits, while giving the government new powers to negotiate drug costs in a move that could lower seniors’
costs. But lawmakers like Manchin previously have expressed opposition to lowering the age in the package. Nor is it clear Democrats even
have the budgetary room to do it, given the wide array of other health programs they seek to fund, including the extension of expanded tax
credits that lower the costs of other Americans’ insurance payments. The tall task ahead of them has left some Democrats to acknowledge they
may not have the money or votes to tackle one of their top priorities. The skeptics include Yarmuth, who joked about his decision to endorse
the bill last week: “That doesn’t mean it can pass.” The disagreements set the stage for an all-out scramble ahead of Sept.
27, at which point Pelosi has pledged to begin debate over the $1 trillion infrastructure bill that previously passed the Senate. The mad dash is a
result of an earlier standoff between moderates and progressives over the order in which they would vote on the bills, a stalemate that
ultimately led Pelosi to turn up the heat on her caucus. “It
creates pressure,” acknowledged DelBene, when asked about the road
ahead. “But I’ve also found during my time in Congress that sometimes pressure is needed to force folks to come to
conclusion on issues.”

PC is key.
Joan Greve, 9/7/21, The Guardian, “Joe Biden to referee democrats in brewing battle over $3.5tn
budget bill,” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/07/biden-democrats-brewing-battle-
budget-bill, mm

Congress will return from its summer recess later this month, and some Democrats are already gearing up for a political fight –
with each other. Democratic lawmakers are looking to pass their $3.5tn spending package, after the House and the Senate approved the
blueprint for the budget bill last month. The ambitious legislation encompasses much of Joe Biden’s economic agenda, including proposals to
expand access to affordable childcare, invest in climate-related initiatives and broaden Medicare coverage. But to get the bill passed,
Democrats will first need to reach an agreement on the cost of the legislation. Centrist Democrats, including Senators Kyrsten Sinema and Joe
Manchin, have expressed concern about the bill’s $3.5tn price tag, while progressives have indicated they will fiercely oppose any attempt to
cut funding in the proposal. With his entire economic agenda hanging in the balance ,
Biden will need to convince the two fractious
wings of his party to come together and pass a comprehensive spending package . And given Democrats’ extremely
narrow majorities in both the House and the Senate, there is virtually no room for error. Despite warning signs of intra-party
friction over the cost of the budget bill, congresswoman Suzan DelBene, who chairs the centrist New Democrat Coalition, said the House’s focus
right now should still be on the content of the legislation. “I think discussion of a number is more distracting when the focus really needs to be
on, what is the substance going to be of this legislation?” DelBene told the Guardian. “If we have strong legislation the people support, I think
we can find the path forward.” Over in the Senate, majority leader Chuck Schumer is attempting to advance the bill using reconciliation,
meaning Democrats do not need any Republican support to pass the legislation. But the 50-50 split in the upper chamber means that every
single Democratic senator must be on board to get the bill approved. Schumer has been clear-eyed about the challenges ahead for the
legislation. Shortly after the Senate approved the blueprint for the bill in a party-line vote last month, Schumer told reporters, “We’ve labored
for months and months to reach this point, and we have no illusions – maybe the hardest work is yet to come.” Manchin proved Schumer’s
point last Thursday, when he wrote a Wall Street Journal op-ed calling for a “strategic pause” in advancing the spending package. “While some
have suggested this reconciliation legislation must be passed now, I believe that making budgetary decisions under artificial political deadlines
never leads to good policy or sound decisions,” Manchin said in the op-ed. “I, for one, won’t support a $3.5tn bill, or anywhere near that level
of additional spending, without greater clarity about why Congress chooses to ignore the serious effects inflation and debt have on existing
government programs.” Bernie Sanders, the leftwing chairman of the Senate budget committee, responded to Manchin’s warning in kind,
threatening to torpedo the bipartisan infrastructure bill if the spending package is not approved. “Rebuilding our crumbling physical
infrastructure – roads, bridges, water systems – is important,” Sanders said on Twitter. “Rebuilding our crumbling human infrastructure –
healthcare, education, climate change – is more important. No infrastructure bill without the $3.5tn reconciliation bill.” Progressive groups
have echoed Sanders’s argument, insisting that every component of the $3.5tn legislation is vital. Sanders had initially called for spending $6tn
on the budget bill, so progressives already view the current price tag as a concession. “We’re in a moment of crisis. Is this really the time for the
Senate to press pause?” Ellen Sciales, the communications director of the climate group Sunrise Movement, said in a statement. She added: “If
the Senate can’t pass an incredibly popular climate and jobs plan during a summer of unprecedented, fatal climate disasters, and an economy
reeling from a global pandemic, we must abolish the Senate. $3.5tn was the compromise.” Natalia Salgado, the director of federal affairs for the
Working Families Party, noted that some progressive economists have suggested the US needs to spend $10tn over 10 years to meet its
obligations in the Paris Climate Agreement. “We’re going to come nowhere near that,” Salgado said. “So we can’t afford to lose a single cent in
this $3.5tn. Every single penny will count.” Despite
the war of words between moderates and progressives, the White House
has continued to express confidence that Congress will ultimately reach an agreement on the legislation.
“The president and his whole team are proud of and fighting for the substance of his Build Back Better agenda,” a White House official said in a
statement. “These
are complex processes, but as recent weeks have demonstrated, leaders in Congress and the President
know how to move them forward.” And DelBene similarly said that her group, which represents 95 Democrats in the House,
remains committee to advancing both the bipartisan infrastructure bill and the spending package. “The strength of the legislation, both on the
infrastructure side and the reconciliation bill, is what people are going to look at moving forward,” DelBene said. “I think we want to see the
infrastructure deal and the reconciliation bill get done.”

Aff sparks backlash and costs PC.

Mitchell '20 [Charlie; 11/16/20; journalist for The New Republic; "Can Biden Keep His Promise to
Make Farms Climate Friendly?" https://newrepublic.com/article/160205/can-biden-keep-promise-
make-farms-climate-friendly/]

Last month, when asked on Pod Save America to name three or four things atop his first-term agenda, Joe
Biden mentioned a
surprising topic: farm policy. “I know it’s boring as hell, but it’s consequential,” he said, adding that agriculture could be
“the first net-zero industry in America” when it comes to carbon emissions. The president-elect is right—it could
be. But that would require Biden and the Democrats to commit to that goal and to pick leaders who will guide
agriculture policy away from the pro-corporate swamp it has been stuck in for years. It’s far from clear
they have the vision to do that.
If the country is serious about reducing carbon emissions, farm policy must play an essential role. As a recent blockbuster study in Science made
clear, even if we had the zero-emissions energy grid of our fantasies, greenhouse gases expelled during food production would still warm the
planet past two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), the Paris Agreement goal. Livestock—mostly cows—belch a lot of methane, and
manure emits noxious greenhouse gases. Fertilizers and other crop chemicals require copious fossil fuels to produce, and when they get
overused, nitrogen suffocates waterways and pumps the atmosphere with nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas.

For the Biden administration to tackle these problems and achieve the goal he laid out on the podcast, it will
have to veer sharply away from the plans his campaign laid out. His agriculture policy , which appears primarily
in his rural and climate plans, was influenced heavily by fellow Obama administration alum Tom Vilsack , the former
Iowa governor who served as secretary of agriculture from 2009 to 2017. After Vilsack left that post, he immediately took a
million-dollar salary lobbying for the dairy industry, and since the Iowa caucuses, he’s been moonlighting as Biden’s rural
campaign adviser and surrogate. As a result, portions of Biden’s farm plans —particularly those that offer solutions to climate
change—traffic in false solutions advanced by corporate interests. The premier example of this is ethanol, a climate and
policy disaster that Democrats have nonetheless refused to renounce.
This year, 30 million acres of corn—over a third of the U.S. corn crop—is expected to be refined into ethanol and blended into gasoline, as required by the EPA. And though using a plant-based
fuel sounded like a good alternative to oil 20 years ago, scientists regard biofuel projects, including the “net zero” practice of harvesting forested land for fuel, to be a “catastrophic mistake” in
climate accounting, in the words of Timothy Searchinger, a research scholar at Princeton University and senior fellow at the World Resources Institute. “Plants are so inefficient at meeting our
energy needs. It takes a huge amount of land, and therefore sacrifices a huge amount of carbon,” he said.

Yet in a failing effort to compete with Republicans in the Corn Belt, moderate Democrats insist on singing ethanol’s praises; in September, Biden even ripped Trump for being insufficiently pro-
ethanol. If a Biden administration promotes biofuels over other programs, serious progress on agricultural emissions will be dead on arrival.

Biden’s policy proposals include appending digesters to factory farms and making biogas out of their methane-heavy manure (which still emits carbon dioxide when burned)—a failing
technology that accommodates rather than regulates the most pollutive farms. He backs the corporate campaign to create a market for carbon sequestered in farmland. “We could be
spending billions of dollars paying farmers to do pretty much what they’re doing now, and the carbon sequestration benefits of that will be pretty minimal,” said Ken Cook, co-founder and
president of the Environmental Working Group. Big Ag is smart enough to create excitement over solutions that never deliver—ethanol being one such boondoggle that haunts us today.
There’s a gauntlet of others waiting down the line.

Biden’s farm policy plans may seem bleak to climate hawks, but they were not a surprise, given concerns about who the president-elect might appoint as secretary of agriculture. Heidi
Heitkamp, Trump’s rumored top choice for the job in 2016, has been the most talked-about candidate on Biden’s list. The one-term North Dakota senator has taken millions in corporate
money, notably large handfuls from the oil and gas industry and agribusiness; she supported the Keystone Pipeline and Dakota Access Pipeline and fought to roll back farm regulations, overall
earning an abysmal environmental rating from conservation groups. “Her background … should be disqualifying for her to run a major agency that has to help Biden achieve his climate goals,”
said Kari Hammerschlag, the deputy director of the Food and Environment program and Friends of the Earth.

For many climate and sustainable farm advocates (as well as the Congressional Black Caucus), the preferred choice for agriculture secretary is Marcia Fudge, a Black congresswoman
representing Ohio’s 11th district in Cleveland and the subcommittee chair for nutrition and oversight on the House Agriculture Committee. Fudge could pivot the USDA’s focus from the
agribusiness lobby toward the well-being of the broader public, dislodging a crucial roadblock to progress on climate through agriculture. She’s fought for smarter and increased investment in
conservation before, which is what environmental advocates are prioritizing. “The only way that we are going to change the USDA is to bring in leadership that is not beholden to the corporate
interests,” Hammerschlag said.

Cook agrees that a nutrition and conservation advocate such as Fudge would improve the climate position in Farm
Bill negotiations,
which take place every five years and are the Olympics of farm policy, where deliberation on subsidies
for crops, technology, conservation, and feeding programs all take place at once. During the
negotiations, set to start back up in 2022, Republicans routinely attack access and funding for the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in the name of minimizing federal spending. The offensive forces
Democrats to spend limited political capital defending the vital program and relegating farm programs—where most
of the climate opportunity is—to the back burner.

That’s key to economic recovery.

Tyson '9/9 [Laura; 9/9/21; Professor of the Graduate School at the Haas School of Business and Chair
of the Blum Center Board of Trustees at the University of California Berkeley, former chair of the US
President's Council of Economic Advisers; Lenny Mendonca; Senior Partner Emeritus at McKinsey &
Company; "Why America Must Go Big on Infrastructure," https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/infrastructure-plan-biden-budget-needed-for-recovery-by-laura-tyson-and-
lenny-mendonca-2021-09/]

Economists across the political spectrum have long advocated an increase in infrastructure investment
in the United States. Now, Congress is debating infrastructure spending packages that would secure the
current economic recovery and boost potential growth over the next decade.

Despite deep partisan divisions on most other issues, the Senate recently passed the $1 trillion Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) by a large majority. The bill now must pass the House of Representatives, where
Speaker Nancy Pelosi has secured an agreement for a vote by the end of September. Approval looks likely
but is by no means certain, given complete lack of support from House Republicans and ongoing divisions
among House Democrats.
The IIJA focuses on traditional physical infrastructure, where much of the need is for long-overdue maintenance, committing about $550 billion
for investment in items like roads and bridges, water infrastructure, and broadband. The bill also contains climate-related investments in clean-
energy transmission and electric-vehicle infrastructure, including electrification of school and transit buses.

These investments would be paid for through a combination of unspent emergency relief funds,
corporate user fees, strengthened tax enforcement, and revenues from stronger economic growth. The
Congressional Budget Office warns that the IIJA could increase the fiscal deficit by $256 billion over the next decade. But additional
borrowing to finance infrastructure is warranted, given that the real cost of federal borrowing is
currently in the 2% range, while the projected return on investment in physical infrastructure is around
7%.
The IIJA, moreover, is only a down payment on the investments in physical and human capital needed to achieve inclusive and sustainable
growth. Congress must
pass an even bigger and bolder plan that focuses on human development,
economic mobility, and climate resilience.

To that end, the Senate, with only Democratic support, recently passed a $3.5 trillion budget resolution for the next
ten years that includes such investments , and the House has now incorporated the plan into its budget framework. Again,
passage of the plan is by no means certain. Major details need to be decided, and tough negotiations on
financing and non-infrastructure items (including immigration) lie ahead.

The US economy rests on fragile foundations. While the rebound from the COVID-19 recession has been
surprisingly rapid and robust, the US Federal Reserve may soon start to taper its monthly bond purchases,
and the earlier fiscal emergency and stimulus spending packages will soon run their course. The spread
of the Delta variant (owing to vaccine hesitancy) has already curtailed demand in pandemic-sensitive sectors like travel, tourism, and
hospitality. Worse, the recovery has yet to reach many workers hit hardest by the “dual recession,” especially non-
college-educated people, lower-wage women, and people of color in vulnerable sectors.

Moreover, labor-force participation remains low , largely because school closures have forced many parents (predominantly
women) to leave the workforce to care for their children. Politically motivated claims that expanded unemployment benefits have fostered low
labor-force participation will disappear as those benefits expire this month. Indeed, the experience of states that decided to cut enhanced
benefits earlier has already refuted the argument that those provisions were undermining work incentives.

The recovery has been kind to shareholders, homeowners, and the wealthy. Stock markets are hitting record highs, and home prices are up by
25% from a year ago. The number of billionaires continues to grow, with their overall wealth increasing by 62% since 2020. Overall, inequality
has continued to increase while economic mobility has declined, leaving a growing number of Americans further behind.

The $3.5 trillion budget plan proposes major investments in social infrastructure to change this
trajectory. These include $726 billion for preschool services, childcare for working families, tuition-free
community college, increased funding for historically black universities and colleges, and expansions of
Pell grants and primary health care. There is also more than $300 billion earmarked for public housing, the
Housing Trust Fund, housing affordability, and equity and community land trusts.

To foster sustainable, equitable growth, the plan includes nearly $200 billion for clean-energy development
and $135 billion to address forest fires, droughts, and other climate-driven challenges. As evidence of the adverse effects of climate change
mounts, denialism and resistance to mitigation and adaptation policies have waned both in the US and around the world. Recent
polls
show that over two-thirds of Americans now want the government to do more to address climate
change. As more communities experience its adverse effects, voters are increasingly joining major investors in
demanding action.
The $3.5 trillion plan would be funded through a combination of new tax revenues, strengthened tax enforcement, health-care savings, and
revenues from long-term growth. The main revenue generators are an increase in the corporate tax rate to the 28% range, a global minimum
corporate tax in the 20% range, and higher tax rates on personal income and capital gains for wealthy Americans (those with taxable incomes
over $400,000). Recent polls indicate that there is robust voter support across party lines for tax increases on both corporations and high-
income earners.

A recent report by Moody’s Analytics concludes that over

the next decade, the $3.5 trillion budget along with the IIJA
would accelerate the economy’s recovery to full employment, increase employment by 20 million, and
boost long-term growth, the benefits of which would mostly accrue to lower- and middle-income families. Moreover, even if
these plans increase the deficit more than anticipated, this is still an especially propitious time for the federal
government to borrow to increase investments in infrastructure, given the anticipated returns and
extraordinarily low interest rates.

Infrastructure investment is a twofer: in the short run, it stimulates demand through strong fiscal
multiplier effects, and it strengthens the supply foundations of economic growth and competitiveness
over time. The infrastructure plans being debated this month would generate these macroeconomic benefits in ways that would also foster
greater equity and climate resilience. Congress holds the keys to a future of inclusive and sustainable growth for America.
Now it needs to muster the courage to use them .

Global war.
Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen
Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University
of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable
Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the
nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an
equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both
domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis
created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its
ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack
the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access
good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its
international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years
to come.
An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a
bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages
in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with
dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits,
and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address
urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health . Alongside these job
growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and
develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home
the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of
international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength
increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and
national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared.
Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and
mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance,
and alliances around the world.
After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement
made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and
economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our
democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important
part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a
small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced
stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical
care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable
workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those
with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are
experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while
workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary
education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover
earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will
strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message
about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt
to a changing global economic landscape . An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our
most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been
a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A
strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to
solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a
position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global
pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared
economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous
economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in
developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.
 Uncooperative Federalism CP---1NC
The 50 States and relevant subnational actors should refuse to cooperate with federal
initiatives unless the federal government <plan words>.
The CP forces follow on AND normalizes un-cooperative federalism.
Heather Gerken 17, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law at Yale Law School, JD from the University of
Michigan Law School, AB from Princeton University, and Joshua Resevz, JD from Yale Law School, BA in
Political Science from Yale University, now Civil Attorney with the Appellate Staff at the United States
Department of Justice, “Progressive Federalism: A User’s Guide”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas,
Number 44, Spring 2017, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-users-
guide/ [language modified]
But if progressives can simply look outside the Beltway, they will find that they still have access to one of the most powerful weapons in politics:
federalism. Using the power they wield in states and cities across the country, progressives can
do a good deal more than mourn and
obstruct. They
can resist Washington overreach, shape national policies, and force the Republicans to
compromise. Cities and states have long been at the center of the fight over national values. And it’s time progressives recognized that
federalism isn’t just for conservatives.

Unfortunately, the moment one mentions federalism many progressives stop listening. The language of “states’ rights” has an ugly history,
invoked to shield slavery and Jim Crow. Federalism’s checkered past led political scientist William H. Riker to remark in 1964 that “if one
disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.” Even today, many progressives think of federalism as a parochial anachronism,
better suited for stymieing change than for effecting it.

But they are making a mistake. This is not your father’s federalism. These days, state and local governments are often led by
dissenters and racial minorities, the two groups progressives think have the most to fear from federalism. And this has allowed
them to not only take advantage of the enormous power that federalism confers within their own cities and
states, but to affect national debates, influence national policy, and force national actors to the bargaining
table. Their success shows that federalism is a neutral and powerful tool for change, not an intrinsically conservative quirk of U.S.
government.

The call for progressive federalism is not a new one. In 2004, Duke law professor Ernie Young invited liberals to come to the “Dark Side” and
embrace the power of the states. (And one of the authors of this essay has spent more than a decade arguing—including in the pages of this
journal— that federalism doesn’t have a political valence.) But having a Democrat in the White House was just too tempting for most
progressives. They turned their attention to Washington while neglecting what was going on in California, Massachusetts, or New York City. We
suspect that most progressives aren’t even aware that the Democrats have lost 27 state legislative chambers since 2008. But perhaps the 2016
election will help progressives shake loose the notion that D.C. is the center of the political universe.

Needless to say, though, the devil is in the details. So below we offer a “user’s guide” that identifies four ways that progressive leaders—from
Jerry Brown and Bill de Blasio to small-city mayors—can push back against federal policy and force compromise. And, in doing so, we hope to
persuade even the most fervent nationalist to become a fan of federalism. While we fashion this as a progressive user’s guide, it could, in
theory, work just as well for conservatives should they lose the presidency in 2020. That’s precisely the point.

Types of Resistance

We often forget that the federal government’s administrative capacity is modest, relatively speaking. Excluding the military, it
employs just short of three million personnel. Its 2015 budget (excluding defense, Social Security, and mandatory spending obligations) was less
than $600 billion. Together, state and local governments [swamp] dwarf these figures, with more than 14 million workers and
a combined budget of more than $2.5 trillion.

Because of this, Washington can’t go it alone. When Congress makes a law, it often lacks the resources to enforce it. Instead, it
relies on states and localities to carry out its policies. Without those local actors, the feds cannot enforce
immigration law, implement environmental policy, build infrastructure, or prosecute drug offenses.
Changing policies in these areas—and many more—is possible only if cities and states lend a hand. This arrangement creates opportunities for
federal-state cooperation. But it also allows for “uncooperative federalism”: State and local officials can use their leverage over the
feds to shape national policy.

This means that states can shape policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. This form of
resistance involves more than mere obstruction. It allows progressive states to help set the federal agenda by forcing debates
that conservatives would rather avoid and by creating incentives for compromise. When states opt out of a federal program, it costs the
federal government resources and political capital. That’s why President Trump has a lot more incentive to compromise
with Democrats in Sacramento than with those on the Hill.

Uncooperative federalism solves bioterror.

Dr. Paul Posner 3, Ph.D., Recognized National Expert on U.S. Federalism, Managing Director, Federal
Budget Issues, Strategic Issues for the General Accounting Office, 3/24/2003, “The Federalism Challenge:
The Challenge for State and Local Government,” p. 20

For example, in
public health, let’s examine what a local government faces to prepare for bioterrorism. It has
to improve the capacity of its local health departments, the human capital that has been woefully neglected in recent years
reportedly. It has to update its technology so that it at least can communicate problems to the CDC in Atlanta over the Internet. It has to
achieve agreements with hospitals to develop surge capacity and support from doctors and other medical personnel. It has to
develop laboratory infrastructure to at least know where the labs are and reach some kind of agreements on how to process
samples of suspicious materials. And most importantly, what we’re finding increasingly in the local health departments, it has to
develop surveillance systems to produce real-time data on day-to-day incidences , to help get early warning of
suspicious health trends and incidents to facilitate an expeditious response to health problems where time is such a critical variable influencing
potential health outcomes for those exposed.

Baltimore is one of the pioneers. They can show daily the numbers of admittances to emergency rooms, the veterinarians’ reports,
daily school absences. They are trying to get pharmacies to report daily on medications prescribed. The point is they can monitor these things
and look for variations and look for puzzles and, fortunately, they haven’t found any. That’s the kind of surveillance
system that is
under development in some communities and illustrates the political challenges in gaining the cooperation of
numerous independent actors at the local level.
Framing the Problem

The way the problem is framed determines the framework and the modality or the process that we use to address it. For example, if
we
define the homeland security problem as a response problem , as a first responder’s problem, then the
model will have a local orientation. City managers have told me that when you’re dealing with the
response to an incident, the most effective thing for the effective management of response is for the
federal government to stay out of our way. These managers feel they know their communities best. As one
said, “Give us money but let us control the action.”

That’s an existential threat.

Owen Cotton-Barratt et al. 17. PhD in Pure Mathematics from Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at
Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; Sebastian Farquhar, PhD student in
Computer Science at Oxford; John Halstead, DPhil in Political Philosophy from Oxford, former Research
Fellow at the Global Priorities Project; Stefan Schubert, Ph.D. in philosophy from Lund University, former
postdoc at London School of Economics; Haydn Belfield, Academic Project Manager at the Centre for the
Study of Existential Risk, BA in PPE from Oxford; Andrew Snyder-Beattie, leads Open Philanthropy's work
on biosecurity and pandemic preparedness, former Director of Research at the Future of Humanity
Institute, PhD/DPhil in Zoology from the University of Oxford. “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and
Governance”. pg. 9. GLOBAL PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017. https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf. wms-hhb.

pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural

However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31
species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to

their extinction. It therefore seems that ourown species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a
rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for
this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure

for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39 Recent developments in

biotechnology may, however, give people the capability to design pathogens which overcome this
trade-off. Some gain-of-function research has demonstrated the feasibility of altering pathogens to create strains
with dangerous new features, such as vaccine-resistant smallpox40 and human-transmissible avian flu,41
with the potential to kill millions or even billions of people. For an engineered pathogen to derail humanity’s long-term future, it would probably
have to have extremely high fatality rates or destroy reproductive capability (so that it killed or prevented reproduction by all or nearly
all of its victims), be extremely infectious (so that it had global reach), and have delayed onset of symptoms (so that we would fail to

notice the problem and mount a response in time).42 Making such a pathogen would be close to impossible at present. However, the cost of the technology is

falling rapidly,43 and adequate expertise and modern laboratories are becoming more available. Consequently,
states and perhaps even terrorist groups could eventually gain the capacity to create pathogens which could
deliberately or accidentally cause an existential catastrophe.
 Space CP---1NC
Instead of directing substantial U.S. agricultural subsidies toward meeting water
quality goals, the United States federal government should spend the funds allocated
by the aff to pursue human habitation of other planets.

Money is the obstacle to a successful Mars mission

Gaffey, reporter for Newsweek, 7/14/2017
(Conor, NASA CAN’T AFFORD TO PUT HUMANS ON MARS, www.newsweek.com/mission-mars-nasa-life-
mars-636662)

Colonizing Mars has long captivated the human imagination , and NASA is no exception.

The American space agency has made landing humans on Mars a high priority of its exploration
programs and under bipartisan 2010 legislation pledged to develop the capabilities to send humans to
the planet by the 2030s.

But there remains a major problem standing between mankind and the red planet: money.

The head of NASA’s program on human exploration of space, William Gerstenmaier, said on Wednesday
that with its current budget the agency simply cannot afford the cost of propelling a manned spacecraft
to Mars.

“Through this horizon, through the 2030s, I can’t put a date on humans on Mars,” said Gerstenmaier on
Wednesday, in response to a question at a propulsion meeting of the American Institute for Aeronautics
and Astronautics in Georgia.

“At the budget levels we’ve described—it’s roughly a 2 percent increase—we don’t have the surface
systems available for Mars. That entry, descent and landing is a huge challenge for us for Mars.”

It’s try or die – this is the only true solution to every extinction impact
Becker, Presidential Climate Action Project for Obama, 15 years at the U.S. Department of Energy and a
journalism career that began when he was a combat correspondent in Vietnam at age 19, 2/6/ 2017

(William, Who Wants to Live on Mars?, www.huffingtonpost.com/william-s-becker/who-wants-to-live-

on-mars_b_14632700.html)

Some of the most intelligent people alive - among them,, billionaire Elon Musk, fellow billionaire Sir
Richard Branson and theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking - want us to colonize Mars. Hawking predicts
unless we prepare another celestial body to be our lifeboat, humanity is destined to suffer mass
extinction due in part to our unsustainable squandering of Earth’s resources.
“Although the chance of a disaster to planet Earth in a given year may be quite low, it adds up over time,
and becomes a near certainty in the next thousand or ten thousand years ,” Hawking says. “By that time
we should have spread out into space, and to other stars, so a disaster on Earth would not mean the end
of the human race.”

Musk has less patience. He’s working with NASA on an interplanetary transport that will take take the
first astronauts to Mars in the 2030s. Later, regular people could make the trip for $200,000 per ticket
(checked baggage fees not included) in one of Musk’s interplanetary space buses. “I really think there
are two fundamental paths,” Musk says. “One path is we stay on Earth forever, and some eventual
extinction event wipes us out.” The other path: Traveling 19,000 miles over three months to get to a
barren planet of rocks, dust and deadly radiation. “It will be like, really fun to go, you’ll have a great
time,” Musk says.
 Adv 2---1NC
Power of the purse constrains the executive.
Alex Bolton 16 Duke University Sharece Thrower University of Pittsburgh; 5-9-16; The Constraining
Power of the Purse: Executive

Discretion and Legislative Appropriations; https://visionsinmethodology.org/wp- content/

uploads/sites/4/2016/05/bolton_thrower_discretion.pdf - BS

One of the most consequential powers of the executive branch is its ability to influence policy outcomes
through implementation, potentially moving policy to a substantially different place relative to where Congress originally intended in
legislation (Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; 1989; Shepsle 1992). To prevent such “bureaucratic drift,”
Congress can impose a number of control mechanisms upon the bureaucracy including administrative
procedures, agency design, appointments, budgets, audits, and oversight hearings. These mechanisms have
become fundamental to constraining executive power. Accordingly, there is a rich body of theoretical and
empirical research examining these methods of congressional control (Aberbach 1990; Balla 2000; Bawn 1995; Drotning and Rothenberg 1999;
Kriner and Schwartz 2008; Lewis 2008; MacDonald 2007; Mayhew 1991; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; 1989; McCubbins and Schwartz
1984; Ting 2002; Wood and Bohte 2004).

The loss sets a precedent that destroys pres powers.

Kenneth Klukowski 11. Research Fellow, Liberty University School of Law; Fellow and Senior Legal
Analyst, American Civil Rights Union; National-Bestselling Author. George Mason University School of
Law, J.D. “Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional
Oversight.” 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 31.
Most controversies between Congress and the White House over information are decided more by politics than by law, and so a settlement is
usually reached favoring the party with the public wind to its back . n348 Questions of law should not be
decided in that fashion. Therefore, the reach and scope of executive privilege should be settled by the
courts in such situations, so that the President's power is not impaired whenever the political wind is in the
President's face and at his opponents' backs , or the President is inappropriately shielded when political tides flow in his favor.
While the best outcome in any interbranch dispute is the political branches reaching a settlement, "such compromise may not
always be available, or even desirable." n349 It is not desirable where it sets a precedent that degrades one of the three
branches of government. If one branch of government demands something to which it is not
constitutionally entitled and that the Constitution has fully vested in a coequal branch, the vested
branch should not be required to negotiate on the question. Negotiation usually involves compromise. This negotiation
would often result in one branch needing to cede to the other, encouraging additional unconstitutional demands in
the future. Though this may perhaps be a quicker route to a resolution, it disrupts the constitutional balance in
government. As the Supreme Court has recently explained, "'convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks--
of democratic government.'" President Reagan declared that "you aren't President; you are temporarily custodian
of an institution, the Presidency. And you don't have any right to do away with any of the prerogatives of
that institution, and one of those is executive privilege . And this is what was being attacked by the Congress."
n351 Thus, any White House has the obligation to fight to protect executive privilege, and the courts should
draw the line to preserve that constitutional prerogative. Likewise, there are times when it is the President who is refusing
to give Congress its due under the Constitution, where Congress must assert its prerogatives for future generations. Conversely, where
confidentiality is not warranted, courts must ensure public disclosure and accountability.
Extinction---executive flexibility is key to respond to terror, rogue states, and prolif.
John Yoo 17. Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute. “Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional.” National Review. 4/13/2017.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-
war-powers

The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes,
making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive
action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances — that is best carried out by a
branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements.
Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the
Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason.

Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose,
decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew . Congress has no political incentive to
mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where
the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable
for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a
happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe
at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the

While pro-Congress critics worry

conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis.

about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from
inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without
the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the

the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has
Cold War and the passage of

No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even

ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad.

Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake
the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by
interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations.
It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major
conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war
because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this
reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not
admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission
before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to
war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945,
the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has
authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power
worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military. A radical change in the system for making war might appease
critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also
block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off
funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative
congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little
more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential
war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the
British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the

war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by
Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen
not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for

making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American

national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or take advantage of a window of
opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of
situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation , which can lead to passivity

and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution
creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security .
Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. As
we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD proliferation, now is not the
time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

1AC Spalding also says they crush the administrative state generally.
1AC Spalding 17 (Matthew Spalding is associate vice president and dean of educational programs for
Hillsdale College in Washington, D.C. He oversees the operations of the Kirby Center and the various
academic and educational programs of Hillsdale in the nation’s capital, 07-16-2017, "Make Congress
Great Again," US News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2017-06-16/its-
time-to-make-congress-great-again)//ArchanSen

One place where the power of the legislative branch is not entirely lost is Congress' power of the
purse. Strategically controlling and using the budget process will turn the advantage back to Congress,
not only forcing the executive to engage with the legislative branch and get back into the habit of
executing the laws enacted by Congress, but also bringing the administrative state to heel.

Effective regulation solves extinction.

Tate ’15 Jitendra S. Tate, Associate Professor of Manufacturing Engineering at the Ingram School of Engineering, Texas State
University, et al., “Military And National Security Implications Of Nanotechnology”, The Journal of Technology Studies, Volume
41, Number 1, Spring, https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JOTS/v41/v41n1/tate.html

All branches of the U.S. military are currently conducting nanotechnology research, including the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Office of Naval Research (ONR), Army Research Office (ARO), and Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The United States is

currently the leader of the development of nanotechnologybased applications for military and national
defense. Advancements in nanotechnology are intended to revolutionize modern warfare with the development of applications such as nano-sensors, artificial intelligence, nanomanufacturing, and nanorobotics.
Capabilities of this technology include providing soldiers with stronger and lighter battle suits, using nano-enabled medicines for curing field wounds, and producing silver-packed foods with decreased spoiling rate ( Tiwari, A.,

Military Nanotechnology, 2004 ). Although the improvements in nanotechnology hold great promise, this technology has the potential to pose some risks . This article
addresses a few of the more recent, rapidly evolving, and cutting edge developments for defense purposes. To prevent irreversible damages, regulatory measures

must be taken in the advancement of dangerous technological developments implementing

nanotechnology. The article introduces recent efforts in awareness of the societal implications of military and national security nanotechnology as well as recommendations for national leaders. Keywords:
Nanotechnology, Implications, modern warfare INTRODUCTION Advances in nano-science and nanotechnology promise to have major implications

for advances in the scientific field as well as peace for the upcoming decades. This will lead to dramatic changes in the way that material, medicine, surveillance, and sustainable energy
technology are understood and created. Significant breakthroughs are expected in human organ engineering, assembly of

atoms and molecules, and the emergence of a new era of physics and chemistry . Tomorrow’s soldiers will have many challenges such
as carrying self-guided missiles, jumping over large obstacles, monitoring vital signs, and working longer periods with sleep deprivation. ( Altmann & Gubrud, Anticipating military nanotechnology, 2004 ). This will be achieved by
controlling matter at the nanoscale (1-100nm). A nanometer is one-billionth of a meter. This article considers the social impact of nanotechnology (NT) from the point of view of the possible military applications and their
implications for national defense and arms control. This technological evolution may become disruptive; meaning that it will come out of mainstream. Ideas that are coming forth through nanotechnology are becoming very popular
and the possibilities will in practice have profound implications for military affairs as well as relations between nations and thinking about war and national security ( Altmann J. , Military Uses of Nanotechnology: Perspectives and

Concerns, 2004 ). In this article some of the potential applicability uses of recent nanotechnology driven applications within the military are introduced. This article also discusses how the impact of a rapid
technological evolution in the military will have implications on society . POTENTIAL MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES Magneto rheological Fluid (MR Fluid) A magneto-
rheological-fluid is a fluid where colloidal ferrofluids experience a body force on the entire material that is proportional to the magnetic field strength ( Ashour, Rogers, & Kordonsky, 1996 ). This allows the status of the fluid to change reversibly from a liquid to solid state. Thus, the fluid
becomes intelligently controllable using the magnetic field. MR fluid consists of a basic fluid, ferromagnetic particles, and stabilizing additives ( Olabi & Grunwald, 2007 ). The ferromagnetic particles are typically 20-50μm in diameter whereas in the presence of the magnetic field, the
particles align and form linear chains parallel to the field ( Ahmadian & Norris, 2008 ). Response times 21 that require impressively low voltages are being developed. Recently, ( Ahmadian & Norris, 2008 ) has shown the ability of MR fluids to handle impulse loads and an adaptable fixing
for blast resistant and structural membranes. For military applications, the strength of the armor will depend on the composition of the fluid. Researchers propose wiring the armor with tiny circuits. While current is applied through the wires, the armor would stiffen, and while the current
is turned off, the armor would revert to its liquid, flexible state. Depending on the type of particles used, a variety of armor technology can be developed to adapt for soldiers in different types of battle conditions. Nanotechnology could increase the agility of soldiers. This could be
accomplished by increasing mechanical properties as well as the flexibility for battle suit technology. Nano Robotics Nanorobotics is a new emerging field in which machines and robotic components are created at a scale at or close to that of a nanometer. The term has been heavily
publicized through science fiction movies, especially the film industry, and has been growing in popularity. In the movie Spiderman , Peter Parker and Norman Osborn briefly talk about Norman’s research which involves nanotechnology that is later used in the Green Goblin suit.
Nanorobotics specifically refers to the nanotechnology engineering discipline or designing and building nano robots that are expected to be used in a military and space applications. The terms nanobots, nanoids, nanites, nanomachines or nanomites have been used to describe these
devices but do not accurately represent the discipline. Nanorobotics includes a system at or below the micrometer range and is made of assemblies of nanoscale components with dimensions ranging from 1 to 100nm ( Weir, Sierra, & Jones, 2005 ). Nanorobotics can generally be divided
into two fields. The first area deals with the overall design and control of the robots at the nanoscale. Much of the research in this area is theoretical. The second area deals with the manipulation and/or assembly of nanoscale components with macroscale manipulators ( Weir, Sierra, &
Jones, 2005 ). Nanomanipulation and nanoassembly may play a critical role in the development and deployment of artificial robots that could be used for combat. According to Mavroidis et al. ( 2013 ), nanorobots should have the following three characteristic abilities at the nano scale
and in presence of a large number in a remote environment. First they should have swarm intelligence. Second the ability to self-assemble and replicate at the nanoscale. Third is the ability to have a nano to macro world interface architecture enabling instant access to the nanorobots
with control and maintenance. ( Mavroidis & Ferreira, 2013 ) also states that collaborative efforts between a variety of educational backgrounds will need to work together to achieve this common objective. Autonomous nanorobots for the battlefield will be able to move in all media such
as water, air, and ground using propulsion principles known for larger systems. These systems include wheels, tracks, rotor blades, wings, and jets ( Altmann & Gubrud, Military, arms control, and security aspects of nanotechnology, 2004 ). These robots will also be designed for specific
military tasks such as reconnaissance, communication, target destination, and sensing capabilities. Self-assembling nanorobots could possibly act together in high numbers, blocking windows, putting abrasives into motors and other machines, and other unique tasks. Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a vast emerging field that can be very thought provoking . AI has been seen recently in a number of
movies and television shows that have predicted what the possibility of an advanced intelligence could do to our society. This intellect could possibly outperform human

capabilities in practically every field from scientific research to social interactions. Aspirations to surpass human capabilities include
tennis, baseball, and other daily tasks demanding motion and common sense reasoning (Kurzweil, 2005). Examples where AI could be seen include chess playing, theorem proving, face and speech recognition, and natural language

understanding. AI has been an active and dynamic field of research and development since its establishment in 1956 at the Dartmouth
Conference in the United States ( Cantu-Ortiz, 2014 ). In past decades, this has led to the development of smart systems, including phones, laptops,
medical instruments, and navigation software. One problem with AI is that people are coming to a conclusion about its capabilities too soon. Thus, people are becoming afraid of the probability that an artificial intelligent system
could possibly expand and turn on the human race. True artificial intelligence is still very far from becoming “alive” due to our current technology. Nanotechnology might advance AI research and development. In nanotechnology,
there is a combination of physics, chemistry and engineering. AI relies most heavily on biological influence as seen genetic algorithm mutations, rather than chemistry or engineering. Bringing together nanosciences and AI can
boost a whole new generation of information and communication technologies that will impact our society. This could be accomplished by successful convergences between technology and biology ( Sacha & P., 2013 ).
Computational power could be exponentially increased in current successful AI based military decision behavior models as seen in the following examples. Expert Systems Artificial intelligence is currently being used and evolving in
expert systems (ES). An ES is an “intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and interference procedures to solve problems that are difficult enough to require significant human expertize to their solution” ( Mellit &
Kalogirou, 2008 ). Results early on in its development have shown that this technology can play a significant impact in military applications. Weapon systems, surveillance, and complex information have created numerous
complications for military personnel. AI and ES can aid commanders in making decisions faster than before in spite of limitations on manpower and training. The field of expert systems in the military is still a long way from solving
the most persistent problems, but early on research demonstrated that this technology could offer great hope and promise ( Franklin, Carmody, Keller, Levitt, & Buteau, 1988 ). Mellit et al. argues that an ES is not a program but a
system. This is because the program contains a variety of different components such as a knowledge base, interference mechanisms, and explanation facilities. Therefore they have been built to solve a range of problems that can
be beneficial to military applications. This includes the prediction of a given situation, planning which can aid in devising a sequence of actions that will achieve a set goal, and debugging and repair-prescribing remedies for
malfunctions. Genetic Algorithms Artificial intelligence with genetic algorithms (GA) can tackle complex problems through the process of initialization, selection, crossover, and mutation. A GA repeatedly modifies a population of
artificial structures in order to adjust for a specific problem (Prelipcean et al., 2010). In this population, chromosomes evolve over a number of generations through the application of genetic operations. This evolution process of
the GA allows for the most elite chromosomes to survive and mate from one generation to the next. Generally, the GA will include three genetic operations of selection, crossover, and mutation. This is currently being applied to
solving problems in military vehicle scheduling at logistic distribution centers. Nanomanufacturing Nanomanufacturing is the production of materials and components with nanoscale features that can span a wide range of unique
capabilities. At the nanoscale, matter is manufactured at lengthscales of 1-100nm with precise size and control. The manufacturing of parts can be done with the “bottom up” from nano sized materials or “top down” process for
high precision. Manufacturing at the nanoscale could produce new features, functional capabilities, and multi-functional properties. Nanomanufacturing is distinguished from nanoprocessing, and nanofabrication, whereas
nanomanufacturing must address scalability, reliability and cost effectiveness ( Cooper & Ralph, 2011 ). Military applications will need to be very tough and sturdy but at the same time very reliable for use in harsh environments
with the extreme temperatures, pressure, humidity, radiation, etc. The use of nano enabled materials and components increase the military’s in-mission success. Eventually, these new nanotechnologies will be transferred for
commercial and public use. Cooper et al. makes known how nanomanufacuring is a multi-disciplinary effort that involves synthesis, processing and fabrication. There are however a great number of challenges that as well as
opportunities in nanomanufacturing R&D such as; Predictions from first principles of the progress and kinetics of nanosynthesis and nano-assembly processes. 23 Understand and control the nucleation and growth of nanomaterial
and nanostructures and asses the effects of catalysts, crystal orientation, chemistry, etc. on growth rates and morphologies. R&D IN THE USA The USA is proving to have a lead in military research and development in
nanotechnology. Research spans under umbrella of applications related to defense capabilities. NNI has provided funds in which one quarter to one third goes to the department of defense – in 2003, $ 243 million of $774 million.
This is far more than any country and the US expenditure would be five times the sum of all the rest of the world ( Altmann & Gubrud, Military, arms control, and security aspects of nanotechnology, 2004 ). INITIATIVES The
National Nanotechnology Initiative The National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) was unveiled by President Clinton in a speech that he gave on science and technology policy in January of 2000 where he called for an initiative with
funding levels around 500 million dollars ( Roco & Bainbridge, 2001 ). The initiative had five elements. The first was to increase support for fundamental research. The second was to pursue a set of grand challenges. The third was
to support a series of centers of excellence. The fourth was to increase support for research infrastructure. The fifth is to think about the ethical, economic, legal and social implications and to address the education and training of
nanotechnology workforce ( Roco & Bainbridge, 2001 ). NNI brings together the expertise needed to advance the potential of nanotechnology across the nation. ISN at MIT The Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) initiated
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2002 ( Bennet-Woods, 2008 ). The mission of ISN is to develop battlesuit technology that will increase soldier survivability, protection, and create new methods of detecting toxic
agents, enhancing situational awareness, while decreasing battle suit weight and increasing flexibility. ISN research is organized into five strategic areas (SRA) designed to address broad strategic challenges facing soldiers. The first
is developing lightweight, multifunctional nanostructured materials. Here nanotechnology is being used to develop soldier protective capabilities such as sensing, night vision, communication, and visible management. Second is
soldier medicine – prevention, diagnostics, and far-forward care. This SRA will focus on research that would enable devices to aid casualty care for soldiers on the battle field. Devices would be activated by qualified personnel, the
soldier, or autonomous. Eventually, these devices will find applications in medical hospitals as well. Third is blast and ballistic threats – materials damage, injury mechanisms, and lightweight protection. This research will focus on
the development of materials that will provide for better protection against many forms of mechanical energy in the battle field. New protective material design will decrease the soldier’s risk of trauma, casualty, and other related
injuries. The fourth SRA is hazardous substances sensing. This research will focus on exploring advanced methods of molecularly complicated hazardous substances that could be dangerous to soldiers. This would include food-
borne pathogens, explosives, viruses and bacteria. The fifth and final is nanosystems integration –flexible capabilities in complex environments. This research focuses on the integration of nano-enabled materials and devices into
systems that will give the soldier agility to operate in different environments. This will be through capabilities to sense toxic chemicals, pressure, and temperature, and allow groups of soldiers to communicate undetected (Institute
for Soldier Nanotechnologies). SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS The purpose of country’s armed forces is to provide protection from foreign threats and from internal conflict. On the other hand, they may also harm a society by engaging in counter- productive warfare or serving as an economic burden. Expenditures on science and technology to develop weapons and
systems sometimes produces side benefits, such as new medicines, technologies, or materials. Being ahead in military technology provides an important advantage in armed conflict. Thus, all potential opponents have a strong motive for military research and development. From the perspective of international security and arms control it appears that in depth studies of the social
science of these implications has hardly begun. Warnings about this emerging technology have been sounded against excessive promises made too soon. The public may be too caught up with a “nanohype” ( Gubrud & Altmann, 2002 ). It is essential to address questions of possible dangers arising from military use of nanotechnology and its impacts on national security. Their

The goal of preventive arms control is to limit how the development of future
consequences need to be analyzed. NT and Preventative Arms Control Background

weapons could create horrific situations, as seen in the past world wars. A qualitative method here is to
design boundaries which could limit the creation of new military technologies before they are ever
deployed or even thought of. One criterion regards arms control and how the development of military and surveillance technologies could go beyond the limits of international law warfare and control agreements. This could include
autonomous fighting war machines failing to define combatants of either side and Biological weapons could possibly give terrorist circumvention over existing treaties ( Altmann & Gubrud, Military, arms control, and security aspects of nanotechnology, 2004 ). The second criterion is to
prevent destabilization of the military situation which emerging technologies could make response times in battle much faster. Who will strike first? The third criterion, according to Altman & Gubrud, is how to consider unintended hazards to humans, the environment, and society.
Nanoscience is paving the way for smaller more efficient systems which could leak into civilian sectors that could bring risks to human health and personal data. Concrete data on how this will affect humans or the environment is still uncertain. Arms Control Agreements The development
of smaller chemical or biological weapons that may contain less to no metal could potentially violate existing international laws of warfare by becoming virtually undetectable. Smaller weapons could fall into categories that would undermine peace treaties. The manipulation of these
weapons by terrorist could give a better opportunity to select specific targets for assassination. Anti- satellite attacks by smaller more autonomous satellites could potentially destabilize the space situation. Therefore a comprehensive ban on space weapons should be established
( Altmann & Gubrud, 2002 ). Autonomous robots with a degree of artificial intelligence will potentially bring great problems. The ability to identify a soldiers current situation such as a plea for surrender, a call for medical attention, or illness is a a very complicated tasks that to an extent

New weapons could pressure the military to prevent attacks by pursuing

requires human intelligence. This could potentially violate humanitarian law. Stability

the development of new technologies faster. This could lead to an arms race with other nations trying to
attain the same goal. Destabilization may occur through faster action, and more available nano systems.
Vehicles will become much lighter and will be used for surveillance. This will significantly reduce time to acquire a targets location. Medical devices implanted in soldiers’ bodies will enable the release of drugs that influence mood
and response times. For example, an implant that attaches to the brains nervous system could give the possibility to reduce reaction time by processing information much faster than usual ( Altmann & Gubrud, Anticipating military

Artificial intelligence based genetic algorithms could make tactical decisions much faster
nanotechnology, 2004 ).

through computational power by adapting to a situations decision . Nano robots could eavesdrop, manipulate or even destroy targets while at the
same time being undetected ( Altmann J. , Military Uses of Nanotechnology: Perspectives and Concerns, 2004 ). Environment Society & Humans Human beings have always been exposed to natural reoccurring nanomaterials in nature. These particles may enter the human body
through respiration, and ingestion ( Bennet- Woods, 2008 ). Little been known about how manufactured nanoscale materials will have an impact to the environment. Jerome (2005) argues that nanomaterials used for military uniforms could break of and enter the body and environment.
New materials could destroy species of plants and animal. Fumes from fuel additives could be inhaled by military personnel. Contaminant due to weapon blasts could lead to diseases such as cancer or leukemia due to absorption through the skin or inhalation. Improper disposal of
batteries using nano particles could also affect a wide variety of species. An increase in nanoparticle release into the environment could be aided by waste streams from military research facilities. Advanced nuclear weapons that are miniaturized may leave large areas of soil contaminated
with radioactive materials. There is an increase in toxicity as the particle size decrease which could cause unknown environmental changes. Bennet-woods ( 2008 ) argues that there is great uncertainty in which the way nano materials will degrade under natural conditions and interact

Danger to society could greatly be affected due to self-replicating, mutating, mechanical or biological
with local organisms in the environment.

plagues. In the event that these intelligent nano systems were to be unleashed, they could potentially attack the physical world . There are a number of applications that will be developed
with nanotechnology that could potentially crossover from the military to national security that can harm the civilian sector ( Bennet-Woods, 2008 ). There is a heightened awareness that new technologies will allow for a more efficient access to personal privacy and autonomy ( Roco &
Bainbridge, 2005 ). Concerns regarding artificial intelligence acquiring a vast amount of personal data, voice recognition, and financial data will also arise. Implantable brain devices, intended for communication, raise concerns for actually observing and manipulating thoughts. Some of the
most feared risks due to nanotechnology in the society are the loss of privacy ( Flagg, 2005 ). Nano sensors developed for the battlefield could be used for eavesdropping and tracking of citizens by state agencies. This could lead to improvised warfare or terrorism. Bennet-Woods ( 2008 )
argues that there should be an outright ban on nanoenabled tracking and surveillance devices for any purpose. Nanotechnology in combination with biotechnology and medicine raise concerns regarding human safety. This includes nanoscale drugs that may allow for improvements in
terrorism alongside more efficient soldiers for combat. Bioterrorism could greatly be improved through nano-engineered drugs and chemicals ( Milleson, 2013 ). Body implants could be used by soldiers to provide for better fighting efficiency but in the society, the extent in which the
availability of body manipulation will have to be debated at large ( Altmann J. , Nanotechnology and preventive arms control, 2005 ). Brain implanted stimulates could become addictive and lead to health defects. The availability of body and brain implants could have negative effects
during peace time. Milleson ( 2013 ) argues that there is fear that this technology could destabilize the human race, society, and family. Thus, the use in society should be delayed for at least a decade. CONCLUSIONS Nanoscience will lead to a revolutionary development of new materials,
medicine, surveillance, and sustainable energy. Many applications could arrive in the next decade. The US is currently in the lead in nanoscience research and development. This equates to roughly five times the sum of all the rest of world. It is essential to address the potential risks that
cutting edge military applications will have on warfare and civilian sector. There is a potential for mistrust in areas where revolutionary changes are expected. There are many initiatives by federal agencies, industry, and academic institutions pertaining to nanotechnology applications in

Preventive measures should be coordinated early on among national leaders. Scientists propose for national
military and national security.

leaders to follow general guidelines. There shall be no circumvention of existing treaties as well as a ban on space weapons. Autonomous robots should be greatly restricted. Due to rapidly advancing

capabilities, a technological arms race should be prevented at all costs. Nanomaterials could greatly harm humans and their environment
therefore nations should work together to address safety protocols. The national nanotechnology of different nations should build
confidence in addressing the social implications and preventive arms control from this technological
revolution.

Impact ev is about pre-emption, zero chance Biden goes rogue and launches a nuke.
The national security bureaucracy prevents any disruptive moves
Reich 18 [Simon Reich is professor in the division of global affairs and department of political science
at Rutgers University, Peter Dombrowski is professor of strategy in the strategic and operational
research department at the Naval War College, Beyond the Tweets: President Trump’s Continuity in
Military Operations, May, Strategic Studies Quarterly,
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-
2/Dombrowski_Reich.pdf]

Nonetheless, although operational circumstances may evolve over time, presidents generally inherit the same or similar
ones of their predecessors. President Trump— despite his forthright approach —is as much of a captive to
these constraints as were his predecessors, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Despite the president and his advisors’
proclamation that they will pursue different approaches than those of previous administrations, circumstances generally limit
their degrees of freedom in the prosecution of military operations. Domestic Bureaucratic and Leadership Constraints on Military
Operations Furthermore, presidents inherit both the domestic political , bureaucratic , and historical capabilities

and constraints of the American political system and national security state . Incoming presidents
invariably depend on a national security structure developed over decades . It includes, below the
level of political appointees , many of the same personnel and, of course, standard operating processes ,
budgetary claim s made by powerful congressional constituencies , legal constraints , administrative
traditions , and institutional cultures . The size and structure of the national security apparatus by default
reinforces a propensity for continuity and can therefore often undermine the grand promises of politicians. As
many journalists and scholars have documented, especially in the wake of 9/11, the national security state has inexorably grown, with a base
budget increase of more than 50 percent between 2001 and 2016.12 With that has come an increase in the size of its bureaucracy. That
bureaucracy, broadly defined, now includes the Department of Homeland Security and the various intelligence agencies, those responsible for
managing the massive growth of government contractors and private security services, and departments specifically created to address new
forms of conflict across the entire electromagnetic spectrum (including cyber and space). Pointedly, national
security professionals,
regardless of their personal views and even any political differences, cannot simply be ignored ; they are necessary for

policy and strategy implementation . Indeed, they are more valuable than ever in the absence of more than half
the number of key appointees. Furthermore, entirely consistent with the classic scholarship on bureaucratic and
organizational behavior, their familiarity with ongoing operations and standard operating procedures
generally reinforces the strategic status quo rather than radical change, often for fear of the unknown
consequences of any major shift.13 Complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, for example, sounds good on a
bumper sticker, but the long-held concern of thereby giving terrorists a base from which to attack the United States suggests
otherwise. President Trump’s choice of leadership has reinforced this trend. The incoming leaders of national security
departments often arrive intent on instituting dramatic strategic changes. Sometimes they even succeed in some aspects,
a notable example being the changes in immigration policy instituted by the Trump administration’s Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security to date.14 President Trump chose, however, to install three distinguished career military personnel at the
apex of his administration: Lt Gen H. R. McMaster as his second National Security Advisor, Gen James Mattis as secretary of Defense, and Gen
John F. Kelly, initially as secretary of Homeland Defense and now chief of staff. Their extensive and distinguished military careers socialized
them to view strategic challenges from a pragmatic, operational perspective rather than a dogmatic one. McMaster’s studious personal manner
reputedly grated the president, eventually leading to his departure. But if reports are to be believed, President Trump regards Mattis and Kelly
as credible and authoritative to the point where he routinely delegates strategy to them.15 It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that they
reputedly favor institutionally and culturally embedded conventions, abjuring many of the president’s more radical proposals (as McMaster did)
when it comes to force deployment.16 In effect, they recognize the contextual factors that operate in differing theaters of war—such as
Secretary Mattis’ insistence on sustaining troop deployments in Eastern Europe—that often reinforce the propensity for continuity.17
Commentators, such as George Will, expressed an early concern that Trump’s third national security advisor, John Bolton, may adopt a more
aggressive approach to force deployment.18 At this point, however, there is no evidence by which to measure the
relationship between Bolton’s fiery rhetoric and his prescriptions when it comes to deployments. Time will
tell if Bolton will be willing and able to impose new deployment patterns on both his more cautious colleagues and a possibly recalcitrant
bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, while
sounding a cautious note, the available evidence to date has generated an ironic
paradox in President Trump’s case. The vacuum created by his administration’s lack of senior
appointments, coupled with the training of many of those he has appointed to leadership roles, has
collectively reinforced the natural tendency to be circumspect in instigating any major operational
changes.
 Adv 1---1NC
They don’t solve global food shortages,
No food wars.
Jonas Vestby 18, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral
researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and
Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political
Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the
Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18,
https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there

is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access
to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent
conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are
not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups . In fact,
the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they
often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in
protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates
primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to
political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general
economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of
living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as
drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

Global and domestic food production are in the dumps and there are tons of thumpers
Aday and Aday 20 — Serpil Aday, Food Processing Department, Vocational School of Biga, Canakkale
Onsekiz Mart University, Biga, Canakkale, Turkey. Mehmet Seckin Aday, Food Engineering Department,
Engineering Faculty, Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Canakkale, Turkey. ("Impact of COVID-19 on the
food supply chain" OUP Academic, August 1, 2020.
https://academic.oup.com/fqs/article/4/4/167/5896496)//JLPark

Food supply can be divided into five stages including

The chain , agricultural production , postharvest handling processing , ,

distribution and consumption /retail/service, . Two systems are being used in the food supply chain regarding food quality and safety. The First one is based on regulations and laws that use mandatory standards which are inspected by

state agencies. The Second one is relying on voluntary standards which are defined by market laws or international associations (Bendekovic et al., 2015). Safety measures to ensure the continuity of food
flow in each stage can be grouped as food employee’s health issues, personal hygiene, using personal protective equipments such as helmets and glove, sanitization of surfaces and working environments, safe handling/preparation/delivery of

food, and maintenance of social distance. Protective measures in the last stages of the food supply chain are critical since people can be more potentially affected as moved towards the last stages (Rizou et al., 2020).

Unlike foot and mouth disease, bird flu, Escherichia coli (E. coli), or Listeria, the COVID-19 pandemic does not directly affect production, as it does not spread directly through livestock or agricultural products (FAO, 2020a).

However, due to the pandemic, governments around the world have made significant restrictions in the transportation (land, water, and air
transport) of goods, as well as in the migration of labour. Reports showed that using the trucks for food distribution was declined to 60% since the restrictions in France
which was 30% before the pandemic (FAO, 2020j; Bakalis et al., 2020).

In developing and underdeveloped countries the

, temporary or seasonal employment is common, especially for planting, sorting, harvesting, processing, or transporting crops to markets. Therefore,

supply chain is significantly affected as a result of the absence of local or migrant workers due to sickness It also weakens
or travel restrictions imposed by lockdown.

not only production but food safety abilities for others, also their own , in cases where the disease directly affects their health or movement (FAO, 2020k). Especially, labour shortage due
to COVID caused severe disruptions -19 crisis in some sectors such as livestock production, horticulture, planting, harvesting, and crop processing which are relatively labour intensive (Stephens et al., 2020). However, shortage

farmworkers was a major issue before COVID

of well the -19 outbreak, too (Richards and Rickard, 2020).

Due to the fact that many skilled workers in the harvest could not access various countries because of the border controls, a call has been made to the unemployed persons to work in the fields in France. In Britain, ‘Pick for Britain’ campaign was aimed to find 70 000 British to work in the
field and during the harvest (Nature Plants, 2020). However, due to the shortage of workforce as a result of illness and physical distance to be maintained during production, the crisis undermines the ability of farms and agricultural businesses to work. These conditions retarded the
delivery of food and agricultural inputs and created problems in providing continuous food supply to markets (ILO, 2020). Although many manufacturers rely on their core inputs, most are more susceptible to disruptions, as they must obtain their requirements from domestic markets.
Logistics barriers that disrupt food supply chains further weaken high-value goods due to their short shelf life (Shahidi, 2020; FAO, 2020j, FAO, 2020k).

agricultural activities
Most need to follow a fine-tuned schedule depend on the season and weather, and therefore, activities with flexibility so that immediate actions can be performed

and stages
when needed. Since all processes are strongly connected a slight delay or glitch can trigger a butterfly in a supply chain to each other,

effect resulting in a big loss in yield and output the (FAO, 2020k). Actually, there are many reports that farmers were forced to destroy their products by burning or leaving them to spoil because of the
restrictions. Dairy Farmers in America Co-operative consider 14 million litres of milk are being dumped every day due to interrupted supply chain. In England, chair of dairy farmers reported that approximately 5 million litres of milk are at risk in one week. Also, It was reported that tea
plants were being lost because of the logistical challenges in India (BBC, 2020a). Therefore, maintaining logistical efficiency is a key factor for the food industry, especially in global crisis. The biggest issues in the food supply chain are obtaining raw materials from suppliers and ensuring the
continuity of food flow from manufacturers to end users (Alonso et al., 2007).The problems are jeopardizing the ability of agricultural businesses to continue their business as usual, and may have negative effects on food quality, freshness, and food safety, and hinder access to markets
and affordability (FAO, 2020k). As countries struggle with that pandemic, they must make every effort to move the gears of the food supply chains. The impact of pandemic problems on agricultural systems largely depends on the intensity and composition of agricultural inputs and varies
depending on the product produced and the country. Capital-intensive techniques are usually used in high-income countries for agricultural production, whereas production is mostly labour dependent in low-income countries. Thus, the supply chain should be kept running with a
particular focus on the basics of logistic challenges (FAO, 2020j).

Food sector contains many diverse products such as meat, fruit, vegetable, dairy, ready-to-eat foods, and other edible products (Hueston and McLeod, 2012). However, the food and agriculture chain can be broadly classified into two categories regarding capital investment and labour.
The First one can be defined as staple products such as wheat, corn, maize, soybeans, and oilseeds. The Second one contains high-value products such as fruit, vegetables, and fisheries. Staple products require large amounts of capital investments. Restriction between cities, provinces,
regions, and countries has a negative impact on the distribution of staple products (FAO, 2020c). In contrast to staple products, a great deal of labour is required to obtain high-value products. However, time-sensitive nature of the agricultural operations (O’Brien et al., 2014) and needs
for higher productivity over time might lead to the agricultural transformation which can be defined as technological advancement and up-skilling of the labour force (Jeon, 2011; Martin, 2016).

The challenges that have been driven by movement restriction (national or international border closures) and the changes in demand of consumers are important. Because of the restrictions, consumers cannot go to restaurants and they prepare their meals at home. In addition,
consumers do not want to go to markets and supermarkets due to catching the COVID-19 at the stores (FAO, 2020g).

The supply chain affects not only producers, distributors, and consumers, but also food-processing plants that are labour intensive. Production was reduced, suspended, or temporarily discontinued in many plants due to the workers who were found to be COVID-19 positive and who were

reluctant to go to work, thinking that they would get sick at work, mostly in meat-processing food companies at the time of the outbreak. For these reasons, it was thought that the production capacity of pork facilities decreased by
approximately 25% in late April (Devereux et al., 2020; Flynn, 2020).

462 meat packaging 257 food-processing plants and 93 farm and production facilities were
In this context, there were at least and

affected by COVID in the USA -19 cases . At least 54,036 workers (39,905 meat packaging workers, 8,343 food-processing workers, and 5,788 farmers) have been identified as COVID-19 positive and at least 232 workers (184 meat packaging
workers, 34 food-processing workers, and 14 farm workers) have lost their lives (Douglas, 2020). In Brazil, 2,400 meat plant workers were identified as COVID-19 positive from 24 slaughterhouses in 18 municipalities. Several meat factories suspended their operations after 246 positive
cases in England and Wales. In Gana, 534 staff tested positive for the virus at a fish-processing factory. In Germany, 1,553 cases of COVID-19 were found at meat-processing plants, and in France, more than 100 coronavirus infections were recorded at slaughterhouses (BBC,
2020b; Gulland, 2020; Kaur, 2020; Ziady et al., 2020). Close-down of the food plants created the ripple effect in food supply chain. Producers have been forced to cull the farm animals since they could not find any plant to sell their livestock. Greater consumer demand resulted in empty
shelves and a decrease in supply caused an increase in the price of meat products. Some of the markets limited the number of items such as beef and pork products that a single customer could buy. Food services were also affected, and some restaurants stopped serving beef hamburgers
(Hobbs, 2020; Levany, 2020; Murphy, 2020; Rude, 2020; Valinsky, 2020). Despite government reassurances, some of the stores started free delivery services on orders to prevent panic-buying. In addition, supermarkets determined the number of people allowed at any given time to stop
overcrowding. Stores also adjusted special shopping hours for vulnerable customers (Nicola et al., 2020).

There are several reasons at play that make food-processing facilities potential hotbeds for outbreak. Keeping social distance inside the food plants is difficult because workers stand side by side during long shifts on production lines. In addition, talking loudly or shouting, due to noisy
enivironments, results in the release of more droplets to the air (Stewart et al., 2020). Employees also travel on the same buses or use car-sharing systems allowing the virus to spread further. Moreover, the majority of workers have lower income and mostly do not have insurance
coverage or paid sick leave. Therefore, food-processing workers are taking risk to go work even if they feel sick which increase the risk of infection. Cold and humid environment inside the food-processing facilities is another factor that facilitates the spread of the COVID-19. It is possible
that cold and dark environments without any ultraviolet light can keep coronavirus alive and might result in an increase in the rates of transmission (Artiga and Rae, 2020; Gulland, 2020). The stability tests of the virus under five different temperatures (4, 22, 37, 56, and 70 °C) and five
different surfaces (paper, tissue paper, wood, and cloth) showed that SARS-CoV-2 is highly stable at 4 °C, but sensitive to heat. In addition, it was found that the virus is stable on smooth surfaces, however susceptible to standard disinfectants (Chin et al., 2020). Another study by Van
Doremalen et al. (2020) suggested that SARS-CoV-2 remains stable in aerosols for 3 h. The same study revealed that virus was viable for 4, 24, 48, and 72 h on copper, cardboard, stainless steel, and plastic, respectively. These outcomes indicated that the cooking temperatures above 70 °C
are enough to kill the SARS-CoV-2, but sanitary recommendations (washing hands, separating raw and cooked meat, etc.) should be followed while preparing and storing the foods (Rizou et al., 2020; Shahidi, 2020).

Centralized food manufacturing is another factor that caused disruption of food chains during COVID -19
outbreak. This paradigm helped the food processors to increase production and reduce the costs. However, centralization has some drawbacks such as rigid and lengthy supply chain issues. In addition, using the small number of very large production facilities to meet the demands might
create problems (Almena et al., 2019a) such as closure of the entire facility in case of an outbreak leaving high capacity production lines with less alternatives.

Governments are also facing financial pressures due to the economic shrinkage and reallocating their resources focusing on financial incentives and social assistance programs. Therefore, it may be difficult to support programs aimed to improve productivity at the farm levels. It is possible that inadequate funding may reduce the demand for agricultural production and productivity
over the medium term. The drop in demand will particularly harm the emerging private sector in developing countries (FAO, 2020e, 2020h).

The information provided by WHO indicated that coronavirus is transmitted through direct contact or respiratory droplets, however, the latest infections encountered in Xinfandi market raised questions over spread of coronavirus through food. Xinfandi market is the Beijing’s largest wholesale food market with more than 10,000 workers and capacity of 18,000 tonnes of vegetables,
20,000 tonnes of fruit, and 1,500 tonnes of seafood, everyday (Hua and Cadell, 2020). Officials have detected more than 100 infected people, mostly serving at seafood, beef, and mutton sections. The coronavirus was detected on the board used for cutting up salmon at market. Officials point out that high humidity and low temperature conditions in Beijing might be the reason for
transmission of coronavirus. In addition, officials stated that the surfaces of equipment’s used for preparation of seafood and meat products contaminated by infected people could be another factor of transmission ( Feng and Cheng, 2020; Reuters, 2020). The government blocked the entrances by police and temporarily closed the market due to the fears of a second wave of
pandemic on June 13. The news has resulted in halted importation of salmon from European countries in China and salmon was taken off from some supermarkets’ shelves in reaction. Norwegian officials stated ‘there is no link between the transmission of coronavirus via imported food and the origin of the salmon outbreak is still unclear’ ( Arellano, 2020; Dalton, 2020). Negotiations
between Norwegian and Chinese authorities are currently in progress to clear up the backlog. However, not only the supply of seafoods was affected, but also meat, fruit, and vegetables supply were damaged with the closure of the entire Xinfandi market. Authorities are trying to establish special trading places in the near future to maintain the supply chain of vegetables and fruits.
In addition, government is considering to take actions to increase the hygienic standards in food markets (Globaltimes, 2020; Reuters, 2020). Authorities tested around 30,000 foods including meat, seafood, fruit, and vegetable between 11 and 17 June and results were negative for all samples. Food exporters to China were asked to sign official declarations in which they give a
guarantee for their products that it is not contaminated by coronavirus. However, some of the exporters such as Brazilian grain exporters did not agree to sign the declaration ( Good, 2020; Patton, 2020).

As a result, the COVID-19 pandemic ensured the use of mechanisms designed for emergency and affected contractual transactions in the food supply chains. At the same time, it resulted in the changes in the supply–demand balance and left small producers and operators in a difficult situation ( FAO, 2020i).

Effects of pandemic on consumer behaviour

When the issue of how the COVID-19 pandemic affects consumers’ food demand is examined, it is seen that the demand varies depending on the price of foodstuffs, income level of consumers, socio-demographic situation, consumption, and shopping preferences and time constraints. In addition, the number of visits to food store and spending money on food in per visit changed
(Bakalis et al., 2020; Cranfield, 2020).

COVID-19 outbreak interrupted the daily routine and resulted in boredom which can be defined as high energy intake by the consumption of high amount of fat, carbohydrate, and proteins. In addition, quarantine caused stress in people and pushed them toward sugary foods for feeling positive, because carbohydrate-rich foods can be used as self-medicating components due to
their ability to encourage serotonin production. However, these unhealthy eating habits may contribute to the development of obesity linked to the chronic inflammation and serious complications of COVID-19 ( Muscogiuri et al., 2020).

The closure of restaurants and limited service eating places affected the eating/purchasing habits and resulted in an unusual
demand shift from food service to retail. Reports showed that purchasing food from supermarkets and using food services had the same ratio as 50% before the outbreak; however, it is almost 100% for supermarkets. The number of visits to food
store was decreased whilst spending money on food was raised per visit. Consumers experienced reduced availability of certain types of foods during the COVID-19 lockdown. In European countries, flour which is a staple product received more attention and not found on food store
shelves due to the interest in home-baking as a family activity. Interestingly, bread and baked products kept their place on the supermarket shelves. Consumers have focused on the products with long shelf life such as dried or canned foods, pasta, milk, or milk substitutes, and frozen
foods due to convenience and daily cooking at home. People stocked these foods at home because of the turn to home baking and believing rumours or getting false information. Consumers preferred takeaway and home delivery options as a result of social distance and closure of
restaurants (Bakalis et al., 2020; Shahidi, 2020). Indeed, it was interesting to note that the shortage of eggs was not only due to increased demand but also lack of packaging for retail. Household egg consumption increased 40% since March 20 in Argentina and sales of eggs rose by 44%
compared to last year in the USA. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration provided flexibility related to the packaging and labelling of eggs due to the insufficient availability of appropriately labelled retail packages to fulfill the demand and facilitate the distribution of eggs during COVID-
19 pandemic (FDA, 2020; Mazili, 2020; Reiley, 2020).

Global events such as COVID-19 increase the demand for food worldwide. In a study, demand data in European countries due to COVID-19 were evaluated. Accordingly, although the demand for fresh bread increased by 76% and frozen vegetables by 52% in the week when the pandemic was announced, the demand for alcoholic beverages did not increase. However, the demand for alcoholic beverages increased about twice, one month after pandemic announcement ( Crisp, 2020).

Concerns about COVID-19 are far-reaching and they cover both health and financial issues. In a study on 18 countries, it was shown that food buying behaviour of the consumers has changed because of their will to consume healthy foods, but at the same time to achieve this without exceeding normal budget. Consumers adopted a basic approach of returning to natural food and beverage products which contain ingredients that provide nutritional supplements such as fruits and vegetables, legumes, whole grains, or olive oil. At the same time, most consumers are
concerned about the effect of COVID-19 on their mental effects; therefore, many consumers are looking for food products to improve this mood (Hughes, 2020; Muscogiuri et al., 2020).

In a recent poll by Italy’s Agricultural Research and Economic Council (CREA), the behaviour of the Italian population on food choices and behaviour was monitored under COVID-19 quarantine. Approximately 2,900 people from all regions of Italy responded. According to the results, healthy food and beverage consumption increased for vegetables (33%), fruit (29%), legumes (26.5%), and extra virgin olive oil (21.5%). However, it was determined that 44.5% of them had more sweet consumption and 16% of them drank more wine. Forty-four percent of respondents reported
weight gain due to intake of higher calories and low levels of physical activity. Thirty-seven percent of respondents expressed that they need to lose weight by adjusting their diet ( CREA, 2020).

According to the survey of 630 consumers in May, 70% of consumers reduced the frequency of food shopping and preferred online shopping during COVID-19 outbreak in the USA. Fifty-six percent of consumers are worried about not finding particular foods they want to buy in the store or forgetting to buy something. Seventy percent of consumers said that they consumed more food while at home. When examined in terms of healthy consumption, 43% of consumers emphasized that they consume more fruits, 42% more vegetables, and 30% more protein-containing
foods (meat, chicken, or fish). In addition, 39% of consumers stated that they made their breakfast more balanced. When examined in terms of unhealthy consumption, 47% of consumers said that they consumed more sweets, 24% consumed less vegetables, 21% consumed less fruit, and 19% consumed less protein ( DeBroff, 2020).

In another study, a survey on 1,005 men and women who are over 18 years old showed that more than half of the French people changed their views on the social, economic, and ecological value of food production, during the 8-week quarantine. The results showed that French consumers would only buy ‘necessary’ foods, spend more time cooking, and pay more attention to food spending when they return to ‘normal’ after COVID-19 pandemic measures have been relieved. Changing attitudes also seem to have had an impact on food waste, and one in three respondents
stated that they now waste less food. This includes 29% of those who reported buying more local food and 20% went online shopping ( Askew, 2020).

Another study conducted on the 6th and 7th of April, among 1,000 adults who are above 18, showed that 42% of consumers preferred the packaged foods more than normal, whereas another portion of the same ratio said that the pandemic did not change their attitudes towards packaged food. Eighty-two percent of consumers think that the food they buy during the pandemic is safe to consume. However, a portion of 7% thinks that the food that they buy is not safe. A total of 77% think that food producers can provide enough food to meet consumer needs, whereas
16% think that it cannot be provided (IFIC, 2020).

As consumers play a key role in food supply chain, changes in consumer behaviour strongly affected the food supply chain. COVID-19 outbreak caused a significant rise in food price related to lockdown restrictions accompanied by panic buying, as well as supply chain disruptions ( EDP, 2020). Some of the consumers will pay more attention to reduce food waste for improving food security (Shafiee-Jood and Cai, 2016). However, the opposite is also possible since lots of the perishable foods were discarded or dumped due to the closure of schools, restaurants, or processing
plants. In addition, transportation problems during lockdown or overbuying of perishable items because of panic buying resulted in higher food waste levels (Fleetwood, 2020; Sharma et al., 2020). Changing demands also will bring changes to packaging materials/design, delivery options, and storage conditions (Reynold, 2020).
Effects of pandemic on global food trade

the vulnerability of food systems to problems related to climate and diseases has
Although the current conditions seem exceptional,

been experienced long before COVID Food systems have been unstable from various events and
the -19 crisis.

shocks previously such as the oil crisis SARS and Ebola and the 2006–2008 food crisis Africa in the 1970s, the outbreaks, .

Swine Fever disease made the global commodity markets upset just a year ago and became a progressive epidemic in Eastern Europe and Asia. The world’s largest swine

Ebola had a great negative impact on agricultural

producer (has 1/3 of the global market) and biggest exporter, China, lost 37% of its pigs by the end of 2019 (IPES, 2020).

production, marketing, and trade economies of some African countries. On the production side, due to road constraints, farmers had limited access to inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, and most

more than 40% of agricultural land has not been cultivated

regions faced labour shortages. For this reason, . However, pandemic did not severely affect the production because
agricultural areas were often in the geographic areas which are far away from urban densities (Agrilinks, 2020; Shahidi, 2020).

The current COVID -19 crisis has changed the food trade policies of
governments moving towards restricting some , exports and facilitating

export restriction has

imports. The main reason that countries impose export restrictions is to ensure the maintenance of the number of products in the domestic market. Although the typically produces this result in the short term, it also

some negative effects which will hurt farmers financially and

. First, export restrictions cause domestic prices to drop, resulting in the decrease in crop production

reduced incentives export restrictions undermine

in the industry. Second, countries will lose their competitive advantage by losing their place in international markets. Third,

exporter’s reputation and encourage importers to reduce confidence thereby reducing trust in in the world market,

international trade and destroying future opportunities business for exporters (Espitia et al., 2020; FAO, 2020l).

In 2008 food crisis, although domestic food prices increased greatly, some big countries that could isolate themselves from world markets were not affected. Compared with 2004, rice prices increased by 224%, wheat prices by
108%, and corn prices by 89% (FAO, 2011). In general, prices increased due to trade constraints, risks, and uncertainties in international markets leading to an increase in prices in the import-dependent countries higher than they
should be. Because of the export restrictions enforced by major exporting countries, panic-buying behaviour has been observed in importing countries and prices have been elevated due to more demand for products (DOS, 2011).

a prolonged pandemic crisis cause problems in the food supply chain

Although world food stocks are currently high, can , as well as export-restricted policies,

which can trigger the domino effect . According to the FAO 2019 grain production estimates, it was reported that there had been around 2.721 billion tonnes of production consisting of 1.44 billion tonnes for coarse grains,
763 million tonnes for wheat, and 512 million tonnes for rice. According to FAO’s 2020 estimates, wheat and coarse grain production is expected to be similar to 2019. For this reason, global grain markets are expected to follow a balanced situation despite the concern of COVID-19 ( FAO,
2020b).

A total of 19 countries have taken measures to restrict exports , which are related to 27 food products due to COVID-19 outbreak. Some of these restrictions are inactive and currently a total of 8

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and

countries are continuing their measures on 11 food. When the effects of restrictions on importing countries are evaluated (expressed as Kcal unit), it is seen that

Azerbaijan were negatively affected by 79%, 70%, 61%, and 54% , respectively (IFPRI, 2020).

COVID caused
To summarize, trading provides to move the products from surplus to deficit areas, preventing the shortages and food insecurity related to reliance only on domestic production (Baldos and Hertel, 2015; Fitton et al., 2019). However, -19 pandemic

a significant impact on food trade and led to disruption in food supply chain due to the export
restrictions Export-restricted policies pushed up world prices of stable food
. commodities such as wheat, maize, and rice and resulted in reduction of the

Producers were also weakened

quantity and quality of food eaten (Fyles and Madramootoo, 2016). Customers also could not find the product which is not grown or produced nationally. by the restrictions because international
market contains endless number of buyers and helps the producers to select the best one. When the export restrictive policies were applied, local sellers could not find buyers and resulted in excess supply and waste along with economic losses. Foods that are not grown locally but

needed for processing were not available due to the restrictions and capacity utilization of food-manufacturing plants to respond demand was also negatively
affected (Arianina and Morris, 2020; Ndemezo et al., 2018; Reddy et al., 2016). Transportation challenges for air and sea cargo were also further issues in association with food loss and waste (OECD, 2020a).

No alliances impact.
Benjamin H. Friedman 18, Adjunct Lecturer at George Washington University's Elliott School of
International Affairs, “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances”, Defense 360, 12/13/2018,
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

With repetition over decades, cynical

exaggerations become like strategic sacraments, part of policymakers’ operational
code. History is adjusted to accommodate supporting myths. For example, we are told that the United
States always meant to stay at the center of the “liberal order,” it created in the early Cold War. Never mind that U.S.
strategy was expressly designed to allow U.S. forces to come home from Europe once Germany was rebuilt and its military integrated into
Europe’s or that the Eisenhower administration supported the development of a European Army outside NATO to that end. Likewise,
policymakers often assume that stable military balances demand a hegemon backing one party, even though
history suggests otherwise, especially where geographic barriers dampen security competition, as in Asia.
Early in the Cold War, the extension of U.S. military commitments mostly made sense. But today no
power—China notwithstanding—threatens to dominate Eurasia. Germany and Japan’s expansionism is
gone. Most U.S. allies are rich. Trade, diplomacy, and goodwill do not depend on endlessly protecting
them.

Permanent defense guarantees inflate U.S. military costs, makes rich states into enfeebled dependents,
and heighten the danger of getting pulled into needless wars. Over time, U.S. entanglements caused
Washington to exaggerate its insecurity, conflate U.S. interests with other states,’ and dismiss their
ability to secure themselves without our help. It should be obvious that U.S. alliances should serve U.S. security interests. But
if alliances are permanent, U.S. security interests serve them.

Security issues outweigh.

Paul van Hooft 21, Ph.D., Senior Strategic Analyst at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the
Co-Chair of The Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, “The US and Extended Deterrence,” in
NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, Chapter 6, 2021, pg. 102-103.

The chapter has argued that the

future of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee is precarious. It is increasingly
unclear whether the U.S. can be credible without being escalatory, and vice versa. From its inception the problem of
extended nuclear deterrence is that it is inherently dubious. However, as the U.S. is less and less sure whether it can fight and win conventional
conflicts at low costs, the asymmetry of interests between the U.S. on the one hand, and its allies and adversaries on the
other, is likely to play a greater role. At its core, as long as the U.S. maintains its alliance commitments , this
will continue to generate uncertainty that this and future U.S. nuclear posture must address. Four additional
points will serve to conclude the chapters.

First, the NPR

emphasizes the possibility of U.S. deterrence failure due to changing Russian and Chinese nuclear
capabilities. Yet, arguably the political signalling from the Trump administration has contributed to undermining the
credibility of U.S. commitments to its allies.83 The Trump administration’s policies have been rife with
ambiguity. The commitment of resources to the European Reassurance Initiative has taken place at the same time as the President’s
rhetorical dismissal of the value of alliances,84 and obvious preference for a more transactional approach to alliances.85 President Trump has
also unsubtly poked his finger at the sore spot of the inherently dubious nature of the U.S. guarantees; the U.S.
takes on real risks on
behalf of states that present at best peripheral interests to the U.S.86 There is thus a clear tension between the
current U.S. administration’s sceptical outlook towards alliances and its focus on greater renewed nuclear
superiority and flexibility. U.S. allies must decide what they will make of this discrepancy, and how it compares to previous fractures in the
alliance. In doing so, they should keep in mind that Trump’s style of politics is unusual, but that calls for retrenchment
were growing before he came to office.87

The threat of biodiversity loss is overhyped

G. Bailey 19. “Letters | ‘Mass species extinction’ headlines are overblown and ignore success in
conservation efforts” South China Morning Post. 05-14-2019.
https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3010008/mass-species-extinction-headlines-are-
overblown-and-ignore-success

David Dodwell admits he may have exaggerated just a bit when lamenting the loss of life in the seas
around his idyllic home, and is amazed at the wonderful diversity of natural life in Hong Kong (“Loud and clear alarm bell sounded on
species extinction. What now?”, May 11). I share his amazement and wonder, but it’s a shame he wasn’t able to see that the
United Nations IPBES’ (Intergovernmental Science Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services) claim, that one
million species are heading for extinction due to human activities, may have also been a bit of an
exaggeration – just a bit. How exactly did this UN body arrive at such a huge and frightening figure?
Apparently it was referring to one million species out of eight million, but all you see in yet more
doomsday headlines is “one million species under threat”. In fact, less than 2 per cent of bird and
mammal species have gone extinct over the last few centuries. The success stories about the
revitalisation of nature and species is completely ignored. Humpback whales, for example, are
flourishing after being under threat. Others do remain under threat, and many, like the orangutan, are under threat due to the
demand for biofuels to replace fossil fuels to combat climate change. Sad, but true.

No environmental collapse or extinction.

Peter Kareiva 18 and Valerie Carranza, Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of
California, Los Angeles, “Existential Risk Due To Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back,” Futures,
1/5/2018, ScienceDirect
The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not
clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich &
Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than 0.001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There
is little
evidence that this particular 0.001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would
allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook, Ellis, Perring, Mackay, & Blomqvist, 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A
better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to
the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute
number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia. While there are data that relate local
reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial
existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention
is reduced as species numbers decline locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield
when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more
tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al., 2013, 2017).
Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the
same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the
majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength
of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014).
Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all
species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not
one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either . Tragic, but plausible is the possibility of our planet suffering a loss
of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed
relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity
scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential
risk.