Facts:

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing
the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. During the effectivity of this law, the
President entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws but wholly-owned by an Australian Corporation, covering
99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

A wide range of sectors, including farmers and indigenous people's cooperatives and residents of areas
affected by the mining activities, which shall be referred herein as petitioners, contended that E.O. No.
279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino had already
lost her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.

E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the
opening of Congress on July 27, 1987. Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same "shall take effect
immediately." This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, which
provides:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.

Petitioners posit that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days after its publication at which
time Congress had already convened and the President's power to legislate had ceased. And thus
consequently, the FTAA entered into by the parties should have no legal effect.

Issue:

Whether or not E.O. No. 279 is an effective and a validly enacted statute.

Held:

Yes. E.O. No. 279 is an effective and a validly enacted statute.

It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date
other than — even before — the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own
date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very
essence of the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided" in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200,
therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity.

What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v.
Tuvera, is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat ." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its
invalidation since the Constitution, being “the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,"
is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañada held, mandates the
publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279.

It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
Thus, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the Official
Gazette on August 3, 1987. The fact that such effectivity took place after the convening of the first
Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still
validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states:

Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.

The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President
Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.