ACADEMIA Letters

Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China

Justin Gibbins, Zayed University

Introduction
The rise of China is real. Academic and policy-based disagreements on its origins, nature
and impacts certainly exist but there is little to contradict the ‘rising power’ thesis that frames
contemporary considerations of the state. A cursory search for ‘China rise’ reveals a host of
books, research articles and theses which lodge China within an undisputable contemporary
paradigm: that its economic, political, cultural and diplomatic weight is altering the interna-
tional system. Khong (2013/14, p. 153) gives an apt metaphor with one of the exhibits of
the 2010 Shanghai Expo showing the evolution of the Chinese living room. The 1978 living
room was dull and dated with sparse furniture; the 1988 one was noticeably better quality; the
1998 room having several but not all of the accessories of a middle-class lounge; and the 2008
one dazzling with ambient lighting, a leather settee and plasma television. The message of
China’s economic ascent – which galvanizes and drives other areas of influence and authority
– is clear.
The impact of China’s growth is, of course, perhaps the most speculative area. Very
broadly speaking, one might locate three dominant strands. First, regionalists plant Chinese
hegemony firmly in its own backyard, and despite military and economic competition stem-
ming from states such as Japan, the Philippines and India, configures the US as its greatest
offshore balancer (see, for example, Godwin, 2004). US counterstrategy, and not just China’s
ambitions, shape its regional hegemonic future. Second, bipolarists argue that despite cur-
rent major differences with the Cold War, such as geography which limits the possibility of
direct land-based conflict and instead increases the likelihood of maritime clashes, China is
strong enough to operate as a ‘pole’ within the international system (Tunsjø, 2018). As one

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.

1
economist stated very recently, “[c]ountries will have to deal with a bipolar world rather than a
unipolar world” (cited in Hancock and Curran, 2021). Third, hegemonists contend that China
will, at some point, overtake the US with what one figure has called the “merciless measure”
(Jacques, 2009, p. 6) of gross domestic product and such economic clout functions as the nec-
essary springboard for political and cultural expansionism. As such, “Western norms, values
and institutions will find themselves contending more and more with those of China” (Rat-
tanasevee, 2018). Despite being obvious ideal types, these three categories all position China,
in varying shades, as functioning under some form of hegemonic status. One way of framing
this discussion is to examine the non-static nature of hegemony. How can it be classified?
And what might that mean in the attempts to label China as a hegemony in the making, be it
regionally or globally?

Paleo- and Neo-Hegemony

Hegemony, of course, is a much-disputed concept. Derived from the Greek hēgemonia mean-
ing ‘dominance over’, it can be defined most basically as “the dominance of one group over
another, often supported by legitimating norms and ideas.” (Rosamond, 2020) Due to realism
operating as the major tradition within international relations theory, an essential condition
for a hegemon has been military capabilities. Hegemony therefore stems from the material
assets of a state. However, economic power (Keohane, 1984) as well as ideational power
(Cox, 1983) also impact on a state’s ability to apply influence. There is also the willingness of
the hegemony to play out the role expected of it as well as the need to produce the outcomes
associated with its predominance. As such, the existence of a hegemon means that:

… the dominant state has specific material means to provide certain goods and
back up threats (hegemonic capability), that it effectively seeks to be recog-
nized as responsible for certain functions (hegemonic performance), and that
it effectively gains obedience from subordinate states (hegemonic compliance).
(Schenoni, 2019, p. 5)

An important aspect in China’s rise may well be the distinction between what can be called
paleo-hegemony and neo-hegemony. Paleo-hegemony can be considered as a classical for-
mulation of domination. It relies heavily on the threat and use of military force to produce
the desired subservience from other states within the international system. As its capability
and performance are material in nature, the hegemon also has access to the resources required
not only to fuel an expansive military but also other resources, capital and markets in which
to economically flourish. In a neo-mercantilist way, economics is subservient to politics but

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.

2
is also essential for providing the military assets concomitant with a paleo-hegemon. Com-
pliance is produced effectively through the fear of the repercussions of non-compliance. As
a prominent realist scholar argued nearly 20 years ago:

Neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the
Soviet Union had nearly as much latent power as the United States had during
their confrontations…But if China were to become a giant Hong Kong, it would
probably have somewhere on the order of four times as much latent power as the
United States does, allowing China to gain a decisive military advantage over the
United States. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 57)

Some scholars have countered that economic might does not fungibly translate into military
muscle. For example, Monteiro (2014) has argued that China’s rising power eminence is con-
tingent on whether the unipole, the US, is willing to accommodate economic development.
There is no need for a militarized Chinese presence if its economic ambitions are allowed and
subsequently realized. Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) analyze international relations theories
in relation to American supremacy and argue that apart from the systemic constraints asso-
ciated with balancing, non-systemic constraints exist due to other states furthering their own
interests and, as such, “nuclear proliferation, insurgency, imperial overstretch or oil depen-
dency.” (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 182) However, two points are worth iterating. The first is that
material sources of power are the dominant resources to foster paleo-hegemonic projections.
Non-systemic constraints are still met through the material rather than ideational. The second
is that economic power, because it is inextricably wedded to armed strength, is logically ex-
ercised as a ‘military light’ option. Paleo-hegemony is seldom a ‘war against all’ and instead
trade wars, economic exploitation, asymmetrical trade arrangements and neocolonialism are
the customary.
Global norms have evolved to the point at which military threats cannot be sufficiently
or, at least, solely utilized as a means to achieve regional or global pretensions. That is, of
course, not to say that interstate violence does not occur. However, the ability of a power-
ful state to consolidate its hegemonic status through force alone jars with international law,
norms and rules, and, of course, the self-image a hegemon seeks to propagate internation-
ally. As such, a neo-hegemony employs non-material structures of influence. Diplomacy is
of paramount importance in negotiating influence and solidifying a state’s regional or global
presence and reputation. Contributing to and shaping international organizations in a pos-
itive manner also consolidates a nascent hegemon’s impact. The appeals to a pan-regional
identity may additionally wed subordinate states to a global cultural vision that enables the
hegemon to consolidate its rank. Moreover, a neo-hegemon must employ at least some other

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.

3
soft power attributes. Examples include a universalistic culture, a government’s political goals
and values, positive foreign policy engagement and the attractiveness of a country’s economic
model (The Soft Power 30, 2019, pp. 27–28). Of course, it is not merely by attraction that a
neo-hegemony can be maintained. Many of these neo-hegemonic practices still have material
bases. Nonetheless, neo-hegemony helps foster accommodation and collaboration from other
states by wedding their own national interests to those of the hegemon. Mutuality, the pur-
suit of common interests and simple trust frame the relationship between the dominant and
subdominant actors in the international sphere.

China and Hegemony

The literature on hegemony naturally takes into account the fact that hegemonic control within
recent years is no longer predicated on military threats or conquest alone. So, why are these
two formulations important for the study of China? Principally for two reasons. The first is a
disconnect between what has been perceived as the rhetoric of neo-hegemony being cloaked by
the practices of paleo-hegemony. Elites representing the Chinese state have been increasingly
adamant at mollifying the argument that its rising power is a threat to others and is a precursor
to a regional or global power grab. For example, in an interview with BBC Newsnight in
2015, when questioned over a military display that the interviewer suggested was reminiscent
of the era of Chairman Mao and was designed to send a message to the world that China was
“fearsome and dangerous”, China’s Ambassador to the UK responded: “The message is loud
and clear. That is, peace. Peace was hard won and peace should be cherished and maintained.
And China will make its due contributions to maintaining world peace and regional stability.”
(BBC Newsnight, 2015) More recently, with regard to the Covid-19 global pandemic, the
Chinese foreign minister, in a press conference, stated that:

There is nothing to support the claim that China is using COVID-19 to expand
its presence in the South China Sea. On the contrary, China has worked with
ASEAN countries in recent months to beat the virus. We have assisted and sup-
ported each other, which has helped to strengthen mutual trust. (Embassy of the
People’s Republic of China in Slovenia, 2020).

Similarly, the President of the People’s Republic of China in a speech marking the Interna-
tional Day of Peace held in Nanjing, claimed that China would “unswervingly take the road of
peaceful development and remain a builder of world peace, a contributor to global develop-
ment and a defender of the international order.” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in
the UK, 2018). Some recent international flashpoints involving China include the Hong Kong

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.

4
security law with the seeming end of the “one country, two systems” approach, the military
buildup in the South China Sea, the US-China trade war, accusations of economic espionage,
undermining international institutions and the like. Such examples are more reflective of a
paleo-hegemonic friction.
Secondly, there are the dual issues of identity and ideology. As neo-hegemony relies on
ideational attributes, the hegemonizing identity needs to concord with pre-existing identities
it seeks to influence or control. Similarly, the ideology attributed to the hegemon, in order to
cooperatively influence rather than bluntly dominate, must tap into a pre-existing ideological
framework that subordinate states, elites, citizens and civil society connect with. In their study
of China’s hegemonic prospects, Allan et. al (2018) utilize Gramsci to argue that ideological
hegemony must take into account senso comune because it is national identity – the sense of
who and what a nation is – that is embedded in these every day, taken-for-granted elite and
mass understandings of common sense. (pp. 846 & 8). By mapping nine great powers, includ-
ing China, and by examining how mass and elite national identity discourses, they conclude
that the prevalence of the support for democracy and liberal policies amongst the overwhelm-
ing majority of the states studied places China as an unlikely contender for future hegemonic
claims. China’s identity is replete with Communist Party phrases such as “socialism with
Chinese characteristics,” “bureaucracy-oriented consciousness,” “the Chinese dream,” and
“reciprocal courtesy” which are seen as “insular, nationalist, and propagandistic” (Allen et.
al., 2018, p. 861) and are neither attractive nor universalizing.

Conclusion
It is worth iterating that paleo-hegemony is attached more to the ‘China as threat’ discourse
than neo-hegemony. Suffice to say, this is only one way in which China’s rise is being config-
ured. Nonetheless, current research is focused on a number of important elements linked to
the arguments within this paper. Firstly, hegemonic transition theory can be further enriched
by a focus on the current changes happening with China bearing in mind historical regional
hegemons have been numerous but global ones exceedingly rare. Secondly, China’s national
identities – as all countries have several national narratives – are well worth examining to see
if there are shifts in trying to yoke the national to the regional to the global. Thirdly, existing
frameworks, such as hard/soft and smart power as well as normative/civilizing and military
power, fit well with both paleo- and neo-hegemony (and even the potentially transitioning
category of meso-hegemony). Fourthly, if neo-hegemony is a sign of the current times, the
logical competitors or balancers of China’s rise which, of course, depends very much on US
foreign policy strategy, particularly in light of the new Biden administration, are well worth

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.

5
scrutinizing. Finally, perhaps one of the most fruitful aspects of future research might focus
on whether the paleo practices and neo language continue to play out in a bifurcated manner.
An examination of reality and rhetoric – of actual outcomes and expressed intentions – would
certainly be instrumental.

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Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.

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Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: Justin Gibbins, justinedwardgibbins@gmail.com

Citation: Gibbins, J. (2021). Paleo-hegemony vs. Neo-hegemony : the Issue of China. Academia Letters,
Article 274. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL274.