CITY OF ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL., Petitioners, – versus - QUON ET AL.

,
Respondents. No. 08-1332, June 17, 2010, KENNEDY, J.
Under the approach of the O’Connor plurality, when conducted for a “noninvestigatory, work-
related purpos[e]” or for the “investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct,” a government
employer’s warrantless search is reasonable if it is “‘justified at its inception’” and if “‘the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of’” the circumstances giving rise to the search. The search was justified at its
inception because there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search was
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.” Since the searc was ordered to
determine whether the character limit on the City’s contract with the pager provider was
sufficient to meet the City’s needs. This was a “legitimate work-related rationale.” As for the
scope of the search, reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an efficient and
expedient way to determine whether Quon’s overages were the result of work-related
messaging or personal use. The review was also not “‘excessively intrusive.’”

FACTS:
Jeff Quon was employed by the Ontario Police Department (OPD) as a police officer. In October
2001, the City acquired 20 alphanumeric pagers capable of sending and receiving text
messages. The City issued pagers to its police officers including Quion.
Before acquiring the pagers, the City announced a “Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail
Policy” (Computer Policy) that applied to all employees. Among other provisions, it specified that
the City “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet
use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when
using these resources.”
Within the first or second billing cycle after the pagers were distributed, Quon exceeded his
monthly text message character allotment. His superior told him about the overage and
reminded him that messages sent on the pagers were “considered e-mail and could be audited.”
After multiple incidents of overage, the superior decided to determine whether the existing
character limit was too low—that is, whether officers such as Quon were having to pay fees for
sending work-related messages—or if the overages were for personal messages.
Upon review of the transcripts, it was discovered that many of the messages sent and received
on Quon’s pager were not work related, and some were sexually explicit. The report concluded
that Quon had violated OPD rules. Quon was allegedly disciplined.
ISSUE:
Whether the right of Quon to privacy of communications is violated. (NO)
RULING:
In O’Connor, the Court agreed with the general principle that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.”
A majority of the Court further agreed that “‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement,’” make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable for government
employers.
Even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, petitioners did not
necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining and reviewing the transcripts. Although
as a general matter, warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,” there are “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to that
general rule. The Court has held that the “‘special needs’” of the workplace justify one such
exception.
Under the approach of the O’Connor plurality, when conducted for a “noninvestigatory, work-
related purpos[e]” or for the “investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct,” a government
employer’s warrantless search is reasonable if it is “‘justified at its inception’” and if “‘the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of’” the circumstances giving rise to the search.
The search was justified at its inception because there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search was necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.” Since the searc
was ordered to determine whether the character limit on the City’s contract with the pager
provider was sufficient to meet the City’s needs. This was a “legitimate work-related rationale.”
As for the scope of the search, reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an
efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon’s overages were the result of work-
related messaging or personal use. The review was also not “‘excessively intrusive.’”
Quon was told that his messages were subject to auditing. As a law enforcement officer, he
would or should have known that his actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that
this might entail an analysis of his on-the-job communications. Under the circumstances, a
reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles might require the
audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used. Given that the
City issued the pagers to Quon and other SWAT Team members in order to help them more
quickly respond to crises—and given that Quon had received no assurances of privacy—Quon
could have anticipated that it might be necessary for the City to audit pager messages to assess
the SWAT Team’s performance in particular emergency situations.
CECILIA ZULUETA, Petitioner, – versus - COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 107383, SECOND DIVISION, February 20, 1996, MENDOZA, J.
The only exception to the constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in the case filed by his
wife. (NO)
RULING:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands’
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither one may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, Petitioner, – versus - THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167798, EN BANC, APRIL 19, 2006, CARPIO, J.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO
420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in
contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 that directs a unified ID
system among government agencies and Government owned and controlled corporations in
order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other
respondents assailed this executive order that it infringes the citizens’ right to privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. (NO)
RULING:
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been
issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no
complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to
privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the
collection and recording of personal identification data.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent
of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can
collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition,
government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing
safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect
the right to privacy. Now, under EO 420, safeguards are instituted.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data
that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government
entities.
EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in
contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. Petitioners
have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot showsuch
violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data
collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, –
versus -
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666, THIRD DIVISION, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J.
It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy
FACTS:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to
their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photos to KristineRose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action.
STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching”
in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares,
mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data against the school. They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the
court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally
obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to privacy of the childred was violated. (NO)
RULING:
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S.Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands
of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. With
the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason
that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Since gaining popularity, the online social network(OSN) phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook). To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility
of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking (OSN)
activity,it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed
the images to Escudero