Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska - The - Image - of - A - Western - Politician - in - The

ACADEMIA Letters
The Image of a Western Politician in the Polish Post-War

Public Discourse: The Bruno Kreisky Case
Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska
Abstract
The analysis in this paper shows the mechanisms of creating images of Western politicians
in the Polish post-war public sphere. The figure of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky was
chosen as an example. The paper adopts the qualitative method and uses critical discourse
analysis (CDA). Through historical research on the Polish−Austrian relations and the use of
press publications that are part of the Polish public discourse, the images of Western politi-
cians and the changes they have undergone over several decades are presented. The main
intention for this is to capture the common points of the interpenetrating images and highlight
repeated arguments. The messages constituting the bases for the analyses were taken from
press texts, journalistic reports, economic analyses, witness accounts, correspondence from
the Polish embassy in Vienna and selected foreign articles cited in the Polish press. It can
be assumed that when the authors prepared certain publications on topics related to Kreisky
with the intention of making them part of the public discourse, they did so for a specific pur-
pose. For this study, the intention of disseminating knowledge about Austria was of utmost
importance. It can also be assumed that the authors’ intentions focused on several thematic
groups: presenting the realities of life in a neutral country; promoting the ideals of the strug-
gle for international security, which was favoured by the implemented principle of neutrality;
depicting a prosperous, democratic Western state seeking trade contacts in the East; defining
the principles of political cooperation; describing the economic conditions of countries with
different systems and designating and consolidating the elements that positively characterise
Academia Letters, April 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0
Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Citation: Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, A. (2021). The Image of a Western Politician in the Polish Post-War Public
Discourse: The Bruno Kreisky Case. Academia Letters, Article 713. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL713.
1
bilateral relations, especially those related to a common tradition and culture dating back to
the beginnings of modern history. The adopted study hypothesis concerns the relationship
between the propagated images of a Western politician and the legitimacy of the communist
authority. Between the two images of Kreisky most often depicted over several decades and
relating to his biographical threads, what is dominant in the Polish media coverage is that of
a politician with socialist and anti-communist views.
Introduction
Bruno Kreisky is a social democratic politician, an important figure in the history of Austria
and Polish−Austrian relations. For several decades, he maintained intensive relations with
the Polish authorities, implementing a policy of good neighbourhood in the Eastern European
region (Nachbarschaftspolitik). In the Polish public sphere, he was mentioned as often as
German Chancellor Willy Brandt was. As he remained in power for 24 years, from 1959 to
1983, we can trace a specific evolution of views on his activities in Poland.
This paper adopts the qualitative method, particularly critical discourse analysis (CDA).
Among the many elaborate definitions of discourse analysis, the classifications presented by
Ruth Wodak were adopted. Discourse analysis provides a general conceptual framework for
problem-oriented social research. It allows for the combination of various dimensions of inter-
disciplinarity and many viewpoints on the research subject. Discourse analysis is considered
‘a social activity where specific patterns, common features, relations concerning various texts
and the conditions in which they arise [are] looked at’.1 The relationships between historical
research and discourse analysis are presented in the introduction to a collection of works edited
by Ruth Wodak, The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis.2
History can intervene in the field of discourse analysis in various ways. The analysis of
historical sources as a discourse can compare discourses from a historical perspective. It is
assumed that by using teleological explanation, historical changes in discourse or discursive
practices in their historical sociocultural contexts can be traced. Thus, it is possible to trace the
changes in a politician’s relationship with one of his political partners assuming that he was an
important figure in the Polish political life and is representative of the milieu from which he
came. The main intention herein is to capture common points in the interpenetrating images
and common arguments. These arguments are often transferred to new political and social
1
Jakościowa analiza dyskursu w naukach społecznych, ed. R. Wodak, M. Krzyżanowski, Warszawa 2011, p.
12.
2
Introduction. Section VI. Historical Knowledge, [w:] The Discourse Studies Reader. Main currents in theory
and analysis, ed. J. Angermuller, D. Maingueneau, R. Wodak, Amsterdam 2014, p. 319.

2
contexts. At the same time, a new approach to the discourse developed in post-war Poland
emerges, combining elements of aesthetic narrative and synthesis characterised by patterns
created for political activities. The subject of this analysis is not the procedures regulating the
formation of Polish discourse but the images of the Austrian statesman Kreisky in the context
of post-war bilateral relations. In the case of the post-war conditions in Poland in which the
discourse concerning the West developed, the norms imposed by Moscow were important.3
Not without significance was the fact that after 1956 the USSR leadership sought new ways of
cooperating with the Western countries and came to perceive neutral countries as those with
which wider cooperation could and should be established. In Poland, a number of studies have
been undertaken in recent years to characterise the mechanisms of creating and consolidating
discourse during the communist period.
Like Ruth Wodak, this work adopts the definition of discourse analysis formulated by
Jay Lemke in 1995.4 According to this definition, discourse analysis assumes the existence
of certain patterns and common features within knowledge and structures while the text is a
concrete and unique discourse is realised. The analysis of the printed texts present in the Polish
discourse in the post-war period began with determining the pool of source materials that was
available during such period. The method of building the research corps was adopted from
Gerlinde Mautner.5 The method of building a corpus depends to a large extent on the examined
problem and the adopted hypotheses. It was hypothesised that the Western politician Bruno
Kreisky’s primary goal for creating and consolidating positive relations with other countries,
chiefly Poland, was to emphasise his own political successes in the international space.
The messages constituting the bases for the analysis of the selected publications were
press texts, journalistic reports, economic analyses, witness accounts, correspondence from
the Polish embassy in Vienna and selected foreign articles cited in the Polish press. All the
selected materials were published and disseminated in the Polish public sphere after 1945.6
Their forms and aesthetics were similar and were not very important for the characterised
discourse. For decades, the analysed materials shaped Poland’s perceptions of Austria as a
country with which the former maintained proper bilateral relations, and Bruno Kreisky was
characterised for many years as the main architect of the republic’s political successes.
The linguistic resources referred to in the analysis included lexis, transitivity, modality,
indication of the source, presence of different ‘voices’ in the text, coherence and cohesion of
3
A. Skrzypek, Mechanizmy klientelizmu. Stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1965−1989, Warszawa 2008, p. 15−61.
4
J. Lemke, Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics, London 1995, p. 7.
5
G. Mautner, Analiza gazet, czasopism i innych mediów drukowanych, [w:] Jakościowa analiza dyskursu w
naukach społecznych, ed. M. Krzyżanowski, R. Wodak, Warszawa 2011, p. 56−61.
6
U. Eco, Nadinterpretowanie tekstów, [w:] Interpretacja i nadinterpretacja, ed. U. Eco, R. Rorty, J. Culler,
Ch. Brooke-Rose, Kraków 1996, p. 65.

3
the text and argumentative tools for establishing the relationship between the author and the
reader. Attention was also paid to the marking of words and the context in which the flag words
‘banner keyword’ or the stigmatising ‘stigma keyword’ was used. According to O’Halloran
and Coffin, this ‘[positions] the reader to adopt a specific point of view’.7 Additionally, Rein-
hart Koselleck believes that most assessments are related to personal preferences rather than
to the knowledge of the context in which the texts are created.8 The German researcher proved
that comparative studies of key concepts developed in different communities and languages
are and will be attractive to modern researchers. While researching on the history of concepts,
German scholars have shown constant changes in the concepts’ meanings resulting from the
changes in the environment in which such concepts were shaped. They proved that it is ex-
tremely rare for the meanings of words and the states corresponding to them to refer to each
other over a long period of time, or to change in parallel. One should also bear in mind the
variety of languages used by different layers, groups, parties and even classes. The Austrian
neutrality shown in the comments of the employees of the embassy in Vienna was quite dif-
ferent, and its additional or simplified connotations are contained in materials prepared by
Polish journalists. In the course of the research on the history of the post-war Polish−Austrian
relations, questions about the leading concepts constituting the narrative are asked again and
again and receive new answers.9
When preparing specific publications on topics related to Bruno Kreisky with the intention
of making them part of the public discourse, the authors (e.g. diplomats, politicians, military
officials, journalists, writers, artists) did so for a specific purpose. For this study, the intention
of disseminating knowledge about Austria was of utmost importance. It can be assumed that
the authors’ intentions focused on several thematic groups: presenting the realities of life
in a neutral country; promoting the ideals of the fight for international security, which was
favoured by the implemented principle of neutrality; depicting a strong, democratic Western
state looking for trade contacts in the East; defining the principles of political cooperation;
describing the economic conditions of countries with different systems and designating and
consolidating elements that positively characterise bilateral relations, especially the threads
related to a common tradition and culture dating back to the beginnings of modern history.
The strategies that were used to implement the adopted intentions or to transfer them to text
can be divided into two groups: temporal and resultant. The first assumed actions determined
7
K. O’Halloran, C. Coffin, Checking Overinterpretation and Underinterpretation. Help from Corpora in Crit-
ical Linguistics, [w:] Applaying English Grammar, ed. A. Hewing, C. Coffin, O’Halloran, London 2004, p. 277.
8
R. Koselleck, Conceptual history, [w:] The Discourse Studies Reader. Main currents in theory and analysis,
ed. Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau, Ruth Wodak, Amsterdam 2014, p. 334.
9
A. Duszak, Dyskurs w badaniach kontekstu społecznego [w:] Pragmatyka, retoryka, argumentacja. Obrazy
języka i dyskursu w naukach humanistycznych, Kraków 2014, p. 227.

4
by clear turning points, anniversaries, breakthrough points, doctrines and visits at the highest
level. The second was focused on a clear effect: the results of the activities assumed to have
an element of evaluation and feedback evaluation both in Poland and abroad.
Austria as a topic present in the Polish public discourse has two main themes: the past
and culture. Both the authors of the texts selected in this study and contemporary researchers
on Austria refer to common experiences, relations, myths, achievements and inherited and
ruling economic relations. Culture systematically strengthened by Vienna has found a group
of active recipients in Poland for centuries. Today, culture is supposed to be a brand of a
young, active republic, on the one hand referring to what is important and worth following
in the German-speaking community and on the other hand setting its own paths, values and
goals. For Bruno Kreisky, these two topics were extremely important in his cooperation with
the Central European countries. Austria’s common past with such countries was a basis of
the further development of the cooperation, but it was not the sole basis. The past dictated
the need to shape a new national identity for both Austria and its neighbours. Culture, the
second component of mutual contacts, helped define Austria’s identity vis-à-vis those of the
other countries in the region, and was a visible indicator of the self-awareness of communist
countries. Chancellor Kreisky paid special attention to creating the perfect conditions for
presenting the cultural achievements of the Eastern countries.
Polish images of Bruno Kreisky

The selected publications depicted the turning points in the political activity of Bruno Kreisky,
the main architect of the neighbourhood policy in the years when he was the minister of for-
eign affairs (1959−1966) and the chancellor (1970−1983). Such an approach to the chronol-
ogy and characteristics of Austria’s foreign policy in the Polish discourse under the Polish
People’s Republic allows for the analysis of an important figure created and preserved by cer-
tain procedures, a certain political portrait of a statesman representing a state that was neutral
and that expressed the will to cooperate with communist states. The years of the chancellor’s
activity fell within a period when the mechanisms of including specific contents and texts in
the public discourse were clearly defined, making it easier to focus on the effect of the work
related to its publication. The subject of this analysis is not the procedures for restriction
or censorship but what resulted from them: images of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky against the
backdrop of Austria, a neutral republic, shown in the context of post-war bilateral relations
between Poland and Austria.
Each source on Kreisky presented in this study resulted from a specific social need. Each
message is a response to a specific social problem. Therefore, the prevailing positive image

5
of Austria, which is repeated in these texts, did not result from the desire to strengthen the
message about the Western state but to emphasise the phenomenon in connection with Poland
that supplemented the information conveyed by the authorities to the citizens. The research
questions focus on the issue of Kreisky’s favourable attitude towards Poland. Did it result
from his internal conviction about the need to cooperate with the East, or did it result from the
conditions created by Poland for it to be able to engage in political and commercial cooperation
with democratic countries after the war? This attitude, supplemented by several decades of
relations with Poland, resulted from many elements: the participation of the Austrian elite in
building a new national identity, the efforts to become independent in the country’s relations
with the European Economic Community and the need to seek other areas of cooperation,
the efforts to become independent from Germany, the views of the social democratic party
leaders in Austria, personal experiences and emigration, Poland’s place vis-à-vis other Central
European countries and Poland’s economic and demographic potential.
The assumptions of the rhetorical analysis focus on how a specific topic was presented in the
public sphere; whether different positions were allowed and if they were allowed, to what
extent they were, who represented them and what was their meaning. The last thread of the
rhetorical analysis was the determination of the temporal structure and the argumentation
strategies adopted by the authors. Were the arguments adopted merely a repetition of those
already reflected in the public opinion? Was the conversation interactive, and were metaphors
used? If so, with what social actions towards the interlocutor were particular statements or
their fragments associated, and which statements were met with a retort?10
The population of selected texts consists of several dozen press and journalistic articles
published in Poland after 1956. These materials were subjected to historical research to de-
termine at what stage the schemas concerning the evaluation of individual events and the
comments on them were created, and what was omitted in the public discourse. The rhetori-
cal analysis of Kreisky’s texts on foreign policy led to the identification of a few of the most
important images of the politician shaped in the post-war period. Several key themes have
been identified, thanks to which it is possible to refer in detail to the changes in the evaluation
of the chancellor’s actions. Between the two images of Kreisky most often described over sev-
eral decades (i.e. 1959−1984) and relating to his biographical threads, the dominant theme in
the Polish media coverage is his socialist and anti-communist views. The subsequent images
10
P. Ciołkiewicz, Pamieć zbiorowa w dyskursie publicznym. Analiza polskiej debaty na temat wpędzeń Niemców
po drugiej wojnie światowej, Warszawa 2012, p. 101−121.

6
of Kreisky in relation to the Polish Republic over several years were associated with Austria’s
partnership with Poland, emphasising the latter’s strong position, the Polish−Austrian cultural
ties and Kreisky’s Jewish origin. The publications issued after 1981 provide some summaries
of Kreisky’s political career, highlighting the unique role of the politician in Austrian history.
From the viewpoint of the Polish political interests, the most important and most fre-
quently exposed topic in 1956−1983 was the thread of the country’s cooperation with the East.
The breakthrough points are the events important to the Polish authorities and at the same time
mark new stages in the development of the discourse on selected images of Kreisky. The most
important ones include 1956 (a change in the approach of communist states to neutral states),
1970 (the change of authorities in Warsaw and Vienna, which marked the best period in terms
of Polish−Austrian bilateral relations) and 1981 (the freezing of the Polish−Austrian bilateral
relations). Although the aforementioned turning points were turning points in the history of
the Polish−Austrian bilateral relations and mutual perception, the change in the narrative was
more fluid, in a sense postponed, and was mainly related to the possibility of quoting foreign
texts.
In the analysis of Kreisky’s images in the Polish public sphere, it is worthwhile to pay
attention to both their quality and repeatability. Regine Robin presented an interesting analysis
of the relationship between history and linguistics in the context of CDA. She described the
participation of language research in historiography and drew attention to the repetition of
sentence and verbal structures in describing the past to obtain appropriate effects.11 This
was true in the case of Poland’s relations with Austria. The Polish media, in describing the
activities of the chancellor and the Polish−Austrian relations, pursued specific political and
propaganda goals.
Socialist
In the discussion of how the political profile of Kreisky was shaped, attention was paid to the
specific environment created by Vienna in the interwar period. From an early age, Kreisky
showed an interest in socialism, and along with the development of his political views, he
gained his first experience in relation to it at a time when socialist activities were exposed
to repression. According to Polish journalists, socialism was the word that caused trouble in
post-war Austria. On the one hand, it was associated with the dominant socialist movement
in the Weimar Republic, and on the other, the attitude towards it was determined by Poland’s
border with the East and its Soviet occupation in 1945−1955. Socialism dealt with the burning
11
R. Robin, History and linguistics, [w:] The Discourse Studies Reader. Main currents in theory and analysis,
ed. J. Angermuller, D. Maingueneau, R. Wodak, Amsterdam 2014, p. 329.

7
topic of choosing a political camp in the new republic and the lack of a strong, influential basis
for the workers’ movement on the Danube. The young Kreisky’s embrace of socialism was
associated with his belief that it goes hand in hand with realism.12 Swedish socialism was
to be a model example. Kreisky’s position on the need to co-create power structures with
the participation of all the political and social groups in the country prevailed. The political
program pushed by the young politician assumed the need for constant reforms to guarantee
the favour of the voters and to testify to the constant political development of the party in
power. It was noted, however, that the revolutionary measures that were used in the past or by
other contemporary socialist parties were out of the question.13
Austria’s foreign policy, which strengthened the society and the country’s independence,
was supposed to facilitate the introduction of reforms. Kreisky, as chancellor, emphasised
four elements that accounted for the success of the Austrian socialist program: (i) the na-
tionalisation of heavy industry, which did not cause unemployment but threatened companies
competing on the world market; (ii) the fight against social inequalities at the family level,
which means provision of support for the education and self-development of the citizens;14
(iii) the modernisation of the penal code and (iv) the establishment of the ombudsman office
to protect the citizens from abuse by the public administration.15
During his law studies at the University of Vienna, Kreisky established valuable polit-
ical contacts. It was written that he opposed communism with bourgeois courage and was
not afraid of ideological programs. While he was working on his doctoral dissertation, Adolf
Hitler staged the Anschluss. Socialists were imprisoned and tried for activities against the
state. Kreisky managed to escape from prison in August 1938 and make his way to Sweden.
This was a very important period in the shaping of the political views of the future leader. In
the years 1938−1945, Kreisky published texts for Scandinavian and British socialist maga-
zines, met and made friends with German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Swedish Prime Min-
ister Olof Palme, learned about the principles of neutral states and planned the development
of post-war Austria. The energy, creativity and ambition of the young politician were already
visible during his self-exile.16 Kreisky became the chairman of the Club of Austrian Socialists
in Sweden. He was involved in the organisation of humanitarian aid for the Austrian citizens,
mainly for the children, which received a very positive response in the country. The period of
his self-exile was treated as crucial by Polish sources because it was then that he formulated
12
Z. Ramotowski, Mat kanclerski. Austria po wyborach, „Życie Warszawy” 1975, no. 233, p. 5.
13
M. Podkowiński, Kreisky – fenomen czy symbol ? „Miesięcznik Literacki” 1981, no. 4, p. 121−124.
14
Kanclerz Austrii Bruno Kreisky przybędzie do Polski, „Głos Robotniczy” 22 VI 1973, no. 147, p. 1.
15
M. Condito, Socjalizm według formuły Kreisky’ego, “La Stampa”, 23 III 1975, Rudolf Kirchschläger, Bruno
Kreisky, „Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne. Seria Biograficzna”, no 2(35) PAP, Warszawa 1976, p. 35−39.
16
Kanclerz Austrii Bruno Kreisky przybędzie do Polski, „Głos Robotniczy” 22 VI 1973, no. 147, p. 1.

8
important political assumptions and plans that he later adopted as chancellor. It was often
referred to as the genesis of the actions of a later statesman.
After returning home in 1945, Kreisky, like the other re-emigrants, was not welcome. It
was mentioned that this could be on account of the unfavourable conditions for Kreisky’s re-
turn to Austria that had been created by the Western occupation forces in the country. He tried
to cooperate with influential politicians in the SPÖ but finally decided that a better solution
would be to return to Sweden, where he was responsible for establishing political and eco-
nomic relations with the then-occupied Austria. Kreisky can be counted among the fathers of
the new Austrian reality. ‘For the Austrians who are aware of his history, the role he played
at that time predestines him to the rank of father of the motherland’.17
Kreisky the socialist managed to establish independence from the other social democratic
groups in Western Europe. Although he dreamed of a united movement and was often seen as
its leader in the 1970s, he also cared for the independence of the Austrian position and rejected
interference in his party’s affairs by other political forces.18 The Polish commentators liked
the fact that he maintained independence from the German social democracy. Although such
commentators paid attention to Kreisky’s friendship with German Chancellor Willy Brandt,
they attempted to present Kreisky as the strongest politician active in the European social
democratic movement.
When Kreisky took over the leadership of the SPÖ, the party was in a state of deep crisis.
Still faithful to the principles of Austro−Marxism, it had vegetated in isolation. The new
leader transformed it from a class struggle party into a liberal political party appealing to the
needs of the workers representing the bourgeois electorate of the big cities. The group ‘had
cars, single-family houses and holidays in Majorca to lose instead of handcuffs.’19 Quotations
from Marx, Engels and Otto Bauer have been replaced by the ideas of John Knneth Galbraith.
The vision of a modern Austria turned out to be attractive to the workers, youths and sections
of the intelligentsia, giving the socialist party a simple majority in the 1970 elections and an
absolute majority in parliament in 1971.
Kreisky’s socialist government, the first majority government that this party created in the
history of Austria, introduced a new criminal law, a new tax law, a new value added tax and
parity in the supervisory boards of enterprises; fostered the development of EFTA; reformed
the law on television and radio and the army and put in place an anti-abortion law. Accord-
ing to Polish messages, he was progressive and competitive in relation to the other Austrian
17
M. Podkowiński, Kreisky – fenomen czy symbol, p. 125.
18
J. Eidlitz, Król słońca i socjalista, „Deutsche Zeitung/Christ und Welt”, 27 VI 1975, PAP Zeszyty Dokumen-
tacyjne. Seria Biograficzna”, no 2(35) PAP, Warszawa 1976, p. 42−47.
19
J. Tycner, Papa Austriae, „Prawo i Życie” 1990, no. 32, p. 13.

9
political forces. It was appreciated that the support for Kreisky grew steadily in the 1970s.20
This allowed him as chairman of the ruling party and chancellor of the Republic of Austria
to pursue a policy that the Austrian society embraced, believing that it was the most optimal
considering the prevailing conditions then. ‘The realist trend also flow[ed] from Kreisky’s un-
equivocal commitment to the development of Austria’s relations with the socialist states’.21
In the successive elections, the achievements of the socialist chancellor were exposed in the
Polish public sphere, and the reforms that he had instituted were praised. ‘A young activist
with whom I spoke at the Viennese SPÖ headquarters on Leowel Strasse even said to me:
“Without Kreisky, we would not even dream of such a clear victory. The whole game was
more like a beauty pageant than a political program fight. We have [no reason] to cheat. Many
chose us not as a party; they just voted for Kreisky.”’22
Kreisky’s socialist views, however, were full of contradictions. Although he experienced
political persecution during the war, he defended the Austrian nationalists, such as in his
dispute with Szymon Wiesenthal over vice chancellor candidate Friedrich Peter in 1975. He
was a pacifist, but he at the same time understood the revolutionaries who organised the attacks
in South Tyrol, where the rights of the German-speaking population of the Italian province
were demanded to be upheld. A certain tradition was seen in his policy of loyalty to the
Austrian raison d’état. Kreisky did not completely cut his ties with the past, choosing from the
tradition of the Habsburg monarchy what strengthened the new national identity of the state.
He contributed to the liquidation of the Habsburg complex in the First Republic and met Otto
von Habsburg. ‘Kreisky knows well what he owes to the national tradition. He restored the
Austrians’ national identity. Today a young man in Vienna or Graz, when asked who he is, will
not answer “Austrian German” but simply “Austrian”’.23 The Polish journalists also did not
understand Kreisky’s attitude towards the Catholics. According to Kreisky, integral socialism
consists in a compromise with the Catholic Church, which was finally achieved through the
treaty regulations of 1962−1964. Kreisky believed that what connected social democracy with
the Catholic Church was their shared anti-communism and joint charity works.
The writings about Kreisky’s brand of socialism made use of the word winner many times
in the context of won elections, reforms, party leadership, leadership in the socialist European
movement or relations with the opposition. ‘The last election [was] the fourth [where] he
emerged as a winner.’ Such messages were supplemented with information on partnership
20
M. Podkowiński, Neutralność i współistnienie, ”Perspektywy” 1973, no. 25, p. 26.
21
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland [Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych - AMSZ,
Departament IV Austria], z. 1/84 w. 3, Podstawowe elementy działalności B. Kreisky’ego i roli Socjalistycznej
Partii Austrii w Międzynarodówce Socjalistycznej.
22
J. Tycner, Ery Kreisky’ego ciąg dalszy, „Prawo i Życie” 1979, no. 21, p. 13.
23
M. Podkowiński, Kreisky…, p. 124.

10
relations with Poland, stabilisation in economic relations and plans for the future.
Anti-communist
In the narratives on Kreisky’s political views, his anti-communism was often emphasised.
This topic was viewed in two ways. On the one hand, Kreisky, an Austrian politician, was
opposed to the Communist Party of the Central Committee of the KPÖ operating in Austria
and receiving a trace of support in the parliamentary elections in the post-war period. On
the other hand, Kreisky’s statements or behaviours referring to other communist countries
were noted. In older texts about Kreisky’s first visit in 1960 and from the 1960s, his anti-
communism was mentioned in the form of an objection, and much attention was paid to this.
Kreisky was an anti-communist to his bones.24 At a time when the SPÖ was in the opposition
(after 1966), Kreisky focused heavily on internal politics and the development of his own
party. Kreisky rejected the opening of the SPÖ to the left, as evidenced by the declaration
adopted by the party leadership in Eisenstadt (1969). It contained an absolute prohibition of
cooperation with the KPÖ. Kreisky’s criticism hit especially the publisher of the New Forum,
Günter Nenning, who published his newspaper upon the request of the student movement. At
the SPÖ party congress in the fall of 1968, Kreisky criticized Nenning. Kreisky’s criticism of
politically engaged journalists had various causes, but a meritorious cause is that he rejected
efforts to sharply turn integral socialism into a leftist movement.25
According to the Austrian communists, whose position was repeated by the Polish press,
Kreisky’s anti-communism stemmed from the events related to the Soviet occupation of Aus-
tria. The USSR demanded a license to extract crude oil from Austria and to participate in the
German-owned enterprises in the country during the war. Kreisky believed at the time that
such a decision was related to the collapse of the republic and would drive the state into a
semi-colonial status. At the same time, it was emphasised that the Austrians were not afraid
to hand over the rights to their enterprises to Anglo-Saxon corporations. The Polish press took
the position that anti-communism was contrary to the principle of perpetual neutrality.26
In the journalistic text from Nowe Czasy reprinted by Polish Press Agency (PAP), the au-
thor argues that Austrian Chancellor Kreisky’s anti-communism was contrary to the spirit of
the times. The politician’s anti-communist statements were repeatedly exposed in the Polish
press. Kreisky’s views were treated as uncomfortable dogma. It was recalled in the text that the
Social Democrats, who led the Socialist International in Zurich in 1965, refused to cooperate
24
H. Kalt, Autoportret komunisty, „Volkesstimme”, 24 IV 1975, PAP Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne, p. 40.
25
Muhri F., Austria: Nowa sytuacja- nowe zadania „Problemy Pokoju”, 1981, no. 4, p. 38−44.
26
H. Kalt, Autoportret komunisty, „Volkesstimme”, 24 IV 1975, PAP Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne, p. 40.

11
with the communists in Austria but considered cooperating with the communists in other coun-
tries, such as France and Chile,27 and it was mentioned that Kreisky’s anti-communism and
support for the postulates of the ÖVP ran counter to the rights of the workers.28 Chernousov’s
statement was a kind of encouragement for Kreisky to change his position, and the attempt to
ridicule his views was characterised as a lexicon of yesterday. The topic of anti-communism
was a sensitive matter for Western politicians, whose statements regarding such topic made
people uncomfortable and required some comment in the public sphere. Over time, the Pol-
ish press joked about the chancellor’s version of anti-communism, believing that it was not
harmful but was necessary to prepare for Austria’s internal needs.
Partner
In 1950, Kreisky was summoned to Vienna to assume the position of foreign policy advisor to
the president. In 1951−1959, he carried out a number of advisory functions, mainly concern-
ing the state’s foreign policy, work on the state treaty and trade agreements concluded after
the Second World War.29 This was the time when Kreisky was transformed from a political
advisor and lower-class official in the state bureaucratic apparatus into a leading opposition
politician entrusted with a key ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kreisky, minister
of foreign affairs at an early age and chancellor from 1970, was repeatedly mentioned in the
Polish press as a guarantor of good relations with Poland. The beginnings of these narratives,
however, were modest in biographical details and showed rather schematically the develop-
ment of the political career of an activist of the Socialist Party of Austria. The years when
he served as minister were associated with stricter censorship and sometimes fighting for the
recognition of Poland’s western border. The west-border topic was so important to the Polish
authorities that virtually the entire discourse on Polish foreign policy was focused on it. In this
initial period (until 1970), however, there were terms that remained to be used to characterise
Kreisky. First of all, he was described as a talented socialist with leadership ambitions not
only in Austria but also in the international arena. A politician open to cooperation with the
East, his arrival in Poland in 1960 was emphasised and mentioned. He was depicted as a very
wealthy and well-educated man (in the 1970s, people were not afraid to use the term intel-
lectual). The most frequently used strategy for presenting the chancellor’s profile was citing
27
Muhri F., Główna przesłanka przeobrażeń społecznych, „Problemy Pokoju” 1979, no. 5, p. 18−24.
28
M. Czernousow, Leksykon dnia wczorajszego, „Nowe Czasy” 6 IV 1974, PAP Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne, p.
33.
29
Kanclerz Austrii Bruno Kreisky przybędzie do Polski, „Głos Robotniczy” 22 VI 1973, no. 147, p. 1, M.
Podkowiński, Neutralność i współistnienie, ”Perspektywy” 1973, no. 25, p. 26.

12
metaphors and quotes taken from his statements. This was a clever trick used by journal-
ists to diversify their text and so as not to be exposed to censors. These fragments, however,
painted a picture of a witty, well-read man proudly talking about his homeland and coura-
geously defending its interests.30 Many times during this period, the figure of the chancellor
clashed with those of other Western social democratic politicians. Along with the emphasis
placed on Kreisky’s role in this movement, his ties with Poland were also mentioned.31 The
Polish correspondent Jan Urbaniak remarked that ‘Austrian intellectual circles show a great
knowledge of Polish history and understanding of [the] contemporary political problems of
our country’.32
In 1970, Kreisky, the undisputed leader of the socialists, was elected chancellor after
winning the parliamentary elections, and he held this position continuously until 1983. The
implementation of the neighbourhood policy assumed a faster pace due to the relaxation of
Austria’s international relations; hence, the number of state visits and international agree-
ments concluded at that time increased.33 During the preparations for Kreisky’s first visit to
Poland as chancellor in 1973, many comments appeared in the documents regarding Austria’s
relationship with the so-called SC (socialist countries; from the original KS, kraje socjal-
istyczne). ‘It should be emphasised all the more that the political realist Kreisky uses in the
field of foreign policy the tactic of supporting - rather demonstratively endorsing - develop-
ment trends, [such as] the relaxation trend, or the idea of convening the CSCE’.34 Before the
Bundestag’s ratification meeting, Kreisky’s interview appeared in the magazine Vorwärts, in
which he clearly stated that if the Eastern pacts were to fail, it would mean the inhibition of
the détente process for an indefinite period of time. ‘Eastern policy concerns us all,’ said
Kreisky.35
Although the Polish comments on Kreisky’s diplomacy towards Central Europe were pos-
30
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ D. IV Austria, z. 31/82, w. 4, Tezy do rozmów
Towarzysza Premiera P. Jaroszewicza z Kanclerzem Austrii, Bruno Kreisky’m/ podczas nieoficjalnej wizyty w
Polsce w dniach 16-20 września 1976 roku; Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ, D.IV
Austria, z.47/77, w.7, Pilna notatka z 10 maja 1973 roku.
31
M. Podkowiński, Stanowczy kanclerz, „Perspektywy” 1975, no. 6, p.8, M. Podkowiński, Obiad w Hofburgu
[przed wizytą prezydenta Austrii w Polsce], „Perspektywy” 1975, no 20, p. 9, B. Kreisky, Dwudziestolecie traktatu
państwowego, „Austria-Polska. Czasopismo Gospodarczo-Społeczne”, 1975, no. 94, p. 15.
32
J. Urbaniak, Austriacy oczekują szefa polskiego rządu, „Trybuna Ludu”, no. 260, 19.09 1965, p. 1.
33
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ D. IV Austria, z. 46/84, w. 2, Planowanie wizyty
Bruno Kreisky’ego w Polsce.
34
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ D. IV Austria, z. 46/84, w. 2, Planowanie wizyty
Bruno Kreisky’ego w Polsce.
35
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ, D.IV Austria, z.47/77, w.7, Notatka biograficzna
1973, p. 3.

13
itive, there were also accents of a different content: ‘Currently, Austria, observing the rapidly
advancing East−West dialogue, is trying to catch up on its own backlog, especially since …
the CSRS, Hungary and Yugoslavia … [prefer] it to play an important role in the process of
détente and intensification of East−West relations’.36 On the other hand, archival documents
indicate that the first detailed interpretations of the Austrian policy towards Eastern countries
occurred in the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. They highlighted the need for greater interest
in the proposed cooperation directed, as it was thought at the time, only to Yugoslavia and
Poland.
A change occurred in the description and presentation of Kreisky’s profile after 1973.37
It was influenced not only by the political changes in Poland, freedom of expression and the
participation of Polish correspondents in the events in Austria itself but also by the very pos-
itive attitude of the new chancellor towards Poland and the changes that transpired during the
détente period. Chancellor Kreisky recognised the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche
Demokratische Republik), organised a series of visits to ‘people’s democracies’ and persuaded
people to sign long-term economic agreements based on the exchange of raw materials and
technologies. Marian Podkowiński wrote, ‘This is an unquestionable blow to the unification
policy of Germany’.38 He led a bold international policy, presented himself as the leader of
small and non-aligned states during the CSCE summit and opted for the creation of strong
superstates involved in disarmament. In the assessment of the reforms implemented by the
first two Kreisky offices, praise dominated. Each subsequent election won by Kreisky (1975,
1979) was described in the context of great personal political success. The reforms that en-
sured his victory were discussed, and the compromises between the socialist government and
individual social groups were reported. Much attention was paid to the referendum on the
use of energy from nuclear power plants for example. In 1978, the Austrians decided to reject
such a solution and to call for early elections. The socialists prepared them under the slogan
‘The Austrian Road and the 1980s’. Kreisky made it clear that he did not intend to form a
coalition government and that if the socialists would not win the majority, he would resign as
chancellor.39
In the late 1970s, Kreisky was written about as a phenomenon. The allegations of anti-
communism were relegated to the background, but this did not mean that they were forgotten.
The pride of the Austrians in their strong chancellor, who had strengthened their country and
36
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ, D.IV Austria, z.47/77, w.7, Pilna notatka z 9
lipca 1973 roku.
37
R. Drecki, Austria: czynny udział w sprawach Europy, „Trybuna Ludu” 1973, no. 113, p. 7.
38
M. Podkowiński, Stanowczy kanclerz, „Perspektywy” 1975, no. 6, p. 8.
39
Tycner J., Ery Kreisky’ego ciąg dalszy, „Prawo i Życie” 1979, no. 21, p. 13.

14
had made Vienna a centre of international diplomacy, was emphasised.40 Although the Aus-
trian economy was largely related to West Germany’s, it was exposed to economic fluctuations
but experienced a boom. The unemployment rate was 2%, the lowest in Europe. Kreisky fore-
saw the approaching energy crisis in the early 1970s and prepared Austria accordingly. Polish
journalists, describing Vienna’s Middle East policy, pointed to the independence of Austria
and the need for stronger economic cooperation with it.41
In the narrative strategies in the second half of the 1970s until Kreisky’s resignation in
1983, attention was drawn to the fact that Vienna and Warsaw had a common enemy: West
Germany. The events in the political life of Austria that indicated a conflict of interest with
Bonn were emphasised many times.42 On the other hand, attempts were made to explain
to the public that Kreisky was an intermediary in Austria’s relations with Germany because
he had strong support from the local Social Democrats. In the 1980s, the chancellor was
written about in superlatives. Quotations from him were used to strengthen his image as an
extraordinary politician. Polish PAP materials or archives directly praised their country’s
Western partner for its ability to predict political problems and solve them through effective
reforms. The press releases about the Austrian political life abounded, mentioning not only
Kreisky’s successful political decisions but also the social mood in Austria and the sources of
the chancellor’s popularity. Socialist views were an asset at the time. Kreisky was described
as ‘his [socialism’s] man in Vienna’, and in a way, his socialist views were associated with his
successes.43 After the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981, however, the chancellor
withdrew from his dialogue with the Polish authorities. He refused to meet with them and
officially help them, and he instead became involved in social campaigns supporting the Polish
citizens in terms of material aid or family reunification. Until 1989, however, Poland assessed
Austria as an exceptional political and economic partner in its official statements, recalling its
great tradition of cooperation with Kreisky.
In one of the documents from 1973 prepared for the chancellor’s visit to Poland, a de-
scription appeared in the summary that can be boldly treated as the essence of the Polish
diplomatic assessments of the chancellor: ‘Kreisky is definitely a pro-Western politician who
flexibly and skillfully reacts to events in international politics. With [his] “programmatic”
anti-communism and selective approach to SC [socialist countries], [he] has ambitions to
40
B. Kreisky, Neutralność nie oznacza absencji w polityce międzynarodowej, Rozm. M. Podkowiński, „Per-
spektywy” 1972, no. 23, p. 6−7, Z. Ramotowski, Mat kanclerski. Austria po wyborach, „Życie Warszawy”, 1975,
no. 233, p. 5.
41
T. Brodzic, Mosty i polityka, „Prawo i Życie” 1976, no. 46, p. 13.
42
D. Luliński, Austria i polityka odprężenia. Korespondencja z Wiednia, „Trybuna Ludu” 1979, no. 117, p. 7.
43
T. Derlatka, W obronie superbogatych, „Trybuna Ludu” 1977, no. 59, p. 6; Staribacher J., Perspektywy
współpracy gospodarczej z Polską, „Przegląd Organizacji” 1976, no. 10, p. 410.

15
play the role of a European statesman, especially in the field of normalisation of interstate
European relations, focusing on maintaining Austria’s position as an active partner of Euro-
pean dialogue and finding conciliatory solutions. He has the ability to sense the mood of the
society, and depending on the needs, he can opportunistically disregard any restrictions as
well as party and ideological orders. Has a great sense of humour. He often fends off oppo-
nents’ attacks with an accurate, destructive joke. [He h]as the ability to tactically use [his]
opponents’ mistakes. He is always ready to discuss any topic in which he is active, militant
and has a fighting spirit.’44 Similar statements were published in the press.45
In dealing with the Eastern European satellite countries, Kreisky essentially followed one
rule: he wanted to rebuild relations. While terms such as neighbourhood policy and Eastern
policy were associated with the pan-Eastern European agenda, Kreisky treated each country
differently.46 For the Polish journalists, this approach was easier because what is most impor-
tant was the assessment of the Polish−Austrian bilateral relations. The authorities in Warsaw
expected this. Assessing the overall relationship of Austria with the Eastern states was as
difficult as it was risky. Kreisky’s diplomacy towards Poland was at first described very cau-
tiously in the latter, and later positively. After Kreisky won his first term in 1970, the extent to
which the socialist electoral program was dominated by promises and ‘beautiful words’ was
debated, or it was asked if such program really presented an ‘alternative to modern Austria’.47
The chancellor, however, appeared as a partner, an ally, an ambitious leader, a leader of so-
cialists and a politician open to the East and eager to cooperate with this region in economic
terms. In fact, since the mid-1970s, the positive development of Polish−Austrian bilateral
relations under Kreisky’s rule had been consistently repeated in Polish messages even during
the martial law period, and it was assumed that Poland could cooperate with a politician who
was consistently promoting Polish affairs in the international forum.48 As mentioned earlier,
however, after the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, the chancellor refused to di-
alogue with the Polish authorities, although he tried not to harm them with his moves and
statements.49
With regard to the conditions that shaped Kreisky’s image as a chancellor−politician over
44
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ, D.IV Austria, z.47/77, w.7, Notatka biograficzna
1973.
45
C. Rudziński, Austria w Europie, „Trybuna Ludu“ 1973, no. 172, p. 5.
46
T. Bodulan, Z sympatii i wzajemnych korzyści, „Czas” 1976, no. 48, p. 21; M. Podkowiński, W stronę
odprężenia, „Perspektywy” 1976, no. 49, p. 18.
47
K.K. Sylwetka tygodnia, „Tygodnik Kulturalny” 1970, no. 13, p. 2.
48
Derlatka T., Obrady polsko-austriackiej komisji gospodarczej, „Trybuna Ludu” 1976, no 228, p.2; Derlatka
T., Pod figowym listkiem niezależności, „Trybuna Ludu” 1977, no. 44, p. 7; Derlatka T., Polsko-austriacka
współpraca gospodarcza, „Życie Warszawy” 1976, no. 227, p. 4.
49
J. Moszczeński, Trudna kadencja. Po sukcesie SPÖ, „Życie Warszawy”, 1975, no. 280, p. 8.

16
several decades, several groups of messages on them can be distinguished, concerning the
author of the message, the substantive quality of the statements, the period in which they were
created, the impact of the existing Polish−Austrian bilateral relations or the influence of a cer-
tain tradition of evaluation on the final result. In the case of the authors of the texts, apart from
the aforementioned purposefulness, style should be added. Diplomatic materials, apart from
their schematic nature, limited to a minimum the possibility of drawing independent conclu-
sions about or a proper assessment of situations. The information provided was to serve mainly
the highest state officials as a substantive base when establishing guidelines for the operation
of individual departments. In memoirs, former Polish diplomats repeatedly complained about
the lack of freedom in interpreting the actions of Western countries. Meanwhile, journalists
managed to issue their own comments, presenting Kreisky in a wider European context in rela-
tion to the characteristics of the internal reforms he had instituted.50 Marian Podkowiński was
definitely the most active in this respect.51 The most interesting statements concerned those
materials that were based on Austrian sources. These were reprints of the Western press’s
interviews with Kreisky or quotes from his books.
Statesman
In emphasising Bruno Kreisky’s contributions to Austria, his contributions to the shaping
of neutrality were often presented. This was beneficial for the Polish authorities for many
reasons. Neutral states were treated as natural allies and were used to develop political and
trade cooperation with democratic countries.52 Kreisky’s support of Poland in the interna-
tional forum was particularly important, such as during the work on the Security Conference
or the recognition of Polish political interests. Moreover, the neutral Austrian state was open
to cooperation with the East. The difficult beginnings of a small country with high political
ambitions and a painful past related to the economic crisis taking place in the vicinity of pow-
erful totalitarian states forced the Austrians to seek their own unique development path.53 Its
neighbourhood policy, understood as the entirety of Austria’s relations with the countries in
its immediate vicinity, but mainly in the East, was to be a guarantee of economic indepen-
dence for Vienna. The Eastern region was not the most important area of interaction, but it
was definitely a region that should not be excluded from the very beginning of the Second
50
J. Wańkowicz, 30 lat Towarzystwa Austria-Polska. Piotr Jaroszewicz i Bruno Kreisky o rozwoju polsko-
austriackiej współpracy. Korespondencja z Wiednia, „Życie Warszawy”1976, no. 249, p. 4 and no. 250, p.
1.
51
J. Moszczeński, Kreisky po raz trzeci, „Życie Warszawy” 1975, no. 260, p. 5, Nieoficjalna wizyta kanclerza
Bruno Kreisky’ego, „Głos Robotniczy” 1 i 2 lutego 1975, no. 27, p. 1.
52
E. Brix, The State of Austrian Foreign and Security Policy in Times of Geopolitical Change, [w:] Austrian
Studies Today. Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 25, ed. G. Bischof, F. Karlhofer, New Orleans 2016, p. 244.
53
Reiter J., Drogi w niepewną przyszłość, „Życie Warszawy“ 1977, no. 65, p. 5.

17
Republic. To some extent, this was also the direction imposed by the agreements preceding
the signing of the state treaty. Cooperation with the neighbours and countries of the Danube
basin, regardless of the political separateness and legal and international situation, gave the
Austrians an opportunity to play the role of a political partner responsible for the entire region.
‘In this way, Kreisky instilled in his countrymen the belief that for the first time since the fall
of the Empire, Austria was again needed by Europe. The Austrians know well what they owe
to Kreisky’.54
Austria’s active foreign policy was an important element of the country’s identity, giv-
ing the citizens a sense of satisfaction and fulfilment. The Austrian researcher Anton Pelinka
wrote, ‘In the second half of the twentieth century, Austrian identity was based, on the one
hand, on a sense of pride in the extensive model of the welfare state, and on the other hand, on
attachment to the concept of a neutral state’.55 After the war, the public debates focused on
cooperation with other European countries. The matter of the direction of the changes in both
foreign policy and domestic reforms raised questions about identity in Austria. Westernisa-
tion, treated in terms of following in the footsteps of strangers, was opposed to the principle
of perpetual neutrality adopted after 1955. The most important research on the foreign pol-
icy of post-war Austria focused on the thesis that the principle of neutrality constituted the
young Austrian state and was based on positive cooperation with its neighbouring countries.
Weronika Parafianowicz-Vertun pointed out that the term East (Eastern countries) had a bad
connotation in the German-language public discourse.56 By calling all its relations with the
countries in the Eastern part of Europe part of its neighbourhood policy, Austria created new
conditions and values in these relations and transferred to the partnership ground. Austrian
politicians were aware of certain common political and cultural points of reference among
Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. They were
also aware of the changes related to the definition of the identity of the Central European re-
gion. These changes were part of the process of emancipation of the societies in this region.
The policy of cooperation with the Eastern countries initiated by the great coalition of the
CDU−CSU and the SPD and continued by the SPD after 1969 was compared to the similar
activities carried out by Vienna from the beginning of the 1960s by the Austrian historian
Oliver Rathkolb. Rathkolb stated that both the German and Austrian activities in coopera-
tion with the East were inspired by the American authorities and preceded the détente period
known in the literature.57
54
55
A. Pelinka, Legacies of the Schüssel Years, [w:] The Schüssel Era in Austria. Contemporary Austrian Studies,
vol. 18, ed. G. Bischof, F. Plasser, New Orleans 2010, p. 329.
56
W. Parafianowicz-Vertun, op. cit., s. 61.
57
O. Rathkolb, Austria’s ‘Ostpolitik’ in the 1950s and 1960s., “Austrian History Yearbook (AHY)”, Vol. XXVI

18
It can be concluded that in the initial period of shaping the image of Kreisky as a states-
man responsible for security in Europe and a guarantor of good relations with the East (in
the years 1956−1965), the topics were related to his legacy in relation to the Second World
War, security in Europe, the future of Germany and relations with the so-called SC.58 The
materials were much smaller than those in the next decade, and their character and language
were different from those in the later years. Analyses and comments from talks at the minis-
terial level dominated, and there were no reports from the embassy and no columns or press
releases. It can be seen, however, that both the Austrian affairs and the figure of Kreisky were
more important than the other Western countries. The political situation in Austria and the
country’s foreign policy towards other countries were closely followed. At that time, the per-
ception of Western countries as representatives of a unified economic and military bloc was
still dominant.
During the CSCE period, there were increasing extensive assessments of the policy of
‘active neutrality’ that Kreisky carried out in the post-war period. It was pointed out that com-
pliance with the constitutional provisions relating to the principle of neutrality distinguished
the Danube state from other states.59 The chancellor was dressed in a figure connecting areas
divided by the Iron Curtain. This is how Kreisky himself wanted to be seen. It was pointed
out that the strengthening of the Second Republic in the international arena and its constantly
growing economic position constituted enormous progress considering the political collapse
of Austria in the interwar period.60 In the assessment of the foreign policy, attention was
paid to Austria’s openness to involvement in addressing international problems and adopting
‘unconventional’ solutions. This approach was commented on as being consistent with the
country’s principle of neutrality on the one hand, and on the other, as showing the country’s
willingness to cooperate in the economy of countries outside the Common Market. It was
noted that Kreisky, as the main architect of Austria’s foreign policy, had the ambition of es-
tablishing a meeting and cooperation centre in Vienna. It was also emphasised that foreign
policy, including the implementation of the principle of active neutrality, was not discussed
during the election campaigns. The public accepted the course adopted after 1955 and ex-
pected that Austria, while remaining independent in the international forum, would benefit
from it.
Considering the quantity and quality of materials relating to the policy of neutrality, it
(1995), p. 129–149.
58
B. Kreisky, Kilka uwag o współistnieniu, Ref. uzupełnienie dyskusji O. Dłuski, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”
1960, no. 4, p. 46−71.
59
60
B. Kreisky, Neutralność nie oznacza absencji w polityce międzynarodowej, „Perspektywy” 1972, no. 23, p.
6−7.

19
can be concluded that such materials pay attention to its practical side: free choice of political
partners, economic development of the Second Republic, the ability to react independently in
crisis situations and strengthening Austria’s position in the international arena. The interpre-
tation of Vienna’s diplomacy at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s was based on the promotion
of those moves that in Warsaw’s opinion strengthened the idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’. In
the 1970s, Polish diplomats departed from the rhetoric of ‘cooperation based on the pursuit
of world peace’ in favour of the pragmatic side of neutrality.61 In Polish assessments of the
political figure of Chancellor Kreisky, attention was drawn to the tradition of economic co-
operation and multilateral agreements regarding the export of raw materials. Active German
policy was also emphasised. Poland liked the fact that the chancellor did not seek recognition
and good relations with West Germany.62 Such a policy was treated and assessed as inde-
pendent and active. It should be emphasised, however, that it was not the policy towards the
East but the later chancellor’s Middle East policy that presented Kreisky as a statesman and
an effective player in international politics to the European media.63 The official and public
assessments of the implementation by Kreisky of the principles of neutrality were dominated
by positive comments referring more to the figure of the chancellor than to the entirety of
Austrian activities. Meanwhile, the documents of the 4th Department of the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs do not lack critical analyses. ‘Austria’s intention to sell arms to Egypt
and Saudi Arabia does not contradict the legal principles of Austria’s neutrality and will not
increase the tensions in this region as it is about buyers not currently at war with Israel. Arms
sales to Libya will need to be investigated more closely, given their involvement in Chad and
Western Sahara’.64
In one of the incumbent Chancellor Kreisky’s last official statements on Polish issues
quoted by Polish sources, Kreisky emphasised that the political situation on the Vistula had
been temporarily under control. He claimed that it was necessary to develop comprehen-
sive cooperation with the unions. He also assessed the economic reforms as superficial and
therefore predicted that Poland’s economy would again collapse, which he said could have
catastrophic consequences for the whole of Europe. Meanwhile, in the documents discussing
the Polish−Austrian bilateral relations from the 1980s, the theme of the prosperity of the pre-
vious decade often appeared. Polish politicians wrote about the years of regression as about a
sudden breakdown of the great Polish−Austrian relations. Their ‘governmental character’ was
emphasised, which was said to have been built thanks to the frequent intervisits of the highest
61
H. Chądzyński, Bliscy partnerzy. Polska – Austria, „Życie Warszawy” 1979, no. 276, p. 5.
62
D. Luliński, Odnaleziona tożsamość. Korespondencja z Austrii, „Trybuna Ludu” 1979, no. 76, p. 6.
63
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland AMSZ, D. IV Austria, z. 43/84, w. 5, Notatka Ambasady
PRL w Wiedniu z 8 IX 1980r.
64
Ibidem.

20
state officials of both countries. Taking into account the total number of visits by the Austrian
state officials to each Central European country, Poland was the most visited country.65
In the Polish discourse, however, much more attention was paid to the Austro−German
relations or the border conflicts than to the neighbourhood policy. In the writings on the
Austrian policy towards the Eastern region, attention was drawn to the convergence with Ger-
man Chancellor Willy Brandt’s concepts, emphasizing the close intimacy among the socialist
politicians and their shared emigration experiences.66 An assessment of the Austrian diplo-
macy towards the East would reveal a resentment from the times of the Austro−Hungarian
monarchy or the common past.
Each time before the upcoming parliamentary elections in Austria, the country’s internal
problems (e.g. unemployment) were given greater importance than the widely-commented-on
foreign policy towards Poland. In parliament, the actions of the government had basically no
opponents; although the parliament was a sovereign body, the chancellor’s influence on it was
visible and enormous. Election posters pairing the images of Franz Josef and Bruno Kreisky
emerged, convincing voters of the similarities between the two and the political continuity
of the old empire and the young modern republic. ‘The sly fox Kreisky knows well what
he is doing when he has himself photographed on election posters after a portrait of Franz
Josef: this is how two legends [form a] symbiosis’.67 Kreisky did not give a voice to ideas
that could remove his state from the structures of the Western world. ‘Voters know what they
owe him. And they don’t want to lose him. The chancellor appears frequently on television.
More often than it should be. But the audience is eager to watch him and never complains
about his presence on the glass screen. Kreisky is unusual, always different, full of surprises
and simplicity that captivates people. Television viewers want him in their home, which is an
extraordinary appreciation for the politician of the present day’.68
Undoubtedly, Kreisky was described many times as a leader, a leader with no worthy op-
ponent among the opposition. ‘Outstanding personality, organizational talent, perseverance
and stubbornness in pursuing the goal once set, as well as this unique good-natured and fa-
therly way of being, made Papa Austrie, as he is often called here, enjoys [sic] great authority.
All these features go hand in hand with the sixth sense, which has kept this activist from the
political scene for almost thirty years’.69
65
A. Kosowski, Współpraca gospodarcza państw Dunaju, „Świat i Polska”, 1947, no. 18, p. 3.
66
J. Reiter, Herr Karl i wielka polityka, „Życie Warszawy“ 1976, no. 231, p. 5.
67
J. Laskowski, Gospodarka Austrii w ostatnich latach siódmej dekady, „Gospodarka Planowana” 1981, no. 3,
p. 161−163.
68
J.Staribacher, Austriacko-polskie stosunki gospodarcze, „Austria – Polska. Czasopismo gospodarczo-
kulturalne”, 1979, no. 107, p. 9.
69

21
Attention was also paid to the social effects of the reforms Kreisky was implementing.
Complex investments and the fight for new jobs were emphasized. Kreisky, along with the
minister of finance, Hannes Anderoch, focused on creating the maximum number of jobs in
exchange for a state debt of almost 230 billion shillings (US$16 billion). That is why state
spending, debt and mismanagement were arguments invoked by the Christian Democrats in
their election campaigns. Meanwhile, the lack of a coherent program that would counterbal-
ance the implemented reforms, and the exclusive focus on negating Kreisky’s policies, brought
the socialists in the elections.
In the 1980s, the private side of Kreisky as an Austrian statesman famous for his sense
of humour was shown more often than before. When he celebrated his seventieth birthday
in one of the Schönbrunn ballrooms in 1981, he said, ‘I do not belong to the imperial family
yet, although today it also brings no shame’.70 In the same year, the ‘Bruno 70’ exhibition
was held. Caricatures of the chancellor from his time in office over the years were collected
and displayed. He agreed to participate in its opening because, as he stated, ‘I only came here
to let people see that in fact I am much prettier than they draw me’.71 This is a fundamental
change in the way the figure of the chancellor is presented to a wider audience. Attention is
paid to personality traits and the elements of popularity that were highlighted by the Austrian
media.
In the 1980s, many articles summarising Kreisky’s rule appeared in the Polish press. The
published comments are dominated by favourable opinions, often even enthusiastic about the
actions of a socialist politician. The chancellor appears in them as a timeless statesman, a
charismatic leader, a visionary and a ‘tough player’ in international politics. One can also
see the evolution of the journalistic evaluations of Kreisky from being cautious and moderate
in 1981–1983 to definitely positive ones at the end of the decade. ‘Kreisky’s strength is not
only his personal courage and understanding [of] an opponent, but also [his] great sense of
raison d’état.’ Kreisky retired in 1983, and from 1985 he completely withdrew from politi-
cal life. It was therefore a better time to take stock, especially as the international situation
encouraged people to speak freely on Western issues, auguring the improvement of mutual
relations. In the review of the next volume of the chancellor’s memoirs, Zwischen den Zeiten,
Jerzy Nowakowski cited interesting fragments showing biographical threads unknown to Pol-
ish readers.72 Among them was an anecdote about a conversation between a young voter and
the chancellor. When Kreisky won by an enormous majority, he was accosted by a young
man who told him straight, ‘Mr. Chancellor, I did not vote for you.’ Kreisky smiled and
70
J. Reiter, Herr Karl i wielka polityka, „Życie Warszawy“ 1976, no. 231, p. 5.
71
Ibidem.
72
J. Nowakowski, „Kierunki” 1986, nro12, s. 9. (rec.) B. Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten, p. 9.

22
replied, ‘Ah, that was you!’73 His successive victories and popular support were treated in
the Polish discourse as great personal successes. Admittedly, there were attempts to identify
these with socialist ideas, the work to improve the situation of workers or the struggle for
peace in accordance with the principle of neutrality. Echoes of similar propaganda were sup-
pressed by the passage of time and the possibility of using or freely quoting source texts such
as from the chancellor’s diaries. Polish documents mention many times that the chancellor
was unrivalled. At that time, no Austrian politician had so much public support, recognition
in parliament, support abroad or the will to carry out his election promises.
In 1981, Marian Podkowiński wrote mainly about Kreisky’s election successes, presence
in the media, social trust and lack of competitors/successors. According to the journalist, the
Austrians had little interest in foreign policy but were grateful that the international opinion
valued the Austrian statesman, who made Vienna a city of international meetings. Unfortu-
nately, even at the end of the 1980s, certain patterns were adopted in the profile of the figure.
Attention was paid to the chancellor’s socialist views, his commitment to political agitation,
his cooperation with German Chancellor Willy Brandt and his knowledge of Marx’s works.
According to Polish journalists, Kreisky owed the Austrians the recognition of the new na-
tional identity built after the Second World War. The consent to Kronprinz’s return to the
country won him the support of the conservative party. Kreisky was seen as the new gov-
ernor, or as the anecdotes indicated, Bruno von Österreich. To emphasise his merits, facts
from the interwar history of Austria were recalled. ‘This Austria, which was treated as the
stepson of Europe in the interwar period, is now almost considered to be its navel’.74 The
participation of Kreisky in the making of the first decisions constituting the Second Republic
was emphasised, and he was called the ‘founding father’.75 A similar image of Kreisky was
consistently reinforced until the end of the 1980s. ‘The Austrians are proud that their chancel-
lor is a major politician in the international arena and that each of the distinguished statesmen
sees it appropriate either to visit Kreisky or consult him in his own troubles’.76
Jew
In response to journalists’ question ‘Are you a Jew?’ Kreisky replied, ‘I am [irreligious], I am
an agnostic, although I admit [that] my ancestors belonged to the Jewish community.’77 The
73
Ibidem.
74
M. Podkowiński, Kreisky…p. 124.
75
J. Tycner, Papa…, p. 13.
76
77
Reprint from the interview Bruno Kreisky for the Jsraeli television from November 1975. PAP Zeszyty
Dokumentacyjne, p. 24−26.

23
topic related to the politician’s Jewish roots appeared in Polish publications in the 1970s.78
Until then, both the origins of the chancellor’s ancestors and his attitude towards Judaism were
barely mentioned. Documents recalled these without comments or evaluations, but the press
did not write about them. Kreisky left the Jewish community in 1927 under the influence of the
June 15 political events in Vienna. The state police, on the orders of Chancellor Ignaz Seipl,
suppressed socialist demonstrations and virtually liquidated the leaders of the movement. Un-
der the influence of the party agitators, the Jews operating in the socialist ranks were to leave
their religious communities. Kreisky believed that he could not stay in the community and at
the same time persuade his colleagues to give up their religion. After the war, he claimed that
‘there is no Jewish nation’ and that the Jews are only a religious community. According to the
chancellor, not every Jew had to feel connected with Israel although he professed Judaism,
and that the belief that Israel must be the home of all Jews forces the Jews to make dangerous
choices. This leads to double loyalty, and this carries the danger of being excluded by the
communities outside Israel that give Jews citizenship, rights and a sense of security. Kreisky
was strongly against Israel’s imposition of obligations on the Jews living outside Israel. In his
opinion, it was an example of intolerance and a form of defence of the young state’s identity.
He consistently defended himself against accusations that he was serving Israel’s enemies
by denying the existence of the Jewish nation. He believed that by participating in the talks
about the need to recognise the state of Israel, the Arabs had done much more than could be
expected of them. Polish publications emphasised Kreisky’s participation in the peace plan
for the Middle East and the fight for the rights of the Palestinians.79
In the latter part of September and the early part of October 1973, an intervention took
place in the refugee camp in Schönau.80 Arab commandos closed the camp for Jews emi-
grating from the USSR to Israel. Even the intervention and the visit of Prime Minister Golda
Meir did not help. In a controversial interview with the Israeli daily Jediot Acharonet, Kreisky
stated that he felt Austrian, and Israel was a country of Jews who had no other homeland. He
added that ‘anyone who denies him the right not to consider himself a Jew anymore is intoler-
ant’.81 Political agitation from the Arab states did not prevent Kreisky from harshly criticising
the Munich bombers in 1972 or the other perpetrators of attacks on Jews in Israel at that time.
According to Polish journalists, support for Kreisky was for the Austrians the only form of
denazification they could undergo. Chancellor Kreisky was a ‘punishment’ to the older Aus-
78
Z. Ramotowski, Mat kanclerski. Austria po wyborach, „Życie Warszawy”, 1975, no. 233, p. 5.
79
80
Rudolf Kirchschläger, Bruno Kreisky, „Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne. Seria Biograficzna”, no. 2(35) PAP
Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne, p. 17.
81
Kanclerz Austrii Bruno Kreisky przybędzie do Polski, PAP Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne, s. 17, „Głos Robot-
niczy” 22 VI 1973, no. 147, p. 1.

24
trian generation for their previous political sins. In his memoirs, the chancellor emphasised
that he felt above all an Austrian and treated his emigration as a result of political, not racial,
persecution.82
Kreisky had a bitter conflict with Szymon Wiesenthal on the subject of Austria’s Middle
Eastern policy and the chancellor’s Jewish roots.83 In his memoirs, Wiesenthal referred to a
letter he had sent to Chancellor Josef Klaus in 1966. It was basically a 30-page report on the
participation of the Austrians in World War II. In response, President Franz Jonas wrote that
he had not slept for two days because of this letter. Since then, Wiesenthal noted the hostile
attitude of the Austrians towards him and what he was doing in their country.
Four days after the parliamentary elections in November 1975, the head of the Jewish
Documentation Center in Vienna, Szymon Wiesenthal, accused Kreisky of keeping the in-
formation about the Nazi past of the FPÖ leader Friedrich Peter a secret. As a soldier of the
1st SS brigade during World War II, Peter pacified Russian villages at the rear of the East-
ern front. Kreisky was to receive materials regarding the past candidate for vice chancellor
before the elections. After consultations with President Kirchschläger, he decided to keep
the materials secret for fear that they would influence the election result. A sharp polemic
followed. Kreisky, who perceived Wiesenthal’s allegations as a personal attack, proposed
that the dispute be settled in court, and was to relinquish his mandate.84 At the same time,
he threatened to present incriminating materials against Wiesenthal, and he summed up the
whole of Wiesenthal’s campaign against him as slander propagated at home and abroad that
harmed the good name of Austria. Wiesenthal withdrew the complaint and at the same time
stressed that it was impossible to hitherto conduct the investigative activity of searching for
war criminals in a country with such an attitude towards the past and a judiciary functioning
in such a way.85 In Polish research relating to intelligence activities, there are no references to
cooperation in this area with Austria. Years later, Szymon Wiesenthal described the episode
in his memoirs as Kreisky’s attempt to manipulate German materials belonging to the Gestapo
(Geheime Staatspolizei).
The apex of the dispute with Szymon Wiesenthal occurred in November−December 1975,
and by February 1976 the storm had quieted down. Kreisky seemingly won as Wiesenthal
withdrew his charges and then left Austria. Kreisky believed that influential Jewish groups
could not interfere in the internal situation of the Austrian state. (Wiesenthal confessed in
82
D. Aschheim, Bruno Kreisky and the Paradoxes of Jewishness, Socialism and the Middle East Conflict,
Jerusalem [manuscript] 2015, p. 4.
83
E. Röhrlich, A Century in a Lifetime: Biographical Approches to Bruno Kreisky (1911−1990), [w:] Austrian
Lives, ed. G. Bischof, F. Plasser, E. Maltschnig, Innsbruck 2012, p. 150.
84
Nim wymrą świadkowie. Rozmowa z Szymonem Wiesenthalem, „Polityka” 1999, no. 7, p. 69.
85
S. Wiesenthal, Niewygodny świadek historii, Warszawa 1993, p. 280−289.

25
part in his memoirs that the Jewish groups were indeed doing this.) This marked the start of
a serious debate about Austria’s Nazi past. It was continued during the Waldheim scandal in
1985. Kreisky won over the FPÖ electorate and strengthened his position in the state. He felt
that he had strengthened the unity in the society. On the other hand, Wiesenthal criticised
the Austrian judiciary, especially Christian Broda, in the international forum. In this dispute,
everyone lost because the lack of settlements in relation to Austria’s past sparked many fur-
ther social conflicts, and the subsequent research on the Holocaust, especially the uncritical
approach to and mythologisation of the memories of the witnesses, resulted in the research
on the Austrians’ opponents.86
The assessments of the participation of Kreisky in the process of denazification of the
Austrian state were not clear. On the one hand, attention was drawn to Kreisky’s shortcomings
and ‘saving’ of his fellow citizens in the process of settling past accounts; on the other hand,
attention was drawn to the progress in this area, which was greater than that in Germany
(Textbook Commission). The topic of settlements is another proof of Austria’s ‘better press’ in
Poland. It can be assumed that Kreisky’s Middle East policy was decided to project a positive
image of him or to depict him as an active and effective player in international politics.
Kreisky’s widely-commented-on series of visits to the Middle East countries in 1974−1976
and his consent to the opening of the Office of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Vi-
enna were received very positively in the East. Kreisky’s reaction to the outbreak of the Yom
Kippur War, however, made him enemies in both Israel and the United States. During the
visit to Vienna of Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, the Israelis demanded compensation
for the losses suffered by the Jews in Austria during World War II. Kreisky replied that Aus-
tria could not compensate for such losses and that the problem should have been referred to
Germany. As was stated in the biographical note from 1973, ‘Many people in Austria do not
like Kreisky, some for his Jewish [origin], [some] for his industrial origin, and others for his
kind of anti-Semitism. The director of the infamous Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna,
Wiesenthal, was to be called the Jewish Fascist.’87 PAP’s documentary journals provided
similar comments. In summing up the political career of Kreisky, Janusz Tycner wrote, ‘If
anyone made a great political career between Innsbruck and Vienna in the last half-century,
it was Bruno Kreisky, born in 1911. He had the worst reasons for this. For there are few
countries as devious−conservative and reluctant to Jews as Austria … because he was stub-
born, and as a politician he accepted Austria as it was formed by the four powers after the
86
W. Kulesza, Crimen laesae iustitiae. Odpowiedzialność karna sędziów i prokuratorów za zbrodnie sądowe
według prawa norymberskiego, niemieckiego, austriackiego i polskiego, Łódź 2013, p. 237−238.
87
Rudolf Kirchschläger, Bruno Kreisky, „Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne. Seria Biograficzna”, nr 2(35) PAP Zeszyty
Dokumentacyjne, p. 17.

26
war - small and neutral. He saw it as an opportunity, not a handicap’.88 History shows how
the perception of specific events related to Kreisky’s diplomacy has changed over time due to
conflicting narratives and assessments of specific experiences.
Conclusions
Among the most frequently presented pictures of Bruno Kreisky in the Polish public sphere,
five of the most important ones are that of a socialist, an anti-communist, a partner, a states-
man and a Jew. Although these images perpetuated the realities of the Western world, their
main task was to strengthen the successes and achievements of Poland compared to the other
countries in the region. The presented contents, the selected quotes and the described con-
texts of the cited events were to serve the basic political goal of legitimation of power. The
initially cautious descriptions of political experiences and activities in the sphere of foreign
policy have been transformed over the years into the most exposed asset: socialist views, in
line with the program implemented by the Polish authorities. Kreisky’s anti-communist state-
ments were emphasised mainly in the initial period, while the development of Polish−Austrian
bilateral relations in the 1970s brought a lasting image of a politician as a partner and states-
man. Kreisky’s Jewish roots were, for many reasons, a marginal concern about him.
Some Polish newspapers had permanent correspondents in Vienna and could therefore
come up with reports based on accounts of the work being done on site in Austria. The
materials prepared by foreign correspondents and the domestic reports from PAP had an even
wider and more important context, strengthening the message of the establishment. They
were comments on contents that could not really be commented on in the aforementioned
way.89 By observing the development of the narrative on Kreisky’s foreign policy in the
Polish discourse, we can distinguish several popular, exposed political contexts that enjoy
greater interest. Among them were Middle Eastern issues and Austria’s tense relations with
Israel and Central and Eastern Europe and economic cooperation with the West, including the
fight during the period of the energy crisis. However, efforts were made to hide or blur what
was related to the so-called double exclusion. Kreisky drew attention to the fact that Austria
was close to poorer countries, with which cooperation was difficult, and to richer countries as
well, with whom cooperation was risky.
In the first place, materials with more substantive contents were selected, adopting a cer-
tain scheme of restrictions concerning, inter alia, comments or the number of people to whom
the materials were distributed. The contents distributed by employees of the Ministry of For-
88
89

27
eign Affairs did not get to the press. Correspondents and journalists could only count on the
results of their own research if they managed to go to Austria, or could base their accounts on
PAP reports. In the case of the formation of these two types of messages, the purposefulness
of their preparation and promotion was different. Diplomats collected factual materials for the
development of Polish−Austrian bilateral relations, and journalists distributed information to
a wider audience to keep them abreast with what was going on or to develop their own career.
With regard to the conditions in which the images of Western politicians were created,
several groups of messages on them can be distinguished, concerning the author of the text,
the substantive quality of the statements, the period in which they were created, the impact of
the Polish−Austrian bilateral relations to date or the influence of a certain tradition of evalu-
ation on the final result. In the case of the authors of the texts, apart from the aforementioned
purposefulness, style should also be considered. The information provided was to be used
mainly by high-ranking state officials as a substantive base when establishing guidelines for
the operation of individual departments. In their memoirs, Polish diplomats repeatedly com-
plained about the lack of freedom in interpreting the actions of Western countries. Meanwhile,
journalists managed to add their own comments, presenting Kreisky in a broader European
context while describing Austria’s internal reforms. Marian Podkowiński was definitely the
most active in this respect. In connection with the above, the quality of the comments written
in Poland was as poor in the diplomatic circles as in the journalistic circles. The most inter-
esting statements concerned those reports that were based on Austrian sources or that were
reprints from the Western press. These were interviews with a politician, analyses prepared
before the election day or quotes from memories.
The political situation in Poland was decisive for the emerging message: on the one hand,
strict censorship until the 1970s, and on the other, the positions held by Kreisky. As a min-
ister, there was much less interest in him, and he was thus written about less often. On the
other hand, however, the freedom of expression that emerged after 1989 did not result in a
multiplication of reports on his already historic activity. Not without significance for the evo-
lution of Kreisky’s image was his favourable attitude towards Poland. He openly supported
the Poles and was positive about the reform attempts; although he did not spare his criticism
of the authorities especially after 1981, he was constantly regarded as a reliable partner, to the
extent that his statements on Polish issues were treated as a ‘model’ and were posted in other
establishments.90
The factor that significantly limited both groups of authors of texts (i.e. diplomats/officials
and journalists) was language. It was politically correct and poor in adjectives, analogies
and author’s comments. This is best seen when comparing texts by Austrian politicians that
90
F. Zanetti, Należymy do tej samej Europy, „Życie Warszawy” 1981, no. 78, p. 5.

28
capture the same events. There are not only linguistic differences but above all reflections
of different ways of thinking about, receiving and analysing the observed situation. This is
well illustrated by the quote from the article by Kreisky placed in Prawo i Życie. The text
was written in 1988 and was published in 1991. ‘In the field of agriculture, Poland had all
the conditions to transform into a prosperous country of agricultural overproduction, just like
Hungary and Bulgaria. But the disorganization which was gradually released soon ossified
reforms. This, in turn, also ended [the] cooperation with Austria, [of] which I had probably
too high hopes. Many of the common economic plans that we have talked about - I mean coal
supplies - could not come to fruition because the Polish bureaucracy hampered the state. This
phenomenon is not easy to explain because we are dealing here with a tangle of organizational
inefficiencies, bureaucratization and a far-reaching dislike of the communist regime among the
population’.91 Such remarks and comments did not even appear in documents addressed to
a narrow group of recipients. Polish decision makers chose from among Austrian sources
what was useful from their viewpoint, and incorporated what they had chosen into the Polish
discourse.
Kreisky’s diplomacy texts were influential to varying degrees. Over the decades, the anal-
ysed materials had shaped Poland’s perceptions of Kreisky and Austria as a country with
which Poland maintained bilateral relations. Their rank was given mainly by the publicity that
they achieved that had political significance. The intention of the dissemination of knowledge
about Kreisky was of key importance to this study. Certain images of Kreisky were promoted
to strengthen the public-sphere topics that were important from the viewpoint of the Polish
authorities. It can be assumed that the writings about Kreisky brought the realities of life
in a neutral state and the activity of the socialists therein closer to the public, stigmatised
anti-communist attitudes among Western European politicians and emphasised the success
of gaining a strong, democratic Western partner looking for trade contacts in the East. The
boundaries of the principles of political and economic cooperation between states with differ-
ent systems were also defined, the activities for disarmament were referred to and the threads
related to the common tradition and culture dating back to the beginnings of modern history
were emphasised. Polish decision makers have repeatedly used the images and statements of
Kreisky to legitimise unpopular decisions, such as the reforms preceding the imposition of
martial law in the country.
91
B. Kreisky, Z Polską wiązałem zbyt duże nadzieje, „Prawo i Życie” 1991, no. 32, p. 13.

29

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ACADEMIA Letters

The Image of a Western Politician in the Polish Post-War

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Polish images of Bruno Kreisky

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

Corresponding Author: Agnieszka Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, agnieszka.kisztelinska@uni.lodz.pl

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